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# HISTORY

OF THE

## UNITED NETHERLANDS:

FROM THE DEATH OF WILLIAM THE SILENT TO  
THE SYNOD OF DORT.

BY

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'THE RISE OF THE DUTCH REPUBLIC.'

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1872.





## PREFACE.

THE indulgence with which the History of the Rise of the Dutch Republic has received has encouraged me to prosecute my task with renewed industry.

A single word seems necessary to explain the somewhat increased proportions which the present work has assumed over the original design. The intimate connection which was formed between the Kingdom of England and the Republic of Holland, immediately after the death of William the Silent, rendered the history and the fate of the two commonwealths for a season almost identical. The years of anxiety and suspense during which the great Spanish project for subjugating England and reconquering the Netherlands, by the same invasion, was slowly matured, were of the deepest import for the future destiny of those two countries and for the cause of national liberty. The deep-laid conspiracy of Spain and Rome against human rights deserves to be patiently examined, for it is one of the great lessons of history. The crisis was long and doubtful, and the health—perhaps the existence—of England and Holland, and, with them, of a great part of Christendom, was on the issue.

History has few so fruitful examples of the dangers which come from superstition and despotism, and the blessings which flow from the maintenance of religious and political freedom, as those afforded by the struggle between England and Holland on the one side, and Spain and Rome on the other, during the epoch which I have attempted to describe. It is for this reason that I have thought it necessary to reveal, as minutely as possible, the secret details of this conspiracy of king and priest against the people, and to show how it was baffled at last by the strong self-helping energy of two free nations combined.

The period occupied by these two volumes I is therefore a short one, when counted by years, for it begins in 1584 and ends with the commencement of 1590. When estimated by the significance of events and their results for future ages, it will perhaps be deemed worthy of the close examination which it has received. With the year 1588 the crisis was past; England was safe, and the new Dutch commonwealth was thoroughly organized. It is my design, in two additional volumes, which, with the two now published, will complete the present work, to carry the history of the Republic down to the Synod of Dort. After this epoch the Thirty Years' War broke out in Germany; and it is my wish, at a future day, to retrace the history of that eventful struggle, and to combine with it the civil and military events in Holland, down to the epoch when the Thirty Years' War and the Eighty Years' War of the Netherlands were both brought to a close by the Peace of Westphalia.

The materials for the volumes I now offered to the public were so abundant that it was almost impossible to condense them into smaller compass without doing injustice to the subject. It was desirable to throw full light on these prominent points of the history, while the law of historical perspective will allow long stretches of shadow in the succeeding portions, in which less important objects may be more slightly indicated. That I may not be thought capable of abusing the reader's confidence by inventing conversations, speeches, or letters, I would take this opportunity of stating—although I have repeated the remark in the foot-notes—that no personage in these pages is made to write or speak any words save those which, on the best historical evidence, he is known to have written or spoken.

A brief allusion to my sources of information will not seem superfluous. I have carefully studied all the leading contemporary chronicles and pamphlets of Holland, Flanders, Spain, France, Germany, and England; but, as the authorities are always indicated in the notes, it is unnecessary to give a list of them here. But by far my most valuable materials are entirely unpublished ones.

The archives of England are especially rich for the history of the sixteenth century; and it will be seen, in the course of the narrative, how largely I have drawn from those mines of historical wealth, the State Paper Office and the MS. department of the British Museum. Although both these great national depositories are in admirable order, it is to be regretted that they are not all embraced in one collection, as much trouble might then be spared to the historical student, who is now obliged to pass frequently from the one place to the other, in order to find different portions of the same correspondence.

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1 The volumes alluded to refer to the first English Edition.

2 Ibid.

From the royal archives of Holland I have obtained many most important, entirely unpublished documents, by the aid of which I have endeavoured to verify, to illustrate, or sometimes to correct, the recitals of the elder national chroniclers; and I have derived the greatest profit from the invaluable series of Archives and Correspondence of the Orange-Nassau Family, given to the world by M. Groen van Prinsterer. I desire to renew to that distinguished gentleman, and to that eminent scholar M. Bakhuyzen van den Brink, the expression of my gratitude for their constant kindness and advice during my residence at the Hague. Nothing can exceed the courtesy which has been extended to me in Holland, and I am deeply grateful for the indulgence with which my efforts to illustrate the history of the country have been received where that history is best known.

I have also been much aided by the study of a portion of the Archives of Simancas, the originals of which are in the Archives de l'Empire in Paris, and which were most liberally laid before me through the kindness of M. le Comte de La Borde.

I have, further, enjoyed an inestimable advantage in the perusal of the whole correspondence between Philip II., his ministers, and governors, relating to the affairs of the Netherlands, from the epoch at which this work commences down to that monarch's death. Copies of this correspondence have been carefully made from the originals at Simancas by order of the Belgian Government, under the superintendence of the eminent archivist M. Gachard, who has already published a synopsis or abridgment of a portion of it in a French translation. The translation and abridgment of so large a mass of papers, however, must necessarily occupy many years, and it may be long, therefore, before the whole of the correspondence—and particularly that portion of it relating to the epoch occupied by these volumes—sees the light. It was, therefore, of the greatest importance for me to see the documents themselves unabridged and untranslated. This privilege has been accorded me, and I desire to express my thanks to his Excellency M. van de Weyer, the distinguished representative of Belgium at the English Court, to whose friendly offices I am mainly indebted for the satisfaction of my wishes in this respect. A letter from him to his Excellency M. Rogier, Minister of the Interior in Belgium—who likewise took the most courteous interest in promoting my views—obtained for me the permission thoroughly to study this correspondence; and I passed several months in Brussels, occupied with reading the whole of it from the year 1584 to the end of the reign of Philip II.

I was thus saved a long visit to the Archives of Simancas, for it would be impossible conscientiously to write the history of the epoch without a thorough examination of the correspondence of the King and his ministers. I venture to



hope, therefore—whatever judgment may be passed upon my own labours—that this work may be thought to possess an intrinsic value; for the various materials of which it is composed are original, and—so far as I am aware—have not been made use of by any historical writer.

I would take this opportunity to repeat my thanks to M. Gachard, Archivist of the kingdom of Belgium, for the uniform courtesy and kindness which I have received at his hands, and to bear my testimony to the skill and critical accuracy with which he has illustrated so many passages of Belgian and Spanish history.

31, *Hertford-Street, May-Fair,*

*November 11th, 1860.*

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# THE UNITED NETHERLANDS.

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WILLIAM THE SILENT, Prince of Orange, had been murdered on the 10th July, 1584. It is difficult to imagine a more universal disaster than the one thus brought about by the hand of a single obscure fanatic. For nearly twenty years the character of the Prince had been expanding steadily as the difficulties of his situation increased. Habit, necessity, and the natural gifts of the man, had combined to invest him at last with an authority which seemed more than human. There was such general confidence in his sagacity, courage, and purity, that the nation had come to think with his brain and to act with his hand. It was natural that, for an instant, there should be a feeling as of absolute and helpless paralysis.

Whatever his technical attributes in the polity of the Netherlands — and it would be difficult to define them with perfect accuracy — there is no doubt that he stood there, the head of a commonwealth, in an attitude such as had been maintained by but few of the kings, or chiefs, or high priests of history. Assassination, a regular and almost indispensable portion of the working machinery of Philip's government, had produced, in this instance, after repeated disappointments, the result at last which had been so anxiously desired. The ban of the Pope and the offer-

ed gold of the King had accomplished a victory greater than any yet achieved by the armies of Spain, brilliant as had been their triumphs on the blood-stained soil of the Netherlands.

Had that „exceeding proud, neat, and spruce”<sup>1</sup> Doctor of Laws, William Parry, who had been busying himself at about the same time with his memorable project against the Queen of England, proved as successful as Balthazar Gerard, the fate of Christendom would have been still darker. Fortunately, that member of parliament had made the discovery in time—not for himself, but for Elizabeth—that the „Lord was better pleased with adverbs than nouns;”<sup>2</sup> the well-known result being that the traitor was hanged and the sovereign saved.

Yet such was the condition of Europe at that day. A small, dull, elderly, imperfectly-educated, patient, plodding invalid, with white hair and protruding underjaw, and dreary visage, was sitting day after day, seldom speaking, never smiling, seven or eight hours out of every twenty-four, at a writing-table covered with heaps of interminable despatches, in a cabinet far away beyond the seas and mountains, in the very heart of Spain. A clerk or two, noiselessly opening and shutting the door, from time to time, fetching fresh bundles of letters and taking away others—all written and composed by secretaries or high functionaries—and all to be scrawled over in the margin by the

<sup>1</sup> Camden's 'Elizabeth,' ed. 1688, p. 305.

<sup>2</sup> Camden, p. 307.



diligent old man, in a big schoolboy's hand and style—if ever schoolboy, even in the sixteenth century, could write so illegibly or express himself so awkwardly; 1 couriers in the court-yard arriving from or departing for the uttermost parts of earth—Asia, Africa, America, Europe—to fetch and carry these interminable epistles, which contained the irresponsible commands of this one individual, and were freighted with the doom and destiny of countless millions of the world's inhabitants—such was the system of government against which the Netherlands had protested and revolted. It was a system under which their fields had been made desolate, their cities burned and pillaged, their men hanged, burned, drowned, or hacked to pieces, their women subjected to every outrage; and to put an end to which they had been devoting their treasure and their blood for nearly the length of one generation. It was a system, too, which, among other results, had just brought about the death of the foremost statesman of Europe, and had nearly effected simultaneously the murder of the most eminent sovereign in the world. The industrious Philip, safe and tranquil in the depths of the Escorial, saying his prayers three times a day with exemplary regularity, had just sent three bullets through the body of William the Silent at his dining-room door in Delft. „Had it only been done two years earlier,” observed the patient old man, „much trouble might have been spared me; but 'tis better late than never.” Sir Edward Stafford, English envoy in Paris, wrote to his government—so soon as the news of the murder reached him—that, according to his information out of the Spanish minister's own house, „the same practice that had been executed upon the Prince of Orange, there were practisers more than two or three about to execute upon her Majesty,

and that within two months.” Without vouching for the absolute accuracy of this intelligence, he implored the Queen to be more upon her guard than ever. „For there is no doubt,” said the envoy, „that she is a chief mark to shoot at; and seeing that there were men cunning enough to enchant a man and to encourage him to kill the Prince of Orange in the midst of Holland, and that there was a knave found desperate enough to do it, we must think hereafter that anything may be done. Therefore God preserve her Majesty.” 1

Invisible as the Grand Lama of Thibet, clothed with power as extensive and absolute as had ever been wielded by the most imperial Cæsar, Philip the Prudent, as he grew older and feebler in mind and body, seemed to become more gluttonous of work, 2 more ambitious to extend his sceptre over lands which he had never seen or dreamed of seeing, more fixed in his determination to annihilate that monster Protes-

1 Murdin's *State Papers*, 412-415.

William Herle, too, wrote from Holland, immediately after the murder, warning the Queen to be more than ever on her guard. The seminary at Dieppe, placed „upon the brim of England,” was constantly sending Scotch and English assassins into their own country. „'Tis known to me,” he said, „that there are entered above seven score lurking Jesuits into the realm of late, and they do secretly repair more and more to sow infection and rebellion among your subjects, and to conspire against your royal person, whom God alway, for his mercy's sake, preserve.” (Herle to the Queen, 22nd July, 1584, *State-Paper Office MS.*) Moreover, another secret agent at Walsingham, Stephen Le Sieur, wrote shortly afterwards from Antwerp, that the Prince of Orange had been warned by persons resident in Cologne of the attempt about to be made upon his life, but had unfortunately not heeded the admonition. The same persons who had furnished that information now wrote to apprise Le Sieur that there was a similar plot on foot against the Queen. (Le Sieur to Walsingham, 7th September, 1584, *State-Paper Office MS.*)

2 Longlée au Roi de France, apud Groen van Prinsterer, *Archives et Correspondance de la Maison d'Orange-Nassau*, deuxième série, tom. i. p. 29.

1 See vol. ii. of this work for instances.

tantism, which it had been the business of his life to combat, more eager to put to death every human creature, whether anointed monarch or humble artisan, that defended heresy or opposed his progress to universal empire.

If this enormous power, this fabulous labour, had been wielded or performed with a beneficent intention; if the man who seriously regarded himself as the owner of a third of the globe, with the inhabitants thereof, had attempted to deal with these extensive estates inherited from his ancestors with the honest intention of a thrifty landlord, an intelligent slave-owner, it would have yet been possible for a little longer to smile at the delusion, and endure the practise.

But there was another old man, who lived in another palace in another remote land, who in his capacity of representative of Saint Peter, claimed to dispose of all the kingdoms of the earth—and had been willing to bestow them upon the man who would go down and worship him. Philip stood enfeoffed, by divine decree, of all America, the East Indies, the whole Spanish Peninsula, the better portion of Italy, the seventeen Netherlands, and many other possessions far and near; and he contemplated annexing to this extensive property the kingdoms of France, of England, and Ireland. The Holy League, maintained by the sword of Guise, the Pope's ban, Spanish ducats, Italian condottieri, and German mercenaries, was to exterminate heresy and establish the Spanish dominion in France. The same machinery, aided by the pistol or poniard of the assassin, was to substitute for English protestantism and England's queen the Roman Catholic religion and a foreign sovereign. „The holy league,” said Duplessis-Mornay, one of the noblest characters of the age, „has destined us all to the same sacrifice. The ambition of the Spaniard, which has overleaped

so many lands and seas, thinks nothing inaccessible.” 1

The Netherland revolt had therefore assumed worldwide proportions. Had it been merely the rebellion of provinces against a sovereign, the importance of the struggle would have been more local and temporary. But the period was one in which the geographical landmarks of countries were almost removed. The dividing line ran through every state, city, and almost every family. There was a country which believed in the absolute power of the church to dictate the relations between man and his Maker, and to utterly exterminate all who disputed that position. There was another country which protested against that doctrine, and claimed, theoretically or practically, aliberty of conscience. The territory of these countries was mapped out by no visible lines, but the inhabitants of each, whether resident in France, Germany, England, or Flanders, recognised a relationship which took its root in deeper differences than those of race or language. It was not entirely a question of doctrine or dogma. A large portion of the world had become tired of the antiquated delusion of a papal supremacy over every land, and had recorded its determination, once for all, to have done with it. The transition to freedom of conscience became a necessary step, sooner or later to be taken. To establish the principle of toleration for all religions was an inevitable consequence of the Dutch revolt; although, thus far, perhaps only one conspicuous man in advance of his age had boldly announced that doctrine, and had died in its defence. But a great true thought never dies—though long buried in the earth—and the day was to come, after long years, when the seed was to ripen into a harvest of civil and religious emancipation, and when the very word toleration was to sound like an insult and an absurdity.

1. *Mémoires et Correspondance de Duplessis-Mornay*, Paris, 1824, i. p. 27.

A vast responsibility rested upon the head of a monarch, placed as Philip II. found himself, at this great dividing point in modern history. To judge him, or any man in such a position, simply from his own point of view, is weak and illogical. History judges the man according to his point of view. It condemns or applauds the point of view itself. The point of view of a malefactor is not to excuse robbery and murder. Nor is the spirit of the age to be pleaded in defence of the evil-doer at a time when mortals were divided into almost equal troops. The age of Philip II. was also the age of William of Orange and his four brethren, of Sainte Aldegonde, of Olden-Barneveld, of Duplessis-Mornay, La Noue, Coligny, of Luther, Melancthon, and Calvin, Walsingham, Sidney, Raleigh, Queen Elizabeth, of Michael Montaigne, and William Shakspeare. It was not an age of blindness, but of glorious light. If the man whom the Maker of the Universe had permitted to be born to such boundless functions, chose to put out his own eyes that he might grope along his great pathway of duty in perpetual darkness, by his deeds he must be judged. The King perhaps firmly believed that the heretics of the Netherlands, of France, or of England, could escape eternal perdition only by being extirpated from the earth by fire and sword, and therefore, perhaps, felt it his duty to devote his life to their extermination. But he believed, still more firmly, that his own political authority, throughout his dominions, and his road to almost universal empire, lay over the bodies of those heretics. Three centuries have nearly past since this memorable epoch; and the world knows the fate of the states which accepted the dogma which it was Philip's life-work to enforce, and of those who protested against the system. The Spanish and Italian Peninsulas have had a different history from that which records the career of France,

Prussia, the Dutch Commonwealth, the British Empire, the Transatlantic Republic.

Yet the contest between those Seven meagre Provinces upon the sand-banks of the North Sea, and the great Spanish Empire, seemed at the moment with which we are now occupied a sufficiently desperate one. Throw a glance upon the map of Europe. Look at the broad magnificent Spanish Peninsula, stretching across eight degrees of latitude and ten of longitude, commanding the Atlantic and the Mediterranean, with a genial climate, warmed in winter by the vast furnace of Africa, and protected from the scorching heats of summer by shady mountain and forest, and temperate breezes from either ocean. A generous southern territory, flowing with wine and oil, and all the richest gifts of a bountiful nature—splendid cities—the new and daily-expanding Madrid, rich in the trophies of the most artistic period of the modern world—Cadiz, as populous at that day as London, seated by the straits where the ancient and modern systems of traffic were blending like the mingling of the two oceans—Granada, the ancient wealthy seat of the fallen Moors—Toledo, Valladolid, and Lisbon, chief city of the recently-conquered kingdom of Portugal, counting, with its suburbs, a larger population than any city, excepting Paris, in Europe, the mother of distant colonies, and the capital of the rapidly-developing traffic with both the Indies—these were some of the treasures of Spain herself. 1 But she possessed Sicily also, the better portion of Italy, and important dependencies in Africa, while the famous maritime discoveries of the age had all enured to her aggrandizement. The world seemed suddenly to have expanded its wings from East to West, only to bear the

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1 Compare Guicciardini, *Belgiæ Descript.* Amst. 1660, p. 210 *seq.*



fortunate Spanish Empire to the most dizzy heights of wealth and power. The most accomplished generals, the most disciplined and daring infantry the world has ever known, the best equipped and most extensive navy, royal and mercantile, of the age, were at the absolute command of the sovereign. Such was Spain.

Turn now to the north-western corner of Europe. A morsel of territory, attached by a slight sand-hook to the continent, and half-submerged by the stormy waters of the German Ocean—this was Holland. A rude climate, with long, dark, rigorous winters, and brief summers, a territory, the mere wash of three great rivers, which had fertilized happier portions of Europe only to desolate and overwhelm this less-favoured land, a soil so ungrateful, that, if the whole of its four hundred thousand acres of arable land had been sowed with grain, <sup>1</sup> it could not feed the labourers alone, and a population largely estimated at one million of souls—these were the characteristics of the Province which already had begun to give its name to the new commonwealth. The isles of Zeeland—entangled in the coils of deep slow-moving rivers, or combating the ocean without—and the ancient episcopate of Utrecht, formed the only other Provinces that had quite shaken off the foreign yoke. In Friesland the important city of Groningen was still held for the King, while Bois-le-Duc, Zutphen, besides other places in Gelderland and North Brabant, also in possession of the royalists, made the position of those Provinces precarious.

The limit of the Spanish or „obedient” Provinces, on the one hand, and of the United Provinces on the other, cannot, therefore, be briefly and distinctly stated. The memorable treason—or, as it was called, the „reconciliation” of the Walloon Provinces in

the year 1583—4—had placed the Provinces of Hainault, Artois, Douay, with the flourishing cities Arras, Valenciennes, Lille, Tournay, and others—all Celtic Flanders, in short—in the grasp of Spain. Cambray was still held by the French governor, Seigneur de Balagny, who had taken advantage of the Duke of Anjou’s treachery to the States, to establish himself in an unrecognized but practical petty sovereignty, in defiance both of France and Spain; while East Flanders and South Brabant still remained a disputed territory, and the immediate field of contest. With these limitations, it may be assumed, for general purposes, that the territory of the United States was that of the modern Kingdom of the Netherlands, while the obedient Provinces occupied what is now the territory of Belgium.

Such, then, were the combatants in the great eighty years’ war for civil and religious liberty; sixteen of which had now passed away. On the one side, one of the most powerful and populous world-empires of history, then in the zenith of its prosperity; on the other hand, a slender group of cities, governed by merchants and artisans, and planted precariously upon a meagre, unstable soil. A million and a half of souls against the autocrat of a third part of the known world. The contest seemed as desperate as the cause was certainly sacred; but it had ceased to be a local contest. For the history which is to occupy us in these volumes is not exclusively the history of Holland. It is the story of the great combat between despotism, sacerdotal and regal, and the spirit of rational human liberty. The tragedy opened in the Netherlands, and its main scenes were long enacted there; but as the ambition of Spain expanded, and as the resistance to the principle which she represented became more general, other nations were, of necessity, involved in the struggle. There came to be one country, the

<sup>1</sup> *Mémoires de Jean de Wit*, La Haye, 1709-18-19.



citizens of which were the Leaguers; and another country, whose inhabitants were Protestants. And in this lay the distinction between freedom and absolutism. The religious question swallowed all the others. There was never a period in the early history of the Dutch revolt when the Provinces would not have returned to their obedience, could they have been assured of enjoying liberty of conscience or religious peace; nor was there ever a single moment in Philip II.'s life in which he wavered in his fixed determination never to listen to such a claim. The quarrel was in its nature irreconcilable and eternal as the warfare between wrong and right; and the establishment of a comparative civil liberty in Europe and America was the result of the religious war of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The struggle lasted eighty years, but the prize was worth the contest.

The object of the war between the Netherlands and Spain was not, therefore, primarily, a rebellion against established authority for the maintenance of civil rights. To preserve these rights was secondary. The first cause was religion. The Provinces had been fighting for years against the Inquisition. Had they not taken arms, the Inquisition would have been established in the Netherlands, and very probably in England, and England might have become in its turn a Province of the Spanish Empire.

The death of William the Silent produced a sudden change in the political arrangements of the liberated Netherlands. During the year 1583 the United Provinces had elected Francis, Duke of Anjou, to be Duke of Brabant and sovereign of the whole country, under certain constitutional provisions enumerated in articles of solemn compact. That compact had been grossly violated. The Duke had made a treacherous attempt to possess himself of absolute power and to seize several important

cities. He had been signally defeated in Antwerp, and obliged to leave the country, covered with ignominy. The States had then consulted William of Orange as to the course to be taken in the emergency. The Prince had told them that their choice was triple. They might reconcile themselves with Spain, and abandon the contest for religious liberty which they had so long been waging; they might reconcile themselves with Anjou, notwithstanding that he had so utterly forfeited all claims to their consideration; or they might fight the matter out with Spain single-handed. The last course was, in his opinion, the most eligible one, and he was ready to sacrifice his life to its furtherance. It was, however, indispensable, should that policy be adopted, that much larger supplies should be voted than had hitherto been raised, and, in general, that a much more extensive and elevated spirit of patriotism should manifest itself than had hitherto been displayed.

It was, on the whole, decided to make a second arrangement with the Duke of Anjou, Queen Elizabeth warmly urging that course. At the same time, however, that articles of agreement were drawn up for the installation of Anjou as sovereign of the United Provinces, the Prince had himself consented to accept the title of Count of Holland, under an ample constitutional charter, dictated by his own lips. Neither Anjou nor Orange lived to be inaugurated into the offices thus bestowed upon them. The Duke died at Château-Thierry on the 10th June, and the Prince was assassinated a month later at Delft.

What now was the political position of the United Provinces at this juncture? The sovereignty which had been held by the Estates, ready to be conferred respectively upon Anjou and Orange, remained in the hands of the Estates. There was no opposition to this theory. No more enlarged view of the social compact had yet been taken. The people,

as such, claimed no sovereignty. Had any champion claimed it for them they would hardly have understood him. The nation dealt with facts. After abjuring Philip in 1581—an act which had been accomplished by the Estates—the same Estates in general assembly had exercised sovereign power, and had twice disposed of that sovereign power by electing a hereditary ruler. Their right and their power to do this had been disputed by none, save by the deposed monarch in Spain. Having the sovereignty to dispose of, it seemed logical that the Estates might keep it, if so inclined. They did keep it, but only in trust. While Orange lived, he might often have been elected sovereign of all the Provinces, could he have been induced to consent. After his death, the Estates retained, *ex necessitate*, the sovereignty; and it will soon be related what they intended to do with it. One thing is very certain, that neither Orange, while he lived, nor the Estates, after his death, were actuated in their policy by personal ambition. It will be seen that the first object of the Estates was to dispossess themselves of the sovereignty which had again fallen into their hands.

What were the Estates? Without, at the present moment, any farther inquiries into that constitutional system which had been long consolidating itself, and was destined to exist upon a firmer basis for centuries longer, it will be sufficient to observe, that the great characteristic of the Netherland government was the municipality. Each Province contained a large number of cities, which were governed by a board of magistrates, varying in number from twenty to forty. This college, called the *Vroedschap* (Assembly of Sages), consisted of the most notable citizens, and was a selfelecting body—a close corporation—the members being appointed for life, from the citizens at large. Whenever vacancies occurred from death

or loss of citizenship, the college chose new members—sometimes immediately, sometimes by means of a double or triple selection of names, the choice of one from among which was offered to the stadholder of the Province. This functionary was appointed by the Count, as he was called, whether Duke of Bavaria or of Burgundy, Emperor, or King. After the abjuration of Philip, the governors were appointed by the Estates of each Province.

The Sage-Men chose annually a board of senators, or *schepens*, whose functions were mainly judicial; and there were generally two, and sometimes three, *burgomasters*, appointed in the same way.<sup>1</sup> This was the popular branch of the Estates. But, besides this body of representatives, were the nobles, men of ancient lineage and large possessions, who had exercised, according to the general feudal law of Europe, high, low, and intermediate jurisdiction upon their estates, and had long been recognized as an integral part of the body politic, having the right to appear, through delegates of their order, in the provincial and in the general assemblies.

Regarded as a machine for bringing the most decided political capacities into the administration of public affairs, and for organizing the most practical opposition to the system of religious tyranny, the Netherland constitution was a healthy, and, for the age, an enlightened one. The office-holders, it is obvious, were not greedy for the spoils of office; for it was, unfortunately, often the case that their necessary expenses in the service of the state were not defrayed. The people raised enormous contributions for carrying on the war; but they could not afford to be extremely generous to their faithful servants.

Thus constituted was the commonwealth upon the death of William the Silent. The gloom produced by that

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<sup>1</sup> *Meteren, loc. cit.*

event was tragical. Never in human history was a more poignant and universal sorrow for the death of any individual. The despair was, for a brief season, absolute; but it was soon succeeded by more lofty sentiments. It seemed, after they had laid their hero in the tomb, as though his spirit still hovered above the nation which he had loved so well, and was inspiring it with a portion of his own energy and wisdom. 1

Even on the very day of the murder, the Estates of Holland, then sitting at Delft, passed a resolution „to maintain the good cause, with God's help,

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1 „The people of that country,” wrote Walsingham, ten days after the death of Orange, to Davison, „have hitherto showed themselves but little amazed with the accident. Rather, the wickedness of the deed hath hardened their stomachs to hold out as long as they shall have any means of defence.”

<sup>12</sup><sub>22</sub> July, 1584, S. P. Office MS.

William Herle, also, a secret and most capable emissary of the English government, was visiting the cities of Holland and Zeeland at the time of the tragic occurrence. He described, in vivid colours, the courageous attitude maintained by all persons in the midst of the general gloom. „The recent death of the Prince of Orange,” he wrote to Queen Elizabeth, „has created no astonishment (dismay) at all, either of the people or magistrates, by fear or division, but rather generally animated them with a great resolution of courage and hatred engraved in them, to revenge the foulness of the fact committed on the person of the prince by the tyrant of Spain, and to defend their liberties advisedly against him and his adherents by all means that God has given them, to the uttermost portion of their substance, and the last drop of their blood.”

<sup>1</sup><sub>22</sub> July, 1584, S. P. Office MS.

1 Aug.,  
In the city of Dort he was waited upon by the magistrates, and received by them with singular respect, as the known, although secret, representative of the Queen. „They repaired to me immediately,” he wrote, „not as men condoling their estate, or craving courage to be instilled into them—though wanting now a head—but irritated above measure to be revenged, and to defend all their heads, so apparently sought for by the King of Spain, in murdering their head, the Prince of Orange.” (Ibid.)

to the uttermost, without sparing gold or blood.” This decree was 10th July, communicated to Admiral de 1584.

Warmont, to Count Hohenlo, to William Lewis of Nassau, and to other commanders by land and sea. At the same time, the sixteen members—for no greater number happened to be present at the session—addressed letters to their absent colleagues, informing them of the calamity which had befallen them, summoning them at once to conference, and urging an immediate convocation of the Estates of all the Provinces in general assembly. They also addressed strong letters of encouragement, mingled with manly condolence, upon the common affliction, to prominent military and naval commanders and civil functionaries, begging them to „bear themselves manfully and valiantly, without faltering in the least on account of the great misfortune which had occurred, or allowing themselves to be seduced by any one from the union of the States.” 1 Among these sixteen were Van Zuylen van Nyvelt, the Seigneur de Warmont, the Advocate of Holland, Paul Buys, Joost de Menin, and John van Olden-Barneveld. A noble example was thus set at once to their fellow citizens by these their representatives—a manful step taken forward in the path where Orange had so long been leading.

The next movement, after the last solemn obsequies had been rendered to the Prince, was to provide for the immediate wants of his family. For the man who had gone into the revolt with almost royal revenues, left his estate so embarrassed that his carpets, tapestries, household linen—nay, even his silver spoons, and the very clothes of his wardrobe—were disposed of at auction for the benefit of his creditors. 2

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1 'Van Wyn et al. Aanmerkingen op Wagenaar,' viii. 1-5.

2 His extensive estates were all deeply



He left eleven children—a son and daughter by the first wife, a son and daughter by Anna of Saxony, six daughters by Charlotte of Bourbon, and an infant, Frederic Henry, born six months before his death. The eldest son, Philip William, had been a captive in Spain for seventeen years, having been kidnapped from school, in Leyden, in the year 1567. He had already become so thoroughly Hispaniolized under the masterly treatment of the King and the Jesuits, that even his face had lost all resemblance to the type of his heroic family, and had acquired a sinister, gloomy, forbidding expression, most painful to contemplate. All of good that he had retained was a reverence for his father's name—a sentiment which he had manifested to an extravagant extent on a memorable occasion in Madrid, by throwing out of window, and killing on the spot, a Spanish officer who had dared to mention the great Prince with insult.

The next son was Maurice, then seventeen years of age, a handsome youth, with dark blue eyes, wellchiselled features, and full red lips, who had already manifested a courage and concentration of character beyond his years. The son of William the Silent, the grandson of Maurice of Saxony, whom he resembled in visage and character, he was summoned by every drop of blood in his veins to do life-long battle with the spirit of Spanish absolutism, and he was already girding himself for his life's work. He assumed at once for his device a fallen oak, with a young sapling springing from its root.

His motto,—„Tandem fit surculus arbor,” „the twig shall yet become a tree”—was to be nobly justified by his career. 1

The remaining son, then a six months' child, was also destined to high fortunes and to win an enduring name in his country's history. For the present he remained with his mother, the noble Louisa de Coligny, who had thus seen, at long intervals, her father and two husbands fall victims to the Spanish policy; for it is as certain that Philip knew beforehand, and testified his approbation of, the massacre of St. Bartholomew, as that he was the murderer of Orange.

The Estates of Holland implored the widowed Princess to remain in their territory, settling a liberal allowance upon herself and her child, and she fixed her residence at Leyden. 2

But her position was most melancholy. Married in youth to the Seigneur de Telnig, a young noble of distinguished qualities, she had soon become both a widow and an orphan in the dread night of St. Bartholomew. She had made her own escape to Switzerland; and ten years afterwards she had united herself in marriage with the Prince of Orange. At the age of thirty-two she now found herself desolate and wretched in a foreign land, where she had never felt thoroughly at home. The widow and children of William the Silent were almost without the necessities of life. „I hardly know,” wrote the Princess to her brother-in-law, Count

mortgaged, and he left absolutely no ready money. „Both Buis and Meeterkerk told me,” wrote Herle to Queen Elizabeth, „that the prince had not in ready money at his death one hundred guilders, which was a note of his popularity.”

22 July, 1588, S.P. Office MS.

1 Aug.,

Compare Wagenaar, viii. 12-15.

1 „The Count Maurice, with whom I was, most gracious Sovereign,” said Herle, „is a gentleman of the age of seventeen years, one of great towardness, good presence and courage, flaxen-haired, endued with a singular wit, and no less learned for his time. He somewhat resembles the countenance and spirit of his grandfather of the mothers's side.” (Herle to the Queen, MS. just cited.) Compare Meteren, xii. 214.

2 Wagenaar, „Vaderlandsche Historie,” viii 8 seq.; Von Wyn op Wagenaar, viii. 5 seq., 16 seq.



John, "how the children and I are to maintain ourselves according to the honour of the house. May God provide for us in his bounty, and certainly we have much need of it. 1 Accustomed to the more luxurious civilisation of France, she had been amused rather than annoyed, when, on her first arrival in Holland for her nuptials, she found herself making the journey from Rotterdam to Delft in an open cart without springs, instead of the well-balanced coaches to which she had been used, arriving, as might have been expected, „much bruised and shaken." Such had become the primitive simplicity of William the Silent's household. 2 But on his death, in embarrassed circumstances, it was still more straitened. She had no cause either to love Leyden, for, after the assassination of her husband, a brutal preacher, Hakkius by name, had seized that opportunity for denouncing the French marriage, and the sumptuous christening of the infant in January, as the deeds which had provoked the wrath of God and righteous chastisement. 3 To remain there in her widowhood, with that six months' child, „sole pledge of her dear lord, her consolation and only pleasure," 4 as she pathetically expressed herself, was sufficiently painful, and she had been inclined to fix her residence in Flushing, in the edifice which had belonged to her husband, as Marquis of Vere. She had been persuaded, however, to remain in Holland, although „complaining, at first, somewhat of the unkindness of the people." 5

A small well-formed woman, with delicate features, exquisite complexion, and very beautiful dark eyes, that seemed in after-years, as they looked from be-

neath her coif, to be dim with unshed tears; with remarkable powers of mind angelic sweetness of disposition, a winning manner, and a gentle voice, Louisa de Coligny became soon dear to the rough Hollanders, and was ever a disinterested and valuable mistress both to her own child and to his elder brother Maurice. 1

Very soon afterwards the States General established a state-council, as a provisional executive board, for the term of three months, for the Provinces of Holland, Zeeland, Utrecht, Friesland, and such parts of Flanders and Brabant as still remained in the Union. At the head of this body was placed young Maurice, who accepted the responsible position, after three days' deliberation. The young man had been completing his education, with a liberal allowance from Holland and Zeeland, at the University of Leyden; and such had been their tender care for the child of so many hopes, that the Estates had given particular and solemn warning, by resolution, to his governor during the previous summer, on no account to allow him to approach the sea-shore, lest he should be kidnapped by the Prince of Parma, who had them some war-vessels cruising on the coast. 2

The salary of Maurice was now fixed at thirty thousand florins a year, while each of the councillors was allowed

1 „I visited the Princess of Orange by her own request," said Herle, a few days after the death of the Prince, „and found her in a most dark melancholic little chamber. 'T was a twice sorrowful sight to behold her heaviness and apparel augmented by the woefulness of the place; and truly the perplexity was great that I found her in, not only for the consideration of things past, but for that which might follow here after, her afflictions having been great. She was accompanied by the Princess Chimay, who was newly come to Delft, and no less dolorous in another degree than she, but truly a virtuous and wise lady, whatsoever, under correction, hath been otherwise interpreted of her." (Herle's MS. before cited.)

2 „Resol. Holl.,' 11th August, 1584, bl. 294; Wagenaar, viii. 6.

1 Groen v. Prinsterer, „Archives,' &c. 2 S., i. 98.

2 Du Maurier, „Mémoires,' 182.

3 Van Wyn op Wagenaar, viii. 19.

4 Groen v. Prinsterer, *ubi sup.*

5 MS. letter of Herle.

fifteen hundred annually, out of which stipend he was to support at least one servant, without making any claim for travelling or other incidental expenses. 1

The council consisted of three members from Brabant, two from Flanders, four from Holland, three from Zeeland, two from Utrecht, one from Mechlin, and three from Friesland—eighteen in all. They were empowered and enjoined to levy troops by land and sea, and to appoint naval and military officers; to establish courts of admiralty, to expend the moneys voted by the States, to maintain the ancient privileges of the country, and to see that all troops in service of the Provinces made oath of fidelity to the Union. Diplomatic relations, questions of peace and war, the treaty-making power, were not entrusted to the council, without the knowledge and consent of the States General, which body was to be convoked twice a year by the state-council. 2

Thus the Provinces in the hour of danger and darkness were true to themselves, and were far from giving way to a despondency which under the circumstances would not have been unnatural.

For the waves of bitterness were rolling far and wide around them. A medal, struck in Holland at this period, represented a dismasted hulk reeling through the tempest. The motto, „*incertum quo fata ferent*” (who knows whither fate is sweeping her?), expressed most vividly the shipwrecked condition of the country. Alexander of Parma, the most accomplished general and one of the most adroit statesmen of the age, was swift to take advantage of the calamity which had now befallen the rebellious Provinces. Had he been better provided with men and money, the cause of the States might have seemed hopeless. He addressed many letters to the States General, to the magistracies of

various cities, and to individuals, affecting to consider that with the death of Orange had died all authority, as well as all motive for continuing the contest with Spain. He offered easy terms of reconciliation with the discarded monarch—always reserving, however, as a matter of course, the religious question—for it was as well known to the States as to Parma that there was no hope of Philip making concessions upon that important point.

In Holland and Zeeland the Prince's blandishments were of no avail. His letters received in various towns of those Provinces, offered, said one who saw them, „almost everything they would have or demand, even till they should repent.” 1 But the bait was not taken. Individuals and municipalities were alike staunch, remembering well that faith was not to be kept with heretics. The example was followed by the Estates of other Provinces, and all sent in to the General Assembly, soon in session at Delft, „their absolute and irrevocable authority to their deputies to stand to that which they, the said States General, should dispose of as to their persons, goods, and country; a resolution and agreement which never concurred before among them, to this day, in what age or government soever.” 2

It was decreed that no motion of agreement „with the tyrant of Spain” should be entertained either publicly or privately, „under pain to be reputed ill patriots.” It was also enacted in the city of Dort that any man that brought letter or message from the enemy to any private person „should be forthwith hanged.” This was expeditious and business-like. The same city likewise took the lead in recording its determination by public act, and proclaiming it by sound of trumpet, „to live and die in the cause now undertaken.” 3

1 Wagenaar, viii. ; Van Wyn op Wagenaar, viii. 12.

2 Ibid.

1 Herle to the Queen, MS. before cited.

2 Ibid.

3 Ibid.

In Flanders and Brabant the spirit was less noble. Those Provinces were nearly lost already. Bruges seconded Parma's efforts to induce its sister-city Ghent to imitate its own baseness in surrendering without a struggle; and that powerful, turbulent, but most anarchical little commonwealth was but too ready to listen to the voice of the tempter. „The ducats of Spain, Madam, are trotting about in such fashion,” wrote envoy Des Pruneaux to Catherine de' Medici, „that they have vanquished a great quantity of courages. Your Majesties, too, must employ money if you wish to advance one step.”<sup>1</sup> No man knew better than Parma how to employ such golden rhetoric to win back a wavering rebel to his loyalty, but he was not always provided with a sufficient store of those practical arguments.

He was, moreover, not strong in the field, although he was far superior to the States at this contingency. He had, besides his garrisons, something above 18,000 men. The Provinces had hardly 3000 foot and 2500 horse, and these were mostly lying in the neighbourhood of Zutphen.<sup>2</sup> Alexander was threatening at the same time Ghent, Dendermonde, Mechlin, Brussels, and Antwerp. These five powerful cities lie in a narrow circle, at distances varving from six miles to thirty, and are, as it were, strung together upon the Scheldt, by which river, or its tributary, the Senne, they are all threaded. It would have been impossible for Parma, with 100,000 men at his back, to undertake a regular and simultaneous siege of these important places. His purpose was to isolate them from each other and from the rest of the country, by obtaining the control of the great river, and so to reduce them by famine. The scheme was a masterly one, but even the consummate ability of Farnese would have

proved inadequate to the undertaking, had not the preliminary assassination of Orange made the task comparatively easy. Treason, faint-heartedness, jealousy, were the fatal allies that the Governor-General had reckoned upon, and with reason, in the council-rooms of these cities. The terms he offered were liberal. Pardon, permission for soldiers to retreat with technical honour, liberty to choose between apostacy to the reformed religion or exile, with a period of two years granted to the conscientious for the winding up of their affairs; these were the conditions, which seemed flattering, now that the well-known voice which had so often silenced the Flemish palterers and intriguers was for ever hushed.

Upon the 17th August Dendermonde surrendered, and no lives were taken save those of two preachers, 17th Aug. one of whom was hanged, 1584. while the other was drowned. Upon the 7th September Vilvoorde capitulated, by which event the water-communication between Brussels and Antwerp was cut off. Ghent, now thoroughly disheartened, treated with Parma likewise; and upon the 17th September made its reconciliation with the King.<sup>1</sup> The surrender of so strong and important a place was as disastrous to the cause of the patriots as it was disgraceful to the citizens themselves. It was, however, the result of an intrigue which had been long spinning, although the thread had been abruptly, and, as it was hoped, conclusively, severed several months before. During the early part of the year, after the reconciliation of Bruges with the King—an event brought about by the duplicity and adroitness of Prince Chimay—the same machinery had been diligently and almost successfully employed to produce a like result in Ghent. Champagny, brother of the famous Cardinal Granvelle, had been under arrest

<sup>1</sup> Groen v. Prinsterer, *Archives*, &c., 4.  
<sup>2</sup> Wagenaar, viii. 13.

<sup>1</sup> Meteren, xii. 216, 217.



for six years in that city. His imprisonment was not a strict one however, and he avenged himself for what he considered very unjust treatment at the hands of the patriots, by completely abandoning a cause which he had once begun to favour. A man of singular ability, courage, and energy, distinguished both for military and diplomatic services, he was a formidable enemy to the party from which he was now for ever estranged. As early as April of this year, secret emissaries of Parma, dealing with Champagny in his nominal prison, and with the disaffected burghers at large, had been on the point of affecting an arrangement with the royal governor. The negotiation had been suddenly brought to a close by the discovery of a flagrant attempt by Imbize, one of the secret adherents of the King, to sell the city of Dendermonde, of which he was governor, to Parma. 1 For this crime he had been brought to Ghent for trial, and then publicly beheaded. The incident came in aid of the eloquence of Orange, who, up to the latest moment of his life, had been most urgent in his appeals to the patriotic hearts of Ghent, not to abandon the great cause of the union and of liberty. William the Silent knew full well, that, after the withdrawal of the great key-stone-city of Ghent, the chasm between the Celtic-Catholic and the Flemish-Calvinist Netherlands could hardly be bridged again. Orange was now dead. The negotiations with France, too, on which those of the Ghenters who still held true to the national cause had fastened their hopes, had previously been brought to a standstill by the death of Anjou; and Champagny, notwithstanding the disaster to Imbize, became more active than ever. A private agent, whom the municipal government

had despatched to the French court for assistance, was not more successful than his character and course of conduct would have seemed to warrant; for during his residence in Paris he had been always drunk, and generally abusive. This was not good diplomacy, particularly on the part of an agent from a weak municipality to a haughty and most undecided government.

„They found, at this court,” wrote Stafford to Walsingham, „great fault with his manner of dealing that was sent from Gaunt. He was scarce sober from one end of the week to the other, and stood so much on his tiptoes to have present answer within three days, or else that they of Gaunt *could tell where* to bestow themselves. They send him away after keeping him three weeks, and he went off in great dudgeon, swearing by yea and nay that he will make report thereafter.” 1

Accordingly, they of Ghent did bestow themselves very soon thereafter upon the King of Spain. The terms were considered liberal, but there was, of course, no thought of conceding the great object for which the patriots were contending—religious liberty. The municipal privileges—such as they might prove to be worth under the interpretation of a royal governor and beneath the guns of a citadel filled with Spanish troops—were to be guaranteed; those of the inhabitants who did not choose to go to mass were allowed two years to wind up their affairs before going into perpetual exile, provided they behaved themselves „without scandal;” while, on the other hand, the King’s authority as Count of Flanders was to be fully recognised, and all the dispossessed monks and abbots to be restored to their property. 2

1 See, *Rise of the Dutch Republic*, vol. iii. chap. vi., and the authorities there cited; Everhard van Reydt, *Historie der Nederlandsche Oorlogen*, ed. 1650, iii. 47.

1 Stafford to Walsingham, 27th July, 1584, in Murdin, ii. pp. 412-415.

2 Meteren, xii. 217; V. Reydt, iii. 47; Le Petit, *Grande Chronique de Hollande*, ed. 1601, xiv. 409, 500.



Accordingly, Champagne was rewarded for his exertions by being released from prison and receiving the appointment of governor of the city; and, after a very brief interval, about one-half of the population, the most enterprising of its merchants and manufacturers, the most industrious of its artisans, emigrated to Holland and Zeeland.<sup>3</sup> The noble city of Ghent—then as large as Paris, thoroughly surrounded with moats, and fortified with bulwarks, ravelins, and counterescarpes, constructed of earth during the previous two years, at great expense, and provided with bread and meat, powder and shot, enough to last a year—was ignominiously surrendered. The population, already a very reduced and slender one for the great extent of the place and its former importance, had been estimated at 70,000.<sup>4</sup> The number of houses was 35,000, so that, as the inhabitants were soon farther reduced to one-half, there remained about one individual to each house. On the other hand, the twenty-five monasteries and convents in the town were re peopled—with how much advantage as a set-off to the thousands of spinners and weavers who had wandered away, and who in the flourishing days of Ghent had sent gangs of workmen through the streets “whose tramp was like that of an army”—may be sufficiently estimated by the result.

The fall of Brussels was deferred till March, and that of Mechlin (19th July, 1585) and of Antwerp (19th 10th March, August, 1585), till Midsummer 1585. mer of the following year; but the surrender of Ghent foreshadowed the fate of Flanders and Brabant. Ostend and Sluys, however, were still in the hands of the patriots, and with them the control of the whole Flemish coast. The command of the sea was

destined to remain for centuries with the new republic.

The Prince of Parma, thus encouraged by the great success of his intrigues, was determined to achieve still greater triumphs with his arms, and steadily proceeded with his large design of closing the Scheldt and bringing about the fall of Antwerp. The details of that siege—one of the most brilliant military operations of the age and one of the most memorable in its results—will be given, as a connected whole, in a subsequent series of chapters. For the present, it will be better for the reader who wishes a clear view of European politics at this epoch, and of the positions of the Netherlands, to give his attention to the web of diplomatic negotiation and court-intrigue which had been slowly spreading over the leading states of Christendom, and in which the fate of the world was involved. If diplomatic adroitness consists mainly in the power to deceive, never were more adroit diplomatists than those of the sixteenth century. It would however be absurd to deny them a various range of abilities; and the history of no other age can show more subtle, comprehensive, indefatigable—but, it must also be added, often unscrupulous—intellects engaged in the great game of politics in which the highest interests of millions were the stakes, than were those of several leading minds in England, France, Germany, and Spain. With such statesmen the burgher-diplomatists of the new-born commonwealth had to measure themselves; and the result was to show whether or not they could hold their own in the cabinet as on the field.

For the present, however, the new state was unconscious of its latent importance. The new-risen republic remained for a season nebulous, and ready to unsphere itself so soon as the relative attraction of other great powers should determine its absorption. By

1 Meteren, *ubi sup.*

2 Guicciardini, p. 207.

the death of Anjou and of Orange the United Netherlands had become a sovereign state, an independent republic; but they stood with that sovereignty in their hands, offering it alternately, not

to the highest bidder, but to the power that would be willing to accept their allegiance, on the sole condition of assisting them in the maintenance of their religious freedom.

## CHAPTER II.

*Relations of the Republic to France—Queen's Severity towards Catholics and Calvinists—Relative Positions of England and France—Timidity of Germany—Apathy of Protestant Germany—Indignation of the Netherlands—Henry III, of France—The King and his Minions—Henry of Guise—Henry of Navarre—Power of France—Embassy of the States to France—Ignominious Position of the Envoys—Views of the French Huguenots—Efforts to procure Annexation—Success of Des Pruniaux.*

THE Prince of Orange had always favoured a French policy. He had ever felt a stronger reliance upon the support of France than upon that of any other power. This was not unreasonable, and, so long as he lived, the tendency of the Netherlands had been in that direction. It had never been the wish of England to acquire the sovereignty of the Provinces. In France, on the contrary, the Queen Dowager, Catharine de' Medici, had always coveted that sovereignty for her darling, Francis of Alençon; and the design had been favoured, so far as any policy could be favoured, by the impotent monarch who occupied the French throne.

The religion of the United Netherlands was Calvinistic. There were also many Anabaptists in the country. The Queen of England hated Anabaptists, Calvinists, and other sectarians, and banished them from her realms on pain of imprisonment and confiscation of property. <sup>1</sup> As firmly opposed as was her father to the supremacy of the Bishop of Rome, she felt much of the paternal reluctance to accept the spirit

of the Reformation. Henry Tudor hanged the men who believed in the Pope, and burnt alive those who disbelieved in transubstantiation, auricular confession, and the other 'Six Articles.' His daughter, whatever her secret religious convictions, was stanch in her resistance to Rome, and too enlightened a monarch not to see wherein the greatness and glory of England were to be found; but she had no thought of tolerating liberty of conscience. All opposed to the Church of England, whether Papists or Puritans, were denounced as heretics, and as such imprisoned or banished. „To allow churches with contrary rites and ceremonies,” said Elizabeth, „were nothing else but to sow religion out of religion, to distract good men's minds, to cherish factious men's humours, to disturb religion and commonwealth, and mingle divine and human things; which were a thing in deed evil, in example worst of all; to our own subjects hurtful, and to themselves to whom it is granted, neither greatly commodious, nor yet at all safe.” <sup>1</sup> The words were addressed, it is true, to Papists, but there is very little doubt that Anabaptists or any other heretics would have received a similar reply, had they, too, ventured to demand the right of public worship. It may even be said that the Romanists in the earlier days of Elizabeth's reign fared better than the Calvinists. The Queen neither banished nor imprisoned the Catholics. She did not enter their houses, to disturb

<sup>1</sup> Camden, i. 48.

<sup>1</sup> Camden, i. 32.

their private religious ceremonies, or to inquire into their consciences. This was milder treatment than the burning alive, burying alive, hanging, and drowning, which had been dealt out to the English and the Netherland heretics by Philip and by Mary, but it was not the spirit which William the Silent had been wont to manifest in his measures towards Anabaptists and Papists alike. Moreover, the Prince could hardly forget that, of the nine thousand four hundred Catholic ecclesiastics who held benefices at the death of Queen Mary, all had renounced the Pope on the accession of Queen Elizabeth, and acknowledged her as the head of the church, saving only one hundred and eighty nine individuals. <sup>1</sup> In the hearts of the nine thousand two hundred and eleven others, it might be thought perhaps that some tenderness for the religion from which they had so suddenly been converted might linger, while it could hardly be hoped that they would seek to inculcate in the minds of their flocks or of their sovereign any connivance with the doctrines of Geneva.

When, at a later period, the plotting of Catholics, suborned by the Pope and Philip, against the throne and person of the Queen, made more rigorous measures necessary; when it was thought indispensable to execute as traitors those Roman seedlings—seminary priests and their disciples—who went about preaching to the Queen's subjects the duty of carrying out the bull by which the Bishop of Rome had deposed and excommunicated their sovereign, and that "it was a meritorious act to kill such princes as were excommunicate," <sup>2</sup> even then, the men who preached and practised treason and murder experienced no severer treatment than that which other „heretics" had met with at the Queen's hands. Jesuits and

Popish priests were, by Act of Parliament, ordered to depart the realm within forty days. <sup>1</sup> Those who should afterwards return to the kingdom were to be held guilty of high treason. Students in the foreign seminaries were commanded to return within six months and recant, or be held guilty of high treason. Parents and guardians supplying money to such students abroad were to incur the penalty of a *præmunire*—perpetual exile, namely, with loss of all their goods. <sup>2</sup>

Many seminary priests and others were annually executed in England under these laws, throughout the Queen's reign, but nominally at least they were hanged not as Papists, but as traitors; not because they taught transubstantiation, ecclesiastical celibacy, auricular confession, or even Papal supremacy, but because they taught treason and murder—because they preached the necessity of killing the Queen. It was not so easy, however, to defend or even comprehend the banishment and imprisonment of those who, without conspiring against the Queen's life or throne, desired to see the Church of England reformed according to the Church of Geneva. Yet there is no doubt that many sectaries experienced much inhuman treatment for such delinquency, both in the early and the later years of Elizabeth's reign. <sup>3</sup>

There was another consideration, which had its due weight in this balance, and that was the respective succession to the throne in the two kingdoms of France and England. Mary Stuart, the Catholic, the niece of the Guises, emblem and exponent of all that was most Roman in Europe, the sworn friend of Philip, the mortal foe to all heresy, was the legitimate successor to Elizabeth. Although that sovereign had ever refused to recognize that claim; holding that to confirm Mary in the succession

<sup>1</sup> *Ibid.*, i. 28.

<sup>2</sup> *Camden*, iii. 336.

<sup>1</sup> *Ibid.* iii. 309.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.* 107, 469.

was to „lay her own winding-sheet before her eyes, yea, to make her own grave, while she liveth and looketh on;”<sup>1</sup> and although the unfortunate claimant of two thrones was a prisoner in her enemy’s hands; yet, so long as she lived, there was little security for Protestantism, even in Elizabeth’s lifetime, and less still in case of her sudden death. On the other hand, not only were the various politico-religious forces of France kept in equilibrium by their action upon each other—so that it was reasonable to believe that the House of Valois, however Catholic itself, would be always compelled by the fast-expanding strength of French Calvinism, to observe faithfully a compact to tolerate the Netherland churches—but, upon the death of Henry III. the crown would be legitimately placed upon the head of the great champion and chief of the Huguenots, Henry of Navarre.

It was not unnatural, therefore, that the Prince of Orange, a Calvinist himself, should expect more sympathy with the Netherland reformers in France than in England. A large proportion of the population of that kingdom, including an influential part of the nobility, was of the Huguenot persuasion, and the religious peace, established by royal edict, had endured so long, that the reformers of France and the Netherlands had begun to believe in the royal clemency, and to confide in the royal word. Orange did not live to see the actual formation of the Holy League, and could only guess at its secrets.

Moreover, it should be remembered that France at that day was a more formidable state than England, a more dangerous enemy, and, as it was believed, a more efficient protector. The England of the period, glorious as it was for its own and all future ages, was not the great British Empire of to-day. On the contrary, it was what would now

be considered, statistically speaking, a rather petty power. The England of Elizabeth, Walsingham, Burghley, Drake, and Raleigh, of Spenser and Shakspeare, hardly numbered a larger population than now dwells in its capital and immediate suburbs. It had neither standing army nor considerable royal navy. It was full of conspirators, daring and unscrupulous, loyal to none save to Mary of Scotland, Philip of Spain, and the Pope of Rome, and untiring in their efforts to bring about a general rebellion. With Ireland at its side, nominally a subject province, but in a state of chronic insurrection—a perpetual hot-bed for Spanish conspiracy and stratagem; with Scotland at its back, a foreign country, with half its population exasperated enemies of England, and the rest but doubtful friends, and with the legitimate sovereign of that country, „the daughter of debate, who discord still did sow,”<sup>1</sup> a prisoner in Elizabeth’s hands, the central point around which treason was constantly crystallizing itself,—it was not strange that, with the known views of the Queen on the subject of the reformed Dutch religion, England should seem less desirable as a protector for the Netherlands than the neighbouring kingdom of France.

Elizabeth was a great sovereign, whose genius Orange always appreciated, in a comparatively feeble realm. Henry of Valois was the contemptible monarch of a powerful state, and might be led by others to produce incalculable mischief or considerable good. Notwithstanding the massacre of St. Bartholomew, therefore, and the more recent „French fury” of Antwerp, Orange had been willing to countenance fresh negotiations with France.

Elizabeth, too, it should never be forgotten, was, if not over generous, at least consistent and loyal in her policy

<sup>1</sup> Camden, i. 54.

<sup>1</sup> Sonnet by Queen Elizabeth.



towards the Provinces. She was not precisely jealous of France, as has been unjustly intimated on distinguished authority, 1 for she strongly advocated the renewed offer of the sovereignty to Anjou, after his memorable expulsion from the Provinces. 2 At that period, moreover, not only her own love-coquetries with Anjou were over, but he was endeavouring with all his might, though in secret, to make a match with the younger Infanta of Spain. 3 Elizabeth furthered the negotiation with France, both publicly and privately. It will soon be narrated how those negotiations prospered.

If then England were out of the question, where, except in France, should the Netherlands, not deeming themselves capable of standing alone, seek for protection and support?

We have seen the extensive and almost ubiquitous power of Spain. Where she did not command as sovereign, she was almost equally formidable as an ally. The Emperor of Germany was the nephew and the brother-in-law of Philip, and a strict Catholic besides. Little aid was to be expected from him or the lands under his control for the cause of the Netherland revolt. Rudolph hated his brother-in-law, but lived in mortal fear of him. He was also in perpetual dread of the Grand Turk. That formidable potentate, not then the „sick man” whose precarious condition and territorial inheritance cause so much anxiety in modern days, was, it is true, sufficiently occupied for the moment in Persia, and

had been sustaining there a series of sanguinary defeats. He was all the more anxious to remain upon good terms with Philip, and had recently sent him a complimentary embassy, 1 together with some rather choice presents, among which were „four lions, twelve unicorns, and two horses coloured white, black, and blue.” 2 Notwithstanding these pacific manifestations towards the West, however, and in spite of the truce with the German Empire which the Turk had just renewed for nine years,—Rudolph and his servants still trembled at every report from the East.

„He is much deceived,” wrote Busbecq, Rudolph’s ambassador in Paris, „who doubts that the Turk has sought anything by this long Persian war, but to protect his back, and prepare the way, after subduing that enemy, to the extermination of all Christendom, and that he will then, with all his might, wage an unequal warfare with us, in which the existence of the Empire will be at stake.” 3

The envoy expressed, at the same period, however, still greater awe of Spain. „It is to no one,” he wrote, „endowed with good judgment, in the least obscure, that the Spanish nation, greedy of empire, will never be quiet, even with their great power, but will seek for the dominion of the rest of Christendom. How much remains beyond what they have already acquired? Afterwards, there will soon be no liberty, no dignity, for other princes and republics. That single nation will be arbiter of all things, than which nothing can be more miserable, nothing more degrading. It cannot be doubted that all kings, princes, and states, whose safety or dignity is dear to them, would willingly associate in arms to extinguish the common

1 *H. Grotii Annalium*, v. 128, ed. 1658, Amst.

2 *Rise of the Dutch Republic*, iii. chap. vi., and MS. Letter of Queen Elizabeth, cited in note.

3 *Collection de Lettres relatives aux Négociations sur le Project de Mariage du Duc d’Anjou avec une des Infantes d’Espagne, et aux Affaires traitées de part et d’autre pour les Pays Bas, Cambray, la succession de Portugal*, &c. Bib. Imp. de France, Brieune MS.

1 De Thou, *‘Hist. Univ.’* ix. 209 *seq.*

2 Meteren, xiii. 233; *Le Petit*, xiv. 515.

3 *‘Busbequii Epistolæ ad Rudolphum II.’* Brux., 1631, p. 152-3.

conflagration. The death of the Catholic king would seem the great opportunity *miscendis rebus.*"<sup>1</sup>

Unfortunately neither Busbecq's master nor any other king or prince manifested any of this commendable alacrity to „take up arms against the conflagration." Germany was in a shiver at every breeze from East or West—trembling alike before Philip and Amurath. The Papists were making rapid progress, the land being undermined by the steady and stealthy encroachments of the Jesuits. Lord Burghley sent many copies of his pamphlet, in Latin, French, and Italian, against the Seminaries, to Gebhard Truchsess; and the deposed archbishop made himself busy in translating that wholesome production into German, and in dispersing it „all Germany over." The work, setting duly forth „that the executions of priests in England were not for religion but for treason," was „marvellously liked" in the Netherlands. „In uttering the truth," said Herle, „'tis likely to do great good;" and he added, that Duke Augustus of Saxony „did now see so far into the sect of Jesuits, and to their inward mischiefs, as to become their open enemy, and to make friends against them in the Empire."<sup>2</sup>

The love of Truchsess for Agnes Mansfeld had created disaster not only for himself but for Germany. The whole electorate of Cologne had become the constant seat of partizan warfare, and the resort of organized bands of brigands. Villages were burned and rifled, highways infested, cities threatened, and the whole country subjected to perpetual black mail (*brandschatzung*)—fire-insurance levied by the incendiaries in person—by the supporters of the rival bishops. Truchsess had fled to Delft, where he had been countenanced and

supported by Orange. Two cities still held for him, Rheinberg and Neusz. On the other hand, his rival, Albert of Bavaria, supported by Philip II., and the occasional guest of Alexander of Parma, had not yet succeeded in establishing a strong foothold in the territory. Two pauper archbishops, without men or means of their own, were thus pushed forward and back, like puppets, by the contending highwaymen on either side; while robbery and murder, under the name of Protestantism or Catholicism, were for a time the only motive or result of the contest.

Thus along the Rhine, as well as the Maas and the Scheldt, the fires of civil war were ever burning. Deeper within the heart of Germany, there was more tranquillity; but it was the tranquillity rather of paralysis than of health. A fearful account was slowly accumulating, which was eventually to be settled only by one of the most horrible wars which history has ever recorded. Meantime there was apathy where there should have been enthusiasm; parsimony and cowardice where generous and combined efforts were more necessary than ever; sloth without security. The Protestant princes, growing fat and contented on the spoils of the church, lent but a deaf ear to the moans of Truchsess, forgetting that their neighbour's blazing roof was likely soon to fire their own. „They understand better, *proximus sum egomet mihi*," wrote Lord Willoughby from Kronenburg, „than they have learned, *humani nihil a me alienum puto*. These German princes continue still in their lethargy, careless of the state of others, and dreaming of their ubiquity, and some of them, it is thought, inclining to be Spanish of Popish more of late than heretofore."<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Busbecqui 'Epist ad Rud.' d. 124-126.

<sup>2</sup> Herle to Queen Elizabeth, 22nd July, 1584, MS. before cited.

<sup>1</sup> Willoughby to Burghley, in Wright's 'Queen Elizabeth and her Times,' vol. ii. 275.

The beggared archbishop, more forlorn than ever since the death of his great patron, cried woe from his resting-place in Delft, upon Protestant Germany. His tones seemed almost prophetic of the thirty years' wrath to blaze forth in the next generation. „Courage is wanting to the people throughout Germany,” he wrote to William Lewis of Nassau, „We are becoming the laughing-stock of the nations. Make sheep of yourselves, and the wolf will eat you. We shall find our destruction in our immoderate desire for peace. Spain is making a Papistical league in Germany. Therefore is Assonleville despatched thither, and that's the reason why our trash of priests are so insolent in the Empire. „'Tis astonishing how they are triumphing on all sides. God will smite them. Thou dear God! What are our evangelists about in Germany? Asleep on both ears. Dormiunt in utramque aurem. I doubt they will be suddenly enough awakened one day, and the cry will be „Who'd have thought it?” Then they will be for getting oil for the lamp, for shutting the stable-door when the steed is stolen.” 1 and so on, with a string of homely proverbs worthy of Sancho Panza, or landgrave William of Hesse. 2

1 Groen v. Prinsterer, Archives, &c., i. 9.

2 The statesmen of England were too sagacious not to see the importance to Protestant Germany of sustaining the ex-electeur, if to sustain him were possible. But to this end it was necessary that the German princes, whom it most nearly concerned, should unite in his support. Queen Elizabeth had authorized a subsidy to enable Truchsess to carry on the war, but his Bavarian competitor was backed by the power of Spain, and was himself of higher rank and larger resources.

„No man,” wrote Walsingham to Davison, „wishes better success than myself to the elector, knowing how greatly it importeth the common cause of religion that he should be upholden, and the benefit that those distressed countries, where you now are, may receive by way of diversion through his employment; for that Spain, and his minister the Prince of Parma, must not see the Bishop

In truth, one of the most painful features in the general aspect of affairs was the coldness of the German Protestants towards the Netherlands. The enmity between Lutherans and Calvinists

of Liege quail. Yet when I consider, upon view of the report of the conference between you and the said elector, how little appearance is of any great assistance that he shall have, and that the prince-electors whom the cause doth touch, especially Saxony and Brandenburg, have as yet no disposition to deal therein, *as though the conservation of the liberty of Germany did in no respect touch them*, I see no great reason to hope that this enterprise will be accompanied with that good success that both I wish and is also looked for here.” (30th Dec. 1584. S. P. Office MS.)

It was therefore necessary, in the opinion of the English government, to move warily in the matter. For remote allies to expend their strength in sustaining the sinking elector, while the Protestants nearest him looked upon his struggles with folded arms, seemed superfluous and unreasonable. „For it is hard,” said Walsingham, „formen of judgment to think that he, having no greater likelihood of support than yet appeareth he hath, shall be able to prevail against a bishop of Liege, by birth more noble than himself, already possessed of the most part of the bishopric, who will not lack any assistance that the Catholic princes can yield him. As for the supports promised by the kings of Denmark and of Navarre, being in respect of the others but weak and far distant in place, 'tis very doubtful, before the Elector can take any profit thereof, that his cause may miscarry, unless it should be through God's goodness upholden.” (Ibid.)

But, in truth, the Protestant princes of Germany were most lukewarm in the matter, and the complaints of poor Truchsess were founded upon very accurate knowledge as to the sentiments of his compatriots. „By letters received from Germany, as well from Casimir (elector-palatine) as others,” continued Walsingham, „I do not find any other forwardness in those that are thought the best affected towards him there than to *wish well* unto him. But because that help which consists in well-wishing groweth fruitless, unless it be accompanied by effects, which the dulness of the Almaigne nature easily yieldeth not until the disease grow desperate, I cannot but advise you, for the Queen's honour, to induce him to make it very probable unto you, that the support now yielded by her Majesty is like to work that effect which he pretendeth.” (Ibid.)

Otherwise it was cautiously suggested by the Secretary, that the envoy would „do well to forbear to be over-forward in delivering of the money.”



was almost as fatal as that between Protestants and Papists. There was even a talk, at a little later period, of excluding those of the „reformed” church from the benefits of the peace of Passau. The princes had got the Augsburg confession and the abbey-lands into the bargain; the peasants had got the Augsburg confession without the abbeylands, and were to believe exactly what their masters believed. This was the German-Lutheran sixteenth-century idea of religious freedom. Neither prince nor peasant stirred in behalf of the struggling Christians in the United Provinces, battling, year after year, knee-deep in blood, amid blazing cities and inundated fields, breast to breast with the yellow-jerked pikemen of Spain and Italy, with the axe and the faggot and the rack of the Holy Inquisition distinctly visible behind them. Such were the realities which occupied the Netherlanders in those days, not watery beams of theological moonshine, fantastical catechism-making, intermingled with scenes of riot and wantonness, which drove old John of Nassau half frantic; „with banqueting and guzzling, drinking and devouring, with unchristian flaunting and wastefulness of apparel, with extravagant and wanton dancing, and other lewd abominations;”<sup>1</sup> all which, the firm old reformer prophesied, would lead to the destruction of Germany.

For the mass, slow moving but apparently irresistible, of Spanish and papistical absolutism was gradually closing over Christendom. The Netherlands were the wedge by which alone the solid bulk could be riven asunder. It was the cause of German, of French, of English liberty, for which the Provinces were contending. It was not surprising that they were bitter, getting nothing in their hour of distress from the land of Luther but dogmas and

Augsburg catechisms instead of money and gunpowder, and seeing German reiters galloping daily to reinforce the army of Parma, in exchange for Spanish ducats.

Brave old La Noue, with the iron arm, noblest of Frenchmen and Huguenots—who had just spent five years in Spanish bondage, writing military discourses in a reeking dungeon filled with toads and vermin, after fighting the battle of liberty for a life-time, and with his brave son already in the Netherlands emulating his father’s valour on the same field—denounced, at a little later day, the lukewarmness of Protestant Germany with whimsical vehemence: — „I am astounded,” he cried, „that these princes are not ashamed of themselves; doing nothing while they see the oppressed cut to pieces at their gates. When will God grant me grace to place me among those who are doing their duty, and afar from those who do nothing, and who ought to know that the cause is a common one? If I am ever caught dancing the German cotillon, or playing the German flute, or eating pike with German sauce, I hope it may be flung in my teeth.”<sup>1</sup>

The great league of the Pope and Philip was steadily consolidating itself, and there were but gloomy prospects for the counter-league in Germany. There was no hope but in England and France. For the reasons already indicated, the Prince of Orange, taking counsel with the Estates, had resolved to try the French policy once more. The balance of power in Europe, which no man in Christendom so well understood as he, was to be established by maintaining (he thought) the equilibrium between France and Spain. In the antagonism of those two great realms lay the only hope for Dutch or European liberty. Notwithstanding the treason of Anjou, therefore, it had been decided to renew

<sup>1</sup> Groen v. Prinsterer, „Archives,” &c. i. 227.

<sup>1</sup> Groen v. Prinsterer, „Archives,” &c., i. 85.



negotiations with that Prince. On the death of the Duke, the envoys of the States were accordingly instructed to make the offer to King Henry III. which had been intended for his brother. That proposition was the sovereignty of all the Netherlands, save Holland and Zeeland, under a constitution maintaining the reformed religion and the ancient laws and privileges of the respective Provinces.

But the death of Francis of Anjou had brought about a considerable change in French policy. It was now more sharply defined than ever, a right-angled triangle of almost mathematical precision. The three Henrys and their partizans divided the realm into three hostile camps—threatening each other in simulated peace since the treaty of Fleix (1580), which had put an end to the „lover's war” of the preceding year,—Henry of Valois, Henry of Guise, and Henry of Navarre.

Henry III., last of the Valois line, was now thirty-three years of age. Less than king, less even than man, he was one of those unfortunate personages who seem as if born to make the idea of royalty ridiculous, and to test the capacity of mankind to eat and drink humiliation as if it were wholesome food. It proved how deeply engraved in men's minds of that century was the necessity of kingship, when the hardy Netherlanders, who had abjured one tyrant, and had been fighting a generation long rather than return to him, were now willing to accept the sovereignty of a thing like Henry of Valois.

He had not been born without natural gifts, such as Heaven rarely denies to prince or peasant; but the courage which he once possessed had been exhausted on the field of Moncontour, his manhood had been left behind him at Venice, and such wit as Heaven had endowed him withal was now expended in darting viperous epigrams at court-ladies whom he was only capable of dishonouring by calumny, and whose

charms he burned to outrival in the estimation of his minions. For the monarch of France was not unfrequently pleased to attire himself like a woman and a harlot. With silken flounces, jewelled stomacher, and painted face, with pearls of great price adorning his bared neck and breast, and satin-slipped feet, of whose delicate shape and size he was justly vain, it was his delight to pass his days and nights in a ceaseless round of gorgeous festivals, tourneys, processions, masquerades, banquets, and balls, the cost of which glittering frivolities caused the popular burthen and the popular execration to grow, from day to day, more intolerable and more audible. Surrounded by a gang of „minions,” the most debauched and the most desperate of France, whose bedizened dresses exhaled perfumes throughout Paris, and whose sanguinary encounters dyed every street in blood, Henry lived a life of what he called pleasure, careless of what might come after, for he was the last of his race. The fortunes of his minions rose higher and higher, as their crimes rendered them more and more estimable in the eyes of a King who took a woman's pride in the valour of such champions to his weakness, and more odious to a people whose miserable homes were made even more miserable, that the coffers of a few court-favourites might be filled. Now sauntering, full-dressed, in the public promenades, with ghastly little death's heads strung upon his sumptuous garments, and fragments of human bones dangling among his orders of knighthood—playing at cup and ball as he walked, and followed by a few select courtiers who gravely pursued the same exciting occupation—now presiding like a queen of beauty at a tournament to assign the prize of valour, and now, by the advice of his mother, going about the streets in robes of penitence, telling his beads as he went, that the populace might be edified by his piety, and solemnly offering up

prayers in the churches that the blessing of an heir might be vouchsafed to him. — Henry of Valois seemed straining every nerve in order to bring himself and his great office into contempt.

As orthodox as he was profligate, he hated the Huguenots, who sought his protection and who could have saved his throne, as cordially as he loved the Jesuits, who passed their lives in secret plottings against his authority and his person, or in fierce denunciations from the Paris pulpits against his manifold crimes. Next to an exquisite and sanguinary fop, he dearly loved a monk. The presence of a friar, he said, exerted as agreeable an effect upon his mind as the most delicate and gentle tickling could produce upon his body; <sup>1</sup> and he was destined to have a fuller dose of that charming presence than he coveted.

His party—for he was but the nominal chief of a faction, *tanquam unus ex nobis*—was the party in possession—the office-holders' party; the spoilsmen, whose purpose was to rob the exchequer and to enrich themselves. His minions—for the favourites were called by no other name—were even more hated, because less despised, than the King. Attired in cloth of gold—for silk and satin were grown too coarse a material for them—with their little velvet porringer-caps stuck on the sides of their heads, with their long hair stiff with pomatum, and their heads set inside a well-starched ruff a foot wide, „like St. John's head in a charger,” as a splenetic contemporary observed, <sup>2</sup> with a nimbus of musk and violet-powder enveloping them as they passed before vulgar mortals, these rapacious and insolent courtiers were the impersonation of extortion and oppression to the Parisian populace. They were supposed, not unjustly, to pass their lives in dancing,

blasphemy, duelling, dicing, and intrigue, in following the King about like hounds, fawning at his feet, and showing their teeth to all besides; and for virtues such as these they were rewarded by the highest offices in church, camp, and state, while new taxes and imposts were invented almost daily to feed their avarice and supply their extravagance. France, doomed to feel the beak and talons of these harpies in its entrails, impoverished by a government that robbed her at home while it humiliated her abroad, struggled vainly in its misery, and was now on the verge of another series of internecine combats—civil war seeming the only alternative to a voluptuous and licentious peace. <sup>1</sup>

„We all stood here at gaze,” wrote ambassador Stafford to Walsingham, „looking for some great matter to come of this sudden journey to Lyons; but, as far as men can find, *parturiunt montes*, for there hath been nothing but dancing and banqueting from one house to another, bravery in apparel, glittering like the sun.” <sup>2</sup> He mentioned that the Duke of Epemon's horse, taking fright at a red cloak, had backed over a precipice, breaking his own neck, while his master's shoulder merely was put out of joint. At the same time the Duke of Joyeuse, coming over Mount Cenis, on his return from Savoy, had broken his wrist. The people, he said,

<sup>1</sup> „Quant à leur habit, il excède  
Tout leur bien et tout leur trésor,  
Car le mignon qui tout consomme,  
Ne se vest plus en gentilhomme,  
Mais comme un prince de drap d'or;  
Et pour mieux contenter  
Leur jen, leur pompe, leur bobance,  
Et leur trop prodigue dépense,  
Il faut tous les jours inventer  
Nouveaux impôts, nouvelles tailles,  
Qu'il faut du profond des entrailles  
Des pauvres sujets arracher,  
Qui traînent leurs chetives vies.  
Sous la griffe de ces harpies,  
Qui avalent tout sans macher,” &c.  
*L'Estoile, ubi sup.*

<sup>1</sup> De Thou, x. 667.

<sup>2</sup> L'Estoile, „Registre Journal de Henry III.,” ed. Michaud et Poujoulat, p. 72 seq.

<sup>2</sup> Stafford to Walsingham, 24th Aug. 1584, in Murdin ii. 415-419.

would rather they had both broken their necks „than any other joint, the King having racked the nation for their sakes, as he hath done.”<sup>1</sup> Stafford expressed much compassion for the French in the plight in which they found themselves. „Unhappy people!” he cried, „to have such a King, who seeketh nothing but to impoverish them to enrich a couple, and who careth not what cometh after his death, so that he may rove on while he liveth, and careth neither for doing his own estate good nor his neighbour's state harm.” Sir Edward added, however, in a philosophizing vein, worthy of Corporal Nym, that; „seeing we cannot be so happy as to have a King to concur with us to do us any good, yet we are happy to have one that his humour serveth him not to concur with others to do us harm; and 'tis a wisdom for us to follow these humours that we may keep him still in that humour, and from hearkening to others that may egg him on to worse.”<sup>2</sup>

It was a dark hour for France, and rarely has a great nation been reduced to a lower level by a feeble and abandoned government than she was at that moment under the distaff of Henry III. Society was corrupted to its core. „There is no more truth, no more justice, no more mercy,” moaned President L'Etoile. „To slander, to lie, to rob, to wench, to steal; all things are permitted save to do right and to speak the truth.” Impiety the most cynical, debauchery the most unveiled, public and unpunished homicides, private murders by what was called magic, by poison, by hired assassins, crimes natural, unnatural, and preternatural, were the common characteristics of the time.<sup>3</sup> All posts and charges were venal. Great offices of justice were sold to be the highest bid-

der, and that which was thus purchased by wholesale was retailed in the same fashion. Unhappy the pauper client who dreamed of justice at the hands of law. The great ecclesiastical benefices were equally matter of merchandise, and married men, women, unborn children, enjoyed revenues as dignitaries of the church. Infants came into the world, it was said, like the mitre-fish, stamped with the emblems of place.<sup>1</sup>

„'Twas impossible,” said L'Etoile, „to find a crab so tortuous and back-sliding as the government.”<sup>2</sup>

This was the aspect of the first of the three factions in France. Such was the Henry at its head, the representative of royalty.

Henry with the Scar, Duke of Guise, the well-known chief of the house of Lorraine, was the chief of the extreme papistical party. He was now thirty-four years of age, tall, stately, with a dark, martial face and dangerous eyes, which Antonio Moro loved to paint; a physiognomy made still more expressive by the arquebus-shot which had damaged his left cheek at the fight near Château-Thierry and gained him his name of Balaféré. Although one of the most turbulent and restless plotters of that plotting age, he was yet thought more slow and heavy in character than subtle, Teutonic rather than Italian. He was the idol of the Parisian burghers. The grocers, the market-men, the members of the arquebus and crossbow clubs, all doted on him. The fishwomen worshipped him as a god. He was the defender of the good old religion under which Paris and the other cities of France had thriven; the uncompromising opponent of the new-fangled doctrines which western clothiers, and dyers, and tapestry-workers had adopted, and which the nobles of the mountain-country, the penniless chevaliers of Béarn and Gas-

<sup>1</sup> Ibid.

<sup>2</sup> Stafford to Walsingham, *ubi sup.*

<sup>3</sup> L'Etoile, 97, 98; Perefex, *Histoire du Roi Henri le Grand*, ed. 1816, p. 92.

<sup>1</sup> Perefex, L'Etoile, *ubi sup.*

<sup>2</sup> L'Etoile, *ubi sup.*



cony and Guienne, were ceaselessly taking the field and plunging France into misery and bloodshed to support. But for the Balafré and Madam League—as the great Spanish Catholic conspiracy against the liberties of France, and of England, and of all Europe, was affectionately termed by the Paris populace—honest Catholics would fare no better in France than they did in England, where, as it was well known, they were every day subjected to fearful tortures. The shop-windows were filled with coloured engravings, representing, in exaggerated fashion, the sufferings of the English Catholics under bloody Elizabeth, or Jezebel, as she was called; and, as the gaping burghers stopped to ponder over these works of art, there were ever present, as if by accident, some persons of superior information who would condescendingly explain the various pictures, pointing out with a long stick the phenomena most worthy of notice. 1 These caricatures proving highly successful, and being suppressed by order of government, they were repeated upon canvas on a larger scale, in still more conspicuous situations, as if in contempt of the royal authority, which sullied itself by compromise with Calvinism. 2 The pulpits, meanwhile, thundered denunciations on the one hand against the weak and wicked King, who worshipped idols, and who sacrificed the dearly-earned pittance of his subjects to feed the insolent pomp of his pampered favourites; and on the other, upon the arch-heretic, the arch-apostate, the Béarnese Huguenot, who, after, the death of the reigning monarch, would have the effrontery to claim his throne, and to introduce into France the persecutions and the horrors under which unhappy England was already groaning.

The scarce-concealed instigator of these assaults upon the royal and upon the Huguenot faction was, of course, the

Duke of Guise,—the man whose most signal achievement had been the Massacre of St. Bartholomew—all the preliminary details of that transaction having been arranged by his skill. So long as Charles IX. was living, the Balafré had created the confusion which was his element by entertaining and fomenting the perpetual intrigues of Anjou and Alençon against their brother; while the altercations between them and the Queen-Mother and the furious madman who then sat upon the throne, had been the cause of sufficient disorder and calamity for France. On the death of Charles IX. Guise had sought the intimacy of Henry of Navarre, that by his means he might frustrate the hopes of Alençon for the succession. During the early period of the Béarnese's residence at the French court the two had been inseparable, living together, going to the same festivals, tournaments, and masquerades, and even sleeping in the same bed. „My master,” was ever Guise's address to Henry; „my gossip,” the young King of Navarre's reply. But the crafty Béarnese had made use of the intimacy only to read the secrets of the Balafré's heart; and on Navarre's flight from the court, and his return to Huguenotism, Guise knew that he had been played upon by a subtler spirit than his own. The simulated affection was now changed into undisguised hatred. Moreover, by the death of Alençon, Navarre now stood next to the throne, and Guise's plots became still more extensive and more open as his own ambition to usurp the crown on the death of the childless Henry III. became more fervid. 1

Thus, by artfully inflaming the populace of Paris, and—through his organised bands of confederates—that of all the large towns of France, against the Huguenots and their chief, by appeals to the religious sentiment; and at the same

1 De Thou, ix. 269, 270, *seq.*      2 *Ibid.*

1 Preface, 28 *seq.*



time by stimulating the disgust and indignation of the tax-payers everywhere at the imposts and heavy burthens which the boundless extravagance of the court engendered, Guise paved the way for the advancement of the great League which he represented. The other two political divisions were ingeniously represented as mere insolent factions, while his own was the true national and patriotic party, by which alone the ancient religion and the cherished institutions of France could be preserved. 1

And the great chief of this national patriotic party was not Henry of Guise, but the industrious old man who sat writing despatches in the depths of the Escorial. Spanish counsels, Spanish promises, Spanish ducats—these were the real machinery by which the plots of Guise against the peace of France and of Europe were supported. Madam League was simply Philip II. Nothing was written, officially or unofficially, to the French government by the Spanish court that was not at the same time communicated to „Mucio”—as the Duke of Guise was denominated in the secret correspondence of Philip,—and Mucio was in Philip's pay, his confidential agent, spy, and confederate, long before the actual existence of the League was generally suspected.

The Queen-Mother, Catherine de' Medici, played into the Duke's hands. Throughout the whole period of her widowhood, having been accustomed to govern her sons, she had, in a certain sense, been used to govern the kingdom. By sowing dissensions among her own children, by inflaming party against party, by watching with care the oscillations of France—so that none of the great divisions should obtain preponderance—by alternately caressing and massacring the Huguenots, by cajoling or confronting Philip, by keeping, as she boasted, a spy in every family that

possessed the annual income of two thousand livres, by making herself the head of an organized system of harlotry, by which the soldiers and politicians of France were inveigled, their secrets faithfully revealed to her by her well-disciplined maids of honour, by surrounding her unfortunate sons with temptation from earliest youth, and plunging them by cold calculation into deepest debauchery, that their enervated faculties might be ever forced to rely in political affairs on the maternal counsel, and to abandon the administration to the maternal will; such were the arts by which Catherine had maintained her influence, and a great country been governed for a generation—Machiavelian state-craft blended with the more simple wiles of a procuress.

Now that Alençon was dead, and Henry III. hopeless of issue, it was her determination that the children of her daughter, the Duchess of Lorraine, should succeed to the throne. The matter was discussed as if the throne were already vacant, and Guise and the Queen-Mother, if they agreed in nothing else, were both cordial in their detestation of Henry of Navarre. The Duke affected to support the schemes in favour of his relatives, the Princes of Lorraine, while he secretly informed the Spanish court that this policy was only a pretence. He was not likely, he said, to advance the interests of the younger branch of a house of which he was himself the chief, nor were their backs equal to the burthen. It was necessary to amuse the old queen, but he was profoundly of opinion that the only sovereign for France, upon the death of Henry, was Philip II. himself. This was the Duke's plan of arriving, by means of Spanish assistance, at the throne of France; and such was Henry le Balafre, chief of the League. 1

And the other Henry, the Huguenot,

1 De Thou, *Prefixe*, *ubi sup.*

1 De Thou, ix. 267.

the Béarnese, Henry of Bourbon, Henry of Navarre, the chieftain of the Gascon chivalry, the king errant, the hope and the darling of the oppressed Protestants in every land—of him it is scarce needful to say a single word. At his very name a figure seems to leap forth from the mist of three centuries, instinct with ruddy vigorous life. Such was the intense vitality of the Béarnese prince, that even now he seems more thoroughly alive and recognizable than half the actual personages who are fretting their hour upon the stage.

We see, at once, a man of moderate stature, light, sinewy, and strong; a face browned with continual exposure, small, mirthful, yet commanding blue eyes, glittering from beneath an arching brow, and prominent cheekbones; a long hawk's nose, almost resting upon a salient chin, a pendent moustache, and a thick, brown, curly beard, prematurely grizzled; we see the mien of frank authority and magnificent good humour, we hear the ready sallies of the shrewd Gascon mother-wit, we feel the electricity which flashes out of him, and sets all hearts around him on fire, when the trumpet sounds to battle. The headlong desperate charge, the snow-white plume waving where the fire is hottest, the large capacity for enjoyment of the man, rioting without affectation in the *certaminis gaudia*, the insane gallop, after the combat, to lay its trophies at the feet of the Cynthia of the minute, and thus to forfeit its fruits; all are as familiar to us as if the seven distinct wars, the hundred pitched battles, the two hundred sieges, in which the Béarnese was personally present, had been occurrences of our own day.

He at least was both king and man, if the monarch who occupied the throne was neither. He was the man to prove, too, for the instruction of the patient letter-writer of the Escorial, that the crown of France was to be won with foot in stirrup and carbine in hand, rather than to be caught by the weaving

and casting of the most intricate nets of diplomatic intrigue, though thoroughly weighted with Mexican gold.

The King of Navarre was now thirty-one years old; for the three Henrys were nearly of the same age. The first indications of his existence had been recognized amid the cannon and trumpets of a camp in Picardy, and his mother had sung a gay Béarnese song as he was coming into the world at Pau. Thus, said his grandfather, Henry of Navarre, thou shalt not bear to us a morose and sulky child. The good king, without a kingdom, taking the child, as soon as born, in the lappel of his dressing-gown, had brushed his infant lips with a clove of garlic, and moistened them with a drop of generous Gascon wine. Thus, said the grandfather again, shall the boy be both merry and bold. There was something mythologically prophetic in the incidents of his birth.

The best part of Navarre had been long since appropriated by Ferdinand of Aragon. In France there reigned a young and warlike sovereign with four healthy boys. But the new-born infant had inherited the lilies of France from St. Louis, and a later ancestor had added to the escutcheon the motto „Espoir.” His grandfather believed that the boy was born to revenge upon Spain the wrongs of the House of Albret, and Henry's nature seemed ever pervaded with Robert of Clermont's device.

The same sensible grandfather, having different views on the subject of education from those manifested by Catherine de' Medici towards her children, had the boy taught to run about bareheaded and barefooted, like a peasant, among the mountains and rocks of Béarn, till he became as a young bear, and as nimble as a kid. Black bread, and beef, and garlic, were his simple fare; and he was taught by his mother and his grandfather to hate lies and liars, and to read the Bible.

When he was fifteen the third reli-

gious war broke out. Both his father and grandfather were dead. His mother, who had openly professed the reformed faith, since the death of her husband, who hated it, brought her boy to the camp at Rochelle, where he was received as the chief of the Huguenots. His culture was not extensive. He had learned to speak the truth, to ride, to shoot, to do with little sleep and less food. He could also construe a little Latin, and had read a few military treatises; but the mighty hours of an eventful life were now to take him by the hand, and to teach him much good and much evil, as they bore him onward. He now saw military treatises expounded practically, by professors like his uncle Condé, and Admiral Coligny, and Lewis Nassau, in such lecture-rooms as Laudun, and Jarnac, and Moncontour, and never was apter scholar.

The peace of Arnay-le-Duc succeeded, and then the fatal Bartholomew marriage with the Messalina of Valois. The faith taught in the mountains of Béarn was no buckler against the demand of „the mass or death,” thundered at his breast by the lunatic Charles, as he pointed to thousands of massacred Huguenots. Henry yielded to such conclusive arguments, and became a Catholic. Four years of court-imprisonment succeeded, and the young King of Navarre, though proof to the artifices of his gossip Guise, was not adamant to the temptations spread for him by Catherine de' Medici. In the harem entertained for him in the Louvre many pitfalls entrapped him; and he became a stock-performer in the state comedies and tragedies of that plotting age.

A silken web of palace-politics, palace-diplomacy, palace-revolutions, enveloped him. Schemes and counterschemes, stratagems and conspiracies, assassinations and poisonings; all the state-machinery which worked so exquisitely in fair ladies' chambers, to spread havoc and desolation over a kingdom, were displayed before his eyes. Now campaigning with one

royal brother against Huguenots, now fighting with another on their side, now solicited by the Queen-Mother to attempt the life of her son, 1 now implored by Henry III. to assassinate his brother, 2 the Béarnese, as fresh antagonisms, affinities, combinations, were developed, detected, neutralized, almost daily, became rapidly an adept in Medicean state-chemistry. Charles IX. in his grave, Henry III. on the throne, Alençon in the Huguenot camp—Henry at last made his escape. The brief war and peace of Monsieur succeeded, and the King of Navarre formally abjured the Catholic creed. The parties were now sharply defined. Guise mounted upon the League, Henry astride upon the Reformation, were prepared to do battle to the death. The temporary „war of the amorous” was followed by the peace of Fleix.

Four years of peace again; four fat years of wantonness and riot preceding fourteen hungry famine-stricken years of bloodiest civil war. The voluptuousness and infamy of the Louvre were almost paralleled in vice, if not in splendour, by the miniature court at Pau. Henry's Spartan grandfather would scarce have approved the courses of the youth whose education he had commenced on so simple a scale. For Margaret of Valois, hating her husband, and living in most undisguised and promiscuous infidelity to him, had profited by her mother's lessons. A seraglio of maids of honour ministered to Henry's pleasures, and were carefully instructed that the peace and war of the kingdom were playthings in their hands. While at Paris royalty was hopelessly sinking in a poisonous marsh, there was danger that even the hardy nature of the Béarnese would be mortally enervated by the atmosphere in which he lived. 3

The unhappy Henry III., baited by

1 Prefixe, 28.

2 Ibid. 38, 39.

3, *Mémoires d'Agrippa d'Aubigné*, ed. 1854. Appendix, xvii. p. 237.



the Guises, worried by Alençon and his mother, implored the King of Navarre to return to Paris and the Catholic faith. M. de Ségur chief of Navarre's council, who had been won over during a visit to the capital, where he had made the discovery that „Henry III. was an angel, and his ministers devils,” came back to Pau, urging his master's acceptance of the royal invitation. 1 Henry wavered. Bold D'Aubigné, staunchest of Huguenots, and of his friends, next day privately showed Ségur a palace-window opening on a very steep precipice over the Bayse, and cheerfully assured him that he should be flung from it, did he not instantly reverse his proceedings, and give his master different advice. If I am not able to do the deed myself, said D'Aubigné, here are a dozen more to help me. The chief of the council cast a glance behind him, saw a number of grim Puritan soldiers, with their hats plucked down upon their brows, looking very serious; so made his bow, and quite changed his line of conduct. 2

At about the same time Philip II. confidentially offered Henry of Navarre four hundred thousand crowns in hand, and twelve hundred thousand yearly, if he would consent to make war upon Henry III. 3 Mucio, or the Duke of Guise, being still in Philip's pay, the combination of Leaguers and Huguenots against the unfortunate Valois would, it was thought, be a good triangular contest.

1 D'Aubigné, „Mémoires,” p. 67, 68.

2 D'Aubigné, „Mémoires,” p. 67, 68.

3 „The Abp. of Colein told me that the Prince of Orange had acquainted him with a practice of the King of Spain's, which was an offer made to the King of Navarre of 400,000  $\Delta^*$  in ready money, and a 100,000  $\Delta^*$  monthly, if he would make wars with the French king—whereunto I answered, that I thought it done with a Spanish mind and cunning to draw the King of Navarre, as Sebastian of Portugal was, to his ruin and loss of life and kingdom, and by this means to destroy also the religion and churches in France,” &c. (Herle to Queen Elizabeth, 22nd July, 1584. S. P. Office MS.)

But Henry—no longer the unsophisticated youth who had been used to run barefoot among the cliffs of Coarasse—was grown too crafty a politician to be entangled by Spanish or Medicean wiles. The Duke of Anjou was now dead. Of all the princes who had stood between him and the throne, there was none remaining save the helpless, childless, superannuated youth who was its present occupant. The King of Navarre was legitimate heir to the crown of France. „Espoir” was now in letters of light upon his shield, but he knew that his path to greatness led through manifold dangers, and that it was only as the head of his Huguenot chivalry that he could cut his way. He was the leader of the nobles of Gascony, and Dauphiny, and Guienne, in their mountain fastnesses, of the weavers, cutlers, and artizans, in their thriving manufacturing and trading towns. It was not Spanish gold, but carbines and cutlasses, bows and bills, which could bring him to the throne of his ancestors.

And thus he stood, the chieftain of that great, austere party of Huguenots, the men who went on their knees before the battle, beating their breasts with their iron gauntlets, and singing in full chorus a psalm of David, before smiting the Philistines hip and thigh.

Their chieftain—scarcely their representative—fit to lead his Puritans on the battle-field, was hardly a model for them elsewhere. Yet, though profligate in one respect, he was temperate in every other. In food, wine, and sleep he was always moderate. Subtle and crafty in self-defence, he retained something of his old love of truth, of his hatred for liars. Hardly generous perhaps, he was a friend of justice, while economy in a wandering King, like himself, was a necessary virtue, of which France one day was to feel the beneficent action. Reckless and headlong in appearance, he was in truth the most careful of men. On the religious ques-



tion, most cautious of all, he always left the door open behind him, disclaimed all bigotry of opinion, and earnestly implored the Papists to seek, not his destruction, but his instruction. Yet, prudent as he was by nature in every other regard, he was all his life the slave of one woman or another, and it was by good luck rather than by sagacity that he did not repeatedly forfeit the fruits of his courage and conduct, in obedience to his master-passion.

Always open to conviction on the subject of his faith, he repudiated the appellation of heretic. A creed, he said, was not to be changed like a shirt, but only on due deliberation, and under spiritual advice. In his secret heart he probably regarded the two religions as his chargers, and was ready to mount alternately the one or the other, as each seemed the more likely to bear him safely in the battle. The Béarnese was no Puritan, but he was most true to himself and to his own advancement. His highest principle of action was to reach his goal, and to that principle he was ever loyal. Feeling, too, that it was the interest of France that he should succeed, he was even inspired—compared with others on the stage—by an almost lofty patriotism.

Amiable by nature and by habit, he had preserved the most unimpaired good-humour throughout the horrible years which succeeded St. Bartholomew, during which he carried his life in his hand, and learned not to wear his heart upon his sleeve. Without gratitude, without resentment, without fear, without remorse, entirely arbitrary, yet with the capacity to use all men's judgments; without convictions, save in regard to his dynastic interests, he possessed all the qualities necessary to success. He knew how to use his enemies. He knew how to use his friends, to abuse them, and to throw them away. He refused to assassinate Francis Alençon

at the bidding of Henry III., but he attempted to procure the murder of the truest of his own friends, and one of the noblest characters of the age—whose breast showed twelve scars received in his service—Agrippa D'Aubigné, because the honest soldier had refused to become his pimp—a service the King had implored upon his knees. 1

Beneath the mask of perpetual careless good-humour, lurked the keenest eyes, a subtle, restless, widely-combining brain, and an iron will. Native sagacity had been tempered into consummate elasticity by the fiery atmosphere in which feebler natures had been dissolved. His wit was a flashing and as quickly unsheathed as his sword. Desperate, apparently reckless temerity on the battle-field was deliberately indulged in, that the world might be brought to recognise a hero and chieftain in a King. The do-nothings of the Merovingian line had been succeeded by the Pepins; to the effete Carlovingians had come a Capet; to the impotent Valois should come a worthier descendant of St. Louis. This was shrewd Gascon calculation, aided by constitutional fearlessness. When despatch-writing, invisible Philips, star-gazing Rudolphs, and petticoated Henrys sat upon the thrones of Europe, it was wholesome to show the world that there was a King left who could move about in the bustle and business of the age, and could charge as well as most soldiers at the head of his cavalry; that there was one more sovereign fit to reign over men, besides the glorious Virgin who governed England.

Thus courageous, crafty, far-seeing, consistent, untiring, imperturbable, he was born to command, and had a right to reign. He was need of the throne, and the throne had still more need of him.

This then was the third Henry, | *repré-*

1 D'Aubigné, *Mémoires*, pp. 38-44.

sentative of the third side of the triangle, the reformers of the kingdom.

And before this bubbling caldron of France, where intrigues, foreign and domestic, conflicting ambitions, stratagems, and hopes, were whirling in never-ceasing tumult, was it strange if the plain Netherland envoys should stand somewhat aghast?

Yet it was necessary that they should ponder well the aspect of affairs; for all their hopes, the very existence of themselves and to their religion, depended upon the organization which should come of this chaos.

It must be remembered, however, that those statesmen—even the wisest or the best-informed of them—could not take so correct a view of France and its politics as it is possible for us, after the lapse of three centuries, to do. The interior leagues, subterranean schemes, conflicting factions, could only be guessed at; nor could the immediate future be predicted, even by such far-seeing politicians as William of Orange, at a distance, or Henry of Navarre, upon the spot.

It was obvious to the Netherlanders that France, although torn by faction, was a great and powerful realm. There had now been, with the brief exception of the lover's war in 1580, a religious peace of eight years' duration. The Huguenots had enjoyed tranquil exercise of their worship during that period, and they expressed perfect confidence in the good faith of the King. That the cities were inordinately taxed to supply the luxury of the court could hardly be unknown to the Netherlanders. Nevertheless they knew that the kingdom was the richest and most populous of Christendom, after that of Spain. Its capital, already called by contemporaries the „compendium of the world,” was described by travellers as „stupendous in extent and miraculous for its numbers.” It was even said to contain eight hundred thousand souls, and although its

actual population did not probably exceed three hundred and twenty thousand, yet this was more than double the number of London's inhabitants, and thrice as many as Antwerp could then boast, now that a great proportion of its foreign denizens had been scared away. Paris was at least by one hundred thousand more populous than any city of Europe, except perhaps the remote and barbarous Moscow, while the secondary cities of France, Rouen in the north, Lyons in the centre, and Marseilles in the south, almost equalled in size, business, wealth, and numbers, the capitals of other countries. In the whole kingdom were probably ten or twelve millions of inhabitants, nearly as many as in Spain, without her colonies, and perhaps three times the number that dwelt in England.

In a military point of view, too, the alliance of France was most valuable to the contiguous Netherlands. A few regiments of French troops, under the command of one of their experienced marshals, could block up the Spaniards in the Walloon Provinces, effectually stop their operations against Ghent, Antwerp, and the other great cities of Flanders and Brabant, and, with the combined action of the United Provinces on the north, so surround and cripple the forces of Parma, as to reduce the power of Philip, after a few vigorous and well-concerted blows, to an absolute nullity in the Low Countries. As this result was of as vital importance to the real interests of France and of Europe, whether Protestant or Catholic, as it was to the Provinces, and as the French government had privately manifested a strong desire to oppose the progress of Spain towards universal empire, it was not surprising that the States General, not feeling capable of standing alone, should make their application to France. This they had done with the knowledge and concurrence of the English government. What lay upon the surface the Netherland statesmen saw and pondered

well. What lurked beneath, they surmised as shrewdly as they could, but it was impossible, with plummet and fathom-line ever in hand, to sound the way with perfect accuracy, where the quicksands were ever shifting, and the depth of shallowness of the course perpetually varying. It was not easy to discover the intentions of a government which did not know its own intentions, and whose changing policy was controlled by so many hidden currents.

Moreover, as already indicated, the envoys and those whom they represented had not the same means of arriving at a result as are granted to us. Thanks to the liberality of many modern governments of Europe, the archives where the state-secrets of the buried centuries have so long mouldered, are now open to the student of history. To him who has patience and industry many mysteries are thus revealed, which no political sagacity or critical acumen could have divined. He leans over the shoulder of Philip the Second at his writing-table, as the King spells patiently out, with cipher-key in hand, the most concealed hieroglyphics of Parma or Guise or Mendoza. He reads the secret thoughts of „Fabius,”<sup>1</sup> as that cunctative Roman scrawls his marginal apostilles on each despatch; he pries into all the stratagems of Camillus, Hortensius, Mucius, Julius, Tullius, and the rest of those ancient heroes who lent their names to the diplomatic masqueraders of the 16th century: he enters the cabinet of the deeply pondering Burghley, and takes from the most private drawer the memoranda which record that minister's unutterable doubtings: he pulls from the dressinggown folds of the stealthy, softly-gliding Walsingham the last secret which he has picked from the Emperor's pigeon-holes, or the Pope's pocket, and which,

not Hatton, nor Buckhurst, nor Leicester, nor the Lord Treasurer, is to see; nobody but Elizabeth herself: he sits invisible at the most secret councils of the Nassaus and Barneveld and Buys, or pores with Farnese over coming victories, and vast schemes of universal conquest: he reads the latest bit of scandal, the minutest characteristic of king or minister, chronicled by the gossiping Venetians for the edification of the Forty: and after all this prying and eavesdropping, having seen the cross-purposes, the bribings, the windings, the fencings in the dark, he is not surprised, if those who were systematically deceived did not always arrive at correct conclusions.

Noel de Caron, Seigneur de Schoneval, had been agent of the States at the French court at the time of the death of the Duke of Anjou. Upon the occurrence of that event, La Mouillerie and Asseliers were deputed by the Provinces to King Henry III., in order to offer him the sovereignty which they had intended to confer upon his brother. <sup>1</sup> Meantime that brother, just before his death, and with the privity of Henry, had been negotiating for a marriage with the younger daughter of Philip II.—an arrangement somewhat incompatible with his contemporaneous scheme to assume the sovereignty of Philip's revolted Provinces. An attempt had been made at the same time to conciliate the Duke of Savoy, and invite him to the French court; but the Duc de Joyeuse, then on his return from Turin, was bringing the news, not only that the match with Anjou was not favoured—which, as Anjou was dead, was of no great consequence—but that the Duke of Savoy was himself to espouse the Infanta, and was

<sup>1</sup> The name usually assigned to Philip himself in the Paris-Simancas Correspondence.

<sup>1</sup> „Verhael van 't gene de heeren de la. Mouillerie ende van Asseliers hebben gedaan ende gebesoigneert, midtsgaders verstaen in henluyden reise naer Vrankryck aen den Coninck raeckende den last hen gegeven op mijne heeren de Generale Staten.” (Royal Archives at the Hague, MS)



therefore compelled to decline the invitation to Paris, for fear of offending his father-in-law. 1 Other matters were in progress, to be afterwards indicated, very much interfering with the negotiations of the Netherland envoys.

When La Mouillerie and Asseliers arrived at Rouen, on their road from Dieppe to Paris, they received a peremptory order from the Queen-Mother to proceed no farther. This prohibition was brought by an unofficial personage, and was delivered, not to them, but to Des Pruneaux, French envoy to the States General, who had accompanied the envoys to France. 2

After three weeks' time, during which they „kept themselves continually concealed in Rouen,” there arrived in that city a young nephew of Secretary Brulart, who brought letters empowering him to hear what they had in charge for the King. The envoys, not much flattered by such cavalier treatment on the part of him to whom they were offering a crown, determined to digest the affront as they best might, and, to save time, opened the whole business to this subordinate stripling. He received from them accordingly an ample memoir to be laid before his Majesty, and departed by the post the same night. Then they waited ten days longer, concealed as if they had been thieves or spies, rather than the representatives of a friendly power, on a more than friendly errand. 3

At last, on the 24th of July, after the deputies had been thus shut up a whole month, Secretary Brulart himself arrived from Fontainebleau. 4

He stated that the King sent his royal thanks to the States for the offer which they had made him, and to the deputies in particular for taking the trouble of so long a journey; but that he did not find his realm in condition to undertake a foreign war so inopportunistically. In every other regard, his Majesty offered the States „all possible favours and pleasures.” 1

Certainly, after having been thus kept in prison for a month, the ambassadors had small cause to be contented with this very cold communication. To be forbidden the royal presence, and to be turned out of the country without even an official and accredited answer to a communication in which they had offered the sovereignty of their fatherland, was not flattering to their dignity. „We little thought,” said they to Brulart, after a brief consultation among themselves, „to receive such a reply as this. It displeases us infinitely that his Majesty will not do us the honour to grant us an audience. We must take the liberty of saying, that 'tis treating the States, our masters, with too much contempt. Who ever heard before of refusing audience to public personages? Kings often grant audience to mere letter-carriers. Even the King of Spain never refused a hearing to the deputies from the Netherlands when they came to Spain to complain of his own government. The States General have sent envoys to many other kings and princes, and they have instantly granted audience in every case. His Majesty, too, has been very ill-informed of the contracts which we formerly made with the Duke of Anjou, and therefore a personal interview is the more necessary.” 2 As the envoys were obstinate on the point

1 Stafford to Walsingham, 29th Aug. 1584, in Murdin, ii. 419, 420.

2 „Lettre des Deputés en France au Prince d'Oranges du 16 Juillet, 1584,” (Hague Archives, MS.) This letter to William the Silent was written six days after his death.

3 MS. letter in Hague Archives, before cited.

4 „Rapport fait par Noel de Caron, aiant esté député de la part de Messeigneurs les

Etats generaux vers la Majesté du Roy de France, en l'assemblée des dicts Estats à Delft, le 5 Août, 1584,” (Hague Archives, MS.)

1 Report of Noel de Caron, MS. before cited.

2 Report of Noel de Caron, MS. before cited.



of Paris, Brulart said „that the King, although he should himself be at Lyons, would not prevent any one from going to the capital on his own private affairs; but would unquestionably take it very ill if they should visit that city in a public manner, and as deputies.” 1

Des Pruneaux professed himself „very grievous at this result, and desirous of a hundred deaths in consequence.” 2

They stated that they should be ready within a month to bring an army of 3000 horse and 13,000 foot into the field for the relief of Ghent, besides their military operations against Zutphen; and that the enemy had recently been ignominiously defeated in his attack upon Fort Lillo, and had lost 2000 of his best soldiers. 3

Here were encouraging facts; and it certainly was worth the while of the French sovereign to pause a moment before rejecting, without a hearing, the offer of such powerful and conveniently-situated Provinces.

Des Pruneaux, a man of probity and earnestness, but perhaps of insufficient ability to deal with such grave matters as now fell almost entirely upon his shoulders, 4 soon afterwards obtained audience of the King. Being most sincerely in favour of the annexation of the Netherlands to France, and feeling that now or never was the opportunity of bringing it about, he persuaded the King to send him back to the Provinces, in order to continue the negotiation directly with the States General. The timidity and procrastination of the court could be overcome no further.

The two Dutch envoys, who had stolen secretly to Paris, were indulged in a

most barren and unmeaning interview with the Queen-Mother. Before their departure from France, however, they had the advantage of much conversation with leading members of the royal council, of the parliaments of Paris and Rouen, and also with various persons professing the reformed religion. They endeavoured thus to inform themselves. as well as they could, why the King made so much difficulty in accepting their propositions, and whether, and by what means, his Majesty could be induced to make war in their behalf upon the King of Spain. 1

They were informed, that, *should Holland and Zeeland unite with the rest of the Netherlands*, the King „without any doubt would undertake the cause most earnestly.” His councillors, also—even those who had been most active in dissuading his Majesty from such a policy—would then be unanimous in supporting the annexation of the Provinces and the war with Spain. In such a contingency, with the potent assistance of Holland and Zeeland, the King would have little difficulty, within a very short time, in chasing every single Spaniard out of the Netherlands. To further this end, many leading personages in France avowed to the envoys their determination „to venture their lives and their fortunes, und to use all the influence which they possessed at court.”

The same persons expressed their conviction that the King, once satisfied by the Provinces as to conditions and reasons, would cheerfully go into the war, without being deterred by any apprehension as to the power of Spain. It was, however, fitting that each Province should chaffer as little as possible about details, but should give his Majesty every reasonable advantage. They should remember that they were dealing with „a great, powerful monarch, who was

1 Report of Noel de Caron, MS. before cited.

2 „Dont le dict Sr. des Epruneaux estoit en son particulier fort dolent, et se souhaita cent fois estre mort,” &c. (MS. Report before cited.)

3 MS. letter to the States-General before cited.

4 De Thou, ix. 251.

1, Verhael, &c., MS. before cited.

putting his realm in jeopardy, and not with a Duke of Anjou, who had everything to gain and nothing to lose." 1

All the Huguenots with whom the envoys conversed were excessively sanguine. Could the King be once brought, they said, to promise the Netherlands his protection, there was not the least fear but that he would keep his word. He would use all the means within his power; „yea, he would take the crown from his head," rather than turn back. Although reluctant to commence a war with so powerful a sovereign, having once promised his help, he would keep his pledge to the utmost, „for he was a King of his word," and had never broken and would never break his faith with those of the reformed religion. 2

Thus spoke the leading Huguenots of France, in confidential communication with the Netherland envoys, not many months before the famous edict of extermination published at Nemours.

At that moment the reformers were full of confidence; not foreseeing the long procession of battles and sieges which was soon to sweep through the land. Notwithstanding the urgency of the Papist for their extirpation, they extolled loudly the liberty of religious worship which Calvinists, as well as Catholics, were enjoying in France, and pointed to the fact that the adherents

of both religions were well received at court, and that they shared equally in offices of trust and dignity throughout the kingdom. 1

The Netherland envoys themselves bore testimony to the undisturbed tranquillity and harmony in which the professors of both religions were living and worshiping side by side „without reproach or quarrel" in all the great cities which they had visited. They expressed the conviction that the same toleration would be extended to all the Provinces when under French dominion; and, so far as their ancient constitutions and privileges were concerned, they were assured that the King of France would respect and maintain them with as much fidelity as the States could possibly desire. 2

Des Pruneaux, accompanied by the two States' envoys, departed forthwith for the Netherlands. On the 24th August, 1584, he delivered a discourse before the States General, in which he disclosed, in very general terms, the expectations of Henry III., and intimated very clearly that the different Provinces were to lose no time in making an unconditional offer to that monarch. With regard to Holland and Zeeland he observed that he was provided with a special commission to those Estates. 3

It was not long before one Province after the other came to the conclusion to offer the sovereignty to the King without written conditions, but with a general understanding that their religious freedom and their ancient constitutions were to be sacredly respected. Meantime, Des Pruneaux made his appearance in Holland and Zeeland, and declared the King's intentions of espousing the cause of the States, and of accepting the sovereignty of all the Provinces. He distinctly observed, however, that it was

1 Mouillerie and Asseliers, MS. before cited.

2 „Dus Verclarende oick bezunder die van de Religie, die wy gesproken hebben, dat zoo verre wy consten den Coninck zoo verre bringen dat hy ons beloofde te beschermen, wy niet en dorften vreessen oft hy en zoude ons houden ende zoude gebruycken alle zyne middelen, jae die crone van zynen hoofde, seggende dat hoe wel hy zeer qualycken es, ons totter oirlooge te brengen niet zonder oirzaecke, mids het es tegen eenen alzulcken machtigen Prince, dat hebbende belooft ons te helpen, dat hy nyet laten en zoude tselfde int neerste te houden, want hy es (zoo zy ons verclaerden) eenen Coninck van zynen worde zyn beloofte houdende, ende zelve die van der religie seyden ons, dat hy hen nemmermeer en hadde gefailleert van tgene hy hen beloofte hadde" (Mouilliere and Asseliers, Verhael, &c., MS. before cited).

1 Ibid.

2 Ibid.

3 Wagenaar, viii. 31 seq.

as sovereign, not as protector, that his Majesty must be recognised in Holland and Zeeland, as well as in the rest of the country.

Upon this grave question there was much debate and much difference of opinion. Holland and Zeeland had never contemplated the possibility of accepting any foreign sovereignty, and the opponents of the present scheme were loud and angry, but very reasonable in their remarks. 1

The French, they said, were no respecters of privileges nor of persons. The Duke of Anjou had deceived William of Orange and betrayed the Provinces. Could they hope to see farther than that wisest and most experienced prince? Had not the stout hearts of the Antwerp burghers proved a stronger defence to Brabant liberties than the „joyous entry” on the dread day of the „French fury,” it would have fared ill then and for ever with the cause of freedom and religion in the Netherlands. The King of France was a Papist, a Jesuit. He was incapable of keeping his pledges. Should they make the arrangement now proposed, and confer the sovereignty upon him, he would forthwith make peace with Spain, and transfer the Provinces back to that crown in exchange for the duchy of Milan, which France had ever coveted. The Netherlands, after a quarter of a century of fighting in defence of their hearths and altars, would find themselves handed over again, bound and fettered, to the tender mercies of the Spanish Inquisition. 2

The Kings of France and of Spain always acted in concert, for religion was the most potent of bonds. Witness the sacrifice of thousands of French soldiers to Alva by their own sovereign at Mons,

witness the fate of Genlis, witness the bloody night of St. Bartholomew, witness the Antwerp fury. Men cited and relied upon the advice of William of Orange as to this negotiation with France. But Orange never dreamed of going so far as now proposed. He was ever careful to keep the Provinces of Holland and Zeeland safe from every foreign master. That spot was to be holy ground. Not out of personal ambition—God forbid that they should accuse his memory of any such impurity—but because he wished one safe refuge for the spirit of freedom.

Many years long they had held out by land and sea against the Spaniards, and should they now, because this Des Pruneaux shrugged his shoulders, be so alarmed as to open the door to the same Spaniard wearing the disguise of a Frenchman? 1

Prince Maurice also made a brief representation to the States’ Assembly of Holland, in which, without distinctly opposing the negotiation with France, he warned them not to proceed too hastily with so grave a matter. He reminded them how far they had gone in the presentation of the sovereignty to his late father, and requested them, in their dealings with France, not to forget his interests and those of his family. He reminded them of the position of that family, overladen with debt contracted in their service alone. He concluded by offering most affectionately his service in any way in which he, young and inexperienced as he knew himself to be, might be thought useful; as he was long since resolved to devote his life to the welfare of his country. 2

These passionate appeals were ans-

1 „En zou ons nu ’tgerugt van zyne aankomst, en dat Pruneaux de schouders optrok, dermaate verbaazen, dat wy hem zelf als een Franschman vermoed, gingen inhaalen?” (Ibid.)

2 Bor, ii. (xix.) 488 seq.; Wagenaar viii. 39, 40.

1 Wagenaar, Bor, xix. 462.

2 „Vertoog van Gouda tegen den handel met Frankryk,” apud Bor, ii. 489 seq.; Wagenaar, viii. 41 seq.



wered with equal vehemence by those who had made up their minds to try the chances of the French sovereignty. Des Pruneaux, meanwhile, was travelling from province to province, and from city to city, using the arguments which have already been sufficiently indicated, and urging a speedy compliance with the French King's propositions. At the same time, in accordance with his instructions, he was very cautious to confine himself to generalities, and to avoid hampering his royal master with the restrictions which had proved so irksome to the Duke of Anjou.

„The States General demanded a copy of my speech,” he wrote the day after that harangue had been delivered, „but 25th Aug. I only gave them a brief out-

1584. line extending myself as little as I possibly could, according to the intention and command of your Majesty. When I got here I found them without hope of our assistance, and terribly agitated by the partizans of Spain. There was some danger of their going over in a panic to the enemy. They are now much changed again, and the Spanish partizans are beginning to lose their tongues. I invite them, if they intend to address your Majesty, to proceed as they ought towards a veritably grand monarch, without hunting up any of their old quibbles, or reservations of provinces, or anything else which could inspire suspicion. I have sent into Gelderland and Friesland, for I find I must stay here in Holland and Zeeland myself. These two Provinces are the gates and ramparts through which we must enter. 'Tis, in my opinion, what could be called superb, to command all the sea, thus subject to the crown of France. And France, too, with assistance of this country, will command the land as well. They are much astonished here, however, that I communicate nothing of the intention of your Majesty. They say that if your Majesty does not ac-

cept this offer of their country, your Majesty puts the rope around their necks.” 1

The French envoy was more and more struck with the brilliancy of the prize offered to his master. „If the King gets these Provinces,” said he to Catherine, „'twill be the most splendid inheritance which prince has ever conquered.” 2

In a very few weeks the assiduity of the envoy and of the French party was successful. All the other Provinces had very soon repeated the offer which they had previously made through Asseliers and La Mouillerie. By the beginning of October the opposition of Holland was vanquished. The Estates of that Province—three cities excepted, however—determined „to request England and France to assume a joint protectorate over the Netherlands. In case the King of France should refuse this proposition, they were then ready to receive him as prince and master, with knowledge and consent of the Queen of England, and on such conditions as the United States should approve.” 3

Immediately afterwards the General Assembly of all the States determined to offer the sovereignty to King Henry on conditions to be afterwards settled. 4

Des Pruneaux, thus triumphant, received a gold chain of the value of two thousand florins, and departed before the end of October for France. 5.

The departure of the solemn embassy to that country, for the purpose of offering the sovereignty to the King, was delayed till the beginning of January. Meantime it is necessary to cast a glance at the position of England in relation to these important transactions.

1 Groen v. Prinsterer, , Archives' &c., i. 1-3

2 Ibid., i. 4.

3 Wagenaar, viii. 49.

4 Ibid.; Bor, ii. 495, Hoofd, xxi. 945.

5 Wagenaar, viii. 51; , Resol. Holl., 24th Oct. 1584, bl. 651.



## CHAPTER III.

Policy of England—Schemes of the Pretender of Portugal—Hesitation of the French Court—Secret Wishes of France—Contradictory Views as to the Opinions of Netherlanders—Their Love for England and Elizabeth—Prominent Statesmen of the Provinces—Roger Williams the Welshman—Views of Walsingham, Burghley, and the Queen—An Embassy to Holland decided upon—Davison at the Hague—Cautious and Secret Measures of Burghley—Consequent Dissatisfaction of Walsingham—English and Dutch Suspicion of France—Increasing Affection of Holland for England.

THE policy of England towards the Provinces had been somewhat hesitating, but it had not been disloyal. It was almost inevitable that there should be timidity in the councils of Elizabeth, when so grave a question as that of confronting the vast power of Spain was forcing itself day by day more distinctly upon the consideration of herself and her statesmen. It was very clear, now that Orange was dead, that some new and decided step would be taken. Elizabeth was in favour of combined action by the French and English governments, in behalf of the Netherlands—a joint protectorate of the Provinces, until such time as adequate concessions on the religious question could be obtained from Spain. She was unwilling to plunge into the peril and expense of a war with the strongest power in the world. She disliked the necessity under which she should be placed of making repeated applications to her parliament, and of thus fostering the political importance of the Commons; she was reluctant to encourage rebellious subjects in another land, however just the cause of their revolt. She felt herself vulnerable in Ireland and on the Scottish border. Nevertheless, the Spanish power was becoming so preponderant, that, if the Netherlands were conquered, she could never feel a moment's security within her own territory. If the Provinces were annexed to France, on the other hand, she could not con-

template with complacency the increased power thus placed in the hands of the treacherous and jesuitical house of Valois.

The path of the Queen was thickly strewn with peril: her advisers were shrewd, far-seeing, patriotic, but some of them were perhaps over-cautious. The time had, however, arrived when the danger was to be faced, if the whole balance of power in Europe were not to come to an end, and weak states, like England and the Netherlands, to submit to the tyranny of an overwhelming absolutism. The instinct of the English sovereign, of English statesmen, of the English nation, taught them that the cause of the Netherlands was their own. Nevertheless, they were inclined to look on yet a little longer, although the part of spectator had become an impossible one. The policy of the English government was not treacherous, although it was timid. That of the French court was both the one and the other, and it would have been better both for England and the Provinces, had they more justly appreciated the character of Catherine de' Medici and her son.

The first covert negotiations between Henry and the States had caused much anxiety among the foreign envoys in France. Don Bernardino de Mendoza, who had recently returned from Spain, after his compulsory retreat from his post of English ambassador, was now established in Paris, as representative of Philip. He succeeded Tassis—a Netherlander by birth, and one of the ablest diplomatists in the Spanish service—and his house soon became the focus of intrigue against the government to which he was accredited—the very headquarters of the League. His salary was large, his way of living magnificent, his insolence intolerable.

„Tassis is gone to the Netherlands,” wrote envoy Busbecq to the Emperor,

„and thence is to proceed to Spain. Don Bernardino has arrived in his place. If it be the duty of a good ambassador to expend largely, it would be difficult to find a better one than he; for they say 'tis his intention to spend sixteen thousand dollars yearly in his embassy. I would that all things were in correspondence, and that he were not in other respects so inferior to Tassis.” 1

It is, however, very certain that Mendoza was not only a brave soldier, but a man of very considerable capacity in civil affairs, although his inordinate arrogance interfered most seriously with his skill as a negotiator. He was, of course, watching with much fierceness the progress of these underhand proceedings between the French court and the rebellious subjects of his master, and using threats and expostulations in great profusion. „Mucio,” too, the great stipendiary of Philip, was becoming daily more dangerous, and the adherents of the League were multiplying with great celerity.

The pretender of Portugal, Don Antonio, prior of Crato, was also in Paris; and it was the policy of both the French and the English governments to protect his person, and to make use of him as a rod over the head of Philip. Having escaped, after the most severe sufferings, in the mountains of Spain, where he had been tracked like a wild beast, with a price of thirty thousand crowns placed upon his head, he was now most anxious to stir the governments of Europe into espousing his cause, and into attacking Spain through the recently acquired kingdom of Portugal. Meantime, he was very desirous of some active employment, to keep himself from starving, and conceived the notion that it would be an excellent thing for the Netherlands and himself, were he to make good to them the loss of William the Silent.

„Don Antonio,” wrote Stafford, „made a motion to me yesterday, to move her Majesty, that now upon the Prince of Orange's death, as it is a necessary thing for them to have a governor and head, and him to be at her Majesty's devotion, if her Majesty would be at the means to work it for him, she should be assured nobody should be more faithfully tied in devotion to her than he. Truly you would pity the poor man's case, who is almost next door to starving in effect.” 1

A starving condition being, however, not the only requisite in a governor and head to replace the Prince of Orange, nothing came of this motion. Don Antonio remained in Paris, in a pitiable plight, and very much environed by dangers; for the Duke of Guise and his brother had undertaken to deliver him into the hands of Philip the Second, or those of his ministers, before the feast of St. John of the coming year. Fifty thousand dollars were to be the reward of this piece of work, combined with other services; „and the sooner they set about it the better,” said Philip, writing a few months later, „for the longer they delay it, the less easy they will find it.” 2

The money was never earned, however, and meantime Don Antonio made himself as useful as he could, in picking up information for Sir Edward Stafford and the other opponents of Spanish policy in Paris.

The English envoy was much embarrassed by the position of affairs. He felt sure that the French monarch would never dare to enter the lists against the King of Spain, yet he was accurately informed of the secret negotiations with the Netherlands, while in the dark as to the ultimate intentions of his own government.

„I was never set to school so much,”

1 Stafford to Walsingham, Murdin, ii. 412-415.

2 Philip II. to J. B. Tassis, 15 and 28 March, 1585. (Archivo general de Simancas. Negociado de Estado. Flandes. MS.)

1 Busbecqui, „Epist. ad Rud.” ii. p. 132.

he wrote to Walsingham (27th July, 1584), „as I have been to decipher the cause of the deputies of the Low Countries coming hither, the offers that they made the King here, and the King's manner of dealing with them.” 1

He expressed great jealousy at the mystery which enveloped the whole transaction; and much annoyance with Noelde Caron, who „kept very secret, and was angry at the motion,” when he endeavoured to discover the business in which they were engaged. Yet he had the magnanimity to request Walsingham not to mention the fact to the Queen, lest she should be thereby prejudiced against the States.

„For my part,” said he, „I would be glad in anything to further them, rather than to hinder them—though they do not deserve it—yet for the good the helping them at this time may bring ourselves.” 2

Meantime, the deputies went away from France, and the King went to Lyons, where he had hoped to meet both the Duke of Savoy and the King of Navarre. But Joyeuse, who had been received at Chambery with „great triumphs and tourneys,” brought back only a broken wrist, without bringing the Duke of Savoy; that potentate sending word that the „King of Spain had done him the honour to give him his daughter, and that it was not fit for him to do anything that might bring jealousy.” 3

Henry of Navarre also, as we have seen, declined the invitation sent him, M. de Ségur not feeling disposed for the sudden flight out of window suggested by Agrippa D'Aubigné; so that, on the whole, the King and his mother, with all the court, returned from Lyons in marvellous ill humour.

„The King storms greatly,” said Stafford, „and is in a great dump.” 4 It was less practicable than ever to discover the intentions of the government; for

although it was now very certain that active exertions were making by Des Pruneaux in the Provinces, it was not believed by the most sagacious that a serious resolution against Spain had been taken in France. There was even a talk of a double matrimonial alliance, at that very moment, between the two courts.

„It is for certain here said,” wrote Stafford, „that the King of Spain doth presently marry the dowager of France, and 'tis thought that, if the King of Spain marry, he will not live a year. Whensoever the marriage be,” added the envoy, „I would to God the effect were true, for if it be not by some such handy-work of God, I am afraid things will not go so well as I could wish.” 1

There was a lull on the surface of affairs, and it was not easy to sound the depths of unseen combinations and intrigues. There was also considerable delay in the appointment and the arrival of the new deputies from the Netherlands: and Stafford was as doubtful as ever as to the intentions of his own government.

„They look daily here for the States,” he wrote to Walsingham (29th Dec. 1584), „and I pray that I may hear from you, as soon as you may, what course I shall take when they be here, either hot or cold or lukewarm in the matter, and in what sort I shall behave myself. Some badly affected have gone about to put into the King's head that they never meant to offer the sovereignty, which, though the King be not thoroughly persuaded of, yet so much is won by this means that the king *hearkeneth to see* the end, and then to believe as he seeth cause, and in the mean time to speak no more of any such matter than if it had never been moved.” 2

While his Majesty was thus hearkening in order to see more, according to Sir Edward's somewhat Hibernian

1 Murdin, *ubi supra*.

2 Ibid.

3 Murdin, ii. 419, 420.

4 Ibid.

1 Ibid.

2 Murdin, ii. 431.



mode of expressing himself; and keeping silent that he might see the better, it was more difficult than ever for the envoy to know what course to pursue. Some persons went so far as to suggest that the whole negotiation was a mere phantasmagoria devised by Queen Elizabeth—her purpose being to breed a quarrel between Henry and Philip for her own benefit; and „then, seeing them together by the ears, as her accustomed manner was, to let them go alone, and sit still to look on.” 1

The King did not appear to be much affected by these insinuations against Elizabeth; but the doubt and the delay were very harassing. „I would to God,” wrote the English envoy, „that if the States mean to do anything here with the King, and if her Majesty and the council think it fit, they would delay no time, but go roundly either to an agreement or to a breach with the King. Otherwise, as the matter now sleepeth, so it will die, for the King must be taken in his humour when he begins to nibble at any bait, for else he will come away, and never bite a full bite while he liveth.” 2

There is no doubt that the bait at which Henry nibbled with much avidity was the maritime part of the Netherlands. Holland and Zeeland in the possession of either England or Spain, was a perpetual inconvenience to France. The King, or rather the Queen-Mother and her advisers—for Henry himself hardly indulged in any profound reflections on state-affairs,—desired and had made a *sine quâ non* of those Provinces. It had been the French policy, from the beginning, to delay matters, in order to make the States feel the peril of their position to the full.

„The King, differing and temporising,” wrote Herle to the Queen, „would have them fall into that necessity and danger, as that they should offer unto

him simply the possession of all their estates. Otherwise, they were to see, as in a glass, their evident and hasty ruin.” 1

Even before the death of Orange, Henry had been determined, if possible, to obtain possession of the island of Walcheren, which controlled the whole country. „To give him that,” said Herle, „would be to turn the hot end of the poker towards themselves, and put the cold part in the King’s hand. 2 He had accordingly made a secret offer to William of Orange, through the Princess, of two millions of livres in ready money, or, if he preferred it, one hundred thousand livres yearly of perpetual inheritance, if he would secure to him the island of Walcheren. In that case he promised to declare war upon the King of Spain, to confirm to the States their privileges, and to guarantee to the Prince the earldoms of Holland and Zeeland, with all his other lands and titles.” 3

1 Herle to Queen Elizabeth, MS. before cited.

2 Ibid.

3 „The French King’s inward intention being discovered in some manner to them and his faith holden suspected, Paul Buys at Delft to this effect willed me under secrecy and assurance to say unto your Majesty from him, that the said French King had two months since sounded the Prince of Orange by the Princess his wife, that, in case he could be content to put into his hands the island of Walcheren, the said King would immediately declare Spain his enemy, confirm to the States their privileges, and unto the Prince of Orange the earldoms of Holland and Zeeland, with all his other lands and titles, and give him over and above 100,000  $\Delta^*$  yearly of perpetual inheritance, well assured to him and his, where he would choose the same; or, if he thought better, he should have in ready money 2,000,000  $\Delta^*$  to bestow at his pleasure.

„But, saith Buys (his scope being once seen), he shall never be trusted by us, what hazard and extremity soever we run into; yet he excused the Prince that he was not French in mind, but for necessity and connivency, to conserve the churches in France and to breed jealousy and pique between those great kings, whereof the defence and relief of those countries and religion might ensue and be continued.” (Herle to Q. Elizabeth, MS. *ubi sup*).



It is superfluous to say that such offers were only regarded by the Prince as an affront. It was, however, so necessary, in his opinion, to maintain the cause of the reformed churches in France, and to keep up the antagonism between that country and Spain, that the French policy was not abandoned, although the court was always held in suspicion.

But on the death of William, there was a strong reaction against France, and in favour of England. Paul Buys one of the ablest statesmen of the Netherlands, Advocate of Holland, and a confidential friend of William the Silent up to the time of his death, now became the leader of the English party, and employed his most strenuous efforts against the French treaty—having „seen the scope of that court.” 1

With regard to the other leading personages, there was a strong inclination in favour of Queen Elizabeth, whose commanding character inspired great respect. At the same time warmer sentiments of adhesion seem to have been expressed towards the French court, by the same individuals, than the mere language of compliment justified.

Thus, the widowed Princess of Orange was described by Des Pruneaux to his sovereign as „very desolate, but nevertheless doing all in her power to advance his interests; the Count Maurice, of gentle hopes, as also most desirous of remaining his Majesty’s humble servant; while Elector Truchsess was said to be employing himself, in the same cause, with very great affection.” 2

A French statesman resident in the Provinces, whose name has not been preserved, but who was evidently on intimate terms with many eminent Netherlanders, declared that Maurice, „who had a mind entirely French, deplored infinitely the misfortunes of France, and

regretted that all the Provinces could not be annexed to so fair a kingdom. I do assure you,” he added, „that he is in no wise English.” 1

Of Count Hohenlo, general-in-chief of the States’ army under Prince Maurice, and afterwards his brother-in-law, the same gentleman spoke with even greater confidence. „Count d’Oloc,” said he (for by that ridiculous transformation of his name the German general was known to French and English), „with whom I have passed three weeks on board the fleet of the States, is now wholly French, and does not love the English at all. The very first time I saw him, he protested twice or thrice, in presence of members of the States General and of the state-council, that if he had no Frenchmen he could never carry on the war. He made more account, he said, of two thousand French than of six thousand others, English or Germans.” 2

Yet all these distinguished persons—the widowed Princess of Orange, Count Maurice, ex-electeur Truchsess, Count Hohenlo—were described to Queen Elizabeth by her confidential agent, then employed in the Provinces, as entirely at that sovereign’s devotion.

„Count Maurice holds nothing of the French, nor esteems them,” said Herle, „but humbly desired me to signify unto your Majesty that he had in his mind and determination faithfully vowed his service to your Majesty, which should be continued in his actions with all duty, and sealed with his blood; for he knew how much his father and the cause were beholden ever to your Highness’s goodness.” 3

The Princess, together with her sister-in-law Countess Schwartzenburg, and the young daughters of the late Prince, were described on the same occasion „as

1 Wagenaar, viii. 50.

2 Groen van Prinsterer, 'Archives,' &c., i. 2, 8.

1 Ibid. 15.

2 Ibid.

3 Letter of Herle, before cited.

recommending their service unto her Majesty with a most tender affection, as to a lady of all ladies." „Especially," said Herle, „did the two Princesses in most humble and wise sort, express a certain fervent devotion towards your Majesty." 1

Elector Truchsess was spoken of as „a prince well qualified and greatly devoted to her Majesty; who, after many grave and sincere words had of her Majesty's virtue, calling her la fille unique de Dieu, and la bien heureuse Princesse, desired of God that he might do her service as she merited." 2

And, finally, Count Hollock—who seemed to „be reformed in sundry things, if it hold" (a delicate allusion to the Count's propensity for strong potations), was said „to desire humbly to be known for one that would obey the commandment of her Majesty more than of any earthly prince living besides." 3

There can be no doubt that there was a strong party in favour of an appeal to England rather than to France. The Netherlands were too shrewd a people not to recognise the difference between the king of a great realm who painted his face and wore satin petticoats, and the woman who entertained ambassadors each in his own language, on gravest affairs of state, who matched in her wit and wisdom the deepest or the most sparkling intellects of her council, who made extemporaneous Latin orations to her universities, and who rode on horseback among her generals along the lines of her troops in battle-array, and yet was only the unmarried queen of a petty and turbulent state.

„The reverend respect that is borne to your Majesty throughout these countries is great," said William Herle. They would have thrown themselves into her arms, heart and soul, had they been cordially extended at that moment of

their distress, but she was coy, hesitating, and, for reasons already sufficiently indicated, although not so conclusive as they seemed, disposed to temporize, and to await the issue of the negotiations between the Provinces and France.

In Holland and Zeeland especially there was an enthusiastic feeling in favour of the English alliance. „They recommend themselves," said Herle, „throughout the country in their consultations and assemblies, as also in their common and private speeches, to the Queen of England's only favour and goodness, whom they call their saviour, and the Princess of greatest perfection in wisdom and sincerity that ever governed. Notwithstanding their treaty now on foot by their deputies with France, they are not more disposed to be governed by the French than to be tyrannized over by the Spaniard; concluding it to be alike; and even *commutare non sortem sed servitutem*." 1

Paul Buys was indefatigable in his exertions against the treaty with France, and in stimulating the enthusiasm for England and Elizabeth. He expressed sincere and unaffected devotion to the Queen on all occasions, and promised that no negotiations should take place, however secret and confidential, that were not laid before her Majesty. 2

1 Letter of Herle, before cited.

Sainte Aldegonde and Villers favoured the French policy. Sainte Aldegonde was burgomaster of Antwerp, but even in that city, although so many influential persons looked to France, the people generally had more confidence in England. „The accepting of the French King as prince of these countries," wrote Le Sieur to Walsingham, „is much sought by some that govern this day here; but in the ears of the common people it soundeth but evil, though the report be here that Holland and Zeeland have almost accepted him. If it would please her Majesty to give ear unto it, she could have the country cheap enough. Je juge que sa Majesté auroit bon marché de ce pays." (Le Sieur to Walsingham, 7 Sept. 1584, S. P. Office MS.)

2 Treslong, too, Admiral of Holland and

1 Letter of Herle, before cited.

2 Ibid. 3 Ibid.

„He has the chief administration among the States,” said Herle, „and to his credit and dexterity they attribute the despatch of most things. He showed unto me the state of the enemy throughout the Provinces, and of the negotiation in France, whereof he had no opinion at all of success, nor any will of his own part but to please the Prince of Orange in his lifetime.” 1

It will be seen in the sequel whether or not the views of this experienced and able statesman were lucid and comprehensive. It will also be seen whether his strenuous exertions in favour of the English alliance were rewarded as bountifully as they deserved by those most indebted to him.

Meantime he was busily employed in making the English government acquainted with the capacity, disposition, and general plans of the Netherlands.

„They have certain other things in consultation amongst the States to determine of,” wrote Herle, „which they were sworn not to reveal to any, but Buys protested that nothing should pass but to your liking and surety, and the same to be altered and disposed as should seem good to your Highness’s own

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Zeeland, and Governor of Ostend, made no secret of his preference for England. He avowed himself publicly her Majesty’s faithful servant. Entertaining hospitably at his table in Ostend, Captain Richards and other English officers who had come with troops from Flushing, he pledged a bumper to the Queen’s health, and another to that of Walsingham praying that Elizabeth might yet be his sovereign.

„Nevertheless,” said he, „I have letters from Zeeland, by which it appears that that province is about to deliver itself to the queen-mother of France.”

„And, begging your pardon,” said Richards, „what towns will you give them for garrison.”

„No towns at all,” answered the Admiral; „let them lie on the dykes!”

After dinner he conducted the English officers over the town, showing them the fortifications, and renewing his protestations of devotion to her Majesty. (Richards to Walsingham, 9 Sept. 1584, S. P. Office MS.)

1 Letter of Herle, before cited.

authority; affirming to me sincerely that Holland and Zeeland, with the rest of the Provinces, for the estimation they had of your high virtue and temperancy, would yield themselves absolutely to your Majesty and crown for ever, or to none other (their liberties only reserved), whereof you should have immediate possession, without reservation of place or privilege.” 1

The important point of the capability of the Provinces to defend themselves, about which Elizabeth was most anxious to be informed, was also fully elucidated by the Advocate. „The means should be such, proceeding from the Provinces,” said he, „as your Majesty might defend your interest therein with facility against the whole world.” He then indicated a plan, which had been proposed by the States of Brabant to the States General, according to which they were to keep on foot an army of 15,000 foot and 5000 horse, with which they should be able „to expulse the enemy and to reconquer their towns and country lost, within three months.” Of this army they hoped to induce the Queen to furnish 5000 English footmen and 500 horse, to be paid monthly by a treasurer of her own; and for the assistance thus to be furnished they proposed to give Ostend and Sluys as pledge of payment. According to this scheme the elector palatine, John Casimir, had promised to furnish, equip, and pay 2000 cavalry, taking the town of Maestricht and the country of Limburg, when freed from the enemy, in pawn for his disbursements; while Antwerp and Brabant had agreed to supply 300,000 crowns in ready money for immediate use. Many powerful politicians opposed this policy, however, and urged reliance upon France, „so that this course seemed to be lame in many parts.” 2

Agents had already been sent both to

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1 Letter of Herle, before cited.

2 Ibid.



England and France, to procure, if possible, a levy of troops for immediate necessity. The attempt was unsuccessful in France, but the Dutch community of the reformed religion in London subscribed nine thousand and five florins. 1 This sum, with other contributions, proved sufficient to set Morgan's regiment on foot, which soon after began to arrive in the Netherlands by companies. „But if it were all here at once,” said Stephen Le Sieur, „t would be but a breakfast for the enemy.” 2

The agent for the matter in England was De Griyse, formerly bailiff of Bruges; and although tolerably successful in his mission, he was not thought competent for so important a post, nor officially authorised for the undertaking. While procuring this assistance in English troops he had been very urgent with the Queen to further the negotiations between the States and France; 3 and Paul Buys was offended with him as a mischief-maker and an intriguer. He complained of him as having „thrust himself in, to deal and intermeddle in the affairs of the Low Countries unavowed,” and desired that he might be closely looked after. 4

After the Advocate, the next most important statesman in the Provinces was perhaps Meetkerk, president of the high court of Flanders, a man of much learning, sincerity, and earnestness of character; having had great experience in the diplomatic service of the country on many important occasions. „He stands second in reputation here,” said Herle, „and both Buys and he have one special care in all practises that are discovered, to examine how near anything may concern your person or kingdom, whereof they will advertise as matter shall fall out in importance.” 5

John van Olden-Barneveld, afterwards so conspicuous in the history of the country, was rather inclined, at this period, to favour the French party; a policy which was strenuously furthered by Villiers and by Sainte Aldegonde.

Besides the information furnished to the English government, as to the state of feeling and resources of the Netherlands, by Buys, Meetkerk, and William Herle, Walsingham relied much upon the experienced eye and the keen biting humour of Roger Williams.

A frank open-hearted Welshman, with no fortune but his sword, but as true as its steel, he had done the States much important service in the hard-fighting days of Grand Commander Requesens and of Don John of Austria. With a shrewd Welsh head under his iron morion, and a stout Welsh heart under his tawny doublet, he had gained little but hard knocks and a dozen wounds in his campaigning, and had but recently been ransomed, rather grudgingly, by his government, from a Spanish prison in Brabant. He was suffering in health from its effects, but was still more distressed in mind, from his sagacious reading of the signs the times. Fearing that England was growing lukewarm, and the Provinces desperate, he was beginning to find himself out of work, and was already casting about him for other employment. Poor, honest, and proud, he had repeatedly declined to enter the Spanish service. Bribes, such as at a little later period were sufficient to sully conspicuous reputations and noble names, among his countrymen in better circumstances than his own, had been freely but unsuccessfully offered him. To serve under any but the English or States' flag in the Provinces he scorned; and he thought the opportunity fast slipping away there for taking the Papistical party in Europe handsomely by the beard. He had done much manful work in the Netherlands, and was destined to do much more; but he was now discontented, and thought

1 Meteren, xii. 217.

2 Le Sieur to Walsingham, 7 Sept. 1584. P. Office MS.

3 Meteren, vii. 217.

4 Letter of Herle, MS.

5 Letter of Herle, MS.



himself slighted. In more remote regions of the world the thrifty soldier thought that there might be as good harvesting for his sword as in the thrice-trampled stubble of Flanders.

„I would refuse no hazard that it is possible to be done in the Queen's service," he said to Walsingham; „but I do persuade myself she makes no account of me. Had it not been for the duty that nature bound me towards her and my country, I needed not to have been in that case that I am in. Perhaps I could have fingered more pistoles than Mr. Newell, the late Latiner, and had better usage and pension of the Spaniards than he. Some can tell that I refused large offers, in the misery of Alost, of the Prince of Parma. Last of all, Verdugo offered me very fair, being in Loccum, to quit the States' service, and accept theirs, without treachery or betraying of place or man." 1

Not feeling inclined to teach Latin in Spain, like the late Mr. Newell, or to violate oaths and surrender fortresses, like brave soldiers of fortune whose deeds will be afterwards chronicled, he was disposed to cultivate the „acquaintance of divers Pollacks," from whom he had received invitations. „Find I nothing there," said he, „Duke Matthias has promised me courtesy if I would serve in Hungary. If not, I will offer service to one of the Turk's bashaws against the Persians." 2

Fortunately, work was found for the trusty Welshman in the old fields. His brave honest face often reappeared; his sharp sensible tongue uttered much sage counsel; and his ready sword did various solid service, in leaguer, battle-field, and martial debate, in Flanders, Holland, Spain, and France.

For the present, he was casting his keen glances upon the negotiations in

progress, and cavilling at the general policy which seemed predominant.

He believed that the object of the French was to trifle with the States, to protract interminably their negotiations, to prevent the English government from getting any hold upon the Provinces, and then to leave them to their fate.

He advised Walsingham to advance men and money, upon the security of Sluys and Ostend.

„I dare venture my life," said he, with much energy, „that were Norris, Bingham, Yorke, or Carlisle, in those ports, he would keep them during the Spanish King's life." 1

But the true way to attack Spain—a method soon afterwards to be carried into such brilliant effect by the naval heroes of England and the Netherlands—the long-sighted Welshman now indicated; a combined attack, namely, by sea upon the colonial possessions of Philip.

„I dare be bound," said he, „if you join with Treslong, the States' Admiral, and send off, both, threescore sail into his Indies, we will force him to retire from conquering further, and to be contented to let other princes live as well as he." 2

In particular, Williams urged rapid action, and there is little doubt, that had the counsels of prompt, quickwitted, ready-handed soldiers like himself, and those who thought with him, been taken; had the stealthy but quick-darting policy of Walsingham prevailed over the solemn and stately but somewhat ponderous proceedings of Burghley, both Ghent and Antwerp might have been saved, the trifling and treacherous diplomacy of Catherine de' Medici neutralized, and an altogether more fortunate aspect given at once to the state of Protestant affairs.

1 Roger Williams to Sir F. Walsingham, Sept. 1584. (S. P. Office MS.)

2 Ibid.

1 Roger Williams to Sir F. Walsingham, Sept. 1584. (S. P. Office MS.)

2 Ibid.

„If you mean to do anything,” said he, „it is more than time now. If you will send some man of credit about it, will it please your honour, I will go with him, because I know the humour of the people, and am acquainted with a number of the best. I shall be able to show him a number of their dealings, as well with the French as in other affairs, and perhaps will find means to send messengers to Ghent, and to other places, better than the States; for the message of one soldier is better than twenty boors.”<sup>1</sup>

It was ultimately decided—as will soon be related—to send a man of credit to the Provinces. Meantime, the policy of England continued to be expectant and dilatory, and Advocate Buys, after having in vain attempted to conquer the French influence, and bring about the annexation of the Provinces to England, threw down his office in disgust, and retired for a time from the contest. He even contemplated for a moment taking service in Denmark, but renounced the notion of abandoning his country, and he will accordingly be found, at a later period, conspicuous in public affairs.<sup>2</sup>

The deliberations in the English councils were grave and anxious, for it became daily more obvious that the Netherland question was the hinge upon which the whole fate of Christendom was slowly turning. To allow the Provinces to fall back again into the grasp of Philip, was to offer England herself as a last sacrifice to the Spanish Inquisition. This was felt by all the statesmen in the land; but some of them, more than the rest, had a vivid perception of the danger, and of the necessity of dealing with it at once.

To the prophetic eye of Walsingham, the mists of the future at times were

lifted; and the countless sails of the invincible Armada, wafting defiance and destruction to England, became dimly visible. He felt that the great Netherland bulwark of Protestantism and liberty was to be defended at all hazards, and that the death-grapple could not long be deferred.

Burghley, deeply pondering, but less determined, was still disposed to look on and to temporize.

The Queen, far-seeing and anxious, but somewhat hesitating, still clung to the idea of a joint protectorate. She knew that the re-establishment of Spanish authority in the Low Countries would be fatal to England, but she was not yet prepared to throw down the gauntlet to Philip. She felt that the proposed annexation of the Provinces to France would be almost as formidable; yet she could not resolve, frankly and fearlessly, to assume the burthen of their protection. Under the inspiration of Burghley, she was therefore willing to encourage the Netherlanders underhand; preventing them at every hazard from slackening in their determined hostility to Spain; discountenancing, without absolutely forbidding, their proposed absorption by France; intimating, without promising, an ultimate and effectual assistance from herself. Meantime, with something of feline and feminine duplicity, by which the sex of the great sovereign would so often manifest itself in the most momentous affairs, she would watch and wait, teasing the Provinces, dallying with the danger, not quite prepared as yet to abandon the prize to Henry or Philip, or to seize it herself.

The situation was rapidly tending to become an impossible one.

Late in October a grave conference was held in the English council, „upon the question whether her Majesty should presently relieve the States of the Low Countries.”

It was shown, upon one side, that

<sup>1</sup> Roger Williams to Sir F. Walsingham, Sept. 1584. (S. P. Office MS.)

<sup>2</sup> Wagenaar, viii. 50.

the „perils to the Queen and to the realm were great, if the King of Spain should recover Holland and Zeeland, as he had the other countries, for lack of succour in seasonable time, either by the French King or the Queen's Majesty.”

On the other side, the great difficulties in the way of effectual assistance by England, were „fully remembered.”

„But in the end, and upon comparison made,” said Lord Burghley, summing up, „betwixt the perils on the one part, and the difficulties on the other,” it was concluded that the Queen would be obliged to succumb to the power of Spain, and the liberties of England be hopelessly lost, if Philip were then allowed to carry out his designs, and if the Provinces should be left without succour at his mercy. 1

A „wise person” was accordingly to be sent into Holland; first, to ascertain whether the Provinces had come to an actual agreement with the King of France, and, if such should prove to be the case, to inquire whether that sovereign had pledged himself to declare war upon Philip. In this event, the wise person was to express her Majesty's satisfaction that the Provinces were thus to be „relieved from the tyranny of the King of Spain.”

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1 The report of the conference is in the State Paper Office, written in Burghley's own hand. A brief extract will give a characteristic specimen of the Lord Treasurer's style:—„But in the end, and upon comparison made betwixt the perils on the one part and the difficulties of the other, it was concluded to advise her Majesty rather to seek the avoiding and directing of the great perils, than, in respect of any difficulties, to suffer the King of Spain to grow to the full height of his designs and conquests, whereby the perils were to follow so evident as, if presently he were not by succouring of the Hollanders and their party impeached the Queen's Majesty should not hereafter be any wise able to withstand the same. And therefore it was thought good that her Majesty should send presently some wise person into Holland,” &c. (Holland Correspondence, S. P. Office, Oct. 10, 1584, MS.)

On the other hand, if it should appear that no such conclusive arrangements had been made, and that the Provinces were likely to fall again victims to the „Spanish tyranny,” her Majesty would then „strain herself as far as, with preservation of her own estate, she might, to succour them at this time.” 1

The agent was then to ascertain „what conditions the Provinces would require” upon the matter of succour, and, if the terms seemed reasonable, he would assure them that „they should not be left to the cruelties of the Spaniards.”

And further, the wise person, „being pressed to answer, might by conference of speeches and persuasions provoke them to offer to the Queen the ports of Flushing and Middelburg and the Brill, wherein she meant not to claim any property, but to hold them as gages for her expenses, and for performances of their covenants.”

He was also to make minute inquiries as to the pecuniary resources of the Provinces, the monthly sums which they would be able to contribute, the number of troops and of ships of war that they would pledge themselves to maintain. These investigations were very important, because the Queen, although very well disposed to succour them, „so nevertheless she was to consider how her power might be extended, without ruin or manifest peril to her own estate.”

It was also resolved, in the same conference, that a preliminary step of great urgency was to „procure a good peace with the King of Scots.” Whatever the expense of bringing about such a pacification might be, it was certain that a „great deal more would be expended in defending the realm against Scotland,” while England was engaged in hostilities with Spain. Otherwise, it was argued that her Majesty would be „so impeached by Scotland in favour of

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1 Ibid.



the King of Spain, that her action against that King would be greatly weakened."

Other measures necessary to be taken in view of the Spanish war were also discussed. The ex-electoral of Cologne, „a man of great account in Germany," was to be assisted with money to make head against his rival supported by the troops of Philip.

Duke Casimir of the Palatinate was to be solicited to make a diversion in Gelderland.

The King of France was to be reminded of his treaty with England for mutual assistance in case of the invasion by a foreign power of either realm, and to be reformed „not only of the intentions of the Spaniards to invade England, upon their conquest of the Netherlands, but of their actual invasion of Ireland."

It was „to be devised how the King of Navarre and Don Antonio of Portugal, for their respective titles, might be induced to offend and occupy the King of Spain, whereby to diminish his forces bent upon the Low Countries."

It was also decided that Parliament should be immediately summoned, in which, besides the request of a subsidy, many other necessary provisions should be made for her Majesty's safety.

„The conclusion of the whole," said Lord Burghley, with much earnestness, „was this. Although her Majesty should hereby enter into a war presently, yet were she better to do it now, while she may make the same out of her realm, having the help of the people of Holland, and before the King of Spain shall have consummated his conquests in those countries, whereby he shall be so provoked with pride, solicited by the Pope, and tempted by the Queen's own subjects, and shall be so strong by sea, and so free from all other actions and quarrels, - yea, shall be so formidable to all the rest of Christendom, as that her Majesty shall no wise be able with her own power, nor with aid of any

other, neither by sea nor land, to withstand his attempts, but shall be forced to give place to his insatiable malice, which is most terrible to be thought of, but miserable to suffer." 1

Thus did the Lord Treasurer wisely, eloquently, and well, describe the danger by which England was environed. Through the shield of Holland the spear was aimed full at the heart of England. But was it a moment to linger? Was that buckler to be suffered to fall to the ground, or to be raised only upon the arm of a doubtful and a treacherous friend? Was it an hour when the protection of Protestantism and of European liberty against Spain was to be entrusted to the hand of a feeble and priest-ridden Valois? Was it wise to indulge any longer in doubtings and dreamings, and in yet a little more folding of the arms to sleep, while that insatiable malice, so terrible to be thought of, so miserable to feel, was growing hourly more formidable, and approaching nearer and near?

Early in December, William Davison, gentleman-in-ordinary of her Majesty's household, arrived at the Hague; a man painstaking, earnest, and zealous, but who was fated, on more than one great occasion, to be made a scapegoat for the delinquencies of greater personages than himself.

He had audience of the States General on the 8th December. He then informed that body that the Queen had heard, with sorrowful heart, of the great misfortunes which the United Provinces had sustained since the death of the Prince of Orange; the many cities which they had lost, and the disastrous aspect of the common cause. Moved by the affection which she had always borne the country, and anxious for its preservation, she had ordered her ambassador Stafford to request the King of France to undertake, jointly with herself, the defence

1 MS. Report of Burghley, before cited.

of the Provinces against the King of Spain. Not till very lately, however, had that envoy succeeded in obtaining an audience, and he had then received „a very cold answer.” It being obvious to her Majesty, therefore, that the French government intended to protract these matters indefinitely, Davison informed the States that she had commissioned him to offer them „all possible assistance, to inquire into the state of the country, and to investigate the proper means of making that assistance most useful.” He accordingly requested the appointment of a committee to confer with him upon the subject; and declared that the Queen did not desire to make herself mistress of the Provinces, but only to be informed how she best could aid their cause. 1

A committee was accordingly appointed, and a long series of somewhat concealed negotiations was commenced. As the deputies were upon the eve of their departure for France, to offer the sovereignty of the Provinces to Henry, these proceedings were necessarily confused, dilatory, and at times contradictory.

After the arrival of the deputies in France, the cunctative policy inspired by the Lord Treasurer was continued by England. The delusion of a joint protectorate was still clung to by the Queen, although the conduct of France was becoming very ambiguous, and suspicion growing darker as to the ultimate and secret purport of the negotiations in progress. 2

The anxiety and jealousy of Elizabeth were becoming keener than ever. If the offers to the King were unlimited, he would accept them, and would thus become as dangerous as Philip. If they were unsatisfactory, he would turn his back upon the Provinces, and leave them a prey to Philip. 3 Still she would not yet renounce the hope of bringing

the French King over to an ingenuous course of action. It was thought, too, that something might be done with the great malcontent nobles of Flanders, whose defection from the national cause had been so disastrous, but who had been much influenced in their course it was thought, by their jealousy of William the Silent.

Now that the Prince was dead, it was thought probable that the Arschots and Havres, Chimays and Lalaings, might arouse themselves to more patriotic views than they had manifested when they espoused the cause of Spain.

It would be desirable to excite their jealousy of French influence, and, at the same time, to inspire throughout the popular mind the fear of another tyranny almost as absolute as that of Spain. „And if it be objected,” said Burghley, „that, except they shall admit the French King to the *absolute dominion*, he will not aid them, and they, for lack of succour, be forced to yield to the Spaniard, it may be answered that, rather than they should be wholly subjected to the French, or overcome by the Spaniard, her Majesty would yield unto them as much as, with preservation of her own country, might be demanded.” 1

The real object kept in view by the Queen’s government was, in short, to obtain for the Provinces and for the general cause of liberty the greatest possible amount of assistance from Henry, and to allow him to acquire in return the least possible amount of power. The end proposed was a reasonable one, but the means employed savoured too much of intrigue.

„It may be easily made probable to the States,” said the Lord Treasurer, „that the government of the French is likely to prove as cumbersome and perilous as that of the Spaniards; and likewise it may probably be doubted

1 Register van de Resolution der Staten General, 8 Dec. 1584. (Hague Archives MS.)

2 Queen to W. Davison, 14 Jan. 1585. (S. P. Office MS.)

3 Ibid.

1 MS. *ubi sup.*

how the French will keep touch and covenants with them, when any opportunity shall be offered to break them; so that her Majesty thinketh no good can be looked for to those countries by yielding this large authority to the French. If they shall continue their title by this grant to be absolute lords, there is no end, for a long time, to be expected of this war; and contrariwise, if they break off, there is an end of any good composition with the King of Spain." 1

Shivering and shrinking, but still wading in deeper and deeper, inch by inch, the cautious minister was fast finding himself too far advanced to retreat. He was rarely decided, however, and never lucid; and least of all in emergencies, when decision and lucidity would have been more valuable than any other qualities.

Deeply doubting, painfully balancing, he at times drove the unfortunate Davison almost distraught. Puzzled himself and still more puzzling to others, he rarely permitted the Netherlands, or even his own agents, to perceive his drift. It was fair enough, perhaps, to circumvent the French government by its own arts, but the Netherlands meanwhile were in danger of sinking into despair.

"Thus," wrote the Lord Treasurer to the envoy, "I have discoursed to you of these uncertainties and difficulties, things not unknown to yourself, but now being imparted to you by her Majesty's commandment, you are, by your wisdom, to consider with whom to deal for the stay of this French course, and yet, so to use it (as near as you may) that they of the French faction there be not able to charge you therewith, by advertising into France. For it hath already appeared, by some speeches past between our ambassador there and Des Pru-

neaux, that you are had in some jealousy as a hinderer of this French course, and at work for her Majesty to have some entrance and partage in that country. Nevertheless our ambassador, by his answer, hath satisfied them to think the contrary." 1

They must have been easily satisfied, if they knew as much of the dealings of her Majesty's government as the reader already knows. To inspire doubt of the French, to insinuate the probability of their not „keeping touch and covenant," to represent their rule as „cumbersome and perilous," was wholesome conduct enough towards the Netherlands—and still more so, had it been accompanied with frank offers of assistance—but it was certainly somewhat to „hinder the courses of the French."

But in truth all parties were engaged for a season in a round game of deception, in which nobody was deceived. Walsingham was impatient, almost indignant at this puerility. „Your doings, no doubt of it," he wrote to Davison, „are observed by the French faction, and therefore *you cannot proceed so closely but it will be espied*. Howsoever it be, *seeing direction groweth from hence, we cannot but blame ourselves*, if the effects thereof do not fall out to our liking." 2

That sagacious statesman was too well informed, and too much accustomed to penetrate the designs of his antagonists, to expect anything from the present intrigues.

To loiter thus, when mortal blows should be struck, was to give the Spanish government exactly that of which it was always most gluttonous—time; and the Netherlands had none of it to spare. „With time and myself, there are two of us," was

1 MS. last cited.

2 Walsingham to Davison, 14 Jan. 1585. (S. P. Office MS.)



Philip II.'s favourite observation; and the Prince of Parma was at this moment sorely perplexed by the parsimony and the hesitations of his own government, by which his large, swift, and most creative genius was so often hampered.

Thus the Spanish soldiers, deep in the trenches, went with bare legs and empty stomachs in January; and the Dutchmen, among their broken dykes, were up to their ears in mud and water; and German mercenaries, in the obedient Provinces, were burning the peasants' houses in order to sell the iron to buy food withal; 1 while grave-visaged statesmen, in comfortable cabinets, wagged their long white beards at each other from a distance, and exchanged grimaces and protocols which nobody heeded.

Walsingham was weary of this solemn trifling. „I conclude,” said he to Davison, „that her Majesty—with reverence be it spoken—is ill advised, to direct you in a course that is like to work so great peril. I know you will do your best endeavour to keep all things upright, and yet it is hard—the disease being now come to this state, or, as the physicians term it, crisis—to carry yourself in such sort but that it will, I fear, breed a dangerous alteration in the cause.” 2

He denounced with impatience, almost with indignation, the insincerity and injustice of these intolerable hesitations. „Sorry am I,” said he, „to see the course that is taken in this weighty cause, *for we will neither help those poor countries ourselves, nor yet suffer others to do it.* I am not ignorant that in time to come the annexing of these countries to the crown of France may prove prejudicial to Eng-

land; but if France refuse to deal with them, *and the rather for that we shall minister some cause of impediment by a kind of dealing underhand* then shall they be forced to return into the hands of Spain, which is like to breed such a present peril towards her Majesty's self, *as never a wise man that seeth it, and loveth her, but lamenteth it from the bottom of his heart.*” 1

Walsingham had made up his mind that it was England, not France, that should take up the cause of the Provinces, and defend them at every hazard. He had been overruled, and the Queen's government had decided to watch the course of the French negotiation, doing what it could, underhand, to prevent that negotiation from being successful. The Secretary did not approve of this disingenuous course. At the same time he had no faith in the good intentions of the French court.

„I could wish,” said he, „that the French King were carried with that honourable mind into the defence of these countries that her Majesty is, but France has not been used to do things for God's sake; neither do they mean to use our advice or assistance in making to the bargain. For they still hold a jealous conceit that, when Spain and they are together by the ears, we will seek underhand to work our own peace.” 2 Walsingham, therefore, earnestly deprecated the attitude provisionally maintained by England.

Meantime, early in January, the 3 Jan. deputation from the Provinces 1585. had arrived in France. The progress of their negotiation will soon be related, but, before its result was known, a general dissatisfaction had already manifested itself in the Netherlands. The factitious enthusiasm which had been created in favour of France, as well as the prejudice against England,

1 Richards to Walsingham, Sept. 9, 1584. (S. P. Office MS.)

2 Walsingham to Davison. (M. S. before cited.)

1 Ibid.

2 Ibid.

began to die out. It became probable, in the opinion of those most accustomed to read the signs of the times, that the French court was acting in connivance with Philip, and that the negotiation was only intended to amuse the Netherlanders, to circumvent the English, and to gain time both for France and Spain. It was not believed that the character of Henry or the policy of his mother was likely to be the source of any substantial aid to the cause of civil liberty or Protestant principles.

„They look for no better fruit from the commission to France,” wrote Davison, who surveyed the general state of affairs with much keenness and breadth of vision, „than a dallying entertainment of the time,—neither leaving them utterly hopeless, nor at full liberty to seek for relief elsewhere, especially in England,—or else some pleasing motion of peace, wherein the French King will offer his mediation with Spain. Meantime the people, wearied with the troubles, charges; and hazard of the war, shall be rocked asleep, the provision for their defence neglected, some Provinces nearest the danger seduced, the rest by their defection astonished, and the enemy, by their decay and confusions, strengthened. This is the scope whereto the doings of the French King, not without intelligence with the Spanish sovereign, doth aim, whatever is pretended.”<sup>1</sup>

There was a wide conviction that the French King was dealing falsely with the Provinces. It seemed certain that he must be inspired by intense jealousy of England, and that he was unlikely, for the sake of those whose „religion, popular liberty, and rebellion against their sovereign” he could not but disapprove, to allow Queen Elizabeth to steal a march upon him, and „make her own market with Spain, to his cost and disadvantage.”<sup>2</sup>

In short, it was suspected—whether justly or not will be presently shown—that Henry III. „was seeking to blear the eyes of the world, as his brother Charles did before the Massacre of St. Bartholomew.”<sup>1</sup> As the letters received from the Dutch envoys in France became less and less encouraging, and as the Queen was informed by her ambassador in Paris of the tergiversations in Paris, she became the more anxious lest the States should be driven to despair. She therefore wrote to Davison, instructing him „to nourish in them underhand some hope—as a thing proceeding from himself—that, though France should reject them, yet she would not abandon them.”<sup>2</sup>

He was directed to find out, by circuitous means, what towns they would offer to her as security for any advances she might be induced to make, and to ascertain the amount of monthly contributions towards the support of the war that they were still capable of furnishing. She was beginning to look with dismay at the expatriation of wealthy merchants and manufacturers going so rapidly forward, now that Ghent had fallen and Brussels and Antwerp were in such imminent peril. She feared that, while so much valuable time had been thrown away, the Provinces had become too much impoverished to do their own part in their own defence; and she was seriously alarmed at rumours which had become prevalent of a popular disposition towards treating for a peace at any price with Spain. It soon became evident that these rumours were utterly without foundation, but the other reasons for Elizabeth's anxiety were sufficiently valid.

On the whole, the feeling in favour of England was rapidly gaining ground. In Holland especially there was general

<sup>1</sup> Davison to Walsingham, 12 Feb. 1585. S. P. Office MS.)

<sup>2</sup> Ibid.

<sup>1</sup> Davison to Walsingham, *ubi sup.*

<sup>2</sup> Queen to Davison, 18 Feb. 1585. (S. P. Office MS.)

indignation against the French party. The letters of the deputies occasioned „murmur and dislike of most persons, who noted them to contain more ample report of ceremonies and compliments than solid argument of comfort.” 1

Sir Edward Stafford, who looked with great penetration into the heart of the mysterious proceedings at Paris, assured his government that no better result was to be looked for, „after long dalliance and entertainment, than either a flat refusal or such a masked embracing of their cause as would rather tend to the increasing of their miseries and confusion than relief for their declining estate.” While „reposing upon a broken reed,” they were, he thought, „neglecting other means more expedient for their necessities.” 2

This was already the universal opinion in Holland. Men now remembered, with bitterness, the treachery of the Duke of Anjou, which they had been striving so hard to forget, but which less than two years ago had nearly proved fatal to the cause of liberty in the Provinces. A committee of the States had an interview with the Queen’s

envoy at the Hague; implored her Majesty through him not to abandon their cause; expressed unlimited regret for the course which had been pursued, and avowed a determination „to pluck their heads out of the collar” so soon as the opportunity should offer. 1

They stated, moreover, that they had been directed by the assembly to lay before him the instructions for the envoys to France, and the articles proposed for the acceptance of the King. The envoy knew his business better than not to have secretly provided himself with copies of these documents, which he had already laid before his own government.

He affected, however, to feel hurt that he had been thus kept in ignorance of papers which he really knew by heart. „After some pretended quarrel,” said he, „for their not acquainting me therewith sooner, I did accept them, as if I had before neither seen nor heard of them.” 2

This then was the aspect of affairs in the Provinces during the absence of the deputies in France. It is now necessary to shift the scene to that country.

1 Davison to Lord Burghley and Sir F. Walsingham, 28 Feb. 1585. (S. P. Office MS.)

2 Davison to Burghley and Walsingham, *ubi sup.*

1 Ibid.

2 Davison to Burghley and Walsingham, *ubi sup.*

## CHAPTER IV.

Reception of the Dutch Envoys at the Louvre—Ignominious Result of the Embassy—Secret influences at work—Bargaining between the French and Spanish Courts—Claims of Catherine de’ Medici upon Portugal—Letters of Henry and Catherine—Secret Proposal by France to invade England—States’ Mission to Henry of Navarre—Subsidies of Philip to Guise—Treaty of Joinville—Philip’s Share in the League denied by Parma—Philip in reality its Chief—Manifesto of the League—Attitude of Henry III. and of Navarre—The League demands a Royal Decree—Designs of France and Spain against England—Secret interview of Mendoza and Villeroy—Complaints of English Persecution—Edict of Nemours—Excommunication of Navarre, and his Reply.

THE King, notwithstanding his apparent reluctance, had, in Sir Edward Stafford’s language, „nibbled at the bait.” He had, however, not been secured at the first attempt, and now a second effort was to be made, under what were supposed to be most favourable circumstances. In accordance with his own instructions, his envoy, Des Pruneaux, had been busily employed in the States, arranging the terms of a treaty which should be entirely satisfactory. It had been laid down as an indispensable condition that Holland



and Zeeland should unite in the offer of sovereignty, and, after the expenditure of much eloquence, diplomacy, and money, Holland and Zeeland had given their consent. The court had been for some time anxious and impatient for the arrival of the deputies. Early in December, Des Pruneaux wrote from Paris to Count Maurice, urging, with some asperity, the necessity of immediate action.

„When I left you,” he said, „I thought that performance would follow promises. I have been a little ashamed, as the time passed by, to hear nothing of the deputies, nor of any excuse on the subject. It would seem as though God had bandaged the eyes of those who have so much cause to know their own adversity.”

To the States his language was still more insolent. „Excuse me, gentlemen,” he said, „if I tell you that I blush at hearing nothing from you. I shall have the shame, and you the damage. I regret much the capture of De Teligny, and other losses which are occasioned by your delays and want of resolution.”

Thus did the French court, which a few months before had imprisoned, and then almost ignominiously dismissed the envoys who came to offer the sovereignty of the Provinces, now rebuke the governments which had ever since been strenuously engaged in removing all obstacles to the entire fulfilment of the King's demands. The States were just despatching a solemn embassy to renew that offer, with hardly any limitation as to terms. 1

The envoys arrived on January 3rd, 1585, at Boulogne, after a stormy voyage from Brielle. Yet it seems incredible to relate, that, after all the ignominy heaped upon the last, there was nothing but solemn trifling in reserve for the present legation; although the object of both embassies was to offer a crown. The deputies were, however, not kept in prison, upon this occasion, nor treated like thieves or spies. They were admirably lodged, with plenty of cooks and lacqueys to minister to them; they fared sumptuously every day, at Henry's expense; and, after they had been six weeks in the kingdom, they at last succeeded in obtaining their first audience.

On the 13th February the King sent five „very splendid, richly-gilded, court-coach-waggon” to bring the envoys to the palace. At one o'clock they arrived at the Louvre, and were ushered through four magnificent antechambers into the royal cabinet. The apartments through which they passed swarmed with the foremost nobles, court-functionaries, and ladies of France, in blazing gala costume, who all greeted the envoys with demonstrations of extreme respect. The halls and corridors were lined with archers, halberdiers, Swiss guards, and grooms „besmeared with gold,” and it was thought that all this rustle of fine feathers would be somewhat startling to the barbarous republicans, fresh from the fens of Holland.

Henry received them in his cabinet, where he was accompanied only by the Duke of Joyeuse—his foremost and bravest „minion”—by the Count of

1 Groen v. Prinsterer, *Archives*, &c., i. 7.

2 The deputies were appointed from each of the United Provinces: Merode, Hinkaert, Stralen, and Cornelius Aerssens represented Brabant; Chancellor Leoninus, John van Ghent, and Gerard Voet were appointed from Gelderland; Noel de Caron was deputy for Flanders, Arend van Dorp for Holland, Jakob Valcke for Zeeland, Rengers and Amelis van Amstel for Utrecht, Teitsma and Alsma for Friesland, La Mouillerie and La

Pré for Mechlin. The Prince of Espinoy, brother of the Marquis of Richebourg, but a patriotic Netherlander himself, was also commissioned to be of the legation, and he served at his own expense. (*Wagenaar*, viii. 55, 56; *Des Pruneaux aux Etats généraux*, 3rd Dec. 1584, *Hague Archives*, MS.; *Brief van de Gedeputeerden in Frankryck aan de Staten Gen.* 19th Jan. 1585. *Hague Archives*, MS.)

Bouscaige, M. de Valette, and the Count of Château Vieux. 1

The most Christian King was neatly dressed, in white satin doublet and hose, and well-starched ruff, with a short cloak on his shoulders, a little velvet cap on the side of his head, his long locks duly perfumed and curled, his sword at his side, and a little basket, full of puppies, suspended from his neck by a broad ribbon. He held himself stiff and motionless, although his face smiled a good-humoured welcome to the ambassadors; and he moved neither foot, hand, nor head, as they advanced.

Chancellor Leoninus, the most experienced, eloquent, and tedious of men, now made an interminable oration, fertile in rhetoric and barren in facts; and the King made a short and benignant reply, according to the hallowed formula in such cases provided. And then there was a presentation to the Queen, and to the Queen-Mother, when Leoninus was more prolix than before, and Catherine even more affectionate than her son; and there were consultations with Chiveryn and Villeroy, and Brulart and Pruneaux, and great banquets at the royal expense, and bales of protocols, and drafts of articles, and conditions and programmes and apostilles by the hundredweight, and at last articles of annexation were presented by the envoys, and Pruneaux looked at and pronounced them „too raw and imperative,” and the envoys took them home again, and dressed them and cooked them till there was no substance left in them; for, whereas the envoys originally offered the crown of their country to France, on condition that no religion but the reformed religion should be tolerated there, no appointments made but by the States, and no security offered for advances to be made by the Christian

King, save the hearts and oaths of his new subjects—so they now ended by proposing the sovereignty unconditionally, almost abjectly; and, after the expiration of nearly three months, even these terms were absolutely refused, and the deputies were graciously permitted to go home as they came. The annexation and sovereignty were definite declined. Henry regretted and sighed, Catherine de' Medici wept—for tears were ever at her command—Chancellor Chiveryn and Secretary Brulart wept likewise, and Pruneaux was overcome with emotion, at the parting interview of the ambassadors with the court, in which they were allowed a last opportunity for expressing what was called their gratitude.

And then, on the 16th March, M. d'Oignon came to them, and presented, on the part of the King, to each of the envoys a gold chain weighing twenty-one ounces and two grains. 1

Des Pruneaux, too—Des Pruneaux who had spent the previous summer in the Netherlands, who had travelled from province to province, from city to city, at the King's command, offering boundless assistance, if they would unanimously offer their sovereignty; who had vanquished by his importunity the resistance of the stern Hollanders, the last of all the Netherlands to yield to the royal blandishments—Des Pruneaux who had „blushed”—Des Pruneaux who had wept—now thought proper to assume an airy tone, half encouragement, half condolence.

„Man proposes, gentlemen,” said he, 2 „but God disposes. We are frequently called on to observe that things have a great variety of times and terms. Many

1 MS. Report of the envoys.

2 „Messieurs, les hommes proposent, et Dieu est le maître qui dispose. Nous voyons toutes choses avoir différens temps et termes; Prou sont refusés d'une femme deux fois qu'y l'emportent la troisième,” &c. (Des Pruneaux aux Etats généraux. 14th Mar. 1585, Brienne, MS.)

1 MS. letter of the envoys, before cited.

a man is refused by a woman twice, who succeeds the third time:" and so on, with which wholesome apophthegms Des Pruneaux faded away then and for ever from the page of Netherland history.

In a few days afterwards the envoys took shipping at Dieppe, and arrived early in April at the Hague. 1

And thus terminated the negotiation of the States with France.

It had been a scene of elaborate trifling on the King's part from beginning to end. Yet the few grains of wheat which have thus been extracted from the mountains of diplomatic chaff so long mouldering in national storehouses, contain, however dry and tasteless, still something for human nourishment. It is something to comprehend the ineffable meanness of the hands which then could hold the destiny of mighty empires. Here had been offered a magnificent prize to France; a great extent of frontier in the quarter where expansion was most desirable, a protective network of towns and fortresses on the side most vulnerable, flourishing cities on the seacoast where the marine traffic was most lucrative, the sovereignty of a large population, the most bustling, enterprising, and hardy in Europe—a nation destined in a few short years to become the first naval and commercial power in the world—all this was laid at the feet of Henry Valois and Catherine de' Medici, and rejected.

The envoys, with their predecessors, had wasted eight months of most precious time; they had heard and made orations, they had read and written protocols, they had witnessed banquets, masquerades, and revels of stupendous frivolity, in honour of the English Garter, brought solemnly to the Valois by Lord Derby, accompanied by one hundred gentlemen „marvellously, sumptuously, and richly accoutred," during that dreadful winter when the inhabi-

tants of Brussels, Antwerp, Mechlin—to save which splendid cities, and to annex them to France, was a main object of the solemn embassy from the Netherlands—were eating rats, and cats, and dogs, and the weeds from the pavements, and the grass from the churchyards, and were finding themselves more closely pressed than ever by the relentless genius of Farnese; and in exchange for all these losses and all this humiliation, the ambassadors now returned to their constituents, bringing an account of Chiverny's magnificent banquets and long orations, of the smiles of Henry III., the tears of Catherine de' Medici, the regrets of M. Des Pruneaux, besides sixteen gold chains, each weighing twenty-one ounces and two grains. 1

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1 Brieven van de Gedeputeerden uyt Paris, 22nd Feb. 1585; Rapport van de Handeling gehouden by de Gezanten &c.; Brief van de Gezanten uyt Paris, 11 Maart, 1585. (Hague Archives MS.) Compare De Thou, ix. 275 seq.; Strada, ii. 292 seq.; Meteren, xii. 221 seq.; Le Petit, ii. xiv. 508 seq.; Wagenaar, viii. 58; Bor. ii. xix. 528 seq.

It is remarkable that in all the conferences between the deputies and the ministers of Henry, and in all the expressions used by the King and his mother, as recorded by the envoys in their despatches and reports, no allusion was ever made to the civil war then brewing in France, nor to the machinations of the Guises,—*the name of which family was never mentioned*. The Court excused itself, as well as it could, for its elaborate trifling with the Netherlands, at so momentous an epoch, by general reflections upon the condition of France, and the inconvenience to the government, at that moment, of engaging in the enterprise which it had itself solicited. All the contemporaneous historians whether Protestant or Catholic, French, Flemish, or Spanish, give a very brief, imperfect, conventional, and generally mistaken view of these negotiations.

Le Petit, instead of the meagre farewell address of the King (which we have given in the text from the report of the envoys to their constituents), does not scruple to invent a very epigrammatic little speech for Henry, in which that monarch is made to complain bitterly of the „violence done to him by the King of Spain, the Guise family, and the Leaguers;" to regret that he is thereby prevented from assisting the Provinces, on the ground that „his shirt is nearer to him than his doublet;" and to hope that they will sustain themselves until

1 MS. Report, Wagenaar, viii. 66.



It is worth while to go for a moment behind the scenes. We have seen the actors, with mask and cothurn and tinsel crown, playing their well-conned parts upon the stage. Let us hear them threaten, and whimper, and chaffer among themselves.

So soon as it was intimated that Henry III. was about to grant the Netherland envoys an audience, the wrath of ambassador Mendoza was kindled. That magniloquent Spaniard instantly claimed an interview with the King, before whom, according to the statement of his colleagues, doing their best to pry into these secrets, he blustered and bounced, and was more fantastical in his insolence than even Spanish envoy had ever been before.

„He went presently to court,” so Walsingham was informed by Stafford, „and dealt very passionately with the King and Queen-Mother to deny them audience, who being greatly offended with his presumptuous and malapert manner of proceeding, the King did in choler and with some sharp speeches let him plainly understand that he was an absolute king, bound to yield account of his doings to no man, and that it was lawful for him to give access to any man within his own realm. The Queen-Mother answered him likewise very roundly, whereupon he departed for the time, very much discontented.”<sup>1</sup>

Brave words, on both sides, if they had ever been spoken, or if there had been any action corresponding to their spirit.

But, in truth, from the beginning, Henry and his mother saw in the Ne-

therland embassy only the means of turning a dishonest penny. Since the disastrous retreat of Anjou from the Provinces, the city of Cambray had remained in the hands of the Seigneur de Balagny, placed there by the Duke. The citadel, garrisoned by French troops, it was not the intention of Catherine de' Medici to restore to Philip, and a truce on the subject had been arranged provisionally for a year. Philip, taking Parma's advice to prevent the French court, if possible, from „fomenting the Netherland rebellion,” had authorized the Prince to conclude that truce, as if done on his own responsibility, and not by royal order. Meantime, Balagny was gradually swelling into a petty potentate, on his own account, making himself very troublesome to the Prince of Parma, and requiring a great deal of watching. Cambray was however apparently acquired for France.

But, besides this acquisition, there was another way of earning something solid, by turning this Netherland matter handsomely to account. Philip II. had recently conquered Portugal. Among the many pretensions to that crown, those of Catherine de' Medici had been put forward, but had been little heeded. The claim went back more than three hundred years, and to establish its validity would have been to convert the peaceable possession of a long line of sovereigns into usurpation. To ascend to Alphonso III. was like fetching, as it was said, a claim from Evander's grandmother. Nevertheless, ever since Philip had been upon the Portuguese throne, Catherine had been watching the opportunity, not of unseating that sovereign, but of converting her claim into money.

he shall have got his kingdom quiet, after which the States may depend upon his assistance. It is superfluous to say that this and similar harangues recorded by various historians are purely imaginary.

<sup>1</sup> Walsingham to Davison,  $\frac{1}{2}$  Jan. 1585, S. P. Office MS. Compare De Thou, ix. 275 seq.; Strada, „De Bello Belgico,” 1585, ii. 592 seq.; Meteren, xii 221 seq.; Le Petit, ii. xiv. 508 seq.; Busbequius, Epist. *passim*.

<sup>1</sup> Philip II. to Prince of Parma, 2nd Sept. 1584, and 15th Jan. 1585. (Archivo de Simancas, MS.) „Sera bien que la concluyas à trueque de conseguir esto con que no parezca orden, mia sino que lo haceis como de vuestro,” &c. Comp. Strada, ii. 295.

The Netherland embassy seemed to offer the coveted opportunity. There was, therefore, quite as much warmth at the outset, on the part of Mendoza, in that first interview after the arrival of the deputies, as had been represented. There was however less dignity and more cunning on the part of Henry and Catherine than was at all suspected. Even before that conference the King had been impatiently expecting overtures from the Spanish envoy, and had been disappointed. „He told me,” said Henry, „that he would make proposals so soon as Tassis should be gone, but he has done nothing yet. He said to Gondi that all he meant was to get the truce of Cambray accomplished. I hope, however, that my brother, the King of Spain, will do what is right in regard to madam my mother’s pretensions. ’Tis likely that he will be now incited thereto, seeing that the deputies of all the Netherland Provinces are at present in my kingdom, to offer me *carte blanche*. I shall hear what they have to say, and do exactly what the good of my own affairs shall seem to require. The Queen of England, too, has been very pressing and urgent with me for several months on this subject. I shall hear, too, what she has to say, and I presume, if the King of Spain will now disclose himself, and do promptly what he ought, that we may set Christendom at rest.” 1

Henry then instructed his ambassador in Spain to keep his eyes wide open, in order to penetrate the schemes of Philip, and to this end ordered him an increase of salary by a third, that he might follow that monarch on his journey to Arragon.

Meanwhile Mendoza had audience of his Majesty. „He made a very pressing remonstrance,” said the King, „concerning the arrival of these deputies, urging me to send them back at once;

denouncing them as disobedient rebels and heretics. I replied, that my kingdom was free, and that I should hear from them all that they had to say, *because I could not abandon madam my mother in her pretensions, not only for the filial obedience which I owe her, but because I am her only heir*. Mendoza replied that he should go and make the same remonstrance to the Queen-Mother, which he accordingly did, and she will herself write you what passed between them. If they do not act up to their duty *down there*, I know how to take my revenge upon them.” 1

This is the King’s own statement—his veriest words—and he was surely best aware of what occurred between himself and Mendoza, under their four eyes only. The ambassador is not represented as extremely insolent, but only pressing; and certainly there is little left of the fine periods on Henry’s part about listening to the cry of the oppressed, or preventing the rays of his ancestor’s diadem from growing pale, with which contemporary chronicles are filled.

There was not one word of the advancement and glory of the French nations; not a hint of the fame to be acquired by a magnificent expansion of territory, still less of the duty to deal generously or even honestly with an oppressed people, who in good faith were seeking an assylum in exchange for offered sovereignty; not a syllable upon liberty of conscience, of religious or civil rights; nothing but a petty and exclusive care for the interest of his mother’s pocket, and of his own as his mother’s heir. This farthing-candle was alone to guide the steps of „the high and mighty King,” whose reputation was perpetually represented as so precious to him in all the conferences between his ministers and the Nether-

1 Henry III. à Longlée, 11 Jan. 1585, Brienne MS.

1 Henry III. à Longlée, 11 Jan. 1585, Brienne MS.

land deputies. Was it possible for those envoys to imagine the almost invisible meanness of such childish tricks?

The Queen-Mother was still more explicit and unblushing throughout the whole affair.

„The ambassador of Spain,” she said, „has made the most beautiful remonstrances he could think of about these deputies from the Netherlands. All his talk, however, cannot persuade me to anything else save to increase my desire to have reparation for the wrong that has been done me in regard to my claims upon Portugal, which I am determined to pursue by every means within my power. Nevertheless I have told Don Bernardino that I should always be ready to embrace any course likely to bring about a peaceful conclusion. He then entered into a discussion of my rights, which, he said, were not thought in Spain to be founded in justice. But when I explained to him the principal points (of which I possess all the pieces of evidence and justification), he hardly knew what to say, save that he was astounded that I had remained so long without speaking of my claims. In reply, I told him ingenuously the truth.” 1

The truth which the ingenuous Catherine thus revealed was, in brief, that all her predecessors had been minors, women, and persons in situations not to make their rights valid. Finding herself more highly placed, she had advanced her claims, which had been so fully recognized in Portugal, that she had been received as Infanta of the kingdom. All pretensions to the throne being now through women only, hers were the best of any. At all this Don Bernardino expressed profound astonishment, and promised to send a full

account to his master of „the infinite words” which had passed between them at this interview. 1

„I desire,” said Catherine, „that the Lord-King of Spain should open his mind frankly and promptly upon the recompense which he is willing to make me for Portugal, in order that things may pass rather with gentleness than otherwise;” 2

It was expecting a great deal to look for frankness and promptness from the Lord-King of Spain, but the Queen-Mother considered that the Netherland envoys had put a whip into her hand. She was also determined to bring Philip up to the point, without showing her own game. „I will never say,” said Catherine—ingenuous no longer— „I will never say how much I ask, but, on the contrary, I shall wait for him to make the offer. I expect it to be reasonable, because he has seen fit to seize and occupy that which I declare to be my property.” 3

This is the explanation of all the languor and trifling of the French court in the Netherland negotiation. A deep, constant, unseen current was running counter to all the movement which appeared upon the surface. The tergiversations of the Spanish cabinet in the Portugal matter were the cause of the shufflings of the French ministers on the subject of the Provinces.

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1 Ibid. „Et croy qu'il n'y obmaetra rien d'infinies parolles qui se sont passees de la substance dessus dicté en la dicté audience.” &c.

2 Lettre de la Reine Mere à Longlée, 16 Jan. 1585. Brienne MS. „Je desirerois bien que le dict seigneur roi d'Espagne s'ouvrit franchement et promptement de la recompense qu'il me venet et doit faire pour le dict Portugal, afin que les choses passassent plustot par là doucement qu'autrement.”

3 Ibid. „Je ne diray jamais ce que je demande, au contraire, attendrai ses offres qu'il fault qui soient raisonnables, puis qu'il est saisy et occupateur de ce que je pretendz m'appartenir,” &c.

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1 Lettre de la Reine à Longlée, 16 Jan. 1585. Brienne MS. „Il ne m'a sceu que dire autre chose, sinon qu'il s'ebahissoit comme j'avois si long temps demouré sans parler de mes dictz droits, a quoi je luy ay respondu ingenuement la verité, qui est,” &c.



„I know well,” said Henry a few days later, „that the people down there, and their ambassador here, are leading us on with words, as far as they can, with regard to the recompense of madam my mother for her claims upon Portugal. But they had better remember (and I think they will), that out of the offers which these sixteen deputies of the Netherlands are bringing me—and I believe it to be *carte blanche*—I shall be able to pay myself. ’Twill be better to come promptly to a good bargain and a brief conclusion, than to spin the matter out longer.” 1

„Don Bernardino,” said the Queen-Mother on the same day, „has been keeping us up to this hour in hopes of a good offer, but ’tis to be feared, for the good of Christendom, that ’twill be too late. The deputies are come, bringing *carte blanche*. Nevertheless, if the King of Spain is willing to be reasonable, and that instantly, it will be well, and it would seem as if God had been pleased to place this means in our hands.” 2

After the conferences had been fairly got under way between the French government and the envoys, the demands upon Philip for a good bargain and a handsome offer became still more pressing.

„I have given audience to the deputies from the Provinces,” wrote Henry, „and the Queen-Mother has done the same. Chancellor Chiverny, Villequier, Bellièvre, and Brulart, will now confer with them from day to day. I now tell you

that it will be well, before things go any farther, for the King of Spain to come to reason about the pretensions of madam mother. This will be a means of establishing the repose of Christendom. I shall be very willing to concur in such an arrangement, if I saw any approximation to it on the part of the King or his ministers. But I fear they will delay too long, and so you had better tell them. Push them to the point as much as possible, without letting them suspect that I have been writing about it, for that would make them rather draw back than come forward.” 1

At the same time, during this alternate threatening and coaxing between the French and the Spanish court, and in the midst of all the solemn and tedious protocolling of the ministry and the Dutch envoys, there was a most sincere and affectionate intercourse maintained between Henry III. and the Prince of Parma. The Spanish Governor-General was assured that nothing but the warmest regard was entertained for him and his master on the part of the French court. Parma had replied, however, that so many French troops had in times past crossed the frontier to assist the rebels, that he hardly knew what to think. He expressed the hope, now that the Duke of Anjou was dead, that his Christian Majesty would not countenance the rebellion, but manifest his good-will.

„How can your Highness doubt it?” said Malpierre, Henry’s envoy, „for his Majesty has given proof enough of his good-will, having prevented all enterprises in this regard, and preferred

1 Henry III. à Longlée, 18 Jan. 1585. Brieune MS. „Mais il doit bien considérer—que sur les offres que me viennent faire seize principaux deputez des pays bas (les quelz m’apportent, à ce que j’entendz la *carte blanche*), j’y auray consideration, et vouldroit beaucoup mieulx venir promptement à une bonne negotiation et briève conclusion d’icelle, que de tenir ainsi les choses à la longue.” &c.

2 La Reine Mere à Longlée, 18 Jan. 1585. Brieune MS.

1 Henry III. à Longlée, 21 Feb. 1585 „Il seroit très à propos, avant que les choses allassent plus avant que le Roy d’Espagne regardasse à se mettre à la raison pour les pretensions de la royne madame et mere,” &c.—„Les incitant le plus qu’il vous sera possible, sans toutefois qu’ils puissent cognoistre que vous en ayant escript, car cela pourroit estre plustot cause de les en faire reculer qu’aultrement,” &c. Brieune MS.

to have his own subjects cut into pieces rather than that they should carry out their designs. Had his Majesty been willing merely to connive at these undertakings, 'tis probable that the affairs of your Highness would not have succeeded so well as they have done." 1

With regard to England, also, the conduct of Henry and his mother in these negotiations was marked by the same unfathomable duplicity. There was an appearance of cordiality on the surface; but there was deep plotting, and bargaining, and even deadly hostility, lurking below. We have seen the efforts which Elizabeth's government had been making to counteract the policy which offered the sovereignty of the Provinces to the French monarch. At the same time there was at least a loyal disposition upon the Queen's part to assist the Netherlands, in concurrence with Henry. The demeanour of Burghley and his colleagues was frankness itself, compared with the secret schemings of the Valois; for at least peace and good-will between the „triumvirate" of France, England, and the Netherlands, was intended, as the true means of resisting the predominant influence of Spain.

Yet very soon after the solemn reception by Henry of the garter brought by Lord Derby, and in the midst of the negotiations between the French court and the United Provinces, the French king was not only attempting to barter the sovereignty offered him by the Netherlands against a handsome recompense for the Portugal claim, but he was actually proposing to the King of Spain to join with him in an invasion of England! Even Philip himself must have admired and respected such a complication of villany on the part of his most Christian brother. He was,

however, not disposed to put any confidence in his schemes.

„With regard to the attempt against England," wrote Philip to Mendoza, „you must keep your eyes open—you must look at the danger of letting them, before they have got rid of their rivals and reduced their heretics, go out of their own house and kingdom, and thus of being made fools of when they think of coming back again. Let them first exterminate the heretics of France, and then we will look after those of England; because 'tis more important to finish those who are near than those afar off. Perhaps the Queen-Mother proposes this invasion in order to proceed more feebly with matters in her own kingdom; and thus Micio (Duke of Guise) and his friends will not have so safe a game, and must take heed lest they be deceived." 1

Thus it is obvious that Henry and Catherine intended, on the whole, to deceive the English and the Netherlands, and to get as good a bargain and as safe a friendship from Philip as could be manufactured out of the materials placed in the French King's hands by the United Provinces. Elizabeth honestly wished well to the States, but allowed Burghley and those who acted with him to flatter themselves with the chimera that Henry could

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1 Philip II. to Bernardino de Mendoza, 17 Aug. 1585. Archivo de Simancas. A. 56, No. 28, MS., in the Archives de l'Empire at Paris. „En lo de la impresa de Inglaterra, le yd abriendo los ojos para que eche de ver el peligro en quo se pone, si antes de deshazer sus emulos y reducir a los bereges o echerlos, se dexa sacar fuera de su casa y del Reyno y quan burlado se podria hallar quando pensasse bolver. Que acaben primo los hereses de francia, y despues demos tras de Inglaterra, por que mas importa a todos acabar los de cerca que los de lejos, y quica la Reyna madre propone la nueva impresa (de Inglaterra) por hazor afloxar con los hereges de dentro de su reyno, y assi pues Musio. y los suyos no ternan cosa segura mientras estos estuviere aqui, miren bien no se dexten enganar."

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1 Malpierre à Henry III., 16 Fev. 1585. Brienne MS.

be induced to protect the Netherlands without assuming the sovereignty of that commonwealth. The Provinces were fighting for their existence, unconscious of their latent strength, and willing to trust to France or to England, if they could only save themselves from being swallowed by Spain. As for Spain itself, that country was more practised in duplicity even than the government of the Medici-Valois, and was of course more than a match at the game of deception for the franker politicians of England and Holland.

The King of Navarre had meanwhile been looking on at a distance. Too keen an observer, too subtle a reasoner, to doubt the secret source of the movements then agitating France to its centre, he was yet unable to foresee the turn that all these intrigues were about to take. He could hardly doubt that Spain was playing a dark and desperate game with the unfortunate Henry III.; for, as we have seen, he had himself not long before received a secret and liberal offer from Philip II., if he would agree to make war upon the King. 1 But the Béarnese was not the man to play into the hands of Spain, nor could he imagine the possibility of the Valois, or even of his mother, taking so suicidal a course.

After the Netherland deputies had received their final dismissal from the King, they sent Calvart, who had been secretary to their embassy, on a secret mission to Henry of Navarre, then resident at Chartres.

The envoy communicated to the Huguenot chief the meagre result of the long negotiation with the French court. Henry bade him be of good cheer, and assured him of his best wishes for their cause. He expressed the opinion that the King of France would now either attempt to overcome the Guise faction

by gentle means, or at once make war upon them. The Bishop of Acqs had strongly recommended the French monarch to send the King of Navarre, with a strong force, to the assistance of the Netherlands, urging the point with much fervid eloquence and solid argument. Henry for a moment had seemed impressed, but such a vigorous proceeding was of course entirely beyond his strength, and he had sunk back into his effeminate languor so soon as the bold bishop's back was turned. 1

The Béarnese had naturally conceived but little hope that such a scheme would be carried into effect; but he assured Calvart that nothing could give him greater delight than to mount and ride in such a cause. 2

„Notwithstanding,” said the Béarnese, „that the villanous intentions of the Guises are becoming plainer and plainer, and that they are obviously supplied with Spanish dollars, I shall send a special envoy to the most Christian King, and, although 'tis somewhat late, implore him to throw his weight into the scale, in order to redeem your country from its misery. Meantime, be of good heart, and defend, as you have done, your hearths, your liberty, and the honour of God.” 3

He advised the States unhesitatingly to continue their confidence in the French King, and to keep him informed of their plans and movements; expressing the opinion that these very intrigues of the Guise party would soon justify or even force Henry III. openly to assist the Netherlands.

So far, at that very moment, was so sharp a politician as the Béarnese from suspecting the secret schemes of Henry

1 De Thou, ix. 298 *seq.*

2 'Rapport fait par le Sieur Calvart, aiant esté envoie vers le roy de navarre de la part des deputez des Etats Generaux chez le roy tres Chretien,' 11 Juin, 1585. (Hague Archives, MS.)

3 MS. Report of Calvart, before cited.

1 Herle to Queen Elizabeth, 22nd July, 1584, S. P. Office MS. Vide *ante*, p. 47.



of Valois. Calvart urged the King of Navarre to assist the States at that moment with some slight subsidy. Antwerp was in such imminent danger as to fill the hearts of all true patriots with dismay; and a timely succour, even if a slender one, might be of inestimable value.

Henry expressed profound regret that his own means were so limited, and his own position so dangerous, as to make it difficult for him to manifest in broad daylight the full affection which he bore the Provinces.

„To my sorrow,” said he, „your proposition is made in the midst of such dark and stormy weather, that those who have clearest sight are unable to see to what issue these troubles of France are tending.”<sup>1</sup>

Nevertheless, with much generosity and manliness, he promised Calvart to send two thousand soldiers, at his own charges, to the Provinces without delay; and authorised that envoy to consult with his agent at the court of the French King, in order to obtain the royal permission for the troops to cross the frontier.<sup>2</sup>

The crownless and almost houseless King had thus, at a single interview, and in exchange for nothing but good wishes, granted what the most Christian monarch of France had refused, after months of negotiation, and with sovereignty as the purchase-money. The envoy, well pleased, sped as swiftly as possible to Paris; but, as may easily be imagined, Henry of Valois forbade the movement contemplated by Henry of Navarre.

„His Majesty,” said Villeroy, secretary of state, „sees no occasion, in so weighty a business, thus suddenly to change his mind; the less so, because he hopes to be able ere long to smooth over these troubles which have begun in France.

Should the King either openly or secretly assist the Netherlands or allow them to be assisted, 'twould be a reason for all the Catholics now sustaining his Majesty's party to go over to the Guise faction. The Provinces must remain firm, and make no pacification with the enemy. Meantime the Queen of England is the only one to whom God has given means to afford you succour. One of these days, when the proper time comes, his Majesty will assist her in affording you relief.”<sup>1</sup>

Calvart, after this conference with the King of Navarre, and subsequently with the government, entertained a lingering hope that the French King meant to assist the Provinces. „I know well who is the author of these troubles,” said the unhappy monarch, who never once mentioned the name of Guise in all those conferences; „but, if God grant me life, I will give him as good as he sends, and make him rue his conduct.”<sup>2</sup>

They were not aware after how many strange vacillations Henry was one day to wreak this threatened vengeance. As for Navarre, he remained upon the watch, good-humoured as ever, more merry and hopeful as the tempest grew blacker; manifesting the most frank and friendly sentiments towards the Provinces, and writing to Queen Elizabeth, in the chivalrous style so dear to the that sovereign, that he desired nothing better than to be her „servant and captain-general against the common enemy.”

But, indeed, the French King was not so well informed as he imagined himself to be of the authorship of these troubles. Mucio, upon whose head he thus threatened vengeance, was but the

<sup>1</sup> It will be observed that the envoys here speak of Villeroy as mentioning the Guises by name.

<sup>2</sup> „Wiert oock verwittigt dat Z. M. luttel dagen voer myn vertreck, wesende onder zyne familieren seyde---je scay bien qui est l'auteur de ces troubles mais si Dieu me donne vie, je luy rendrai pareille et l'en ferai repentir.” (MS. Report of Calvart.)

<sup>1</sup> MS. Report of Calvart, before cited.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid.

instrument. The concealed hand that was directing all these odious intrigues, and lighting these flames of civil war which were so long to make France a scene of desolation, was that of the industrious letter-writer in the Escorial. That which Henry of Navarre shrewdly suspected when he talked of the Spanish dollars in the Balafré's, pocket, that which was dimly visible to the bishop of Acs when he told Henry III. that the „Tagus had emptied itself into the Seine and Loire, and that the gold of Mexico was flowing into the royal cabinet,”<sup>1</sup> was much more certain than they supposed.

Philip, in truth, was neglecting his own most pressing interests that he might direct all his energies towards entertaining civil war in France. That France should remain internally at peace was contrary to all his plans. He had therefore long kept Guise and his brother, the Cardinal de Lorraine, in his pay, and he had been spending large sums of money to bribe many of the most considerable functionaries in the kingdom.

The most important enterprises in the Netherlands were allowed to languish, that these subterranean operations of the „prudent” monarch of Spain should be pushed forward. The most brilliant and original genius that Philip had the good fortune to have at his disposal, the genius of Alexander Farnese, was cramped and irritated almost to madness by the fetters imposed upon it by the sluggish yet obstinate nature of him it was bound to obey. Farnese was at that moment engaged in a most arduous military undertaking, that famous siege of Antwerp, the details of which will be related in future chapters, yet he was never furnished with men or money enough to ensure success to a much more ordinary operation. His complaints, subdued but intense, fell almost unheeded on his master's ear. He had not „ten

dollars at his command,” his cavalry horses were all dead of hunger or had been eaten by their riders, who were starving to death themselves, his army had dwindled to a „handful,” yet he still held on to his purpose, in spite of famine, the desperate efforts of indefatigable enemies, and all the perils and privations of a deadly winter. He, too, was kept for a long time in profound ignorance of Philip's designs.

Meantime, while the Spanish soldiers were starving in Flanders, Philip's dollars were employed by Mucio and his adherents in enlisting troops in Switzerland and Germany, in order to carry on the civil war in France. The French king was held systematically up to ridicule or detestation in every village-pulpit in his own kingdom, while the sister of Mucio, the Duchess of Montpensier, carried the scissors at her girdle with which she threatened to provide Henry with a third crown, in addition to those of France and Poland, which he had disgraced—the coronal tonsure of a monk. The convent should be, it was intimated, the eventual fate of the modern Childeric, but meantime it was more important than ever to supersede the ultimate pretensions of Henry of Navarre. To prevent that heretic of heretics, who was not to be bought with Spanish gold, from ever reigning, was the first object of Philip and Mucio.

Accordingly, on the last day of the year 1584, a secret treaty had been signed at Joinville between Henry of Guise and his brother the Duc de Mayenne, holding the Cardinal and those of their uncles Aumale and Elbeuf, on the one part, and John Baptist Tassis and Commander Moreo, on the other, as representatives of Philip.<sup>1</sup> This transaction,—sufficiently well known now to the most superficial student of history,—was a profound mystery then, so far as regarded the action of the

<sup>1</sup> De Thou, *ubi sup.*

<sup>1</sup> Prefixe, 58, 59; De Thou, ix. 272.

Spanish King. It was not a secret, however, that the papistical party did not intend that the Béarnese Prince should ever come to the throne, and the matter of the succession was discussed precisely as if the throne had been vacant.

It was decided that Charles, paternal uncle to Henry of Navarre, commonly called the Cardinal Bourbon, should be considered successor to the crown, in place of Henry, whose claim was forfeited by heresy. Moreover, a great deal of superfluous money and learning was expended in ordering some elaborate legal arguments to be prepared by venal juriconsults, proving not only that the uncle ought to succeed before the nephew, but that neither the one nor the other had any claim to succeed at all. The pen having thus been employed to do the work which the sword alone could accomplish, the poor old Cardinal was now formally established by the Guise faction as presumptive heir to the crown. 1

A man of straw, a superannuated court-dangler, a credulous trifler, but an earnest Papist, as his brother Antony had been, sixty-six years old, and feeble beyond his years, who, his life long, had never achieved one manly action, and had now one foot in the grave—this was the puppet placed in the saddle to run a tilt against the Béarnese, the man with foot ever in the stirrup, with sword rarely in its sheath.

The contracting parties at Joinville agreed that the Cardinal should succeed on the death of the reigning king, and that no heretic should ever ascend the throne, or hold the meanest office in the kingdom. They agreed further that all heretics should be „exterminated” without distinction, throughout France and the Netherlands. In order to pro-

cure the necessary reforms among the clergy, the council of Trent was to be fully carried into effect. Philip pledged himself to furnish at least fifty thousand crowns monthly, for the advancement of this Holy League, is it was denominated, and as much more as should prove necessary. The sums advanced were to be repaid by the Cardinal on his succeeding to the throne. All the great officers of the crown, lords and gentlemen, cities, chapters, and universities, all Catholics, in short, in the kingdom, were deemed to be included in the league. If any foreign Catholic prince desired to enter the union, he should be admitted with the consent of both parties. Neither his Catholic Majesty nor the confederated princes should treat with the most Christian King, either directly or indirectly. The compact was to remain strictly secret—one copy of it being sent to Philip, while the other was to be retained by Cardinal Bourbon and his fellow leaguers. 1

And now—in accordance with this program—Philip proceeded stealthily and industriously to further the schemes of Mucio, to the exclusion of more urgent business. Noiseless and secret himself, and delighting in nothing so much as to glide, as it were, throughout Europe, wrapped in the mantle of invisibility, he was perpetually provoked by the noise, the bombast, and the bustle, which his late prudent confederates permitted themselves. While Philip for a long time hesitated to confide the secret of the League to Parma, whom it most imported to understand these schemes of his master, the confederates were openly boasting of the assistance which they were to derive from Parma's co-operation. Even when the Prince had at last been informed as to the state of affairs, he

1 De Thou, ix. 262 seq.

1 Prefixe; De Thou, *ubi sup.*; Meteren. xii. 221 seq.; Le Petit, xiv. 505 seq.



stoutly denied the facts of which the leaguers made their vaunt; thus giving to Mucio and his friends a lesson in dissimulation. 1

„Things have now arrived at a point,” wrote Philip to Tassis, 15th March, 1585, „that this matter of the League cannot and ought not to be concealed from those who have a right to know it. Therefore you must speak plainly to the Prince of Parma, informing him of the whole scheme, and enjoining the utmost secrecy. You must concert with him as to the best means of rendering aid to this cause, after having apprised him of the points which regard him, and also that of the security of Cardinal de Bourbon, in case of necessity.” 2

The Prince was anything but pleased, in the midst of his anxiety and his almost superhuman labour in the Antwerp siege, to be distracted, impoverished, and weakened, in order to carry out these schemes against France; but he kept the secret manfully.

To Malpierre, the French envoy in Brussels—for there was the closest diplomatic communication between Henry III. and Philip, while each was tampering with the rebellious subjects of the other—to Malpierre Parma flatly contradicted all complicity on the part of the Spanish King or himself with the Holy League, of which he knew Philip to be the originator and the chief.

„If I complain to the Prince of Parma,” said the envoy, „of the companies going from Flanders to assist the League, he will make me no other reply than that which the President has done—that there is nothing at all in

it—until they are fairly arrived in France. The President (Richardot) said that if the Catholic King belonged to the League, as they insinuate, his Majesty would declare the fact openly.” 1

And a few days later, the Prince himself averred, als Malpierre had anticipated, that, „as to any intention on the part of himself or his Catholic Majesty to send succour to the League, according to the boast of these gentlemen, he had never thought of such a thing, nor had received any order on the subject from his master. If the King intended to do anything of the kind, he would do it openly. He protested that he had never seen anything or known anything of the League.” 2

Here was a man who knew how to keep a secret, and who had no scruples in the matter of dissimulation, however enraged he might be at seeing men and money diverted from his own masterly combinations in order to carry out these schemes of his master.

Mucio, on the contrary, was imprudent and inclined to boast. His contempt for Henry III. made him blind to the dangers to be apprehended from Henry of Navarre. He did little, but talked a great deal.

Philip was very anxious that the work should be done both secretly and thoroughly. „Let the business be finished before Saint John’s day,” said he to Tassis, when sending fifty thousand dollars for the use of the brothers Guise. „Tell Iniquez to warn them not to be sluggish. Let them not begin in a lukewarm manner, but promise them plenty of assistance from me, if they conduct themselves properly. Let them beware of wavering, or of falling into plans of conciliation. If they do their duty, I will do mine.” 3

1 Malpierre à Henry III., 27 Av. 1585. Brienne MS. „Et luy (Prince de Parme) donne à entendre que les seigneurs de la diete ligue ne faisoient fortz d’avoir secours de deca—à quoi il m’a respondu que jamais le d’ Seign. Roy Catholique ne le feroit, et s’ils en faisoient courir le bruit, ce estoit pour donner plus d’annguy à leurs affaires.” &c.

2 Philip II. to J. B. Tassis, 15 March, 1585. ‘Archivo de Simancas,’ MS.

1 Malpierre à De Crosne, 27 Av. 1585. Brienne MS.

2 Malpierre à Henry III., 28 Mai, 1585. ‘Brienne MS.’

3 Philip II. to Tassis. MS. before cited.

But the Guise faction moved slowly despite of Philip's secret promptings. The truth is, that the means proposed by the Spanish monarch were ludicrously inadequate to his plans, and it was idle to suppose that the world was to be turned upside down for his benefit at the very low price which he was prepared to pay.

Nothing less than to exterminate all the heretics in Christendom, to place himself on the thrones of France and of England, and to extinguish the last spark of rebellion in the Netherlands, was his secret thought, and yet it was very difficult to get fifty thousand dollars from him from month to month. Procrastinating and indolent himself, he was for ever rebuking the torpid movements of the Guises.

„Let Mucio set his game well at the outset,” said he; „let him lay the axe to the root of the tree, for to be wasting time fruitlessly is sharpening the knife for himself.” 1

This was almost prophetic. When, after so much talking and tampering, there began to be recrimination among the leaguers, Philip was very angry with his subordinate.

„Here is Mucio,” said he, „trying to throw the blame of all the difficulties which have arisen upon us. Not hastening, not keeping his secret, letting the execution of the enterprise grow cold, and lending an ear to suggestions about peace, without being sure of its conclusion, he has turned his followers into cowards, discredited his cause, and given the King of France opportunity to strengthen his force and improve his party. These are all very palpable things. I am willing to continue my friendship for them, but not

if, while they accept it, they permit themselves to complain, instead of manifesting gratitude.” 1

On the whole, however, the affairs of the League seemed prosperous. There was doubtless too much display among the confederates, but there was a growing uneasiness among the royalists. Cardinal Bourbon, discarding his ecclesiastical robes and scarlet stockings, paraded himself daily in public, clothed in military costume, with all the airs of royalty. Many persons thought him mad. On the other hand, Epergnon, the haughty minion-in-chief, who governed Henry III. and insulted all the world, was becoming almost polite.

„The progress of the League,” said Busbecq, „is teaching the Duc d'Epergnon manners. 'Tis a youth of such insolence, that without uncovering he would talk with men of royal descent, while they were bareheaded, 'Tis a common jest now that he has found out where his hat is.” 2

Thus, for a long time, a network of secret political combinations had been stretching itself over Christendom. There were great movements of troops throughout Germany, Switzerland, the Netherlands, slowly concentrating themselves upon France; yet, on the whole, the great mass of the populations, the men and women who were to pay, to fight, to starve, to be trampled upon

1 Lo que sobre todo conviene acordar y encargar a Mucio es que procure poner bien su juego á los principios, con acudir á la raíz, porque lo contrario y dejarse consumir del tiempo de balde, podrá ser su cuchillo.” (Ibid.)

1 „Mucio nos quiere hazer aca cargo de todas las dificultades en que alla se han metido, al principio par apresurarse y no guardar bien su secreto, y despues por haver se resfriado la execucion de la empresa, y dado oydes a la paz, que tras no les poder ser segura la conclusion della, solo el trato ha acobardado los animos de los que le siguieran, desacreditando su causa y dando lugar a que el Rey de Francia pudiesse recoger sus fuerzas y mejorar su partido, que son todas tan palpables—mas no les aceptando que estan quexosos en lugar de obligados.” Philip II. to Mendoza, 9 July, 1585. 'Archivo de Simancas.' MS. In the Archives de l'Empire at Paris, A. 56, 30.

2 Busbecqui. 'Epist. ad Rud.' 25 April 1585, p. 154.

to be outraged, to be plundered, to be burned out of house and home, to bleed, and to die, were merely ignorant gaping spectators. That there was something very grave in prospect was obvious, but exactly what was impending they knew no more than the generation yet unborn. Very noiselessly had the patient manager who sat in the Escorial been making preparations for that European tragedy in which most of the actors had such fatal parts assigned them, and of which few of the spectators of its opening scenes were doomed to witness the conclusion. A shifting and glancing of lights, a vision of vanishing feet, a trampling and bustling of unseen crowds, movements of concealed machinery, a few incoherent words, much noise and confusion vague and incomprehensible, till at last the tinkling of a small bell, and a glimpse of the modest manager stealing away as the curtain was rising—such was the spectacle presented at Midsummer, 1585.

And in truth the opening picture was effective. Sixteen black-robed, long-bearded Netherland envoys stalking away, discomfited and indignant, upon one side; Catherine de' Medici on the other, regarding them with a sneer, painfully contorted into a pathetic smile; Henry the King, robed in a sack of penitence, trembling and hesitating, leaning on the arm of Epergnon, but quailing even under the protection of that mighty swordsman; Mucio, careering, truncheon in hand, in full panoply, upon his war-horse, waving forward a mingled mass of German lanzknechts, Swiss musketeers, and Lorraine pikemen; the redoubtable Don Bernardino de Mendoza, in front, frowning and ferocious, with his drawn sword in his hand; Elizabeth of England, in the background, with the white-bearded Burghley and the monastic Walsingham, all surveying the scene with eyes of deepest meaning;

and, somewhat aside, but in full view, silent, calm, and imperturbably good-humoured, the bold Béarnese, standing with a mischievous but prophetic smile glittering through his blue eyes and curly beard—thus grouped were the personages of the drama in the introductory scenes.

The course of public events which succeeded the departure of the Netherland deputies is sufficiently well known. The secret negotiations and intrigues, however, by which those external facts were preceded or accompanied rest mainly in dusty archives, and it was therefore necessary to dwell somewhat at length upon them in the preceding pages.

The treaty of Joinville was signed on the last day of the year 1584.

We have seen the real nature of the interview of Ambassador Mendoza with Henry III. and his mother, which took place early in January, 1585. Immediately after that conference Don Bernardino betook himself to the Duke of Guise, and lost no time in stimulating his confederate to prompt but secret action.

The Netherland envoys had their last audience on the 18th of March, and their disappointment was the signal for the general exhibition and explosion. The great civil war began, and the man who refused to annex the Netherlands to the French kingdom soon ceased to be regarded as a king.

On the 31st March the heir presumptive, just manufactured by the Guises, sent forth his manifesto. Cardinal Bourbon, by this document, declared that for twenty-four years past no proper measures had been taken to extirpate the heresy by which France was infested. There was no natural heir to the King. Those who claimed to succeed at his death had deprived themselves, by heresy, of their rights. Should they gain their ends, the ancient religion would be abolished throughout the kingdom, as it had been in England, and Ca-



tholics be subjected to the same frightful tortures which they were experiencing there. New men, admitted to the confidence of the crown, clothed with the highest honours, and laden with enormous emoluments, had excluded the ancient and honoured functionaries of the state, who had been obliged to sell out their offices to these upstart successors. These new favourites had seized the finances of the kingdom, all of which were now collected into the private coffers of the King, and shared by him with his courtiers. The people were groaning under new taxes invented every day, yet they knew nothing of the distribution of the public treasure, while the King was himself so impoverished as to be unable to discharge his daily debts. Meantime these new advisers of the crown had renewed to the Protestants of the kingdom the religious privileges of which they had so justly been deprived, yet the religious peace which had followed had not brought with it the promised diminution of the popular burthens. Never had the nation been so heavily taxed or reduced to such profound misery. For these reasons, he, Cardinal Bourbon, with other princes of the blood, peers, gentlemen, cities, and universities, had solemnly bound themselves by oath to extirpate heresy down to the last root, and to save the people from the dreadful load under which they were languishing. It was for this that they had taken up arms, and till that purpose was accomplished they would never lay them down.

The paper concluded with the hope that his Majesty would not take these warlike demonstrations amiss; and a copy of the document was placed in the royal hands. <sup>1</sup>

It was very obvious to the most superficial observer that the manifesto was directed almost as much against

the reigning sovereign as against Henry of Navarre. The adherents of the Guise faction, and especially certain theologians in their employ, had taken very bold grounds upon the relations between king and subjects, and had made the public very familiar with their doctrines. It was a duty, they said, "to depose a prince who did not discharge his duty. Authority ill-regulated was robbery, and it was as absurd to call him a king who knew not how to govern, as it was to take a blind man for a guide, or to believe that a statue could influence the movements of living men." <sup>1</sup>

Yet to the faction, inspired by such rebellious sentiments, and which was thundering in his face such tremendous denunciations, the unhappy Henry could not find a single royal or manly word of reply. He threw himself on his knees, when, if ever, he should have assumed an attitude of command. He answered the insolence of the men who were parading their contempt for his authority, by humble excuses and supplications for pardon. He threw his crown in the dust before their feet, as if such humility would induce them to place it again upon his head. He abandoned the minions who had been his pride, his joy, and his defence, and deprecated, with an abject whimper, all responsibility for the unmeasured ambition and the insatiable rapacity of a few private individuals. He conjured the party-leaders, who had hurled defiance in his face, to lay down their arms, and promised that they should find in his wisdom and bounty more than all the advantages which they were seeking to obtain by war. <sup>2</sup>

Henry of Navarre answered in a different strain. The gauntlet had at last been thrown down to him, and he

<sup>1</sup> Prefixe, 58.

<sup>2</sup> De Thou, ix. 288.

<sup>1</sup> De Thou, ix. 284 *seq.*

came forward to take it up; not insolently nor carelessly, but with the cold courtesy of a Christian knight and valiant gentleman. He denied the charge of heresy. He avowed detestation of all doctrines contrary to the Word of God, to the decrees of the Fathers of the Church or condemned by the councils. The errors and abuses which had from time to time crept into the church, had long demanded, in the opinion of all pious persons, some measures of reform. After many bloody wars, no better remedy had been discovered to arrest the cause of these dire religious troubles, whether in France or Germany, than to permit all men to obey the dictates of their own conscience. The Protestants had thus obtained in France many edicts by which the peace of the kingdom had been secured. He could not himself be denounced as a heretic, for he had always held himself ready to receive instruction, and to be set right where he had erred. To call him "relapsed" was an outrage. Were it true, he were indeed unworthy of the crown, but the world knew that his change at the Massacre of St. Bartholomew had been made under duress, and that he had returned to the reformed faith when he had recovered his liberty. Religious toleration had been the object of his life. In what the tyranny of the popes and the violence of the Spaniards had left him of his kingdom of Navarre, Catholics and Protestants enjoyed a perfect religious liberty. No man had the right, therefore, to denounce him as an enemy of the church, or a disturber of the public repose, for he had ever been willing to accept all propositions of peace which left the rights of conscience protected.

He was a Frenchman, a prince of France, a living member of the kingdom, feeling with its pains, and bleeding with its wounds. They who denounced him were alien to France, factitious portions of her body, feeling no suffering, even

should she be consuming with living fire. The Leaguers were the friends and the servants of the Spaniards, while he had been born the enemy, and with too good reason, of the whole Spanish race.

„Let the name of Papist and of Huguenot," he said, „be heard no more among us. Those terms were buried in the edict of peace. Let us speak only of Frenchmen and of Spaniards. It is the counter-league which we must all unite to form, the natural union of the head with all its members."

Finally, to save the shedding of so much innocent blood, to spare all the countless miseries of civil war, he implored the royal permission to terminate this quarrel in person, by single combat with the Duke of Guise, one to one, two to two, or in as large a number as might be desired, and upon any spot within or without the kingdom that should be assigned. „The Duke of Guise," said Henry of Navarre, „cannot but accept my challenge as an honour, coming as it does from a prince infinitely his superior in rank; and thus, may God defend the right."

This paper, drawn up by the illustrious Duplessis-Mornay, who was to have been the second of the King of Navarre in the proposed duel, was signed 10 June, 1585. 1

The unfortunate Henry III., not so dull as to doubt that the true object of the Guise party was to reduce him to insignificance, and to open their own way to the throne, was too impotent of purpose to follow the dictates which his wisest counsellors urged and his own reason approved. His choice had lain between open hostility with his Spanish enemy and a more terrible combat with

1 'Declaration du Roy de Navarre contre les calomnies de la Ligue.' In Duplessis-Mornay, *Mémoires et Correspondance*, ed 1824, vol. iii. 94 seq. De Thon, ix. les calomnies de la Ligue.' In Duplessis-Mornay, *Mémoires et Correspondance*.

that implacable foe wearing the mask of friendship. He had refused to annex to his crown the rich and powerful Netherlands, from dread of a foreign war; and he was now about to accept for himself and kingdom all the horrors of a civil contest, in which his avowed antagonist was the first captain of the age, and his nominal allies the stipendiaries of Philip II.

Villeroy, his prime minister, and Catherine de' Medici, his mother, had both devoted him to disgrace and ruin. The deputies from the Netherlands had been dismissed, and now, notwithstanding the festivities and exuberant demonstrations of friendship with which the Earl of Derby's splendid embassy had been greeted, it became necessary to bind Henry hand and foot to the conspirators, who had sworn the destruction of that Queen, as well as his own, and the extirpation of heresy and heretics in every realm of Christendom.

On the 9th June the League demanded a royal decree, forbidding the practice of all religion but the Roman Catholic, on pain of death. In vain had the clear-sighted Bishop of Aqqs uttered his eloquent warnings. Despite such timely counsels, which he was capable at once of appreciating and of neglecting, Henry followed slavishly the advice of those whom he knew in his heart to be his foes, and authorised the great conspiracy against Elizabeth, against Protestantism, and against himself.

On the 5th June Villeroy had expressed a wish for a very secret interview with Mendoza, on the subject of the invasion of England.

"It needed not this overture," said that magniloquent Spaniard, "to engender in a person of my talents, and with the heart of a Mendoza, venom enough for vengeance. I could not more desire than I did already to assist in so holy a work; nor could I aspire to greater honour than would be gained in uniting those crowns (of France and

Spain) in strict friendship for the purpose of extirpating heresy throughout Europe, and of chastising the Queen of England—whose abominations I am never likely to forget, having had them so long before my eyes—and of satisfying my just resentment for the injuries she has inflicted on myself. It was on this subject," continued the ambassador, "that Monsieur de Villeroy wished a secret interview with me, pledging himself—if your Majesty would deign to unite yourself with this King, and to aid him with your forces—to a successful result." 1

Mendoza accordingly expressed a willingness to meet the ingenuous Secretary of State—who had so recently been assisting at the banquets and rejoicings with Lord Derby and his companions, which had so much enlivened the French capital—and assured him that his most Catholic Majesty would be only too glad to draw closer the bonds of friendship with the most Christian King, for the service of God and the glory of his Church.

The next day the envoy and the Secretary of State met, very secretly, in the house of the Signor Gondi. Villeroy

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1 "La abertura que estos reyes me havian hecho . . . no havia de engendrar en una persona de mis preudas y coraçon de un Mendoza veneno para procurar venganças, y no antes desseo de ayudar obra tan santa, pues que me podria redundar mayor honra que de otra ninguna, siendo instrumento para unir estas coronas con firme amistad, debaxo de lo qual pudiesse extirpar las heregias de Europa, dando privilegio a esto, con castigar a la Reyna de Inglatierra, cuyas abominaciones creya que yo no tendria olvidadas, como persona que las havia tenido tantos años adelante los ojos, y causa de justo resentimiento por lo que havia hecho a la propia mia. Sobre esta materia dessara el Señor Villeroy vene secretamente conmigo, y entender suyo, me asegurara, si V. M.<sup>a</sup> holgaria de ayudar con sus fuerças y juntarse con este rey, para el efeto." Don Bernardino de Mendoza a Su Caíca R. Mag.<sup>a</sup>. (deçifrada), Paris, 7 June, 1585. Arch. de Simancas, in the Archives de l'Empire at Paris, B. 56, 220, 223, MS.



commenced his harangue by an allusion to the current opinion, that Mendoza had arrived in France with a torch in his hand, to light the fires of civil war in that kingdom, as he had recently done in England. 1

„I do not believe,” replied Mendoza, „that discreet and prudent persons in France attribute my actions to any such motives. As for the ignorant people of the kingdom, they do not appal me, although they evidently imagine that I have imbibed, during my residence in England, something of the spirit of the enchanter Merlin, that, by signs and cabalistic words alone, I am thought capable of producing such commotions.” 2

After this preliminary flourish the envoy proceeded to complain bitterly of the most Christian King and his mother, who, after the propositions which they had made him when on his way to Spain, had, since his return, become so very cold and dry towards him. 3 And on this theme he enlarged for some time.

Villeroy replied by complaining, in his turn, about the dealings of the most Catholic King with the leaguers and the rebels of France, and Mendoza rejoined by an intimation, that harping upon past grievances and suspicions was hardly the way to bring about harmony in present matters.

Struck with the justice of this remark, the French Secretary of State entered at once upon business. He made a very long speech 4 upon the tyranny which

„that Englishwoman” was anew inflicting upon the Catholics in her kingdom, upon the offences which she had committed against the King of Spain, and against the King of France and his brothers, and upon the aliment which she had been yielding to the civil war in the Netherlands and in France for so many years. He then said that, if Mendoza would declare with sincerity, and „without any of the duplicity of a minister,” that Philip would league himself with Henry for the purpose of invading England, in order to reduce the three kingdoms to the Catholic faith, and to place their crowns on the head of the Queen of Scotland, to whom they of right belonged, then that the King, his master, was most ready to join in so holy an enterprise. He begged Mendoza to say with what number of troops the invasion could be made; whether Philip could send any from Flanders or from Spain; how many it would be well to send from France, and under what chieftain; in what manner it would be best to communicate with his most Catholic Majesty; whether it were desirable to despatch a secret envoy to him, and of what quality such agent ought to be. He also observed that the most Christian King could not himself speak to Mendoza on the subject before having

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me con grande arenga, la tirannia con que procedia contra los catolicos agora de nuevo la de Ingaltierra, offensas que havia hecho a V. M<sup>d</sup>. y el mismo a este rey y hermanos, alimentando la guerra en los payses baxos, y en francia, por largos años, que le dicesse, con llaneza y sin doblez de ministro, si V. M<sup>d</sup>. holgaria de juntarse y ligarse con este rey, para hazer aquella impresa, reduziendo los tres reynos a la fee Cat<sup>ol</sup> Rom<sup>ana</sup>, y poniendo la corona a la de la reyna de Escocia, que era a la que de derecho le tocava, y lo que el rey su amo solo pretendia, que quedasse a quel reyno en la neutralidad, que hasta aqui, que por ser empresa tan santa, se prometia que V. M<sup>d</sup>. no refusaria el asistir con sus fuerzas a ella, que de antmo de su amo me asegurava de estar aparejedisimo para ello.” (Ibid.)

1 „Con el acha en la mano para emprender fuego de guerra civil, como havia hecho an Ingaltierra.” (MS. just cited, 7 June, 1585.)

2 „Y que los ignorantes de francia no me espantarian, imaginandose haverse me pegado del tiempo que estuve en Ingaltierra algo del spiritu de Merlin, para haer, con signos y palabras, semejantes commociones.” (MS. just cited, 7 June, 1585.)

3 „Havellos hallado tan frios y secos.” (Ibid.)

4 „Respondio me que era bien proponiendo

communicated the matter to the Queen-Mother, but expressed a wish that a special carrier might be forthwith despatched to Spain; for he might be sure that, on an affair of such weight, he would not have permitted himself to reveal the secret wishes of his master, except by his commands.<sup>1</sup>

Mendoza replied by enlarging with much enthusiasm on the facility with which England could be conquered by the combined power of France and Spain. If it were not a very difficult matter before—even with the jealousy, between the two crowns—how much less so, now that they could join their fleets and armies; now that the arming by the one prince would not inspire the other with suspicion; now that they would be certain of finding safe harbour in each other's kingdoms, in case of unfavourable weather and head-winds, and that they could arrange from what ports to sail, in what direction, and under what commanders. He disapproved, however, of sending a special messenger to Spain, on the ground of wishing to keep the matter entirely secret, but in reality—as he informed Philip—because he chose to keep the management in his own hands; because he could always let slip Mucio upon them, in case they should play him false; because he feared that the leaking out of the secret might discourage the Leaguers; and because he felt that the bolder and more lively were the Cardinal of Bourbon and his confederates, the stronger was the party of the King his master, and the more intimidated and dispirited would be the mind and the forces of the most Christian King. „And this is precisely the point,” said the diplomatist, „at which a minister of your Majesty should aim at this season.”<sup>2</sup>

Thus the civil war in France—an indispensable part of Philip's policy—was to be maintained at all hazards, and although the ambassador was of opinion that the most Christian King was sincere in his proposition to invade England, it would never do to allow any interval of tranquillity to the wretched subjects of that Christian King.

„I cannot doubt,” said Mendoza, „that the making of this proposal to me with so much warmth was the especial persuasion of God, who, hearing the groans of the Catholics of England, so cruelly afflicted, wished to force the French King and his minister to feel, in the necessity which surrounds them, that the offending Him, by impeding the grandeur of your Majesty, would be their total ruin, and that their only salvation is to unite in sincerity and truth with your Majesty for the destruction of the heretics.”<sup>1</sup>

Therefore, although—judging from the nature of the French—he might imagine that they were attempting to put him to sleep, Mendoza, on the whole, expressed a conviction that the King was in earnest, having arrived at the conclusion that he could only get rid of the Guise faction by sending them over to England. „Seeing that he cannot possibly eradicate the war from his kingdom,” said the envoy, „because of the boldness with which the Leaguers maintain it, with the strong assistance of your Majesty, he has determined to embrace with much fervour, and without any deception at all, the enterprise against England, as the only remedy to quiet his own dominions. The subjugation of those three kingdoms, in order to restore them to their rightful owner, is a purpose so holy, just, and worthy of your Majesty, and one which you have had so constantly in view, that

<sup>1</sup> MS. just cited, 7 June, 1585.

<sup>2</sup> „Que es, en lo que en esta sazón el ministro de V. Ma. ha de traer puesta la mira.” (Ibid.)

<sup>1</sup> MS. just cited, 7 June, 1585.

it is superfluous for me to enlarge upon the subject. Your Majesty knows that its effects will be the tranquillity and preservation of all your realms. The reasons for making the attempt, even without the aid of France, become demonstrations now that she is unanimously in favour of the scheme. The most Christian King is resolutely bent—so far as I can comprehend the intrigues of Villeroy—to carry out this project on the foundation of a treaty with the Guise party. It will not take much time, therefore, to put down the heretics here; nor will it consume much more to conquer England with the armies of two such powerful Princes. <sup>1</sup> The power of that island is of little moment, there being no disciplined forces to oppose us, even if they were all unanimous in its defence; how much less then, with so many Catholics to assist the invaders, seeing them so powerful! If your Majesty, on account of your Netherlands, is not afraid of putting arms into the hands of the Guise family in France, there need be less objection to sending one of that house into England, particularly as you will send forces of your own into that kingdom, by the reduction of which the affairs of Flanders will be secured. To effect the pacification of the Netherlands the sooner, it would be desirable to conquer England as early as October.” <sup>2</sup>

Having thus sufficiently enlarged upon the sincerity of the French King and his prime minister, in their dark projects against a friendly power, and upon the

ease with which that friendly power could be subjected, the ambassador begged for a reply from his royal master without delay. He would be careful, meantime, to keep the civil war alive in France—thus verifying the poetical portrait of himself, the truth of which he had just been so indignantly and rhetorically denying—but it was desirable that the French should believe that this civil war was not Philip’s sole object. He concluded by drawing his master’s attention to the sufferings of the English Catholics. „I cannot refrain,” he said, „from placing before your eyes the terrible persecutions which the Catholics are suffering in England; the blood of the martyrs flowing in so many kinds of torments; the groans of the prisoners, of the widows and orphans; the general oppression and servitude, which is the greatest ever endured by a people of God, under any tyrant whatever. Your Majesty, into whose hands God is now pleased to place the means, so long desired, of extirpating and totally destroying the heresies of our time, can alone liberate them from their bondage.” <sup>1</sup>

The picture of these kings, prime ministers, and ambassadors, thus plotting treason, stratagem, and massacre, is a dark and dreary one. The description of English sufferings for conscience’ sake, under the Protestant Elizabeth, is even more painful; for it had unfortunately too much of truth, although as wilfully

<sup>1</sup> „Les de Guisa, teniendo las armas en la mano, combaten a los hereges de aqui, que no puede ser mucho tiempo, y assi mismo, el que se consumira en reduzir a Ingaltierra con fuerças de tan poderosissimos principes y la de la isla no de momento, para podellos contrastar gente no exercitada, si bien estuviessen todos nnanimos para defendarse, quanto mas, haviendo tantos Catcos que han de acudir á los estrangeros, viendo los tan poderosos.” (MS. just cited, 7 June, 1585.)

<sup>2</sup> Ibid.

<sup>1</sup> „Ante cuyos ojos no puedo dexar de anteponer en esta la terrible persecution que passan los Catcos en Ingalt<sup>a</sup>, con mucha sangre de martires derremada con diversos generos de tormentos, los gemidos de los prisioneros, de los viudas y huerfanos, y opresion general y servidumbre que es la mayor que ha parescido jamas pueblo de Dios, debaxo de ningun tirano, de cuya mano espera solo ser libertados por las de V. Md. a quien Dios es servido de poner en las proprias la ocasion que tantos dias ha procurado para la extirpacion y total destruycion de les heregias de nro tiempo, el sea servido de remediallos.” (MS. just cited, 7 June, 1585.)



darkened and exaggerated as could be done by religious hatred and Spanish bombast. The Queen was surrounded by legions of deadly enemies. Spain, the Pope, the League, were united in one perpetual conspiracy against her; and they relied on the co-operation of those subjects of hers whom her own cruelty was converting into traitors.

We read with a shudder these gloomy secrets of conspiracy and wholesale murder, which make up the diplomatic history of the sixteenth century, and we cease to wonder that a woman, feeling herself so continually the mark at which all the tyrants and assassins of Europe were aiming—although not possessing perhaps the evidences of her peril so completely as they have been revealed to us—should come to consider every English Papist as a traitor and an assassin. It was unfortunate that she was not able to rise beyond the vile instincts of the age, and by a magnanimous and sublime toleration to convert her secret enemies into loyal subjects.

And now Henry of Valois was to choose between league and counter-league, between Henry of Guise and Henry of Navarre, between France and Spain. The whole chivalry of Gascony and Guienne, the vast swarm of industrious and hardy Huguenot artisans, the Netherland rebels, the great English Queen, stood ready to support the cause of French nationality, and of all nationalities, against a threatening world-empire; of religious liberty against sacerdotal absolutism; and the crown of a King, whose only merit had hitherto been to acquiesce in a religious toleration dictated to him by others, against those who derided his authority and insulted his person. The bold knight-errant of Christendom, the champion to the utterance against Spain, stood there with lance in rest, and the King scarcely hesitated.

The League, gliding so long unheeded, now reared its crest in the very

palace of France, and full in the monarch's face. With a single shudder the victim fell into its coils.

The choice was made. On the 18th of July the edict of Nemours was published, revoking all previous edicts by which religious peace had been secured. Death and confiscation of property were now proclaimed as the penalty of practising any religious rites save those of the Roman Catholic Church. Six months were allowed to the Nonconformists to put their affairs in order, after which they were to make public profession of the Catholic religion, with regular attendance upon its ceremonies, or else go into perpetual exile. To remain in France without abjuring heresy was thenceforth a mortal crime, to be expiated upon the gallows. As a matter of course, all Huguenots were instantaneously incapacitated from public office, the mixed chambers of justice were abolished, and the cautionary towns were to be restored. On the other hand, the Guise faction were to receive certain cities into their possession, as pledges that this sanguinary edict should be fulfilled.<sup>1</sup>

Thus did Henry III. abjectly kiss the hand which smote him. His mother, having since the death of Anjou no farther interest in affecting to 15th July, favour the Huguenots, had 1855. arranged the basis of this treaty with the Spanish party. And now the unfortunate King had gone solemnly down to the parliament of Paris, to be present at the registration of the edict. The counsellors and presidents were all assembled, and, as they sat there in their crimson robes, they seemed, to the excited imagination of those who loved their country, like embodiments of the impending and most sanguinary tragedy. As the monarch left the parliament-house a faint cry of „God save the King!” was heard in the street.

<sup>1</sup> De Thou, ix. 328 seq.

Henry hung his head, for it was long since that cry had met his ears, and he knew that it was a false and languid demonstration which had been paid for by the Leaguers.

And thus was the compact signed—an unequal compact. Madam League was on horseback, armed in proof, said a contemporary; the King was on foot, and dressed in a shirt of penitence. 1 The alliance was not an auspicious one. Not peace, but a firebrand—*facem, non pacem*—had the King held forth to his subjects. 2

When the news came to Henry of Navarre that the King had really promulgated this fatal edict, he remained for a time, with amazement and sorrow, leaning heavily upon a table, with his face in his right hand. When he raised his head again—so he afterwards asserted—one side of his moustachio had turned white. 3

Meantime Gregory XIII., who had always refused to sanction the League, was dead, and Cardinal Peretti, under 24th April, the name of Sixtus V., 1585. now reigned in his place.

Born of an illustrious house, as he said—for it was a house without a roof 4—this monk of humble origin was of inordinate ambition. Feigning a humility which was but the cloak to his pride, he was in reality as grasping, self-seeking, and revengeful, as he seemed gentle and devout. It was inevitable that a pontiff of this character should seize the opportunity offered him to mimic Hildebrand, and to brandish on high the thunderbolts of the Church.

With a flaming prelude concerning the omnipotence delegated by Almighty God to St. Peter and his successors—an authority infinitely superior to all earthly

powers—the decrees of which were irresistible alike by the highest and the meanest, and which hurled misguided princes from their thrones into the abyss, like children of Beelzebub, the Pope proceeded to fulminate his sentence of excommunication against those children of wrath, Henry of Navarre and Henry of Condé. They were denounced as heretics, relapsed, and enemies of God. The King was declared 28th Aug. dispossessed of his principality 1585. of Béarn, and of what remained to him of Navarre. He was stripped of all dignities, privileges, and property, and especially proclaimed incapable of ever ascending the throne of France. 1

The Béarnese replied by a clever political squib. A terse and spirited paper found its way to Rome, and was soon affixed to the statues of Pasquin and Marforio, and in other public places of that city, and even to the gates of the papal palace. Without going beyond his own doors, his Holiness had the opportunity of reading, to his profound amazement, that Mr. Sixtus, calling himself Pope, had foully and maliciously lied in calling the King of Navarre a heretic. This Henry offered to prove before any free council legitimately chosen. If the Pope refused to submit to such decision, he was himself no better than excommunicate and Antichrist, and the King of Navarre thereby declared mortal and perpetual war upon him. The ancient kings of France had known how to chastise the insolence of former popes, and he hoped, when he ascended the throne, to take vengeance on Mr. Sixtus for the insult thus offered to all the kings of Christendom—and so on, in a vein which showed the Béarnese to be a man rather amused than blasted by these papal fireworks. 2

1 L'Estoile, 186.

2 „Guisiadi factum dumputo dicere pacem, Pacem non possum dicere, dico facem.” L'Estoile, 137.

3 Mathieu, anno 1585.

4 De Thou, ix. 368 seq.

1 De Thou, ix. 369. L'Estoile, 190.

2 De Thou, ix. 376-378. Prefixe, 62, 63. L'Estoile, 190. The last-named writer declares himself the author of this famous answer to the bull of Sixtus:

Sixtus V., though imperious, was far from being dull. He knew how to appreciate a man when he found one, and he rather admired the cheerful attitude maintained by Navarre as he tossed back the thunderbolts. He often spoke after-

„Au susdit écrit, fait par l'auteur des pre sens memoires, on a fait faire du palais de Paris un voyage à Rome, ou l'on l'a mis, signifié, et affiché, et l'a t on inséré aux recueils de ce tems, imprimés à la Rochelle, tant la vanité et curiosité de ce tems estoit grande.”

wards of Henry with genuine admiration, and declared that in all the world he knew but two persons fit to wear a crown—Henry of Navarre and Elizabeth of England. „'Twas pity,” he said, „that both should be heretics.” 1

And thus the fires of civil war had been lighted throughout Christendom, and the monarch of France had thrown himself head foremost into the flames.

1 De Thou, *Prefixe, ubi sup.*

## CHAPTER V.

Positio and Character of Farnese—Preparations for Antwerp Siege—Its Characteristics—Foresight of William the Silent—Sainte Aldegonde, the Burgomaster—Anarchy in Antwerp—Character of Sainte Aldegonde—Admiral Treslong—Justinus de Nassau—Hohenlo—Opposition to the Plan of Orange—Liefkenshoek—Head-quarters of Parma at Kalloo—Difficulty of supplying the City—Results of not piercing the Dykes—Preliminaries of the Siege—Successes of the Spaniards—Energy of Farnese with sword and pen—His Correspondence with the Antwerpers—Progress of the Bridge—Impoverished Condition of Parma—Patriots attempt Bois-le-Duc—Their Misconduct—Failure of the Enterprise—The Scheldt Bridge completed—Description of the Structure—Position of Alexander and his Army—La Motte attempts in vain Ostend—Patriots gain Liefkenshoek—Projects of Gianibelli—Alarm on the Bridge—The Fire-Ships—The Explosion—Its Results—Death of the Viscount of Ghent—Perpetual Anxiety of Farnese—Impoverished State of the Spaniards—Intended Attack of the Kowenstyn—Second Attack of the Kowenstyn—A Landing effected—A sharp Combat—The Dyke pierced—Rally of the Spaniards—Parma comes to the Rescue—Fierce Struggle on the Dyke—The Spaniards successful—Premature Triumph at Antwerp—Defeat of the Patriots—The Ship „War's End”—Despair of the Citizens—Sainte Aldegonde discouraged—His critical Position—His Negotiations with the enemy—Correspondence with Richardot—Commotion in the City—Interview of Marnix with Parma—Suspicious conduct of Marnix—Deputation to the Prince—Oration of Marnix—Private Views of Parma—Capitulation of Antwerp—Mistakes of Marnix—Philip

on the Religious Question—Triumphal Entrance of Alexander—Rebuilding of the Citadel—Gratification of Philip—Note on Sainte Aldegonde.

THE negotiations between France and the Netherlands have been massed, in order to present a connected and distinct view of the relative attitude of the different countries of Europe. The conferences and diplomatic protocolling had resulted in nothing positive; but it is very necessary for the reader to understand the negative effects of all this dissimulation and palace-politics upon the destiny of the new commonwealth, and upon Christendom at large. The League had now achieved a great triumph; the King of France had virtually abdicated, and it was now requisite for the King of Navarre, the Netherlands, and Queen Elizabeth, to draw more closely together than before, if the last hope of forming a counter-league were not to be abandoned. The next step in political combination was therefore a solemn embassy of the States-General to England. Before detailing these negotiations, however, it is proper to direct attention to the external public events which had been unrolling themselves in the Provinces contempo-



raneously with the secret history which has been detailed in the preceding chapters.

By presenting in their natural groupings various distinct occurrences, rather than by detailing them in strict chronological order, a clearer view of the whole picture will be furnished than could be done by intermingling personages, transactions, and scenery, according to the arbitrary command of Time alone.

The Netherlands, by the death of Orange, had been left without a head. On the other hand, the Spanish party had never been so fortunate in their chief at any period since the destiny of the two nations had been blended with each other. Alexander Farnese, Prince of Parma, was a general and a politician, whose character had been steadily ripening since he came into the command of the country. He was now thirty-seven years of age—with the experience of a sexagenarian. No longer the impetuous, arbitrary, hot-headed youth, whose intelligence and courage hardly atoned for his insolent manner and stormy career, he had become pensive, modest, almost gentle. His genius was rapid in conception, patient in combination, fertile in expedients, adamant in the endurance of suffering; for never did a heroic general and a noble army of veterans manifest more military virtue in the support of an infamous cause than did Parma and his handful of Italians and Spaniards. That which they considered to be their duty they performed. The work before them they did with all their might.

Alexander had vanquished the rebellion in the Celtic provinces by the masterly diplomacy and liberal bribery which have been related in a former work. Artois, Hainault, Douay, Orchies, with the rich cities of Lille, Tournay, Valenciennes, Arras, and other important places, were now the property of Philip. These unhappy and misguided lands, however, were already reaping

the reward of their treason. Beggared, trampled upon, plundered, despised, they were at once the prey of the Spaniards, and the cause that their sister-states, which still held out, were placed in more desperate condition than ever. They were also, even in their abject plight, made still more forlorn by the forays of Balagny, who continued in command of Cambray. Catherine de' Medici claimed that city as her property, by will of the Duke of Anjou.<sup>1</sup> A strange title—founded upon the treason and cowardice of her favourite son—but one which, for a time, was made good by the possession maintained by Balagny. That usurper meantime, with a shrewd eye to his own interests, pronounced the truce of Cambray, which was soon afterwards arranged, from year to year, by permission of Philip, as a „most excellent milch-cow;”<sup>2</sup> and he continued to fill his pails at the expense of the „reconciled” provinces, till they were thoroughly exhausted.

This large south-western section of the Netherlands being thus permanently re-annexed to the Spanish crown, while Holland, Zeeland, and the other provinces, already constituting the new Dutch republic, were more obstinate in their hatred of Philip than ever, there remained the rich and fertile territory of Flanders and Brabant as the great debateable land. Here were the royal and political capital, Brussels, the commercial capital, Antwerp, with Mechlin, Dendermonde, Vilvoorde, and other places of inferior importance, all to be struggled for to the death. With the subjection of this district the last bulwark between the new commonwealth and the old empire would be overthrown, and Spain and Holland would then meet face to face.

If there had ever been a time when

<sup>1</sup> Strada, ii. 295.

<sup>2</sup> Le Petit, ii. 499.

every nerve in Protestant Christendom should be strained to weld all those provinces together into one great commonwealth, as a bulwark for European liberty, rather than to allow them to be broken into stepping-stones, over which absolutism could stride across France and Holland into England, that moment had arrived. Every sacrifice should have been cheerfully made by all Netherlands, the uttermost possible subsidies and auxiliaries should have been furnished by all the friends of civil and religious liberty in every land, to save Flanders and Brabant from their impending fate.

No man felt more keenly the importance of the business in which he was engaged than Parma. He knew his work exactly, and he meant to execute it thoroughly. Antwerp was the hinge on which the fate of the whole country, perhaps of all Christendom, was to turn. „If we get Antwerp,” said the Spanish soldiers—so frequently that the expression passed into a proverb—„you shall all go to mass with us; if you save Antwerp, we will all go to conventicle with you.”

Alexander rose with the difficulty and responsibility of his situation. His vivid, almost poetic intellect formed its schemes with perfect distinctness. Every episode in his great, and, as he himself termed it, his „heroic enterprise,” was traced out beforehand with the tranquil vision of creative genius; and he was prepared to convert his conceptions into reality, with the aid of an iron nature that never knew fatigue or fear.

But the obstacles were many. Alexander's master sat in his cabinet with his head full of Mucio, Don Antonio, and Queen Elizabeth; while Alexander himself was left neglected, almost forgotten. His army was shrinking to a nullity. The demands upon him were enormous, his finances delusive, almost exhausted. To drain an ocean dry he

had nothing but a sieve. What was his position? He could bring into the field perhaps eight or ten thousand men over and above the necessary garrisons. He had before him Brussels, Antwerp, Mechlin, Ghent, Dendermonde, and other powerful places, which he was to subjugate. Here was a problem not easy of solution. Given an army of eight thousand, more or less, to reduce therewith, in the least possible time, half-a dozen cities, each containing fifteen or twenty thousand men able to bear arms. To besiege these places in form was obviously a mere chimera. Assault, battery, and surprises—these were all out of the question.

Yet Alexander was never more truly heroic than in this position of vast entanglement. Untiring, uncomplaining, thoughtful of others, prodigal of himself, generous, modest, brave; with so much intellect and so much devotion to what he considered his duty, he deserved to be a patriot and a champion of the right, rather than an instrument of despotism.

And thus he paused for a moment—with much work already accomplished, but his hardest life-task before him; still in the noon of manhood, a fine martial figure, standing, spear in hand, full in the sunlight, though all the scene around him was wrapped in gloom—a noble, commanding shape, entitled to the admiration which the energetic display of great powers, however unscrupulous, must always command. A dark, meridional physiognomy, a quick, alert, imposing head; jet black, close-clipped hair; a bold eagle's face, with full, bright, restless eye; a man rarely reposing, always ready, never alarmed; living in the saddle, with harness on his back—such was the Prince of Parma; matured and mellowed, but still unharmed by time.

The cities of Flanders and Brabant he determined to reduce by gaining

command of the Scheldt. The five principal ones—Ghent, Dendermonde, Mechlin, Brussels, Antwerp—lie in a narrow circle, at distances from each other varying from five miles to thirty, and are all strung together by the great Netherland river or its tributaries. His plan was immensely furthered by the success of Balthasar Gerard, an ally whom Alexander had despised and distrusted, even while he employed him. The assassination of Orange was better to Parma than forty thousand men. A crowd of allies instantly started up for him, in the shape of treason, faintheartedness, envy, jealousy, insubordination, within the walls of every beleaguered city. Alexander knew well how to deal with those auxiliaries. Letters, artfully couched, full of conciliation and of promise, were circulated in every council-room, in almost every house.

The surrender of Ghent—brought about by the governor's eloquence, aided by the golden arguments which he knew so well how to advance—had 19th Sept, by the middle of September 1584, put him in possession of West Flanders, with the important exception of the coast. Dendermonde capitulated at a still earlier day; while the fall of Brussels, which held out till many persons had been starved to death, was deferred till the 10th March of the following year, and that of Mechlin till midsummer. 1

The details of the military or political operations by which the reduction of most of these places was effected, possess but little interest. The siege of Antwerp, however, was one of the most striking events of the age; and although the change in military tactics and the progress of science may have rendered this leaguer of less technical importance than it possessed in the sixteenth century, yet the illustration that it affords of the splendid abilities of Parma, of

the most cultivated mode of warfare in use at that period, and of the internal politics by which the country was then regulated, make it necessary to dwell upon the details of an episode which must ever possess enduring interest.

It is instructive, too, to observe the diligence and accuracy with which the best lights of the age were brought to bear upon the great problem which Parma had undertaken to solve. All the science then at command was applied both by the Prince and by his burgher antagonists to the advancement of their ends. Hydrostatics, hydraulics, engineering, navigation, gunnery, pyrotechnics, mining, geometry, were summoned as broadly, vigorously, and intelligently to the destruction or preservation of a trembling city, as they have ever been, in more commercial days, to advance a financial or manufacturing purpose. Land converted into water, and water into land, castles built upon the breast of rapid streams, rivers turned from their beds and taught new courses; the distant ocean driven across ancient bulwarks, mines dug below the sea, and canals made to percolate obscene morasses—which the red hand of war, by the very act, converted into blooming gardens—a mighty stream bridged and mastered in the very teeth of winter, floating icebergs, ocean-tides, and an alert and desperate foe, ever ready with fleets and armies and batteries—such were the materials of which the great spectacle was composed; a spectacle which enchained the attention of Europe for seven months, and in the result of which, it was thought, depended the fate of all the Netherlands, and perhaps of all Christendom.

Antwerp, then the commercial centre of the Netherlands and of Europe, stands upon the Scheldt. The river, flowing straight, broad, and full along the verge of the city, subtends the arc into which the place arranges itself as it falls back from the shore. Two

1 Meteren, vii. 217 seq.



thousand ships of the largest capacity then known might easily find room in its ample harbours. The stream, nearly half a mile in width, and sixty feet in depth, with a tidal rise and fall of eleven feet, moves, for a few miles, in a broad and steady current between the provinces of Brabant and Flanders. Then dividing itself into many ample estuaries, and gathering up the level isles of Zeeland into its bosom, it seems to sweep out with them into the Northern Ocean. Here, at the junction of the river and the sea, lay the perpetual hope of Antwerp, for in all these creeks and currents swarmed the fleets of the Zeelanders, that hardy and amphibious race, with which few soldiers or mariners could successfully contend, on land or water.

Even from the beginning of the year 1584 Parma had been from time to time threatening Antwerp. The victim instinctively felt that its enemy was poising and hovering over head, although he still delayed to strike. Early in the summer Sainte Aldegonde, Recorder Martini, and other official personages, were at Delft, upon the occasion of the christening-ceremonies of Frederic Henry, youngest child of Orange. The Prince, at that moment, was aware of the plans of Parma, and held a long conversation with his friends upon the measures which he desired to see immediately undertaken. Unmindful of his usual hospitality, he insisted that these gentlemen should immediately leave for Antwerp. Alexander Farnese, he assured them, had taken the firm determination to possess himself of that place without further delay. He had privately signified his purpose of laying the axe at once to the root of the tree, believing that with the fall of the commercial capital the infant confederacy of the United States would fall likewise. In order to accomplish this object, he would forthwith attempt to make himself master of the banks

of the Scheldt, and would even throw a bridge across the stream, if his plans were not instantly circumvented. 1

William of Orange then briefly indicated his plan; adding that he had no fears for the result; and assuring his friends, who expressed much anxiety on the subject, that if Parma really did attempt the siege of Antwerp it should be his ruin. The plan was perfectly simple. The city stood upon a river. It was practicable, although extremely hazardous, for the enemy to bridge that river, and by so doing ultimately to reduce the place. But the ocean could not be bridged; and it was quite possible to convert Antwerp, for a season, into an ocean-port. Standing alone upon an island, with the sea flowing around it, and with full and free marine communication with Zeeland and Holland, it might safely bid defiance to the land-forces, even of so great a commander as Parma. To the furtherance of this great measure of defence, it was necessary to destroy 10th June, certain bulwarks, the chief 1584. of which was called the Blauw-garen Dyke; and Sainte Aldegonde was therefore requested to return to the city, in order to cause this task to be executed without delay. 2

Nothing could be more judicious than this advice. The low lands along the Scheldt were protected against marine encroachments, and the river itself was confined to its bed, by a magnificent system of dykes, which extended along its edge towards the ocean, in parallel lines. Other barriers of a similar nature ran in oblique directions, through the wide open pasture lands, which they maintained in green fertility against the ever-threatening sea. The Blauw-garen, to which the prince mainly alluded, was connected with the

1 Bor, ii. xix. 466.

2 Bor, *ubi sup.* Meteren, xii. 216-18.

great dyke upon the right bank of the Scheldt. Between this and the city, another bulwark called the Kowenstyn Dyke, crossed the country at right angles to the river, and joined the other two at a point, not very far from Lillo, where the States had a strong fortress. 1

The country in this neighbourhood was low, spongy, full of creeks, small meres, and the old bed of the Scheldt. Orange, therefore, made it very clear, that, by piercing the great dyke just described, such a vast body of water would be made to pour over the land as to submerge the Kowenstyn also, the only other obstacle in the passage of fleets from Zeeland to Antwerp. The city would then be connected with the sea and its islands by so vast an expanse of navigable water, that any attempt on Parma's part to cut off supplies and succour would be hopeless. Antwerp would laugh the idea of famine to scorn; and although this immunity would be purchased by the sacrifice of a large amount of agricultural territory, the price so paid was but a slender one, when the existence of the capital, and with it perhaps of the whole confederacy, was at stake. 2

Sainte Aldegonde and Martini suggested, that, as there would be some opposition to the measure proposed, it might be as well to make a similar attempt on the Flemish side, in preference, by breaking through the dykes in the neighbourhood of Saftingen. Orange replied by demonstrating that the land in the region which he had indicated was of a character to ensure success, while in the other direction there were certain very unfavourable circumstances which rendered the issue doubtful. 3 The result was destined to prove the sagacity of the Prince for it will be

shown in the sequel that the Saftingen plan, afterwards really carried out, was rather advantageous than detrimental to the enemy's projects.

Sainte Aldegonde, accordingly, yielded to the arguments and entreaties of his friend, and repaired without delay to Antwerp.

The advice of William the Silent—as will soon be related—was not acted upon; and within a few weeks after it had been given he was in his grave. Nowhere was his loss more severely felt than in Antwerp. It seemed, said a contemporary, that with his death had died all authority. 1 The Prince was the only head which the many-membered body of that very democratic city ever spontaneously obeyed. Antwerp was a small republic—in time of peace intelligently and successfully administered—which in the season of a great foreign war, amid plagues, tumults, famine, and internal rebellion required the firm hand and the clear brain of a single chief. That brain and hand had been possessed by Orange alone.

Before his death he had desired that Sainte Aldegonde should accept the office of burgomaster of the city. Nominally, the position was not so elevated as were many of the posts which that distinguished patriot had filled. In reality, it was as responsible and arduous a place as could be offered to any man's acceptance throughout the country. Sainte Aldegonde consented, not without some reluctance. He felt that there was odium to be incurred; he knew that much would be expected of him, and that his means would be limited. His powers would be liable to a constant and various restraint. His measures were sure to be the subject of perpetual cavil. If the city were besieged, there were nearly one hundred thousand mouths so feed, and nearly one hundred thousand tongues to dispute about furnishing the food.

1 Bor, Meteren, *ubi sup.* Hoofd Vervolgh, 4 seq.

2 Bor, Meteren, *ubi sup.* Hoofd Vervolgh, 4 seq.

3 Ibid.

1 Reyd, iv. 59.

For the government of Antwerp had been degenerating from a well-organised municipal republicanism into anarchy. The clashing of the various bodies exercising power had become incessant and intolerable. 1 The burgomaster was charged with the chief executive authority, both for peace and war. Nevertheless, he had but a single vote in the board of magistrates, where a majority decided. Moreover, he could not always attend the sessions, because he was also member of the council of Brabant. Important measures might therefore be decided by the magistracy, not only against his judgment, but without his knowledge. Then there was a variety of boards or colleges, all arrogating concurrent—which in truth was conflicting—authority. There was the board of militia-colonels, which claimed great powers. Here, too, the burgomaster was nominally the chief, but he might be voted down by a majority, and of course was often absent. Then there were sixteen captains who came into the colonels' sessions whenever they liked, and had their word to say upon all subjects broached. If they were refused a hearing, they were backed by eighty other captains, who were ready at any moment to carry every disputed point before the „broad-council.”

There were a college of ward-masters, a college of select men, a college of deacons, a college of ammunition, of fortification, of ship-building, all claiming equal authority, and all wrangling among themselves; and there was a college of „peace-makers,” who wrangled more than all the rest together.

Once a week there was a session of the broad or general council. Dire was the hissing and confusion, as the hydra heads of the multitudinous government were laid together. Heads of colleges, presidents of chambers, militia-chieftains,

magistrates, ward-masters, deans of fish-mongers, of tailors, gardeners, butchers, all met together pell-mell; and there was no predominant authority. This was not a convenient working machinery for a city threatened with a siege by the first captain of the age. Moreover there was a deficiency of regular troops. The burgher-militia were well trained and courageous, but not distinguished for their docility. There was also a regiment of English under Colonel Morgan, a soldier of great experience, and much respected; but, as Stephen Le Sieur said, „this force, unless seconded with more, was but a breakfast for the enemy.” Unfortunately, too, the insubordination, which was so ripe in the city, seemed to affect these auxiliaries. A mutiny broke out among the English troops. Many deserted to Parma, some escaped to England, and it was not until Morgan had beheaded Captain Lee and Captain Powell, 1 that discipline could be restored.

And into this scene of wild and deafening confusion came Philip de Marnix, Lord of Sainte Aldegonde.

There were few more brilliant characters than he in all Christendom. He was a man of a most rare and versatile genius. Educated in Geneva at the very feet of Calvin, he had drunk, like mother's milk, the strong and bitter waters of the stern reformer's creed; but he had in after-life attempted, although hardly with success, to lift himself to the height of a general religious toleration. He had also been trained in the severe and thorough literary culture which characterised that rigid school. He was a scholar, ripe and rare; no holiday trifler in the gardens of learning. He spoke and wrote Latin like his native tongue. He could compose poignant Greek epigrams. He was so familiar with Hebrew, that he had rendered the Psalms of David out of the original into



flowing Flemish verse, for the use of the reformed churches. That he possessed the modern tongues of civilised Europe, Spanish, Italian, French, and German, was a matter of course. He was a profound juriconsult, capable of holding debate against all competitors upon any point of theory or practice of law, civil, municipal, international. He was a learned theologian, and had often proved himself a match for the doctors, bishops, or rabbins of Europe, in highest argument of dogma, creed, or tradition. He was a practised diplomatist, constantly employed in delicate and difficult negotiations by William the Silent, who ever admired his genius, cherished his friendship, and relied upon his character. He was an eloquent orator, whose memorable harangue, beyond all his other efforts, at the diet of Worms, had made the German princes hang their heads with shame, when, taking a broad and philosophical view of the Netherland matter, he had shown that it was the great question of Europe; that Nether Germany was all Germany; that Protestantism could not be unravelled into shreds; that there was but one cause in Christendom—that of absolutism against national liberty, Papacy against the reform; and that the seventeen Provinces were to be assisted in building themselves into an eternal barrier against Spain, or that the „burning mark of shame would be branded upon the forehead of Germany;” that the war, in short, was to be met by her on the threshold, or else that it would come to seek her at home—a prophecy which the horrible Thirty Years’ War was in after-time most signally to verify.

He was a poet of vigour and originality, for he had accomplished what has been achieved by few; he had composed a national hymn, whose strophes, as soon as heard, struck a chord in every Netherland heart, and for three centuries long have rung like a clarion wherever the Netherland tongue is spo-

ken. ‚Wilhelmus van Nassouwe,’ regarded simply as a literary composition, has many of the qualities which an ode demands; an electrical touch upon the sentiments, a throb of patriotism, sympathetic tenderness, a dash of indignation, with rhythmical harmony and graceful expression; and thus it has rung from millions of lips, from generation to generation.

He was a soldier, courageous, untiring, prompt in action, useful in council, and had distinguished himself in many a hard-fought field. Taken prisoner in the sanguinary skirmish at Maaslands-luys, he had been confined a year, and, for more than three months, had never laid his head, as he declared, upon the pillow without commending his soul as for the last time to his Maker, expecting daily the order for his immediate execution, and escaping his doom only because William the Silent proclaimed that the proudest head among the Spanish prisoners should fall to avenge his death; so that he was ultimately exchanged against the veteran Mondragon.

From the incipient stages of the revolt he had been foremost among the patriots. He was supposed to be the author of the famous ‚Compromise of the Nobles,’ that earliest and most conspicuous of the state-papers of the republic, and of many other important political documents; and he had contributed to general literature many works of European celebrity, of which the ‚Roman Bee-Hive’ was the most universally known.

Scholar, theologian, diplomatist, swordsman, orator, poet, pamphleteer,—he had genius for all things, and was eminent in all. He was even famous for his dancing, and had composed an intelligent and philosophical treatise upon the value of that amusement, as an agent of civilisation, and as a counter-actor of the grosser pleasures of the table to which Upper and Nether Germans were too much addicted.

Of ancient Savoyard extraction, and

something of a southern nature, he had been born in Brussels, and was national to the heart's core.

A man of interesting, sympathetic presence; of a physiognomy where many of the attaching and attractive qualities of his nature revealed themselves; with crisp curling hair, surmounting a tall, expansive forehead—full of benevolence, idealism, and quick perceptions; broad, brown, melancholy eyes, overflowing with tenderness; a lean and haggard cheek, a rugged Flemish nose; a thin flexible mouth; a slender moustache, and a peaked and meagre beard; so appeared Sainte Aldegonde in the forty-seventh year of his age, when he came to command in Antwerp.

Yet after all—many-sided, accomplished, courageous, energetic, as he was—it may be doubted whether he was the man for the hour or the post. He was too impressionable; he had too much of the temperament of genius. Without being fickle, he had, besides his versatility of intellect, a character which had much facility in turning; not, indeed, in the breeze of self-interest, but because he seemed placed in so high and clear an atmosphere of thought that he was often acted upon and swayed by subtle and invisible influences. At any rate his conduct was sometimes inexplicable. He had been strangely fascinated by the ignoble Duke of Anjou; and, in the sequel, it will be found that he was destined to experience other magnetic or magical impulses, which were once thought suspicious, and have remained mysterious even to the present day.

He was imaginative. He was capable of broad and boundless hopes. He was sometimes prone to deep despair. His nature was exquisitely tempered; too fine and polished a blade to be wielded among those hydra-heads by which he was now surrounded; and for which the stunning sledge-hammer of arbitrary force was sometimes necessary.

He was perhaps deficient in that gift, which no training and no culture can bestow, and which comes from above alone by birthright divine—that which men willingly call master-authority; the effluence which came so naturally from the tranquil eyes of William the Silent.

Nevertheless, Sainte Aldegonde was prepared to do his best, and all his best was to be tasked to the utmost. His position was rendered still more difficult by the unruly nature of some of his co-ordinates.

„From the first day to the last,” said one who lived in Antwerp during the siege, „the mistakes committed in the city were incredible.”<sup>1</sup> It had long been obvious that a siege was contemplated by Parma. A liberal sum of money had been voted by the States-General, of which Holland and Zeeland contributed a very large proportion (two hundred thousand florins); the city itself voted another large subsidy, and an order was issued to purchase at once and import into the city at least a year's supply of every kind of provisions of life and munitions of war.<sup>2</sup>

William de Blois, Lord of Treslong, Admiral of Holland and Zeeland, was requested to carry out this order, and superintend the victualling of Antwerp. But Treslong at once became troublesome. He was one of the old „beggars of the sea,” a leader in the wild band who had taken possession of the Brill, in the teeth of Alva, and so laid the foundation of the republic. An impetuous noble, of wealthy family, high connections, and refractory temper—a daring sailor, ever ready for any rash adventure, but possessed of a very moderate share of prudence or administrative ability, he fell into loose and lawless courses on the death of Orange, whose firm hand was needed to control him.

<sup>1</sup> Le Petit, ii. 516.

<sup>2</sup> Le Petit, ii. 500.

The French negotiation had excited his profound disgust, and, knowing Sainte Aldegonde to be heart and soul in favour of that alliance, he was in no haste whatever to carry out his orders with regard to Antwerp.<sup>1</sup> He had also an insignificant quarrel with President Meeterkerk. The Prince of Parma—ever on the watch for such opportunities—was soon informed of the Admiral's discontent, and had long been acquainted with his turbulent character. Alexander at once began to inflame his jealousy and soothe his vanity by letters and messengers, urging upon him the propriety of reconciling himself with the King, and promising him large rewards and magnificent employments in the royal service. Even the splendid insignia of the Golden Fleece were dangled before his eyes. It is certain that the bold Hollander was not seduced by these visions, but there is no doubt that he listened to the voice of the tempter. He unquestionably neglected his duty. Week after week he remained at Ostend, sneering at the French and quaffing huge draughts in honour of Queen Elizabeth. At last, after much time had elapsed, he agreed to victual Antwerp if he could be furnished with thirty krom-stevens,—a peculiar kind of vessel, not to be found in Zeeland. The krom-stevens were sent to him from Holland. Then, hearing that his negligence had been censured by the States General, he became more obstinate than ever, and went up and down proclaiming that if people made themselves disagreeable to him he would do that which should make all the women and children in the Netherlands shriek and tremble. What this nameless horror was to be he never divulged, but meantime he went down to Middelburg, and swore that not a boat-load of corn should go up to Antwerp until two members of

the magistracy, whom he considered unpleasant, had been dismissed from their office. Wearied with all this bluster, and imbued with grave suspicion as to his motives, the States at last rose upon their High Admiral and threw him into prison. He was accused of many high crimes and misdemeanours, and, it was thought, would be tried for his life. He was suspected and even openly accused of having been tampered with by Spain, but there was at any rate a deficiency of proof.

„Treslong is apprehended,” wrote Davison to Burghley, „and is charged to have been the cause that the fleet passed not up to Antwerp. He is suspected to have otherwise forgotten himself, but whether justly or not will appear by his trial. Meantime he is kept in the common prison of Middelburg, a treatment which it is thought they would not offer him if they had not somewhat of importance against him.”<sup>1</sup>

He was subsequently released at the intercession of Queen Elizabeth, and passed some time in England. He was afterwards put upon trial, but, no accuser appearing to sustain the charges against him, he was eventually released. He never received a command in the navy again, but the very rich sinecures of Grand Falconer and Chief Forester of Holland were bestowed upon him, and he appears to have ended his days in peace and plenty.<sup>2</sup>

He was succeeded in the post of Admiral of Holland and Zeeland by Justinus de Nassau, natural son of William the Silent, a young man of much promise but of little experience.<sup>3</sup>

General Count Hohenlo, too, lieutenant for young Maurice, and virtual commander-in-chief of the States forces,

<sup>1</sup> Davison to Burghley and Walsingham, Feb. 28, 1585. S. P. Office MS.

<sup>2</sup> Strada, ii. 382 seq. Reynd, iv. 59 Bor, ii. xx. 570-594. Wagenaar, viii. 84-87. Meteren, xii. 218.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid.

<sup>1</sup> Strada, ii. 332 seq.



was apt to give much trouble. A German noble, of ancient descent and princely rank, brave to temerity, making a jest of danger, and riding into a foray as if to a merry-making; often furiously intoxicated, and always turbulent and uncertain; a handsome, dissipated cavalier, with long curls floating over his shoulders, an imposing aristocratic face, and a graceful, athletic figure, he needed some cool brain and steady hand to guide him—valuable as he was to fulfil any daring project—but was hardly willing to accept the authority of a burgomaster. While the young Maurice yet needed tutelage, while „the sapling was growing into the tree,” Hohenlo was a dangerous chieftain and a most disorderly lieutenant.

With such municipal machinery and such coadjutors had Sainte Aldegonde to deal, while, meantime, the delusive French negotiation was dragging its slow length along, and while Parma was noiselessly and patiently proceeding with his preparations.

The burgomaster—for Sainte Aldegonde, in whom vulgar ambition was not a foible, had refused the dignity and title of Margrave of Antwerp, which had been tendered him—had neglected no effort towards carrying into effect the advice of Orange, given almost with his latest breath. The manner in which that advice was received furnished a striking illustration of the defective machinery which has been portrayed.

Upon his return from Delft, Sainte Aldegonde had summoned a meeting of the magistracy of Antwerp. He laid before the board the information communicated by June, 1584. Orange as to Parma's intentions. He also explained the scheme proposed for their frustration, and urged the measures indicated with so much earnestness that his fellow-magistrates were convinced. The order was passed for

piercing the Blauw-garen Dyke, and Sainte Aldegonde, with some engineers, was requested to view the locality, and to take order for the immediate fulfilment of the plan. <sup>1</sup>

Unfortunately there were many other boards in session besides that of the Schepens, many other motives at work besides those of patriotism. The guild of butchers held a meeting, so soon as the plan suggested was known, and resolved with all their strength to oppose its execution.

The butchers were indeed furious. Twelve Thousand oxen grazed annually upon the pastures which were about to be submerged, and it was represented as unreasonable that all this good flesh and blood should be sacrificed. At a meeting of the magistrates on the following day, sixteen butchers, delegates from their guild, made their appearance, hoarse with indignation. They represented the vast damage which would be inflicted upon the estates of many private individuals by the proposed inundation, by this sudden conversion of teeming meadows, fertile farms, thriving homesteads, prolific orchards, into sandy desolation. Above all they depicted in glowing colours and with natural pathos the vast destruction of beef which was imminent, and they urged—with some show of reason—that, if Parma were really about to reduce Antwerp by famine, his scheme certainly would not be obstructed by the premature annihilation of these wholesome supplies. <sup>2</sup>

That the Scheldt could be closed in any manner was, however, they said, a preposterous conception. That it could be bridged was the dream of a lunatic. Even if it were possible to construct a bridge, and probable that the Zeelanders and Antwerpers would

<sup>1</sup> Bor, ii. 467.

<sup>2</sup> Bor, ii. 467 *seq.* Meteren, xii. 216-218 *seq.* Hoofd Vervolgh, 4 *seq.*

look on with folded arms while the work proceeded, the fabric, when completed, would be at the mercy of the icefloods of the winter and the enormous power of the ocean-tides. The Prince of Orange himself, on a former occasion, when Antwerp was Spanish, had attempted to close the river with rafts, sunken piles, and other obstructions, but the whole had been swept away, like a dam of bulrushes, by the first descent of the iceblocks of winter. It was witless to believe that Parma contemplated any such measure, and utterly monstrous to believe in its success. 1

Thus far the butchers. Soon afterwards came sixteen colonels of militia, as representatives of their branch of the multiform government. These personages, attended by many officers of inferior degree, sustained the position of the butchers with many voluble and vehement arguments. Not the least convincing of their conclusions was the assurance that it would be idle for the authorities to attempt the destruction of the dyke, seeing that the municipal soldiery itself would prevent the measure by main force, at all hazards, and without regard to their own or others' lives.

The violence of this opposition, and the fear of a serious internecine conflict at so critical a juncture, proved fatal to the project. Much precious time was lost; and when at last the inhabitants of the city awoke from their delusion, it was to find that repentance, as usual, had come many hours too late. 2

For Parma had been acting while his antagonists had been wrangling. He was hampered in his means, but he was assisted by what now seems the incredible supineness of the Ne-

therlanders. Even Sainte Aldegonde did not believe in the possibility of erecting the bridge; not a man in Antwerp seemed to believe it. „The preparations,” said one who lived in the city, „went on before our very noses, and every one was ridiculing the Spanish commander's folly.” 1

A very great error was, moreover, committed in abandoning Herenthals to the enemy. The city of Antwerp governed Brabant, and it would have been far better for the authorities of the commercial capital to succour this small but important city, and, by so doing, to protract for a long time their own defence. Mondragon saw and rejoiced over the mistake. „Now 'tis easy to see that the Prince of Orange is dead,” said the veteran, as he took possession, in the King's name, of the forsaken Herenthals. 2

Early in the summer Parma's operations had been, of necessity, desultory. He had sprinkled forts up and down the Scheldt, and had gradually been gaining control of the navigation upon that river. Thus Ghent and Dendermonde, Vilvoorde, Brussels, and Antwerp, had each been isolated, and all prevented from rendering mutual assistance. Below Antwerp, however, was to be the scene of the great struggle. Here, within nine miles of the city, were two forts belonging to the States, on opposite sides of the stream, Lillo and Liefkenshoek. It was important for the Spanish commander to gain possession of both before commencing his contemplated bridge.

Unfortunately for the States, the fortifications of Liefkenshoek, on the Flemish side of the river, had not been entirely completed. Eight hundred men lay within it, under Colonel John Pettin of Arras, an old patriotic offi-

1 Bor, Meteren, Hoofd, *ubi sup.* Le Petit, ii. 500 *seq.*

2 Bor, Meteren, Hoofd, *ubi sup.* Le Petit, ii. 500 *seq.*

1 Le Petit, ii. 498, 499.

2 Reyd, iv. 59.

cer of much experience. Parma, after reconnoitring the place in person, despatched the famous Viscount of Ghent—now called Marquis of Roubaix and Richebourg—to carry it by assault. The Marquis sent one hundred men from his Walloon legion, under two officers in whom he had confidence, to attempt a surprise, with orders, if not successful, to return without delay. They were successful. The one hundred gained entrance into the fort at a point where the defences had not been put into sufficient repair.

They were immediately followed by Richebourg, at the head of his regiment. The day was a fatal one. It 10th July, was the 10th July, and William of Orange was falling at Delft by the hand of Balthazar Gerard. Liefkenshoek was carried at a blow. Of the eight hundred patriots in the place, scarcely a man escaped. Four hundred were put to the sword, the others were hunted into the river, when nearly all were drowned. Of the royalists *a single man* was killed, and two or three more were wounded. „Our Lord was pleased,” wrote Parma piously to Philip, „that we should cut the throats of four hundred of them in a single instant, and that a great many more should be killed upon the dykes; so that I believe very few to have escaped with life. Wo lost one man, besides two or three wounded.”<sup>1</sup> A few were taken prisoners, and among them was the commander John Pettin. He was at once brought before Richebourg, who was standing in the presence of the Prince of Parma. The Marquis drew his sword, walked calm-

ly up to the captured Colonel, and ran him through the body. Pettin fell dead upon the spot. The Prince was displeased. „Too much choler, Marquis, too much choler”—said he, reprovingly. „Troppa colera, Signor Marchese, é questa.i”<sup>1</sup> But Richebourg knew better. He had, while still Viscount of Ghent, carried on a year previously a parallel intrigue with the royalists and the patriots. The Prince of Parma had bid highest for his services, and had, accordingly, found him a most effectual instrument in completing the reduction of the Walloon Provinces. The Prince was not aware, however, that his brave but venal ally had, at the very same moment, been secretly treating with William of Orange; and as it so happened that Colonel Pettin had been the agent in the unsuccessful negotiation, it was possible that his duplicity would now be exposed.<sup>2</sup> The Marquis had, therefore, been prompt to place his old confederate in the condition wherein men tell no tales, and, if contemporary chronicles dit not belie him, it was not the first time that he had been guilty of such coldblooded murder. The choler had not been superfluous.

The fortress of Lillo was garrisoned by the Antwerp volunteers, called the „Young Bachelors.” Teligny, the brave son of the illustrious „Iron-armed” La Noue, commanded in chief: and he had, besides the militia, a company of French under Captain Gascoigne, and four hundred Scotchmen under Colonel Morgan—perhaps two thousand men in all.

Mondragon, hero of the famous submarine expeditions of Philipsland and Zierickzee, was ordered by Parma to take the place at every hazard. With five thousand men—a large proportion of the Spanish effective force at that

<sup>1</sup> „Y fue nuestro Señor servido que entrasen con sola pérdida de un muerto y 2 o 3 heridos, y que se degollasen hasta 400 hombres en el mismo instante, y que se matasen en los diques muchos de manera que creo que han quedado pocos con vida.” Parma to Philip II., 15 July, 1854. Archivo de Simancas MS. Compare Bor, ii. 496 seq. Meteren, xii. 218vo. Strada, ii. 304 seq.

<sup>1</sup> Meteren, xii. 218.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid.



moment—the veteran placed himself before the fort, taking possession of the beautiful country-house and farm of Lillo, where he planted his batteries, and commenced a regular cannonade. The place was stronger than Liefkenshoek, however, and Teligny thoroughly comprehended the importance of maintaining it for the States. Mondragon dug mines, and Teligny countermined. The Spanish daily cannonade was cheerfully responded to by the besieged, and by the time Mondragon had shot away fifty thousand pounds of powder, he found that he had made no impression upon the fortress, while the number of his troops had been diminishing with great rapidity. Mondragon was not so impetuous as he had been on many former occasions. He never ventured an assault. At last Teligny made a sortie at the head of a considerable force. A warm action succeeded, at the conclusion of which, without a decided advantage on either side, the sluice-gate in the fortress was opened, and the torrent of the Scheldt, swollen by a high tide, was suddenly poured upon the Spaniards. Assailed at once by the fire from the Lillo batteries, and by the waters of the river, they were forced to a rapid retreat. This they effected with great loss, but with signal courage, struggling breast high in the waves, and bearing off their field-pieces in their arms in the very face of the enemy, 1

Three weeks long Mondragon had been before Fort Lillo, and two thousand of his soldiers had been slain in the trenches. The attempt was now abandoned. Parma directed permanent batteries to be established at Lillo-house, at Oordam, and at other places along the river, and proceeded quietly with his carefully-matured plan for closing the river. 2

His own camp was in the neighbourhood of the villages of Beveren, Kalloo, and Borcht. Of the ten thousand foot and seventeen hundred horse which composed at the moment his whole army, about onehalf lay with him, while the remainder were with Count Peter Ernest Mansfeld, in the neighbourhood of Stabroek. Thus the Prince occupied a position on the left bank of the Scheldt, nearly opposite Antwerp, while Mansfeld was stationed upon the right bank, and ten miles farther down the river. From a point in the neighbourhood of Kalloo, Alexander intended to throw a fortified bridge to the opposite shore. When completed, all traffic up the river from Zeeland would be cut off: and as the country on the land side, about Antwerp, had been now reduced, the city would be effectually isolated. If the Prince could hold his bridge until famine should break the resistance of the burghers, Antwerp would fall into his hands.

His head-quarters were at Kalloo, and this obscure spot soon underwent a strange transformation. A drowsy placid little village—with a modest parish spire peeping above a clump of poplars, and with half-a-dozen cottages, with storks nests on their roofs, sprinkled here and there among pastures and orchards—suddenly saw itself changed as it were into a thriving bustling town; for, saving the white tents which dotted the green turf in every direction, the aspect of the scene was, for a time, almost pacific. It was as if some great manufacturing enterprise had been set on foot, and the world had suddenly awoke to the hidden capabilities of the situation.

A great dockyard and arsenal suddenly revealed themselves—rising like an exhalation—where shipbuilders, armourers, blacksmiths, joiners, carpenters, caulkers, gravers, were hard at work all day long. The din and hum of what seemed a peaceful industry were unceasing. From Kalloo, Parma dug a canal twelve miles

1 Hoofd Vervolgh, 7, 8. Strada, ii. 304 seq. Bor, ii. 469 seq. Meteren, xii, 218.

2 Meteren, xii. 218.

long to a place called Steeken, hundreds of pioneers being kept constantly at work with pick and spade till it was completed. Through this artificial channel—so soon as Ghent and Dendermonde had fallen—came floats of timber, fleets of boats laden with provisions of life and munitions of death, building-materials, and every other requisite for the great undertaking, all to be disembarked at Kalloo. The object was a temporary and destructive one, but it remains a monument of the great general's energy and a useful public improvement. The amelioration of the fenny and barren soil, called the Waesland, is dated from that epoch; and the spot in Europe which is the most prolific, and which nourishes the largest proportion of inhabitants to the square mile, is precisely the long dreary swamp which the Prince thus drained for military purposes, and converted into a garden. Drusus and Corbulo, in the days of the Roman Empire, had done the same good service for their barbarian foes.

At Kalloo itself, all the shipwrights, cutlers, masons, brass-founders, rope-makers, anchor-forgers, sailors, boatmen, of Flanders and Brabant, with a herd of bakers, brewers, and butchers, were congregated by express order of Parma. In the little church itself the main workshop was established, and all day long, week after week, month after month, the sound of saw and hammer, adze and plane, the rattle of machinery, the cry of sentinels, the cheers of mariners, resounded, where but lately had been heard nothing save the drowsy homily and the devout hymn of rustic worship. 1

Nevertheless the summer and autumn wore on, and still the bridge was hardly commenced. The navigation of the river

—although impeded and rendered dangerous by the forts which Parma held along the banks—was still open; and, so long as the price of corn in Antwerp remained three or four times as high as the sum for which it could be purchased in Holland and Zeeland, there were plenty of dare-devil skippers ready to bring cargoes. Fleets of fly-boats, convoyed by armed vessels, were perpetually running the gauntlet. Sharp actions on shore between the forts of the patriots and those of Parma, which were all intermingled promiscuously along the banks, and amphibious and most bloody encounters on ship-board, dyke, and in the stream itself, between the wild Zeelanders and the fierce pikemen of Italy and Spain, were of repeated occurrence. Many a lagging craft fell into the enemy's hands, when, as a matter of course, the men, women, and children, on board were horribly mutilated by the Spaniards, and were then sent drifting in their boat with the tide—their arms, legs, and ears lopped off—up to the city, in order that the dangerous nature of this provision trade might be fully illustrated. 1

Yet that traffic still went on. It would have continued until Antwerp had been victualled for more than a year, had 25th Oct. not the city authorities, in 1584. the plenitude of their wisdom, thought proper to issue orders for its regulation. On the 25th of October a census was taken, when the number of persons inside the walls was found to be ninety thousand. For this population it was estimated that 300,000 veertels, or about 900,000 bushels of corn, would be required annually. 2 The grain was coming in very fast, notwithstanding

1 Hoofd, Bor, Meteren, *ubi sup.* Le Petit, ii. 509 *seq.* Reyd, iv. 58, 59. Strada, ii. 321 *seq.* V. d. Kampen, i. 482. Bentivoglio, 'Guerra di Flandra,' p. ii. I. iii.

1 „Bien est vray qu'il en arrivait journellement aucunes qui amenoient des hommes et des femmes, les uns tuez, les autres sans bras, ny jambes, mais tout cela n'empeschoit point le passage pourtant," &c. Le Petit, iv. 500. The historian was in Antwerp during the siege.

2 Bor, iii. 500.

the perilous nature of the trade; for wheat could be bought in Holland for fifty florins the last, or about fifteen pence sterling the bushel, while it was worth five or six florins the veertel, or about four shillings the bushel, in Antwerp. 1

The magistrates now committed a folly more stupendous than it seemed possible for human creatures, under such circumstances, to compass. They established a maximum upon corn. 2 The skippers who had run their cargoes through the gauntlet, all the way from Flushing to Antwerp, found on their arrival, that, instead of being rewarded according to the natural laws of demand and supply, they were required to exchange their wheat, rye, butter, and beef, against the exact sum which the Board of Schepens thought proper to consider a reasonable remuneration. Moreover, in order to prevent the accumulation of provisions in private magazines, it was enacted that all consumers of grain should be compelled to make their purchases directly from the ships. 3 These two measures were almost as fatal as the preservation of the Blauw-garen Dyke, in the interest of the butchers. Winter and famine were staring the city in the face, and the maximum now stood sentinel against the gate, to prevent the admission of food. The traffic ceased without a struggle. Parma himself could not have better arranged the blockade.

Meantime a vast and almost general inundation had taken place. The aspect of the country for many miles around was strange and desolate. The sluices had been opened in the neighbourhood of Saftingen, on the Flemish side, so that all the way from Hulst the waters were out, and flowed nearly to the gates of Antwerp. A wide and shallow sea

rolled over the fertile plains, while church-steeple, the tops of lofty trees, and here and there the turrets of a castle, scarcely lifted themselves above the black waters; the peasants' houses, the granges, whole rural villages, having entirely disappeared. The high grounds of Doel, of Kalloo, and Beveren, where Alexander was established, remained out of reach of the flood. Far below, on the opposite side of the river, other sluices had been opened, and the sea had burst over the wide, level plain. The villages of Wilmerdonk, Ordenen, Ekeren, were changed to islands in the ocean, while all the other hamlets, for miles around, were utterly submerged. 1

Still, however, the Blauw-garen Dyke and its companion the Kowenstyn remained obstinately above the waters, forming a present and more fatal obstruction to the communication between Antwerp and Zeeland than would be furnished even by the threatened and secretly-advancing bridge across the Scheldt. Had Orange's prudent advice been taken, the city had been safe. Over the prostrate dykes, whose destruction he had so warmly urged, the ocean would have rolled quite to the gates of Antwerp, and it would have been as easy to bridge the North Sea as to control the free navigation of the patriots over so wide a surface.

When it was too late, the butchers, and colonels, and captains became penitent enough. An order was passed, by acclamation, in November, to do what Orange had recommended in June. It was decreed that the Blauw-garen and the Kowenstyn should be pierced. 2 Alas! the hour had long gone by. Alexander of Parma was not the man to undertake the construction of a bridge across the river, at a vast expense, and at the same time to permit the

1 Meteren, Bor, *ubi sup.*

2 Reyd, iv. 59. Bor, Meteren, *ubi sup.*

3 Reyd, Bor, Meteren.

1 Bor, Meteren, Hoofd, Le Petit, Reyd, *ubi sup.*

2 Bor, ii. 500.



destruction of the already existing barrier. There had been a time for such a deed. The Seigneur de Kowenstyn, who had a castle and manor on and near the dyke which bore his name, had repeatedly urged upon the Antwerp magistracy the propriety of piercing this bulwark, even after their refusal to destroy the outer barrier. Sainte Aldegonde, who vehemently urged the measure, protested that his hair had stood on end, when he found, after repeated entreaty, that the project was rejected. 1 The Seigneur de Kowenstyn, disgusted and indignant, forswore his patriotism, and went over to Parma. 2 The dyke fell into the hands of the enemy. And now from Stabroek, where old Mansfeld lay with his army, all the way across the flooded country, ran the great bulwark, strengthened with new palisade-work and block-houses, bristling with Spanish cannon, pike, and arquebus, even to the bank of the Scheldt, in the immediate vicinity of Fort Lillo. At the angle of its junction with the main dyke of the river's bank, a strong fortress called Holy Cross (Santa Cruz) had been constructed. That fortress and the whole line of the Kowenstyn were held in the iron grip of Mondragon. To wrench it from him would be no child's play. Five new strong redoubts upon the dyke, and five or six thousand Spaniards established there, made the enterprise more formidable than it would have been in June. It had been better to sacrifice the twelve thousand oxen. Twelve thousand Hollanders might now be slaughtered, and still the dyke remain above the waves.

Here was the key to the fate of Antwerp.

On the other hand, the opening of the Saftingen Sluice had done Parma's

work for him. Even there, too, Orange had been prophetic. Kalloo was high and dry, but Alexander had experienced some difficulty in bringing a fleet of thirty vessels, laden with cannon and other valuable materials, from Ghent along the Scheldt, into his encampment, because it was necessary for them, before reaching their destination, to pass in front of Antwerp. The inundation, together with a rupture in the dyke of Borght, furnished him with a watery road, over which his fleet completely avoided the city, and came in triumph to Kalloo. 1

Sainte Aldegonde, much provoked by this masterly movement on the part of Parma, had followed the little squadron closely with some armed vessels from the city. A sharp action had succeeded, in which the burgomaster, not being properly sustained by the Zeeland ships on which he relied, had been defeated. Admiral Jacob Jacobzoon behaved with so little spirit on the occasion that he acquired with the Antwerp populace the name of „Runaway Jacob,” „Koppen gaet loppen;” and Sainte Aldegonde declared, that, but for his cowardice, the fleet of Parma would have fallen into their hands. The burgomaster himself narrowly escaped becoming a prisoner, and owed his safety only to the swiftness of his barge, which was called the „Flying Devil.” 2

The patriots, in order to counteract similar enterprises in future, now erected a sconce, which they called Fort Teli-gny, upon the ruptured dyke of Borght, directly in front of the Borght block-house, belonging to the Spaniards, and just opposite Fort Hoboken. Here, in this narrow passage, close under the walls of Antwerp, where friends and foes were brought closely face to face, was the scene of many a sanguinary skir-

1 Mertens en Torp. *Geschiedenis van Antwerpen*, v. 206. Papebrochii, *Annales Antwerpienses*, iv. 100 *seq.*

2 Bor, Meteren, Mertens en Torp, *ubi sup.*

1 Meteren, xii. 218. Bor, ii. 501.

2 Haraei, *Ann. Tum. Belg.*, iii. 389. Bor, ii. 501. Meteren, xii. 218 *seq.*

ish, from the commencement of the siege until its close. 1

Still the bridge was believed to be a mere fable, a chimæra. Parma, men said, had become a lunatic from pride. It was as easy to make the Netherlands submit to the yoke of the Inquisition as to put a bridle on the Scheldt. Its depth, breadth, the ice-floods of a northern winter, the neighbourhood of the Zeeland fleets, the activity of the Antwerp authorities, all were pledges that the attempt would be signally frustrated. 2

And they should have been pledges—more than enough. Unfortunately, however, there was dissension within, and no chieftain in the field, no sage in the council, of sufficient authority to sustain the whole burthen of the war, and to direct all the energies of the commonwealth. Orange was dead. His son, one day to become the most illustrious military commander in Europe, was a boy of seventeen, nominally captain-general, but in reality but a youthful apprentice to his art. Hohenlo was wild, wilful, and obstinate. Young William Lewis Nassau, already a soldier of marked abilities, was fully occupied in Friesland, where he was stadholder, and where he had quite enough to do in making head against the Spanish governor and general, the veteran Verdugo. Military operations against Zutphen distracted the attention of the States, which should have been fixed upon Antwerp. Admiral Treslong, as we have seen, was refractory, the cause of great delinquency on the part of the fleets; and of infinite disaster of the commonwealth. More than all, the French negotiation was betraying the States into indolence and hesitation; and creating a schism between the leading politicians of the country. Se-

veral thousand French troops, under Monsieur d'Allaynes, were daily expected, but never arrived; and thus, while English and French partisans were plotting and counterplotting, while a delusive diplomacy was usurping the place of lansquenettes and gunboats—the only possible agents at that moment to preserve Antwerp—the bridge of Parma was slowly advancing. Before the winter had closed in, the preparatory palisades had been finished.

Between Kalloo and Oordam, upon the opposite side, a sandbar had been discovered in the river's bed, which diminished the depth of the stream, and rendered the pile-driving comparatively easy. The breadth of the Scheldt at this passage was twenty-four hundred feet; its depth, sixty feet. Upon the Flemish side, near Kalloo, a strong fort was erected, called Saint Mary, in honour of the blessed Virgin, to whom the whole siege of Antwerp had been dedicated from the beginning. On the opposite bank was a similar fort, named Philip, for the King. From each of these two points, thus fortified, a framework of heavy timber, supported upon huge piles, had been carried so far into the stream on either side that the distance between the ends had at last been reduced to thirteen hundred feet. The breadth of the roadway—formed of strong sleepers firmly bound together—was twelve feet, along which blockhouses of great thickness were placed to defend the whole against assault. 1

Thus far the work had been comparatively easy. To bridge the remaining open portion of the river, however, where its current was deepest and strongest, and where the action of tide, tempest, and icebergs would be most formidable, seemed a desperate under-

1 Haraei, *Ann. Tum. Belg.*, iii. 369. Bor, ii. 501. Meteren, xii. 218 *seq.*

2 Strada, ii. 312, 313. Reynd, iv. 58, 59.

1 Bor, ii. 501 *seq.* Meteren, xii. 218 *seq.* Strada, ii. 313 *seq.* Bentivoglio, p. ii. I. iii. 288 *seq.*

taking; for, as the enterprise advanced, this narrow open space became the scene of daily amphibious encounters between the soldiers and sailors of Parma and the forces of the States. Unfortunately for the patriots, it was only skirmishing. Had a strong, concerted attack, in large force, from Holland and Zeeland below and from the city above, been agreed upon, there was hardly a period, until very late in the winter, when it might not have had the best chances of success. With a vigorous commander against him, Parma, weak in men, and at his wits' end for money, might, in a few hours, have seen the labour of several months hopelessly annihilated. On the other hand, the Prince was ably seconded by his lieutenant. Marquis Richebourg, to whom had been delegated the immediate superintendence of the bridge-building in its minutest details. He was never idle. Audacious, indefatigable, ubiquitous, he at least atoned by energy and brilliant courage for his famous treason of the preceding year, while his striking and now rapidly approaching doom upon the very scene of his present labours made him appear to have been building a magnificent though fleeting monument to his own memory. 1

Sainte Aldegonde, shut up in Antwerp, and hampered by dissension within and obstinate jealousy without the walls, did all in his power to frustrate the enemy's enterprise and animate the patriots. Through the whole of the autumn and early winter he had urged the States of Holland and Zeeland to make use of the long winter nights, when moonless and stormy, to attempt the destruction of Parma's undertaking, but the fatal influences already indicated were more efficient against Antwerp than even the genius of Farnese; and nothing came of the burgomaster's entreaties save desultory skirmishing and unsuc-

cessful enterprises. An especial misfortune happened in one of these midnight undertakings. Teligny ventured forth in a row-barge, with scarcely any companions, to notify the Zeelanders of a contemplated movement, in which their co-operation was desired. It was proposed that the Antwerp troops should make a fictitious demonstration upon Fort Oordam, while at the same moment the States' troops from Fort Lillo should make an assault upon the forts on Kowenstyn dyke; and in this important enterprise the Zeeland vessels were requested to assist. But the brave Teligny nearly forfeited his life by his rashness, and his services were, for a long time, lost to the cause of liberty. It had been better to send a less valuable officer upon such hazardous yet subordinate service. The drip of his oars was heard in the darkness. He was pursued by a number of armed barges, attacked, wounded severely in the shoulder, and captured. He threw his letters overboard, but they were fished out of the water, carried to Parma, and deciphered, so that the projected attack upon the Kowenstyn was discovered, and, of necessity, deferred. As for Teligny, he was taken, as a most valuable prize, into the enemy's camp, and was soon afterwards thrust into prison at Tournay, where he remained six years—one year longer than the period which his illustrious father had been obliged to consume in the infamous dungeon at Mons. Few disasters could have been more keenly felt by the States than the loss of this brilliant and devoted French chieftain, who, young as he was, had already become very dear to the republic; and Sainte Aldegonde was severely blamed for sending so eminent a personage on that dangerous expedition, and for sending him, too, with an insufficient convoy. 1

1 Bentivoglio, Strada, *ubi sup.*

1 Bor, ii. 507, 508. Meteren, xii. 218  
Strada, ii. 319, 320.



Still Alexander felt uncertain as to the result. He was determined to secure Antwerp, but he yet thought it possible to secure it by negotiation. The enigmatical policy maintained by France perplexed him; for it did not seem possible that so much apparent solemnity and earnestness were destined to lead to an impotent and infamous conclusion. He was left, too, for a long time in ignorance of his own master's secret schemes; he was at liberty to guess, and to guess only, as to the projects of the League; he was without adequate means to carry out to a certain triumph his magnificent enterprise; and he was in constant alarm lest he should be suddenly assailed by an overwhelming French force. Had a man sat upon the throne of Henry III. at that moment, Parma's bridge-making and dyke-fortifying—skilful as they were—would have been all in vain. Meantime, in uncertainty as to the great issue, but resolved to hold firmly to his purpose, he made repeated conciliatory offers to the States with one hand, while he steadily prosecuted his aggressive schemes with the other.

Parma had become really gentle, almost affectionate, towards the Netherlanders. He had not the disposition of an Alva to smite and to blast, to exterminate the rebels and heretics with fire and sword, with the axe, the rack, and the gallows. Provided they would renounce the great object of the contest, he seemed really desirous that they should escape further chastisement; but to admit the worship of God, according to the reformed creed, was with him an inconceivable idea. To do so was both unrighteous and impolitic. He had been brought up to believe that mankind could be saved from eternal perdition only by believing in the infallibility of the Bishop of Rome; that the only keys to eternal paradise were in hands of St. Peter's representative. Moreover he instinctively felt that within this reli-

gious liberty which the Netherlanders claimed was hidden the germ of civil liberty; and though no bigger than a grain of mustard-seed, it was necessary to destroy it at once; for of course the idea of civil liberty could not enter the brain of the brilliant general of Philip II.

On the 13th of November he addressed a letter to the magistracy and broad-council of Antwerp. He asserted 13th Nov. that the instigators of the 1584. rebellion were not seeking to further the common weal, but their own private ends. Especially had this been the ruling motive with the Prince of Orange and the Duke of Anjou, both of whom God had removed from the world, in order to manifest to the States their own weakness, and the omnipotence of Philip, whose prosperity the Lord was constantly increasing. It was now more than time for the authorities of the country to have regard for themselves, and for the miseries of the poor people. The affection which he had always felt for the Provinces—from which he had himself sprung—and the favours which he had received from them in his youth, had often moved him to propose measures which, before God and his conscience, he believed adequate to the restoration of peace. But his letters had been concealed or falsely interpreted by the late Prince of Orange, who had sought nothing but to spread desolation over the land, and to shed the blood of the innocent. He now wrote once more, and for the last time, in all fervour and earnestness, to implore them to take compassion on their own wives and children and forlorn fatherland, to turn their eyes backward on the peace and prosperity which they had formerly enjoyed when obedient to his Majesty, and to cast a glance around them upon the miseries which were so universal since the rebellion. He exhorted them to close their ears to the insidious tongues of those who were leading them into delusion as to the benevolence and

paternal sweetness of their natural lord and master, which were even now so boundless that he did not hesitate once more to offer them his entire forgiveness. If they chose to negotiate, they would find everything granted that with right and reason could be proposed. The Prince concluded by declaring that he made these advances not from any doubt as to the successful issue of the military operations in which he was engaged, but simply out of paternal anxiety for the happiness of the Provinces. Did they remain obstinate, their ultimate conditions would be rendered still more severe, and themselves, not he, would be responsible for the misery and the bloodshed to ensue. <sup>1</sup>

Ten days afterwards, the magistrates, thus addressed—after communication with the broad-council—answered Parma's letter manfully, copiously, and with the customary but superfluous <sup>23rd Nov.</sup> historical sketch. They begged <sup>1684.</sup>

leave to entertain a doubt as to the paternal sweetness of a king who had dealt so long in racks and gibbets. With Parma's own mother, as they told the Prince, the Netherlands had once made a treaty, by which the right to worship God according to their consciences had been secured; yet for maintaining that treaty they had been devoted to indiscriminate destruction, and their land made desolate with fire and sword. Men had been massacred by thousands, who had never been heard in their own defence, and who had never been accused of any crime, „save that they had assembled together in the name of God, to pray to Him, through their only mediator and advocate Jesus Christ, according to His command.” <sup>2</sup>

The axis of the revolt was the religious question; and it was impossible to hope

anything from a monarch who was himself a slave of the Inquisition, and who had less independence of action than that enjoyed by Jews and Turks, according to the express permission of the Pope. Therefore they informed Parma that they had done with Philip for ever, and that, in consequence of the extraordinary wisdom, justice, and moderation of the French King, they had offered him the sovereignty of their land, and had implored his protection.

They paid a tribute to the character of Farnese, who, after gaining infinite glory in arms had manifested so much gentleness and disposition to conciliate. They doubted not that he would, if he possessed the power, have guided the royal councils to better and more generous results, and protested that they would not have delayed to throw themselves into his arms, had they been assured that he was authorized to admit that which alone could form the basis of a successful negotiation—religious freedom. They would in such case have *been willing to close with him, without talking about other conditions* than such as his Highness in his discretion and sweetness might think reasonable.

Moreover, as they observed in conclusion, they were precluded, by their present relations with France, from entering into any other negotiation; nor could they listen to any such proposal without deserving to be stigmatized as the most lewd, blasphemous, and thankless mortals that ever cumbered the earth.

Being under equal obligations both to the Union and to France, they announced that Parma's overtures would be laid before the French government and the assembly of the States General.

A day was to come, perhaps, when it would hardly seem lewdness and blasphemy for the Netherlands to don the extraordinary justice and wisdom

<sup>1</sup> See the letters in Meteren, xii. 219; Bor, ii. 502, 503; Hoofd Vervolgh, 60.

<sup>2</sup> Letters in Bor, Meteren, Hoofd, *ubi sup.*

<sup>1</sup> Letters in Bor, Meteren, Hoofd, *ubi su*

the French King. Meantime, it cannot be denied that they were at least loyal to their own engagements, and long-suffering where they had trusted and given their hearts.

Parma replied by another letter, dated December 3rd. He assured the citizens that Henry III. was far too discreet, 10th Dec. and much too good a friend

1584. to Philip II., to countenance this rebellion. If he were to take up their quarrel, however, the King of Spain had a thousand means of foiling all his attempts. As to the religious question—which they affirmed to be the sole cause of the war—he was not inclined to waste words upon that subject; nevertheless, so far as he in his simplicity could understand the true nature of a Christian, he could not believe that it comported with the doctrines of Jesus, whom they called their only mediator, nor with the dictates of conscience, to take up arms against their lawful king, nor to burn, rob, plunder, pierce dykes, overwhelm their fatherland, and reduce all things to misery and chaos, in the name of religion. 1

Thus moralizing and dogmatizing, the Prince concluded his letter, and so the correspondence terminated. This last despatch was communicated at once both to the States-General and to the French government, and remained unanswered. Soon afterwards the Netherlands, and England, France, and Spain, were engaged in that vast game of delusion which has been described in the preceding chapters. Meantime both Antwerp and Parma remained among the deluded, and were left to fight out their battle on their own resources.

Having found it impossible to subdue Antwerp by his rhetoric, Alexander proceeded with his bridge. It is impossible not to admire the steadiness and ingenuity with which the Prince persisted in his plans, the courage with

which he bore up against the parsimony and neglect of his sovereign, the compassionate tenderness which he manifested for his patient little army. So much intellectual energy commands enthusiasm, while the supineness on the other side sometimes excites indignation. There is even a danger of being entrapped into sympathy with tyranny, when the cause of tyranny is maintained by genius; and of being surprised into indifference for human liberty, when the sacred interests of liberty are endangered by self-interest, perverseness, and folly.

Even Sainte Aldegonde did not believe that the bridge could be completed. His fears were that the city would be ruined rather by the cessation of its commerce than by want of daily food. Already, after the capture of Liefkenshoek and the death of Orange, the panic among commercial people had been so intense that seventy or eighty merchants, representing the most wealthy mercantile firms in Antwerp, made their escape from the place, as if it had been smitten with pestilence, or were already in the hands of Parma. 1 All such refugees were ordered to return on peril of forfeiting their property. Few came back, however, for they had found means of converting and transferring their funds to other more secure places, despite the threatened confiscation. It was insinuated that Holland and Zealand were indifferent to the fate of Antwerp, because in the sequel the commercial cities of those Provinces succeeded to the vast traffic and the boundless wealth which had been forfeited by the Brabantine capital. The charge was an unjust one. At the very commencement of the siege the States of Holland voted two hundred thousand florins for its relief; and moreover, these wealthy refugees were positively denied admittance into the territory of

1 Letters in Bor. Meteren, Hoofd, *ubi sup.*

1 Baudartii 'Polemographia,' ii. 24.



the United States, and were thus forced to settle in Germany or England. 1 This cessation of traffic was that which principally excited the anxiety of Aldegonde. He could not bring himself to believe in the possibility of a blockade, by an army of eight or ten thousand men, of a great and wealthy city, where at least twenty thousand citizens were capable of bearing arms. Had he thoroughly understood the deprivations under which Alexander was labouring, perhaps he would have been even more confident as to the result.

„With regard to the affair of the river Scheldt,” wrote Parma to Philip, „I should like to send your Majesty 15th Jan. a drawing of the whole scheme; 1585. for the work is too vast to be explained by letters. The more I examine it, the more astonished I am that it should have been conducted to this point, so many forts, dykes, canals, new inventions, machinery, and engines, have been necessarily required.” 2

He then proceeded to enlighten the King—as he never failed to do in all his letters—as to his own impoverished, almost helpless condition. Money, money, men! This was his constant cry. All would be in vain, he said, if he were thus neglected. „’Tis necessary,” said he, „for your Majesty fully to comprehend, that henceforth the enterprise is your own. I have done my work faithfully thus far; it is now for your Majesty to take it thoroughly to heart; and embrace it with the warmth with which an affair involving so much of your own interests deserves to be embraced.” 3

He avowed that without full confidence in his sovereign’s sympathy he would never have conceived the project. „I confess that the enterprise is great,”

he said, „and that by many it will be considered rash. Certainly I should not have undertaken it, had I not felt certain of your Majesty’s full support.” 1

But he was already in danger of being forced to abandon the whole scheme—although so nearly carried into effect—for want of funds. „The million promised,” he wrote, „has arrived in bits and morsels, and with so many ceremonies that I haven’t ten crowns at my disposal. How I am to maintain even this handful of soldiers—for the army is diminished to such a mere handful that it would astonish your Majesty—I am unable to imagine. It would move you to witness their condition. They have suffered as much as is humanly possible.” 2

Many of the troops, indeed, were deserting, and making their escape, beggared and desperate, into France, where, with natural injustice, they denounced their General, whose whole heart was occupied with their miseries, for the delinquency of his master, whose mind was full of other schemes.

„There passed this way many Spanish soldiers,” wrote Stafford from Paris, „so poor and naked as I ever saw any. There have been within this 29th Dec. fortnight two hundred at a 9th Jan. time in this town, who report 1585. the extremity of want of victuals in their camp, and that they have been twenty-four months without pay. They exclaim greatly upon the Prince of Parma. Mendoza seeks to convey them away, and to get money for them by all means he can.” 3

Stafford urged upon his government the propriety of being at least as negligent as Philip had showed himself to be of the Spaniards. By prohibiting

1 Ibid.

2 Prince of Parma to Philip II., &c., MS. just cited.

3 Stafford to Walsingham, 29 Dec. 1584. in Murdin, ii. 434. 8 Jan. 1585.

1 Baudartii ‘Polemographia,’ ii. 24.

2 Prince of Parma to Philip II., 15 Jan. 1585. Archivo de Simancas. MS.

3 Ibid.

supplies to the besieging army, England might contribute, negatively, if not otherwise, to the relief of Antwerp. „There is no place,” he wrote to Walsingham, „whence the Spaniards are so thoroughly victualled as from us. English boats go by sixteen and seventeen into Dunkirk, well laden with provisions.”

This was certainly not in accordance with the interests nor the benevolent professions of the English ministers.

These supplies were not to be regularly depended upon, however. They were likewise not to be had without paying a heavy price for them, and the Prince had no money in his coffer. He lived from hand to mouth, and was obliged to borrow from every private individual who had anything to lend. Merchants, nobles, official personages, were all obliged to assist in eking out the scanty pittance allowed by the sovereign.

„The million is all gone,” wrote Parma to his master; „some to Verdugo in Friesland; some to repay the advances of Marquis Richebourg and other gentlemen. There is not a farthing for the garrisons. I can't go on a month longer, and, if not supplied, I shall be obliged to abandon the work. I have not money enough to pay my sailors, joiners, carpenters, and other mechanics, from week to week, and they will all leave me in the lurch if I leave them unpaid. I have no resource but to rely on your Majesty. Otherwise the enterprise must wholly fail.”<sup>1</sup>

In case it did fail, the Prince wiped his hands of the responsibility. He certainly had the right to do so.

One of his main sources of supply was the city of Hertogenbosch, or Bois-le-Duc. It was one of the four chief cities of Brabant, and still held for the King, although many towns in its im-

mediate neighbourhood had espoused the cause of the republic. The States had long been anxious to effect a diversion for the relief of Antwerp, by making an attack on Bois-le-Duc. Could they carry the place, Parma would be almost inevitably compelled to abandon the siege in which he was at present engaged; and he could moreover spare no troops for its defence. Bois-le-Duc was a populous, wealthy, thriving town, situate on the Deeze, two leagues above its confluence with the Meuse, and about twelve leagues from Antwerp. It derived its name of „Duke's Wood” from a magnificent park and forest, once the favourite resort and residence of the old Dukes of Brabant, of which some beautiful vestiges still remained. It was a handsome well-built city, with two thousand houses of the better class, besides more humble tenements. Its citizens were celebrated for their courage and belligerent skill, both on foot and on horseback. They were said to retain more of the antique Belgic ferocity which Cæsar had celebrated than that which had descended to most of their kinsmen. The place was, moreover, the seat of many prosperous manufactures. Its clothiers sent the products of their looms over all Christendom, and its linen and cutlery were equally renowned.<sup>1</sup>

It would be a most fortunate blow in the cause of freedom to secure so thriving and conspicuous a town, situated thus in the heart of what seemed the natural territory of the United States; and, by so doing, to render nugatory the mighty preparations of Parma against Antwerp. Moreover, it was known that there was no Spanish or other garrison within its walls, so that there was no opposition to be feared, except from the warlike nature of its citizens.

<sup>1</sup> MS. Letter of Parma, before cited.

<sup>1</sup> Guicciardine, *in voce*.

Count Hohenlo was entrusted, early in January, with this important enterprise. He accordingly collected a force of four thousand infantry, together with two hundred mounted lancers; having previously reconnoitred the ground. He relied very much, for the success of the undertaking, on Captain Kleerhagen, a Brussels nobleman, whose wife was a native of Bois-le-Duc, and who was thoroughly familiar with the locality. One dark winter's night, Kleerhagen, with fifty picked soldiers, advanced to the Antwerp gate of Bois-le-Duc, while Hohenlo, with his whole force, lay in ambuscade as near as possible to the city.

Between the drawbridge and the portcullis were two small guard-houses, which, very carelessly, had been left empty. Kleerhagen, with his fifty followers, successfully climbed into these lurking-places, where they quietly ensconced themselves for the night. At eight o'clock of the following morning (20th January) the guards of the gate drew up the portcullis, and reconnoitred. At the same instant the ambushed fifty sprang from their concealment, put them to the sword, and made themselves masters of the gate. None of the night-watch escaped with life, save one poor old invalided citizen, whose business had been to draw up the portcullis, and who was severely wounded, and left for dead. The fifty immediately summoned all of Hohenlo's ambuscade that were within hearing, and then, without waiting for them, entered the town pell-mell in the best of spirits, and shouting Victory, victory! till they were hoarse. A single corporal, with two men, was left to guard the entrance. Meantime, the old wounded gate-opener, bleeding and crippled, crept into a dark corner, and laid himself down, unnoticed, to die.

Soon afterwards Hohenlo galloped into the town; clad in complete armour,

his long curls floating in the wind, with about two hundred troopers clattering behind him, closely followed by five hundred pikemen on foot.

Very brutally, foolishly, and characteristically, he had promised his followers the sacking of the city so soon as it should be taken. They accordingly set about the sacking, before it was taken. Hardly had the five or six hundred effected their entrance, than, throwing off all control, they dispersed through the principal streets, and began bursting open the doors of the most opulent households. The cries of „Victory!“ „Gained city!“ „Down with the Spaniards!“ resounded on all sides. Many of the citizens, panic-struck, fled from their homes; which they thus abandoned to pillage; while, meantime, the loud shouts of the assailants reached the ears of the corporal and his two companions, who had been left in charge of the gate. Fearing that they should be cheated of their rightful share in the plunder, they at once abandoned their post, and set forth after their comrades as fast as their legs could carry them.

Now it so chanced—although there was no garrison in the town—that forty Burgundian and Italian lancers, with about thirty foot-soldiers, had come in the day before to escort a train of merchandize. The Seigneur de Haultepenne, governor of Breda, a famous royalist commander—son of old Count Berlaymont, who first gave the name of „beggars“ to the patriots—had accompanied them in the expedition. The little troop were already about to mount their horses to depart, when they became aware of the sudden tumult. Elmont, governor of the city, had also flown to the rescue, and had endeavoured to rally the burghers. Not unmindful of their ancient warlike fame, they had obeyed his entreaties. Elmont, with a strong party of armed citizens, joined himself to Haultepenne's little



band of lancers. They fired a few shots at straggling parties of plunderers, and pursued others up some narrow streets. They were but a handful in comparison with the number of the patriots who had gained entrance to the city. They were, however, compact, united, and resolute. The assailants were scattered, disorderly, and bent only upon plunder. When attacked by an armed and regular band, they were amazed. They had been told that there was no garrison; and behold a choice phalanx of Spanish lancers, led on by one of the most famous of Philip's Netherland chieftains. They thought themselves betrayed by Kleerhagen, entrapped into a deliberately arranged ambush. There was a panic. The soldiers, dispersed and doubtful, could not be rallied. Hohenlo, seeing that nothing was to be done with his five hundred, galloped furiously out of the gate, to bring in the rest of his troops who had remained outside the walls. The prize of the wealthy city of Bois-le-Duc was too tempting to be lightly abandoned; but he had much better have thought of making himself master of it himself before he should present it as a prey to his followers.

During his absence the panic spread. The States' troops, bewildered, astonished, vigorously assaulted, turned their backs upon their enemies, and fled helter-skelter towards the gates, through which they had first gained admittance. But, unfortunately for them, so soon as the corporal had left his position, the wounded old gate-opener, in a dying condition, had crawled forth on his hands and knees from a dark hole in the tower, cut, with a pocket-knife, the ropes of the portcullis, and then given up the ghost. Most effective was that blow struck by a dead man's hand. Down came the portcullis. The flying plunderers were entrapped. Close behind them came the excited burghers—their antique Belgic ferocity now fully

aroused—firing away with carbine and matchlock, dealing about them with bludgeon and cutlass, and led merrily on by Haultepenne and Elmont, armed in proof, at the head of their squadron of lancers. The unfortunate patriots had risen very early in the morning only to shear the wolf. Some were cut to pieces in the streets; others climbed the walls, and threw themselves head foremost into the moat. Many were drowned, and but a very few effected their escape. Justinus de Nassau sprang over the parapet, and succeeded in swimming the ditch. Kleerhagen, driven into the Holy Cros tower, ascended to its roof, leaped, all accoutred as he was, into the river, and, with the assistance of a Scotch soldier, came safe to land. Ferdinand Truchsess, brother of the ex-electeur of Cologne, was killed. Four or five hundred of the assailants—nearly all who had entered the city—were slain, and about fifty of the burghers.

Hohenlo soon came back, with Colonel Ysselstein and two thousand fresh troops. But their noses, says a contemporary, grew a hundred feet long with surprise when they saw the gate shut in their faces.<sup>1</sup> It might have occurred to the Count, when he rushed out of the town for reinforcements, that it would be as well to replace the guard, which—as he must have seen—had abandoned their post.

Cursing his folly, he returned, marvellously discomfited, and deservedly censured, to Gertruydenbergh. And thus had a most important enterprise, which had nearly been splendidly successful, ended in disaster and disgrace. To the recklessness of the general, to the cupidity which he had himself awakened in his followers, was the failure alone to be attributed. Had he taken possession of the city with a firm grasp at the head of his four

<sup>1</sup> *Le Petit*, ii. 506.

thousand men, nothing could have resisted him, Haultepenne, and his insignificant force, would have been dead, or his prisoners; the basis of Parma's magnificent operations would have been withdrawn; Antwerp would have been saved. 1

„Infinite gratitude,” wrote Parma to Philip, „should be rendered to the Lord. Great thanks are also due to Haultepenne. *Had the rebels succeeded in their enterprise against Bolduc, I should have been compelled to abandon the siege of Antwerp.* The town, by its strength and situation, is of infinite importance for the reduction both of that place and of Brussels, and the rebels in possession of Bolduc would have cut off my supplies.” 2

The Prince recommended Haultepenne most warmly to the King as deserving of a rich „merced.” The true hero of the day, however—at least the chief agent in the victory—was the poor, crushed, nameless victim who had cut the ropes of the portcullis at the Antwerp gate.

Hohenlo was deeply stung by the disgrace which he had incurred. For a time he sought oblivion in hard drinking; but—brave and energetic, though reckless—he soon became desirous of retrieving his reputation by more successful enterprises. There was no lack of work, and assuredly his hands were rarely idle.

„Hollach (Hohenlo) is gone from hence on Friday last,” wrote Davison to Walsingham; „he will do what he

may to recover his reputation lost in the attempt of Bois-le-Duc; which, for the grief and trouble he hath conceived thereof, hath for the time greatly altered him.” 1

Meantime the turbulent Scheldt, lashed by the storms of winter, was becoming a more formidable enemy to Parma's great enterprise than the military demonstrations of his enemies, or the famine which was making such havoc with his little army. The ocean-tides were rolling huge ice-blocks up and down, which beat against his palisade with the noise of thunder, and seemed to threaten its immediate destruction. But the work stood firm. The piles supporting the piers, which had been thrust out from each bank into the stream, had been driven fifty feet into the river's bed, and did their duty well. But in the space between, twelve hundred and forty feet in width, the current was too deep for piledriving, and a permanent bridge was to be established upon boats. And that bridge was to be laid across the icy and tempestuous flood, in the depth of winter, in the teeth of a watchful enemy, with the probability of an immediate invasion from France—where the rebel envoys were known to be negotiating on express invitation of the King—by half-naked, half-starving soldiers and sailors, unpaid for years, and for the sake of a master who seemed to have forgotten their existence.

„Thank God,” wrote Alexander, „the palisade stands firm in spite of the ice. Now, with the favour of the Lord, we shall soon get the fruit we have been hoping, if your Majesty is not wanting in that to which your grandeur, your great Christianity, your own interests, oblige you. In truth 'tis a great and heroic work, worthy the great power of your Majesty.” „For

1 For the enterprise against Bois-le-Duc, see *Le Petit*, ii. 505-506; *Baudartii Polemog.* ii. 30; *Meteren*, xii. 222; *Strada*, ii. 326, 327 (who by a singular lapse of the pen represents Justinus de Nassau as having been killed, „*Reperti inter eos, qui desiderati sunt, Ferd. Truchsesius, et Nothus Orangii filius,*” &c. 327); *Bor*, ii. 558; *Van Wyn op Wagenaar*, viii. 84 *seq.*; Letter of Parma to the King, 12 Feb. 1585. (Archivo de Simancas MS.)

2 MS. Letter of Parma just cited.

1 Davison to Walsingham, Feb. 12, 1585. (S. P. Office MS.)

my own part," he continued, "I have done what depended upon me. From your own royal hand must emanate the rest; —men, namely, sufficient to maintain the posts, and money enough to support them there." 1

He expressed himself in the strongest language concerning the danger to the royal cause from the weak and gradually sinking condition of the army. Even without the French intrigues with the rebels, concerning which, in his ignorance of the exact state of affairs, he expressed much anxiety, it would be impossible, he said, to save the royal cause without men and money.

"I have spared myself," said the Prince, "neither day nor night. Let not your Majesty impute the blame to me if we fail. Verdugo also is uttering a perpetual cry out of Friesland for men—men and money." 2

Yet, notwithstanding all these obstacles the bridge was finished at last. 25th Feb. On the 25th February, the 1585. — day sacred to Saint Matthew, and of fortunate augury to the Emperor Charles, father of Philip and grandfather of Alexander, the Scheldt was closed. 3

As already stated, from Fort Saint Mary on the Kalloo side, and from Fort Philip, not far from Oordam on the Brabant shore of the Scheldt, strong structures, supported upon piers, had been projected, reaching, respectively, five hundred feet into the stream. These two opposite ends were now connected by a permanent bridge of boats. There were thirty-two of these barges, each of them sixty-two feet in length and twelve in breadth, the spaces between each couple being twenty-two feet wide, and all being bound together, stem, stern, and midships, by

quadruple hawsers and chains. Each boat was anchored at stem and stern with loose cables. Strong timbers, with cross rafters, were placed upon the boats, upon which heavy framework the planked pathway was laid down. A thick parapet of closely-fitting beams was erected along both the outer edges of the whole fabric. Thus a continuous and well-fortified bridge, two thousand for hundred feet in length, was stretched at last from shore to shore. Each of the thirty-two boats on which the central portion of the structure reposed, was a small fortress provided with two heavy pieces of artillery, pointing the one up, the other down the stream, and manned by thirty-two soldiers and four sailors, defended by a breast-work formed of gabions of great thickness.

The forts of Saint Philip and Saint Mary, at either end of the bridge, had each ten great guns, and both were filled with soldiers. In front of each fort, moreover, was stationed a fleet of twenty armed vessels, carrying heavy pieces of artillery; ten anchored at the angle towards Antwerp, and as many looking down the river. One hundred and seventy great guns, including the armaments of the boats under the bridge, of the armada and the forts, protected the whole structure, pointing up and down the stream.

But, besides these batteries, an additional precaution had been taken. On each side, above and below the bridge, at a moderate distance—a bow-shot—was anchored a heavy raft floating upon empty barrels. Each raft was composed of heavy timbers, bound together in bunches of three, the spaces between being connected by ships' masts and lighter spar-work, and with a toothlike projection along the whole outer edge, formed of strong rafters, pointed and armed with sharp prongs and hooks of iron. Thus a serried phalanx, as it were, of spears stood ever on guard to protect the precious

1 MS. Letter of Parma before cited.

2 Ibid.

3 Parma to Philip, 27 Feb. 1585. (Archivo de Simancas MS.)



inner structure. Vessels coming from Zeeland or Antwerp, and the floating ice-masses, which were almost as formidable, were obliged to make their first attack upon these dangerous outer defences. Each raft, floating in the middle of the stream, extended twelve hundred and fifty-two feet across, thus protecting the whole of the bridge of boats and a portion of that resting upon piles. <sup>1</sup>

Such was the famous bridge of Parma. The magnificent undertaking has been advantageously compared with the celebrated Rhine-bridge of Julius Cæsar. When it is remembered, however, that the Roman work was performed in summer, across a river only half as broad as the Scheldt, free from the disturbing action of the tides, and flowing through an unresisting country, while the whole character of the structure, intended only to serve for the single passage of an army, was far inferior to the massive solidity of Parma's bridge; it seems not unreasonable to assign the superiority to the general who had surmounted all the obstacles of a northern winter, vehement ebb and flow from the sea, and enterprising and desperate enemies at every point.

When the citizens, at last, looked upon the completed fabric, converted from the „dream,” which they had pronounced it to be, into a terrible reality; when they saw the shining array of Spanish and Italian legions marching and countermarching upon their new road, and trampling, as it were, the turbulent river beneath their feet; when they witnessed the solemn military spectacle with which the Governor-General celebrated his success,

amid peals of cannon and shouts of triumph from his army, they bitterly bewailed their own folly. Yet, even then, they could hardly believe that the work had been accomplished by human agency, but they, loudly protested that invisible demons had been summoned to plan and perfect this fatal and preterhuman work. They were wrong. There had been but one demon—one clear, lofty intelligence, inspiring a steady and untiring hand. The demon was the intellect of Alexander Farnese; but it had been assisted in its labour by the hundred devils of envy, covetousness, jealousy, selfishness, distrust, and discord, that had housed, not in his camp, but in the ranks of those who were contending for their hearths and altars.

And thus had the Prince arrived at success in spite of every obstacle. He took a just pride in the achievement, yet he knew by how many dangers he was still surrounded, and he felt hurt at his sovereign's neglect. „The enterprise at Antwerp,” he wrote to Philip on the day the bridge was completed, „is so great and heroic, that to celebrate it would require me to speak more at large than I like to do, for fear of being tedious to your Majesty. What I will say, is that the labours and difficulties have been every day so great, that, if your Majesty knew them, you would estimate what we have done more highly than you do; *and not forget us so utterly, leaving us to die of hunger*” <sup>1</sup>

He considered the fabric in itself almost impregnable, provided he were furnished with the means to maintain what he had so painfully constructed. „The whole is in such condition,” said he, „that in opinion of all compe-

<sup>1</sup> MS. Letter of Parma before cited. Compare Strada, ii. 312 *seq.*; Bentivoglio, p. ii. and l. iii. 988-990; Meteren. xii. 218 *seq.*; Bor, ii. l. xx. 590 *seq.* (with admirable plans, etchings, and maps); Baudartii Polemog. ii. 22 *seq.* (with very good engravings.)

<sup>1</sup> „Y no nos tenia tan olvidados, ni permitiria dexarnos en tanta necesidad que no habemos de morir de hambre,” &c. (MS. letter of Parma to Philip, 27 Feb. 1585.)

tent military judges it would stand though all Holland and Zeeland should come to destroy our palisades. Their attacks must be made at immense danger and disadvantage, so severely can we play upon them with our artillery and musketry. Every beat is garnished with the most dainty captains and soldiers, so that, if the enemy should attempt to assail us now, they would come back with broken heads." 1

Yet in the midst of his apparent triumph he had, at times, almost despair in his heart. He felt really at the last gasp. His troops had dwindled to the mere shadow of an army, and they were forced to live almost upon air. The cavalry had nearly vanished. The garrisons in the different cities were starving. The burghers had no food for the soldiers nor for themselves. „As for the rest of the troops," said Alexander, „they are stationed where they have nothing to subsist upon, save salt water and the dykes, and if the Lord does not grant a miracle, succour, even if sent by your Majesty, will arrive too late." 2 He assured his master that he could not go on more than five or six days longer, that he had been feeding his soldiers for a long time from hand to mouth, and that it would soon be impossible for him to keep his troops together. If he did not disband them they would run away. 3

His pictures were most dismal, his supplications for money very moving, but he never alluded to himself. All his anxiety all his tenderness, were for his soldiers. „They must have food," he said. „Tis impossible to sustain them any longer by dribblets, as I have done for a long time. Yet how can I do it without money? And I have none at all, nor do I see where to get a single florin."

But these revelations were made only to his master's most secret ear. His letters, deciphered after three centuries, alone make manifest the almost desperate condition in which the apparently triumphant general was placed, and the facility with which his antagonists, had they been well guided and faithful to themselves, might have driven him into the sea.

But to those adversaries he maintained an attitude of serene and smiling triumph. A spy, sent from the city to obtain intelligence for the anxious burghers, had gained admission into his lines, was captured and brought before the Prince. He expected, of course, to be immediately hanged. On the contrary, Alexander gave orders that he should be conducted over every part of the encampment. The forts, the palisades, the bridge, were all to be carefully exhibited and explained to him as if he had been a friendly visitor entitled to every information. He was requested to count the pieces of artillery in the forts, on the bridge, in the armada. After thoroughly studying the scene he was then dismissed with a safe-conduct to the city.

„Go back to those who sent you," said the Prince. „Convey to them the information in quest of which you came. Apprise them of everything which you have inspected, counted, heard explained. Tell them further, that the siege will never be abandoned, and that this bridge will be my sepulchre or my pathway into Antwerp." 1

And now the aspect of the scene was indeed portentous. The chimæra had become a very visible bristling reality. There stood the bridge which the citizens had ridiculed while it was growing before their faces. There scowled the Kowenstyn—black with cannon, covered all over with fortresses—which the butchers had

1 Parma to Philip II., 28 Feb. 1585 (Archivo de Simancas MS.)

2 Same to same, 27 Feb. 1585. (Archivo de Simancas MS.)

3 Ibid.

1 Strada, ii. 325, 326.

so sedulously preserved. From Parma's camp at Beveren and Kalloo a great fortified road led across the river and along the fatal dyke all the way to the entrenchments at Stabroek, where Mansfeld's army lay. Grim Mondragon held the „Holy Cross” and the whole Kowenstyn in his own iron grasp. A chain of forts, built and occupied by the contending hosts of the patriots and the Spaniards, were closely packed together along both banks of the Scheldt, nine miles long from Antwerp to Lillo, and interchanged perpetual cannonades. The country all around, once fertile as a garden, had been changed into a wild and wintry sea, where swarms of gunboats and other armed vessels manœuvred and contended with each other over submerged villages and orchards, and among half-drowned turrets and steeples. Yet there rose the great bulwark—whose early destruction would have made all this desolation a blessing—unbroken and obstinate; a perpetual obstacle to communication between Antwerp and Zeeland. The very spirit of the murdered Prince of Orange seemed to rise sadly and reproachfully out of the waste of waters, as if to rebuke the men who had been so deaf to his solemn warnings.

Brussels, too, wearied and worn, its heart sick with hope deferred, now fell into despair as the futile result of the French negotiation became apparent. The stately and opulent city had long been in a most abject condition. Many of its inhabitants attempted to escape from the horrors of starving by flying from its walls. Of the fugitives, the men were either scourged back by the Spaniards into the city, or hanged up along the road-side. The women were treated leniently, even playfully, for it was thought an excellent jest to cut off the petticoats of the unfortunate starving creatures up to their knees, and then command them to go back and starve at home with their friends and fellow-citizens. A great many persons literally

died of hunger. Matrons with large families poisoned their children and themselves to avoid the more terrible death by starving. 1 At last, when Vilvoorde was taken, when the baseness of the French King was thoroughly understood, when Parma's bridge was completed and the Scheldt bridled, Brussels 13th March, capitulated on as favourable 1585. terms as could well have been expected. 2

Notwithstanding these triumphs, Parma was much inconvenienced by not possessing the sea-coast of Flanders. Ostend was a perpetual stumbling-block to him. He therefore assented, with pleasure, to a proposition made by La Motte, one of the most experienced and courageous of the Walloon royalist commanders, to attempt the place by surprise. And La Motte, at the first blow, was more than half successful. On the 29th March, night of the 29th March, 1585. with two thousand foot and twelve hundred cavalry, he carried the whole of the old port of Ostend. Leaving a Walloon officer, in whom he had confidence, to guard the position already gained, he went back in person for reinforcements. During his advance the same ill luck attended his enterprise which had blasted Hohenlo's achievement at Bois-le-Duc. The soldiers he left behind him deserted their posts for the sake of rifling the town. The officer in command, instead of keeping them to their duty, joined in the chase. The citizens roused themselves, attacked their invaders, killed many of them, and put the rest to flight. When La Motte returned, he found the panic general. His whole force, including the fresh soldiers just brought to the rescue,

1 Strada, ii. 329, 330.

2 Ibid.; Meteren, xii. 22vo; Le Petit, ii. 511. The burghers were allowed two years, during which they were to decide between the Papacy and perpetual exile. The municipal liberties were to depend upon the pleasure of the King. The houses of Cardinal Granville and of Count Mansfeld were to be rebuilt and refurnished.



were beside themselves with fear. He killed several with his own hand, but the troops were not to be rallied. His quick triumph was changed into an absolute defeat.

Parma, furious at the ignominious result of a plan from which so much had been expected, ordered the Walloon captain, from whose delinquency so much disaster had resulted, to be forthwith hanged. „Such villany,” said he, must never go unpunished.”<sup>1</sup>

It was impossible for the Prince to send a second expedition to attempt the reduction of Ostend, for the patriots were at last arousing themselves to the necessity of exertion. It was very obvious—now that the bridge had been built, and the Kowenstyn fortified—that one or the other was to be destroyed, or Antwerp abandoned to its fate.

The patriots had been sleeping, as it were, all the winter, hugging the delusive dream of French sovereignty and French assistance. No language can exaggerate the deadly effects from the slow poison of that negotiation. At any rate, the negotiation was now concluded. The dream was dispelled. Antwerp must now fall, or a decisive blow must be struck by the patriots themselves, and a telling blow had been secretly and maturely meditated. Certain preparatory steps were however necessary.

The fort of Liefkenshoek, „Darling’s Corner,” was a most important post. The patriots had never ceased to regret that precious possession, lost, as we have seen, in so tragical a manner on the very day of Orange’s death. Fort Lillo, exactly opposite, on the Brabant shore of the Scheldt, had always been

securely held by them, and was their strongest position. Were both places in their power, the navigation of the river, at least as far as the bridge, would be comparatively secure.

A sudden dash was made upon Liefkenshoek. A number of armed vessels sailed up from Zeeland, under 4th April, command of Justinus de Nas- 1585. sau. They were assisted from Fort Lillo by a detachment headed by Count Hohenlo. These two officers were desirous of retrieving the reputation which they had lost at Bois-le-Duc. They were successful, and the „Darling” fort was carried at a blow. After a brief cannonade the patriots made a breach, effected a landing, and sprang over the ramparts. The Walloons and Spaniards fled in dismay; many of them were killed in the fort and along the dykes; others were hurled into the Scheldt. The victors followed up their success by reducing, with equal impetuosity, the fort of Saint Anthony, situate in the neighbourhood farther down the river. They thus gained entire command of all the high ground, which remained in that quarter above the inundation, and was called the Doel.<sup>1</sup>

The dyke, on which Liefkenshoek stood, led up the river towards Kalloo, distant less than a league. There were Parma’s head-quarters and the famous bridge. But a Fort Saint Mary, where the Flemish head of that bridge rested, the dyke was broken. Upon that broken end the commanders of the expedition against Liefkenshoek were ordered to throw up an entrenchment, without loss of a moment, so soon as they should have gained the fortresses which they were ordered first to assault. Sainte Aldegonde had given urgent written directions of this effect. From a redoubt situated thus, in the very face of Saint Mary’s, that position, the palisade-work, the whole bridge, might be battered

<sup>1</sup> Parma to Philip II., 10 Apr. 1585. (Archivo de Simancas MS.) Compare Strada, ii. 332, who says that three of the officers were condemned to be executed, but that all were subsequently pardoned, on account of the previous good conduct of one of them. Alexander in his letter informs the King that he had ordered one to be executed forthwith, as an example to the others.

<sup>1</sup> Le Petit, ii. 511; Strada, ii. 333.

with all the artillery that could be brought from Zeeland.

But Parma was beforehand with them. Notwithstanding his rage and mortification that Spanish soldiers should have ignominiously lost the important fortress which Richebourg had conquered so brilliantly nine months before, he was not the man to spend time in unavailing regrets. His quick eye instantly detected the flaw which might soon be fatal. In the very same night of the loss of Liefkenshoek, he sent as strong a party as could be spared, with plenty of sappers and miners, in flat-bottomed boats across from Kalloo. As the morning dawned, an improvised fortress, with the Spanish flag waving above its bulwarks, stood on the broken end of the dyke. That done, he ordered one of the two captains who had commanded in Liefkenshoek and Saint Anthony to be beheaded on the same dyke. The other was dismissed with ignominy. <sup>1</sup> Ostend was, of course, given up; „but it was not a small matter,” said Parma, „to fortify ourselves that very night upon the ruptured place, and so prevent the rebels from doing it, which would have been very *mal-à-propos*. <sup>2</sup>

Nevertheless, the rebels had achieved a considerable success, and now or never the telling blow, long meditated, was to be struck.

There lived in Antwerp a subtle Mantuan, Gianibelli by name, who had married and been long settled in the city. He had made himself busy with various schemes for victualling the place. He had especially urged upon the authorities, at an early period of the siege, the propriety of making large purchases of corn and storing it in magazines at

a time when the famine-price had by no means been reached. <sup>1</sup> But the leading men had then their heads full of a great ship, or floating castle, which they were building, and which they had pompously named the „War's End,” „*Fin de la Guerre*.” We shall hear something of this phenomenon at a later period. Meanwhile, Gianibelli, who knew something of shipbuilding, as he did of most other useful matters, ridiculed the design, which was likely to cost, in itself before completion, as much money as would keep the city in bread for a third of a year.

Gianibelli was no patriot. He was purely a man of science and of great acquirements, who was looked upon by the ignorant populace alternately as a dreamer and a wizard. He was as indifferent to the cause of freedom as of despotism, but he had a great love for chemistry. He was also a profound mechanician, second to no man of his age in theoretic and practical engineering.

He had gone from Italy to Spain that he might offer his services to Philip, and give him the benefit of many original and ingenious inventions. Forced to dance attendance, day after day, among sneering courtiers and insolent placemen, and to submit to the criticism of practical sages and philosophers of routine, while he was constantly denied an opportunity of explaining his projects, the quick-tempered Italian had gone away at last indignant. He had then vowed revenge upon the dulness by which his genius had been slighted, and had sworn that the next time the Spaniards heard the name of the man whom they had dared to deride, they should hear it with tears. <sup>2</sup>

He now laid before the senate of Antwerp a plan for some vessels likely to prove more effective than the gigantic „War's End,” which he had prophesied

<sup>1</sup> Strada, ii. 338. Bor, ii. 596, and Bentivoglio, p. ii. i. iii. p. 291, say that both the commandants were beheaded. The Prince himself (MS. letter to Philip, 10 April, 1585) relates the loss of the forts, but says nothing of the punishment inflicted upon the culprits.

<sup>2</sup> MS. letter of Parma, just cited.

<sup>1</sup> Bor, ii. 500.

<sup>2</sup> Strada, ii. 334, 335.

would prove a failure. With these he pledged himself to destroy the bridge. He demanded three ships which he had selected from the city fleet—the „Orange,” the „Post,” and the „Golden Lion,”—measuring, respectively, one hundred and fifty, three hundred and fifty, and five hundred tons. Besides these, he wished sixty flat-bottomed scows, which he proposed to send down the river, partially submerged, disposed in the shape of a half-moon, with innumerable anchors and grapnels thrusting themselves out of the water at every point. This machine was intended to operate against the raft.

Ignorance and incredulity did their work, as usual, and Gianibelli's request was refused. As a quarter-measure, nevertheless, he was allowed to take two smaller vessels of seventy and eighty tons. The Italian was disgusted with this parsimony upon so momentous an occasion, but he at the same time determined, even with these slender materials, to give an exhibition of his power. 1

Not all his the glory, however, of the ingenious project. Associated with him were two skilful artizans of Antwerp; a clockmaker named Bory, and a mechanic named Timmerman; 2 but Gianibelli was the chief and superintendent of the whole daring enterprise.

He gave to his two ships the cheerful names of the „Fortune” and the „Hope,” and set himself energetically to justify their titles by their efficiency. They were to be floating marine volcanos,

which, drifting down the river with the ebb tide, were to deal destruction where the Spaniards deemed themselves most secure.

In the hold of each vessel, along the whole length, was laid down a solid flooring of brick and mortar, one foot thick, and five feet wide. Upon this was built a chamber of marble mason-work, forty feet long, three and a half feet broad, as many high, and with side-walls five feet in thickness. This was the crater. It was filled with seven thousand pounds of gunpowder, of a kind superior to anything known, and prepared by Gianibelli himself. It was covered with a roof, six feet in thickness, formed of blue tombstones placed edgewise. Over this crater rose a hollow cone, or pyramid, made of heavy marble slabs, and filled with millstones, cannon-balls, blocks of marble, chain-shot, iron hooks, plough-coulters, and every dangerous missile that could be imagined. The spaces between the mine and the sides of each ship were likewise filled with paving-stones, iron-bound stakes, harpoons, and other projectiles. The whole fabric was then covered by a smooth light flooring of planks and brick-work, upon which was a pile of wood. This was to be lighted at the proper time, in order that the two vessels might present the appearance of simple fire-ships, intended only to excite a conflagration of the bridge. On the „Fortune” a slow match, very carefully prepared, communicated with the submerged mine, which was to explode at a nicely-calculated moment. The eruption of the other floating volcano was to be regulated by an ingenious piece of clock-work, by which, at the appointed time, fire, struck from a flint, was to inflame the hidden mass of gunpowder below.

In addition to these two infernal machines, or „hellburners,” as they were called, a fleet of thirty-two smaller vessels was prepared. Covered with

1 Bor, ii. 596, 597; Hoofd Vervolgh, 91.

2 Bor, ii. 596, 597; Hoofd Vervolgh, 91; Strada, ii. 334 *seq.*; Meteren, xii. 233v; Baudartii Polemog. ii. 24-27, with very curious illustrative plates; Bentivoglio, p. ii. l. iii. 291, 292; Reyd. iv. 60. (Letter of Parma to Philip, 10 April, 1585. Arch. de Sim. MS.)

3 Hondius, „Korte Beschryving ende Afbeelding van de generale Regelen der Fortificatie.” ’S Gravenhage, 1624, fol. cited in Mertens and Torfs’ *Gesch. v. Antwerpen*, v. 223 *seq.*



tar, turpentine, rosin, and filled with inflammable and combustible materials, these barks were to be sent from Antwerp down the river in detachments of eight every half-hour with the ebb tide. The object was to clear the way, if possible, of the raft, and to occupy the attention of the Spaniards, until the „Fortune” and the „Hope” should come down upon the bridge.

The 5th April, being the day following that on which the successful assault upon Liefkenthoeck and 5th April, Saint Anthony had taken 1585. place, was fixed for the descent of the fire-ships. So soon as it should be dark, the thirty-two lesser burning vessels, under the direction of Admiral Jacob Jacobzoon, were to be sent forth from the neighbourhood of the „Boor’s Sconce”—a fort close to be city walls—in accordance with the Italian’s plan. „Runaway Jacob,” however, or „Koppen Lopen,” had earned no new laurels which could throw into the shade that opprobrious appellation. He was not one of Holland’s naval heroes, but, on the whole, a very incompetent officer; exactly the man to damage the best-concerted scheme which the genius of others could invent. Accordingly, Koppen Lopen began with a grave mistake. Instead of allowing the precursory fire-ships to drift down the stream, at the regular intervals agreed upon, he despatched them all rapidly, and helterskelter, one after another, as fast as they could be set forth on their career. Not long afterwards, he sent the two „hell-burners,” the „Fortune” and the „Hope,” directly in their wake. Thus the whole fiery fleet had set forth, almost at once, upon its fatal voyage.

It was known to Parma that preparations for an attack were making at Antwerp, but as to the nature of the danger he was necessarily in the dark. He was anticipating an invasion by a fleet from the city in combination with

a squadron of Zeelanders coming up from below. So soon as the first vessels, therefore, with their trains not yet lighted, were discovered bearing down from the city, he was confirmed in his conjecture. His drums and trumpets instantly called to arms, and the whole body of his troops was mustered upon the bridge, the palisades, and in the nearest forts. Thus the preparations to avoid or to contend with the danger, were leading the Spaniards into the very jaws of destruction. Alexander, after crossing and recrossing the river, giving minute directions for repelling the expected assault, finally stationed himself in the blockhouse at the point of junction, on the Flemish side, between the palisade and the bridge of boats. He was surrounded by a group of superior officers, among whom Richebourg, Billy, Gaetano, Cessis, and the Englishman Sir Rowland Yorke, were conspicuous.

It was a dark, mild evening of early spring. As the fleet of vessels dropped slowly down the river, they suddenly became luminous, each ship flaming out of the darkness, a phantom of living fire. The very waves of the Scheldt seemed glowing with the conflagration, while its banks were lighted up with a preternatural glare. It was a wild, pompous, theatrical spectacle. The array of soldiers on both sides the river, along the dykes and upon the bridge, with banners waving, and spear and cuirass glancing in the lurid light; the demon fleet, guided by no human hand, wrapped in flames, and flitting through the darkness, with irregular movement, but portentous aspect, at the caprice of wind and tide; the death-like silence of expectation which had succeeded the sound of trumpet and the shouts of the soldiers; and the weird glow which had supplanted the darkness—all combined with the sense of imminent and mysterious danger to excite and oppress the imagination.

Presently, the Spaniards, as they gazed from the bridge, began to take heart again. One after another, many of the lesser vessels drifted blindly against the raft, were they entangled themselves among the hooks and gigantic spearheads, and burned slowly out without causing any extensive conflagration. Others grounded on the banks of the river, before reaching their destination. Some sank in the stream.

Last of all came the two infernal ships, swaying unsteadily with the current; the pilots of course, as they neared the bridge, having noiselessly effected their escape in the skiffs. The slight fire upon the deck scarcely illuminated the dark phantom-like hulls. Both were carried by the current clear of the raft, which, by a great error of judgment, as it now appeared, on the part of the builders, had only been made to protect the floating portion of the bridge. The „*Fortune*” came first, staggering inside the raft, and then lurching clumsily against the dyke, and grounding near Kalloo, without touching the bridge. There was a moment’s pause of expectation. At last the slow match upon the deck burned out, and there was a faint and partial explosion, by which little or no damage was produced.

Parma instantly called for volunteers to board the mysterious vessel. The desperate expedition was headed by the bold Rowland Yorke, <sup>1</sup> a Londoner, of whom one day there was more to be heard in Netherland history. The party sprang into the deserted and now harmless volcano, extinguishing the slight fires that were smouldering on the deck, and thrusting spears and long poles into the hidden recesses of the hold. There was, however, little time to pursue these perilous investigations, and the party soon made their escape to the bridge.

The troops of Parma, crowding on the palisade, and looking over the parapets, now began to greet the exhibition with peals of derisive laughter. It was but child’s play, they thought, to threaten a Spanish army, and a general like Alexander Farnese, with such paltry fire-works as these. Nevertheless all eyes were anxiously fixed upon the remaining fire-ship, or „hell-burner,” the „*Hope*,” which had now drifted very near the place of its destination. Tearing her way between the raft and the shore, she struck heavily against the bridge on the Kalloo side, close to the blockhouse at the commencement of the floating portion of the bridge. A thin wreath of smoke was seen curling over a slight and smouldering fire upon her deck.

Marquis Richebourg, standing on the bridge, laughed loudly at the apparently impotent conclusion of the whole adventure. It was his last laugh on earth. A number of soldiers, at Parma’s summons, instantly sprang on board this second mysterious vessel, and occupied themselves, as the party on board the „*Fortune*” had done, in extinguishing the flames, and in endeavouring to ascertain the nature of the machine. Richebourg boldly directed from the bridge their hazardous experiments.

At the same moment a certain ensign De Vega, who stood near the Prince of Parma, close to the blockhouse, approached him with vehement entreaties that he should retire. Alexander refused to stir from the spot, being anxious to learn the result of these investigations. Vega, moved by some instinctive and irresistible apprehension, fell upon his knees, and, plucking the General earnestly by the cloak, implored him with such passionate words and gestures to leave the place, that the Prince reluctantly yielded.

It was not a moment too soon. The clock-work in the „*Hope*” had been

<sup>1</sup> Stowe, ‘*Chronicle of England*,’ ed. 1631, p. 700.

better adjusted than the slow match in the „Fortune.” Scarcely had Alexander reached the entrance of Saint Mary’s Fort, at the end of the bridge, when a horrible explosion was heard. The „Hope” disappeared, together with the men who had boarded her, and the blockhouse, against which she had struck, with all its garrison, while a large portion of the bridge, with all the troops stationed upon it, had vanished into air. It was the work of a single instant. The Scheldt yawned to its lowest depth, and then cast its waters across the dykes, deep into the forts, and far over the land. The earth shook as with the throb of a volcano. A wild glare lighted up the scene for one moment, and was then succeeded by pitchy darkness. Houses were toppled down miles away, and not a living thing, even in remote places, could keep its feet. The air was filled with a rain of ploughshares, grave-stones, and marble balls, intermixed with the heads, limbs, and bodies of what had been human beings. Slabs of granite, vomited by the flaming ship, were found afterwards at a league’s distance, and buried deep in the earth. A thousand soldiers were destroyed in a second of time; many of them being torn to shreds, beyond even the semblance of humanity.

Richebourg disappeared, and was not found until several days later, when his body was discovered, doubled around an iron chain, which hung from one of the bridge-boats in the centre of the river. The veteran Robles, Seigneur de Billy, a Portuguese officer of eminent service and high military rank, was also destroyed. Months afterwards, his body was discovered adhering to the timber-work of the bridge, upon the ultimate removal of that structure, and was only recognised by a peculiar gold chain which he habitually wore. Parma himself was thrown to the ground, stunned by a blow on the shoulder from

a flying stake. The page who was behind him, carrying his helmet, fell dead without a wound, killed by the concussion of the air.

Several strange and less tragical incidents occurred. The Viscomte de Bruxelles was blown out of a boat on the Flemish side, and descended safe and sound into another in the centre of the stream. Captain Tucci, clad in complete armour, was whirled out of a fort, shot perpendicularly into the air, and then fell back into the river. Being of a cool temperament, a good swimmer, and very pious, he skilfully divested himself of cuirass and helmet, recommended himself to the Blessed Virgin, and swam safely ashore. Another young officer of Parma’s body-guard, François de Liege by name, standing on the Kalloo end of the bridge, rose like a feather into the clouds, and, flying quite across the river, alighted on the opposite bank with no further harm than a contused shoulder. He imagined himself (he said afterwards) to have been changed into a cannon-ball, as he rushed through the pitchy atmosphere, propelled by a blast of irresistible fury. 1

It had been agreed that Admiral Jacobzoon should immediately after the explosion of the fire-ships send an eight-oared barge to ascertain the amount of damage. If a breach had been effected, and a passage up to the city opened, he was to fire a rocket. At this signal, the fleet stationed at Lillo, carrying a

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1 The chief authorities used in the foregoing account of this famous enterprise are those already cited on a previous page, viz.: the MS. letters of the Prince of Parma in the Archives of Simancas; Bor, ii. 596, 597; Strada, ii. 334 *seq.*; Meteren, xii. 223<sup>vo</sup>; Hoofd Vervolgh, 91; Baudartii Polemographia, ii. 24-27; Bentivoglio, p. ii. l.iii. 391, 292; Reynd, iv. 60; Martens and Torfs, *Gesch. v. Antw.* v. 222 *seq.*; Papebrochi *Ann. Antw.* iv. 100 *seq. et al.*—I have not thought it necessary to cite them step by step; for all the accounts, with some inevitable and unimportant discrepancies, agree with each other. The most copious details are to be found in Strada and in Bor.



heavy armament, laden with provisions enough to relieve Antwerp from all anxiety, and ready to sail on the instant, was at once to force its way up the river.

The deed was done. A breach, two hundred feet in width, was made. Had the most skilful pilot in Zeeland held the helm of the „Hope,” with a choice crew obedient to his orders, he could not have guided her more carefully than she had been directed by wind and tide. Avoiding the raft which lay in her way, she had, as it were, with the intelligence of a living creature, fulfilled the wishes of the daring genius that had created her; and laid herself alongside the bridge, exactly at the most telling point. She had then destroyed herself, precisely at the right moment. All the effects, and more than all, that had been predicted by the Mantuan wizard had come to pass. The famous bridge was cleft through and through, and a thousand picked men—Parma’s very „daintiest”—were blown out of existence. The Governor-General himself was lying stark and stiff upon the bridge which he said should be his triumphal monument or his tomb. His most distinguished officers were dead, and all the survivors were dumb and blind with astonishment at the unheard-of convulsion. The passage was open for the fleet, and the fleet lay below with sails spread, and oars in the rowlocks, only waiting for the signal to bear up at once to the scene of action, to smite out of existence all that remained of the splendid structure, and to carry relief and triumph into Antwerp.

Not a soul slept in the city. The explosion had shook its walls, and thousands of people thronged the streets, their hearts beating high with expectation. It was a moment of exquisite triumph. The „Hope,” word of happy augury, had not been relied upon in vain, and Parma’s seven months of patient labour had been annihilated in

a moment. Sainte Aldegonde and Gianibelli stood in the „Boors’ Sconce” on the edge of the river. They had felt and heard the explosion, and they were now straining their eyes through the darkness to mark the flight of the welcome rocket.

That rocket never rose. And it is enough, even after the lapse of three centuries, to cause a pang in every heart that beats for human liberty to think of the bitter disappointment which crushed these great and legitimate hopes. The cause lay in the incompetency and cowardice of the man who had been so unfortunately entrusted with a share in a noble enterprise.

Admiral Jacobzoon, paralyzed by the explosion, which announced his own triumph, sent off the barge, but did not wait for its return. The boatmen, too, appalled by the sights and sounds which they had witnessed, and by the murky darkness which encompassed them, did not venture near the scene of action, but, after rowing for a short interval hither and thither, came back with the lying report that nothing had been accomplished, and that the bridge remained unbroken. Sainte Aldegonde and Gianibelli were beside themselves with rage, as they surmised the imbecility of the Admiral, and devoted him in their hearts to the gallows, which he certainly deserved. The wrath of the keen Italian may be conceived, now that his ingenious and entirely successful scheme was thus rendered fruitless by the blunders of the incompetent Fleming. 1

On the other side, there was a man whom no danger could appal. Alexander had been thought dead, and the dismay among his followers was universal. He was known to have been standing an instant before the explosion the very blockhouse where the „Hope” had struck. After the first ter-

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1 Bor, Hoofd, Meteren, *ubi supra*.

rible moments had passed, his soldiers found their general lying, as if in a trance, on the threshold of St. Mary's Fort, his drawn sword in his hand, with Cessis embracing his knees, and Gaetano extended at his side, stunned with a blow upon the head. 1

Recovering from his swoon, Parma was the first to spring to his feet. Sword in hand, he rushed at once upon the bridge to mark the extent of the disaster. The admirable structure, the result of so much patient and intelligent energy, was fearfully shattered; the bridge, the river, and the shore, strewed with the mangled bodies of his soldiers. He expected, as a matter of certainty, that the fleet from below would instantly force its passage, destroy the remainder of his troops—stunned as they were with the sudden catastrophe—complete the demolition of the bridge, and then make its way to Antwerp, with ample reinforcements and supplies. And Alexander saw that the expedition would be successful. Momently expecting the attack, he maintained his courage and semblance of cheerfulness, with despair in his heart.

His winter's work seemed annihilated, and it was probable that he should be obliged to raise the siege. Nevertheless, he passed in person from rank to rank, from post to post, seeing that the wounded were provided for, encouraging those that remained unhurt, and endeavouring to infuse a portion of his own courage into the survivors of his panic-stricken army.

Nor was he entirely unsuccessful, as the night wore on and the expected

assault was still delayed. Without further loss of time, he employed his men to collect the drifting boats, timber, and spar-work, and to make a hasty and temporary restoration—in semblance at least—of the ruined portion of his bridge. And thus he employed himself steadily all the night, although expecting every instant to hear the first broadside of the Zeeland cannon. When morning broke, and it became obvious that the patriots were unable or unwilling to follow up their own success, the Governor-General felt as secure as ever. He at once set about the thorough repairs of his great work, and—before he could be again molested—had made good the damage which it had sustained. 1

It was not till three days afterwards that the truth was known in Antwerp. Hohenlo then sent down a messenger, who swam under the bridge, ascertained the exact state of affairs, and returned, when it was too late, with the first intelligence of the triumph which had been won and lost. The disappointment and mortification were almost intolerable. And thus had Runaway Jacob, „Koppen Loppen,” blasted the hopes of so many wiser and braver spirits than his own.

The loss to Parma and to the royalist cause in Marquis Richebourg was very great. The death of De Billy, who was a faithful, experienced, and courageous general, was also much lamented. „The misfortune from their death,” said Parma, „is not to be exaggerated. Each was ever ready to do his duty in your Majesty's service, and to save me much fatigue in all my various affairs. Nevertheless,” continued the Prince, with great piety, „we give the Lord thanks for all, and take as a favour everything which comes from His hand.” 2

1 Such is the picture minutely painted by Strada, ii. 342; and, although the Prince, in his own letters, written from the scene of action, and preserved in the Simancas Archives, omits the incident, yet I am inclined to rely upon the very ample materials possessed by the genial Jesuit, in the shape of private contemporary letters from Spanish officers engaged in the war—letters, alas! which have probably for ever disappeared.

1 Bor, Strada, Meteren, Hoofd, Bentivoglio, Reyd, Mertens and Torfs, Papebrochii Ann. (MS. letters of Parma, *ubi supra*.)

2 MS. letter, 10 April, 1685, already cited.

Alexander had indeed reason to deplore the loss of Robert de Melun, Viscount of Ghent, Marquis of Roubaix and Richebourg. He was a most valuable officer. His wealth was great. It had been recently largely increased by the confiscation of his elder brother's estates for his benefit, a measure which at Parma's intercession had been accorded by the King. That brother was the patriotic Prince of Espinoy, whom we have recently seen heading the legation of the States to France. And Richebourg was grateful to Alexander, for, besides these fraternal spoils, he had received two marquises through his great patron, in addition to the highest military offices. Insolent, overbearing, truculent to all the world, to Parma he was ever docile, affectionate, watchful, obsequious. A man who knew not fatigue, nor fear, nor remorse, nor natural affection, who could patiently superintend all the details of a great military work, or manage a vast political intrigue by alternations of browbeating and bribery, or lead a forlorn hope, or murder a prisoner in cold blood, or leap into the blazing crater of what seemed a marine volcano, the Marquis of Richebourg had ever made himself most actively and unscrupulously useful to his master. Especially had he rendered invaluable services in the reduction of the Walloon Provinces, and in the bridging of the Scheldt, the two crowning triumphs of Alexander's life. He had now passed from the scene where he had played so energetic and dazzling a part, and lay doubled round an iron cable beneath the current of the restless river.

And in this eventful night, Parma, as always, had been true to himself and to his sovereign. „We expected,” said he, „that the rebels would instantly attack us on all sides after the explosion. But all remained so astonished by the unheard-of accident, that very few understood what was going on. It seemed

better that I—notwithstanding the risk of letting myself be seen—should encourage the people not to run away. I did so, and remedied matters a little, but not so much as that—if the enemy had then attacked us—*we should not have been in the very greatest risk and peril.* I did not fail to do what I am obliged to do, and always hope to do; but I say no more of what passed, or what was done by myself, because it does not become me to speak of these things.” 1

Notwithstanding this discomfiture, the patriots kept up heart, and were incessantly making demonstrations against Parma's works. Their proceedings against the bridge, although energetic enough to keep the Spanish commander in a state of perpetual anxiety, were never so efficient however as on the memorable occasion when the Mantuan engineer and the Dutch watchmaker had exhausted all their ingenuity. Nevertheless, the rebel barks swarmed all over the submerged territory, now threatening this post, and now that, and effecting their retreat at pleasure; for nearly the whole of Parma's little armada was stationed at the two extremities of his bridge. Many fire-ships were sent down from time to time, but Alexander had organized a systematic patrol of a few sentry-boats, armed with scythes and hooks, which rowed up and down in front of the rafts, and protected them against invasion.

Some little effect was occasionally produced, but there was on the whole more anxiety excited than damage actually inflicted. The perturbation of spirit among the Spaniards when any of these „demon fire-ships,” as they called them, appeared bearing down upon their bridge, was excessive. It could not be forgotten that the „Hope” had sent into space a

1 „—y o dijo mas aqui de lo que entonces paso, y yo hice por no estarme bien tratar dello.” (MS. letter before cited.)



thousand of the best soldiers of the little army within one moment of time. Such rapid proceedings had naturally left an uneasy impression on the minds of the survivors. The fatigue of watching was enormous. Hardly an officer or soldier among the besieging forces knew what it was to sleep. There was a perpetual exchanging of signals and beacon-fires and rockets among the patriots—not a day or night, when a concerted attack by the Antwerpers from above, and the Hollanders from below, with gun-boats, and fire-ships, and floating mines, and other devil's enginry, was not expected.

„We are always upon the alert,” wrote Parma, „with arms in our hands. Every one must mount guard, myself as well as the rest, almost every night, and the better part of every day.”<sup>1</sup>

He was quite aware that something was ever in preparation; and the nameless, almost sickening apprehension which existed among his stout-hearted veterans, was a proof that the Mantuan's genius—notwithstanding the disappointment as to the great result—had not been exercised entirely in vain. The image of the Antwerp devil-ships imprinted itself indelibly upon the Spanish mind, as of something preternatural, with which human valour could only contend at a disadvantage; and a day was not very far distant—one of the memorable days of the world's history, big with the fate of England, Spain, Holland, and all Christendom—when the sight of a half-dozen blazing vessels, and the cry of „the Antwerp fire-ships,” was to decide the issue of a most momentous enterprise. The blow struck by the obscure Italian against Antwerp bridge, although ineffective then, was to be most sensibly felt after a few years had passed, upon a wider field.

Meantime the uneasiness and the watchfulness in the besieging army were very exhausting. „They are never idle in the city,” wrote Parma. „They are perpetually proving their obstinacy and pertinacity by their industrious genius and the machines which they devise. Every day we are expecting some new invention. On our side we endeavour to counteract their efforts by *every human means* in our power. Nevertheless, I confess that our merely *human intellect* is not competent to penetrate the designs of *their diabolical genius*. Certainly, most wonderful and extraordinary things have been exhibited, such as the oldest soldiers here have never before witnessed.”<sup>1</sup>

Moreover, Alexander saw himself growing weaker and weaker. His force had dwindled to a mere phantom of an army. His soldiers, ill-fed, half-clothed, unpaid, were fearfully overworked. He was obliged to concentrate all the troops at his disposal around Antwerp. Diversions against Ostend, operations in Friesland and Gelderland, although most desirable, has thus been rendered quite impossible.

„I have recalled my cavalry and infantry from Ostend,” he wrote, „and Don Juan de Manrique has fortunately arrived in Stabroek with a thousand good German folk. The commissary-general of the cavalry has come in, too, with a good lot of the troops that had been encamped in the open country. Nevertheless, we remain wretchedly weak—quite insufficient to attempt what ought to be done. If the enemy were more in force, or if the French wished to make trouble, your Majesty would see how important it had been to pro-

<sup>1</sup> Parma to Philip, 6 May 1585. (Archivo de Simancas MS.)

<sup>1</sup> „—aunque confieso que nuestros ingenios no alcanzan ni penetran lo que los suyos diabolicos hazen, porque cierto se veen cosas estrañas y nuevas a lo que aseguran cuantos soldados viejos aqui hay.” (Parma to Philip, 25 May, 1585. Arch. de Sim. MS.)

vide in time against contingencies. And although our neighbours, crestfallen and rushing upon their own destruction, leave us in quiet, we are not without plenty of work. It would be of inestimable advantage to make diversions in Gelderland and Friesland, because in that case the Hollanders, seeing the enemy so near their own borders, would be obliged to withdraw their assistance from Antwerp. 'Tis pity to see how few Spaniards your Majesty has left, and how diminished is our army. Now, also, is the time to expect sickness, and this affair of Antwerp is obviously stretching out into large proportions. Unless soon reinforced, we must inevitably go to destruction. I implore your Majesty to ponder the matter well, and not to defer the remedy." 1

His Majesty was sure to ponder the matter well, if that had been all. Philip was good at pondering; but it was equally certain that the remedy would be deferred. Meantime Alexander and his starving but heroic little army were left to fight their battles as they could.

His complaints were incessant, most reasonable, but unavailing. With all the forces he could muster, by withdrawing from the neighbourhood of Ghent, Brussel, Vilvoorde, and from all the garrisons, every man that could be spared, he had not strength enough to guard his own posts. To attempt to win back the important forts recently captured by the rebels on the Doel was quite out of the question. The pictures he painted of his army were indeed most dismal. The Spaniards were so reduced by sickness that it was pitiful to see them. The Italians were not in much better condition, nor the Germans. „As for the Walloons," said he, „they are deserting, as they always do. In truth, one of my principal dangers is that the French civil

wars are now tempting my soldiers across the frontier; the country there is so much richer, and offers so much more for the plundering." 1

During the few weeks which immediately followed the famous descent of the „Hope" and the „Fortune," there had accordingly been made a variety of less elaborate, but apparently mischievous, efforts against the bridge. On the whole, however, the object was rather to deceive and amuse the royalists, by keeping their attention fixed in that quarter, while a great attack was, in reality, preparing against the Kowenstyn. That strong barrier, as repeatedly stated, was even a more formidable obstacle than the bridge to the communication between the beleaguered city and their allies upon the outside. Its capture and demolition, even at this late period, would open the navigation to all the fleets of Zeeland.

In the undertaking of the 5th of April all had been accomplished that human ingenuity could devise; yet the triumph had been snatched away even at the very moment when it was complete. A determined and vigorous effort was soon to be made upon the Kowenstyn, in the very face of Parma; for it now seemed obvious that the true crisis was to come upon that fatal dyke. The great bulwark was three miles long. It reached from Stabroek in Brabant, near which village Mansfeld's troops were encamped, across the inundated country, up to the line of the Scheldt. Thence along the river-dyke, and across the bridge to Kalloo and Beveren, where Parma's forces lay, was a continuous fortified road some three leagues in length; so that the two divisions of the besieging army, lying four leagues apart, were all connected by this important line.

Could the Kowenstyn be pierced, the waters, now divided by that great bul-

1 MS. letter, 10 April, 1585, before cited.

1 MS. letter, Parma to Philip, 6 May, 1585.

wark into two vast lakes, would flow together in one continuous sea. More-over the Scheldt, it was thought, would, in that case, return to its old channel through Brabant, deserting its present bed, and thus leaving the famous bridge high and dry. A wide sheet of navigable water would then roll between Antwerp and the Zeeland coasts, and Parma's bridge, the result of seven months' labour, would become as useless as a child's broken toy.

Alexander had thoroughly comprehended the necessity of maintaining the Kowenstyn. All that it was possible to do with the meagre forces at his disposal, he had done. He had fringed both its margins, along its whole length, with a breastwork of closely-driven stakes. He had strengthened the whole body of the dyke with timber-work and piles. Upon its river-end, just at the junction with the great Scheldt dyke, a strong fortress, called the Holy Cross, had been constructed, which was under the special command of Mondragon.<sup>1</sup> Besides this, three other forts had been built, at intervals of about a mile, upon the dyke. The one nearest to Mondragon was placed at the Kowenstyn manor-house, and was called 'Sint James. This was entrusted to Camillo Bourbon del Monte, an Italian officer, who boasted the blood royal of France in his veins, and was disposed on all occasions to vindicate that proud pedigree by his deeds.<sup>2</sup> The next fort was Saint George's, sometimes called the Black Sconce. It had been built by La Motte, but it was now in command of the Spanish officer Benites. The third was entitled the Fort of the Palisades, because it had been necessary to support it by a stockade-work in the water, there being absolutely not earth enough to hold

the structure. It was placed in the charge of Captain Gamboa. These little castles had been created, as it were, out of water and upon water, and under a hot fire from the enemy's forts and fleets, which gave the pioneers no repose.<sup>1</sup>

„'Twas very hard work," said Parma, „our soldiers are so exposed during their labour, the rebels playing upon them perpetually from their musket-proof vessels. They fill the submerged land with their boats, skimming everywhere as they like, while we have none at all. We have been obliged to build these three forts with neither material nor space; making land enough for the foundation by bringing thither bundles of hurdles and of earth. The fatigue and anxiety are incredible. Not a man can sleep at night; not an officer nor soldier but is perpetually mounting guard. But they are animated to their hard work by seeing that I share in it, like one of themselves. We have now got the dyke into good order, so far as to be able to give them a warm reception, whenever they choose to come." <sup>2</sup>

Quite at the farther or land end of the Kowenstyn was another fort, called the Stabroek, which commanded and raked the whole dyke, and was in the neighbourhood of Mansfeld's headquarters.

Placed as were these little citadels upon a slender and—at a brief distance—invisible thread of land, with the dark waters rolling around them far and near, they presented an unsubstantial dream-like aspect, seeming rather like castles floating between air and ocean than actual fortifications—a deceptive mirage rather than reality. There was nothing imaginary, however, in the work which they were to perform.

<sup>1</sup> Strada. ii. 345, 346.

<sup>2</sup> De Thou, viii. 428.

<sup>1</sup> Strada, ii. 345, 346. Bor, ii. 597, 598.

<sup>2</sup> Parma to Philip, 6 May, 1585, Archivo de Simancas MS.



A series of attacks, some serious, others fictitious, had been made, from time to time, upon both bridge and dyke; but Alexander was unable to inspire his soldiers with his own watchfulness. Upon the 7th of May a more determined attempt was made upon the Kowenstyn, by the fleet from Lillo. Hohenlo and Colonel Ysselstein conducted the enterprise. The sentinels at the point selected—having recently been so often threatened by an enemy, who most frequently made a rapid retreat, as to have grown weary and indifferent—were surprised, at dawn of day, and put to the sword. „If the truth must be told,” said Parma, „the sentries were sound asleep.”<sup>1</sup> Five hundred Zeelanders, with a strong party of sappers and miners, fairly established themselves upon the dyke, between St. Georges and Fort Palisade. The attack, although spirited at its commencement, was doomed to be unsuccessful. A co-operation, agreed upon by the fleet from Antwerp, failed through a misunderstanding. Sainte Aldegonde had stationed certain members of the munition-chamber in the cathedral tower, with orders to discharge three rockets when they should perceive a beacon-fire which he should light in Fort Tholouse. The watchmen mistook an accidental camp-fire in the neighbourhood for the preconcerted signal, and sent up the rockets. Hohenlo understanding, accordingly, that the expedition was on the point of starting from Antwerp, hastened to perform his portion of the work, and sailed up from Lillo. He did his duty faithfully and well, and established himself upon the dyke, but found himself alone and without sufficient force to maintain his position. The Antwerp fleet never sailed. It was even whispered that the delinquency was rather intended than accidental; the

Antwerpers being supposed desirous to ascertain the result of Hohenlo's attempt before coming forth to share his fate. Such was the opinion expressed by Farnese in his letters to Philip, but it seems probable that he was mistaken. Whatever the cause, however, the fact of the Zeelanders discomfiture was certain. The St. George battery and that of the Palisade were opened at once upon them, the balls came plunging among the sappers and miners before they had time to throw up many spadefuls of earth, and the whole party was soon dead or driven from the dyke. The survivors effected their retreat as they best could, leaving four of their ships behind them and three or four hundred men.

„Forty rebels lay dead on the dyke,” said Parma, „and one hundred and fifty more, at least, were drowned. The enemy confess a much larger loss than the number I state, but I am not a friend of giving details larger than my ascertained facts; nor do I know how many were killed in the boats.”<sup>1</sup>

This enterprise was but a prelude, however, to the great undertaking which had now been thoroughly matured. Upon the 26th May another and most determined attack was to be made upon the Kowenstyn, by the Antwerpers and Hollanders acting in concert. This time, it was to be hoped, there would be no misconception of signals. „It was a determination,” said Parma, „so daring and desperate that there was no substantial reason why we should believe they would carry it out; but they were at last solemnly resolved to die or to effect their purpose.”<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Parma to Philip II., 25 May, 1584, Arch. de Sim. MS. Compare Bor, ii. 598, 599. Strada, 348, 349. Le Petit, ii. 512. Meteren, xii. 224. Bentivoglio, p. 11, l. iii. 294.

<sup>2</sup> Parma to Philip II., 26 May, 1585. Arch. de Sim. MS.

<sup>1</sup> In Strada, ii. 349.

Two hundred ships in all had been got ready, part of them under Hohenlo and Justinus de Nassau, to sail up from Zeeland; the others to advance from Antwerp under Sainte Aldegonde. Their destination was the Kowenstyn Dyke. Some of the vessels were laden with provisions, others with gabions, hurdles, branches, sacks of sand and of wool, and with other materials for the rapid throwing up of fortifications.

It was two o'clock, half an hour before the chill dawn of a May morning, Sunday, the 26th of the month. The pale light of a waning moon was faintly perceptible in the sky. Suddenly the sentinels upon the Kowenstyn—this time not asleep—descried, as they looked towards Lillo, four fiery apparitions gliding towards them across the waves. The alarm was given, and soon afterwards the Spaniards began to muster, somewhat reluctantly, upon the dyke, filled as they always were with the mysterious dread which those demon-vessels never failed to inspire.

The fire-ships floated slowly nearer, and at last struck heavily against the stockade-work. There, covered with tar, pitch, rosin, and gunpowder, they flamed, flared, and exploded, during a brief period, with much vigour, and then burned harmlessly out. One of the objects for which they had been sent—to set fire to the palisade—was not accomplished. The other was gained; for the enemy, expecting another volcanic shower of tombstones and plough-coulters, and remembering the recent fate of their comrades on the bridge, had retired shuddering into the forts. Meantime, in the glare of these vast torches, a great swarm of gun-boats and other vessels, skimming across the leaden-coloured waters, was seen gradually approaching the dyke. It was the fleet of Hohenlo and Justinus de Nassau, who had been sailing and rowing since ten o'clock of the preceding night. The burning ships lighted them on their

way, while it had scared the Spaniards from their posts.

The boats ran ashore in the mile-long space between forts St. George and the Palisade, and a party of Zeelanders, Admiral Haultain, governor of Walcheren, at their head, sprang upon the dyke. Meantime, however, the royalists, finding that the fire-ships had come to so innocent an end, had rallied and emerged from their forts. Haultain and his Zeelanders, by the time they had fairly mounted the dyke, found themselves in the iron embrace of several hundred Spaniards. After a brief fierce struggle, face to face, and at push of pike, the patriots reeled backward down the bank, and took refuge in their boats. Admiral Haultain slipped as he left the shore, missed a rope's end which was thrown to him, fell into the water, and, borne down by the weight of his armour, was drowned. The enemy, pursuing them, sprang to the waist in the ooze on the edge of the dyke, and continued the contest. The boats opened a hot fire, and there was a severe skirmish for many minutes, with no certain result. It was, however, beginning to go hard with the Zeelanders, when, just at the critical moment, a cheer from the other side of the dyke was heard, and the Antwerp fleet was seen coming swiftly to the rescue. The Spaniards, taken between the two bands of assailants, were at a disadvantage, and it was impossible to prevent the landing of these fresh antagonists. The Antwerpers sprang ashore. Among the foremost was Sainte Aldegonde, 1—poet, orator, hymn-book maker, bur-

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1 „Monsr. Ste. Aldegonde being one of the first.” Letter of Capt. Thomas James to Walsingham, <sup>16</sup> May, 1585, S. P. Office <sub>26</sub>

MS. The English soldier had no remarkable talent for description, but he had been fighting all day on the dyke, and sent off a rough account of the business, the same night, to England.

gomaster, lawyer, polemical divine—now armed to the teeth and cheering on his men, in the very thickest of the fight. The diversion was successful, and Sainte Aldegonde gallantly drove the Spaniards quite off the field. The whole combined force from Antwerp and Zeeland now effected their landing. Three thousand men occupied all the space between Fort George and the Palisade.

With Sainte Aldegonde came the unlucky Koppen Loppen, and all that could be spared of the English and Scotch troops in Antwerp, under Balfour and Morgan. With Hohenlo and Justinus de Nassau came Reinier Kant, who had just succeeded Paul Buys as Advocate of Holland. Besides these came two other men, side by side, perhaps in the same boat, of whom the world was like to hear much from that time forward, and whose names are to be most solemnly linked together, so long as Netherland history shall endure; one a square-visaged, heavy-browed man of forty—Prince Maurice I and John of Olden-Barneveld. The statesman had been foremost to urge the claim of William the Silent's son upon the stadholderate of Holland and Zeeland, and had been, as it were, the youth's political guardian. He had himself borne arms more than once before, having shouldered his matchlock under Batenburg, and marched on that

officer's spirited but disastrous expedition for the relief of Haarlem. But this was the life of those Dutch rebels. Quill-driving, law-expounding, speech-making, diplomatic missions, were intermingled with very practical business in besieged towns or open fields, with Italian musketeers and Spanish pikemen. And here, too, young Maurice was taking his first solid lesson in the art of which he was one day to be so distinguished a professor. It was a sharp beginning. Upon this riband of earth, scarce six paces in breadth, with miles of deep water on both sides—a position recently fortified by the first general of the age, and held by the famous infantry of Spain and Italy—there was likely to be no prentice-work.

To assault such a position was in truth, as Alexander had declared it to be, a most daring and desperate resolution on the part of the States. „Soldiers, citizens, and all,” said Parma, „they are obstinate as dogs to try their fortune.”<sup>1</sup>

With wool-sacks, sand-bags, hurdles, planks, and other materials brought with them, the patriots now rapidly entrenched themselves in the position so brilliantly gained; while, without deferring for an instant the great purpose which they had come to effect, the sappers and miners fastened upon the iron-bound soil of the dyke, tearing it with pick, mattock, and shovel, digging, delving, and throwing up the earth around them, busy as human beavers instinctively engaged in a most congenial task.

But the beavers did not toil unmo-  
lested. The large and determined force of Antwerpers and English, Hollanders and Zeelanders, guarded the fortifications as they were rapidly rising, and the pioneers as they were so manfully delving; but the enemy was not idle.

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<sup>1</sup> „The Count Maurice, with divers of the States, was here,” says Capt. James, in the letter above cited.

There is a doubt as to Olden-Barneveld's presence. My authority, in stating the fact, rested on a contemporaneous MS., but the note has unluckily been lost. The common biographers of the great advocate, and the contemporary historians, are silent as to the fact, if it be one. It is certain, however, that many members of the States-General came up in Hohenlo's fleet, and it was not likely that Barneveld would stay behind. His presence is distinctly stated by some one, but the reader is at liberty to be incredulous if he choose.

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<sup>1</sup> Parma to Philip II., 6 June, 1585, Arch. de Sim. MS.



From Fort Saint James, next beyond Saint George, Camillo del Monte led a strong party to the rescue. There was a tremendous action, foot to foot, breast to breast, with pike and pistol, sword and dagger. Never since the beginning of the war had there been harder fighting than now upon that narrow isthmus. „Twas an affair of most brave obstinacy on both sides,” said Parma, who rarely used strong language. „Soldiers, citizens, and all—they were like mad bulldogs.”<sup>1</sup> Hollanders, Italians, Scotchmen, Spaniards, Englishmen, fell thick and fast. The contest was about the entrenchments before they were completed, and especially around the sappers and miners, in whose picks and shovels lay the whole fate of Antwerp. Many of the dyke-breakers were digging their own graves, and rolled, one after another, into the breach which they were so obstinately creating. Upon that slender thread of land the hopes of many thousands were hanging. To tear it asunder, to roll the ocean-waves up to Antwerp, and thus to snatch the great city triumphantly from the grasp of Philip—to accomplish this, the three thousand had come forth that May morning. To prevent it, to hold firmly the great treasure entrusted to them, was the determination of the Spaniards. And so, closely pent and packed, discharging their carbines into each other’s faces, rolling, coiled together, down the slimy sides of the dyke into the black waters, struggling to and fro, while the cannon from the rebel fleet and from the royal forts mingled their roar with the sharp crack of the musketry, Catholics and patriots contended for an hour, while still, through all the confusion and uproar, the miners dug and delved.

At last the patriots were victorious. They made good their entrenchments, drove the Spaniards, after much

slaughter, back to the fort of Saint George on the one side, and of the Palisade on the other, and cleared the whole space between the two points. The centre of the dyke was theirs; the great Kowenstyn, the only key by which the gates of Antwerp could be unlocked, was in the deliverers’ hands. They pursued their victory, and attacked the Palisade Fort. Gamboa its commandant, was severely wounded; many other officers dead or dying; the outworks were in the hands of the Hollanders; the slender piles on which the fortress rested in the water were rudely shaken; the victory was almost complete.

And now there was a tremendous cheer of triumph. The beavers had done their work, the barrier was bitten through and through, the salt water rushed like a river through the ruptured dyke. A few moments later, and a Zealand barge, freighted with provisions, floated triumphantly into the waters beyond, now no longer an inland sea. The deed was done—the victory achieved. Nothing more was necessary than to secure it, to tear the fatal barrier to fragments, to bury it, for its whole length, beneath the waves. Then, after the isthmus had been utterly submerged, when the Scheldt was rolled back into its ancient bed, when Parma’s famous bridge had become useless, when the maritime communication between Antwerp and Holland had been thoroughly established, the Spaniards would have nothing left for it but to drown like rats in their entrenchments or to abandon the siege in despair. All this was in the hands of the patriots. The Kowenstyn was theirs. The Spaniards were driven from the field, the batteries of their forts silenced. For a long period the rebels were unmolested, and felt themselves secure. 1

<sup>1</sup> Same to same, 26 May, 1585, MS.

1 Meteren, xii. 234. Bor, ii. 599, 600. Hoofd Vervolg, 97-99 seq. Bentivoglio, p. ii. 1. iii. 297 seq. Strada, ii. 354-367. Bau-

„We remained thus some three hours,” says Captain James, an English officer who fought in the action, and described it in rough, soldierly fashion to Walsingham the same day, „thinking all things to be secure.”<sup>1</sup> Yet, in the very supreme moment of victory, the leaders, both of the Hollanders and of the Antwerpers, proved themselves incompetent to their position. With deep regret it must be admitted, that not only the reckless Hohenho, but the all-accomplished Sainte Aldegonde, committed the gravest error. In the hour of danger both had comported themselves with perfect courage and conduct. In the instant of triumph they gave way to puerile exultation. With a celerity as censurable as it seems incredible, both these commanders sprang into the first barge which had thus floated across the dyke, in order that they might, in person, carry the news of the victory to Antwerp, and set all the bells ringing and the bonfires blazing. They took with them Ferrante Spinola, a mortally-wounded Italian officer of rank, as a trophy of their battle, and a boat-load of beef and flour as an earnest of the approaching relief.<sup>2</sup>

While the conquerors were thus gone to enjoy their triumph, the conquered, though perplexed and silenced, were not yet disposed to accept their defeat. They were even ignorant that they were conquered. They had been forced to abandon the field, and the patriots had entrenched themselves upon the dyke, but neither Fort Saint George nor the Palisade had been carried, although the latter was in imminent danger.

Old Count Peter Ernest Mansfeld—a grizzled veteran, who had passed his childhood, youth, manhood, and old age under fire—commanded at the land-end of the dyke, in the fortress of Stabroek, in which neighbourhood his whole division was stationed. Seeing how the day was going, he called a council of war. The patriots had gained a large section of the dyke. So much was certain. Could they succeed in utterly demolishing that bulwark in the course of the day? If so, how were they to be dislodged before their work was perfected? It was difficult to assault their position. Three thousand Hollanders, Antwerpers, Englishmen—„mad bulldogs all,” as Parma called them—showing their teeth very mischievously, with one hundred and sixty Zealand vessels throwing in their broadsides from both margins of the dyke, were a formidable company to face.

„Oh for one half-hour of Alexander in the field!” sighed one of the Spanish officers in council. But Alexander was more than four leagues away, and it was doubtful whether he even knew of the fatal occurrence. Yet how to send him a messenger. Who could reach him through that valley of death? Would it not be better to wait till nightfall? Under the cover of darkness something might be attempted, which in the daylight would be hopeless. There was much anxiety, and much difference of opinion had been expressed, when Camillo Capizucca, colonel of the Italian Legion, obtained a hearing. A man bold in words as in deeds, he vehemently denounced the pusillanimity which would wait either for Parma or for nightfall. „What difference will it make,” he asked, „whether we defer our action until either darkness or the General arrives? In each case we give the enemy time enough to destroy the dyke, and thoroughly to relieve the city. That done, what good can be accomplished by our arms?

*dartii*, 'Polemographia,' ii. 27-30. Le Petit, ii. 514. Capt. T. James to Walsingham, <sup>16</sup><sub>26</sub> May, 1585, S. P. Office MS. Gilpin to Walsingham, <sup>17</sup><sub>27</sub> May, 1585, S. P. Office MS.

Parma to Philip II., 26 May and 6 June, 1585, Archivo de Simancas MS.

<sup>1</sup> MS. letter before cited.

<sup>2</sup> Meteren, *Bor, Hoofd, Strada, ubi sup.*

Then our disheartened soldiers will either shrink from a fruitless combat or march to certain death." Having thus, very warmly but very sagaciously, defined the position in which all were placed, he proceeded to declare that he claimed neither for himself nor for his legion any superiority over the rest of the army. He knew not that the Italians were more to be relied upon than others in the time of danger, but this he did know, that no man in the world was so devoted as he was to the Prince of Parma. To show that devotion by waiting with folded arms behind a wall until the Prince should arrive to extricate his followers, was not in his constitution. He claimed the right to lead his Italians against the enemy at once—in the front rank, if others chose to follow; alone, if the rest preferred to wait till a better leader should arrive. 1

The words of the Italian colonel sent a thrill through all who heard him. Next in command under Capizucca was his camp-marshal, an officer who bore the illustrious name of Piccolomini—father of the Duke Ottavio, of whom so much was to be heard at a later day throughout the fell scenes of that portion of the eighty years' tragedy now enacting, which was to be called the Thirty Years' War of Germany. The camp-marshal warmly seconded the proposition of his colonel. Mansfeld, pleased with such enthusiasm among his officers, yielded to their wishes, which were, in truth, his own. Six companies of the Italian Legion were in his encampment, while the remainder were stationed, far away, upon the bridge, under command of his son, Count Charles. Early in the morning, before the passage across the dyke had been closed, the veteran condottiere, pricking his ears as he snuffed the

battle from afar, had contrived to send a message to his son.

"Charles, my boy," were his words, "to-day we must either beat them or burst." 1

Old Peter Ernest felt that the long-expected, long-deferred assault was to be made that morning in full force, and that it was necessary for the royalists, on both bridge and dyke, to hold their own. Piccolomini now drew up three hundred of his Italians, picked veterans all, and led them in marching order to Mansfeld. That general, at the same moment, received another small but unexpected reinforcement. A portion of the Spanish Legion, which had long been that of Pedro Pacchi, lay at the extreme verge of the Stabroek encampment, several miles away. Aroused by the distant cannonading, and suspecting what had occurred, Don Juan d'Aquila, the colonel in command, marched without a moment's delay to Mansfeld's head-quarters, at the head of all the force he could muster—about two hundred strong. With him came Cardona, Gonzales de Castro, Toralva, and other distinguished officers. As they arrived, Capizucca was just setting forth for the field. There arose a dispute for precedence between the Italians and the Spaniards. Capizucca had first demanded the privilege of leading what seemed a forlorn hope, and was unwilling to yield his claim to the new comer. On the other hand, the Spaniards were not disposed to follow where they felt entitled to lead. The quarrel was growing warm, when Aquila, seizing his Italian rival by the hand, protested that it was not a moment for friends to wrangle for precedence.

"Shoulder to shoulder," said he, "let us go into this business, and let our blows rather fall on our enemies"

1 Strada, ii. 357, 358 seq.

1 Charles, mon fils, il te faut viancre ou crever" Le Petit, ii. 514.



heads than upon each other's." This terminated the altercation. The Italians and Spaniards—in battle array as they were—all dropped on their knees, offered a brief prayer to the Holy Virgin, and then, in the best possible spirits, set forth along the dyke. Next to fort Stabroek—whence they issued—was the Palisade Fort, nearly a mile removed, which the patriots had nearly carried, and between which and St. George, another mile farther on, their whole force was established.<sup>1</sup>

The troops under Capizucca and Aquila soon reached the Palisade, and attacked the besiegers, while the garrison, cheered by the unexpected relief, made a vigorous sortie. There was a brief sharp contest, in which many were killed on both sides; but at last the patriots fell back upon their own entrenchments, and the fort was saved. Its name was instantly changed to Fort Victory, and the royalists then prepared to charge the fortified camp of the rebels, in the centre of which the dyke-cutting operations were still in progress. At the same moment, from the opposite end of the bulwark, a cry was heard along the whole line of the dyke. From Fort Holy Cross, at the Scheldt end, the welcome intelligence was suddenly communicated—as if by a magnetic impulse—that Alexander was in the field.<sup>2</sup>

It was true. Having been up half the night, as usual, keeping watch along his bridge, where he was ever expecting a fatal attack, he had retired for a few hours' rest in his camp at Beveren. Aroused at daybreak by the roar of the cannon, he had hastily thrown on his armour, mounted his horse, and, at the head of two hundred pikemen, set forth for the scene of action. Detained on the bridge by a detachment of the Antwerp fleet, which had been ordered to make a diversion

in that quarter, he had, after beating off their vessels with his boat-artillery, and charging Count Charles Mansfeld to heed well the brief injunction of old Peter Ernest, made all the haste he could to the Kowenstyn. Arriving at Fort Holy Cross, he learned from Mondragon how the day was going. Three thousand rebels, he learned, were established on the dyke, Fort Palisade was tottering, a fleet from both sides was cannonading the Spanish entrenchments, the salt water was flowing across the breach already made. His seven months' work, it seemed, had come to nought. The navigation was already open from the sea to Antwerp; the Kowenstyn was in the rebels' hands. But Alexander was not prone to premature despair. „I arrived,” said he to Philip in a letter written on the same evening, „at the very nick of time.”<sup>1</sup> A less hopeful person might have thought that he had arrived several hours too late. Having brought with him every man that could be spared from Beveren and from the bridge, he now ordered Camillo del Monte to transport some additional pieces of artillery from Holy Cross and from Saint James to Fort Saint George. At the same time a sharp cannonade was to be maintained upon the rebel fleet from all the forts.<sup>2</sup>

Mondragon, with a hundred musketeers and pikemen, was sent forward likewise as expeditiously as possible to Saint George. No one could be more alert. The battered veteran, hero of some of the most remarkable military adventures that history has ever recorded, <sup>3</sup> fought his way on foot, in the midst of the fray, like a young ensign who had his first laurels to win. And, in truth, the day was not one

<sup>1</sup> MS. letter before cited. „Llegue a la mayor conjuntura del mundo que fue quando se habia comenzado el fuego.

<sup>2</sup> Strada, *ubi sup.*

<sup>3</sup> See „Rise of the Dutch Republic,” vol. ii. chap. iii., and vol. iii. chap. iii.

<sup>1</sup> Strada, *ubi sup.*

<sup>2</sup> Ibid.

for cunning manoeuvres, directed, at a distance, by a skilful tactician. It was a brisk close contest, hand to hand and eye to eye—a Homeric encounter, in which the chieftains were to prove a right to command by their personal prowess. Alexander, descending suddenly—dramatically as it were—when the battle seemed lost—like a deity from the clouds—was to justify, by the strength of his arm, the enthusiasm which his name always awakened. Having, at a glance, taken in the whole situation, he made his brief arrangements, going from rank to rank, and disposing his troops in the most effective manner. He said but few words, but his voice had always a telling effect.

„The man who refuses, this day, to follow me,” he said, „has never had regard to his own honour, nor has God’s cause or the King’s ever been dear to his heart.” 1

His disheartened Spaniards and Italians—roused as by a magic trumpet—eagerly demanded to be led against the rebels. And now, from each end of the dyke the royalists were advancing toward the central position occupied by the patriots. While Capizucca and Aquila were occupied at Fort Victory, Parma was steadily cutting his way from Holy Cross to Saint George. On foot, armed with sword and shield, and in coat of mail, and marching at the head of his men along the dyke, surrounded by Bevilacqua, Bentivoglio, Manriquez, Sforza, and other officers of historic name and distinguished courage, now upon the summit of the causeway, now on its shelving banks, now breast high in the waters, through which lay the perilous path, contending at every inch with the scattered bands of the patriots, who slowly retired to their entrenched camp, and with the Antwerp and Zealand vessels, whose balls tore through the royalist ranks, the General at last

reached Saint George. On the preservation of that post depended the whole fortune of the day, for Parma had already received the welcome intelligence that the Palisade—now Fort Victory—had been regained. He instantly ordered an outer breastwork of wool-sacks and sand-bags to be thrown up in front of Saint George, and planted a battery to play point-blank at the enemy’s entrenchments. Here the final issue was to be made.

The patriots and Spaniards were thus all enclosed in the mile-long space between St. George and the Palisade. Upon that narrow strip of earth, scarce six paces in width, more than five thousand men met in mortal combat—a narrow arena for so many gladiators, hemmed in on both sides by the sea. The patriots had, with solemn ceremony, before starting upon their enterprise, vowed to destroy the dyke and relieve Antwerp, or to perish in the attempt. They were true to their vow. Not the ancient Batavians or Nervii had ever manifested more tenacity against the Roman legions than did their descendants against the far-famed Spanish infantry upon this fatal day. The fight on the Kowenstyn was to be long remembered in the military annals of Spain and Holland. Never, since the curtain first rose upon the great Netherland tragedy, had there been a fiercer encounter. 1 Flinching was impossible. There was scant room for the play of pike and dagger, and, close packed as were the combatants, the dead could hardly fall to the ground. It was a mile-long series of separate mortal duels, and the oozy dyke was soon slippery with blood.

From both sides, under Capizucca and Aquila on the one hand, and under Alexander on the other, the entrench-

1 Strada, ii. 360.

1 „Mihi tanto accuratius dicendum,” says Strada, „quanto raro alias in Belgio, audacior loco, aut fallacioris alternatione victoriæ, aut nobilioribus audientium exemplis, aut præsentiore caelitus ope, dimicatum est,” &c., ii. 349.

ments of the patriots were at last assaulted; and as the royalists fell thick and fast beneath the breastwork which they were storming, their comrades clambered upon their bodies, and attempted, from such vantage-ground, to effect an entrance. Three times the invaders were beaten back with heavy loss, and after each repulse the attack was renewed with fresh vigour, while within the entrenchments the pioneers still plied the pick and shovel, undismayed by the uproar around them.

A fourth assault, vigorously made, was cheerfully repelled by the Antwerp-ers and Hollanders clustering behind their breast-works, and looking steadily into their enemies' eyes. Captain Heraugiere—of whom more was to be heard one day—had led two hundred men into action, and now found himself at the head of only thirteen. 1 The loss had been as severe among many other patriot companies, as well as in the Spanish ranks, and again the pikemen of Spain and Italy faltered before the iron visages and cordial blows of the Hollanders.

This work had lasted a good hour and a half, when at last, on the fifth assault, a wild and mysterious apparition renewed the enthusiasm of the Spaniards. The figure of the dead commander of the old Spanish Legion, Don Pedro Pacchi, who had fallen a few months before at the siege of Den-dermonde, was seen charging in front of his regiment, clad in his well-known armour, and using the gestures which had been habitual with him in life. 2 No satisfactory explanation was ever made of this singular delusion, but it was general throughout the ranks, and in that superstitious age was as effective as truth. The wavering Spaniards rallied once more under the guidance of their phantom-leader, and again

charged the breast-work of the patriots. Toralva, mounting upon the back of one of his soldiers, was first to vault into the entrenchments. At the next instant he lay desperately wounded on the ground, but was close followed by Capizucca, sustained by a determined band. The entrenchment was carried, but the furious conflict still continued. At nearly the same moment, however, several of the patriot vessels were observed to cast off their moorings, and to be drifting away from the dyke. A large number of the rest had been disabled by the hot fire which by Alexander's judicious order had been directed upon the fleet. The ebbing tide left no choice to the commander of the others but to retreat or to remain and fall in to the enemy's hands, should he gain the day. Had they risked the dangerous alternative, it might have ensured the triumph of the whole enterprise, while their actual decision proved most disastrous in the end.

„We have conquered,” cried Alexander, stretching his arm towards the receding waters. „The sea deserts the impious heretics. Strike from them now their last hope, and cut off their retreat to the departing ships.” 1 The Spaniards were not slow to perceive their advantage, while the courage of the patriots at last began to ebb with the tide. The day was lost. In the hour of transitory triumph the leaders of the expedition had turned their backs on their followers, and now, after so much heroism had been exhibited, fortune too had averted her face. The grim resistance changed to desperate panic, and a mad chase began along the blood-stained dyke. Some were slain with spear and bullet, others were hunted into the sea, many were smothered in the ooze along the edge of the embankment. The fugitives, making their way to the retreating vessels, were pursued

1 Meteren, *ubi sup.*

2 Strada, ii. 364.

1 Strada, ii. 365.



by the Spaniards, who swam after them, with their swords in their teeth, and engaged them in mortal combat in the midst of the waves.

„And so we cut all their throats,” said Parma, „the rebels on every side remaining at our mercy, and I having no doubt that my soldiers would avenge the loss of their friends.”<sup>1</sup>

The English and the Scotch, under Balfour and Morgan, were the very last to abandon the position which they had held so manfully seven hours long. Honest Captain James, who fought to the last, and described the action the same night in the fewest possible words, was of opinion that the fleet had moved away only to obtain a better position. „They put off to have more room to play on the enemy,” said he; „but the Hollanders and Zeelanders, seeing the enemy come on so hotly and thinking our galleys would leave them, abandoned their string. The Scots, seeing them to retire, left their string. The enemy pursued very hotly; the Englishmen stood to repulse, and are put most to the sword. In this shameful retreat there were slain or drowned to the number of two thousand.”<sup>2</sup> The blunt Englishman was justly indignant that an enterprise so nearly successful had been ruined by the desertion of its chiefs. „We had cut the dyke in three places,” said he; „*but left it most shamefully for want of commandment.*”<sup>3</sup>

Poor Koppen Loppen—whose blunders on former occasions had caused so much disaster—was now fortunate enough to expiate them by a soldier's death. Admiral Haultain had, as we have seen, been drowned at the commencement of the action.<sup>4</sup> Justinus de

Nassau, at its close, was more successful in his retreat to the ships. He, too, sprang into the water when the overthrow was absolute; but, alighting in some shallows, was able to conceal himself among weeds and waterlilies till he had divested himself of his armour, when he made his escape by swimming to a boat, which conveyed him to Lillo. Roelke van Deest, an officer of some note, was so horribly wounded in the face, that he was obliged to wear a mask for the remainder of his life.<sup>1</sup>

Parma, overjoyed at his victory, embraced Capizueca before the whole army, with warm expressions of admiration for his conduct. Both the Italian colonel and his Spanish rival Aquila were earnestly recommended to Philip for reward and promotion. The wounded Toralva was carried to Alexander's own quarters, and placed in Alexander's own bed, where he remained till his recovery, and was then presented—a distinction which he much valued—with the armour which the Prince had worn on the day of the battle.<sup>2</sup> Parma himself, so soon as the action was concluded, went with his chief officers straight from the field to the little village-church of Stabroek, where he fell upon his knees and offered up fervent thanks for his victory. He next set about repairing the ruptured dyke, damaged in many places but not hopelessly ruined, and for this purpose the bodies of the rebels, among other materials, were cast by hundreds into the ditches which their own hands had dug.<sup>3</sup>

Thus ended the eight hours' fight on the Kowenstyn. „The feast lasted from seven to eight hours,” said Parma, „with the most brave obstinacy on both sides that has been seen for many a

1 „Y asi los degollaron a todos, quedando por una parte y otra a nuestra misericordia, y yo fiador que vengaron la perdida de los amigos.” Parma to Philip II., May 26, 1585, MS.

2 James to Walsingham, MS. before cited.

3 Ibid.

4 This appears from the letter of Captain

James. The other accounts describe the death of the Admiral as occurring in the general rout at the close of the battle.

1 Van Wyn op Wagenaar, viii. 40.

2 Strada, ii. 364.

3 Strada, ii. 367.

long day." 1 A thousand royalists were killed and twice as many patriots, and the issue of the conflict was most uncertain up to the very last.

"Our loss is greater than I wish it was," wrote Alexander to Philip. "It was a very close thing, and I have never been more anxious in my life as to the result for your Majesty's service. The whole fate of the battle was hanging all the time by a thread." 2 More than ever were reinforcements necessary, and it was only by a miracle that the victory had at last been gained with such slender resources. "Tis a large, long, laborious, expensive, and most perilous war," said Parma, when urging the claims of Capizucca and Aquila, "for we have to fight every minute; and there are no castles and other rewards, so that, if soldiers are not to have promotion, they will lose their spirit." 3 Thirty-two of the rebel vessels grounded, and fell into the hands of the Spaniards, who took from them many excellent pieces of artillery. The result was most conclusive and most disheartening for the patriots.

Meantime—as we have seen—Hohenlo and Sainte Aldegonde had reached Antwerp in breathless haste to announce their triumph. They had been met on the quay by groups of excited citizens, who eagerly questioned the two generals arriving thus covered with laurels from the field of battle, and drank with delight all the details of

the victory. The poor dying Spinola was exhibited in triumph, the boat-load of bread-stuffs received with satisfaction, and vast preparations were made to receive, on wharves and in storehouses, the plentiful supplies about to arrive. Beacons and bonfires were lighted, the bells from all the steeples rang their merriest peals, cannon thundered in triumph not only in Antwerp itself, but subsequently at Amsterdam and other more distant cities. In due time a magnificent banquet was spread in the town-house to greet the conquering Hohenlo. Immense gratification was expressed by those of the reformed religion; dire threats were uttered against the Catholics. Some were for hanging them all out of hand, others for throwing them into the Scheldt; the most moderate proposed packing them all out of town so soon as the siege should be raised—an event which could not now be delayed many days longer.

Hohenlo, placed on high at the head of the banquet-table, assumed the very god of war. Beside and near him sat the loveliest dames of Antwerp, rewarding his bravery with their brightest smiles. The Count drained huge goblets to their health, to the success of the patriots, and to the confusion of the royalists, while, as he still drank and feasted, the trumpet, kettle-drum, and cymbal, and merry peal of bell without, did honour to his triumph. So gay and gallant was the victor, that he announced another banquet on the following day, still further to celebrate the happy release of Antwerp, and invited the fair ladies around him again to grace the board. It is recorded that the gentlewoman next him responded with a sigh, that, if her presentiments were just, the morrow would scarcely be so joyful as the present day had been, and that she doubted whether the triumph were not premature. 1

1 „Y habiendo durado esta fiesta, obra de 7 o 8 hore, con la mas brava obstinacion de entrambas partes que se ha visto hartos dias ha." Parma to Philip II., MS. before cited.

2 „De los nuestros tambien han quedado mas de los que yo quisiera—ha sidopendencia tan reñida—que hartas veces ha puesto harto mas cuidado el ver termino en que estable el servicio de V. M. Todo esto ha estado colgado de un hilo." Parma to Philip II. MS. before cited.

3 „Guerra larga, trabajosa, costosa, y muy peligrosa, pues sempre se trata de pelear, y que no se hay castillos ni otros premios," &c. (Ibid.)

1 Mertens en Torps, v. 242.

Hardly had she spoken when sinister sounds were heard in the streets. The first few stragglers, survivors of the deadly fight, had arrived with the fatal news that all was lost, the dyke regained, the Spaniards victorious, the whole band of patriots cut to pieces. A few frightfully-wounded and dying sufferers were brought into the banqueting-hall. Hohenlo sprang from the feast—interrupted in so ghastly a manner—pursued by shouts and hisses. Howls of execration saluted him in the streets, and he was obliged to conceal himself for a time, to escape the fury of the populace. 1

On the other hand, Parma was, not unnaturally, overjoyed at the successful issue to the combat, and expressed himself on the subject in language of (for him) unusual exultation. „To-day, Sunday, 26th of June,” said he, in a letter to Philip, despatched by special courier on the very same night, „the Lord has been pleased to grant to your Majesty a great and most signal victory. In this conjuncture of so great importance it may be easily conceived that the best results that can be desired will be obtained if your Majesty is now ready to do what is needful. I congratulate your Majesty very many times on this occasion, and I desire to render infinite thanks to Divine Providence.” 2

He afterwards proceeded, in a rapid and hurried manner, to give his Majesty the outlines of the battle, mentioning, with great encomium, Capizucca and Aquila, Mondragon and Vasto, with many other officers, and recommending them for reward and promotion; praising, in short, heartily and earnestly, all who had contributed to the victory, except himself, to whose personal exertions it was chiefly due. „As for good old Mansfeld,” said he, „he bore himself like

the man he is, and he deserves that your Majesty should send him a particular mark of your royal approbation, writing to him yourself pleasantly in Spanish, which is that which will be most highly esteemed by him.” 1 Alexander hinted also that Philip would do well to bestow upon Mansfeld the countship of Biart, as a reward for his long years of faithful service. 2

This action on the Kowenstyn terminated the effective resistance of Antwerp. A few days before, the monster-vessel, in the construction of which so much time and money had been consumed, had at last been set afloat. She had been called the „War’s End,” and, so far as Antwerp was concerned, the fates that presided over her birth seemed to have been paltering in a double sense when the ominous name was conferred. She was larger than anything previously known in naval architecture; she had four masts and three helms. Her bulwarks were ten feet thick; her tops were musketproof. She had twenty guns of largest size, besides many other pieces of artillery of lesser calibre, the lower tier of which was almost at the water’s level. She was to carry one thousand men, and she was so supported on corks and barrels as to be sure to float under any circumstances. Thus she was a great swimming fortress which could not be

1 „El buen viejo del conde de Mansfeld anduvo como quien es, y merece que V.M. se le mande en particular agradecer, escribiendole en Español regaladamente que es lo que mas estimaria,” &c. (Ibid.)

2 Ibid. The account of this remarkable action has been mainly gathered from the manuscript letters of Parma to Philip, written from the scene itself of some Englishmen, also eye-witnesses, and from a careful comparison of contemporary historians. Vide Bor, ii. 599, 600. Meteren, xii. 224. Hoofd Vervolgh, 97-99 *seq.* Bentivoglio, p. ii. l. iii. 297 *seq.*, whose brother, the Marchese Hippolito Bentivoglio, distinguished himself in the action, and was promoted, in consequence, to a company of lancers by Parma. Strada, ii. 354-367. Baudartii, „Polemographia,” ii. 27-30. Le Petit, ii. 514. Wagenaar, viii. 80. Van Wyn op Wagenaar, viii. 39, 40. *et al.*

1 Mertens en Torps, v. 242. Compare Bor, Meteren, Hoofd. *et al.*, *ubi sup.*

2 „Doy a V. M. muy muchas vezes la enora buena y infinitas gracias a la Divina,” &c. MS. letter before cited.



sunk, and was impervious to shot. Unluckily, however, in spite of her four masts and three helms, she would neither sail nor steer, and she proved but a great, unmanageable and very ridiculous tub, fully justifying all the sarcasms that had been launched upon her during the period of her construction, which had been almost as long as the siege itself. 1

The Spaniards called her the Bugaboo—a monster to scare children withal. 2 The patriots christened her the Elephant, the Antwerp Folly, the Lost Penny, with many similar appellations. 3 A small army might have been maintained for a month, they said, on the money she had cost, or the whole city kept in bread for three months. At last, late in May, a few days before the battle of the Kowenstyn, she set forth from Antwerp, across the submerged land, upon her expedition to sweep all the Spanish forts out of existence, and to bring the war to its end. She came to her own end very briefly, for, after drifting helplessly about for an hour, she stuck fast in the sand in the neighbourhood of Oordam, while the crew and soldiers made their escape, and came back to the city to share in the ridicule which, from first to last, had attached itself to the monster-ship. 4

Two days after the Kowenstyn affair, Alexander sent an expedition under Count Charles Mansfeld to take possession of the great Bugaboo. The boat in which were Count Charles, Count Aremberg, his brother de Barbançon, and other noble volunteers, met with an accident: a keg of gunpowder accidentally exploding, blowing Aremberg into the water, whence he escaped unharmed by swimming, and frightfully damaging Mansfeld in

the face. 1 This indirect mischief—the only injury ever inflicted by the „War's End” upon the enemy—did not prevent the rest of the party in the boats from taking possession of the ship, and bringing her in triumph to the Prince of Parma. After being thoroughly examined and heartily laughed at by the Spaniards, she was broken up—her cannon, munitions, and other valuable materials, being taken from her—and then there was an end of the „War's End.” 2

This useless expenditure—against the judgment and entreaties of many leading personages—was but a type of the difficulties with which Sainte Aldegonde had been obliged to contend from the first day of the siege to the last. Every one in the city had felt himself called on to express an opinion as to the proper measures for defence. Diversity of humours, popular licence, anarchy, did not constitute the best government for a city beleaguered by Alexander Farnese. We have seen the deadly injury inflicted upon the cause at the outset by the brutality of the butchers, and the manful struggle which Sainte Aldegonde had maintained against their cupidity and that of their friends. He had dealt with the thousand difficulties which rose up around him from day to day, but his best intentions were perpetually misconstrued, his most strenuous exertions steadily foiled. It was a city where there was much love of money, and where commerce—always timed by nature, particularly when controlled by alien residents—was often the cause of almost abject cowardice.

From time to time there had been threatening demonstrations made against the burgomaster, who, by protracting the resistance of Antwerp, was bringing about the absolute destruction of a world-wide trade, and the downfall of the most opulent capital in Christendom. There were also many popular

1 Strada, ii. 353. Le Petit, ii. 512. Baudartii, *„Polemog.”* ii. 30, with an admirable engraving. Meteren, Bor, Hoofd *et al.*, *ubi sup.*

2 „Caranjamaula.” Strada, *ubi sup.*

3 Baudartius. Le Petit, Strada, *ubi sup.*

4 Ibid.

1 Strada, ii. 368.

2 Ibid.

riots—very easily inflamed by the Catholic portion of the inhabitants—for bread. „Bread, bread, or peace!” was hoarsely shouted by ill-looking mischievous crowds, that dogged the steps and besieged the doors of Sainte Aldegonde; but the burgomaster had done his best by eloquence of tongue and personal courage, both against mobs and against the enemy, to inspire the mass of his fellow-citizens with his own generous spirit. He had relied for a long time on the negotiation with France, and it would be difficult to exaggerate the disastrous effects produced by the treachery of the Valois court. The historian Le Petit, a resident of Antwerp at the time of the siege, had been despatched on secret mission to Paris, and had communicated to the States’ deputies Sainte Aldegonde’s earnest adjurations that they should obtain, if possible, before it should be too late, an auxiliary force and a pecuniary subsidy. An immediate assistance, even if slight, might be sufficient to prevent Antwerp and its sister cities from falling into the hands of the enemy. On that messenger’s return, the burgomaster, much encouraged by his report, had made many eloquent speeches in the senate, and for a long time sustained the sinking spirits of the citizens. 1

The irritating termination to the triumph actually achieved against the bridge, and the tragical result to the great enterprise against the Kowenstyn, had now thoroughly broken the heart of Antwerp. For the last catastrophe Sainte Aldegonde himself was highly censurable, although the chief portion of the blame rested on the head of Hohenlo. Nevertheless the States of Holland were yet true to the cause of Union and of liberty. Notwithstanding their heavy expenditures, and their own loss of men, they urged warmly and earnestly the continuance of the

resistance, and promised, within at latest three months’ time, to raise an army of twelve thousand foot and seven thousand horse, with which they pledged themselves to relieve the city, or to perish in the endeavour. 1 At the same time, the legation, which had been sent to England to offer the sovereignty to Queen Elizabeth, sent encouraging despatches to Antwerp, assuring the authorities that arrangements for an auxiliary force had been effected; while Elizabeth herself wrote earnestly upon the subject with her own hand. 2

„I am informed,” said that Princess, „that through the closing of the Scheldt you are likely to enter into a treaty with the Prince of Parma, the issue of which is very much to be doubted, so far as the maintenance of your privileges is concerned. Remembering the warm friendship which has ever existed between this crown and the house of Burgundy, in the realms of which you are an important member, and considering that my subjects engaged in commerce have always met with more privilege and comity in the Netherlands than in any other country, I have resolved to send you at once assistance, comfort, and aid. The details of the plan will be stated by your envoys; but be assured that by me you will never be forsaken or neglected.” 3

The negotiations with Queen Elizabeth—most important for the Netherlands, for England, and for the destinies of Europe—which succeeded the futile diplomatic transactions with France, will be laid before the reader in a subsequent chapter. It is proper that they should be massed by themselves, so that the eye can comprehend at a single glance their whole progress and aspect, as revealed both by public and official, and by secret and hitherto unpublished

1 Meteren, xii. 225.

2 Bor, ii. 607-609.

3 See the letter in Bor, ii. 608.

records. Meantime, so far as regards Antwerp, those negotiations had been too deliberately conducted for the hasty and impatient temper of the citizens.

The spirit of the commercial metropolis, long flagging, seemed at last broken. Despair was taking possession of all hearts. The common people did nothing but complain, the magistrates did nothing but wrangle. In the broad council the debates and dissensions were discouraging and endless. Six of the eight militia-colonels were for holding out at all hazards, while a majority of the eighty captains were for capitulation. The populace was tumultuous and threatening, demanding peace and bread at any price. Holland sent promises in abundance, and Holland was sincere; but there had been much disappointment, and there was now infinite bitterness. It seemed obvious that a crisis was fast approaching, and—unless immediate aid should come from Holland or from England—that a surrender was inevitable. 1 La Noue, after five years' imprisonment, had at last been exchanged against Count Philip Egmont. That noble, chief of an ancient house, cousin of the Queen of France, was mortified at being ransomed against a simple Huguenot gentleman—even though that gentleman was the illustrious „iron-armed” La Noue—but he preferred to sacrifice his dignity for the sake of his liberty. He was still more annoyed that one hundred thousand crowns as security were exacted from La Noue—for which the King of Navarre became bondsman—that he would never again bear arms in the Netherlands except in obedience to the French monarch, while no such pledges were required of himself. La Noue visited the Prince of Parma at Antwerp, to take leave, and was received with the courtesy due to his high character and great distinction. Alexander took pleasure in showing him

all his fortifications, and explaining to him the whole system of the siege, and La Noue was filled with honest amazement. He declared afterwards that the works were superb and impregnable, and that, if he had been on the outside at the head of twelve thousand troops, he should have felt obliged to renounce the idea of relieving the city. 1 Antwerp cannot escape you,” confessed the veteran Huguenot, „but must soon fall into your hands. And when you enter, I would counsel you to hang up your sword at its gate, and let its capture be the crowning trophy in your list of victories.”

„You are right,” answered Parma, „and many of my friends have given me the same advice; but how am I to retire, engaged as I am for life in the service of my King?” 2

Such was the opinion of La Noue, a man whose love for the reformed religion and for civil liberty can be as little doubted as his competency to form an opinion upon great military subjects. As little could he be suspected—just coming as he did from an infamous prison, whence he had been at one time invited by Philip II. to emerge, on condition of allowing his eyes to be put out 3—of any partiality for that monarch or his representative.

Moreover, although the States of Holland and the English government were earnestly desirous of relieving the city, and were encouraging the patriots with well-founded promises, the Zeeland authorities were lukewarm. The officers of the Zeeland navy, from which so much was expected, were at last discouraged. They drew up, signed, and delivered to Admiral Justinus de Nassau, a formal opinion to the effect that the Scheld

1 Groen v. Prinsterer, „Archives,” &c. i-77-80.

2 Le Petit, ii. 518.

3 Amirault, „Vie de la Noue,” 280. 281-298; „Rise of the Dutch Republic,” iii. p. 451, 452.



had now so many dry and dangerous places, and that the tranquil summer-nights—so different from those long, stormy ones of winter—were so short, as to allow of no attempt by water likely to be successful to relieve the city. <sup>1</sup>

Here certainly was much to discourage, and Sainte Aldegonde was at length discouraged. He felt that the last hope of saving Antwerp was gone, and with it all possibility of maintaining the existence of a united Netherland commonwealth. The Walloon Provinces were lost already; Ghent, Brussels, Mechlin, had also capitulated, and, with the fall of Antwerp, Flanders and Brabant must fall. There would be nor barrier left even to save Holland itself. Despair entered the heart of the burgomaster, and he listened too soon to its treacherous voice. Yet while he thought a free national state no longer a possibility, he imagined it practicable to secure religious liberty by negotiation with Philip II. He abandoned with a sigh one of the two great objects for which he had struggled side by side with Orange for twenty years, but he thought it possible to secure the other. His purpose was now to obtain a favourable capitulation for Antwerp, and at the same time to bring about the submission of Holland, Zeeland, and the other United Provinces, to the King of Spain. Here certainly was a great change of face on the part of one so conspicuous, and hitherto so consistent, in the ranks of Netherland patriots, and it is therefore necessary, in order thoroughly to estimate both the man and the crisis, to follow carefully his steps through the secret path of negotiation into which he now entered, and in which the Antwerp drama was to find its conclusion. In these transactions the chief actors are, on the one side, the Prince of Parma, as representative of absolutism and the

Papacy; on the other, Sainte Aldegonde, who had passed his life as the champion of the Reformation.

No doubt the pressure upon the burgomaster was very great. Tumults were of daily occurrence. Crowds of rioters beset his door with cries of denunciations and demands for bread. A large and turbulent mob upon one occasion took possession of the horse-market, and treated him with personal indignity and violence, when he undertook to disperse them. <sup>1</sup> On the other hand, Parma had been holding out hopes of pardon with more reasonable conditions than could well be expected, and had, with a good deal of art, taken advantage of several trivial circumstances to inspire the burghers with confidence in his good-will. Thus, an infirm old lady in the city happened to imagine herself so dependent upon asses' milk as to have sent her purveyor out of the city, at the peril of his life, to procure a supply from the neighbourhood. The young man was captured, brought to Alexander, from whose hands he very naturally expected the punishment of a spy. The prince, however, presented him, not only with his liberty, but with a she-ass, and loaded the animal with partridges and capons, as a present for the invalid. The magistrates, hearing of the incident, and not choosing to be outdone in courtesy, sent back a waggon-load of old wine and remarkable confectionery as an offering to Alexander, and with this interchange of dainties led the way to the amenities of diplomacy. <sup>2</sup>

Sainte Aldegonde's position had become a painful one. The net had been drawn closely about the city. The bridge seemed impregnable, the great Kowenstyn was irrecoverably in the hands of the enemy, and now all the lesser forts in the immediate vicinity of Antwerp—Borghat, Hoboken, Cantecroix, Stralen,

<sup>1</sup> Meteren, xii. 225<sup>vo</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> Bor, ii. 605, 606. Hoofd Vervolgh, 108.  
<sup>2</sup> Strada, ii. 372.

Berghen, and the rest—had likewise fallen into his grasp. An account of grain, taken on the 1st of June, gave an average of a pound a-head for a month long, or half a pound for two months.<sup>1</sup> This was not the famine-point, according to the standard which had once been established in Leyden; but the courage of the burghers had been rapidly oozing away, under the pressure of their recent disappointments. It seemed obvious to the burgomaster that the time for yielding had arrived.

„I had maintained the city,”<sup>2</sup> he said, „for a long period, without any excessive tumult or great effusion of blood—a city where there was such a multitude of inhabitants, mostly merchants or artisans deprived of all their traffic, stripped of their manufactures, destitute of all commodities and means of living. I had done this in the midst of a great diversity of humours and opinions, a vast popular licence, a confused anarchy, among a great number of commanders, most of them inexperienced in war; with very little authority of my own, with slender forces of ships, soldiers, and sailors; with slight appearance of support from king or prince without, or of military garrison within; and under all these circumstances I exerted myself to do my uttermost duty in preserving the city, both in regard to its internal government, and by force of arms by land and sea, without sparing myself in any labour or peril.

„I know very well that there are many persons, who, finding themselves quite at their ease, and far away from the hard blows that are passing, are pleased to exhibit their wisdom by sitting in

judgment upon others, founding their decision only upon the results. But I demand to be judged by equity and reason, when passion has been set aside. I claim that my honour shall be protected against my calumniators; for all should remember that I am not the first man, nor shall I be the last, that has been blamed unjustly. All persons employed in public affairs are subject to such hazards, but I submit myself to Him who knows all hearts, and who governs all. I take Him to witness that in the affair of Antwerp, as in all my other actions since my earliest youth, I have most sincerely sought His glory and the welfare of His poor people, without regard to my own private interests.”<sup>1</sup>

For it is not alone the fate of Antwerp that is here to be recorded. The fame of Sainte Aldegonde was now seriously compromised. The character of a great man must always be closely scanned and scrutinised, protected, if needful, against calumny, but always unflinchingly held up to the light. Names illustrious by genius and virtue are History's most precious treasures, faithfully to be guarded by her, jealously to be watched; but it is always a misfortune when her eyes are deceived by a glitter which is not genuine.

Sainte Aldegonde was a man of unquestionable genius. His character had ever been beyond the reproach of self-seeking or ignoble ambition. He had multiplied himself into a thousand forms to serve the cause of the United Netherlands, and the services so rendered had been brilliant and frequent. A great change in his conduct and policy was now approaching, and it is therefore the more necessary to examine closely at this epoch his attitude and his character.

Early in June, Richardot, president of the council of Artois, addressed a letter to Sainte Aldegonde, by command of Alexander of Parma, suggesting a

<sup>1</sup> Meteren, xii. 224 seq.

<sup>2</sup> Marnix de Ste. Aldegonde, 'Commentaire sur les Affaires d'Anvers,' 1585. Vide 'Notices Historiques et Bibliographiques sur Philippe de Marnix,' par Albert La Croix et François van Meenen, Bruxelles, 1858. 'Oeuvres de Philippe de Marnix, précédées d'une Introduction par Edgar Quinet.

<sup>1</sup> Works just cited.

secret interview between the burgomaster and the Prince.

On the 8th of June Sainte Aldegonde replied, in favourable terms as to the interview; but observed, that, as he was an official personage, it was necessary for him to communicate the project to the magistracy of the city. He expressed likewise the hope that Parma would embrace the present opportunity for making a general treaty with all the Provinces. A special accord with Antwerp, leaving out Holland and Zeeland, would, he said, lead to the utter desolation of that city, and to the destruction of its commerce and manufactures, while the occasion now presented itself to the Prince of „winning praise and immortal glory by bringing back all the country to a voluntary and prompt obedience to his Majesty.” He proposed, that, instead of his coming alone, there should be a number of deputies sent from Antwerp to confer with Alexander. 1

On the 11th June Richardot replied by expressing his own regrets and those of the Prince that the interview could not have been with the burgomaster alone, but acknowledging the weight of his reasons, and acquiescing in the proposition to send a larger deputation. Three days afterwards, Sainte Aldegonde, on private consultation with some confidential personages, changed his ground; announced his preference for a private interview, under four eyes, with Parma; and requested that a passport might be sent. The passport was accordingly forwarded the same day, with an expression of Alexander’s gratification, and with the offer, on the part of Richardot, to come himself to Antwerp as hostage during the absence of the burgomaster in Parma’s camp at Beveren. 2

Sainte Aldegonde was accordingly about to start on the following day (16th

of June), but meantime the affair had 16th June, got wind. A secret interview, 1585. thus projected, was regarded by the citizens as extremely suspicious. There was much bitter insinuation against the burgomaster—many violent demonstrations. „Aldegonde, they say, is going to see Parma,” said one of the burghers, which gives much dissatisfaction, because ’tis feared that he will make a treaty according to the appetite and pleasure of his Highness, having been gained over to the royal cause by money. He says that it would be a misfortune to send a large number of burghers. Last Sunday (16th June) there was a meeting of the broad council. The preachers came into the assembly, and so animated the citizens by demonstrations of their religion, that all rushed from the council-house, crying with loud voices that they did not desire peace but war.” 1

This desire was a healthy and a reasonable one; but, unfortunately, the Antwerpens had not always been so vigorous or so united in their resistance to Parma. At present, however, they were very furious, so soon as the secret purpose of Sainte Aldegonde became generally known. The proposed capitulation, which great mobs had been for weeks long savagely demanding at the hands of the burgomaster, was now ascribed to the burgomaster’s unblushing corruption. He had obviously, they thought, been purchased by Spanish ducats to do what he had hitherto been

1 „Correspondance de Richardot avec Marnix de Ste. Aldegonde.” Archivo de Simancas MS.

2 Richardot to Marnix, 11 June 1585, MS.

1 „Aldegonde dit qu’il veult aller, ce que plusieurs des bourgeois ne veulent, à cause qu’ils craignent qu’il feroit l’accord selon l’appetit et volonté de son Alteze, estant gagné par force d’argent. Disant estre malheur qu’il y aillent douze bourgeois.—Les predicans ont entré au conseil le dimanche passé, et ont tellement animés les bourgeois par démonstrances de leur religion, que les bourgeois sortant du conseil, crioient à haute voix qu’ils ne desireroient paix mais bien guerre. MS. letter, without date or signature, in the Archives Royales de Belgique 1585.



so steadily refusing. A certain Van Werne had gone from Antwerp into Holland a few days before upon his own private affairs, with a safe-conduct from Parma. Sainte Aldegonde had not communicated to him the project then on foot, but he had permitted him to seek a secret interview with Count Mansfeld. If that were granted, Van Werne was to hint that in case the Provinces could promise themselves a religious peace, it would be possible, in the opinion of Sainte Aldegonde, to induce Holland and Zealand, and all the rest of the United Provinces, to return to their obedience. Van Werne, on his return to Antwerp, divulged these secret negotiations, and so put a stop to Sainte Aldegonde's scheme of going alone to Parma. „This has given a bad suspicion to the people,” wrote the burgomaster to Richardot, „so much so that I fear to have trouble. The broad council has been in session, but I don't know what has taken place there, and I do not dare to ask.” 1

Sainte Aldegonde's motive, as avowed by himself, for seeking a private interview, was because he had received no answer to the main point in his first letter, as to the proposition for a general accord. In order therefore to make the deliberations more rapid, he had been disposed to discuss that preliminary question in secret. „But now,” said he to Richardot, „as the affair has been too much divulged, as well by diverse reports and writings sown about, very inopportunately, as by the arrival of M. Van Werne, I have not found it practicable to set out upon my road, without communication with the members of the government. This has been done, however, not in the way of consultation, but as the announcement of a thing already resolved upon.” 2

He proceeded to state that great difficulties had arisen, exactly as he had foreseen. The magistrates would not hear of a general accord, and it was therefore necessary that a delay should be interposed before it would be possible for him to come. He begged Richardot to persuade Alexander that he was not trifling with him. „It is not,” said he, „from lightness, or any other passion, that I am retarding this affair. I will do all in my power obtain leave to make a journey to the camp of his Highness, at whatever price it may cost, and I hope before long to arrive at my object. If I fail, it must be ascribed to the humours of the people; for my anxiety to restore all the Provinces to obedience to his Majesty is extreme.” 1

Richardot, in reply, the next day, expressed regret, without astonishment, on the part of Alexander and himself, 17th June at the intelligence thus received. 1585. People had such difference of humour, he said, and all men were not equally capable of reason. Nevertheless the citizens were warned not to misconstrue Parma's gentleness, because he was determined to die, with his whole army, rather than not take Antwerp. „As for the King,” said Richardot, „he will lay down all his crowns sooner than abandon this enterprise.” 2 Van Werne was represented as free from blame, and sincerely desirous of peace. Richardot had only stated to him, in general terms, that letters had been received from Sainte Aldegonde, expressing an opinion in favour of peace. As for the royalists, they were quite innocent of the reports and writings that

semés mal à propos, comme par la venue de Sr Van Werne, je n'ay trouvé faisable de me mettre en chemin, sans le communiquer aux membres, non pas toutefois en forme de deliberation, mais comme une chose que nous avions resolue.” Marnix to Richardot, MS., *ubi sup.*

1 Ibid.

1 Marnix to Richardot, 16 June, 1585. Arch. de Sim. MS. „De ce que s'y est passé, je l'ignore, sans l'oser demander.” &c.

2 „Mais comme l'affaire a este par trop divulguee, tant par divers rapports et ecrits

2 Richardot to Marnix, 17 June, 1585, MS. „Mettre toutes ses couronnes plutot qu'abandonner cette entreprise.” &c.

had so inopportunately been circulated in the city. It was desirable, however, that the negociation should not too long be deferred, for otherwise Antwerp might perish before a general accord with Holland and Zeeland could be made. He begged Sainte Aldegonde to banish all anxiety as to Parma's sentiments towards himself or the community. „Put yourself, Sir, quite at your ease,” said he. „His Highness is in no respects dissatisfied with you, nor prone to conceive any indignation against this poor people.”<sup>1</sup> He assured the burgomaster that he was not suspected of lightness, nor of a wish to delay matters, but he expressed solicitude with regard to the threatening demonstrations which had been made against him in Antwerp. „For,” said he, „popular governments are full of a thousand hazards, and it would be infinitely painful to me if you should come to harm.”<sup>2</sup>

Thus it would appear that it was Sainte Aldegonde who was chiefly anxious to effect the reconciliation of Holland and Zeeland with the King. The initiative of this project to include all the United Provinces in one scheme with the reduction of Antwerp came originally from him, and was opposed, at the outset, by the magistrates of that city, by the Prince of Parma and his councillors, and by the States of Holland and Zeeland. The demonstrations on the part of the preachers, the municipal authorities, and the burghers, against Sainte Aldegonde and his plan for a secret interview, so soon as it was divulged, made it impossible to carry that project into effect.

„Aldegonde, who governs Antwerp,” wrote Parma to Philip, „was endeavour-

ing, eight days ago, to bring about some kind of negociation for an accord. He manifested a desire to come hither for the sake of a personal interview with me, which I permitted. It was to have taken place last Sunday, 16th of this month, but by reason of a certain popular tumult, which arose out of these circumstances, it has been necessary to defer the meeting.”<sup>1</sup>

There was much disappointment felt by the royalists at this unsatisfactory result. „These bravadoes and impertinent demonstrations on the part of some of your people,” wrote Richardot, ten days later, „will be the destruction of the whole country, and will convert the Prince's gentleness into anger. 'Tis these good and zealous patriots, trusting to a little favourable breeze that blew for a few days past, who have been the cause of all this disturbance, and who are ruining their miserable country—miserable, I say, for having produced such abortions as themselves.”<sup>2</sup>

Notwithstanding what had passed, however, Richardot intimated that Alexander was still ready to negotiate. „And if you, Sir,” he concluded, in his letter to Aldegonde, „concerning whom many of our friends have at present a sinister opinion,—as if your object were to circumvent us,—are willing to proceed roundly and frankly, as I myself firmly believe that you will do, we may yet hope for a favourable issue.”<sup>3</sup>

Thus the burgomaster was already the object of suspicion to both parties. The

<sup>1</sup> „Bref, Monsieur. mettez vous a repos. Car son Altesse n'est en rien mal satisfaite de vous, ni facile a concevoir quelque indignation contre ce pauvre peuple.” MS. *ubi sup.*

<sup>2</sup> „Car les gouvernemens populaires sont plains de mil hazards, et il me desplairait infiniment que vous eussiez mal.” (Ibid.)

<sup>1</sup> „De ocho dias ha procurado Aldegonde, qui gobierna Anveres, travar alguna platica de acuerdo con aquella villa, mostrando deseo de querer venir el mismo a verse conmigo, loquel le permití, Havia de haverlo hecho este ultimo domingo 16 del presente, pero con la excusa de cierto tumulto popular, que sobre el caso havia sucedido la ha tenido par differirlo.” Parma to Philip II., 20 June, 1585. Arch. de Sim. MS.

<sup>2</sup> Richardot to Marnix, 30 June, 1585. „Ce sont ces bons et zeux patriotes qui ruynent leur miserable patrie, miserable, dis je, d'avoir produit tels avortons.” Arch. de Sim. MS.

<sup>3</sup> Richardot to Marnix, 30 June, 1585.

Antwerpers denounced him as having been purchased by Spanish gold; the royalists accused him of intending to overreach the King. It was not probable therefore that all were correct in their conjectures.

At last it was arranged that deputies should be appointed by the broad council to commence a negotiation with Parma. 5th July, 1585. Sainte Aldegonde informed Richardot that he would accompany them, if his affairs should permit. He protested his sincerity and frankness throughout the whole affair. „They try to calumniate me,” he said, „as much on one side as on the other, but I will overcome by my innocence all the malice of my slanderers. If his Highness should be pleased to grant us some liberty for our religion, I dare to promise such faithful service as will give very great satisfaction.” 1

Four days later, Sainte Aldegonde himself, together with M. de Duffel, M. de Schoonhoven, and Adrian Hessel, came to Parma's camp at Beveren, as deputies on the part of the Antwerp authorities. They were courteously received by the Prince, and remained three days as his guests. During the period of this visit the terms of a capitulation were thoroughly discussed, between Alexander and his councillors upon one part, and the four deputies on the other. The envoys endeavoured, with all the arguments at their command, to obtain the consent of the Prince to three preliminary points which they laid down as indispensable. Religious liberty must be granted, the citadel must not be reconstructed, a foreign garrison must not be admitted, they said. As it was the firm intention of the King, however, not to make the slightest concession on any one of these points, the discussion was not a very profitable one. Besides the public in-

terviews at which all the negotiators were present, there was a private conference between Parma and Sainte Aldegonde which lasted more than four hours, in which each did his best to enforce his opinions upon the other. The burgomaster endeavoured to persuade the Prince, with all the eloquence for which he was so renowned, that the hearts not of the Antwerpers only, but of the Hollanders and Zeelanders, were easily to be won at that moment. Give them religious liberty, and attempt to govern them by gentleness rather than by Spanish garrisons, and the road was plain to a complete reconciliation of all the Provinces with his Majesty.

Alexander, who knew his master to be inexorable upon these three points, was courteous but peremptory in his statements. He recommended that the rebels should take into consideration their own declining strength, the inexhaustible resources of the King, the impossibility of obtaining succour from France, and the perplexing dilatoriness of England, rather than waste their time in idle expectations of a change in the Spanish policy. He also intimated, obliquely but very plainly, to Sainte Aldegonde, that his own fortune would be made, and that he had everything to hope from his Majesty's bounty, if he were now willing to make himself useful in carrying into effect the royal plans. 1

The Prince urged these views with so much eloquence, that he seemed, in his own words, to have been directly inspired by the Lord for this special occasion. 2 Sainte Aldegonde, too, was signally impressed by Alexander's language, and thoroughly fascinated—magnetized, as it were—by his character. He subsequently declared that he had often conversed familiarly with many

1 Marnix to Richardot, 5 July, 1585. Arch. de Sim. MS.

1 Strada, ii. 379. Comp. Bor, ii. 606. Hoofd Vervolgh, 109.

2 Strada, *ubi sup.*



eloquent personages, but that he had never known a man more powerful or persuasive than the Prince of Parma. 1 He could honestly say of him—as Hasdrubal had said of Scipio—that Farnese was even more admirable when seen face to face, than he had seemed when one only heard of his glorious achievements. 2

„The burgomaster and three deputies,” wrote Parma to Philip, „were here until the 12th July. We discussed the 30th July, points and form of a capitulation, and they have gone back thoroughly satisfied. Sainte Aldegonde especially was much pleased with the long interview which he had with me, alone, and which lasted more than three hours. I told him, as well as my weakness and suffering from the tertian fever permitted, all that God inspired me to say on our behalf.” 3

Nevertheless, if Sainte Aldegonde and his colleagues went away thoroughly satisfied, they had reason, soon after their return, to become thoroughly dejected. The magistrates and burghers would not listen to a proposition to abandon the three points, however strongly urged to do so by arguments drawn from the necessity of the situation, and by representations of Parma's benignity. As for the burgomaster, he became the target for calumny, so soon as his three hours' private interview became known; and the citizens loudly declared that his head ought to be cut off, and sent in a bag, as a present, to Philip, in order that the traitor might meet the sovereign with whom he sought a reconciliation, face to face, as soon as possible. 4

1 Strada, *ubi sup.* 2 Ibid.

3 „Se dieron los puntos y forma del acuerdo, con que tomaron a yr muy satisfechos, y el Aldegde en particular de la large platica que a solas con el mas de 3 horas tave, diziendole lo que Dios me inspiro a nro proposito, y mejor me permitió la flaqueza y travajo de la terciaria.” Parma to Philip II., 30 July, 1585, Arch. de Sim. MS.

4 Bor, ii. 606. Hoofd Vervolgh, 109.

The deputies, immediately after their return, made their report to the magistrates, as likewise to the colonels and 15th July, captains, and to the deans 1585. of guilds. Next day, although it was Sunday, there was a session of the broad council, and Sainte Aldegonde made a long address, in which—as he stated in a letter to Richardot—he related everything that had passed in his private conversation with Alexander. An answer was promised to Parma on the following Tuesday, but the burgomaster spoke very discouragingly as to the probability of an accord. 1

„The joy with which our return was greeted,” he said, „was followed by a general disappointment and sadness so soon as the result was known. The want of a religious toleration, as well as the refusal to concede on the other two points, has not a little altered the hearts of all, *even of the Catholics*. A citadel and a garrison are considered ruin and desolation to a great commercial city. I have done what I can to urge the acceptance of such conditions as the Prince is willing to give, and have spoken in general terms of his benign intentions. The citizens still desire peace. Had his Highness been willing to take both religions under his protection, he might have won all hearts, and very soon all the other Provinces would have returned to their obedience, while the clemency and magnanimity of his Majesty would thus have been rendered admirable throughout the world.” 2

The power to form an accurate conception as to the nature of Philip and of other personages with whom he was dealing, and as to the general signs of his times, seems to have been wanting in the character of the gifted Aldegonde. He had been dazzled by the personal presence of Parma, and he now spoke of Philip II. as if his tyranny over the

1 Marnix to Richardot, 15 July, 1585, MS.

2 Ibid.

Netherlands—which for twenty years had been one horrible and uniform whole—were the accidental result of circumstances, not the necessary expression of his individual character, and might be easily changed at will—as if Nero, at a moment's warning, might transform himself into Trajan. It is true that the innermost soul of the Spanish king could by no possibility be displayed to any contemporary, as it reveals itself, after three centuries, to those who study the record of his most secret thoughts; but, at any rate, it would seem that his career had been sufficiently consistent to manifest the amount of „clemency and magnanimity” which he might be expected to exercise.”

„Had his Majesty, wrote Sainte Aldegonde, been willing, since the year sixty-six, to pursue a course of tolera-

tion, the memory of his reign 15th July, 1585. would have been sacred to all posterity, with an immortal praise of sapience, benignity, and sovereign felicity.”<sup>1</sup>

This might be true, but nevertheless a tolerating Philip, in the year 1585, ought to have seemed to Sainte Aldegonde an impossible idea.

„The emperors,” continued the burgomaster, „who immediately succeeded Tiberius were the cause of the wisdom which displayed itself in the good Trajan—also a Spaniard—and in Antoninus, Verus, and the rest.”<sup>2</sup> If you think that this city, by the banishment of a certain number of persons, will be content to abandon the profession of the reformed faith, you are much mistaken. You will see, with time, that the exile of this religion will be accompanied by a depopulation and a sorrowful ruin and desolation of this flourishing city. But this will be as it pleases God. Mean-

time I shall not fail to make all possible exertions to induce the citizens to consent to a reconciliation with his Majesty. The broad council will soon give their answer, and then we shall send a deputation. We shall invite Holland and Zeeland to join with us, but there is little hope of their consent.”<sup>1</sup>

Certainly there was little hope of their consent. Sainte Aldegonde was now occupied in bringing about the capitulation of Antwerp, without any provision for religious liberty—a concession which Parma had most distinctly refused—and it was not probable that Holland and Zeeland, after twenty years of hard fighting, and with an immediate prospect of assistance from England, could now be induced to resign the great object of the contest without further struggle.

It was not until a month had elapsed that the authorities of Antwerp sent their propositions to the Prince of Par-

ma. On the 12th August, 1585. however, Sainte Aldegonde,

accompanied by the same three gentlemen who had been employed on the first mission, and by seventeen others besides, proceeded with safe-conduct to the camp at Beveren. Here they were received with great urbanity, and hospitably entertained by Alexander, who received their formal draft of articles for a capitulation, and referred it to be reported upon to Richardot, Pamel, and Vanden Burgh. Meantime there were many long speeches and several conferences—sometimes between all the twenty-one envoys and the Prince together; on other occasions, more secret ones, at which only Aldegonde and one or two of his colleagues were présent. It had been obvious, from the date of the first interview, in the preceding month, that the negociation would be of no avail until the government of Antwerp was prepared to abandon all the conditions which they had originally announced as

<sup>1</sup> Marnix to Richardot, just cited.

<sup>2</sup> „Les premiers empereurs apres Tybere rendirent sages et advisiez premierement le bon Trajan, aussi Espagnol, et puis Antonin, Verus,” &c. (Ibid.)

<sup>1</sup> Ibid.

indispensable. Alexander had not much disposition and no authority whatever to make concessions.

„So far as I can understand,” Parma had written on the 30th July, „they are very far from a conclusion. They have most exorbitant ideas, talking of some kind of liberty of conscience, besides refusing on any account to accept of garrisons, and having many reasons to allege on such subjects.”<sup>1</sup>

The discussions, therefore, after the deputies had at last arrived, though courteously conducted, could scarcely be satisfactory to both parties. „The articles were thoroughly deliberated upon,” wrote Alexander, „by all the deputies, nor did I fail to have private conferences with Aldegonde, that most skilful and practised lawyer and politician, 2 as well as with two or three of the others. I did all in my power to bring them to a thorough recognition of their errors, and to produce a confidence in his Majesty’s clemency, in order that they might concede what was needful for the interests of the Catholic religion and the security of the city. They heard all I had to say without exasperating themselves, and without interposing any strong objections, except in the matter of religion, and, still more, in the matter of the citadel and the garrison. Aldegonde took much pains to persuade me that it would be ruinous for a great, opulent, commercial city to submit to a foreign military force. Even if compelled by necessity to submit now, the inhabitants would soon be compelled by the same necessity to abandon the place entirely, and to leave in ruins one of the most splendid and powerful cities in the world, and in this opinion Catholics and heretics

unanimously concurred. The deputies protested, with one accord, that so pernicious and abominable a thing as a citadel and garrison could not even be proposed to their constituents. I answered, that, so long as the rebellion of Holland and Zeeland lasted, it would be necessary for your Majesty to make sure of Antwerp by one or the other of those means, but promised that the city should be relieved of the incumbrance so soon as those islands should be reduced.

„Sainte Aldegonde was not discouraged by this statement, but in the hope of convincing others, or with the wish of showing that he had tried his best, desired that I would hear him before the council of state. I granted the request, and Sainte Aldegonde then made another long and very elegant oration, intended to divert me from my resolution.”<sup>1</sup>

It must be confessed—if the reports, which have come down to us of that long and elegant oration be correct—that the enthusiasm of the burgomaster for Alexander was rapidly degenerating into idolatry.

„We are not here, O invincible Prince,” he said, „that we may excuse, by an anxious legation, the long defence which we have made of our homes. Who could have feared any danger to the most powerful city in the Netherlands from so moderate a besieging force? You would yourself have rather wished for, than approved of, a greater facility on our part, for the brave cannot love the timid. We knew the number of your troops, we had discovered the famine in your camp, we were aware of the paucity of your ships, we had heard of the quarrels in your army, we were expecting daily to hear of a general mutiny among your soldiers. Were we to believe that with ten or eleven thousand men you

1 „Hasta agora bien lejos de concluir, segun las exhorvitancias que presentan de querer alguna forma de libertad de conciencia, y en ninguna manera, guarnicion, ale-gando muchas cosas in su favor.” MS. letter, 30 July, 1585.

2 „Tan platica letrado y politico.” Parma to Philip II., 25 Aug. 1535, MS.

1 „Otra larga y muy elegante oracion directiva a desviar me de mi proposito,” &c. Parma to Philip II., MS. just cited.



would be able to block up the city by land and water, to reduce the open country of Brabant, to cut off all aid as well from the neighbouring towns as from the powerful provinces of Holland and Zeeland, to oppose, without a navy, the whole strength of our fleets, directed against the dyke? Truly, if you had been at the head of fifty thousand soldiers, and every soldier had possessed one hundred hands, it would have seemed impossible for you to meet so many emergencies, in so many places, and under so many distractions. What you have done we now believe possible to do, only because we see that it has been done. You have subjugated the Scheldt, and forced it to bear its bridge, notwithstanding the strength of its current, the fury of the ocean-tides, the tremendous power of the icebergs, the perpetual conflicts with our fleets. We destroyed your bridge, with great slaughter of your troops. Rendered more courageous by that slaughter, you restored that mighty work. We assaulted the great dyke, pierced it through and through, and opened a path for our ships. You drove us off when victors, repaired the ruined bulwark, and again closed to us the avenue of relief. What machine was there that we did not employ? what miracles of fire did we not invent? what fleets and floating citadels did we not put in motion? All that genius, audacity, and art could teach us we have executed, calling to our assistance water, earth, heaven, and hell itself. Yet with all these efforts, with all this enginry, we have not only failed to drive you from our walls, but we have seen you gaining victories over other cities at the same time. You have done a thing, O Prince, than which there is nothing greater either in ancient or modern story. It has often occurred, while a general was besieging one city, that he lost another situate farther off. But you, while besieging Antwerp, have reduced simultaneously Dender-

monde, Ghent, Nymegen, Brussels, and Mechlin." 1

All this, and much more, with florid rhetoric, the burgomaster pronounced in honour of Farnese, and the eulogy was entirely deserved. It was hardly becoming, however, for such lips, at such a moment, to sound the praise of him whose victory had just decided the downfall of religious liberty, and of the national independence of the Netherlands. His colleagues certainly must have winced as they listened to commendations so lavishly bestowed upon the representative of Philip, and it is not surprising that Sainte Aldegonde's growing unpopularity should, from that hour, have rapidly increased. To abandon the whole object of the siege, when resistance seemed hopeless, was perhaps pardonable, but to offer such lip-homage to the conqueror was surely transgressing the bounds of decorum.

His conclusion, too, might to Alexander seem as insolent as the whole tenor of his address had been humble; for, after pronouncing this solemn eulogy upon the conqueror, he calmly proposed that the prize of the contest should be transferred to the conquered.

„So long as liberty of religion, and immunity from citadel and garrison, can be relied upon," he said, „so long will Antwerp remain the most splendid and flourishing city in Christendom; but desolation will ensue if the contrary policy is to prevail." 2

1 The oration is reported by Strada, ii. 374-376, who had access to more of Farnese's papers than will probably ever be in the possession of any other writer. It is possible that the harangue is indebted for some of its declamatory exuberance to the imagination of the historian; but I have found the Jesuit, in general, very accurate in transcribing and translating the diplomatic documents relating to his hero. A circumstantial account of this particular interview between the Prince and Marnix, with a full report of this oration by the latter, is not among the Simancas MSS.; and I have therefore relied upon Strada.

2 Strada. ii. 374-376.

But it was very certain that liberty of religion, as well as immunity from citadel and garrison, were quite out of the question. Philip and Parma had long been inexorably resolved upon all three points.

„After the burgomaster had finished his oration,” wrote Alexander to his sovereign, „I discussed the matter with him in private, very distinctly and minutely.”<sup>1</sup>

The religious point was soon given up, Sainte Aldegonde finding it waste of breath to say anything more about freedom of conscience. A suggestion was however made on the subject of the garrison, which the Prince accepted, because it contained a condition which it would be easy to evade.

„Aldegonde proposed,” said Parma, „that a garrison might be admissible if I made my entrance into the city merely with infantry and cavalry of nations which were acceptable—Wal-loons, namely, and Germans—and in no greater numbers than sufficient for a body-guard. I accepted, because, in substance, this would amount to a garrison, and because, also, after the magistrates shall have been changed, I shall have no difficulty in making myself master of the people, continuing the garrison, and rebuilding the citadel.”<sup>2</sup>

The Prince proceeded to give his reasons why he was willing to accept the capitulation on what he considered so favourable terms to the besieged. Autumn was approaching. Already the fury of the storms had driven vessels clean over the dykes; the rebels in Holland and Zeeland were preparing their fleets—augmented by many new ships of war and fire-machines—for another desperate attack upon the Palisades, in which there was great possibility of their succeeding; an auxiliary force from England was soon expected; so that, in

view of all these circumstances, he had resolved to throw himself at his Majesty's feet and implore his clemency. „If this people of Antwerp, as the head, is gained,” said he, „there will be tranquillity in all the members.”<sup>1</sup>

These reasons were certainly conclusive; nor is it easy to believe that, under the circumstances thus succinctly stated by Alexander, it would have been impossible for the patriots to hold out until the promised succour from Holland and from England should arrive. In point of fact, the bridge could not have stood the winter which actually ensued; for it was the repeatedly expressed opinion of the Spanish officers in Antwerp that the icebergs which then filled the Scheldt must inevitably have shattered twenty bridges to fragments, had there been so many.<sup>2</sup> It certainly was superfluous for the Prince to make excuses to Philip for accepting the proposed capitulation. All the prizes of victory had been thoroughly secured, unless pillage, massacre, and rape, which had been the regular accompaniments of Alva's victories, were to be reckoned among the indispensable trophies of a Spanish triumph.

Nevertheless, the dearth in the city had been well concealed from the enemy; for, three days after the surrender, not a loaf of bread was to be had for any money in all Antwerp, and Alexander declared that he would never have granted such easy conditions had he been aware of the real condition of affairs.<sup>3</sup>

The articles of capitulation agreed upon between Parma and the deputies were brought before the broad council on the 9th August. There was much opposition to them, as many magistrates and other influential personages entertained san-

1 „Y pues de la que en usasse con este pueblo, como cabeza, ha de resultar bien y tranquilidad a los miembros que restan,” &c. (Ibid.)

2 Le Petit, ii. 502.

3 Meteren, xii. 225.

1 MS. letter of 25 Aug. 1585, before cited.

2 Ibid.

guine expectations from the English negotiation, and were beginning to rely with confidence upon the promises of Queen Elizabeth. The debate was waxing warm, when some of the councillors, looking out of window of the great hall, perceived that a violent mob had collected in the streets. 1 Furious cries for bread were thrust forward to indicate the famine which was prevailing, and the necessity of concluding the treaty without further delay. Thus the municipal government was perpetually exposed to democratic violence, excited by diametrically opposite influences. Sometimes the burgomaster was denounced for having sold himself and his country to the Spaniards, and was assailed with execrations for being willing to conclude a sudden and disgraceful peace. 2 At other moments he was accused of forging letters containing promises of succour from the Queen of England and from the authorities of Holland, in order to protract the lingering tortures of the war. 3 Upon this occasion the peace mob carried its point. The councillors looking out of window rushed into the hall with direful accounts of the popular ferocity; the magistrates and colonels who had been warmest in opposition suddenly changed their tone, and the whole body of the broad council accepted the articles of capitulation by a unanimous vote. 4

The window was instantly thrown open, and the decision publicly announced. The populace, wild with delight, rushed through the streets, tearing down the arms of the Duke of Anjou, which had remained above the public edifices since the period of that personage's temporary residence in the Netherlands, and substituting, with wonderful celebrity, the escutcheon of Philip the Second. 5 Thus suddenly could an Ant-

werp mob pass from democratic insolence to intense loyalty.

The articles, on the whole, were as liberal as could have been expected. The only hope for Antwerp and for a great commonwealth of all the Netherlands was in holding out, even to the last gasp, until England and Holland, now united, had time to relieve the city. This was, unquestionably, possible. Had Antwerp possessed the spirit of Leyden, had William of Orange been alive, that Spanish escutcheon, now raised with such indecent haste, might have never been seen again on the outside wall of any Netherland edifice. Belgium would have become at once a constituent portion of a great independent national realm, instead of languishing until our own century the dependency of a distant and a foreign metropolis. Nevertheless, as the Antwerpers were not disposed to make themselves martyrs, it was something that they escaped the nameless horrors which had often alighted upon cities subjected to an enraged soldiery. It redounds to the eternal honour of Alexander Farnese—when the fate of Naarden and Haarlem and Maastricht, in the days of Alva, and of Antwerp itself in the horrible „Spanish fury,” is remembered—that there were no scenes of violence and outrage in the populous and wealthy city which was at length at his mercy after having defied him so long.

Civil and religious liberty were trampled in the dust, commerce and manufactures were destroyed, the most valuable portion of the citizens sent into hopeless exile, but the remaining inhabitants were not butchered in cold blood.

The treaty was signed on the 17th August. Antwerp was to return to its obedience. There was to be an entire amnesty and oblivion for the past, without a single exception. Royalist absentees were to be reinstated in their possessions. Monasteries, churches, and the King's domains were to be restored to their former proprietors. The inhabitants,

1 Le Petit, ii. 518. 2 Bor, ii. 609.

3 Bentivoglio, p. ii. l. iii. 292.

4 Le Petit, *ubi sup.*

5 Ibid.



of the city were to practise nothing but the Catholic religion. Those who refused to conform were allowed to remain two years for the purpose of winding up their affairs and selling out their property, provided that during that period they lived „without scandal towards the ancient religion”—a very vague and unsatisfactory condition. All prisoners were to be released excepting Teligny. Four hundred thousand florins were to be paid by the authorities as a fine. The patriot garrison was to leave the city with arms and baggage and all the honours of war. 1

This capitulation gave more satisfaction to the hungry portion of the Antwerprians than to the patriot party of the Netherlands. Sainte Aldegonde was vehemently and unsparingly denounced as a venal traitor. It is certain, whatever his motives, that his attitude had completely changed. For it was not Antwerp alone that he had reconciled or was endeavouring to reconcile with the King of Spain, but Holland and Zeeland as well, and all the other independent Provinces. The ancient champion of the patriot party, the earliest signer of the „Compromise,” the bosom friend of William the Silent, the author of the „Wilhelmus” national song, now avowed his conviction, in a published defence of his conduct against the calumnious attacks upon it, „that it was impossible, with a clear conscience, for subjects, under any circumstances, to take up arms against Philip, their king.” 2 Certainly if he had always entertained that opinion he must have suffered many pangs of remorse during his twenty years of active and illustrious rebellion. He now made

himself secretly active in promoting the schemes of Parma and in counteracting the negotiation with England. He flattered himself, with an infatuation which it is difficult to comprehend, that it would be possible to obtain religious liberty for the revolting Provinces, although he had consented to its sacrifice in Antwerp. It is true that he had not the privilege of reading Philip’s secret letters to Parma, but what was there in the character of the King—what intimation had ever been given by the Governor-General—to induce a belief in even the possibility of such a concession?

Whatever Sainte Aldegonde’s opinions, it is certain that Philip had no intention of changing his own policy. He at first suspected the burgomaster of a wish to protract the negotiations for a perfidious purpose.

„Necessity had forced Antwerp,” he wrote on the 17th of August—the very day on which the capitulation was actually signed—”to enter into negotiation. I understand the artifice of Aldegonde in seeking to prolong and make difficult the whole affair, under pretext of treating for the reduction of Holland and Zeeland at the same time. It was therefore very adroit in you to defeat this joint scheme at once, and urge the Antwerp matter by itself, at the same time not shutting the door on the others. With the prudence and dexterity with which this business has thus far been managed I am thoroughly satisfied.” 1

The King also expressed his gratification at hearing from Parma that the

1 Bor, ii. 610-613. Hoofd Vervolgh, III-116. Strada, ii. 378-383. Compare, for the history of the siege, which he calls „the most memorable in the world,” Herrera, *Hist. Gen. del Mundo*, p. ii. l. xiv., cap. 13-16, and l. xv., c. 1-4, ss. 28, 29. See also De Thou, ix., l. 80 and 81; Bentivoglio, p. ii., l. iii.; and the authorities previously cited.

2 Strada, ii. 379.

1 „Bien se vé que necesidad ha forzado Amberes a las pláticas de concierto que andan, y el artificio de Aldegonde en haber tentado dilatar el negocio, so color de tratar la reduccion de Holanda y Zelanda juntamente, y así fué muy acertado desbaratarle este intento, y apretarle en lo que de Amberes, de casi no cerrando la puerta a lo demas, y de la cordura y destreza con que todo esto se ha guiado, quedo muy enterado y satisfecho.” Philip II. to Parma, 17 Aug. 1585, Arch. de Sim. MS.

demand for religious liberty in the Netherlands would soon be abandoned.

„In spite of the vehemence,” he said, „which they manifest in the religious matter, desiring some kind of liberty, they will in the end, as you say they will, content themselves with what the other cities, which have returned to obedience, have obtained. *This must be done in all cases without finching, and without permitting any modification.*”<sup>1</sup>

What „had been obtained” by Brussels, Mechlin, Ghent, was well known. The heretics had obtained the choice of renouncing their religion or of going into perpetual exile, and this was to be the case „without finching” in Holland and Zeeland, if those provinces chose to return to obedience. Yet Sainte Aldegonde deluded himself with the thought of a religious peace.

In another and very important letter of the same date Philip laid down his policy very distinctly. The Prince of Parma, by no means such a bigot as his master, had hinted at the possibility of tolerating the reformed religion in the places recovered from the rebels, and long enough for the heretics to awake from their errors.

„You have got an expressions of opinion, I see,” wrote the King to Alexander, „of some grave men of wisdom and conscience, that the limitation of time, during which the heretics may live without scandal, may be left undefined; but I feel very keenly, the danger of such a proposition. With regard to Holland and Zeeland, or any other provinces or towns, the first step must be for them to receive and maintain *alone* the exercise of the Catholic reli-

gion, and to subject themselves to the Roman church, without tolerating the exercise of any other religion, in city, village, farmhouse, or building thereto destined, in the fields, or in any place whatsoever; and in this regulation there is to be no flaw, no change, no concession by convention or otherwise of religious peace, or anything of the sort. They are all to embrace the Roman Catholic religion, and the exercise of that is alone to be permitted.”<sup>1</sup>

This certainly was distinct enough, and nothing had been ever said in public to induce a belief in any modification of the principles on which Philip had uniformly acted. That monarch considered himself born to suppress heresy, and he had certainly been carrying out this work during his whole lifetime.

The King was willing, however, as Alexander had intimated in his negotiations with Antwerp, and previously in the capitulations of Brussels, Ghent, and other places, that there should be an absence of investigation into the private chambers of the heretics, during the period allotted them for choosing between the Papacy and exile.

„It may be permitted,” said Philip, „to abstain from inquiring as to what the heretics are doing within their own doors, in a private way, without scandal, or any public exhibition of their rites *during a fixed time*. But this connivance, and the abstaining from executing the heretics, or from chastising them, even although they may be living very

<sup>1</sup> „Con todo sentiera yo mucho ver esta tolerancia sin limite. Ha de ser el primo paso recibir y tener solamente el egercicio catolico, y subjetarse á la obediencia de la Yglesia Romana, sin tolerar ni consentir porvia de capitulacion otro ningun egercicio en ninguna villa, ni granja, ni parte destinada para el en el campo ni dentro en los lugares . . . y quanto á esto no ha de haber quiebra ni mudanza ni concederles por concierto ninguna libertad de consciencias, ni religionsfried, ni otra cosa semejante, sino que abracen la Cat<sup>a</sup> Rom<sup>a</sup> con solo el egercicio della,” &c. Philip II. to Parma, 17 Aug. 1585. Archivo de Simancas MS.

<sup>1</sup> „Que por mas dureza que muestran en lo de la religion, deseando alguna libertad, al cabo se reduciran á contentarse en esta parte con lo que las otras villas que han venido á la obediencia, porque esto se ha de hacer asi en todo caso, sin aflojar, ni permitir otra cosa en ninguna manera.” Philip to Parma, 17 Aug., MS. just cited.

circumspectly, is to be expressed in very vague terms." 1

Being most anxious to provide against a second crop of heretics to succeed the first, which he was determined to uproot, he took pains to enjoin with his own hand upon Parma the necessity of putting in Catholic schoolmasters and mistresses to the exclusion of reformed teachers into all the seminaries of the recovered Provinces, in order that all the boys and girls might grow up in thorough orthodoxy. 2

Yet this was the man from whom Sainte Aldegonde imagined the possibility of obtaining a religious peace.

Ten days after the capitulation Parma made his triumphal entrance into Antwerp; but, according to his agreement, he spared the citizens the presence of the Spanish and Italian soldiers, the military procession being composed of the Germans and Walloons. Escorted by his body-guard, and surrounded by a knot of magnates and veterans, among whom the Duke of Arschot, the Prince of Chimay, the Counts Mansfeld, Egmont, and Aremberg, were conspicuous, Alexander proceeded towards the captured city. He was met at the Keyser Gate by a triumphal chariot of gorgeous workmanship, in which sat the fair nymph Antwerpia, magnificently bedizen- ed, and accompanied by a group of beautiful maidens. Antwerpia welcomed the conqueror with a kiss, recited a poem in his honour, and bestowed upon him the keys of the city, one of which was in gold. This the Prince immediately fastened to the chain around his

neck, from which was suspended the lamb of the Golden Fleece, with which order he had just been, amid great pomp and ceremony, invested.

On the public square called the Mere the Genoese merchants had erected two rostral columns, each surmounted by a colossal image, representing respectively Alexander of Macedon and Alexander of Parma. Before the house of Portugal was an enormous phoenix, expanding her wings quite across the street; while, in other parts of the town, the procession was met by ships of war, elephants, dromedaries, whales, dragons, and other triumphal phenomena. In the market-place were seven statues in copper, personifying the seven planets, together with an eighth representing Bacchus; and perhaps there were good mythological reasons why the god of wine, together with so large a portion of our solar system, should be done in copper by Jacob Jongeling, to honour the triumph of Alexander, although the key to the enigma has been lost. 1

The cathedral had been thoroughly fumigated with frankincense, and besprinkled with holy water, to purify the sacred precincts from their recent pollution by the reformed rites; and the Protestant pulpits, which had been placed there, had been soundly beaten with rods, and then burned to ashes. 2 The procession entered within its walls, where a magnificent „Te Deum” was performed, and then, after much cannon-firing, bell-ringing, torchlight exhibitions, and other pyrotechnics, the Prince made his way at last to the palace provided for him. The glittering display, by which the royalists celebrated their triumph, lasted three days long, the city being thronged from all the country round with eager and frivolous spectators, who were never wearied with examining the

1 „Mas bien se podra debaxo desto no inquirir lo que los hereges hicieron dentro de sus casas y los unos en las de los otros en forma privada y sin escandalo, ni muestra de egercicio publico de sus sectas y errores durante el dicho tiempo, porque esta dissimulacion, y no los egecutar ni castigar aunque en lo del mal egemplo viven menos recatados que debrian ha de ser en forma bien larga.” Philip II. to Parma, MS. just cited.

2 Ibid.

1 Bor, ii. 622. Hoofd Vervolgh, 117. Strada, ii. 383 seq. Meteren, xii. 228. Mertens and Torfs, v. 258.

2 Le Petit, ii. 519.



wonders of the bridge and the forts, and with gazing at the tragic memorials which still remained of the fight on the Kowenstyn.

During this interval the Spanish and Italian soldiers, not willing to be outdone in demonstrations of respect to their chief, nor defrauded of their rightful claim to a holiday, amused themselves with preparing a demonstration of a novel character. The bridge, which, as it was well known, was to be destroyed within a very few days, was adorned with triumphal arches, and decked with trees and flowering plants; its roadway was strewn with branches; and the palisades, parapets, and forts, were garnished with wreaths, emblems, and poetical inscriptions in honour of the Prince. The soldiers themselves, attired in verdurous garments of foliage and flower-work, their swart faces adorned with roses and lilies, paraded the bridge and the dyke in fantastic procession with clash of cymbal and flourish of trumpet, dancing, singing, and discharging their carbines, in all the delirium of triumph. Nor was a suitable termination to the festival wanting, for Alexander, pleased with the genial character of these demonstrations, repaired himself to the bridge, where he was received with shouts of rapture by his army, thus whimsically converted into a horde of fauns and satyrs. Afterwards a magnificent banquet was served to the soldiers upon the bridge. The whole extent of its surface, from the Flemish to the Brabant shore—the scene so lately of deadly combats, and of the midnight havoc caused by infernal enginry—was changed, as if by the stroke of a wand, into a picture of sylvan and Arcadian merrymaking, and spread with tables laden with delicate viands. Here sat that host of war-bronzed figures, banqueting at their ease, their heads crowned with flowers, while the highest magnates of the army, humouring them in their masquerade,

served them with dainties, and filled their goblets with wine. 1

After these festivities had been concluded, Parma set himself to practical business. There had been a great opposition, during the discussion of the articles of capitulation, to the reconstruction of the famous citadel. That fortress had been always considered, not as a defence of the place against a foreign enemy, but as an instrument to curb the burghers themselves beneath a hostile power. The city magistrates, however, as well as the deans and chief officers in all the guilds and fraternities, were at once changed by Parma—Catholics being uniformly substituted for heretics. 2 In consequence, it was not difficult to bring about a change of opinion in the broad council. It is true that neither Papists nor Calvinists regarded with much satisfaction the prospect of military violence being substituted for civic rule, but in the first effusion of loyalty, and in the triumph of the ancient religion, they forgot the absolute ruin to which their own action was now condemning their city. Champagny, who had once covered himself with glory by his heroic though unsuccessful efforts to save Antwerp from the dreadful „Spanish fury” which had descended from that very citadel, was now appointed governor of the town, and devoted himself to the reconstruction of the hated fortress. „Champagny has particularly aided me,” wrote Parma, „with his rhetoric and clever management, and has brought the broad council itself to propose that the citadel should be rebuilt. It will therefore be done, as by the burghers themselves, without your Majesty or myself appearing to desire it.” 3

1 Strada, ii. 387.

2 Parma to Philip II., 30 Sept. 1585. Archivo de Simancas MS. Same to same, 11 Nov. 1585. (Ibid.)

3 MS. letter of 11 Nov. 1585, before cited. „Rhetorica y buena maña,” &c.

This was, in truth, a triumph of „rhetoric and clever management,” nor could a city well abase itself more completely, kneeling thus cheerfully at its conqueror’s feet, and requesting permission to put the yoke upon its own neck. „The erection of the castle has thus been determined upon,” said Parma, „and I am supposed to know nothing of the resolution.” 1

A little later he observed that they were „working away most furiously at the citadel, and that within a month it would be stronger than it ever had been before.” 2

The building went on, indeed, with astonishing celerity, the fortress rising out of its ruins almost as rapidly, under the hands of the royalists, as it had been demolished, but a few years before, by the patriots. The old foundations still remained, and blocks of houses, which had been constructed out of its ruins, were thrown down that the materials might be again employed in its restoration. 3

The citizens, impoverished and wretched, humbly demanded that the expense of building the citadel might be in part defrayed by the four hundred thousand florins in which they had been mulcted by the capitulation. „I don’t marvel at this,” said Parma, „for certainly the poor city is most forlorn and poverty-stricken, the heretics having all left it.” 4 It was not long before it was very satisfactorily established that the presence of those same heretics and liberty of conscience for all men were indispensable conditions for the prosperity of the great capital. Its downfall was instantaneous. The merchants and industrious artisans all wandered away from the place which had been the seat of a world-wide

traffic. Civilization and commerce departed, and in their stead were the citadel and the Jesuits. By express command of Philip, that order, banished so recently, was reinstated in Antwerp, as well as throughout the obedient provinces; and all the schools and colleges were placed under its especial care. No children could be thenceforth instructed except by the lips of those fathers. 1 Here was a curb more efficacious even than the citadel. That fortress was at first garrisoned with Walloons and Germans. „I have not yet induced the citizens,” said Parma, „to accept a Spanish garrison, nor am I surprised; so many of them remembering past events” (alluding to the „Spanish fury,” but not mentioning it by name), and „observing the frequent mutinies at the present time. Before long I expect, however, to make the Spaniards as acceptable and agreeable as the inhabitants of the country themselves.” 2

It may easily be supposed that Philip was pleased with the triumphs that had thus been achieved. He was even grateful, or affected to be grateful, to him who had achieved them. He awarded great praise to Alexander for his exertions on the memorable occasions of the attack upon the bridge and the battle of the Kowenstyn; but censured him affectionately for so rashly exposing his life. „I have no words,” he said, „to render the thanks which are merited for all that you have been doing. I recommend you earnestly however to have a care for the security of your person, for that is of more consequence than all the rest.” 3

After the news of the reduction of

1 MS. letter, 30 Sept. 1585, before cited.

2 Letter of 11 Nov. 1585.

3 Strada, ii. 394.

4 „Pues es cierto està la pobre villa pobrissima y alcanzadissima, habiendola dejado los hereges,” &c. MS. letter last cited.

1 Strada, ii. 399.

2 MS. letter. 11 Nov. 1585.

3 „Ya yo no sé palabras con que daros las gracias que merece todo lo que ahí hazeis, y así no dire sino que os encomiendo mucho que mireis por la seguridad de vuestra persona, pues en esta va mas que en todo.” Philip II. to Parma, 5 July 1585. Arch. de Sim. MS.

the city he again expressed gratification, but in rather cold language. „From such obstinate people,” said he, „not more could be extracted than has been extracted; therefore the capitulation is satisfactory.”<sup>1</sup> What more he wished to extract it would be difficult to say, for certainly the marrow had been extracted from the bones, and the dead city was henceforth left to moulder under the blight of a foreign garrison and an army of Jesuits. „Perhaps religious affairs will improve before long,”<sup>2</sup> said Philip. They did improve very soon, as he understood the meaning of improvement. A solitude of religion soon brought with it a solitude in every other regard, and Antwerp became a desert, as Sainte Aldegonde had foretold would be the case.

The King had been by no means so calm, however, when the intelligence of the capitulation first reached him at Madrid. On the contrary, his oldest courtiers had never seen him exhibit such marks of hilarity.

When he first heard of the glorious victory at Lepanto, his countenance had remained impassive, and he had continued in the chapel at the devotional exercises which the messenger from Don John had interrupted. Only when the news of the Massacre of St. Bartholomew first reached him had he displayed an amount of cheerfulness equal to that which he manifested at the fall of Antwerp. „Never,” said Granville, „had the King been so radiant with joy as when he held in his hand the despatches which announced the capitulation.”<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> „Sacar mas que lo que se ha sacado,” &c. Philip to Parma, 5 Sept. 1585. Arch. de Sim. MS.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid.

<sup>3</sup> Strada, ii. 388, 389.

The letters were brought to him after he had retired to rest, but his delight was so great that he could not remain in his bed. Rushing from his chamber, so soon as he had read them, to that of his dearly-beloved daughter Clara Isabella, he knocked loudly at the door, and, screaming through the keyhole the three words, „Antwerp is ours,” returned precipitately again to his own apartment.<sup>1</sup>

It was the general opinion in Spain that the capture of this city had terminated the resistance of the Netherlands. Holland and Zeeland would, it was thought, accept with very little hesitation the terms which Parma had been offering, through the agency of Sainte Aldegonde; and, with the reduction of those two provinces, the Spanish dominion over the whole country would of course become absolute. Secretary Idiaguez observed, on drawing up instructions for Carlo Coloma, a Spanish financier then departing on special mission for the Provinces, that he would soon come back to Spain, for the Prince of Parma was just putting an end to the whole Belgic war.<sup>2</sup>

Time was to show whether Holland and Zeeland were as malleable as Antwerp, and whether there would not be a battle or two more to fight before that Belgic war would come to its end. Meantime Antwerp was securely fettered, while the spirit of commerce—to which its unexampled prosperity had been due—now took its flight to the lands where civil and religious liberty had found a home.

<sup>1</sup> Ibid.

<sup>2</sup> Strada, ii. 389.

#### NOTE ON MARNIX DE SAINTE ALDEGONDE.

As every illustration of the career and character of this eminent personage excites constant interest in the Netherlands, I have here thrown together, in the form of an Appendix, many im-

portant and entirely unpublished details, drawn mainly from the Archives of Simancas, and from the State Paper Office and British Museum in London.



THE ex-burgomaster seemed determined to counteract the policy of those Netherlanders who wished to offer the sovereignty of the Provinces to the English Queen. He had been earnestly in favour of annexation to France, for his sympathies and feelings were eminently French. He had never been a friend to England, and he was soon aware that a strong feeling of indignation—whether just or unjust—existed against him both in that country and in the Netherlands, on account of the surrender of Antwerp.

„I have had large conference with Villiers,” wrote Sir John Norris to Walsingham: „he condemneth Ste. Aldegonde’s doings, but will impute it to fear and not to malice. Ste. Aldegonde, notwithstanding that he was forbidden to come to Holland, and laid for at the fleet, yet stole secretly to Dort, where they say he is staid, but I doubt he will be heard speak, and then assuredly he will do great hurt.” 1

It was most certainly Sainte Aldegonde’s determination, so soon as the capitulation of Antwerp had been resolved upon, to do his utmost to restore all the independent Provinces to their ancient allegiance. Rather Spanish than English was his settled resolution. Liberty of religion, if possible—that was his cherished wish—but still more ardently, perhaps, did he desire to prevent the country from falling into the hands of Elizabeth.

„The Prince of Parma hath conceived such an assured hope of the fidelity of Aldegonde,” wrote one of Walsingham’s agents, Richard Tomson, „in reducing the Provinces, yet enemies, into a perfect subjection, that the Spaniards are so well persuaded of the man as if he had never been against them. They say, about the middle of this month, he departed for Zeeland and Holland, to

prosecute the effect of his promises, and I am the more induced to believe that he is become altogether Spanish, for that the common bruit goeth that he hastened the surrendering of the town of Antwerp after he had intelligence of the coming of the English succours.” 1

There was naturally much indignation felt in the independent Provinces against all who had been thought instrumental in bringing about the reduction of the great cities of Flanders. Famars, governor of Mechlin, Van den Tympel, governor of Brussels, Martini, who had been active in effecting the capitulation of Antwerp, were all arrested in Holland. „From all that I can hear,” said Parma, „it is likely that they will be very severely handled, which is the reason why Ste. Aldegonde, although he sent his wife and children to Holland, has not ventured thither himself. It appears that they threaten him there, but he means now to go, under pretext of demanding to justify himself from the imputations against him. Although he tells me freely that, without some amplification of the concessions hitherto made on the point of religion, he hopes for no good result, yet I trust that he will do good offices in the mean time, in spite of the difficulties which obstruct his efforts. On my part, every exertion will be made, and not without hope of some fruit, if not before, at least after, these people have become as tired of the English as they were of the French.” 2.

Of this mutual ill-feeling between the English and the burgomaster there can be no doubt whatever. The Queen’s government was fully aware of his efforts to counteract its negotiation with the Netherlands, and to bring about their reconciliation with Spain. When the Earl of Leicester—as will soon be re-

1 Sir John Norreys to Walsingham, Aug. 24 (O.S.), 1585. S. P. Office MS.

1 Richard Tomson to Sir F. Walsingham, 29th August, 1585 (O.S.). S. P. Office MS.  
2 Parma to Philip II. Arch. de Sim. MS.

lated—arrived in the Provinces, he was not long in comprehending his attitude and his influence.

„I wrote somewhat of Ste. Aldegonde in putting his case,” wrote Leicester; „but this is certain, I have the copy of his very letters sent hither to practise the peace not two days before I came, and this day one hath told me that loves him well, that he hates our countrymen unrecoverably. I am sorry for it.”<sup>1</sup>

On the other hand, the Queen was very indignant with the man whom she looked upon as the paid agent of Spain. She considered him a renegade, the more dangerous because his previous services had been so illustrious. „Her Majesty’s dislike towards Ste. Aldegonde continueth,” wrote Walsingham to Leicester, „and she taketh offence that he was not restrained of his liberty by your Lordship’s order.”<sup>2</sup> It is unquestionable that the ex-burgomaster intended to do his best towards effecting the reconciliation of all the Provinces with Spain; and it is equally certain that the King had offered to pay him well if he proved successful in his endeavours. There is no proof, however, and no probability, that Sainte Aldegonde ever accepted or ever intended to accept the proffered bribe. On the contrary, his whole recorded career ought to disprove the supposition. Yet it is painful to find him, at this crisis, assiduous in his attempts to undo the great work of his own life, and still more distressing to find that great rewards were distinctly offered to him for such service. Immense promises had been frequently made no doubt to William the Silent; nor could any public man, in such times, be so pure that

an attempt to tamper with him might not be made: but when the personage, thus solicited, was evidently acting in the interests of the tempters, it is not surprising that he should become the object of grave suspicion.

„It does not seem to me bad,” wrote Philip to Parma, „this negotiation which you have commenced with Ste. Aldegonde, in order to gain him, and thus to employ his services in bringing about a reduction of the islands (Holland and Zeeland). In exchange for this work, anything which you think proper to offer to him as a reward, will be capital well invested; but it must be not given until the job is done.”<sup>1</sup>

But the job was hard to do, and Sainte Aldegonde cared nothing for the offered bribe. He was, however, most strangely confident of being able to overcome, on the one hand, the opposition of Holland and Zeeland to the hated authority of Spain, and, on the other, the intense abhorrence entertained by Philip to liberty of conscience.

Soon after the capitulation he applied for a passport to visit those two Provinces. Permission to come was refused him. Honest men from Antwerp, he was informed, would be always welcome, but there was no room for him.<sup>2</sup> There was, however—or Parma persuaded himself that there was—a considerable party in those countries in favour of reconciliation with Spain, if the ex-burgomaster could gain a hearing, it was thought probable that his eloquence would prove very effective.

„We have been making efforts to bring about negotiations with Holland and Zeeland,” wrote Alexander to Philip. „Gelderland and Overysael likewise show signs of good disposition, but I have

<sup>1</sup> Correspondence of Robert Dudley, Earl of Leycester, in the years 1585 and 1586, edited by John Bruce. Printed for the Camden Society, 1844, p. 27, 28, <sup>15</sup>/<sub>25</sub> Dec. 1585.

<sup>2</sup> Leycester Correspondence, by Bruce, p. 36, Dec. 1585.

1 — „que a trueque dello sera bien empleado lo que vieredes que combendra ofrecelle para darselo despues de hecho el efecto.”—Philip II. to Parma; 5th Sept. 1585. Arch. de Sim. MS.

<sup>2</sup> Bor, ii. 614-620. Hoofd Vervolgh, 116.

not soldiers enough to animate the good and terrify the bad. As for Holland and Zeeland, there is strong inclination on the part of the people to a reconciliation, if some concession could be made on the religious question, but the governors oppose it, because they are perverse, and are relying on assistance from England. Could this religious concession be made, an arrangement could, without doubt, be accomplished, and more quickly than people think. Nevertheless, in such a delicate matter, I am obliged to await your Majesty's exact instructions and ultimatum." 1

He then proceeded to define exactly the position and intentions of the burgomaster.

"The government of Holland and Zeeland," he said, "have refused a passport to Ste. Aldegonde, and express dissatisfaction with him for having surrendered Antwerp so soon. They know that he has much credit with the people and with the ministers of the sects, and they are in much fear of him, because he is inclined for peace, which is against their interests. They are, therefore, endeavouring to counteract my negotiations with him. These have been, thus far, only in general terms. I have sought to induce him to perform the offices required, without giving his reason to expect any concession as to the exercise of religion. *He persuades himself that, in the end, there will be some satisfaction obtained upon this point*, and, under this impression, he considers the peace as good as concluded, there remaining no doubt as to other matters. He has sent his wife to Zeeland, and is himself going to Germany, where, as he says, he will do all the good service that he can. He hopes that very shortly the Provinces will not only invite, but implore him to come to them; in which case, he promises me to perform miracles." 2

Alexander then proceeded to pay a distinct tribute to Sainte Aldegonde's motives; and, when it is remembered that the statement thus made is contained in a secret despatch, in cipher, to the King, it may be assumed to convey the sincere opinion of the man most qualified to judge correctly as to this calumniated person's character.

"Ste. Aldegonde offers me wonders," he said, "and I have promised him that he shall be recompensed very largely; yet, although he is poor, I do not find him influenced by mercenary or selfish considerations, but only very set in opinions regarding his religion." 1

The Prince had however no doubt of Sainte Aldegonde's sincerity, for sincerity was a leading characteristic of the man. His word, once given, was sacred, and he had given his word to do his best towards effecting a reconciliation of the Provinces with Spain, and frustrating the efforts of England. "Through the agency of Ste. Aldegonde and that of others," wrote Parma, "I shall watch, day and night, to bring about a reduction of Holland and Zeeland, if humanly possible. I am quite persuaded that they will soon be sick of the English, who are now arriving, broken down, without arms or money, and obviously incapable of holding out very long. Doubtless, however, this English alliance, and the determination of the Queen to do her utmost against us, complicates matters, and assists the government of Holland and Zeeland in opposing the inclinations of their people." 2

Nothing ever came of these intended negotiations. The miracles were never wrought; and even had Sainte Aldegonde been as venal as he was suspected of being—which we have thus proof positive

1 —, "en el cual caso ofrece maravillas, como le he ofrecido yo de que será recompensado muy largamente, aunque si bien es pobre no le veo interesado, mas tan solamente puesto en la opinion de su religion."  
—Parma to Philip II., 30 Sept. MS. just cited.

1 Parma to Philip II., 30th Sept. 1585. Arch. de Sim. MS.

2 Ibid.

2 Ibid.



that he was not—he never could have obtained the recompense, which, according to Philip's thrifty policy, was not to be paid until it had been earned. *Sainte Aldegonde's* hands were clean. It is pity that we cannot render the same tribute to his political consistency of character. It is also certain that he remained—not without reason—for a long time under a cloud. He became the object of unbounded and reckless calumny. Antwerp had fallen, and the necessary consequence of its reduction was the complete and permanent prostration of its commerce and manufactures. These were transferred to the new, free, national, independent, and prosperous commonwealth that had risen in the „islands” which Parma and *Sainte Aldegonde* had vainly hoped to restore to their ancient servitude. In a very few years after the subjugation of Antwerp, it appeared by statistical documents that nearly all the manufactures of linen, coarse and fine cloths, serges, fustians, tapestry, gold embroidery, arras-work, silks, and velvets, had been transplanted of the towns of Holland and Zeeland, which were flourishing and thriving, while the Flemish and Brabantine cities had become mere dens of thieves and beggars. It was in the mistaken hope of averting this catastrophe—as melancholy as it was inevitable—and in despair of seeing all the Netherlands united, unless united in slavery, and in deep-rooted distrust of the designs and policy of England, that this statesman, once so distinguished, had listened to the insidious tongue of Parma. He had sought to effect a general reconciliation with Spain, and the only result of his efforts was a blight upon his own illustrious name.

He published a defence of his conduct, and a detailed account of the famous siege. His apology, at the time, was not considered conclusive, but his narrative remains one of the clearest and most trustworthy sources for the history of these important transactions. He was

never brought to trial, but he discovered, with bitterness, that he had committed a fatal error, and that his political influence had passed away. He addressed numerous private epistles to eminent persons, indignantly denying the imputations against his character, and demanding an investigation. Among other letters he observed in one to Count Hohenlo that he was astonished and grieved to find that all his faithful labours and sufferings in the cause of his fatherland had been forgotten in an hour. In place of praise and gratitude, he had reaped nothing but censure and calumny; because men ever judged, not by the merits, but by the issue. That common people should be so unjust, he said, was not to be wondered at, but of men like Hohenlo he had hoped better things. He asserted that he had saved Antwerp from another „Spanish fury,” and from impending destruction—a city in which there was not a single regular soldier, and in which his personal authority was so slight that he was unable to count the number of his masters. If a man had ever performed a service to his country, he claimed to have done so in this capitulation. Nevertheless, he declared that he was the same Philip Marx, earnestly devoted to the service of God, the true religion, and the fatherland; although he avowed himself weary of the war, and of this perpetual offering of the Netherland sovereignty to foreign potentates. He was now going, he said, to his estates in Zeeland; there to turn farmer again; renouncing public affairs, in the administration of which he had experienced so much ingratitude from his countrymen. <sup>1</sup> Count Maurice and the States of Holland and Zeeland wrote to him, however, in very plain language, describing the public indignation as so strong as to make it unsafe for him to visit the country. <sup>2</sup>

The Netherlands and England—so

<sup>1</sup> Bor, ii. 614.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid.

soon as they were united in policy—were, not without reason, indignant with the man who had made such strenuous efforts to prevent that union. The English were, in truth, deeply offended. He had systematically opposed their schemes, and to his prejudice against their country, and distrust of their intentions, they attributed the fall of Antwerp. Envoy Davison, after his return to Holland, on the conclusion of the English treaty, at once expressed his suspicions of the ex-burgomaster, and the great dangers to be apprehended from his presence in the free States. „Here is some working underhand,” said he to Walsingham, „to draw hither Sainte Aldegonde, under a pretext of his justification, which—as it has hitherto been denied him—so is the sequel suspected, if he should obtain it before they were well settled here, betwixt her Majesty and them, considering the manifold presumptions that the subject of his journey should be little profitable or advantageous to the state of these poor countries, as tending, at the best, to the propounding of some general reconciliation.”<sup>1</sup> It was certainly not without substantial grounds that the English and Hollanders, after concluding their articles of alliance, felt uneasy at the possibility of finding their plans reversed by the intrigues of a man whom they knew to be a mediator between Spain and her revolted Provinces, and whom they suspected of being a venal agent of the Catholic King. It was given out that Philip had been induced to promise liberty of religion, in case of reconciliation. We have seen that Parma was at heart in favour of such a course, and that he was very desirous of inducing Marnix to believe in the possibility of obtaining such a boon, however certain the Prince had been made by the

King’s secret letters that such a belief was a delusion. „Martini hath been examined,” wrote Davison, „who confesseth, both for himself and others, to be come hither by direction of the Prince of Parma and intelligence of Sainte Aldegonde, from whom he was first addressed by Villiers and afterwards to others for advice and assistance. That the scope of this direction was to induce them here to hearken to a peace, wherein the Prince of Parma promiseth them toleration of religion, although he confesseth yet to have no absolute power in that behalf, but hath written thereof to the King expressly, and *holdeth himself assured thereof by the first post*, as I have likewise been advertised from Rowland York, which if it had been propounded openly here before things had been concluded with her Majesty, and order taken for her assurance, your honour can judge what confusion it must of necessity have brought forth.”<sup>1</sup>

At last, when Marnix had become convinced that the toleration would not arrive „by the very next mail from Spain,” and that, in truth, such a blessing was not to be expected through the post-office at all, he felt an inward consciousness of the mistake which he had committed. Too credulously had he inclined his ear to the voice of Parma; too obstinately had he steeled his heart against Elizabeth; and he was now the more anxious to clear himself at least from the charges of corruption so clamorously made against him by Holland and by England. Conscious of no fault more censurable than credulity and prejudice, feeling that his long fidelity to the reformed religion ought to be a defence for him against his calumniators, he was desirous both to clear his own honour, and to do at least a tardy justice to England. He felt confident that loyal natures, like those of Davison and his colleagues at home, would re-

<sup>1</sup> Davison to Walsingham, Sept.  $\frac{4}{14}$  1585, S. P. Office, MS.

<sup>1</sup> Davison to Walsingham, Sept. 1585.

cognise his own loyalty. He trusted, not without cause, to English honour, and, coming to his manor-house of Zoubourg, near Flushing, he addressed a letter to the ambassador of Elizabeth, in which the strong desire to vindicate his aspersed integrity is quite manifest.

„I am very joyous,” said he, „that coming hither in order to justify myself against the false and malignant imputations with which they charge me, I have learned your arrival here on the part of her Majesty, as well as the soon-expected coming of the Earl of Leicester. I see, in truth, that the Lord God is just, and never abandons his own. I have never spared myself in the service of my country, and I would have sacrificed my life a thousand times, had it been possible, in her cause. Now, I am receiving for all this a guerdon of blame and calumny, which is cast upon me in order to cover up faults which have been committed by others in past days. I hope, however, to come soon to give you welcome, and to speak more particularly to you of all these things. Meantime demanding my justification before these gentlemen, who ought to have known me better than to have added faith to such villanous imputations, I will entreat you that my definite justification, or condemnation,—if I have merited it,—may be reserved till the arrival of Lord Leicester.” 1

1 Sainte Aldegonde to Davison, Oct. 30  
Nov. 9

1585, S. P. Office MS. (The letter is in French.)

Walsingham always entertained a high opinion of Sainte Aldegonde's integrity. „Je pourrais à bon droit estre taxé,” wrote Marnix, in answer to a letter from Sir Francis, „ou de stupidité, ou d'ingratitude—d'autant plus qu'en une commune opinion, mesmes de ceux qui estoient plus proches tesmoins de mes actions, et avoyent plus de commodité d'en pouvoir juger à la verité, si ils en eussent prendre la peine il vous a pleu, en estant beaucoup plus esloigné, et plus environné de préjugés, maintenir constamment l'impression qu'aviez une fois conceue de mon intégrité. \*\*\* Et pleut à Dieu que

This certainly was not the language of a culprit. Nevertheless, his words did not immediately make a deep impression on the hearts of those who heard him. He had come secretly to his house at Zoubourg, having previously published his memorable apology; and in accordance with the wishes of the English government, he was immediately confined to his own house. Confidence in the intention of a statesman who had at least committed such grave errors of judgment, and who had been so deeply suspected of darker faults, was not likely very soon to revive. So far from shrinking from an investigation which would have been dangerous, even to his life, had the charges against his honour been founded in fact, he boldly demanded to be confronted with his accusers, in order that he might explain his conduct before all the world. „Sir, yesternight,

j'eusse peu avoir gens de qualité et de jugement tels qu'est V. S. ou spectateurs, ou juges de mes conseils et procédures. Je m'asseure qu'en lieu de blâme, que, ou les ignorans ou les malicieux m'ont mis sus, j'en eusse rapporté louange et gloire. Tant y a que rends graces encore pour ce jour d'huy à mon Dieu, de ce qu'en ces grandes extremités environnés de tant de difficultés, il ne m'a oncques si avant privé de son esprit, que je n'aye toujours eu mon seul but et la gloire de son nom et la conservation de ses eglises. Ce que je vous prie de croire, et vous assure qu'en cette resolution je desire vivre et mourir.” Marnix de Sainte Aldegonde to Walsingham, May <sup>6</sup>/<sub>16</sub> 1586, from

Zoubourg, S. P. Office MS.

„The Count Maurice,” wrote envoy and counsellor Wilkes, a year later, from Utrecht, „is loved and respected here of the people, for the merits of his late father; and is (so far as I can judge) like to succeed him in wisdom and sufficiency I cannot discern that there is any doubt to be had of him, that he should be led away by any persuasion to seek his advancement but by her Majesty; and Sainte Aldegonde, contrary to the opinion conceived of him by her Majesty, is noted here of all men to be a good patriot, and worthy to be employed in the services here, in respect of his ability and wisdom, howbeit I perceive (to take away the offence that may be mustered to her Majesty) they are contented to forbear the use of his services.” Wilkes to the Lords of Council, 20th Aug. 1586. S. P. Office MS.



at the shutting of the gates," wrote Davison to Walsingham—transmitting the little note from Marnix which has just been cited—, "I was advertised that Ste. Aldegonde was not an hour before secretly landed at the head on the other side the Rammekens, and come to his house at Zoubourg, having prepared his way by an apology, newly published in his defence, whereof I have as yet recovered one only copy, which herewith I send your honour. This day, whilst I was at dinner, he sent his son unto me, with a few lines, whereof I send you the copy, advertising me of his arrival (which he knew I understood before), together with the desire he had to see me, and speak with me, if the States, before whom he was to come to purge himself of the crimes wherewith he stood, as he saith, unjustly charged, would vouchsafe him so much liberty. The same morning, the council of Zeeland, taking knowledge of his arrival, sent unto him the pensioner of Middelburgh and this town, to sound the causes of his coming, and to will him, in their behalf, to keep his house, and to forbear all meddling, by word or writing, with any whatsoever till they should further advise and determine in his cause. In defence thereof, he fell into large and particular discourse with the deputies, accusing his enemies of malice and untruth, offering himself to any trial, and to abide what punishment the laws should lay upon him, if he were found guilty of the crimes imputed to him. Touching the cause of his coming, he pretended and protested that he had no other end than his simple justification, preferring any hazard he might incur thereby to his honour and good fame." <sup>1</sup> As to the great question at issue, Marnix had at last become conscious that he had been a victim to Spanish dissimulation, and

that Alexander Farnese was in reality quite powerless to make that concession of religious liberty, without which a reconciliation between Holland and Philip was impossible. „Whereas," said Davison, „it was supposed that Ste. Aldegonde had commission from the Prince of Parma to make some offer of peace, he assured them of the contrary as a thing which neither the Prince had any power to yield unto with the surety of religion, or himself would, in conscience, persuade without it; with a number of other particularities in his excuse; amongst the rest, allowing and commending in his speech the course they had taken with her Majesty, as the only safe way of deliverance for these afflicted countries—letting them understand how much the news thereof, specially since the entry of our garrison into this place (which before they would in no sort believe), hath troubled the enemy, who doth what he may to suppress the bruit thereof, and yet comforteth himself with the hope that between the factions and partialities nourished by his industry, and musters among the towns, especially in Holland and Zeeland (where he is persuaded to find some pliable to a reconciliation), and the disorders and misgovernment of our people, there will be yet occasion offered him to make his profit and advantage. I find that the gentleman hath here many friends indifferently persuaded of his innocency, notwithstanding the closing up of his apology doth make but little for him. Howsoever it be, it falleth out the better that the treaty with her Majesty is finished, and the cautionary towns assured before his coming, which, if he be ill affected, will I hope either reform his judgment or restrain his will. I will not forget to do the best I can to sift and decipher him yet more narrowly and particularly." <sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Davison to Walsingham, Nov. <sup>1</sup>/<sub>11</sub>, 1585,

Thus, while the scales had at length fallen from the eyes of Marnix, it was not strange that the confidence which he now began to entertain in the policy of England should not be met, at the outset, with a corresponding sentiment on the part of the statesman by whom that policy was regulated. „Howsoever Ste. Aldegonde would seem to purge himself,” said Davison, „it is suspected that his end is dangerous. I have done what *I may to restrain him, so nevertheless as it may not seem to come from me.*”<sup>1</sup> And again—„Ste Aldegonde,” he wrote, „continueth still our neighbour at his house between this and Middelburg, yet unmolested. He findeth many favourers, and, I fear, doth no good offices. He desireth to be reserved till the coming of my Lord of Leicester, before whom he pretends a desired trial.”<sup>2</sup>

This covert demeanour on the part of the ambassador was in accordance with the wishes of his government. It was thought necessary that Sainte Aldegonde should be kept under arrest until the arrival of the Earl, but deemed preferable that the restraint should proceed from the action of the States rather than from the order of the Queen. Davison was fulfilling orders in attempting, by underhand means, to deprive Marnix, for a time, of his liberty. „Let him, I pray you, remain in good safety in anywise,”<sup>3</sup> wrote Leicester, who was uneasy at the thought of so influential, and, as he thought, so ill-affected a person being at large, but at the same time disposed to look dispassionately upon his past conduct, and to do justice, according to the

results of an investigation. „It is thought meet,” wrote Walsingham to Davison, „that you should do your best endeavour to procure that Ste. Aldegonde may be restrained, which in mine opinion were fit to be handled in such sort as the restraint might rather proceed from themselves than by your solicitation. And yet rather than he should remain at liberty to practise underhand, whereof you seem to stand in great doubt, it is thought meet that you should make yourself a partizan, to seek by all the means that you may to have him restrained under the guard of some well-affected patriot until the Earl’s coming, at what time his cause may receive examination.”<sup>1</sup>

This was, however, a result somewhat difficult to accomplish; for twenty years of noble service in the cause of liberty had not been utterly in vain, and there were many magnanimous spirits to sympathize with a great man struggling thus in the meshes of calumny. That the man who challenged rather than shunned investigation should be thrown into prison, as if he were a detected felon upon the point of absconding, seemed a heartless and superfluous precaution. Yet Davison and others still feared the man whom they felt obliged to regard as a baffled intriguer. „Touching the restraint of Ste. Aldegonde,” wrote Davison to Lord Burghley, „which I had order from Mr. Secretary to procure underhand, I find the difficulty will be great in regard of his many friends and favourers, preoccupied with some opinion of his innocence, although I have travailed with divers of them underhand, and am promised that some order shall be taken in that behalf, which I think will be harder to execute as long as Count Maurice is here. For Ste. Aldegonde’s affection, I find continual matter to

<sup>1</sup> Davison to Walsingham, Nov.  $\frac{1}{11}$ , 1585, S. P. Office MS.

<sup>2</sup> Davison to —, Nov.  $\frac{11}{21}$ , 1585, S. P. Office MS.

<sup>3</sup> Leicester to Davison, Nov.  $\frac{10}{20}$ , 1585, S. P. Office MS.

<sup>1</sup> Minute of Walsingham, Nov.  $\frac{19}{29}$ , 1585, S. P. Office MS.

suspect it inclined to a peace, and that as one notably prejudging our scope and proceeding in this cause, doth lie in wait for an occasion to set it forward, being, as it seems, fed with a hope of, *telle quelle liberté de conscience*, which the Prince of Parma and others of his council have, as he confesseth, earnestly solicited at the King's hands. This appeareth, in truth, the only apt and easy way for them to prevail both against religion and the liberty of these poor countries, having thereby once recovered the authority which must necessarily follow a peace, to renew and alter the magistrates of the particular towns, which, being at their devotion, may turn, as we say, all upside down, and so in an instant being under their servitude, if not wholly, at the least in a great part of the country, leaving so much the less to do about the rest, a thing confessed and looked for of all men of any judgment here, if the drift of our peacemakers may take effect." 1

Sainte Aldegonde had been cured of his suspicions of England, and at last the purity of his own character shone through the mists.

One winter's morning, two days after Christmas, 1585, Colonel Morgan, an ingenuous Welshman, whom we have seen doing much hard fighting on Kowenstyn Dyke, and at other places, and who now commanded the garrison at Flushing, was taking a walk outside the gates, and inhaling the salt breezes from the ocean. While thus engaged he met a gentleman coming along, staff in hand, at a brisk pace towards the town, who soon proved to be no other than the distinguished and deeply suspected Sainte Aldegonde. The two got at once into conversation. „He began,” said Morgan, „by cunning insinuations, to wade into matters of state, and at the last fell to

touching the principal points, to wit, her Majesty's entrance into the cause now in hand, which, quoth he, was an action of high importance, considering how much it behoved her to go through the same, as well in regard of the hope that thereby was given to the distressed people of these parts, as also in consideration of that worthy personage whom she hath here placed, whose estate and credit may not be suffered to quail, but must be upholden as becometh the lieutenant of such a princess as her Majesty." 1

„The opportunity thus offered,” continued honest Morgan, „and the way opened by himself, I thought good to discourse with him to the full, partly to see the end and drift of his induced talk, and consequently to touch his quick in the suspected cause of Antwerp.” 2 And thus, word for word, taken down faithfully the same day, proceeded the dialogue that wintry morning, near three centuries ago. From that simple record—mouldering unseen and unthought of for ages beneath piles of official dust—the forms of the illustrious Fleming and the bold Welsh colonel seem to start, for a brief moment, out of the three hundred years of sleep which have succeeded their energetic existence upon earth. And so, with the bleak winds of December whistling over the breakers of the North Sea, the two discourse together, as they paced along the coast.

Morgan.—„I charge you with your want of confidence in her Majesty's promised aid. 'Twas a thing of no small moment had it been embraced when it was first most graciously offered.”

Sainte Aldegonde.—„I left not her princelike purpose unknown to the States who too coldly and carelessly passed over the benefit thereof, until it was too late to put the same in prac-

1 Davison to Burghley, <sup>Nov. 29,</sup> <sub>Dec. 9,</sub> 1585,  
S. P. Office MS.

1 Sir Thomas Morgan to Sir F. Walsingham, Jan. <sup>1</sup>/<sub>11</sub>, 1585, S. P. Office MS.

2 Ibid.



tice. For my own part, I acknowledge that indeed I thought some future advice would either alter or at least detract from the accomplishment of her determination. I thought this the rather because she had so long been wedded to peace, and I supposed it impossible to divorce her from so sweet a spouse. But, set it down that she were resolute, yet the sickness of Antwerp was so dangerous, as it was to be doubted the patient would be dead before the physician could come. I protest that the state of the town was much worse than was known to any but myself and some few private persons. The want of victuals was far greater than they durst bewray, fearing lest the common people, perceiving the plague of famine to be at hand, would rather grow desperate than patiently expect some happy event. For as they were many in number, so were they wonderfully divided: some being Martinists, some Papists, some neither the one nor the other, but generally given to be factious, so that the horror at home was equal to the hazard abroad."

Morgan.—„But you forget the motion made by the martial men for putting out of the town such as were simple artificers, with women and children, mouths that consumed meat, but stood in no stead for defence."

Sainte Aldegonde.—„Alas, alas! would you have had me guilty of the slaughter of so many innocents, whose lives were committed to my charge, as well as the best? Or might I have answered my God when those massacred creatures should have stood up against me, that the hope of Antwerp's deliverance was purchased with the blood of so many simple souls? No, no.—I should have found my conscience such a hell and continual worm as the gnawing thereof would have been more painful and bitter than the possession of the whole world would have been pleasant."

Morgan continued to press the various points which had excited suspicion as

to the character and motives of Marnix, and point by point Marnix answered his antagonist, impressing him, armed as he had been in distrust, with an irresistible conviction as to the loftiness of the nature which had been so much calumniated.

Sainte Aldegonde (with vehemence).—„I do assure you, in conclusion, that I have solemnly vowed service and duty to her Majesty, which I am ready to perform where and when it may best like her to use the same. I will add moreover that I have oftentimes determined to pass into England to make my own purgation, yet, fearing lest her Highness would mislike so bold a resolution, I have checked that purpose with a resolution to tarry the Lord's leisure, until some better opportunity might answer my desire. For since I know not how I stand in her grace, unwilling I am to attempt her presence without permission; but might it please her to command my attendance, I should not only most joyfully accomplish the same, but also satisfy her of and in all such matters as I stand charged with, and afterwards spend life, land, and goods to witness my duty towards her Highness."

Morgan.—„I tell you plainly, that if you are in heart the same man that you seem outwardly to be, I doubt not but her Majesty might easily be persuaded to conceive a gracious opinion of you. For mine own part, I will surely advertise Sir Francis Walsingham of as much matter as this present conference hath ministered."

„Hereof," said the Colonel—when, according to his promise, faithfully recording the conversation in all its details for Mr. Secretary's benefit,—„he seemed not only content but most glad. Therefore I beseech your honour to vouchsafe some few lines herein, that I may return him some part of your mind. I have already written thereof to Sir Philip Sidney, lord governor of Flushing, with

request that his Excellency the Earl of Leicester may presently be made acquainted with the cause."

Indeed the brave Welshman was thoroughly converted from his suspicions by the earnest language and sympathetic presence of the fallen statesman. This result of the conference was creditable to the ingenuous character of both personages.

"Thus did he," wrote Morgan to Sir Francis, "from point to point answer all objections from the first to the last, and that in such sound and substantial manner, with a strong show of truth, as I think his very enemies, having heard his tale, would be satisfied. And truly, Sir, as heretofore I have thought hardly of him, being led by a superficial judgment of things as they stood in outward appearance; so now, having pierced deep, and weighed causes by a sounder and more deliberate consideration, I find myself somewhat changed in conceit; not so much carried away by the sweetness of his speech, as confirmed by the force of his religious profession, wherein he remaineth constant, without wavering—an argument of great strength to set him free from treacherous attempts; but as I am herein least able and most unworthy to yield any censure, much less to give advice, so I leave the man and the matter to your honour's opinion. Only (your graver judgment reserved) thus I think, that it were good either to employ him as a friend, or as an enemy to remove him farther from us, being a man of such action as the world knoweth he is. And to conclude," added Morgan, "this was the upshot between us." 1

Nevertheless, he remained in this obscurity for a long period. 2 When, towards the close of the year 1585,

the English government was established in Holland, he was the object of constant suspicion.

"Here is Aldegonde," wrote Sir Philip Sidney to Lord Leicester from Flushing, "a man greatly suspected, but by no man charged. He lives restrained to his own house, and, for aught I can find, deals with nothing, only desiring to have his cause wholly referred to your Lordship, and therefore, with the best heed I can to his proceedings, I will leave him to his clearing or condemning, when your Lordship shall hear him." 1

In another letter Sir Philip again spoke of Sainte Aldegonde as "one of whom he kept a good opinion, and yet a suspicious eye." 2

Leicester himself was excessively anxious on the subject, deeply fearing the designs of a man whom he deemed so mischievous, and being earnestly desirous that he should not elude the chastisement which he seemed to deserve.

"Touching Ste. Aldegonde," he wrote Davison, "I grieve that he is at his house without good guard. I do earnestly pray you to move such as have power presently to commit a guard about him, for I know he is a dangerous and a bold man, and presumes yet to carry all, for he hath made many promises to the Prince of Parma. I would he were in Fort Rammekyns, or else that Mr. Russell had charge of him, with a recommendation from me to Russel to look well to him till I shall arrive. You must have been so commanded in this from her Majesty, for she thinks he is in close and safe guard. If he is not, look for a turn of all things, for he hath friends, I know." 3

1 Sir P. Sidney to Earl of Leicester Brit. Mus. Galba, C. viii. 213 MS.

2 Sir P. Sidney to Earl of Leicester, 19th Feb. 1586. Brit. Mus. Galba, C. ix. p. 93.

3 Leicester to Davison Nov. 18, 1585. S. P. Office MS.

1 Fomas Morgan to Sir F. Walsingham, MS. just cited.

2 Bor. ii. 610-614. Hoofd Vervolgh, 116, 117. Wagenaar, viii. 83, 84.

But very soon after his arrival, the Earl, on examining into the matter, saw fit to change his opinions and his language. Persuaded, in spite of his previous convictions, even as the honest Welsh colonel had been, of the upright character of the man, and feeling sure that a change had come over the feelings of Marnix himself in regard to the English alliance, Leicester at once interested himself in removing the prejudices entertained towards him by the Queen.

„Now a few words for Ste. Aldegonde,” said he in his earliest despatches from Holland; „I will beseech her Majesty to stay her judgment till I write next. If the man be as he now seemeth, it were pity to lose him, for he is indeed marvellously friended. Her Majesty will think, I know, that I am easily pacified or led in such a matter, but I trust so to deal as she shall give me thanks. Once if he do offer service it is sure enough, for *he is esteemed that way above all the men in this country for his word, if he give it.* His worst enemies here procure me to win him, for sure, just matter for his life there is none. He would fain come into England, so far is he come already, and doth extol her Majesty for this work of hers to heaven, and confesseth, till now an angel could not make him believe it.”<sup>1</sup>

Here certainly was a noble tribute paid unconsciously, as it were, to the character of the maligned statesman. „Above all the men in the country for his word, if he give it.” What wonder that Orange had leaned upon him, that Alexander had sought to gain him? and how much does it add to our bitter regret that his prejudices against England should not have been removed until too late for Antwerp and for his own usefulness! Had his good angel really been present to make him believe in that „work of her Majesty,” when his

ear was open to the seductions of Parma, the destiny of Belgium and his own subsequent career might have been more fortunate than they became.

The Queen was slow to return from her prejudices. She believed—not without reason—that the opposition of Ste. Aldegonde to her policy had been disastrous to the cause both of England and the Netherlands; and it had been her desire that he should be imprisoned, and tried for his life. Her councillors came gradually to take a more favourable view of the case, and to be moved by the pathetic attitude of the man who had once been so conspicuous.

„I did acquaint Sir Christopher Hatton,” wrote Walsingham to Leicester, „with the letter which Ste. Aldegonde wrote to your Lordship, which, carrying a true picture of an afflicted mind, cannot but move an honest heart, weighing the rare parts the gentleman is endowed withal, to pity his distressed estate, and to procure him relief and comfort, which Mr. Vice-Chamberlain (Hatton) hath promised on his part to perform. I thought good to send Ste. Aldegonde’s letter unto the Lord Treasurer (Burghley), who heretofore has carried a hard conceit of the gentleman, hoping that the view of his letter will breed some remorse towards him. I have also prayed his Lordship, if he see cause, to acquaint her Majesty with the said letter.”<sup>1</sup>

But his high public career was closed. He lived down calumny, and put his enemies to shame, but the fatal error which he had committed, in taking the side of Spain rather than of England at so momentous a crisis, could never be repaired. He regained the good opinion of the most virtuous and eminent personages in Europe, but in the noon of life he voluntarily withdrew from public affairs. The circumstances just detailed had made him impossible as a

<sup>1</sup> Bruce, *Leycest. Corresp.* pp. 33, 34.

<sup>1</sup> Ibid pp. 31, 34.



political leader, and it was equally impossible for him to play a secondary part. He occasionally consented to be employed in special diplomatic missions, but the serious avocations of his life now became theological and literary. He sought—in his own words—to penetrate himself still more deeply than ever with the spirit of the Reformation, and to imbue the minds of the young with that deep love for the reformed religion which had been the guiding thought of his own career. He often spoke with a sigh of his compulsory exile from the field where he had been so conspicuous all his lifetime; he bitterly lamented the vanished dream of the great national union between Belgium and Holland which had flattered his youth and his manhood; and he sometimes alluded with bitterness to the calumny which had crippled him of his usefulness. He might have played a distinguished part in that powerful commonwealth which was so steadily and splendidly arising out of the lagunes of Zeeland and Holland, but destiny and calumny and his own error had decided otherwise.

„From the depth of my exile,” he said, „for I am resolved to retire, I know not where, into Germany, perhaps into Sarmatia, I shall look from afar upon the calamities of my country. That which to me is most mournful is no longer to be able to assist my fatherland by my counsels and my actions.”<sup>1</sup> He did not go into exile, but remained chiefly at his mansion of Zoubourg, occupied with agriculture and with profound study. Many noble works—conspicuous in the literature of the epoch—were the results of his learned leisure; and the name of Marnix of Sainte Aldegonde will be always as dear to the lovers of science and letters as to the believers in civil and religious liberty. At the request of the States of Holland he undertook, in 1593, a

translation of the Scriptures from the original, and he was at the same time deeply engaged with a History of Christianity, which he intended for his literary masterpiece. The man whose sword had done knightly service on many a battle-field for freedom, whose tongue had controlled mobs and senates, courts and councils, whose subtle spirit had metamorphosed itself into a thousand shapes to do battle with the genius of tyranny, now quenched the feverish agitation of his youth and manhood in Hebrew and classical lore. A grand and noble figure always; most pathetic when thus redeeming, by vigorous but solitary and melancholy hard labour, the political error which had condemned him to retirement. To work, ever to work, was the primary law of his nature. Repose in the other world, „Repos ailleurs,” was the device which he assumed in earliest youth, and to which he was faithful all his days.

A great and good man, whose life had been brimfull of noble deeds, and who had been led astray from the path, not of virtue, but of sound policy, by his own prejudices and by the fascination of an intellect even more brilliant than his own, he at least enjoyed in his retirement whatever good may come from hearty and genuine labour, and from the high regard entertained for him by the noblest spirits among his contemporaries.

„They tell me,” said La Noue, „that the Seigneur de Ste. Aldegonde has been suspected by the Hollanders and the English. I am deeply grieved, for 'tis a personage worthy to be employed. I have always known him to be a zealous friend of his religion and his country, and I will bear him this testimony, *that his hands and his heart are clean.* Had it been otherwise, I must have known it. His example has made me regret the less the promise I was obliged to make, never to bear arms again in the Netherlands. For I have thought

<sup>1</sup> .Commentaire sur les Affaires d'Anvers.

that since this man, who has so much credit and authority among your people, after having done his duty well, has not failed to be calumniated and ejected from service, what would they have done with me, who am a stranger, had I continued in their employment? The consul Terentius Varro lost, by his fault, the battle of Cannæ; nevertheless, when he returned to Rome, offering the remainder of his life in the cause of his Republic reduced to extremity, he was not rejected, but well received, because he hoped well for the country. It is not to be imputed as blame to Ste. Aldegonde that he lost Antwerp, for he surrendered when it could not be saved. What I now say is drawn from me by the compassion I feel when persons of merit suffer without cause at the hands of their fellow-citizens. In these terrible tempests, as it is a duty rigorously to punish the betrayers of their country, even so is it an obligation upon us to honour good patriots, and to support them in venial errors, that we all may encourage each other to do the right." 1

Strange too as it may now seem to us, a reconciliation of the Netherlands with Philip was not thought an impossibility by other experienced and sagacious patriots besides Marnix. Even Olden-Barneveld, on taking office as Holland's Advocate, at this period, made it a condition that his service was to last only until the reunion of the Provinces with Spain. 2

There was another illustrious personage in a foreign land who ever rendered homage to the character of the retired Netherland statesman. Amid the desolation of France, Duplessis-Mornay often solaced himself by distant communion with that kindred and sympathizing spirit.

"Plunged in public annoyances," he wrote to Sainte Aldegonde, "I find no consolation, except in conference with the good, and among the good I hold you for one of the best. With such men I had rather sigh profoundly than laugh heartily with others. In particular, Sir, do me the honour to love me, and believe that I honour you singularly. Impart to me something from your solitude, for I consider your deserts to be more fruitful and fertile than our most cultivated habitations. As for me, think of me as of a man drowning in the anxieties of the time, but desirous, if possible, of swimming to solitude." 1

Thus solitary, yet thus befriended,—remote from public employment, yet ever employed, doing his daily work with all his soul and strength,—Marnix passed the fifteen years yet remaining to him. Death surprised him at last, at Leyden, in the year, 1598, while steadily labouring upon his Flemish translation of the Old Testament, and upon the great political, theological, controversial, and satirical work on the differences of religion, which remains the most stately, though unfinished, monument of his literary genius. At the age of sixty he went at last to the repose which he had denied to himself on earth. "Repos ailleurs." 2

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1, *Memoires et Corresp. de Duplessis-Mornay*, vi. 35.

2 I am bound to state that there is a single passage in one of Parma's letters to Philip which contains a somewhat suspicious allusion to Marnix. Were it not for the distinct assertion of Farnese, already cited, to the disinterested character of the burgomaster, and to his elevation above mercenary considerations, the observation now alluded to would be still more painful.

Six months after the fall of Antwerp the Prince informed his sovereign that Sainte Aldegonde had not yet gone to Germany, but was still in Zeeland, where they were treating him with great attention, but conferring no authority upon him. "Those in power," added Farnese, "distrust him, because they see him inclined to that party to which, when he can—unless I deceive myself—he will give his support. If he had

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1 Groen v. Prinsterer, *'Archives,'* &c. i., 79, 80.

2 Willems, *'Mengelingen,'* p. 389.

## CHAPTER VI.

Policy of England—Diplomatic Coquetry—Dutch Envoys in England—Conference of Orléans and Walsingham—Interview with Leicester—Private Audience of the Queen—Letters of the States-General—Ill effects of Gilpin's Despatch—Close Bargaining of the Queen and States—Guarantees required by England—England's comparative Weakness—The English characterised—Paul Hentzner—The Envoys in London—Their Characters—Olden-Barneveld described—Reception at Greenwich—Speech of Menin—Reply of the Queen—Memorial of the Envoys—Discussions with the Ministers—Second Speech of the Queen—Third Speech of the Queen—Sir John Norris sent to Holland—Parsimony of Elizabeth—Energy of Davison—Protracted Negotiations—Friendly Sentiments of Count Maurice—Letters from him and Louisa de Coligny—Davison vexed by the Queen's Caprice—Dissatisfaction of Leicester—His vehement Complaints—The Queen's Avarice—Perplexity of Davison—Manifesto of Elizabeth—Sir Philip Sidney—His Arrival at Flushing.

ENGLAND—as we have seen—had carefully watched the negotiations between France and the Netherlands. Although

not found the English already introduced, I think they would have made less of him, and that he would have accomplished some valuable piece of service. I do not fail to send compliments, as well to him, as to others who may prove useful agents, and to do all I can to keep them in their good dispositions, and in this course I shall ever persist, keeping awake by day and night."

"Desconfiando por verle inclinado a la parte a la cual cuando puede, sino me engaño; creo ayudará, y sino hallará introducidos los Ingleses, creo hecharen menos de el, y que hiciera algun buen efeto. Yo asi a el, como a los demas medios que me parecen ser a proposito, no dejo de embiar recaudos, \* ni de procurar tenerlos en su buen proposito, y en la dicha conformidad lo hire, haciendo siempre, desvelandome de dia y de noche," &c. &c. Parma to Philip II., 28th Feb. 1586. Archivo de Simancas MS.

\* The wordt 'recaudo' or 'recado' means a complimentary message, which might, or might not, be accompanied with more solid arguments.

It has been seen that Philip authorized Farnese to offer large rewards to Marnix, with the stipulation that they were not to be conferred until the service required had been rendered. On the other hand, the Prince privately assured the King that the man whom they so much wished to gain was not to be won by a bribe. After scrupulously examining the evidence, I cannot resist a conclusion favourable to the purity of Marnix.

she had—upon the whole, for that intriguing age—been loyal in her bearing towards both parties, she was perhaps not entirely displeased with the result. As her cherished triumvirate was out of the question, it was quite obvious that, now or never, she must come forward to prevent the Provinces from falling back into the hands of Spain. The future was plainly enough foreshadowed, and it was already probable, in case of a prolonged resistance on the part of Holland, that Philip would undertake the reduction of his rebellious subjects by a preliminary conquest of England. It was therefore quite certain that the expense and danger of assisting the Netherlands must devolve upon herself, but, at the same time, it was a consolation that her powerful next-door neighbour was not to be made still more powerful by the annexation to his own dominion of those important territories.

Accordingly, so soon as the deputies in France had received their definite and somewhat ignominious repulse from Henry III. and his mother, the English government lost no time in intimating to the States that they were not to be left without an ally. Queen Elizabeth was however resolutely averse from assuming that sovereignty which she was not unwilling to see offered for her acceptance; and her accredited envoy at the Hague, besides other more secret agents, were as busily employed in the spring of 1585—as Des Pruneaux had been the previous winter on the part of France—to bring about an application, by solemn embassy, for her assistance.

There was, however, a difference of view, from the outset, between the leading politicians of the Netherlands and the English Queen. The Hollanders were extremely desirous of becoming her subjects; for the United States,



although they had already formed themselves into an independent republic, were quite ignorant of their latent powers. The leading personages of the country—those who were soon to become the foremost statesmen of the new commonwealth—were already shrinking from the anarchy which was deemed inseparable from a non-regal form of government, and were seeking protection for and against the people under a foreign sceptre. On the other hand, they were indisposed to mortgage large and important fortified towns, such as Flushing, Brill, and others, for the repayment of the subsidies which Elizabeth might be induced to advance. They preferred to pay in sovereignty rather than in money. The Queen, on the contrary, preferred money to sovereignty, and was not at all inclined to sacrifice economy to ambition. Intending to drive a hard bargain with the States, whose cause was her own, and whose demands for aid she had secretly prompted, she meant to grant a certain number of soldiers for as brief a period as possible, serving at her expense, and to take for such outlay a most ample security in the shape of cautionary towns.

Too intelligent a politician not to feel the absolute necessity of at last coming into the field to help the Netherlanders to fight her own battle, she was still willing, for a season longer, to wear the mask of coyness and coquetry, which she thought most adapted to irritate the Netherlanders into a full compliance with her wishes. Her advisers in the Provinces were inclined to take the same view. It seemed obvious, after the failure in France, that those countries must now become either English or Spanish; yet Elizabeth, knowing the risk of their falling back, from desperation, into the arms of her rival, allowed them to remain for a season on the edge of destruction—which would probably have been her ruin also—in the hope of bringing them to her feet

on her own terms. There was something of feminine art in this policy, and it was not without the success which often attends such insincere manoeuvres. At the same time, as the statesmen of the republic knew that it was the Queen's affair, when so near a neighbour's roof was blazing, they entertained little doubt of ultimately obtaining her alliance. It was pity—in so grave an emergency—that a little frankness could not have been substituted for a good deal of superfluous diplomacy.

Gilpin, a highly intelligent agent of the English government in Zealand, kept sir Francis Walsingham thoroughly informed of the sentiments entertained by the people of that Province towards England. Mixing habitually with the most influential politicians, he was able to render material assistance to the English council in the diplomatic game which had been commenced, and on which a no less important stake than the crown of England was to be hazarded.

„In conference,” he said, „with particular persons that bear any rule or credit, I find a great inclination towards her Majesty, joined notwithstanding with a kind of coldness. They allege that matters of such importance are to be maturely and thoroughly pondered, while some of them harp upon the old string, as if her Majesty, for the security of her own estate, was to have the more care of theirs here.” 1

He was also very careful to insinuate the expediency of diplomatic coquetry into the mind of a Princess who needed no such prompting. „The less by outward appearance,” said he, „this people shall perceive that her Majesty can be contented to take the protection of them upon her, the forwarder they will be to seek and send unto her, and the larger conditions in treaty may be required. For if they see it to come from

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1 Gilpin to Walsingham,  $\frac{6}{16}$  March, 1585.  
S. P. Office MS.

herself, then do they persuade themselves that it is for the greater security of our own country and her Highness to fear the King of Spain's greatness. But if they become seekers unto her Majesty, and if they may, by outward show, deem that she accounteth not of the said King's might, but able and sufficient to defend her own realms, then verily I think they may be brought to whatsoever points her Majesty may desire." 1

Certainly it was an age of intrigue, in which nothing seemed worth getting at all unless it could be got by underhand means, and in which it was thought impossible for two parties to a bargain to meet together except as antagonists, who believed that one could not derive a profit from the transaction unless the other had been overreached. This was neither good morality nor sound diplomacy, and the result of such trifling was much loss of time and great disaster. In accordance with this crafty system, the agent expressed the opinion that it would „be good and requisite for the English government somewhat to temporise," and to dally for a season longer, in order to see what measures the States would take to defend themselves, and how much ability and resources they would show for belligerent purposes. If the Queen were too eager, the Provinces would become jealous, „yielding, as it were, their power, and yet keeping the rudder in their own hands."

At the same time Gilpin was favourably impressed with the character both of the country and the nation, soon to be placed in such important relations with England. „This people," he said, „is such as by fair means they will be won to yield and grant any reasonable motion or demand. What these islands of Zealand are, her Majesty and all my lords of her council do know. Yet for their

government thus much I must write, that during these troubles it was never better than now. They draw, in a manner, one line, long and carefully, in their resolution; but the same once taken and promises made, they would perform them to the uttermost." 1

Such then was the character of the people, for no man was better enabled to form an opinion on the subject than was Gilpin. Had it not been as well, then, for Englishmen—who were themselves in that age, as in every other, apt to „perform to the uttermost promises once taken and made," and to respect those endowed with the same wholesome characteristic—to strike hands at once in a cause which was so vital to both nations?

So soon as the definite refusal of Henry III. was known in England, Leicester and Walsingham wrote at once to the Netherlands. The Earl already saw shining through the distance a brilliant prize for his own ambition, although he was too haughty, perhaps too magnanimous, but certainly far too crafty, to suffer such sentiments as yet to pierce to the surface. „Mr. Davison," he wrote, „you shall perceive by Mr. Secretary's letters how the French have dealt with these people. They are well enough served; but yet I think, if they will heartily seek it, the Lord hath appointed them a far better defence. But you must so use the matter as that they must seek their own good, although we shall be partakers thereof also. They may now, if they will effectually and liberally deal, bring themselves to a better end than ever France would have brought them." 2

At that moment there were two diplomatic agents from the States resident in England—Jacques de Gryze, whom Paul Buys had formerly described as having

1 Ibid.

2 Leicester to Davison,  $\frac{8}{18}$  March, 1585.

1 Gilpin to Walsingham, MS. just cited.

S. P. Office MS.

thrust himself head and shoulders into the matter without proper authority, and Joachim Ortel, a most experienced and intelligent man, speaking and writing English like a native, and thoroughly conversant with English habits and character. So soon as the despatches from France arrived, Walsingham, 18th March, 1585, sent for Ortel, and the two held a long conference. 1

Walsingham.—, We have just received letters from Lord Derby and Sir Edward Stafford, dated the 13th March. They inform us that your deputies—contrary to all expectation and to the great hopes that had been held out to them—have received, last Sunday, their definite answer from the King of France. He tells them, that, considering the present condition of his kingdom, he is unable to undertake the protection of the Netherlands; but says that if they like, and if the Queen of England be willing to second his motion, he is disposed to send a mission of mediation to Spain

1 *Memorie van Ortel & de Gryze*, 24 March, 1585. Hague Archives MS.

It is necessary, once for all, to state that no personage is ever made, in the text, to say or to write anything except what, upon the best evidence of eye and ear witnesses, he is known to have said or written. It is no longer permitted to historians—as was formerly the case, from the times of Livy to those of Cardinal Bentivoglio—to *invent* harangues, letters, and conferences. Where my narrative, for the convenience of the reader, is thrown into a dramatic form, the words—not the substance merely but the *ipsissima verba*—have been gathered from authentic documents. Letters, speeches, and the like, are often translated into the text from various languages—Latin, French, Flemish, Spanish, Italian, German; and—where the sources are English—the spelling, and, in a very slight measure, the diction, have been put into modern garb. But the reader may be sure that he is never made to be present at imaginary conversations, which, however agreeable and instructive in works intentionally fictitious, are quite out of place in those which claim to be historical.

In his instance the account of the conference is derived from the Report made by Envoy Ortel to the States General, preserved in the Royal Archives at the Hague.

for the purpose of begging the King to take the condition of the provinces to heart, and bringing about some honourable composition, and so forth, and so forth.

„Moreover the King of France has sent Monsieur de Bellievre to Lord Derby and Mr. Stafford, and Bellievre has made those envoys a long oration. He explained to them all about the original treaty between the States and Monsieur, the King's brother, and what had taken place from that day to this, concluding, after many allegations and divers reasons, that the King could not trouble himself with the provinces at present; but hoped her Majesty would make the best of it, and not be offended with him,

„The ambassadors say further, that they have had an interview with your deputies, who are excessively provoked at this most unexpected answer from the King, and are making loud complaints, being all determined to take themselves off as fast as possible. The ambassadors have recommended that some of the number should come home by the way of England.”

Ortel.—, It seems necessary to take active measures at once, and to leave no duty undone in this matter. It will be advisable to confer, so soon as may be, with some of the principal counsellors of her Majesty, and recommend to them most earnestly the present condition of the provinces. They know the affectionate confidence which the States entertain towards England, and must now, remembering the sentiments of goodwill which they have expressed towards the Netherlands, be willing to employ their efforts with her Majesty in this emergency.”

Walsingham (with much show of vexation).—, This conduct on the part of the French court has been most pernicious. Your envoys have been delayed, fed with idle hopes, and then disgracefully sent away, so that the best part



of the year has been consumed, and it will be most difficult now, in a great hurry, to get together a sufficient force of horse and foot folk, with other necessities in abundance. On the contrary, the enemy, *who knew from the first what result was to be expected in France*, has been doing his best to be beforehand with you in the field: add, moreover, that this French negotiation has given other princes a bad taste in their mouths. *This is the case with her Majesty.* The Queen is, not without reason, annoyed that the States have not only despised her friendly and good-hearted offers, but have all along been endeavouring to embark her in this war, for the defence of the Provinces, which would have cost her several millions, without offering to her the slightest security. On the contrary, others, enemies of the religion, who are not to be depended upon—who had never deserved well of the States or assisted them in their need, as she has done—have received this large offer of sovereignty without any reserve whatever.”

Ortel (not suffering himself to be disconcerted at this unjust and somewhat insidious attack).—„That which has been transacted with France was not done except with the express approbation and full foreknowledge of her Majesty, so far back as the lifetime of his Excellency (William of Orange), of high and laudable memory. Things had already gone so far, and the Provinces had agreed so entirely together, as to make it inexpedient to bring about a separation in policy. It was our duty to hold together, and, once for all, thoroughly to understand what the King of France, after such manifold presentations through Monsieur Des Pruneaulx and others, and in various letters of his own, finally intended to do. At the same time, notwithstanding these negotiations, we had always an especial eye upon her Majesty. We felt a hopeful confidence that she would never desert

us, leaving us without aid or counsel, but would consider that these affairs do not concern the Provinces alone or even especially, but are just as deeply important to her and to all other princes of the religion.”

After this dialogue, with much more conversation of a similar character, the Secretary and the Envoy set themselves frankly and manfully to work. It was agreed between them that every effort should be made with the leading members of the council to induce the Queen, „in this terrible conjuncture, not to forsake the Provinces, but to extend good counsel and prompt assistance to them in their present embarrassments.”

There was, however, so much business in Parliament just then, that it was impossible to obtain immediately the desired interviews.

On the 20th, Ortel and De Gryze had another interview with Walsingham at the Palace of Greenwich. The Secretary expressed the warmest March 20th, and most sincere affection for 1585. the Provinces, and advised that one of the two envoys should set forth at once for home in order to declare to the States, without loss of time, her Majesty's good inclination to assume the protection of the land, together with the maintenance of the reformed religion and the ancient privileges. Not that she was seeking her own profit, or wished to obtain that sovereignty which had just been offered to another of the contrary religion, but in order to make manifest her affectionate solicitude to preserve the Protestant faith and to support her old allies and neighbours. Nevertheless, as she could not assume this protectorate without embarking in a dangerous war with the King of Spain, in which she would not only be obliged to spend the blood of her subjects, but also at least two millions of gold, there was the more reason that the States should give her certain cities as security. Those cities would be

held by certain of her gentlemen, nominated thereto, of quality, credit, and religion, at the head of good, true, and well-paid garrisons, who should make oath never to surrender them to the King of Spain or to any one else without consent of the States. The Provinces were also reciprocally to bind themselves by oath to make no treaty with the King, without the advice and approval of her Majesty. It was likewise thoroughly to be understood that such cautionary towns should be restored to the States so soon as payment should be made of all moneys advanced during the war.

Next day the envoys had an interview with the Earl of Leicester, whom they found as amicably disposed towards 21st March, their cause as Secretary Walsingham had been. „Her Majesty,” said the Earl, „is excessively indignant with the King of France, that he should so long have abused the Provinces, and at last have dismissed their deputies so contemptuously. Nevertheless,” he continued, „’tis all your own fault to have placed your hopes so entirely upon him as to entirely forget other princes, and more especially her Majesty. Notwithstanding all that has passed, however, I find her fully determined to maintain the cause of the Provinces. For my own part, I am ready to stake my life, estates, and reputation upon this issue, and to stand side by side with other gentlemen in persuading her Majesty to do her utmost for the assistance of your country.”

He intimated however, as Walsingham had done, that the matter of cautionary towns would prove an indispensable condition, and recommended that one of the two envoys should proceed homeward at once, in order to procure, as speedily as possible, the appointment of an embassy for that purpose to her Majesty. „They must bring full powers,” said the Earl, „to give her the neces-

sary guarantees, and make a formal demand for protection; for it would be unbecoming, and against her reputation, to be obliged to present herself, unsought by the other party.”

In conclusion, after many strong expressions of goodwill, Leicester promised to meet them next day at court, where he would address the Queen personally on the subject, and see that they spoke with her as well. Meantime he sent one of his principal gentlemen to keep company with the envoys, and make himself useful to them. This personage, being „of good quality and a member of Parliament,” gave them much useful information, assuring them that there was a strong feeling in England in favour of the Netherlands, and that the matter had been very vigorously taken up in the national legislature. That assembly had been strongly encouraging her Majesty boldly to assume the protectorate, and had manifested a willingness to assist her with the needful. „And if,” said he, „one subsidy should not be enough, she shall have three, four, five, or six, or as much as may be necessary.”

The same day the envoys had an interview with Lord Treasurer Burghley, who held the same language as Walsingham and Leicester had done. „The Queen, to his knowledge,” he said, „was quite ready to assume the protectorate; but it was necessary that it should be formally offered, with the necessary guarantees, and that without further loss of time.”

On the 22nd March, according to agreement, Ortel and De Gryze went to the court at Greenwich. While waiting there for the Queen, who had ridden out into the country, they had more conversation with Walsingham, whom they found even more energetically disposed in their favour than ever, and who assured them that her Majesty was quite ready to assume the protectorate so soon as offered. „Within a month,”

he said, „after the signing of a treaty, the troops would be on the spot, under command of such a personage of quality and religion as would be highly satisfactory.” While they were talking the Queen rode into the court-yard, accompanied by the Earl of Leicester and other gentlemen. Very soon afterwards the envoys were summoned to her presence, and allowed to recommend the affairs of the Provinces to her consideration. She lamented the situation of their country, and in a few words expressed her inclination to render assistance, provided the States would manifest full confidence in her. They replied by offering to take instant measures to gratify all her demands, so soon as those demands should be made known; and the Queen, finding herself surrounded by so many gentlemen and by a crowd of people, appointed them accordingly to come to her private apartments the same afternoon.

At that interview none were present save Walsingham and Lord Chamberlain Howard. The Queen showed herself „extraordinary resolute” to take up the affairs of the Provinces. „She had always been sure,” she said, „that the French negotiation would have no other issue than the one which they had just seen. She was fully aware what a powerful enemy she was about to make—one who could easily create mischief for her in Scotland and Ireland; but she was nevertheless resolved, if the States chose to deal with her frankly and generously, to take them under her protection. She assured the envoys that, if a deputation with full powers and reasonable conditions should be immediately sent to her, she would not delay and dally with them, as had been the case in France, but would despatch them back again at the speediest, and would make her good inclination manifest by deeds as well as words. As she was hazarding her treasure, together with the blood and repose of her subjects, she was not

at liberty to do this except on receipt of proper securities.” 1

Accordingly De Gryze went to the Provinces, provided with complimentary and affectionate letters from the Queen, while Ortel remained in England. So far all was plain and aboveboard; and Walsingham, who, from the first, had been warmly in favour of taking up the Netherland cause, was relieved by being able to write in straightforward language. Stealthy and subtle where the object was to get within the guard of an enemy who menaced a mortal blow, he was, both by nature and policy, disposed to deal frankly with those he called his friends.

„Monsieur de Gryze repaireth presently,” he wrote to Davison, „to try if he can induce the States to send their deputies hither, furnished with more ample instructions than they had to treat with the French King, considering that her Majesty carrieth another manner of princely disposition than that sovereign. Meanwhile, for that she doubteth lest in this hard estate of their affairs, and the distrust they have conceived to be relieved from hence, they should from despair throw themselves into the course of Spain, her pleasure therefore is—though by Burnham I sent you directions to put them in comfort of relief, *only as of yourself*—that you shall now, as it were, in her name, if you see cause sufficient, assure some of the aptest instruments that you shall make choice of for that purpose, that her Majesty, rather than that they should perish, will be content to take them under her protection.”

He added that it was indispensable for the States, upon their part, to offer „such sufficient cautions and assurances as she might in reason demand.” 2

1 *Memorie van de Gryze & Ortel.* MS. before cited.

2 Walsingham to Davison, <sup>13</sup>/<sub>23</sub> March, 1586, S. P. Office MS.



Matters were so well managed that by the 22nd April the States-General addressed a letter to the Queen, in which they notified her that 22nd April, the desired deputation was on 1585. the point of setting forth. „Recognising,” they said, „that there is no prince or potentate to whom they are more obliged than they are to your Majesty, we are about to request you very humbly to accept the sovereignty of these Provinces, and the people of the same for your very humble vassals and subjects.” They added that, as the necessity of the case was great, they hoped the Queen would send, so soon as might be, a force of four or five thousand men for the purpose of relieving the siege of Antwerp. 1

A similar letter was despatched by the same courier to the Earl of Leicester. 2

On the 1st of May, Ortel had audience of the Queen, to deliver the letters from the States-General. He found May 1st, that despatches, very encou- 1585. raging and agreeable in their tenor, had also just arrived from Davison. The Queen was in good humour. She took the letter from Ortel, read it attentively, and paused a good while. Then she assured him that her good affection towards the Provinces was not in the least changed, and that she thanked the States for the confidence in her that they were manifesting. „It is unnecessary,” said the Queen, „for me to repeat over and over again sentiments which I have so plainly declared. You are to assure the States that they shall never be disappointed in the trust that they have reposed in my good intentions. Let them deal with me sincerely, and without holding open any back-door. Not that I am seeking the sovereignty of the Provinces, for I wish only to maintain their

privileges and ancient liberties, and to defend them in this regard against all the world. Let them ripely consider, then, with what fidelity I am espousing their cause, and how, without fear of any one, I am arousing most powerful enemies.” 1

Ortel had afterwards an interview with Leicester, in which the Earl assured him that her Majesty had not in the least changed in her sentiments towards the Provinces. „For myself,” said he, „I am ready, if her Majesty choose to make use of me, to go over there in person, and to place life, property, and all the assistance I can gain from my friends, upon the issue. Yea, with so good a heart, that I pray the Lord may be good to me only so far as I serve faithfully in this cause.” He added a warning that the deputies to be appointed should come with absolute powers, in order that her Majesty’s bountiful intentions might not be retarded by their own fault. 2

Ortel then visited Walsingham at his house, Barn-Elms, where he was confined by illness. Sir Francis assured the envoy that he would use every effort, by letter to her Majesty and by verbal instructions to his son-in-law, Sir Philip Sidney, to further the success of the negotiation, and that he deeply regretted his enforced absence from the court on so important an occasion.

Matters were proceeding most favourably, and the all-important point of sending an auxiliary force of Englishmen to the relief of Antwerp—before it should be too late, and in advance of the final conclusion of the treaty between the countries—had been nearly conceded. Just at that moment, however, „as ill-luck would have it,” said Ortel, „came a letter from Gilpin. I don’t think he meant it in malice, but the effect was most pernicious. 3 He sent the informa-

1 Lettre des Etats Generaux des Provinces Unies a la serenissime Reyne d’Angleterre, 21 April, 1585. Hague Archives, MS.

2 Lettre des Etats au Cte. de Leicester, 21 April, 1585. Hague Archives, MS.

1 Brief van Ortel aan de Staaten Generaal, 8 Mei, 1585. Hague Archives, MS.

2 Ibid.

3 „Nu zynde in al desen geoccupeert,

tion that a new attack was to be made by the 10th May upon the Kowenstyn, that it was sure to be successful, and that the siege of Antwerp was as good as raised. So Lord Burghley informed me, in presence of Lord Leicester, that her Majesty was determined to await the issue of this enterprise. It was quite too late to get troops in readiness to co-operate with the States' army so soon as the 10th May, and, as Antwerp was so sure to be relieved, there was no pressing necessity for haste. I uttered most bitter complaints to these lords and to other counsellors of the Queen, that she should thus draw back, on account of a letter from a single individual, without paying sufficient heed to the despatches from the States-General, who certainly knew their own affairs and their own necessities better than any one else could do, but her Majesty sticks firm to her resolution." 1

Here were immense mistakes committed on all sides. The premature shooting up of those three rockets from the cathedral-tower, on the unlucky 10th May, had thus not only ruined the first assault against the Kowenstyn, but also the second and the more promising adventure. Had the four thousand bold Englishmen there enlisted, and who could have reached the Provinces in time to co-operate in that great enterprise, have stood side by side with the Hollanders, the Zeelanders, and the Antwerpens, upon that fatal dyke, it is almost a certainty that Antwerp would have been relieved, and the whole of Flanders and Brabant permanently annexed to the independent commonwealth, which would have thus assumed at once most imposing proportions.

It was a great blunder of Sainte

Aldegonde to station in the cathedral, on so important an occasion, watchmen in whose judgment he could not thoroughly rely. It was a blunder in Gilpin, intelligent as he generally showed himself, to write in such sanguine style before the event. But it was the greatest blunder of all for Queen Elizabeth to suspend her co-operation at the very instant when, as the result showed, it was likely to prove most successful. It was a chapter of blunders from first to last, but the most fatal of all the errors was the one thus prompted by the great Queen's most traitorous characteristic, her obstinate parsimony.

And now began a series of sharp chafferings on both sides, not very much to the credit of either party. The kingdom of England and the rebellious Provinces of Spain were drawn to each other by an irresistible law of political attraction. Their absorption into each other seemed natural and almost inevitable; and the weight of the strong Protestant organism, had it been thus completed, might have balanced the great Catholic League which was clustering about Spain. It was unfortunate that the two governments of England and the Netherlands should now assume the attitude of traders driving a hard bargain with each other, rather than that of two important commonwealths, upon whose action, at that momentous epoch, the weal and woe of Christendom was hanging. It is quite true that the danger to England was great, but that danger in any event was to be confronted. Philip was to be defied, and, by assuming the cause of the Provinces to be her own, which it unquestionably was, Elizabeth was taking the diadem from her head—as the King of Sweden well observed—and adventuring it upon the doubtful chance of war. 1 Would it not have been better then—her mind being once made up—promptly to accept all

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voert het ongeluck zeker missive van den Secretaris Gilpin, uyt Middelbourg, daertoe, hoewel ick nyet en dencke tzelve uyt eenich malitie by hem geschiet te zyn," &c. (Ibid).

1 Brief van Ortel, &c., just cited.

1 Camden, 321.

the benefits, as well as all the hazards, of the bold game to which she was of necessity a party? But she could not yet believe in the incredible meanness of Henry III. „I asked her Majesty” (3rd May, 1585), said Ortel, „whether, in view of these vast preparations in France, it did not behove her to be most circumspect and upon her guard. For, in the opinion of many men, everything showed one great scheme already laid down—a general conspiracy throughout Christendom against the reformed religion. She answered me, ‘that thus far she could not perceive this to be the case; nor could she believe,’ she said, ‘that the King of France could be so faint-hearted as to submit to such injuries from the Guises.’”<sup>1</sup>

Time was very soon to show the nature of that unhappy monarch with regard to injuries, and to prove to Elizabeth the error she had committed in doubting his faint-heartedness. Meanwhile, time was passing, and the Netherlands were shivering in the storm. They needed the open sunshine which her caution kept too long behind the clouds. For it was now enjoined upon Walsingham to manifest a coldness upon the part of the English government towards the States. Davison was to be allowed to return; „but,” said Sir Francis, „her Majesty would not have you accompany the commissioners who are coming from the Low Countries, but to come over either before them or after them, lest it be thought they come over by her Majesty’s procurement.”<sup>2</sup>

As if they were not coming over by her Majesty’s most especial procurement, and as if it would matter to Philip—the union once made between England and Holland—whether the invitation to that union came first from the one party or the other!

„I am retired for my health from the court to mine own house,” said Walsingham, „but I find those in whose judgment her Majesty reposeth greatest trust so coldly affected unto the cause, as I have no great hope of the matter; and yet, for that the hearts of princes are in the hands of God, who both can and will dispose them at his pleasure, I would be loth to hinder the repair of the commissioners.”<sup>1</sup>

Here certainly had the sun gone most suddenly into a cloud. Sir Francis would be loth to advise the commissioners to stay at home, but he obviously thought them coming on as bootless an errand as that which had taken their colleagues so recently into France.

The cause of the trouble was Flushing. Hence the tears, and the coldness, and the scoldings, on the part of the imperious and the economical Queen. Flushing was the patrimony—a large portion of that which was left to him—of Count Maurice. It was deeply mortgaged for the payment of the debts of William the Silent, but his son Maurice, so long as the elder brother Philip William remained a captive in Spain, wrote himself Marquis of Flushing and Kampveer, and derived both revenue and importance from his rights in that important town. The States of Zeeland, while desirous of a political fusion of the two countries, were averse from the prospect of converting, by exception, their commercial capital into an English city, the remainder of the Provinces remaining meanwhile upon their ancient footing. The negotiations on the subject caused a most ill-timed delay. The States, finding the English government cooling, affected to grow tepid themselves. This was the true mercantile system, perhaps, for managing a transaction most thriftily, but frankness and promptness would have been more statesmanlike at such a juncture.

<sup>1</sup> MS. letter of Ortel, 8 May, 1585, before cited.

<sup>2</sup> Walsingham to Davison, 22 April, 1585, S. P. Office MS.

<sup>1</sup> Ibid.



„I am sorry to understand,” wrote Walsingham, „that the States are not yet grown to a full resolution for the delivering of the town of Flushing into her Majesty's hands. The Queen, finding the people of that island so wavering and inconstant, besides that they can hardly, after the so long enjoying a popular liberty, bear a regal authority, would be loth to embark herself into so dangerous a war without some sufficient caution received from them. It is also greatly to be doubted that if, by practice and corruption, that town might be recovered by the Spaniards, it would put all the rest of the country in peril. I find her Majesty, in case that town may be gotten, fully resolved to receive them into her protection, so as it may also be made probable unto her that the promised three hundred thousand guilders the month will be duly paid.” 1

A day or two after writing this letter, Walsingham sent, one afternoon, in a great hurry, for Ortel, and informed him very secretly, that, according to information just received, the deputies from the States were coming without sufficient authority in regard to this very matter. Thus all the good intentions of the English government were likely to be frustrated, and the Provinces to be reduced to direful extremity.

„What can we possibly advise her Majesty to do?” asked Walsingham, „since you are not willing to put confidence in her intentions. You are trying to bring her into a public war, in which she is to risk her treasure and the blood of her subjects against the greatest potentates of the world, and you hesitate meantime at giving her such security as is required for the very defence of the Provinces themselves. The deputies are coming hither to offer the sovereignty to her Majesty, as was recently done in

France, or, if that should not prove acceptable, they are to ask assistance in men and money upon a mere *taliter qualiter* guaranty. That's not the way. And there are plenty of ill-disposed persons here to take advantage of this position of affairs to ruin the interest of the Provinces now placed on so good a footing. Moreover, in this perpetual sending of despatches back and forth, much precious time is consumed; and this is exactly what our enemies most desire.” 1

In accordance with Walsingham's urgent suggestions, Ortel wrote at once to his constituents, imploring them to remedy this matter. „Do not allow,” he said, „any more time to be wasted. „Let us not painfully build a wall only to knock our own heads against it, to the dismay of our friends and the gratification of our enemies.” 2

It was at last arranged that an important blank should be left in the articles to be brought by the deputies, upon which vacant place the names of certain cautionary towns, afterwards to be agreed upon, were to be inscribed by common consent. Meantime the English ministers were busy in preparing to receive the commissioners, and to bring the Netherland matter handsomely before the legislature.

The integrity, the caution, the thrift, the hesitation, which characterized Elizabeth's government, were well portrayed in the habitual language of the Lord Treasurer, chief minister of a third-rate kingdom now called on to play a first-rate part, thoroughly acquainted with the moral and intellectual power of the nation whose policy he directed, and prophetically conscious of the great destinies which were opening upon her horizon. Lord Burghley could hardly be censured—least of all

1 Minute to Gilpin,  $\frac{8}{17}$  May, 1585. S. P. Office MS.

1 Brief van Ortel aan de Staaten Generaal, 13 Mai, 1585. Hague Archives MS..

2 Brief van Ortel, &c., just cited.

ridiculed—for the patient and somewhat timid attributes of his nature. The ineffable ponderings, which might now be ludicrous, on the part of a minister of the British Empire, with two hundred millions of subjects and near a hundred millions of revenue, were almost inevitable in a man guiding a realm of four millions of people with half a million of income.

It was, on the whole, a strange negotiation this, between England and Holland. A commonwealth had arisen, but was unconscious of the strength which it was to find in the principle of states' union, and of religious equality. It sought, on the contrary, to exchange its federal sovereignty for provincial dependence, and to imitate, to a certain extent, the very intolerance by which it had been driven into revolt. It was not unnatural that the Netherlands should hate the Roman Catholic religion, in the name of which they had endured such infinite tortures, but it is, nevertheless, painful to observe that they requested Queen Elizabeth, whom they styled defender, not of „the faith,” but of the „reformed religion,” to exclude from the Provinces, in case she accepted the sovereignty, the exercise of all religious rites except those belonging to the reformed church. They, however, expressly provided against inquisition into conscience. 1 Private houses were to be sacred, the papists free within their own walls, but the churches were to be closed to those of the ancient faith. This was not so bad as to hang, burn, drown, and bury alive nonconformists, as had been done by Philip and the holy inquisition in the name of the church of Rome; nor

is it very surprising that the horrible past should have caused that church to be regarded with sentiments of such deep-rooted hostility as to make the Hollander shudder at the idea of its re-establishment. Yet, no doubt, it was idle for either Holland or England, at that day, to talk of a reconciliation with Rome. A step had separated them, but it was a step from a precipice. No human power could bridge the chasm. The steep contrast between the league and the counter-league, between the systems of Philip and Mucio, and that of Elizabeth and Olden-Barneveld, ran through the whole world of thought, action, and life.

But still the negotiation between Holland and England was a strange one. Holland wished to give herself entirely, and England feared to accept. Elizabeth, in place of sovereignty, wanted mortgages; while Holland was afraid to give a part, although offering the whole. There was no great inequality between the two countries. Both were instinctively conscious, perhaps, of standing on the edge of a vast expansion. Both felt that they were about to stretch their wings suddenly for a flight over the whole earth. Yet each was a very inferior power, in comparison with the great empires of the past or those which then existed.

It is difficult, without a strong effort of the imagination, to reduce the English empire to the slender proportions which belonged to her in the days of Elizabeth. That epoch was full of light and life. The constellations which have for centuries been shining in the English firmament were then human creatures walking English earth. The captains, statesmen, corsairs, merchant-adventurers, poets, dramatists, the great Queen herself, the Cecils, Raleigh, Walsingham, Drake, Hawkins, Gilbert, Howard, Willoughby, the Norrises, Essex, Leicester, Sidney, Spenser, Shakespeare and the lesser but brilliant

1 Points et Articles concus et arrestes par les etats generaux de Pay Bas pour traicter avec la Serenissime Roynie d'Angleterre sur la souveraineté. Hague Archives, MS.

Art. II. „Sans qu'icelle pourra estre changée ou autre Religion es diets pays exercée. Pourveu toutefois que personne ne sera recherché en sa conscience.”

lights which surrounded him; such were the men who lifted England upon an elevation to which she was not yet entitled by her material grandeur. At last she had done with Rome, and her expansion dated from that moment, Holland and England, by the very condition of their existence, were sworn foes to Philip, Elizabeth stood excommunicated of the Pope. There was hardly a month in which intelligence was not sent by English agents out of the Netherlands and France, that assassins, hired by Philip, were making their way to England to attempt the life of the Queen. The Netherlands were rebels to the Spanish monarch, and they stood, one and all, under death-sentence by Rome. The alliance was inevitable and wholesome. Elizabeth was, however, consistently opposed to the acceptance of a new sovereignty. England was a weak power. Ireland was at her side in a state of chronic rebellion—a stepping-stone for Spain in its already foreshadowed invasion. Scotland was at her back with a strong party of Catholics, stipendiaries of Philip, encouraged by the Guises and periodically inflamed to enthusiasm by the hope of rescuing Mary Stuart from her imprisonment, bringing her rival's head to the block, and elevating the long-suffering martyr upon the throne of all the British Islands. And in the midst of England itself conspiracies were weaving every day. The mortal duel between the two queens was slowly approaching its termination. In the fatal form of Mary was embodied everything most perilous to England's glory and to England's Queen. Mary Stuart meant absolutism at home, subjection to Rome and Spain abroad. The uncle Guises were stipendiaries of Philip, Philip was the slave of the Pope. Mucio had frightened the unlucky Henry III. into submission, and there was no health nor hope in France. For England, Mary Stuart embodied the possible relapse into sloth, depend-

ence, barbarism. For Elizabeth, Mary Stuart embodied sedition, conspiracy, rebellion, battle, murder, and sudden death.

It was not to be wondered at that the Queen thus situated should be cautious, when about throwing down the gauntlet to the greatest powers of the earth. Yet the commissioners from the United States were now on their way to England to propose the throwing of that gauntlet. What now was that England?

Its population was, perhaps, not greater than the numbers which dwell to-day within its capital and immediate suburbs. Its revenue was perhaps equal to the sixtieth part of the annual interest on the present national debt. Single, highly-favoured individuals, not only in England but in other countries cis- and trans-Atlantic, enjoy incomes equal to more than half the amount of Elizabeth's annual budget. London, then containing perhaps one hundred and fifty thousand inhabitants, was hardly so imposing a town as Antwerp, and was inferior in most material respects to Paris and Lisbon. Forty-two hundred children were born every year within its precincts, and the deaths were nearly as many. 1 In plague years, which were only too frequent, as many as twenty and even thirty thousand people had been annually swept away. 2 At the present epoch there are seventeen hundred births every week, and about one thousand deaths.

It is instructive to throw a glance at the character of the English people as it appeared to intelligent foreigners at that day; for the various parts of the world were not then so closely blended, nor did national colours and characteristics flow so liquidly into each other, as is the case in these days of intimate juxtaposition.

1 Meteren, xiii. 243. The historian was, for a long period, resident in London at this epoch.

2 Ibid.



„The English are a very clever, handsome, and well-made people,” says a learned Antwerp historian and merchant, who had resided a long time in London, „but, like all islanders, by nature weak and tender. They are generally fair, particularly the women, who all—even to the peasant women—protect their complexions from the sun with fans and veils, as only the stately gentlewomen do in Germany and the Netherlands. As a people they are stout-hearted, vehement, eager, cruel in war, zealous in attack, little fearing death; not revengeful, but fickle, presumptuous, rash, boastful, deceitful, very suspicious, especially of strangers, whom they despise. They are full of courteous and hypocritical gestures and words, which they consider to imply good manners, civility, and wisdom. They are well spoken, and very hospitable. They feed well, eating much meat, which—owing to the rainy climate and the ranker character of the grass—is not so firm and succulent as the meat of France and the Netherlands. The people are not so laborious as the French and Hollanders, preferring to lead an indolent life, like the Spaniards. The most difficult and ingenious of the handicrafts are in the hands of foreigners, as is the case with the lazy inhabitants of Spain. They feed many sheep, with fine wool, from which, two hundred years ago, they learned to make cloth. They keep many idle servants, and many wild animals for their pleasure, instead of cultivating the soil. They have many ships, but they do not even catch fish enough for their own consumption, but purchase of their neighbours. They dress very elegantly. Their costume is light and costly, but they are very changeable and capricious, altering their fashions every year, both the men and the women. When they go away from home, riding or travelling, they always wear their best clothes, contrary to the habit of other nations. The English language is broken

Dutch, mixed with French and British terms and words, but with a lighter pronunciation. They do not speak from the chest, like the Germans, but prattle only with the tongue”<sup>1</sup>

Here are few statistical facts, but certainly it is curious to see how many national traits thus photographed by a contemporary have quite vanished, and have been exchanged for their very opposites. Certainly the last physiological criticism of all would indicate as great a national metamorphosis, during the last three centuries, as is offered by many other of the writer’s observations.

„With regard to the women,” continues the same authority, „they are entirely in the power of the men, except in matters of life and death, yet they are not kept so closely and strictly as in Spain and elsewhere. They are not locked up, but have free management of their household, like the Netherlands and their other neighbours. They are gay in their clothing, taking well their ease, leaving house-work to the servant-maids, and are fond of sitting, finely-dressed, before their doors to see the passers-by and to be seen of them. In all banquets and dinner-parties they have the most honour, sitting at the upper end of the board, and being served first. Their time is spent in riding, lounging, cardplaying, and making merry with their gossips at childbearings, christenings, churchings, and burials; and all this conduct the men wink at, because such are the customs of the land. They much commend however the industry and careful habits of the German and Netherlands women, who do the work which in England devolves upon the men. Hence, England is called the paradise of married women, for the unmarried girls are kept much more strictly than upon the continent. The women are handsome, white, dressy,

<sup>1</sup> Emanuel van Meteren, „Nederlandsche Historien,” xlii. 243.

modest; although they go freely about the streets without bonnet, hood, or veil; but the noble dames have lately learned to cover their faces with a silken mask or vizard with a plumage of feathers, for they change their fashions every year, to the astonishment of many." 1

Paul Hentzner, a tourist from Germany at precisely the same epoch, touches with equal minuteness on English characteristics. It may be observed, that, with some discrepancies, there is also much similarity in the views of the two critics.

„The English," says the whimsical Paul, „are serious, like the Germans, lovers of show, liking to be followed, wherever they go, by troops of servants, who wear their master's arms, in silver, fastened to their left sleeves, and are justly ridiculed for wearing tails hanging down their backs. They excel in dancing and music, for they are active and lively, although they are of thicker build than the Germans. They cut their hair close on the forehead, letting it hang down on either side. They are good sailors, and better pirates, cunning, treacherous, thievish. Three hundred and upwards are hanged annually in London. Hawking is the favourite sport of the nobility. The English are more polite in eating than the French, devouring less bread, but more meat, which they roast in perfection. They put a great deal of sugar in their drink. Their beds are covered with tapestry, even those of farmers. They are powerful in the field, successful against their enemies, impatient of anything like slavery, vastly fond of great ear-filling noises, such as cannon-firing, drum-beating, and bell-ringing; so that it is very common for a number of them, when they have got a cup too much in their heads, to go up to some belfry, and ring the bells for an hour together, for the sake of the amusement. If they see a for-

eigner very well made or particularly handsome, they will say, 'tis pity he is not an Englishman.'" 1

It is also somewhat amusing, at the present day, to find a German elaborately explaining to his countrymen the mysteries of tobacco-smoking, as they appeared to his unsophisticated eyes in England. „At the theatres and everywhere else," says the traveller, „the English are constantly smoking tobacco in the following manner. They have pipes, made on purpose, of clay. At the farther end of these is a bowl. Into the bowl they put the herb, and then setting fire to it, they draw the smoke into their mouths, which they puff out again through their nostrils, like funnels," 2 and so on; conscientious explanations which a German tourist of our own times might think it superfluous to offer to his compatriots.

It is also instructive to read that the light-fingered gentry of the metropolis were nearly as adroit in their calling as they are at present, after three additional centuries of development for their delicate craft; for the learned Tobias Salander, the travelling companion of Paul Hentzner, finding himself at a Lord Mayor's Show, was eased of his purse, containing nine crowns, as skillfully as the feat could have been done by the best pickpocket of the nineteenth century, much to that learned person's discomfiture. 3

Into such an England and among such English the Netherland envoys had now been despatched on their most important errand.

After twice putting back, through stress of weather, the commissioners, early in July, arrived at London, and were „lodged and very worshipfully appointed at charges of her Majesty in

1 Paulus Hentznerus, *Itinerarium Germaniae, Galliae, Angliae, Italiae*, Breslae, 1617.

2 Paulus Hentznerus, just cited.

3 Ibid.

1 Emanuel van Meteren, just cited.

the Clothworkers' Hall in Pynchon-lane, near Tower-street." 1 About the Tower and its faubourgs the buildings were stated to be as elegant as they were in the city itself, although this was hardly very extravagant commendation. From this district a single street led along the river's strand to Westminster, where were the old and new palaces, the famous hall and abbey, the Parliament chambers, and the bridge to Southwark, built of stone, with twenty arches, sixty feet high, and with rows of shops and dwelling-houses on both its sides. Thence, along the broad and beautiful river, were dotted here and there many stately mansions and villas, residences of bishops and nobles, extending farther and farther west as the city melted rapidly into the country. London itself was a town lying high upon a hill—the hill of Lud—and consisted of a coil of narrow, tortuous, unseemly streets, each with a black, noisome rivulet running through its centre, and with rows of three-storied, leaden-roofed houses, built of timber-work filled in with lime, with many gables, and with the upper stories overhanging and darkening the basements. There were one hundred and twenty-one churches, small and large, the most conspicuous of which was the Cathedral. Old Saint Paul's was not a very magnificent edifice, but it was an extremely large one, for it was seven hundred and twenty feet long, one hundred and thirty broad, and had a massive quadrangular tower, two hundred and sixty feet high. Upon this tower had stood a timber-steeple, rising to a height of five hundred and thirty-four feet from the ground, but it had been struck by lightning in the year 1561, and consumed to the stonework. 2

The Queen's favourite residence was Greenwich Palace, the place of her

birth, and to this mansion, on the 9th of July, the Netherland envoys were conveyed, in royal barges, from the neighbourhood of Pynchonlane, for their first audience.

The deputation was a strong one. There was Falck of Zeeland, a man of consummate adroitness, perhaps not of as satisfactory integrity; „a shrewd fellow and a fine,” as Lord Leicester soon afterwards characterised him. There was Menin, pensionary of Dort, an eloquent and accomplished orator, and employed on this occasion as chief spokesman of the legation—„a deeper man, and, I think, an honest,” said the same personage; adding, with an eye to business, „and he is but poor, which you must consider, but with great secrecy.” 1 There was Paul Buys, whom we have met with before; keen, subtle, somewhat loose of life, very passionate, a most energetic and valuable friend to England, a determined foe to France, who had resigned the important post of Holland's Advocate, when the mission offering sovereignty to Henry III. had been resolved upon, and who had since that period been most influential in procuring the present triumph of the English policy. Through his exertions the Province of Holland had been induced at an early moment to furnish the most ample instructions to the commissioners for the satisfaction of Queen Elizabeth in the great matter of the mortgages. „Judge if this Paul Buys has done his work well,” said a French agent in the Netherlands, who, despite the infamous conduct of his government towards the Provinces, was doing his best to frustrate the subsequent negotiation with England, and whether or no he has Holland under his thumb.” 2 The same individual had conceived hopes from Falck

1 Bruce's, *Leycest. Corresp.* 400.  $\frac{4}{14}$  Sept.

1586.

2 Groen v. Prinsterer, *Archives*, &c., i. 14.

1 Stowe's *Chronicle*, p. 708.

2 Meteren, xiii. 243. Camden, 57.



of Zeeland. That Province, in which lay the great bone of contention between the Queen and the States—the important town of Flushing—was much slower than Holland to agree to the English policy. It is to be feared that Falck was not the most ingenuous and disinterested politician that could be found even in an age not distinguished for frankness or purity; for even while setting forth upon the mission to Elizabeth, he was still clinging, or affecting to cling, to the wretched delusion of French assistance. „I regret infinitely,” said Falck to the French agent just mentioned, „that I am employed in this affair, and that it is necessary in our present straits to have recourse to England. There is—so to speak—not a person in our Province that is inclined that way, all recognising very well that France is much more salutary for us, besides that we all bear her a certain affection. Indeed, if I were assured that the King still felt any goodwill towards us, I would so manage matters that neither the Queen of England nor any other prince whatever except his most Christian Majesty should take a bite at this country, at least at this Province; and with that view, while waiting for news from France, I will keep things in suspense, and spin them out as long as it is possible to do.”<sup>1</sup>

The news from France happened soon to be very conclusive, and it then became difficult even for Falck to believe—after intelligence received of the accord between Henry III. and the Guises—that his Christian Majesty would be inclined for a bite at the Netherlands. This duplicity on the part of so leading a personage furnishes a key to much of the apparent dilatoriness on the part of the English government. It has been seen that Elizabeth, up to the last moment, could not fairly comprehend the ineffable meanness of the French

monarch. She told Ortel that she saw no reason to believe in that great Catholic conspiracy against herself and against all Protestantism which was so soon to be made public by the King's edict of July, promulgated at the very instant of the arrival in England of the Netherland envoys. When that dread fiat had gone forth, the most determined favourer of the French alliance could no longer admit its possibility, and Falck became the more open to that peculiar line of argument which Leicester had suggested with regard to one of the other deputies. „I will do my best,” wrote Walsingham, „to procure that Paul Buys and Falck shall receive underhand some reward.”<sup>1</sup>

Besides Menin, Falck, and Buys, were Noel de Caron, an experienced diplomatist; the poet-soldier, Van der Does, heroic defender of Leyden; De Gryze, Hersolte, Francis Maalzoen, and three legal Frisians of pith and substance, Feitsma, Aisma, and Jongema; 2 a dozen Dutchmen together—as muscular champions as ever little republic sent forth to wrestle with all comers in the slippery ring of diplomacy. For it was instinctively felt that here were conclusions to be tried with a nation of deep, solid thinkers, who were aware that a great crisis in the world's history had occurred, and would put forth their most substantial men to deal with it. Burghley and Walsingham, the great Queen herself, were no feather-weights like the frivolous Henry III. and his minions. It was pity, however, that the discussions about to ensue presented from the outset rather the aspect of a hard-hitting encounter of antagonists than that of a frank and friendly congress between two great parties whose interests were identical.

<sup>1</sup> Walsingham to Davis 23 Oct., 1585. S.  
2 Nov.

P. Office MS.

2 Wagenaar, viii. 90.

<sup>1</sup> Groen v. Prinsterer, just cited.

Since the death of William the Silent there was no one individual in the Netherlands to impersonate the great struggle of the Provinces with Spain and Rome, and to concentrate upon his own head a poetical, dramatic, and yet most legitimate interest. The great purpose of the present history must be found in its illustration of the creative power of civil and religious freedom. Here was a little republic, just born into the world, suddenly bereft of its tutelary saint, left to its own resources, yet already instinct with healthy, vigorous life, and playing its difficult part among friends and enemies with audacity, self-reliance, and success. To a certain extent its achievements were anonymous, but a great principle manifested itself through a series of noble deeds. Statesmen, soldiers, patriots, came forward on all sides to do the work which was to be done, and those who were brought into closest contact with the commonwealth acknowledged in strongest language the signal ability with which, self-guided, she steered her course. Nevertheless, there was at this moment one Netherlander, the chief of the present mission to England, already the foremost statesman of his country, whose name will not soon be effaced from the record of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. That man was John of Olden-Barneveld.

He was now in his thirty-eighth year, having been born at Amersfort on the 14th of September, 1547. <sup>1</sup> He bore an imposing name, for the Olden-Barnevelds of Gelderland were a race of unquestionable and antique nobility. His enemies, however, questioned his right to the descent which he claimed. They did not dispute that the great-grandfather, Claas van Olden-Barneveld, was of distinguished lineage and allied to many illustrious houses, but they denied

that Claas was really the great-grandfather of John. John's father, Geritt, they said, was a nameless outcast, a felon, a murderer, who had escaped the punishment due to his crimes, but had dragged out a miserable existence in the downs, burrowing like a rabbit in the sand. They had also much to say in disparagement of all John's connections. Not only was his father a murderer, but his wife, whom he had married for money, was the child of a most horrible incest, his sisters were prostitutes, his sons and brothers were debauchees and drunkards, and, in short, never had a distinguished man a more uncomfortable and discreditable family-circle than that which surrounded Barneveld, if the report of his enemies was to be believed. <sup>1</sup> Yet it is agreeable to reflect that, with all the venom which they had such power of secreting, these malignant tongues had been unable to destroy the reputation of the man himself. John's character was honourable and upright, his intellectual power not disputed even by those who at a later period hated him the most bitterly. He had been a profound and indefatigable student from his earliest youth. He had read law at Leyden, in France, at Heidelberg. Here, in the head-quarters of German Calvinism, his youthful mind had long pondered the dread themes of foreknowledge, judgment absolute, free will, and predestination. To believe it worth the while of a rational and intelligent Deity to create annually several millions of thinking beings, who were to struggle for a brief period on earth, and to consume in perpetual brimstone afterwards, while others were predestined to endless enjoyment, seemed to him an indifferent exchange for a faith in the purgatory and paradise of Rome. Perplexed in the extreme, the youthful John bethought himself of an inscription over the gate-

<sup>1</sup> Naeranus, 'Historie van het Leven en Sterven van Johan van Olden-Barneveldt,' 1648, p. 8. 'Levensbeschrijving Nederlandscher Mannen en Vrouwen,' ii. 247.

<sup>1</sup> Gulden Legende van den Nieuwen St. Jan,' 1618.

way of his famous but questionable great-grandfather's house at Amersfort—*nil scire tuissima fides*.<sup>1</sup> He resolved thenceforth to adopt a system of ignorance upon matters beyond the flaming walls of the world; to do the work before him manfully and faithfully while he walked the earth, and to trust that a benevolent Creator would devote neither him nor any other man to eternal hell-fire. For this most offensive doctrine he was howled at by the strictly pious, while he earned still deeper opprobrium by daring to advocate religious toleration. In face of the endless horrors inflicted by the Spanish Inquisition upon his native land, he had the hardihood—although a determined Protestant himself—to claim for Roman Catholics the right to exercise their religion in the free States on equal terms with those of the reformed faith. „Any one,” said his enemies, „could smell what that meant who had not a wooden nose.”<sup>2</sup> In brief, he was a liberal Christian, both in theory and practice, and he nobly confronted in consequence the wrath of bigots on both sides. At a later period the most zealous Calvinists called him Pope John, and the opinions to which he was to owe such appellations had already been formed in his mind.

After completing his very thorough legal studies, he had practised as an advocate in Holland and Zeeland. An early defender of civil and religious freedom, he had been brought at an early day into contact with William the Silent, who recognised his ability. He had borne a snap-hance on his shoulder as a volunteer in the memorable attempt to relieve Haarlem, and was one of the few survivors of that bloody night. He had stood outside the walls of Leyden in company of the Prince of Orange when that magnificent destruction of

the dykes had taken place by which the city had been saved from the fate impending over it. At a still more recent period we have seen him landing from the gunboats upon the Kowenstyn, on the fatal 26th May. These military adventures were, however, but brief and accidental episodes in his career, which was that of a statesman and diplomatist. As pensionary of Rotterdam, he was constantly a member of the General Assembly, and had already begun to guide the policy of the new commonwealth. His experience was considerable, and he was now in the high noon of his vigour and his usefulness.<sup>1</sup>

He was a man of noble and imposing presence, with thick hair pushed from a broad forehead rising dome-like above a square and massive face; a strong deeply-coloured physiognomy, with shaggy brow, a chill blue eye, not winning but commanding, high cheek-bones, a solid, somewhat scornful nose, a firm mouth and chin, enveloped in a copious brown beard; the whole head not unfitly framed in the stiff formal ruff of the period; and the tall stately figure well draped in magisterial robes of velvet and sable—such was John of Olden-Barneveld.

The Commissioners thus described arrived at Greenwich Stairs, and were at once ushered into the palace, a residence which had been much enlarged and decorated by Henry VIII. They were received with stately ceremony. The presence-chamber was hung with Gobelin tapestry, its floor strewn with rushes. Fifty gentlemen pensioners, with gilt battle-axes, and a throng of buffeters, or beef-eaters, in that quaint old-world garb which has survived so many centuries, were in attendance, while the counsellors of the Queen, in their robes of state, waited around the throne.

<sup>1</sup> Naeranus, p. 5.

<sup>2</sup> „Waertoe dit alles soude strecken, konnen sy wel ruycken die geen houten neusen hebben.” „Gulden Legende,” p. 83.

<sup>1</sup> Naeranus, l. 14. „Levensbeschrijving,” &c., ii. 246-241.



There, in close skull-cap and dark flowing gown, was the subtle, monastic-looking Walsingham, with long, grave, melancholy face and Spanish eyes. There too, white staff in hand, was Lord High Treasurer Burghley, then sixty-five years of age, with serene blue eye, large, smooth, pale, scarce-wrinkled face and forehead; seeming, with his placid symmetrical features, and great velvet bonnet, under which such silver hairs as remained were soberly tucked away, and with his long dark robes which swept the ground, more like a dignified gentlewoman than a statesman, but for the wintry beard which lay like a snow-drift on his ancient breast.

The Queen was then in the fifty-third year of her age, and considered herself in the full bloom of her beauty. Her garments were of satin and velvet, with fringes of pearl as big as beans. A small gold crown was upon her head, and her red hair, throughout its multiplicity of curls, blazed with diamonds and emeralds. Her forehead was tall, her face long, her complexion fair, her eyes small, dark, and glittering, her nose high and hooked, her lips thin, her teeth black, her bosom white and liberally exposed. As she passed through the ante-chamber to the presence-hall, supplicants presented petitions upon their knees. Wherever she glanced, all prostrated themselves on the ground. The cry of „Long live Queen Elizabeth” was spontaneous and perpetual; the reply, „I thank you, my good people,” was constant and cordial. She spoke to various foreigners in their respective languages, being mistress, besides the Latin and Greek, of French, Spanish, Italian, and German. As the Commissioners were presented to her by Lord Buckhurst it was observed that she was perpetually gloving and ungloving, as if to attract attention to her hand, which was esteemed a wonder of beauty. She spoke French with purity and elegance, but with a drawling, somewhat

affected accent, saying „*Paar maa foi; paar le Dieeu vivaant,*” and so forth, in a style which was ridiculed by Parisians, as she sometimes, to her extreme annoyance, discovered. 1

Joos de Menin, pensionary of Dort, in the name of all the envoys, made an elaborate address. He expressed the gratitude which the States entertained for her past kindness, and particularly for the good offices rendered by Ambassador Davison after the death of the Prince of Orange, and for the deep regret expressed by her Majesty for their disappointment in the hopes they had founded upon France.

„Since the death of the Prince of Orange,” he said, the States have lost many important cities, and now, for the preservation of their existence, they have need of a prince and sovereign lord to defend them against the tyranny and iniquitous oppression of the Spaniards and their adherents, who are more and more determined utterly to destroy their country, and reduce the poor people to a perpetual slavery worse than that of Indians, under the insupportable and detestable yoke of the Spanish Inquisition. We have felt a confidence that your Majesty will not choose to see us perish at the hands of the enemy against whom we have been obliged to sustain this long and cruel war. That war we have undertaken in order to preserve for the poor people their liberty, laws, and franchises, together with the exercise of the true Christian religion, of which your Majesty bears rightfully the title of defender, and against which the enemy and his allies have made so many leagues and devised so many ambushes and stratagems, besides organizing every day so many plots against the life of your Majesty and the safety of your realms—schemes which thus far the good God has averted for the good of Christianity and the

maintenance of His churches. For these reasons, Madam, the States have taken a firm resolution to have recourse to your Majesty, seeing that it is an ordinary thing for all oppressed nations to apply in their calamity to neighbouring princes, and especially to such as are endowed with piety, justice, magnanimity, and other kingly virtues. For this reason we have been deputed to offer to your Majesty the sovereignty over these Provinces, under certain good and equitable conditions, having reference chiefly to the maintenance of the reformed religion and of our ancient liberties and customs. And although, in the course of these long and continued wars, the enemy has obtained possession of many cities and strong places within our country, nevertheless the Provinces of Holland, Zeeland, Utrecht, and Friesland, are, thank God, still entire. And in those lands are many large and stately cities, beautiful and deep rivers, admirable seaports, from which your Majesty and your successors can derive much good fruit and commodity, of which it is scarcely necessary to make a long recital. This point, however, beyond the rest, merits a special consideration, namely, that the conjunction of those Provinces of Holland, Zeeland, Utrecht, and Friesland, together with the cities of Sluys and Ostend, with the kingdoms of your Majesty, carries with it the absolute empire of the great ocean, and consequently an assurance of perpetual felicity for your subjects. We therefore humbly entreat you to agree to our conditions, to accept the sovereign seignory of these Provinces, and consequently to receive the people of the same as your very humble and obedient subjects, under the perpetual safeguard of your crown—a people certainly as faithful and loving towards their princes and sovereign lords, to speak without boasting, as any in all Christendom.

„So doing, Madam, you will preserve

many beautiful churches which it has pleased God to raise up in these lands, now much afflicted and shaken, and you will deliver this country and people—before the iniquitous invasion of the Spaniards, so rich and flourishing by the great commodity of the sea, their ports and rivers, their commerce and manufactures, for all which they have such natural advantages—from ruin and perpetual slavery of body and soul. This will be a truly excellent work, agreeable to God, profitable to Christianity, worthy of immortal praise, and comporting with the heroic virtues of your Majesty, and ensuring the prosperity of your country and people. With this we present to your Majesty our articles and conditions, and pray that the King of kings may preserve you from all your enemies and ever have you in His holy keeping.” 1

The Queen listened intently and very courteously to the delivery of this address, and then made answer in French to this effect:—„Gentlemen,—Had I a thousand tongues I should not be able to express my obligation to you for the great and handsome offers which you have just made. I firmly believe that this proceeds from the true zeal, devotion, and affection, which you have always borne me, and I am certain that you have ever preferred me to all the princes and potentates in the world. Even when you selected the late Duke of Anjou, who was so dear to me, and to whose soul I hope that God has been merciful, I know that you would sooner have offered your country to me if I had desired that you should do so. Certainly I esteem it a great thing that you wish to be governed by me, and I feel so much obliged to you in consequence that I will never abandon you, but, on the contrary, assist you till the

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1 „Vertoog door de Gedeputeerden by monde van der Heere Menin den ix<sup>den</sup> July, 1585, voor de Koningin gedaan,” Hague Archives, MS.

last sigh of my life. I know very well that your princes have treated you ill, and that the Spaniards are endeavouring to ruin you entirely; but I will come to your aid, and I will consider what I can do, consistently with my honour; in regard to the articles which you have brought me. They shall be examined by the members of my council, and I promise that I will not keep you three or four months, for I know very well that they will become ruinous if you are not assisted. It is not my custom to procrastinate, and upon this occasion I shall not dally, as others have done, but let you have my answer very soon." <sup>1</sup>

Certainly, if the Provinces needed a king, which they had most unequivocally declared to be the case, they might have wandered the whole earth over, and, had it been possible, searched through the whole range of history, before finding a monarch with a more kingly spirit than the great Queen to whom they had at last had recourse.

Unfortunately, she was resolute in her refusal to accept the offered sovereignty. The first interview terminated with this exchange of addresses, and the deputies departed in their barges for their lodgings in Pyncheon-lane.

The next two days were passed in perpetual conferences, generally at Lord Burghley's house, between the envoys and the lords of the council, in which the acceptance of the sovereignty was vehemently urged on the part of the Netherlanders, and steadily declined in the name of her Majesty.

"Her Highness," said Burghley, "cannot be induced, by any writing or harangue that you can make, to accept the principality or proprietorship as sovereign, and it will therefore be labour lost for you to exhibit any writing for the purpose of changing her intention. It will be better to content yourselves

with her Majesty's consent to assist you, and to take you under her protection." <sup>1</sup>

Nevertheless, two days afterwards, a writing was exhibited, drawn up by Menin, in which another elaborate effort was made to alter the Queen's determination. This anxiety, on the part of men already the principal personages in a republic, to merge the independent existence of their commonwealth in another and a foreign political organism, proved, at any rate, that they were influenced by patriotic motives alone. It is also instructive to observe the intense language with which the necessity of a central paramount sovereignty for all the Provinces, and the inconveniences of the separate States' right principle were urged by a deputation, *at the head of which stood Olden-Barneveld.* "Although it is not becoming in us," they said, "to inquire into your Majesty's motives for refusing the sovereignty of our country, nevertheless, we cannot help observing that your consent would be most profitable, as well to your Majesty and your successors, as to the Provinces themselves. By your acceptance of the sovereignty the two peoples would be, as it were, united in one body. This would cause a fraternal benevolence between them, and a single reverence, love, and obedience to your Majesty. The two peoples being thus under the government of the same sovereign prince, the intrigues and practices which the enemy could attempt with persons under a separate subjection would of necessity surcease. Moreover, those Provinces are all distinct duchies, counties, seignories, governed by their own magistrates, laws, and ordinances; each by itself, without any authority or command to be exercised by one Province over another. To this end they have need of a supreme power and of one sovereign prince or seignor,

<sup>1</sup> Vertoog, &c., before cited. Compare Bor, ii. 635 seq.; Hoofd Vervolgh, 118.

<sup>1</sup> MS. Report of the Envoys. Comp. Bor, Hoofd, *ubi sup.*



who may command all equally, having a constant regard to the public weal—considered as a generality, and not with regard to the profit of the one or the other individual Province—and causing promptly and universally to be executed such ordinances as may be made in the matter of war or police, according to various emergencies. Each Province, on the contrary, retaining its sovereignty over its own inhabitants, obedience will not be so promptly and completely rendered to the commands of the lieutenant-general of your Majesty, and many a good enterprise and opportunity will be lost. Where there is not a single authority it is always found that one party endeavours to usurp power over another, or to escape doing his duty so thoroughly as the others. And this has notoriously been the case in the matter of contributions, imposts, and similar matters.”<sup>1</sup>

Thus much, and more of similar argument, logically urged, made it sufficiently evident that twenty years of revolt and of hard fighting against one king, had not destroyed in the minds of the leading Netherlands their conviction of the necessity of kingship. If the new commonwealth was likely to remain a republic, it was, at that moment at any rate, because they could not find a king. Certainly they did their best to annex themselves to England, and to become loyal subjects of England's Elizabeth. But the Queen, besides other objections to the course proposed by the Provinces, thought that she could do a better thing in the way of mortgages. In this, perhaps, there was some-

thing of the penny-wise policy which sprang from one great defect in her character. At any rate much mischief was done by the mercantile spirit which dictated the hard chaffering on both sides the Channel at this important juncture; for during this tedious flint-paring, Antwerp, which might have been saved, was falling into the hands of Philip. It should never be forgotten, however, that the Queen had no standing army, and but a small revenue. The men to be sent from England to the Netherlands wars were first to be levied wherever it was possible to find them. In truth, many were pressed in the various wards of London, furnished with red coats and matchlocks at the expense of the citizens, and so despatched, helter-skelter, in small squads as opportunity offered. <sup>1</sup> General Sir John Norris was already superintending these operations, by command of the Queen, before the present formal negotiation with the States had begun.

Subsequently to the 11th July, on which day the second address had been made to Elizabeth, the envoys had many conferences with Leicester, Burgley, Walsingham, and other councillors, without making much progress. There was perpetual wrangling about figures and securities.

„What terms will you pledge for the repayment of the moneys to be advanced?” asked Burghley and Walsingham.

„But if her Majesty takes the sovereignty,” answered the deputies, „there will be no question of guarantees. The Queen will possess our whole land, and there will be no need of any repayment.”

„And we have told you over and over again,” said the Lord Treasurer, „that her Majesty will never think of accepting the sovereignty. She will assist you in money and men, and must be repaid to the last farthing when the war is over; and, until that period, must have solid

<sup>1</sup> Remonstrantie der Gedeputeerden aan H. M. In the MS. Report before cited. Compare Bor, *ubi sup.*, who, as an historian of the States' right and republican party, seems to have been unwilling to give currency to the strong monarchical and centripetal tendencies, thus expressed by men subsequently the representatives of very different doctrines; and so omits these passages altogether from his abstract of the report.

pledges in the shape of a town in each Province." 1

Then came interrogatories as to the amount of troops and funds to be raised respectively by the Queen and the States for the common cause. The Provinces wished her Majesty to pay one-third of the whole expense, while her Majesty was reluctant to pay one-quarter. The States wished a permanent force to be kept on foot in the Netherlands of thirteen thousand infantry and two thousand cavalry for the field, and twenty-three thousand for garrisons. The councillors thought the last item too much. Then there were queries as to the expense of maintaining a force in the Provinces. The envoys reckoned one pound sterling, or ten florins, a month for the pay of each foot soldier, including officers; and for the cavalry, three times as much. This seemed reasonable, and the answers to the inquiries touching the expense of the war-vessels and sailors were equally satisfactory. Nevertheless it was difficult to bring the Queen up to the line of which the envoys had been limited by their instructions. Five thousand foot and one thousand horse serving at the Queen's expense till the war should be concluded, over and above the garrisons for such cautionary towns as should be agreed upon; this was considered, by the States, the minimum. The Queen held out for giving only four thousand foot and four hundred horse, and for deducting the garrisons even from this slender force. As guarantee for the expense thus to be incurred, she required that Flushing and Brill should be placed in her hands. Moreover the position of Antwerp complicated the negotiation. Elizabeth, fully sensible of the importance of preserving that great capital, offered four thousand soldiers to serve until that city should be relieved, requiring repayment within three months after the object should have been ac-

complished. As special guarantee for such repayment she required Sluys and Ostend. 1 This was sharp bargaining, but at any rate, the envoys knew that the Queen, though cavilling to the ninth-part of a hair, was no trifler, and that she meant to perform whatever she should promise.

There was another exchange of speeches at the Palace of Nonesuch, on the 5th August; and the position of affairs and the respective attitudes of the Queen and envoys were plainly characterized by the language then employed.

After an exordium about the cruelty of the Spanish tyranny and the enormous expense entailed by the war upon the Netherlands, Menin, who, as usual, was the spokesman, alluded to the difficulty which the States at last felt in maintaining themselves.

„Five thousand foot and one thousand horse,” he said, „over and above the maintenance of garrisons in the towns to be pledged as security to your Majesty, seemed the very least amount of succour that would be probably obtained from your royal bounty. Considering the great demonstrations of affection and promises of support made as well by your Majesty's own letters as by the mouth of your ambassador Davison, and by our envoys De Gryze and Ortel, who have all declared publicly that your Majesty would never forsake us, the States sent us their deputies to this country in full confidence that such reasonable demands as we had been authorized to make would be satisfied.”

The speaker then proceeded to declare that the offer made by the royal councillors of four thousand foot and four hundred horse, to serve during the war, together with a special force of four thousand for the relief of Antwerp, to be paid for within three months after the siege should be raised, against a concession of the cities of Flushing,

Brill, Slays, and Ostend, did not come within the limitations of the States-General. They therefore begged the Queen to enlarge her offer to the number of five thousand foot and one thousand horse, or at least to allow the envoys to conclude the treaty provisionally, and subject to approval of their constituents. 1

So soon as Menin had concluded his address, her Majesty instantly replied, with much earnestness and fluency of language. 2

„Gentlemen,” she said, „I will answer you upon the first point, because it touches my honour. You say that I promised you, both by letters and through my agent Davison, and also by my own lips, to assist you and never to abandon you, and that this had moved you to come to me at present. Very well, masters; do you not think I am assisting you when I am sending you four thousand foot and four hundred horse to serve during the war? Certainly, I think, yes; and I say frankly that I have never been wanting to my word. No man shall ever say, with truth, that the Queen of England had at any time and ever so slightly failed in her promises, whether to the mightiest monarch, to republics, to gentlemen, or even to private persons of the humblest condition. Am I, then, in your opinion, forsaking you when I send you English blood, which I love, and which is my own blood, and which I am bound to defend, It seems to me, no. For my part, I tell you again that I will never forsake you.

„*Sed de modo?* That is matter for agreement. You are aware, gentlemen, that I have storms to fear from many quarters—from France, Scotland, Ire-

land, and within my own kingdom. What would be said if I looked only on one side, and if on that side I employed all my resources? No, I will give my subjects no cause for murmuring. I know that my councillors desire to manage matters with prudence; *sed ceterum habeo*, and you are to believe, that, of my own motion, I have resolved not to extend my offer of assistance, at present, beyond the amount already stated. But I don't say that at another time I may not be able to do more for you. For my intention is never to abandon your cause, always to assist you, and never more to suffer any foreign nation to have dominion over you.

„It is true that you present me with two places in each of your Provinces. I thank you for them infinitely, and certainly it is a great offer. But it will be said instantly, the Queen of England wishes to embrace and devour everything; while, on the contrary, I only wish to render you assistance. I believe, in truth, that, if other monarchs should have this offer, they would not allow such an opportunity to escape. I do not let it slip because of fears that I entertain for any prince whatever. For to think that I am not aware—doing what I am doing—that I am embarking in a war against the King of Spain is a great mistake. I know very well that the succour which I am affording you will offend him as much as if I should do a great deal more. But what care I? 2 Let him begin, I will answer him. For my part, I say again, that never did fear enter my heart. We must all die once. I know very well that many princes are my enemies, and are seeking my ruin; and that, where malice is joined with force,

1 Discours du Sr Menin au nom des députés des Provinces unies prononcé devant S. M. à Nonsuck le 5 d'Aout, 1685. (Hague Archives, MS.)

2 Reponse de la Reine au Discours precedent. (Hague Archives MS.)

1 „—mais on droit incontinent que la Roynie d'Angleterre vouldroit embrasser et gourmander tout, et moy je ne veulx que vous assister et ayder,” &c. (Discours de la Roynie, &c., MS. *ubi supra*.)

2 „—mais il ne m'en chault.”



malice often arrives at its ends. But I am not so feeble a princess that I have not the means and the will to defend myself against them all. They are seeking to take my life, but it troubles me not. He who is on high has defended me until this hour, and will keep me still, for in Him do I trust.

„As to the other point, you say that your powers are not extensive enough to allow your acceptance of the offer I make you. Nevertheless, if I am not mistaken, I have remarked in passing—for princes look very close to words—that you would be content if I would give you money in place of men, and that your powers speak only of demanding a certain proportion of infantry and another of cavalry. I believe this would be, as you say, an equivalent, *secundum quod*. But I say this only because you govern yourselves so precisely by the measure of your instructions. Nevertheless I don't wish to contest these points with you. For very often *dum Romæ disputator Saguntum perit*. Nevertheless, it would be well for you to decide; and, in any event, I do not think it good that you should all take your departure, but that, on the contrary, you should leave some of your number here. Otherwise it would at once be said that all was broken off, and that I had chosen to do nothing for you; and with this the bad would comfort themselves, and the good would be much discouraged,

„Touching the last point of your demand—according to which you desire a personage of quality—I know, gentlemen, that you do not always agree very well among yourselves, and that it would be good for you to have some one to effect such agreement. For this reason I have always intended, so soon as we should have made our treaty, to send a lord of name and authority to reside with you, to assist you in governing, and to aid, with his advice, in the better direction of your affairs.

„Would to God that Antwerp were relieved! Certainly I should be very glad, and very well content to lose all that I am now expending if that city could be saved. I hope, nevertheless, if it can hold out six weeks longer, that we shall see something good. Already the two thousand men of General Norris have crossed, or are crossing, every day by companies. I will hasten the rest as much as possible; and I assure you, gentlemen, that I will spare no diligence. Nevertheless you may, if you choose, retire with my council, and see if together you can come to some good conclusion.”<sup>1</sup>

Thus spoke Elizabeth, like the wise, courageous, and very parsimonious princess that she was. Alas, it was too true, that Saguntum was perishing while the higgling went on at Rome. Had those two thousand under Sir John Norris and the rest of the four thousand but gone a few weeks earlier, how much happier might have been the result!

Nevertheless, it was thought in England that Antwerp would still hold out; and, meantime, a treaty for 12th Aug. its relief, in combination with 1585. another for permanent assistance to the Provinces, was agreed upon between the envoys and the lords of council.

On the 12th August Menin presented himself at Nonesuch at the head of his colleagues, and, in a formal speech, announced the arrangement which had thus been entered into, subject to the approval of the States.<sup>2</sup> Again Elizabeth, whose „tongue,” in the homely phrase of the Netherlanders, „was wonderfully well hung,”<sup>3</sup> replied with energy and ready eloquence.

„You see, gentlemen,” she said, „that I have opened the door; that I am embarking once for all with you in a war

<sup>1</sup> Discours de la Roïne, &c. (Hague Archives, MS.)

<sup>2</sup> Discours du Sr. Menin. (Hague Archives, MS.)

<sup>3</sup> Hoofd Vervolgh, 119.

against the King of Spain. Very well; I am not anxious about the matter. I hope that God will aid us, and that we shall strike a good blow in your cause. Nevertheless, I pray you, with all my heart, and by the affection you bear me, to treat my soldiers well; for they are my own Englishmen, whom I love as I do myself. Certainly it would be a great cruelty if you should treat them ill, since they are about to hazard their lives so freely in your defence, and I am sure that my request in this regard will be received by you as it deserves.

„In the next place, as you know that I am sending, as commander of these English troops, an honest gentleman, who deserves most highly for his experience in arms, so I am also informed that you have on your side a gentleman of great valour. I pray you, therefore, that good care be taken lest there be misunderstanding between these two, which might prevent them from agreeing well together, when great exploits of war are to be taken in hand. For if that should happen—which God forbid—my succour would be rendered quite useless to you. I name Count Hohenlo, because him alone have I heard mentioned. But I pray you to make the same recommendation to all the colonels and gentlemen in your army; for I should be infinitely sad if misadventures should arise from such a cause, for your interest and my honour are both at stake.

„In the third place, I beg you, at your return, to make a favourable report of me, and to thank the States, in my behalf, for their great offers, which I esteem so highly as to be unable to express my thanks. Tell them that I shall remember them for ever. I consider it a great honour, that, from the commencement, you have ever been so faithful to me, and that with such great constancy you have preferred me to all other princes, and have chosen me for your Queen. And chiefly do I thank the gentlemen of Holland and

Zeeland, who, as I have been informed, were the first who so singularly loved me. And so on my own part I will have a special care of them, and will do my best to uphold them by every possible means, as I will do all the rest who have put their trust in me. But I name Holland and Zeeland more especially, because they have been so constant and faithful in their efforts to assist the rest in shaking off the yoke of the enemy.

„Finally, gentlemen, I beg you to assure the States that I do not decline the sovereignty of your country from any dread of the King of Spain. For I take God to witness that I fear him not; and I hope, with the blessing of God, to make such demonstrations against him, that men shall say the Queen of England does not fear the Spaniards.”<sup>1</sup>

Elizabeth then smote herself upon the breast, and cried, with great energy, *Illa que virgo viri*; and is it not quite the same to you, even if I do not assume the sovereignty, since I intend to protect you, and since therefore the effects will be the same, It is true that the sovereignty would serve to enhance my grandeur, but I am content to do without it, if you, upon your own part, will only do your duty. For myself, I promise you, in truth, that so long as I live, and even to my last sigh, I will never forsake you. Go home and tell this boldly to the States which sent you hither.”<sup>2</sup>

1 Reponce de Sa Majesté. (Hague Archives, MS.) „Car je jure Dieu que je ne le crains pas, et espere avecq l'ayde de Dieu faire telle preuve contre luy, qu'on dira que la Royne d'Angleterre ne craint pas les Espagnols.”

2 Ibid.

„Et frappant sur sa poitrine dict: *Illa que virgo viri*. Ne vous est ce pas tout ung, encoires que je ne prene pas la souverainete, puisque je vous veulx proteger, et que par la vous aurez les mesmes affectz. Il est vray que la souverainete serviroit a moy pour grandeur. Mais je suis bien contente de ne l'avoir pas, et que seulement vous faictes le debvoir requis de votre part. Car

Menin then replied with fresh expressions of thanks and compliments, and requested, in conclusion, that her Majesty would be pleased to send, as soon as possible, a personage of quality to the Netherlands.

„Gentlemen,” replied Elizabeth, „I intend to do this so soon as our treaty shall be ratified, for, in contrary case, the King of Spain, seeing your government continue on its present footing, would do nothing but laugh at us. Certainly I do not mean this year to provide him with so fine a banquet.” 1

The envoys were then dismissed, and soon afterwards a portion of the deputation took their departure from the Netherlands with the proposed treaty. It was however, as we know, quite too late for Saguntum. Two days after the signing of the treaty, the remaining envoys were at the palace of Nonesuch, in conference with the Earl of Leicester, when a gentleman rushed suddenly into the apartment, exclaiming with great manifestations of anger:

„Antwerp has fallen! A treaty has been signed with the Prince of Parma. Aldegonde is the author of it all. He is the culprit who has betrayed us;” with many more expressions of vehement denunciation. 2

de ma part je vous prometz en verité, que si long temps que vivray, et jusques a mon dernier soupir, que je ne vous deslaisseray pas. Ce que pouvez hardiment asseurer et rapporter a Messrs. les Estatz.”

1 „C'est ce que j'entens aussy de faire aussy tost que serons d'accord. Car certes autrement le Roy d'Espagne, voiant la continuation de vostre gouvernement, il ne ferat que rire de nous. Et je ne lui veulx donner pour ceste annee si bon banquet.” (MS. Report, Hague Archives.)

2 „—is corts daernaar by zyne Exce nte camer van haere Mat. door eenen edelman den Gedeputeerden doen bootschappen vant verlies ende overgaen der stadt van Antwerpen aen den vyand op zeker verdrach ofte tractaet metten Prince van Parma gemaect. Daeraff principal autheur ende culpabel werde gehouden den Heere van St. Aldegonde, als de voorn. edelmann opentlyck ende haestich verclaerde, seggende dat de voorn. Aldegonde ons allen verraden hadde,” &c. (MS. Report of the Envoys, Hague Archives.)

The Queen was disappointed, but stood firm. She had been slow in taking her resolution, but she was unflinching when her mind was made up. Instead of retreating from her position, now that it became doubly dangerous, she advanced several steps nearer towards her allies. For it was obvious, if more precious time should be lost, that Holland and Zeeland would share the fate of Antwerp. Already the belief that, with the loss of that city, all had been lost, was spreading both in the Provinces and in England, and Elizabeth felt that the time had indeed come to confront the danger.

Meantime the intrigues of the enemy in the independent Provinces were rife. Blunt Roger Williams wrote in very plain language to 23rd Aug. Walsingham, a very few days after the capitulation of Antwerp:—

„If her Majesty means to have Holland and Zeeland,” said he, „she must resolve presently. Aldegonde hath promised the enemy to bring them to compound. Here arrived already his ministers which knew all his dealings about Antwerp from first to last. Count Maurice is governed altogether by Villiers, and Villiers was never worse for the English than at this hour. To be short, the people say in general, they will accept a peace, unless her Majesty do sovereign them presently. All the men of war will be at her Highness' devotion, if they be in credit in time. What you do, it must be done presently, for I do assure your honour there is large offers presented unto them by the enemies. If her Majesty deals not roundly and resolutely with them now, it will be too late two months hence.” 1

Her Majesty meant to deal roundly and resolutely. Her troops had already

1 Capt. Roger Williams to Walsingham, 13 Augst, 1585. (S. P. Office MS.)  
23



gone in considerable numbers. She wrote encouraging letters with her own hand to the States, imploring them not to falter now, even though the great city had fallen. She had long since promised never to desert them, and she was, if possible, more determined than ever to redeem her pledge. She especially recommended to their consideration General Norris, commander of the forces that been despatched to the relief of Antwerp.

A most accomplished officer, sprung of a house renowned for its romantic valour, Sir John was the second of the six sons of Lord Norris of Rycot, all soldiers of high reputation, „chickens of Mars,” as an old writer expressed himself. „Such a bunch of brethren for eminent achievement,” said he, „was never seen. So great their states and stomachs that they often jostled with others.”<sup>1</sup> Elizabeth called their mother „her own crow;”<sup>2</sup> and the darkness of her hair and visage was thought not unbecoming to her martial issue, by whom it had been inherited. Daughter of Lord Williams of Tame, who had been keeper of the Tower in the time of Elizabeth’s imprisonment, she had been affectionate and serviceable to the Princess in the hour of her distress, and had been rewarded with her favour in the days of her grandeur. We shall often meet this crow-black Norris, and his younger brother Sir Edward—the most daring soldiers of their time, posters of sea and land—wherever the buffeting was closest; or adventure the wildest, on shipboard or shore, for they were men who combined much of the knight-errantry of a vanishing age with the more practical and expansive spirit of adventure that characterized the new epoch.

Nor was he a stranger in the Netherlands, 13 lands. „The gentleman to Aug. 1585. whom we have committed the

government of the forces going to the relief of Antwerp,” said Elizabeth, „has already given you such proofs of his affection by the good services he has rendered you, that, without recommendation on our part, he should stand already recommended. Nevertheless, in respect for his quality, the house from which he is descended, and the valour which he manifested in your own country, we desire to tell you that we hold him dear, and that he deserves also to be dear to you.”<sup>1</sup>

When the fall of Antwerp was certain, the Queen sent Davison, who had been for a brief period in England, back again to his post. „We have learned,” she said in the letter which she sent by that envoy, „with very great regret of the surrender of Antwerp. Fearing lest some apprehension should take possession of the people’s mind in consequence, and that some dangerous change might ensue, we send you our faithful and wellbeloved Davison to represent to you how much we have your affairs at heart, and to say that we are determined to forget nothing that may be necessary to your preservation. Assure yourselves that we shall never fail to accomplish all that he may promise you in our behalf.”<sup>2</sup>

Yet, notwithstanding the gravity of the situation, the thorough discussion that had taken place of the whole matter, and the enormous loss which had resulted from the money-saving insanity upon both sides, even then the busy devil of petty economy was not quite exorcised. Several precious weeks were wasted in renewed chafferings. The Queen was willing that the permanent force should now be raised to five thousand foot and one thousand horse—the additional sixteen hundred men being

<sup>1</sup> Lettre de la Royné aux Etats generaux, 13 Aug. 1585. (Hague Archives MS.)

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<sup>2</sup> Lettre de S. M. contenant credence pour le Sieur Davison, 25 Aug. 1585, (Hague Archives, MS.) + Sept.

<sup>1</sup> „Martis pulli,” Fuller’s ‘Worthies,’ ed. 1611, ii. 227-229.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid.

taken from the Antwerp relieving force—but she insisted that the garrisons for the cautionary towns should be squeezed out of this general contingent. The States, on the contrary, were determined to screw these garrisons out of her grip, as an additional subsidy. Each party complained with reason of the other's closeness. No doubt the States were shrewd bargainers, but it would have been difficult for the sharpest Hollander that ever sent a cargo of herrings to Cadiz to force open Elizabeth's beautiful hand when she chose to shut it close. Walsingham and Leicester were alternately driven to despair by the covetousness of the one party or the other.

It was still uncertain what „personage of quality” was to go to the Netherlands in the Queen's name, to help govern the country. Leicester had professed his readiness to risk his life, estates, and reputation, in the cause, and the States particularly desired his appointment. „The name of your Excellency is so very agreeable to his people,” said they in a letter to the Earl, „as to give promise of a brief and happy end to this grievous and almost immortal war.”<sup>1</sup> The Queen was, or affected to be, still undecided as to the appointment. While waiting week after week for the ratifications of the treaty from Holland, affairs were looking gloomy at home, and her Majesty was growing very uncertain in her temper.

„I see not her Majesty disposed to use the service of the Earl of Leicester,” wrote Walsingham. „I suppose the lot of government will light on Lord Gray. I would to God the ability of his purse were answerable to his sufficiency otherwise.”<sup>2</sup> This was certainly a most

essential deficiency on the part of Lord Gray, and it will soon be seen that the personage of quality to be selected as chief in the arduous and honourable enterprise now on foot would be obliged to rely quite as much on that same ability of purse as upon the sufficiency of his brain or arm. The Queen did not mean to send her favourite forth to purchase anything but honour in the Netherlands; and it was not the Provinces only that were likely to struggle against her parsimony. Yet that parsimony sprang from a nobler motive than the mere love of pelf. Dangers encompassed her on every side; and while husbanding her own exchequer, she was saving her subjects' resources. „Here we are but bookworms,” said Walsingham, „yet from sundry quarters we hear of great practices against this poor crown. The revolt of Scotland is greatly feared, and that out of hand.”<sup>1</sup>

Scotland, France, Spain, these were dangerous enemies and neighbours to a maiden Queen, who had a rebellious Ireland to deal with on one side the Channel, and Alexander of Parma on the other.

Davison experienced great inconvenience and annoyance before the definite arrangements could be made. There is no doubt that the Spanish party had made great progress since the fall of Antwerp. Roger Williams was right in advising the Queen to deal „roundly and resolutely” with the States, and to „sovereign them presently.”

They had need of being sovereigned, for it must be confessed that the self-government which prevailed at that moment was very like no government. The death of Orange, the treachery of Henry III., the triumphs of Parma, disastrous facts, treading rapidly upon each other, had produced a not very unnatural effect. The peace-at-any-price party was struggling hard for the ascendancy, and the

<sup>1</sup> Lettre des etats generaux au Comte de Leicester, afin qu'il pleust a son Ex<sup>te</sup> accepter le commandement de S. M. pour venir pardeça au gouvernement du pays. (Hague Archives MS.

<sup>2</sup> Walsingham to Davison,  $\frac{5}{15}$  Sept. 1585. (S. P. Office MS.

<sup>1</sup> Ibid.

Spanish partizans were doing their best to hold up to suspicion the sharp practice of the English Queen. She was even accused of underhand dealing with Spain, to the disadvantage of the Provinces; so much had slander, anarchy, and despair been able to effect. The States were reluctant to sign those articles with Elizabeth which were absolutely necessary to their salvation.

„In how doubtful and uncertain terms I found things at my coming hither,” wrote Davison to Burghley, „how thwarted and delayed since for a resolution, and with what conditions, and for what reasons I have been finally drawn to conclude with them as I have done, your Lordship may perceive by that I have written to Mr. Secretary. The chief difficulty has rested upon the point of entertaining the garrisons within the towns of assurance, over and besides the five thousand footmen and one thousand horse.”<sup>1</sup>

This, as Davison proceeded to observe, was considered a *sine qua non* by the States, so that, under the perilous circumstances in which both countries were placed, he had felt it his duty to go forward as far as possible to meet their demands. Davison always did his work veraciously, thoroughly, and resolutely; and it was seldom that his advice, in all matters pertaining to Netherland matters, did not prove the very best that could be offered. No man knew better than he the interests and the temper of both countries.

The imperious Elizabeth was not fond of being thwarted, least of all by anything savouring of the democratic principle, and already there was much friction between the Tudor spirit of absolutism and the rough „mechanical” nature with which it was to ally itself in the Netherlands. The economical Elizabeth was not pleased at being over-

reached in a bargain; and, at a moment when she thought herself doing a magnanimous act, she was vexed at the cavilling with which her generosity was received. „’Tis a manner of proceeding,” said Walsingham, „not to be allowed of, and may very well be termed *mechanical*, considering that her Majesty seeketh no interest in that country—as Monsieur and the French King did—but only their good and benefit, without regard had of the expenses of her treasure and the hazard of her subjects’ lives; besides throwing herself into a present war for their sakes with the greatest prince and potentate in Europe. But seeing the government of those countries resteth in the hands of merchants and advocates—the one regarding profit, the other standing upon vantage of quirks—there is no better fruit to be looked to from them.”<sup>1</sup>

Yet it was, after all, no quirk in those merchants and advocates to urge that the Queen was not going to war with the great potentate for their sakes alone. To Elizabeth’s honour, she did thoroughly comprehend that the war of the Netherlands was the war of England, of Protestantism, and of European liberty, and that she could no longer, without courting her own destruction, defer taking a part in active military operations. It was no quirk, then, but solid reasoning, for the States to regard the subject in the same light. Holland and England were embarked in one boat, and were to sink or swim together. It was waste of time to wrangle so fiercely over pounds and shillings, but the fault was not to be exclusively imputed to the one side or the other. There were bitter recriminations, particularly on the part of Elizabeth, for it was not safe to touch too closely either the pride or the pocket of that frugal and despotic heroine. „The two

<sup>1</sup> Davison to Burghley, 24 Sept. 1585. (S. P. Office MS.)

<sup>1</sup> Walsingham to Davison, 23 Oct. 1585. (S. P. Office MS.)



thousand pounds promised by the States to Norris upon the muster of the two thousand volunteers," said Walsingham, „were not paid. Her Majesty is not a little offended therewith, seeing how little care they have to yield her satisfaction, which she imputeth to proceed rather from contempt than from necessity. If it should fall out, however, to be such as by them is pretended, then doth she conceive her bargain to be very ill made, to join her fortune with so weak and broken an estate." 1 Already there were indications that the innocent might be made to suffer for the shortcomings of the real culprits; nor would it be the first time, or by any means the last, for Davison to appear in the character of a scapegoat.

„Surely, sir," continued Mr. Secretary, „it is a thing greatly to be feared, that the contributions they will yield will fall not more true in paper than in payment; which if it should so happen, it would turn some to blame, whereof you among others are to bear your part." 2.

And thus the months of September and of October wore away, and the ratifications of the treaty had not arrived from the Netherlands. Elizabeth became furious, and those of the Netherlands deputation who had remained in England were at their wits' end to appease her choler. No news arrived for many weeks. Those were not the days of steam and magnetic telegraphs—inventions by which the nature of man and the aspect of history seem altered—and the Queen had nothing for it but to fret, and the envoys to concert with her ministers expedients to mitigate her spleen. Towards the end of the month commissioners chartered a vessel which they despatched for news to Holland. On his way across the sea the captain was hailed on the 28th October by a

boat, in which one Hans Wyghans was leisurely proceeding to England with Netherland despatches dated on the 5th of the same month. This was the freshest intelligence that had yet been received.

So soon as the envoys were put in possession of the documents, they obtained an audience of the Queen. This was the last day of October. 31st Oct. Elizabeth read her letters, 1585. and listened to the apologies made by the deputies for the delay with anything but a benignant countenance. Then, with much vehemence of language, and manifestations of ill-temper, she expressed her displeasure at the dilatoriness of the States. Having sent so many troops, and so many gentlemen of quality, she had considered the whole affair concluded.

„I have been unhandsomely treated," she said, „and not as comports with a prince of my quality. My inclination for your support—because you show yourselves unworthy of so great benefits—will be entirely destroyed, unless you deal with me and mine more worthily for the future than you have done in the past. Through my great and especial affection for your welfare, I had ordered the Earl of Leicester to proceed to the Netherlands, and conduct your affairs; a man of such quality as all the world knows, and one whom I love as if he were my own brother. He was getting himself ready in all diligence, putting himself in many perils through the practices of the enemy; and if I should have reason to believe that he would not be respected there according to his due, I should be indeed offended. He and many others are not going thither to advance their own affairs, to make themselves rich, or because they have not means enough to live magnificently at home. They proceed to the Netherlands from pure affection for your cause. This is the cause, too, with many other of my subjects, all dear to me, and of much worth. For I have sent

1 Walsingham to Davison, 23 Oct. 1585.  
(S. P. Office MS.)

2 Ibid.

a fine heap of folk thither—in all, with those his Excellency is taking with him, not under ten thousand soldiers of the English nation. This is no small succour, and no little unbaring of this realm of mine, threatened as it is with war from many quarters. Yet I am seeking no sovereignty, nor anything else prejudicial to the freedom of your country. I wish only, in your utmost need, to help you out of this lamentable war, to maintain for you liberty of conscience, and to see that law and justice are preserved.” 1

All this, and more, with great eagerness of expression and gesture, was urged by the Queen, much to the discomfort of the envoys. In vain they attempted to modify and to explain. Their faltering excuses were swept rapidly away upon the current of royal wrath; until at last Elizabeth stormed herself into exhaustion and comparative tranquillity. She then dismissed them with an assurance that her good-will towards the States was not diminished, as would be found to be the case, did they not continue to prove themselves unworthy of her favour. 2

It was not long, however, before the whole matter was arranged to the satisfaction of all parties. It was agreed that a permanent force of five thousand foot and one thousand horse should serve in the Provinces at the Queen's expense; and that the cities of Flushing and Brill should be placed in her Majesty's hands until the entire reimbursement of the debt thus incurred by the States. Elizabeth also—at last overcoming her reluctance—agreed that the force necessary to garrison these towns should form an additional contingent, instead of being deducted from the general auxiliary force. 3

Count Maurice of Nassau had been confirmed by the States of Holland and Zeeland as permanent stadholder of those provinces. This measure excited some suspicion on the part of Leicester, who, as it was now understood, was the „personage of quality” to be sent to the Netherlands as representative of the Queen's authority. „Touching the election of Count Maurice,” said the Earl, „I hope it will be no impairing of the authority heretofore allotted to me, for, if it will be, I shall tarry but awhile.” 1

Nothing, however, could be more frank or chivalrously devoted than the language of Maurice to the Queen.

„Madam, if I have ever had occasion,” he wrote, „to thank God for his benefits, I confess that it was when, receiving in all humility the letters with which it pleased your Majesty to honour me, I learned that the great disaster of my lord and father's death had not diminished the debonaire affection and favour which it has always pleased your Majesty to manifest to my father's house. It has been likewise grateful to me to learn that your Majesty, surrounded by so many great and important affairs, had been pleased to approve the command which the States-General have conferred upon me. I am indeed grieved that my actions cannot correspond with the ardent desire which I feel to serve your Majesty and these Provinces, for which I hope that my extreme youth will be accepted as an excuse. And although I find myself feeble enough for the charge thus imposed upon me, yet God will assist my efforts to supply by diligence and sincere intention the defect of the other qualities requisite for my thorough discharge of my duty to the contentment of your Majesty. To fulfil these obligations, which are growing greater day

1 Brief der Gedeputeerden in England aan de Staaten General, 1 Nov. 1585. (Hague Archives, MS.)

2 Ibid.

3 Report of the Envoys, MS.; Articles of

Treaty, &c. MS. (Hague Archives). Compare Bor., ii. 664; Hoofd Vervolgh, 123.

1 Leicester to Davison, Nov. 18, 1585. (S. P. Office MS.)

by day, I trust to prove by my actions that I will never spare either my labour or life." 1

When it was found that the important town of Flushing was required as part of the guaranty to the Queen, Maurice, as hereditary seignor and proprietor of the place—during the captivity of his elder brother in Spain—signified his concurrence in the transfer, together with the most friendly feelings towards the Earl of Leicester, and to Sir Philip Sidney, appointed English governor of the town. He wrote to Davison, whom he called „one of the best and most certain friends that the House of Nassau possessed in England," begging that he would recommend the interests of the family to the Queen, „whose favour could do more than anything else in the world towards maintaining what remained of the dignity of their house." 2 After solemn deliberation with his step-mother, Louisa de Coligny, and the other members of his family, he made a formal announcement of adhesion on the part of the House of Nassau to the arrangements concluded with the English government, and asked the benediction of God upon the treaty. While renouncing, for the moment, any compensation for his consent to the pledging of Flushing—„his patrimonial property, and a place of such great importance"—he expressed a confidence that the long services of his father, as well as those which he himself hoped to render, would meet in time with „condign recognition." He requested the Earl of Leicester to consider the friendship which had existed between himself and the late Prince of Orange, as an hereditary affection to be continued to the children,

and he entreated the Earl do him the honour in future to hold him as a son, and to extend to him counsel and authority; declaring, on his part, that he should ever deem it an honour to be allowed to call him father. And in order still more strongly to confirm his friendship, he begged Sir Philip Sidney to consider him as his brother, and as his companion in arms, promising upon his own part the most faithful friendship. In the name of Louisa de Coligny, and of his whole family, he also particularly recommended to the Queen the interests of the eldest brother of the house, Philip William, „who had been so long and so iniquitously detained captive in Spain;" and begged that, in case prisoners of war of high rank should fall into the hands of the English commanders, they might be employed as a means of effecting the liberation of that much-injured Prince. He likewise desired the friendly offices of the Queen to protect the principality of Orange against the possible designs of the French monarch, and intimated that occasions might arise in which the confiscated estates of the family in Burgundy might be recovered through the influence of the Swiss cantons, particularly those of the Grisons and of Berne.

And, in conclusion, in case the Queen should please—as both Count Maurice and the Princess of Orange desired with all their hearts—to assume the sovereignty of these Provinces, she was especially entreated graciously to observe those suggestions regarding the interests of the House of Nassau which had been made in the articles of the treaty. 1

Thus the path had been smoothed, mainly through the indefatigable energy of Davison. Yet that envoy was not able to give satisfaction to his imperious and somewhat whimsical mistress,

1 Count Maurice to the Queen, <sup>10</sup>/<sub>20</sub> Oct. 1585. (S. P. Office MS.) The letter is in French.

2 Maurice de Nassau to Davison, 12 Oct. 1585, Brit. Mus., Galba, C. viii. 176v, MS.; same to same, 25 Oct. 1585, Galba, C. viii. 189b, MS.

1 Louisa de Coligny and Maurice de Nassau to Earl of Leicester, 19 Oct. 1585. (Brit. Mus. Galba, C. viii. 180, MS.)



whose zeal seemed to cool in proportion to the readiness with which the obstacles to her wishes were removed. Davison was, with reason, discontented. He had done more than any other man, either in England or the Provinces, to bring about a hearty co-operation in the common cause, and to allay mutual heartburnings and suspicions. He had also, owing to the negligence of the English treasurer for the Netherlands, and the niggardliness of Elizabeth, been placed in a position of great financial embarrassment. His situation was very irksome.

„I mused at the sentence you sent me,” he wrote, „for I know no cause her Majesty hath to shrink at her charges hitherto. The treasure she hath yet disbursed here is not above five or six thousand pounds, besides that which I have been obliged to take up for the saving of her honour, and necessity of her service, in danger otherwise of some notable disgrace. I will not, for shame, say how I have been left here to myself.”<sup>1</sup>

The delay in the formal appointment of Leicester, and more particularly of the governors for the cautionary towns, was the cause of great confusion and anarchy in the transitional condition of the country. „The burden I am driven to sustain,” said Davison, „doth utterly weary me. If Sir Philip Sidney were here, and if my Lord of Leicester follow not all the sooner, I would use her Majesty’s liberty to return home. If her Majesty think me worthy the reputation of a poor, honest, and loyal servant, I have that contents me. For the rest, I wish

„Vivere sine invidia, mollesque inglorios annos  
Exigere, amicitias et mihi jungere pares.”

There was something almost prophetic in the tone which this faithful public servant—to whom, on more than one

occasion, such hard measure was to be dealt—habitually adopted in his private letters and conversation. He did his work, but he had not his reward; and he was already weary of place without power, and industry without recognition.

„For mine own particular,” he said, „I will say with the poet,

„Crede mihi, bene qui latuit bene viris.”

Et intra fortunam debet quisque manere  
suam.<sup>1</sup>

For, notwithstanding the avidity with which Elizabeth had sought the cautionary towns, and the fierceness with which she had censured the tardiness of the States, she seemed now half inclined to drop the prize which she had so much coveted, and to imitate the very languor which she had so lately rebuked. „She hath what she desired,” said Davison, „and might yet have more, if this content her not. Howsoever you value the places at home, they are esteemed here, by such as know them best, no little increase to her Majesty’s honour, surety, and greatness, if she be as careful to keep them as happy in getting them. Of this our cold beginning doth already make me jealous.”<sup>2</sup>

Sagacious and resolute princess as she was, she showed something of feminine caprice upon this grave occasion. Not Davison alone, but her most confidential ministers and favourites at home, were perplexed and provoked by her misplaced political coquetries. But while the alternation of her hot and cold fits drove her most devoted courtiers out of patience, there was one symptom that remained invariable throughout all her paroxysms, the rigidity with which her hand was locked. Walsingham, stealthy enough when an advantage was to be gained by subtlety, was manifold and determined in his dealings with his friends; and he had more than once been offended with Elizabeth’s want of frankness in these transactions.

<sup>1</sup> Davison to ———, 11 Nov. 1585. (S. P. Office MS.)

<sup>1</sup> Ibid.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid.

„I find you grieved, and not without cause,” he wrote to Davison, „in respect to the over thwart proceedings as well there as here. The disorders in those countries would be easily redressed if we could take a thoroughly resolute course here—a matter that men may rather pray for than hope for. It is very doubtful whether the action now in hand will be accompanied by very hard success, unless they of the country there may be drawn to bear the greatest part of the burden of the wars.”<sup>1</sup>

And now the great favourite of all had received the appointment which he coveted. The Earl of Leicester was to be Commander-in-Chief of her Majesty’s forces in the Netherlands, and representative of her authority in those countries, whatever that office might prove to be. The nature of his post was anomalous from the beginning. It was environed with difficulties, not the least irritating of which proceeded from the capitious spirit of the Queen. The Earl was to proceed in great pomp to Holland, but the pomp was to be prepared mainly at his own expense. Besides the auxiliary forces that had been shipped during the latter period of the year, Leicester was raising a force of lancers, from four to eight hundred in number; but to pay for that levy he was forced to mortgage his own property, while the Queen not only refused to advance ready money, but declined endorsing his bills.

It must be confessed that the Earl’s courtship of Elizabeth was anything at that moment but a gentle dalliance. In those thorny regions of finance were no beds of asphodel or amaranthine bowers. There was no talk but of troopers, salt-petre, and sulphur, of books of assurance, and bills of exchange; and the aspect of Elizabeth, when the budget was under discussion, must effectually

have neutralized for the time any very tender sentiment. The sharpness with which she clipped Leicester’s authority, when authority was indispensable to his dignity, and the heavy demands upon his resources that were the result of her avarice, were obstacles more than enough to the calm fruition of his triumphs. He had succeeded, in appearance at least, in the great object of his ambition, this appointment to the Netherlands; but the appointment was no sinecure, and least of all a promising pecuniary speculation. Elizabeth had told the envoys, with reason, that she was not sending forth that man—whom she loved as a brother—in order that he might make himself rich. On the contrary, the Earl seemed likely to make himself comparatively poor before he got to the Provinces, while his political power, at the moment, did not seem of more hopeful growth.

Leicester had been determined and consistent in this great enterprise from the beginning. He felt intensely the importance of the crisis. He saw that the time had come for swift and uncompromising action; and the impatience with which he bore the fetters imposed upon him may be easily conceived.

„The cause is such,” he wrote to Walsingham, „that I had as lief be dead as be in the case I shall be in if this restraint hold for taking the oath there, or if some more authority be not granted than I see her Majesty would I should have. I trust you all will hold hard for this, or else banish me England withal. I have sent you the books to be signed by her Majesty. I beseech you return them with all haste, for I get no money till they be under seal.”<sup>1</sup>

But her Majesty would not put them under her seal, much to the favourite’s discomfiture.

<sup>1</sup> Minute to Davison, 19 Nov. 1585. (S. P. Office MS.)

<sup>1</sup> Leicester to Walsingham, 3 Dec. 1585 (S. P. Office MS.)

„Your letter yieldeth but cold answer,” he wrote, two days afterwards. „Above all things yet that her Majesty doth stick at, I marvel most at her refusal to sign my book of assurance; for there passeth nothing in the earth against her profit by that act, nor any good to me but to satisfy the creditors, who were more scrupulous than needs. I did complain to her of those who did refuse to lend me money, and she was greatly offended with them. But if her Majesty were to stay this, if I were half seas over, I must of necessity come back again, for I may not go without money. I beseech, if the matter be refused by her, bestow a post on me to Harwich. I lie this night at Sir John Petrus’, and but for this doubt I had been to-morrow at Harwich. I pray God make you all that be counsellors plain and direct to the furtherance of all good service for her Majesty and the realm; and if it be the will of God to plague us that go, and you that tarry, for our sins, yet let us not be negligent to seek to please the Lord.”<sup>1</sup>

The Earl was not negligent at any rate in seeking to please the Queen, but she was singularly hard to please. She had never been so uncertain in her humours as at this important crisis. She knew, and had publicly stated as much, that she was „embarking in a war with the greatest potentate in Europe;” yet now that the voyage had fairly commenced, and the waves were rolling around her, she seemed anxious to put back to the shore. For there was even a whisper of peace-negotiations, than which nothing could have been more ill-timed. „I perceive by your message,” said Leicester to Walsingham, „that your peace with Spain will go fast on, but this is not the way.”<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Leicester to Walsingham, 5 Dec. 1585. (S. P. Office MS.)

<sup>2</sup> Same to same, 3 Dec. 1585. (S. P. Office MS.)

Unquestionably it was not the way, and the whisper was, for the moment at least, suppressed. Meanwhile Leicester had reached Harwich, but the post „bestowed on him,” contained, as usual, but cold comfort. He was resolved, however, to go manfully forward, and do the work before him, until the enterprise should prove wholly impracticable. It is by the light afforded by the secret never-published correspondence of the period with which we are now occupied, that the true characteristics of Elizabeth, the Earl of Leicester, and other prominent personages, must be scanned; and the study is most important, for it was by those characteristics, in combination with other human elements embodied in distant parts of Christendom, that the destiny of the world was determined. In that age, more than in our own perhaps, the influence of the individual was widely and intensely felt. Historical chemistry is only rendered possible by a detection of the subtle emanations, which it was supposed would for ever elude analysis, but which survive in those secret, frequently ciphered intercommunications. Philip II., William of Orange, Queen Elizabeth, Alexander Farnese, Robert Dudley, never dreamed—when disclosing their inmost thoughts to their trusted friends at momentous epochs—that the day would come on earth when those secrets would be no longer hid from the patient inquirer after truth. Well for those whose reputations before the judgment-seat of history appear even comparatively pure, after impartial comparison of their motives with their deeds.

„For mine own part, Mr. Secretary,” wrote Leicester, „I am resolved to do that which shall be fit for a poor man’s honour, and honestly to obey her Majesty’s commandment. Let the rest fall out to others, it shall not concern me. I mean to assemble myself to the camp, where my authority must wholly lie, and will there do that which in good



reason and duty I shall be bound to do. *I am sorry that her Majesty doth deal in this sort, and is content to overthrow so willingly her own cause.* If there can be means to salve this sore, I will. If not,—I tell you what shall become of me, as truly as God lives.”<sup>1</sup>

Yet it is remarkable that, in spite of this dark intimation, the Earl, after all, did not state what was to become of him if the sore was not salved. He was, however, explicit enough as to the causes of his grief, and very vehement in its manifestations. „Another matter which shall concern me deeply,” he said, „and all the subjects there, is now by you to be carefully considered, which is—money. I find that the money is already gone, and this now given to the treasurer will do no more than pay to the end of the month. I beseech you look to it, for, by the Lord! I will bear no more so miserable burdens; for if I have no money to pay them, let them come home, or what else. I will not starve them, nor stay them. There was never gentleman nor general so sent out as I am; and if neither Queen nor council care to help it, but leave men desperate, as I see men shall be, that inconvenience will follow which I trust in the Lord I shall be free of.”<sup>2</sup>

He then used language about himself singularly resembling the phraseology employed by Elizabeth concerning him, when she was scolding the Netherland commissioners for the dilatoriness and parsimony of the States.

„For mine own part,” he said, „I have taken upon me this voyage, not as a desperate nor forlorn man, but as one as well contented with his place and calling at home as any subject was ever. My causé was not, nor is, any other than the Lord’s and the Queen’s. If the Queen fail, yet must I trust in

the Lord, *and on Him, I see, I am wholly to depend.* I can say no more, but pray to God that her Majesty never send general again as I am sent. And yet I will do what I can for her and my country.”<sup>1</sup>

The Earl had raised a choice body of lancers to accompany him to the Netherlands, but the expense of the levy had come mainly upon his own purse. The Queen had advanced five thousand pounds, which was much less than the requisite amount, while for the balance required, as well as for other necessary expenses, she obstinately declined to furnish Leicester with funds, even refusing him, at last, a temporary loan. She violently accused him of cheating her, reclaimed money which he had wrung from her on good security, and when he had repaid the sum, objected to give him a discharge. As for receiving anything by way of salary, that was quite out of the question. At that moment he would have been only too happy to be reimbursed for what he was already out of pocket. Whether Elizabeth loved Leicester as a brother, or better than a brother, may be a historical question, but it is no question at all that she loved money better than she did Leicester. Unhappy the man, whether foe or favourite, who had pecuniary transactions with her Highness.

„I am sorry,” said the Earl, „that her Majesty hath so hard a conceit of me, that I should go about to cozen her, as though I had got a fee simple from her, and had it not before, or that I had not had her full release for payment of the money I borrowed. I pray God, any that did put such scruple in her have not deceived her more than I have done. I thank God I have a clear conscience for deceiving her, and for money matters. I think I may justly say I have been the only cause of more

<sup>1</sup> Leicester to Walsingham, 5 Dec. 1585. (S. P. Office MS.)

<sup>2</sup> Ibid.

<sup>1</sup> Same to same, 5 Dec. 1585. (S. P. Office, MS.)

gain to her coffers than all her chequer-men have been. But so is the hap of some, that all they do is nothing, and others that do nothing, do all, and have all the thanks. But I would this were all the grief I carry with me; but God is my comfort, and on Him I cast all, for there is no surety in this world beside. What hope of help can I have, finding her Majesty so strait with myself as she is? I did trust that—the cause being hers and this realm's—if I could have gotten no money of her merchants, she would not have refused to have lent money on so easy prized land as mine to have been gainer and no loser by it. Her Majesty, I see, will make trial of me how I love her, and what will discourage me from her service. But resolved am I that no worldly respect shall draw me back from my faithful discharge of my duty towards her, though she shall show to hate me, as it goeth very near; for I find no love or favour at all. And I pray you to remember that I have not had one penny of her Majesty towards all these charges of mine—not one penny—and, by all truth I have already laid out above five thousand pounds. Her Majesty appointed eight thousand pounds for the levy, which was after the rate of four hundred horse, and, upon my fidelity, there is shipped, of horse of service, eight hundred, so that there ought eight thousand more to have been paid me. No general that ever went that was not paid to the uttermost of these things before he went, but had cash for his provision, which her Majesty would not allow me—not one groat. Well, let all this go: it is like I shall be the last shall bear this, and some must suffer for the people. Good Mr. Secretary, let her Majesty know this, for I deserve God-a-mercy, at the least." 1

Leicester, to do him justice, was

thoroughly alive to the importance of the crisis. On political principle, at any rate, he was a firm supporter of Protestantism, and even of Puritanism; a form of religion which Elizabeth detested, and in which, with keen instinct, she detected a mutinous element against the divine right of kings. The Earl was quite convinced of the absolute necessity that England should take up the Netherland matter most vigorously, on pain of being herself destroyed. All the most sagacious counsellors of Elizabeth were day by day more and more confirmed in this opinion, and were inclined heartily to support the new Lieutenant-General. As for Leicester himself, while fully conscious of his own merits, and of his firm intent to do his duty, he was also grateful to those who were willing to befriend him in his arduous enterprise.

"I have received a letter from my Lord Willoughby," he said, "to my seeming, as wise a letter as I have read a great while, and not unfit for her Majesty's sight, I pray God open her eyes, that they may behold her present estate indeed, *and the wonderful means that God doth offer unto her. If she lose these opportunities, who can look for other but dishonour and destruction?* My Lord Treasurer hath also written me a most hearty and comfortable letter touching this voyage, not only in showing the importance of it, both for her Majesty's own safety and the realm's, *but that the whole state of religion doth depend thereon*, and therefore doth faithfully promise his whole and best assistance for the supply of all wants. I was not a little glad to receive such a letter from him at this time." 1

And from on board the "Amity," ready to set sail, he expressed his thanks to Burghley, at finding him "so ear-

1 Leicester to Walsingham, 7 Dec. 1585. (S. P. Office MS.)

1 Leicester to Walsingham, 7 Dec. 1585. (S. P. Office MS.)

nestly bent for the good supply and maintenance of us poor men sent in her Majesty's service and our country's." 1

As for Walsingham, earnestly a defender of the Netherland cause from the beginning, he was wearied and disgusted with fighting against the Queen's parsimony and caprice. „He is utterly discouraged," said Leicester to Burghley, „to deal any more in these causes. I pray God your Lordship grow not so too; for then all will to the ground on my poor side especially." 2

And to Sir Francis himself, he wrote, even as his vessel was casting off her moorings:—„I am sorry, Mr. Secretary," he said, „to find you so discouraged, and that her Majesty doth deem you so partial. And yet my suits to her Majesty have not of late been many nor great, while the greatest, I am sure, are for her Majesty's own service. For my part, I will discharge my duty as far as my poor ability and capacity shall serve; and if I shall not have her gracious and princely support and supply, the lack will be to us for the present, but the shame and dishonour will be hers." 3

And with these parting words the Earl committed himself to the December seas.

Davison had been meantime doing his best to prepare the way in the Netherlands for the reception of the English administration. What man could do, without money and without authority, he had done. The governors for Flushing and the Brill, Sir Philip Sidney and Sir Thomas Cecil, eldest son of Lord Burghley, had been appointed, but had not arrived. Their coming was anxiously looked for, as during the interval the condition of the garrisons was deplorable. The English treasurer—by some unaccountable and unpardona-

ble negligence, for which it is to be feared the Queen was herself to blame—was not upon the spot, and Davison was driven out of his wits to devise expedients to save the soldiers from starving.

„Your Lordship has seen by my former letters," wrote the Ambassador to Burghley from Flushing, „what shift 11th Nov. I have been driven to for the 1585. relief of this garrison here, left à l'abandon; without which mean they had all fallen into wild and shameful disorder, to her Majesty's great disgrace and overthrow of her service. I am compelled, unless I would see the poor men famish, and her Majesty dishonoured, to try my poor credit for them." 1

General Sir John Norris was in the Betuwe threatening Nymegen, a town which he found „not so flexible as he had hoped;" 2 and, as he had but two thousand men, while Alexander Farnese was thought to be marching upon him with ten thousand, his position caused great anxiety. Meantime his brother, Sir Edward, a hot-headed and somewhat wilful young man, who „thought that all was too little for him," was giving the sober Davison a good deal of trouble. 3. He had got himself into a quarrel both with that envoy and with Roger Williams, by claiming the right to control military matters in Flushing until the arrival of Sidney. „If Sir Thomas and Sir Philip," said Davison, „do not make choice of more discreet, staid, and expert commanders than those thrust into these places by Mr. Norris, they will do themselves a great deal of worry, and her Majesty a great deal of hurt." 4

As might naturally be expected, the lamentable condition of the English soldiers, unpaid and starving—according to the report of the Queen's envoy

1 Leicester to Burghley. 9 Dec. 1585. (S. P. Office MS.) 2 Ibid.

3 Leicester to Walsingham, 9 Dec. 1585. (S. P. Office MS.)

1 Davison to Burghley, 11 Nov. 1585. Brit. Mus. (Galba, C. viii. p. 217, MS.)

2 Ibid. 3 Ibid. 4 Ibid.



himself—exercised anything but a salutary influence upon the minds of the Netherlands, and perpetually fed the hopes of the Spanish partizans that a composition with Philip and Parma would yet take place. On the other hand, the States had been far more liberal in raising funds than the Queen had shown herself to be, and were somewhat indignant at being perpetually taunted with parsimony by her agents. Davison was offended by the injustice of Norris in this regard. „The complaints which the General hath made of the States to her Majesty,” said he, „are without cause, and I think, when your Lordship shall examine it well, you will find it no little sum they have already disbursed unto him for their part. Wherein, nevertheless, if they had been looked into, they were somewhat the more excusable, considering how ill our people at her Majesty’s entertainment were satisfied hitherto—a thing that doth much prejudice her reputation, and hurt her service.”<sup>1</sup>

At last, however, the die had been cast. The Queen, although rejecting the proposed sovereignty of the Netherlands, had espoused their cause, by solemn treaty of alliance, and thereby had thrown down the gauntlet to Spain. She deemed it necessary, therefore, out of respect for the opinions of mankind, to issue a manifesto of her motives to the world. The document was published simultaneously in Dutch, French, English, and Italian.”<sup>2</sup>

In this solemn state-paper she spoke of the responsibility of princes to the Almighty, of the ancient friendship between England and the Netherlands, of the cruelty and tyranny of the Spaniards, of their violation of the liberties of the Provinces, of their hanging, beheading, banishing without law and against justice, in the space of a few months, so

many of the highest nobles in the land. Although, in the beginning of the cruel persecution, the pretext had been the maintenance of the Catholic religion, yet it was affirmed they had not failed to exercise their barbarity upon Catholics also, and even upon ecclesiastics. Of the principal persons put to death, no one it was asserted, had been more devoted to the ancient church than was the brave Count Egmont, who, for his famous victories in the service of Spain, could never be forgotten in veracious history any more than could be the cruelty of his execution.

The land had been made desolate, continued the Queen, with fire, sword, famine, and murder. These misfortunes had ever been bitterly deplored by friendly nations, and none could more truly regret such sufferings than did the English, the oldest allies and familiar neighbours of the Provinces, who had been as close to them in the olden time by community of connexion and of language, as man and wife. She declared that she had frequently, by amicable embassies, warned her brother of Spain—speaking to him like a good, dear sister and neighbour—that, unless he restrained the cruelty of his governors and their soldiers, he was sure to force his Provinces into allegiance to some other power. She expressed the danger in which she should be placed if the Spaniards succeeded in establishing their absolute government in the Netherlands, from which position their attacks upon England would be incessant. She spoke of the enterprise favoured and set on foot by the Pope and by Spain against the kingdom of Ireland. She alluded to the dismissal of the Spanish envoy, Don Bernardino de Mendoza, who had been treated by her with great regard for a long time, but who had been afterwards discovered in league with certain ill-disposed and seditious subjects of hers, and with publicly condemned traitors. That envoy had arranged a plot,

<sup>1</sup> Davison to Burghley, MS. last cited.

<sup>2</sup> The Declaration is given in Bor. ii. 667-671.

according to which, as appeared by his secret despatches, an invasion of England by a force of men, coming partly from Spain and partly from the Netherlands, might be successfully managed, and he had even noted down the necessary number of ships and men, with various other details. Some of the conspirators had fled, she observed, and were now consorting with Mendoza, who, after his expulsion from England, had been appointed ambassador in Paris; while some had been arrested, and had confessed the plot. So soon as this envoy had been discovered to be the chief of a rebellion and projected invasion, the Queen had requested him, she said, to leave the kingdom within a reasonable time, as one who was the object of deadly hatred to the English people. She had then sent an agent to Spain, in order to explain the whole transaction. That agent had not been allowed even to deliver despatches to the King.

When the French had sought, at a previous period, to establish their authority in Scotland, even as the Spaniards had attempted to do in the Netherlands, and through the enormous ambition of the House of Guise, to undertake the invasion of her kingdom, she had frustrated their plots, even as she meant to suppress these Spanish conspiracies. She spoke of the Prince of Parma as more disposed by nature to mercy and humanity than preceding governors had been, but as unable to restrain the bloodthirstiness of Spaniards, increased by long indulgence. She avowed, in assuming the protection of the Netherlands, and in sending her troops to those countries, but three objects: peace, founded upon the recognition of religious freedom in the Provinces, restoration of their ancient political liberties, and security for England. Never could there be tranquillity for her own realm until these neighbouring countries were tranquil. These were her ends and aims, despite all

that slanderous tongues might invent. The world, she observed, was overflowing with blasphemous libels, calumnies, scandalous pamphlets; for never had the Devil been so busy in supplying evil tongues with venom against the professors of the Christian religion.

She added, that in a pamphlet, ascribed to the Archbishop of Milan, just published, she had been accused of ingratitude to the King of Spain, and of plots to take the life of Alexander Farnese. In answer to the first charge, she willingly acknowledged her obligations to the King of Spain during the reign of her sister. She pronounced it, however, an absolute falsehood that he had ever saved her life, as if she had ever been condemned to death. She likewise denied earnestly the charge regarding the Prince of Parma. She protested herself incapable of such a crime, besides declaring that he had never given her offence. On the contrary, he was a man whom she had ever honoured for the rare qualities that she had noted in him, and for which he had deservedly acquired a high reputation. 1

Such, in brief analysis, was the memorable Declaration of Elizabeth in favour of the Netherlands—a document which was a hardly disguised proclamation of war against Philip. In no age of the world could an unequivocal agreement to assist rebellious subjects, with men and money, against their sovereign, be considered otherwise than as a hostile demonstration. The King of Spain so regarded the movement, and forthwith issued a decree, ordering the seizure of all English as well as all Netherland vessels within his ports, together with the arrest of persons, and confiscation of property.

Subsequently to the publication of the Queen's memorial, and before the departure of the Earl of Leicester, Sir

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1 Declaration, *ubi sup.*

Philip Sidney having received his appointment, together with the rank of general of cavalry, arrived in the Isle of Walcheren, as governor of Flushing, at the head of a portion of the English contingent.

It is impossible not to contemplate with affection so radiant a figure, shining through the cold mists of that Zealand winter, and that distant and disastrous epoch. There is hardly a character in history upon which the imagination can dwell with more unalloyed delight. Not in romantic fiction was there ever created a more attractive incarnation of martial valour, poetic genius, and purity of heart. If the mocking spirit of the soldier of Lepanto could „smile chivalry away,” the name alone of his English contemporary is potent enough to conjure it back again, so long as humanity is alive to the nobler impulses.

„I cannot pass him over in silence,” says a dusty chronicler, „that glorious star, that lively pattern of virtue, and the lovely joy of all the learned sort. It was God’s will that he should be born into the world, even to show unto our age a sample of ancient virtue.”<sup>1</sup> The descendant of an ancient Norman race, and allied to many of the proudest nobles in England, Sidney himself was but a commoner, a private individual, a soldier of fortune. He was now in his thirty-second year, and should have been foremost among the statesmen of Elizabeth, had it not been, according to Lord Bacon, a maxim of the Cecils, that „able men should be by design and of purpose suppressed.” Whatever of truth there may have been in the bitter remark, it is certainly strange that a man so gifted as Sidney—of whom his father-in-law Walsingham had declared, that „although he had influence in all countries, and a hand upon all affairs, his Philip did far overshoot him with

his own bow”<sup>1</sup>—should have passed so much of his life in retirement, or in comparatively insignificant employments. The Queen, as he himself observed, was most apt to interpret everything to his disadvantage. Among those who knew him well, there seems never to have been a dissenting voice. His father, Sir Henry Sidney, lord-deputy of Ireland and president of Wales, a statesman of accomplishments and experience, called him „*lumen familie sue*,” and said of him, with pardonable pride, „that he had the most virtues which he had ever found in any man; that he was the very formular that all well-disposed young gentlemen do form their manners and life by.”<sup>2</sup> The learned Hubert Languet, companion of Melancthon, tried friend of William the Silent, was his fervent admirer and correspondent. The great Prince of Orange held him in high esteem, and sent word to Queen Elizabeth, that having himself been an actor in the most important affairs of Europe, and acquainted with her foremost men, he could „pledge his credit” that her Majesty had one of the ripest and greatest counsellors of state in Sir Philip Sidney that lived in Europe.”<sup>3</sup>

The incidents of his brief and brilliant life, up to his arrival upon the fatal soil of the Netherlands, are too well known to need recalling. Adorned with the best culture that, in a learned age, could be obtained in the best seminaries of his native country, where, during childhood and youth, he had been distinguished for a „lovely and familiar gravity beyond his years,” he rapidly acquired the admiration of his comrades and the esteem of all his teachers.

Travelling for three years, he made the acquaintance and gained the personal regard of such opposite characters

<sup>1</sup> Life of Sidney. by Fulke Greville. Lord Brooke, edited by Sir E. Brydges, p. 23.

<sup>2</sup> Sydney Papers, edited by Collins, i. 246.

<sup>3</sup> Brooke, p. 16, seq.

<sup>1</sup> Camden’s ‚Britannia’ (1637), p. 329.



as Charles IX. of France, Henry of Navarre, Don John of Austria, and William of Orange, and perfected his accomplishments by residence and study, alternately, in courts, camps, and learned universities. He was in Paris during the memorable days of August, 1572, and narrowly escaped perishing in the St. Bartholomew Massacre. On his return, he was, for a brief period, the idol of the English court, which, it was said, „was maimed without his company.”<sup>1</sup> At the age of twenty-one he was appointed special envoy to Vienna, ostensibly for the purpose of congratulating the Emperor Rudolph upon his accession, but in reality that he might take the opportunity of sounding the secret purposes of the protestant princes of Germany, in regard to the great contest of the age. In this mission, young as he was, he acquitted himself, not only to the satisfaction, but to the admiration of Walsingham, certainly a master himself in that occult science, the diplomacy of the sixteenth century. „There hath not been,” said he, „any gentleman, I am sure, that hath gone through so honourable a charge with as great commendations as he.”<sup>2</sup>

When the memorable marriage-project of Queen Elizabeth with Anjou seemed about to take effect, he denounced the scheme in a most spirited and candid letter, addressed to her Majesty; nor is it recorded that the Queen was offended with his frankness. Indeed we are informed that „although he found a sweet stream of sovereign humours in that well-tempered lady to run against him, yet found he safety in herself against that selfness which appeared to threaten him in her.”<sup>3</sup> Whatever this might mean, translated out of euphuism into English, it is certain that this conduct was regarded with small favour by

the court-grandeers, by whom „worth, duty, and justice, were looked upon with no other eyes than Lamia’s.”<sup>1</sup>

The difficulty of swimming against that sweet stream of sovereign humours in the well-tempered Elizabeth, was aggravated by his quarrel, at this period, with the magnificent Oxford. A dispute at a tennis-court, where many courtiers and foreigners were looking on, proceeded rapidly from one extremity to another. The Earl commanded Sir Philip to leave the place. Sir Philip responded, that if he were of a mind that he should go, he was himself of a mind that he should remain; adding that if he had entreated, where he had no right to command, he might have done more than „with the scourge of fury.” „This answer,” says Fulke Greville, in a style worthy of Don Adriano de Armado, „did, like a bellows, blowing up the sparks of excess already kindled, make my lord scornfully call Sir Philip by the name of puppy. In which progress of heat, as the tempest grew more and more vehement within, so did their hearts breathe out their perturbations in a more loud and shrill accent;”<sup>2</sup> and so on; but the impending duel was the next day forbidden by express command of her Majesty. Sidney, not feeling the full force of the royal homily upon the necessity of great deference from gentlemen to their superiors in rank, in order to protect all orders from the insults of plebeians, soon afterwards retired from the court. To his sylvan seclusion the world owes the pastoral and chivalrous romance of the *‘Arcadia,’* and to the pompous Earl, in consequence, an emotion of gratitude. Nevertheless, it was in him to do, rather than to write, and humanity seems defrauded, when forced to accept the *‘Arcadia,’* the *‘Defence of Poesy,’* and the *‘Astrophel and Stella,’* in discharge

<sup>1</sup> Fuller’s *‘Worthies,’* i. 499, ed. 1811.

<sup>2</sup> Naunton, *‘Regalia,’* p. 63.

<sup>3</sup> Brooke, p. 51.

<sup>1</sup> Brooke, p. 51.

<sup>2</sup> Booke, p. 53.

of its claims upon so great and pure a soul.

Notwithstanding this disagreeable affair, and despite the memorable letter against Anjou, Sir Philip suddenly flashes upon us again, as one of the four challengers in a tournament to honour the duke's presence in England. A vision of him in blue gilded armour—with horses caparisoned in cloth of gold, pearl-embroidered, attended by pages in cloth of silver, Venetian hose, laced hats, and by gentlemen, yeomen, and trumpeters, in yellow velvet cassocks, buskins, and feathers—as one of „the four fostered children of virtuous Desire” (to wit, Anjou) storming „the castle of perfect Beauty”<sup>1</sup> (to wit, Queen Elizabeth, ætatis 47) rises out of the cloud-dusts of ancient chronicle for a moment, and then vanishes into air again.

„Having that day his hand, his horse, his lance,

Guided so well that they attained the prize  
Both in the judgment of our English eyes,  
But of some sent by that sweet enemy,  
France,”

as he chivalrously sings, he soon afterwards felt inclined for wider fields of honourable adventure. It was impossible that knight-errant so true should not feel keenest sympathy with an oppressed people struggling against such odds, as the Netherlands were doing in their contest with Spain. So soon as the treaty with England was arranged, it was his ambition to take part in the dark and dangerous enterprise, and, being son-in-law to Walsingham and nephew to Leicester, he had a right to believe that his talents and character would, on this occasion, be recognized. But, like his „very friend,” Lord Willoughby, he was „not of the genus Reptilia, and could neither creep nor crouch,”<sup>2</sup> and he failed, as usual, to win his way

to the Queen's favour. The governorship of Flushing was denied him, and, stung to the heart by such neglect, he determined to seek his fortune beyond the seas.

„Sir Philip hath taken a very hard resolution,” wrote Walsingham to Davison, „to accompany Sir Francis Drake in this voyage, moved thereto for that he saw her Majesty disposed to commit the charge of Flushing unto some other; which he reputed would fall out greatly to his disgrace, to see another preferred before him, both for birth and judgment inferior unto him. The despair thereof and the disgrace that he doubted he should receive have carried him into a different course.”<sup>1</sup>

The Queen, however, relenting at last, interfered to frustrate his design. Having thus balked his ambition in the Indian seas, she felt pledged to offer him the employment which he had originally solicited, and she accordingly conferred upon him the governorship of Flushing, with the rank of general of horse, under the Earl of Leicester. In the latter part of November he cast anchor, in the midst of a violent storm, at Rammekins, and thence came to the city of his government. Young, and looking even younger than his years—„not only of an excellent wit, but extremely beautiful of face”<sup>2</sup>—with delicately chiselled Anglo-Norman features, smooth fair cheek, a faint moustache, blue eyes, and a mass of amber-coloured hair; such was the author of *Arcadia* and the governor of Flushing.

And thus an Anglo-Norman representative of ancient race had come back to the home of his ancestors. Scholar, poet, knight-errant, finished gentleman, he aptly typified the result of seven centuries of civilization upon the wild

<sup>1</sup> Stowe's Continuation of Holinshed, iv. 436 seq.

<sup>2</sup> Naunton, *Regalia*, p. 66.

<sup>1</sup> Walsingham to Davison, 13 Sept. 1585. (S. P. Office MS.)

<sup>2</sup> Expression of Aubrey, cited by Gray, *Life of Sindney*, 61.

Danish pirate. For among these very quicksands of storm-beaten Walachria that wondrous Normandy first came into existence whose wings were to sweep over all the high places of Christendom. Out of these creeks, langunes, and almost inaccessible sand-banks, those bold freebooters sailed forth on their forays against England, France, and other adjacent countries, and here they brought and buried the booty of many a wild adventure. Here, at a later day, Rollo the Dane had that memorable dream of leprosy, the cure of which was the conversion of North Gaul into Normandy, of Pagans into Christians, and the subsequent conquest of every throne in Christendom from Ultima Thule to Byzantium. And now the descendant of those early freebooters had come back to the spot, at a moment when a wider and even more imperial swoop was to be made by their modern representatives. For the sea-kings of the sixteenth century—the Drakes, Hawkinses, Frobishers, Raleighs, Cavendishes—the De Moors, Heemskirks, Barendts—all sprung of the old pirate-lineage, whether called Englishers or Hollanders, and instinct with the same hereditary love of adventure, were about to wrestle with ancient tyrannies, to explore the most inaccessible regions, and to establish new commonwealths in worlds undreamed of by their ancestors—to accomplish, in short, more wondrous feats than had been attempted by the Knuts, and Rollos, Rurics, Rogers, and Tancreds of an earlier age.

The place which Sidney was appointed to govern was one of great military and commercial importance. Flushing was the key to the navigation of the North Seas, ever since the disastrous storm of a century before, in which a great trading city on the outermost verge of the island had been swallowed bodily by the ocean. 2

The Emperor had so thoroughly recognized its value, as to make special mention of the necessity for its preservation, in his private instructions to Philip, and now the Queen of England had confided it to one who was competent to appreciate and to defend the prize. „How great a jewel this place (Flushing) is to the crown of England,” wrote Sidney to his uncle Leicester, „and to the Queen’s safety, I need not now write it to your lordship, who knows it so well. Yet I must needs say, the better I know it, the more I find the preciousness of it.” 1

He did not enter into his government, however, with much pomp and circumstance, but came afoot into Flushing in the midst of winter and foul weather. „Driven to land at Rammekins,” said he, „because the wind began to rise in such sort as our mariners durst not enter the town, I came from thence with as dirty a walk as ever poor governor entered his charge withal.” 2 But he was cordially welcomed, nor did he arrive by any means too soon.

„I find the people very glad of our coming,” he said, „and promise myself as much surety in keeping this town, as popular good-will, gotten by light hopes, and by as slight conceits, may breed; for indeed the garrison is far too weak to command by authority, which is pity. . . . I think, truly, that if my coming had been longer delayed, some alteration would have followed; for the truth is, this people is weary of war, and if they do not see such a course taken as may be likely to defend them, they will in a sudden give over the cause. . . . All will be lost if government be not presently used.” 3

He expressed much anxiety for the arrival of his uncle, with which sentiments he assured the Earl that the Ne-

1 Guicciardini, „Description de tous les Pays Bas”, p. 354.

2 Guicciardini, *in voce*.

1 Sir P. Sidney to Earl of Leicester, 22 Nov. 1585. Brit. Mus. Galba, C. viii. p. 213, MS.

2 Ibid.

3 Ibid.



therlanders fully sympathized. „Your Lordship's coming,” he said, „is as much longed for as Messiah is of the Jews. It is indeed most necessary that your Lordship make great speed to

reform both the Dutch and English abuses.” 1

1 Sir P. Sydney to Earl of Leicester, 22 Nov. 1585. Brit. Mus. Galbo, C. viii. p. 213, MS.

## CHAPTER VII.

The Earl of Leicester—His Triumphant Entrance into Holland—English Spies about him—Importance of Holland to England—Spanish Schemes for invading England—Letter of the Grand commander—Perilous Position of England—True Nature of the Contest—Wealth and Strength of the Provinces—Power of the Dutch and English People—Affection of the Hollanders for the Queen—Secret purposes of Leicester—Wretched Condition of English Troops—The Nassaus and Hohenlo—The Earl's Opinion of them—Clerk and Killigrew—Interview with the States—Government General offered to the Earl—Discussions on the Subject—The Earl accepts the Office—His Ambition and Mistakes—His Installation at the Hague—Intimations of the Queen's Displeasure—Deprecatory Letters of Leicester—Davison's Mission to England—Queen's Anger and Jealousy—Her angry Letters to the Earl and the States—Arrival of Davison—Stormy Interview with the Queen—The second one is calmer—Queen's Wrath somewhat mitigated—Mission of Heneage to the States—Shirley sent to England by the Earl—His Interview with Elizabeth—Leicester's Letters to his Friends—Paltry Conduct of the Earl to Davison—He excuses himself at Davison's Expense—His Letter to Burghley—Effect of the Queen's Letters to the States—Suspicion and Discontent in Holland—States excuse their Conduct of the Queen—Leicester discredited in Holland—Evil Consequences to Holland and England—Magic Effect of a Letter from Leicester—The Queen appeased—Her Letters to the States and the Earl—She permits the granted Authority—Unhappy Results of the Queen's Course—Her variable Moods—She attempts to deceive Walsingham—Her Injustice to Heneage—His Perplexity and Distress—Humiliating Position of Leicester—His melancholy Letters to the Queen—He receives a little Consolation—And writes more cheerfully—The Queen is more benignant—The States less contented than the Earl—His Quarrels with them begin.

At last the Earl of Leicester came. Embarking at Harwich, with a fleet of fifty ships, and attended „by Dec. 9, 19, the flower and chief gallants 1585.

of England” 1—the Lords Sheffield, Willoughby, North, Burroughs, Sir Gervase Clifton, Sir William Russell, Sir Robert Sidney, and others among the number—the new lieutenant-general of the English forces in the Netherlands arrived on the 19th December, 1585, at Flushing. His nephew, Sir Philip Sidney, and Count Maurice of Nassau, with a body of troops and a great procession of civil functionaries, were in readiness to receive him, and to escort him to the lodgings prepared for him. 2

Robert Dudley, Earl of Leicester, was then fifty-four years of age. There are few personages in English history whose adventures, real or fictitious, have been made more familiar to the world than his have been, or whose individuality has been presented in more picturesque fashion, by chronicle, tragedy, or romance. Born in the same day of the month and hour of the day with the Queen, but two years before her birth, the supposed synastry of their destinies 3 might partly account, in that age of astrological superstition, for the influence which he perpetually exerted. They had, moreover, been fellow-prisoners together, in the commencement of the reign of Mary, and it is possible that he may have been the medium through which the indul-

1 Stowe, 711.

2 Bor, ii. 684, 685; Hoofd Vervolgh, 138, 134; Wagenaar, viii. 112 seq.; Stowe, 711; Strada, ii. 408, 409.

3 Naunton, 34, and note.

gent expressions of Philip II. were conveyed to the Princess Elizabeth.

His grandfather, John Dudley, that „caterpillar of the commonwealth,” who lost his head in the first year of Henry VIII. as a reward for the „grist which he brought to the mill”<sup>1</sup> of Henry VII.; his father, the mighty Duke of Northumberland, who rose out of the wreck of an obscure and ruined family to almost regal power, only to perish, like his predecessor, upon the scaffold, had bequeathed him nothing save rapacity, ambition, and the genius to succeed. But Elizabeth seemed to ascend the throne only to bestow gifts upon her favourite. Baronies and earldoms, stars and garters, manors and monopolies, castles and forests, church livings and college chancellorships, advowsons and sinecures, emoluments and dignities, the most copious and the most exalted, were conferred upon him in breathless succession. Wine, oil, currants, velvets, ecclesiastical benefices, university headships, licenses to preach, to teach, to ride, to sail, to pick and to steal, all brought „grist to his mill.” His grandfather, „the horse leach and shearer,” never filled his coffers more rapidly than did Lord Robert, the fortunate courtier. Of his early wedlock with the ill-starred Amy Robsart, of his nuptial projects with the Queen, of his subsequent marriages and mock-marriages with Douglas Sheffield and Lettice of Essex, of his plottings, poisonings, imaginary or otherwise, of his countless intrigues, amatory and political—of that luxuriant, creeping, flaunting, all-pervading existence which struck its fibres into the mould, and coiled itself through the whole fabric, of Elizabeth’s life and reign—of all this the world has long known too much to render a repetition needful here. The inmost nature and the secret deeds of a man placed so high by wealth and station,

can be seen but darkly through the glass of contemporary record. There was no tribunal to sit upon his guilt. A grandee could be judged only when no longer a favourite, and the infatuation of Elizabeth for Leicester terminated only with his life. He stood now upon the soil of the Netherlands in the character of a „Messiah,” yet he had been charged with crimes sufficient to send twenty humbler malefactors to the gibbet. „I think,” said a most malignant arraigner of the man, in a published pamphlet, „that the Earl of Leicester hath more blood lying upon his head at this day, crying for vengeance, than ever had private man before, were he never so wicked.”<sup>1</sup>

Certainly the mass of misdemeanours and infamies hurled at the head of the favourite by that „green-coated Jesuit,” father Parsons, under the title of *Leycester’s Commonwealth*,<sup>1</sup> were never accepted as literal verities; yet the value of the precept, to calumniate boldly, with the certainty that much of the calumny would last for ever, was never better illustrated than in the case of Robert Dudley. Besides the lesser delinquencies of filling his purse by the sale of honours and dignities, by violent ejectments from land, fraudulent titles, rapacious enclosures of commons, by taking bribes for matters of justice, grace, and supplication to the royal authority, he was accused of forging various letters to the Queen, often to ruin his political adversaries, and of plottings to entrap them into conspiracies, playing first the comrade and then the informer. The list of his murders and attempts to murder was almost endless. „His lordship hath a special fortune,” said the Jesuit, „that when

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<sup>1</sup> *Leycester’s Commonwealth*: conceived, spoken, and published with most earnest protestation of all dutiful goodwill and affection towards the realm, for whose good only it is made common to many (by Robt. Parsons), 4to. London. 1641.

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<sup>1</sup> Expression of Lord Bacon.

he desireth any woman's favour, whatsoever person standeth in his way hath the luck to die quickly." 1 He was said to have poisoned Alice Drayton, Lady Lennox, Lord Sussex, Sir Nicholas Throgmorton, Lord Sheffield, whose widow he married and then poisoned, Lord Essex, whose widow he also married and intended to poison, but who was said to have subsequently poisoned him—besides murders or schemes for murder of various other individuals, both French and English. 2 „He was a rare artist in poison," said Sir Robert Naunton, 3 and certainly not Cæsar Borgia, nor his father or sister, was more accomplished in that difficult profession than was Dudley, if half the charges against him could be believed. Fortunately for his fame, many of them were proved to be false. Sir Henry Sidney, lord deputy of Ireland, at the time of the death of Lord Essex, having caused a diligent inquiry to be made into that dark affair, wrote to the council that it was usual for the Earl to fall into a bloody flux when disturbed in his mind, and that his body when opened showed no signs of poison. 4 It is true that Sir Henry, although an honourable man, was Leicester's brother-in-law, and that perhaps an autopsy was not conducted at that day in Ireland on very scientific principles.

His participation in the strange death of his first wife was a matter of current belief among his contemporaries. „He is infamed by the death of his wife," said Burghley, 5 and the tale has since become so interwoven with classic and legendary fiction, as well as with more authentic history, that the phantom of the murdered Amy Robsart is sure to arise at every mention of the Earl's name. Yet a coroner's inquest—as ap-

pears from his own secret correspondence with his relative and agent at Cumnor—was immediately and persistently demanded by Dudley. A jury was impannelled—every man of them a stranger to him, and some of them enemies. Antony Forster, Appleyard, and Arthur Robsart, brother-in-law and brother of the lady, were present, according to Dudley's special request; „and if more of her friends could have been sent," said he, „I would have sent them;" but with all their minuteness of inquiry, „they could find," wrote Blount, „no presumptions of evil," although he expressed a suspicion that „some of the jurymen were sorry that they could not." That the unfortunate lady was killed by a fall down stairs was all that could be made of it by a coroner's inquest, rather hostile than otherwise, and urged to rigorous investigation by the supposed culprit himself. 1 Nevertheless, the calumny has endured for three centuries, and is like to survive as many more.

Whatever crimes Dudley may have committed in the course of his career, there is no doubt whatever that he was the most abused man in Europe. He had been deeply wounded by the Jesuit's artful publication, in which all the misdeeds with which he was falsely or justly charged were drawn up in awful array, in a form half colloquial, half judicial, „You had better give some contentment to my Lord Leicester," wrote the French envoy from London to his government, „on account of the bitter feelings excited in him by these villanous books lately written against him." 2

1 Abstract of the Correspondence preserved in the Pepysian Library at Cambridge, between Lord Robert Dudley and Thomas Blount, an agent of his at Cumnor, during the inquest held on Amy Robsart, published in Craik, *Romance of the Peerage*.

2 — „il sera bon de donner quelque contentement au dict sieur Conte de Lestre pour ce qu'il a sy affection de ces vilains

1 Leicester's *Commonwealth*, *ut sup.*

2 *Ibid.*

3 Naunton, *Regalia*, 43, 44.

4 Sydney Papers, by Collins, i. 43.

5 Lodge, ii. 202.



The Earl himself ascribed these calumnies to the Jesuits, to the Guise faction, and particularly to the Queen of Scots. He was said, in consequence, to have vowed an eternal hatred to that most unfortunate and most intriguing Princess. „Leicester has lately told a friend,” wrote Charles Paget, „that he will persecute you to the uttermost, for that he supposeth your Majesty to be privy to the setting forth of the book against him.”<sup>1</sup> Nevertheless, calumniated or innocent, he was at least triumphant over calumny. Nothing could shake his hold upon Elizabeth’s affections. The Queen scorned but resented the malignant attacks upon the reputation of her favourite. She declared „before God and in her conscience, that she knew the libels against him to be most scandalous, and such as none but an incarnate devil himself could dream to be true.” His power, founded not upon genius nor virtue, but upon woman’s caprice, shone serenely above the gulf where there had been so many shipwrecks. „I am now passing into another world,” said Sussex, upon his death-bed, to his friends, „and I must leave you to your fortunes, but beware of the gipsy, or he will be too hard for you. You know not the beast so well as I do.”<sup>2</sup>

The „gipsy,” as he had been called from his dark complexion, had been renowned in youth for the beauty of his person, being „tall and singularly well-featured, of a sweet aspect, but high foreheaded, which was of no discommendation,” according to Naunton. The Queen, who had the passion of her father for tall and proper men, was easier won by externals, from her youth even to the days of her dotage, than befitted so very sagacious a personage.

Chamberlains, squires of the body, carvers, cup-bearers, gentlemen-ushers, porters, could obtain neither place nor favour at court, unless distinguished for stature, strength, or extraordinary activity. To lose a tooth had been known to cause the loss of a place, and the excellent constitution of leg which helped Sir Christopher Hatton into the chancellorship, was not more remarkable perhaps than the success of similar endowments in other contemporaries. Leicester, although stately and imposing, had passed his summer solstice. A big bulky man, with a long red face, a bald head, a defiant somewhat sinister eye, a high nose, and a little torrent of foam-white curly beard, he was still magnificent in costume. Rustling in satin and feathers, with jewels in his ears, and his velvet toque stuck as airily as ever upon the side of his head, he amazed the honest Hollanders, who had been used to less gorgeous chieftains. „Every body is wondering at the great magnificence and splendour of his clothes,”<sup>1</sup> said the plain chronicler of Utrecht. For, not much more than a year before, Fulke Greville had met at Delft a man whose external adornments were simpler; a somewhat slipshod personage, whom he thus portrayed:—„His uppermost garment was a gown,” said the euphuistic Fulke, „yet such as, I confidently affirm, a mean-born student of our Inns of Court would not have been well disposed to walk the streets in. Unbuttoned his doublet was, and of like precious matter and form to the other. His waistcoat, which showed itself, under it, not unlike the best sort of those woollen knit ones which our ordinary barge-watermen row us in. His company about him, the burgesses of that beer-brewing town. *No external sign of degree could have discovered the inequality of his worth or estate from that multitude.* Nevertheless, upon conversing with him, there

livres fetz contre luy,” &c. (Castelnau Mauvissiere à M. de Brulart, Brieune, MS.)

<sup>1</sup> Charles Paget to Queen of Scots, 14 Jan. 1585, in Murdin, ii. 439.

<sup>2</sup> Naunton, p. 49.

<sup>1</sup> Bor, ii. 685.

was an outward passage of inward greatness." 1

Of a certainty there must have been an outward passage of inward greatness about him; for the individual in unbuttoned doublet, and bargeman's waist-coast, was no other than *William the Silent*. A different kind of leader had now descended among those rebels, yet it would be a great mistake to deny the capacity or vigorous intentions of the magnificent Earl, who certainly was like to find himself in a more difficult and responsible situation than any he had yet occupied.

And now began a triumphal progress through the land, with a series of mighty banquets and festivities, in which no man could play a better part than Leicester. From Flushing he came to Middelburg, where, upon Christmas eve (according to the new reckoning), there was an entertainment, every dish of which has been duly chronicled. Pigs served on their feet, pheasants in their feathers, and baked swans with their necks thrust through gigantic piecrust; crystal castles of confectionery with silver streams flowing at their base, and fair virgins leaning from the battlements, looking for their new English champion, „wine in abundance, variety of all sorts, and wonderful welcomes" 2—such was the bill of fare. The next day the Lieutenant-General returned the compliment to the magistrates of Middelburg with a tremendous feast. Then came an interlude of unexpected famine; for as the Earl sailed with his suite in a fleet of two hundred vessels for Dort—a voyage of not many hours' usual duration—there descended a mighty frozen fog upon the waters, and they lay five whole days and nights in their ships, almost starved with hunger and cold—offering in vain a „pound of silver for

a pound of bread." 1 Emerging at last from this dismal predicament, he landed at Dort, and so went to Rotterdam and Delft, everywhere making his way through lines of musketeers and civic functionaries, amid roaring cannon, pealing bells, burning cressets, blazing tar-barrels, fiery winged dragons, wreaths of flowers, and Latin orations. 2

The farther he went the braver seemed the country, and the better beloved his Lordship. Nothing was left undone, in the language of ancient chronicle, to fill the bellies and the heads of the whole company. At the close of the year he came to the Hague, where the festivities were unusually magnificent. A fleet of barges was sent to escort him. Peter, James, and John, met him upon the shore, while the Saviour appeared walking upon the waves, and ordered his disciples to cast their nets, and to present the fish to his Excellency. Farther on, he was confronted by Mars and Bel-lona, who recited Latin odes in his honour. Seven beautiful damsels upon a stage, representing the United States, offered him golden keys; seven others equally beautiful, embodying the seven sciences, presented him with garlands, while an enthusiastic barber adorned his shop with seven score of copper basins, with a wax-light in each, together with a rose, and a Latin posy in praise of Queen Elizabeth. 3 Then there were tiltings in the water between champions mounted upon whales, and other monsters of the deep—representatives of siege, famine, pestilence, and murder—the whole interspersed with fireworks, poetry, charades, and harangues. Not Matthias, nor Anjou, nor King Philip, nor the Emperor Charles 4 in their

1 Sir John Conway to —, 27 Dec. 1585. (S. P. Office MS.)

2 Sir John Conway to —, 27 Dec. 1585. (S. P. Office MS.) Stowe, *ubi sub*.

3 Stowe's *Holinshed*. iv. 641 *seq*.

4 „It is thought that when Charles V. made his entries here in these towns, there was

1 Brooke's *Sidney*, 16 *seq*.

2 Stowe's *Holinshed*, ix. 641.

triumphal progresses, had been received with more spontaneous or more magnificent demonstrations. Never had the living pictures been more startling, the allegories more incomprehensible, the banquets more elaborate, the orations more tedious. Beside himself with rapture, Leicester almost assumed the God. In Delft, a city which he described as „another London almost for beauty and fairness,”<sup>1</sup> he is said so far to have forgotten himself as to declare that his family had—in the person of Lady Jane Grey, his father, and brother—been unjustly deprived of the crown of England; an indiscretion which caused a shudder in all who heard him.<sup>2</sup> It was also very dangerous for the Lieutenant-General to exceed the bounds of becoming modesty at that momentous epoch. His power, as we shall soon have occasion to observe, was anomalous, and he was surrounded by enemies. He was not only to grapple with a rapidly developing opposition in the States, but he was surrounded with masked enemies, whom he had brought with him from England. Every act and word of his were liable to closest scrutiny, and likely to be turned against him. For it was most characteristic of that intriguing age, that even the astute Walsingham, who had an eye and an ear at every keyhole in Europe, was himself under closest domestic inspection. There was one Poley, a trusted servant of Lady Sidney, then living in the house of her father Walsingham, during Sir Philip's absence, who was in close communication with Lord Montjoy's brother, Blount, then

high in favour of Queen Elizabeth—„whose grandmother she might be for his age and hers”—and with another brother, Christopher Blount, at that moment in confidential attendance upon Lord Leicester in Holland. Now Poley, and both the Blounts, were, in reality, Papists, and in intimate correspondence with the agents of the Queen of Scots, both at home and abroad, although „forced to fawn upon Leicester, to see if they might thereby live quiet.” They had a secret „alphabet,” or cipher, among them, and protested warmly, that they „honoured the ground whereon Queen Mary trod better than Leicester with all his generation; and that they felt bound to serve her who was the only saint living on the earth.”<sup>1</sup>

It may be well understood then that the Earl's position was a slippery one, and that great assumption might be unsafe. „He taketh the matter upon him,” wrote Morgan to the Queen of Scots, „as though he were an absolute king; but he hath many personages about him of good place out of England, the best number whereof desire nothing more than his confusion. Some of them be gone with him to avoid the persecution for religion in England. My poor advice and labour shall not be wanting to give Leicester all dishonour, which will fall upon him in the end with shame enough; though for the present he be very strong.”<sup>2</sup> Many of these personages of good place, and enjoying „charge and credit” with the Earl had very serious plans in their heads. Some of them meant „for the service of God, and the advantage of the King of Spain, to further the delivery of some notable towns in Holland and Zeeland to the said King and his ministers,”<sup>3</sup> and we are like to hear of these individuals again.

not greater ceremonies; the people so joyful, and thronging so great, to see his Lordship, as it was wonder,” &c. Edward Burnhamto Sir F. Walsingham, Dec. 27, 1585. (S. P. Office MS.)

<sup>1</sup> Leicester to Walsingham, 26 Dec. 1585, in Bruce, p. 31; and writing to Burghley the next day, he says, „the other towns I have passed by are very goodly towns, but this is the fairest of them all,” (S. P. Office MS.)

<sup>2</sup> Hoofd Vervolgh, 184.

<sup>1</sup> Morgan to Queen of Scots, in Murdin, ii. 495-501.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid.



Meantime, the Earl of Leicester was at the Hague. Why was he there? What was his work? Why had Elizabeth done such violence to her affection as to part with her favourite-in-chief; and so far overcome her thrift, as to furnish forth, rather meagrely to be sure, that little army of Englishmen? Why had the flower of England's chivalry set foot upon that dark and bloody ground where there seemed so much disaster to encounter, and so little glory to reap? Why had England thrown herself so heroically into the breach, just as the last bulwarks were falling which protected Holland from the overwhelming onslaught of Spain? It was because Holland was the threshold of England; because the two countries were one by danger and by destiny; because the naval expedition from Spain against England was already secretly preparing; because the deposed tyrant of Spain intended the Provinces, when again subjugated, as a stepping-stone to the conquest of England; because the naval and military forces of Holland—her numerous ships, her hardy mariners, her vast wealth, her commodious seaports, close to the English coast—if made Spanish property would render Philip invincible by sea and land; and because the downfall of Holland and of Protestantism would be death to Elizabeth, and annihilation to England.

There was little doubt on the subject in the minds of those engaged in this expedition. All felt most keenly the importance of the game, in which the Queen was staking her crown, and England its national existence.

„I pray God,” said Wilford, an officer much in Walsingham's confidence, „that I live not to see this enterprise quail, and with it the utter subversion of religion throughout all Christendom. It may be I may be judged to be afraid of my own shadow. God grant it be so. But if her Majesty had not taken the helm in hand, and my Lord of Lei-

cester sent over, this country had been gone ere this. . . . This war doth defend England. Who is he that will refuse to spend his life and living in it? If her Majesty consume twenty thousand men in the cause, the experienced men that will remain will double that strength to the realm.” 1

This same Wilford commanded a company in Ostend, and was employed by Leicester in examining the defences of that important place. He often sent information to the Secretary, „troubling him with the rude style of a poor soldier, being driven to scribble in haste.” He reiterated, in more than one letter, the opinion, that twenty thousand men consumed in the war would be a saving in the end, and his own determination—although he had intended retiring from the military profession—to spend not only his life in the cause, but also the poor living that God had given him. „Her Highness hath now entered into it,” he said; „the fire is kindled; who-soever suffers it to go out, it will grow dangerous to that side. The whole state of religion is in question, and the realm of England also, if this action quail. *God grant we never live to see that doleful day.* Her Majesty hath such footing now in these parts, as I judge it impossible for the King to weary her out, if every man will put to the work his helping hand, whereby it may be lustily followed, and the war not suffered to cool. *The freehold of England will be worth but little, if this action quail,* and therefore I wish no subject to spare his purse towards it.” 2

Spain moved slowly. Philip the Prudent was not sudden or rash, but his whole life had proved, and was to prove, him inflexible in his purposes, and patient in his attempts to carry them into effect, even when the purposes had

1 Thomas Wilford to Walsingham, <sup>15</sup> Dec. 1585. (S. P. Office MS.) <sup>25</sup>  
2 Ibid.

become chimerical, and the execution impossible. Before the fall of Antwerp he had matured his scheme for the invasion of England, in most of its details—a necessary part of which was of course the reduction of Holland and Zeeland. „Surely no danger nor fear of any attempt can grow to England,” wrote Wilford, „so long as we can hold this country good.” But never was honest soldier more mistaken than he, when he added:—„The Papists will make her Highness afraid of a great fleet now preparing in Spain. We hear it also, but it is only a scarecrow to cool the enterprise here.”<sup>1</sup>

It was no scarecrow. On the very day on which Wilford was thus writing to Walsingham, Philip the Second was writing to Alexander Farnese, „The English,” he said, „with their troops having gained a footing in the Islands (Holland and Zeeland), give me much anxiety. The English Catholics are imploring me with much importunity to relieve them from the persecution they are suffering. When you sent me a plan, with the coasts, soundings, quicksands, and ports of England, you said that the enterprise of invading that country should be deferred till we had reduced the Isles; that, having them, we could much more conveniently attack England; or that at least we should wait till we had got Antwerp. As the city is now taken, I want your advice *now* about the invasion of England. To cut the root of the evils constantly growing up there, both for God’s service and mine, is desirable. So many evils will thus be remedied, which would not be by only warring with the Islands. It would be an uncertain and expensive war to go to sea for the purpose of chastising the insolent English corsairs, however much they deserve chastisement. I charge you

to be secret, to give the matter your deepest attention, and to let me have your opinions at once.” Philip then added a postscript, in his own hand, concerning the importance of acquiring a sea-port in Holland, as a basis of operations against England. „Without a port,” he said, „we can do nothing whatever.”<sup>1</sup>

A few weeks later, the Grand Commander of Castile, by Philip’s orders, and upon subsequent information received from the Prince of Parma, drew up an elaborate scheme for the invasion of England, and for the government of that country afterwards; a program according to which the King was to shape his course for a long time to come. The plot was an excellent plot. Nothing could be more artistic, more satisfactory to the prudent monarch; but time was to show whether there might not be some difficulty in the way of its satisfactory development.

„The enterprise,” said the Commander, „ought certainly to be undertaken as serving the cause of the Lord. From the Pope we must endeavour to extract a promise of the largest aid we can get for the time when the enterprise can be undertaken. We must not declare that time however, in order to keep the thing a secret, and because perhaps thus more will be promised, under the impression that it will never take effect.”<sup>2</sup> He added that the work could not well be attempted before August or September of the following year; the only fear of such delay being that the French could hardly be kept during all that time in

<sup>1</sup> „Porque sin puerto no se puede hacer nada.” (Philip II. to Parma, 29 Dec. 1585. Archivo de Simancas MS.)

<sup>2</sup> Parecer del Comendador Mayor dado a S. M. sobre la empresa de Inglaterra, anno 1586. (Archivo de Simancas MS.)

„Y al papa se procure sacar promesa de la mas gruesa ayuda que se pudiese para cuando se puede hacer la empresa, sin declararle el tiempo, por respeto del secreto, y porque quiza asi prometera mas, pensando que no ha de haber efecto.”

<sup>1</sup> Wilford to Burghley,  $\frac{18}{28}$  Dec. 1585. (S. P. Office MS.)

a state of revolt." 1 For this was a uniform portion of the great scheme. France was to be kept, at Philip's expense, in a state of perpetual civil war; its every city and village to be the scene of unceasing conflict and bloodshed—subjects in arms against king, and family against family;—and the Netherlands were to be ravaged with fire and sword; all this in order that the path might be prepared for Spanish soldiers into the homes of England. So much of misery to the whole human race was it in the power of one painstaking elderly valetudinarian to inflict, by never for an instant neglecting the business of his life.

Troops and vessels for the English invasion ought, in the Commander's opinion, to be collected in Flanders, under colour of an enterprise against Holland and Zeeland, while the armada to be assembled in Spain, of galleons, galeazzas, and galleys should be ostensible for an expedition to the Indies.

Then, after the conquest, came arrangements for the government of England. Should Philip administer his new kingdom by a viceroy, or should he appoint a king out of his own family? On the whole the chances for the Prince of Parma seemed the best of any. „We must liberate the Queen of Scotland,” said the Grand Commander, „and marry her to some one or another, both in order to put her out of love with her son, and to conciliate her devoted adherents. Of course the husband should be one of your Majesty's nephews, and none could be so appropriate as the Prince of Parma, that great captain, whom his talents, and the part he has to bear in the business, especially indicate for that honour.” 2

Then there was a difficulty about the possible issue of such a marriage. The

Farneses claimed Portugal; so that children sprung from the blood-royal of England blended with that of Parma might choose to make those pretensions valid. But the objection was promptly solved by the Commander;—„The Queen of Scotland is sure to have no children,” he said. 1

That matter being adjusted, Parma's probable attitude as King of England was examined. It was true his ambition might cause occasional uneasiness; but then he might make himself more unpleasant in the Netherlands. „If your Majesty suspects him,” said the Commander, „which, after all, is unfair; seeing the way in which he has been conducting himself—it is to be remembered that in Flanders are similar circumstances and opportunities, and that he is well armed, much beloved in the country, and that the natives are of various humours. The English plan will furnish an honourable departure for him out of the Provinces; and the principle of loyal obligation will have much influence over so chivalrous a knight as he, when he is once placed on the English throne. Moreover, as he will be new there, he will have need of your Majesty's favour to maintain himself, and there will accordingly be good correspondence with Holland and the Islands. Thus your Majesty can put the Infanta and her husband into full possession of all the Netherlands; having provided them with so excellent a neighbour in England, and one so closely bound and allied to them. Then, as he is to have no English children” (we have seen that the Commander had settled that point), „he will be a very good mediator to arrange adoptions, 2 especially

1 — „deshace esta sombra, que como no ha de tener hijos la Reyna de Escocia. (Ibid.)

2 „Y esta es honrada salida y que a el le obligaria mucho en ley de tan gran caballero; de mas, como nuevo, para mantenerse en Inglaterra habia menester el favor de V. M.

1 „No se pueden tener tanto tiempo rebueitos.” (Ibid.)

2 MS, just cited.



if you make good provision for his son Rainuccio in Italy. The reasons in favour of this plan being so much stronger than those against it, it would be well that your Majesty should write clearly to the Prince of Parma, directing him to conduct the enterprise" (the English invasion), „and to give him the first offer for this marriage (with Queen Mary) if he likes the scheme. If not, he had better mention which of the Archdukes should be substituted in his place." 1

There happened to be no lack of archdukes at that period for anything comfortable that might offer—such as a throne in England, Holland, or France—and the Austrian House was not remarkable for refusing convenient marriages; but the immediate future only could show whether Alexander I. of the House of Farnese was to reign in England, or whether the next king of that country was to be called Matthias, Maximilian, or Ernest of Hapsburg.

Meantime the Grand Commander was of opinion that the invasion-project was to be pushed forward as rapidly and as secretly as possible; because, before any one of Philip's nephews could place himself upon the English throne, it was first necessary to remove Elizabeth from that position. Before disposing of the kingdom, the preliminary step of conquering it was necessary. Afterwards it would be desirable, without wasting more time than was requisite, to return with a large portion of the invading force out of England, in order to complete the conquest of Holland. For after

all, England was to be subjugated only as a portion of one general scheme; the main features of which were the reannexation of Holland and „the Islands," and the acquisition of unlimited control upon the seas.

Thus the invasion of England was no „scarecrow," as Wilford imagined, but a scheme already thoroughly matured. If Holland and Zealand should meantime fall into the hands of Philip, it was no exaggeration on that soldier's part to observe that the „freehold of England would be worth but little." 1

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1 Upon that point there was no difference of opinion. The statesmen and soldiers of England were unanimous. „If I should not," said Burgley, „with all the powers of my heart, continually both wish and work advancement unto this action, I were an accursed person in the sight of God; considering the ends thereof tend to the glory of God, to the safety of the Queen's person, to the preservation of this realm in a perpetual quietness, wherein, for my particular interest, both for myself and my posterity, I have as much interest as any of my degree." (Bruce, *Leyc. Corresp.* p. 24.)

Walsingham had been straightforward from the first in his advocacy of the Netherland cause, which he knew to be identical with that of England, and, as we have seen, had been often indignant at the shufflings practised by the Queen's government in the matter. He was sincerely glad that Leicester had gone to the Provinces before it was quite too late. „All honest and well-affected subjects," said he to the Earl, „have cause to thank God that you arrived there so seasonably as you did; for, howsoever we mislike of the enterprise here, *all England should have smarted* if the same had not been taken in hand." (Ibid. p. 36.)

As for Leicester himself, he was always vehement upon the subject. After his arrival in the country he was more intensely alive than ever to the dangers impending over England, in case the rebel Provinces should be re-annexed to Spain. „He is senseless," said he, „that conceiveth not that if the King of Spain had these countries at his commandment—let her Majesty have the best peace that ever was, or can be made—and we shall find, as the world now standeth, that he will force the Queen of England and England to be at his disposition. What with Spain for the west, and what with these countries for the east, England shall traffic no farther any of these ways, than he shall give leave, without every voyage shall ask the charge of a whole navy to pass withal." (Ibid. p. 82.)

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Y en entronizandose el alli, no faltaria concierto en Hollanda y las Islas, y podria V. M. meter en llena possession de todos los estados bajos a la Señora Infanta y su marido, dandoles tan buen vicino y tan obligado; y el no habiendo de tener hijos en Inglaterra, podria ser buen medianerero para adopciones," &c. Parecer del Comendador Mayor, &c. (MS. before cited.)

1 Parecer del Comendador Mayor, &c. (MS. before cited.)

To oppose this formidable array against the liberties of Europe stood Elizabeth Tudor and the Dutch Republic. For the Queen, however arbitrary her nature, fitly embodied much of the nobler elements in the expanding English national character. She felt instinctively that her reliance in the impending death-grapple was upon the popular principle, the national sentiment, both in her own country and in Holland. That principle and that sentiment were symbolised in the Netherland revolt; and England, although under a somewhat despotic rule, was already fully pervaded with the instinct of self-government. The people held the purse and the sword. No tyranny could be permanently established so long as the sovereign was obliged to come every year before Parliament to ask for subsidies; so long as all the citizens and yeomen of England had weapons in their possession, and were carefully trained to use them; so long, in short, as the militia was the only army, and private adventurers or trading companies created and controlled the only navy. War, colonization, conquest, traffic, formed a joint business and a private speculation. If there were danger that England, yielding to purely mercantile habits of thought and action, might degenerate from the more martial standard to which she had been accustomed, there might be virtue in that Netherland enterprise, which was now to call forth all her energies. The Provinces would be a seminary for English soldiers.

„There can be no doubt of our driving the enemy out of the country through famine and excessive charges,” said the plain-spoken English soldier already quoted, who came out with Leicester, „if every one of us will put our minds to go forward *without making a miserable gain by the wars*. A man may see, by this little progress-journey, what this long peace hath wrought in us. We are weary of the war before we

come where it groweth, such a danger hath this long peace brought us into. This is, and will be, in my opinion, a most fit school and nursery to nourish soldiers to be able to keep and defend our country hereafter, if men will follow it.” 1

Wilford was vehement in denouncing the mercantile tendencies of his countrymen, and returned frequently to that point in his communications with Walsingham and other statesmen, „*God hath stirred up this action*,” he repeated again, „to be a school to breed up soldiers to defend the freedom of England, which through these long times of peace and quietness is brought into a most dangerous estate, if it should be attempted. Our delicacy is such that we are already weary, yet this journey is naught in respect to the misery and hardship that soldiers must and do endure.” 2

He was right in his estimate of the effect likely to be produced by the war upon the military habits of Englishmen; for there can be no doubt that the organization and discipline of English troops was in anything but a satisfactory state at that period. There was certainly vast room for improvement. Nevertheless he was wrong in his views of the leading tendencies of his age. Holland and England, self-helping, self-moving, were already inaugurating a new era in the history of the world. The spirit of commercial maritime enterprise—then expanding rapidly into large proportions—was to be matched against the religious and knightly enthusiasm which had accomplished such wonders in an age that was passing away. Spain still personified, and had ever personified, chivalry, loyalty, piety: but its chivalry,

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1 Thomas Wilford to Walsingham, <sup>15</sup>/<sub>25</sub> Dec. 1585. (S. P. Office MS.)

2 Wilford to Burghley, <sup>18</sup>/<sub>28</sub> Dec., 1585. (S. P. Office MS.)

loyalty, and piety, were now in a corrupted condition. The form was hollow, and the sacred spark had fled. In Holland and England intelligent enterprise had not yet degenerated into mere greed for material prosperity. The love of danger, the thirst for adventure, the thrilling sense of personal responsibility and human dignity—not the base love for land and lucre—were the governing sentiments which led those bold Dutch and English rovers to circumnavigate the world in cockle-shells, and to beard the most potent monarch on the earth, both at home and abroad, with a handful of volunteers.

This then was the contest, and this the machinery by which it was to be maintained. A struggle for national independence, liberty of conscience, freedom of the seas, against sacerdotal and world-absorbing tyranny; a mortal combat of the splendid infantry of Spain and Italy, the professional reiters of Germany, the floating castles of a world-empire, with the militiamen and mercantile marine of England and Holland united. Holland had been engaged twenty years long in the conflict. England had thus far escaped it; but there was no doubt, and could be none, that her time had come. She must fight the battle of Protestantism on sea and shore, shoulder to shoulder, with the Netherlands, or await the conqueror's foot on her own soil.

What now was the disposition and what the means of the Provinces to do their part in the contest? If the twain, as Holland wished, had become of one flesh, would England have been the loser? Was it quite sure that Elizabeth—had she even accepted the less compromising title which she refused—would not have been quite as much the protected as the „protectress?”

It is very certain that the English, on their arrival in the Provinces, were singularly impressed by the opulent and stately appearance of the country and

its inhabitants. Notwithstanding the tremendous war which the Hollanders had been waging against Spain for twenty years, their commerce had continued to thrive, and their resources to increase. Leicester was in a state of constant rapture at the magnificence which surrounded him, from his first entrance into the country. Notwithstanding the admiration expressed by the Hollanders for the individual sumptuousness of the Lieutenant-General, his followers, on their part, were startled by the general luxury of their new allies. „The realm is rich and full of men,” said Wilford, „the sums men exceed in apparel would bear the brunt of this war;” 1 and again, „if the excess used in sumptuous apparel were only abated, and that we could convert the same to these wars, it would stop a great gap.” 2

The favourable view taken by the English as to the resources and inclination of the Netherland commonwealth was universal. „The general wish and desire of these countrymen,” wrote Sir Thomas Shirley, „is that the amity begun between England and this nation may be everlasting, and there is not any of our company of judgment but wish the same. For all they that see the goodness and stateliness of these towns, strengthened both with fortification and natural situation, all able to defend themselves with their own abilities, must needs think it too fair a prey to be let pass, and a thing most worthy to be embraced.” 3

Leicester, whose enthusiasm continued to increase as rapidly as the Queen's zeal seemed to be cooling, was most anxious lest the short-comings of his own Government should work irreparable evil. „I pray you, my lord,” he wrote

1 Wilford to Walsingham. (MS. before cited.)

2 Wilford to Burghley. (MS. before cited.)

3 Sir Thomas Shirley to Earl of Leicester, 26 Dec. 1585. (S. P. Office MS.)

5 Jan. 1586.



to Burghley, „forget not us poor exiles; if you do, God must and will forget you. And great pity it were that so noble provinces and goodly havens, with such infinite ships and mariners, should not be always as they may now easily be, at the assured devotion of England. In my opinion he can neither love Queen nor country that would not wish and further it should be so. And seeing her Majesty is thus far entered into the cause, and that these people comfort themselves in full hope of her favour, it were a sin and a shame it should not be handled accordingly, both for honour and surety.”<sup>1</sup>

Sir John Conway, who accompanied the Earl through the whole of his „progress-journey,” was quite as much struck as he by the flourishing aspect and English proclivities of the Provinces. „The countries which we have passed,” he said, „are fertile in their nature; the towns, cities, buildings, of more state and beauty, to such as have travelled other countries, than any they have ever seen. The people the most industrious by all means to live that be in the world, and, no doubt, passing rich. They outwardly show themselves of good heart, zeal, and loyalty, towards the Queen our mistress. There is no doubt that the general number of them had rather come under her Majesty’s regiment, than to continue under the States and burgomasters of their country. The impositions which they lay in defence of their State is wonderful. If her Highness proceed in this beginning, she may retain these parts hers, with their good love, and her great glory and gain. I would she might as perfectly see the whole country, towns, profits, and pleasures thereof, in a glass, as she may her own face; I do then assure myself she would with careful consideration receive them, and not allow of any man’s reason to

the contrary. . . . The country is worthy any prince in the world, the people do reverence the Queen, and in love of her do so believe that the Grave of Leicester is by God and her sent among them for her good. And they believe in him for the redemption of their bodies, as they do in God for their souls. I dare pawn my soul, that if her Majesty, will allow him the just and rightful mean to manage this cause, that he will so handle the manner and matter as shall highly both please and profit her Majesty, and increase her country, and his own honour.”<sup>1</sup>

Lord North, who held a high command in the auxiliaries force, spoke also with great enthusiasm. „Had your Lordship seen,” he wrote to Burghley, „with what thankful hearts these countries receive all her Majesty’s subjects, what multitudes of people they be, what stately cities and buildings they have, how notably fortified by art, how strong by nature, how fertile the whole country, and how wealthy it is, you would, I know, praise the Lord that opened your lips to undertake this enterprise, the continuance and good success whereof will eternise her Majesty, beautify her crown, with the most shipping, with the most populous and wealthy countries, that ever prince added to his kingdom, or that is or can be found in Europe. I lack wit, good my Lord to dilate this matter.”<sup>2</sup>

Leicester, better informed than some of those in his employment, entertained strong suspicions concerning Philip’s intentions with regard to England; but he felt sure that the only way to laugh at a Spanish invasion was to make Holland and England as nearly one as it was possible to do.

„No doubt that the King of Spain’s preparations by sea be great,” he said

<sup>1</sup> Leicester to Burghley, 27 Dec. 1585. (S. P. Office MS.)

<sup>1</sup> Sir John Conway to —, 27 Dec. 1585. (S. P. Office MS.)

<sup>2</sup> Lord North to Lord Burghley, 27 Dec. 1585. (S. P. Office MS.)

„but I know that all that he and his friends can make are not able to match with her Majesty's forces, if it please her to use the means that God hath given her. But besides her own, if she need, I will undertake to furnish her from hence, upon two months' warning, a navy for strong and tall ships, with their furniture and mariners, that the King of Spain, and all that he can make, shall not be able to encounter with them. I think the bruit of his preparations is made the greater to terrify her Majesty and this country people. But, thanked be God, her Majesty hath little cause to fear him. *And in this country they esteem no more of his power by sea than I do of six fisher-boats off Rye.*" 1

Thus suggestive is it to peep occasionally behind the curtain. In the calm cabinet of the Escorial, Philip and his *comendador mayor* are laying their heads together, preparing the invasion of England; making arrangements for King Alexander's coronation in that Island, and—like sensible, far-sighted persons as they are—even settling the succession to the throne after Alexander's death, instead of carelessly leaving such distant details to chance, or subsequent consideration. On the other hand, plain Dutch sea-captains, grim beggars of the sea, and the like, denizens of a free commonwealth and of the boundless ocean—men who are at home on blue water, and who have burned gunpowder against those prodigious slave-rowed galleys of Spain—together with their new allies, the dauntless mariners of England—who at this very moment are „singing the King of Spain's beard," as it had never been singed before—are not so much awe-struck with the famous preparations for invasion as was perhaps to be expected. There may be a delay, after all, before Parma can be got safely

established in London, and Elizabeth in Orcus, and before the blood-tribunal of the Inquisition can substitute its sway for that of the „most noble, wise, and learned United States." Certainly, Philip the Prudent would have been startled, difficult as he was to astonish, could he have known that those rebel Hollanders of his made no more account of his slowly-preparing invincible armada than of six fisher-boats off Rye. Time alone could show where confidence had been best placed. Meantime it was certain, that it well behoved Holland and England to hold hard together, nor let „that enterprise quail."

The famous expedition of Sir Francis Drake was the commencement of a revelation. „That is the string," said Leicester, „that touches the King indeed." 1 It was soon to be made known to the world that the ocean was not a Spanish lake, nor both the Indies the private property of Philip. „While the riches of the Indies continue," said Leicester, „he thinketh he wil be able to weary out all other princes; and I know, by good means, that he more feareth this action of Sir Francis than he ever did anything that has been attempted against him." 2 With these continued assaults upon the golden treasure-houses of Spain, and by a determined effort to maintain the still more important stronghold which had been wrested from her in the Netherlands, England might still be safe. „This country is so full of ships and mariners," said Leicester, „so abundant in wealth, and in the means to make money, that, had it but stood neutral, what an aid had her Majesty been deprived of! But if it had been the enemy's also, I leave it to your consideration what had been likely to ensue. These people do now honour and love her Majesty in marvellous sort." 3

1 Leicester to Burghley, 29 Jan. 1586. (S. P. Office MS.)

1 Ibid.

2 Ibid.

3 Leicester to Burghley (MS. before cited.)

There was but one feeling on this most important subject among the English who went to the Netherlands. All held the same language. The question was plainly presented to England whether she would secure to herself the great bulwark of her defence, or place it in the hands of her mortal foe? How could there be doubt or supineness on such a momentous subject? „Surely, my Lord,” wrote Richard Cavendish to Burghley, „if you saw the wealth, the strength, the shipping, and abundance of mariners, whereof these countries stand furnished, your heart would quake to think that so hateful an enemy as Spain should again be furnished with such instruments; and the Spaniards themselves do nothing doubt upon the hope of the consequence hereof, to assure themselves of the certain ruin of her Majesty and the whole estate.”<sup>1</sup>

And yet at the very outset of Leicester's administration, there was a whisper of peace-overtures to Spain, secretly made by Elizabeth in her own behalf, and in that of the Provinces. We shall have soon occasion to examine into the truth of these rumours, which, whether originating in truth or falsehood, were most pernicious in their effects. The Hollanders were determined never to return to slavery again, so long as they could fire a shot in their own defence. They earnestly wished English cooperation, but it was the cooperation of English matchlocks and English cutlasses, not English protocols and apostilles. It was military, not diplomatic machinery that they required. If they could make up their minds to submit to Philip and the Inquisition again, Philip and the Holy Office were but too ready to receive the erring penitents to their embrace without a go-between.

It was war, not peace, therefore,

that Holland meant by the English alliance. It was war, not peace, that Philip intended. It was war, not peace, that Elizabeth's most trusty counsellors knew to be inevitable. There was also, as we have shown, no doubt whatever as to the good disposition, and the great power of the republic to bear its share in the common cause. The enthusiasm of the Hollanders was excessive. „There was such a noise, both in Delft, Rotterdam, and Dort,” said Leicester, „in crying ‚God save the Queen!’ as if she had been in Cheapside.”<sup>1</sup> Her own subjects could not be more loyal than were the citizens and yeomen of Holland. „The members of the States dare not but be Queen Elizabeth's” continued the Earl, „for by the living God! if there should fall but the least unkindness through their default, the people would kill them. All sorts of people, from highest to lowest, assure themselves, now that they have her Majesty's good countenance, to beat all the Spaniards out of their country. Never was there people in such jollity as these be. I could be content to lose a limb, could her Majesty see these countries and towns as I have done.”<sup>2</sup>

He was in truth excessively elated, and had already, in imagination, vanquished Alexander Farnese, and eclipsed the fame of William the Silent. „They will serve under me,” he observed, „with a better will than ever they served under the Prince of Orange. Yet they loved him well, but they never hoped of the liberty of this country till now.”<sup>3</sup>

Thus the English government had every reason to be satisfied with the aspect of its affairs in the Netherlands. But the nature of the Earl's authority was indefinite. The Queen had refused the sovereignty and the protectorate.

<sup>1</sup> Bruce, *Leyc. Corresp.* p. 30, 31, 32, 26 Dec. 1585.

<sup>2</sup> 5 Jan. 1586.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.* p. 61, <sup>17</sup>/<sub>24</sub> Jan. 1586.

<sup>1</sup> Richard Cavendish to Lord Burghley, 18 March, 1585. (S. P. Office MS).



She had also distinctly and peremptorily forbidden Leicester to assume any office or title that might seem at variance with such a refusal on her part. Yet it is certain, that, from the very first, he had contemplated some slight disobedience to these prohibitions. „What government is requisite”—wrote he in a secret memorandum of „things most necessary to understand”—„to be appointed to him that shall be their governor? First, that he have as much authority as the Prince of Orange, or any other governor or captain-general, hath had heretofore.”<sup>1</sup> Now the Prince of Orange had been stadholder of each of the United Provinces, governor-general, commander-in-chief, count of Holland in prospect, and sovereign, if he had so willed it. It would doubtless have been most desirable for the country, in its confused condition, had there been a person competent to wield, and willing to accept, the authority once exercised by William I. But it was also certain that this was exactly the authority which Elizabeth had forbidden Leicester to assume. Yet it is difficult to understand what position the Queen intended that her favourite should maintain, nor how he was to carry out her instructions, while submitting to her prohibitions. He was directed to cause the confused government of the Provinces to be redressed, and a better form of polity to be established. He was ordered, in particular, to procure a radical change in the constitution, by causing the deputies to the General Assembly to be empowered to decide upon important matters, without, as had always been the custom, making direct reference to the assemblies of the separate Provinces. He was instructed to bring about, in some indefinite way, a complete reform in financial matters, by compelling the States-General to raise money by liberal taxation, according to

the „advice of her Majesty, delivered unto them by her lieutenant.”<sup>1</sup>

And how was this radical change in the institutions of the Provinces to be made by an English earl, whose only authority was that of commander-in-chief over five thousand half-starved, unpaid, utterly-forlorn English troops?

The Netherland envoys in England, in their parting advice, most distinctly urged him „to hale authority with the first, to declare himself chief head and governor-general” of the whole country,<sup>2</sup>—for it was a political head that was wanted in order to restore unity of action—not an additional general, where there were already generals in plenty. Sir John Norris, valiant, courageous, experienced—even if not, as Walsingham observed, a „religious soldier,” nor learned in anything „but a kind of licentious and corrupt government”<sup>3</sup>—was not likely to require the assistance of the new lieutenant-general in field operations, nor could the army be brought into a state of thorough discipline and efficiency by the magic of Leicester’s name. The rank and file of the English army—not the commanders—needed strengthening. The soldiers required shoes and stockings, bread and meat, and for these articles there were not the necessary funds, nor would the title of Lieutenant-General supply the deficiency. The little auxiliary force was, in truth, in a condition most pitiable to behold: it was difficult to say whether the soldiers who had been already for a considerable period in the Netherlands, or those who had been recently levied in the purlieus of London, were in the most unpromising plight. The beggarly state in which Elizabeth had been willing

<sup>1</sup> Leicester’s Instructions, in Bruce, 12-15, December, 1585.

<sup>2</sup> Advice of the Commissioners to Leicester, in Bruce, 15-19, A.D. 1585.

<sup>3</sup> Bruce’s ‚Leyc. Corresp.’ 222,  $\frac{11}{21}$  April, 1586.

<sup>1</sup> Bruce, ‚Leyc. C. resp.’ p. 20, A.D. 1585.

that her troops should go forth to the wars was a sin and a disgrace. Well might her Lieutenant-General say that her „poor subjects were no better than abjects.”<sup>1</sup> There were few effective companies remaining of the old force. „There is but a small number of the first bands left,” said Sir John Conway, „and those so pitiful an unable ever to serve again, as I leave to speak further of them, to avoid grief to your heart. A monstrous fault there hath been somewhere.”<sup>2</sup>

Leicester took a manful and sagacious course at starting. Those who had no stomach for the fight were ordered to depart. The chaplain gave them sermons; the Lieutenant-General, on St. Stephen's day, made them a „pithy and honourable” oration, and those who had the wish or the means to buy themselves out of the adventure, were allowed to do so: for the Earl was much disgusted with the raw material out of which he was expected to manufacture serviceable troops. Swaggering ruffians from the disreputable haunts of London, cockney apprentices, broken-down tapsters, discarded serving men; the Bardolphs and Pistols, Mouldys, Warts, and the like—more at home in tavern-brawls or in dark lanes than on the battle-field—were not the men to be entrusted with the honour of England at a momentous crisis. He spoke with grief and shame of the worthless character and condition of the English youths sent over to the Netherlands. „Believe me,” said he, „you will all repent the cockney kind of bringing up at this day of young men. They be gone hence with shame enough, and too many, that I will warrant, will make as many frays with bludgeons and bucklers as any in London shall do; but such shall never have credit with me again. Our simplest men in show have been our best men, and

your *gallant blood and ruffian men the worst of all others.*”<sup>1</sup>

Much winnowed, as it was, the small force might in time become more effective; and the Earl spent freely of his own substance to supply the wants of his followers, and to atone for the avarice of his sovereign. The picture painted however by muster-master Digges of the plumed troops that had thus come forth to maintain the honour of England and the cause of liberty, was anything but imposing. None knew better than Digges their squalid and slovenly condition, or was more anxious to effect a reformation therein. „A very wise, stout fellow he is,” said the Earl, „and very careful to serve thoroughly her Majesty.”<sup>2</sup> Leicester relied much upon his efforts. „There is good hope,” said the muster-master, „that his excellency will shortly establish such good order for the government and training of our nation, that these weak, bad-furnished, ill-armed, and worse-trained bands, thus rawly left unto him, shall within a few months prove as well armed, trained, complete, gallant companies as shall be found elsewhere in Europe.”<sup>3</sup> The damage they were likely to inflict upon the enemy seemed very problematical, until they should have been improved by some wholesome ball-practice. „They are so unskilful,” said Digges, „that if they should be carried to the field no better trained than yet they are, they would prove much more dangerous to their own leaders and companies than any ways serviceable on their enemies. The hard and miserable estate of the soldiers generally, excepting officers, hath been such, as by the con-

<sup>1</sup> Bruce's ,Leyc. Corresp.' 23,  $\frac{5}{15}$  Dec. 1585.

<sup>2</sup> Sir John Conway to — 27 Dec., 1585. (S. P. Office MS.)

<sup>1</sup> Bruce's ,Leyc. Corresp.' 228,  $\frac{16}{26}$  April 1586.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid. 135,  $\frac{24 \text{ Feb.}}{6 \text{ March}}$ , 1585-6.

<sup>3</sup> Digges to Walsingham  $\frac{11}{12}$  Jan. 1585. (S. P. Office MS.)

fessions of the captains themselves, they have been offered by many of their soldiers thirty and forty pounds a-piece to be dismissed and sent away; whereby I doubt not the flower of the pressed English bands are gone, and the remnant supplied with such paddy persons as commonly, in voluntary procurements, men are glad to accept." 1

Even after the expiration of four months the condition of the paddy persons continued most destitute. The English soldiers became mere barefoot starving beggars in the streets, as had never been the case in the worst of times, when the States were their paymasters. 2 The little money brought from the treasury by the Earl, and the large sums which he had contributed out of his own pocket, had been spent in settling, and not fully settling, old scores. „Let me entreat you," wrote Leicester to Walsingham, „to be a mean to her Majesty, that the poor soldiers be not beaten for my sake. *There came no penny of treasure over since my coming hither. That which then came was most part due before it came. There is much still due. They cannot get a penny, their credit is spent, they perish for want of victuals and clothing in great numbers. The whole are ready to mutiny. They cannot be gotten out to service, because they cannot discharge the debts they owe in the places where they are. I have let of my own more*

than I may spare." 1 „There was no soldier yet able to buy *himself a pair of hose*," said the Earl again, „and it is too, too great shame to see how they go, and *it kills their hearts to show themselves among men*." 2

There was no one to dispute the Earl's claims. The Nassau family was desperately poor, and its chief, young Maurice, although he had been elected stadholder of Holland and Zeeland, had every disposition—as Sir Philip upon his arrival in Flushing immediately informed his uncle—to submit to the authority of the new governor. Louisa de Coligny, widow of William the Silent, was most anxious for the English alliance, through which alone she believed that the fallen fortunes of the family could be raised. It was thus only, she thought, that the vengeance for which she thirsted upon the murderers of her father and her husband could be obtained. „We see now," she wrote to Walsingham, in a fiercer strain than would seem to comport with so gentle a nature—deeply wronged as the daughter of Coligny and the wife of Orange had been by Papists—„we see now the effects 'of our God's promises. He knows when it pleases Him to avenge the blood of His own, and I confess that I feel most keenly the joy which is shared in by the wole Church of God. There is none that has received more wrong from these murderers than I have done, and I esteem myself happy in the midst of my miseries that God has permitted me to see some vengeance. These beginnings make me hope that I shall see yet more, which will be not less useful to the good, both in your country and in these isles." 3

1 Digges to Walsingham, MS. before cited.

2 „My good Lord," wrote Cavendish to Burghley, „what English heart can without shame or grief hear the Flushingers reproachfully say, that even in their hardest estate the soldiers of that town were always paid at every 15 days' end, whereas the same being now in H. Majesty's hand, her people there can get no pay in three months, so that they be almost driven either to starve or beg in the streets. These be heavy spectacles in the eyes of such as look for relief at H. Majesty's hands. My good Lord, the storm of my careful and grieved mind doth carry me I know not whither," &c. 18 March, 1586. (S. P. Office MS.)

1 Leicester to Burghley and Walsingham, March 15, 1586. (S. P. Office MS.)

2 Bruce, 167, <sup>9</sup>/<sub>19</sub> March, 1586.

3 „Nous voyons, Monsieur, les effects des promesses de notre Dieu qui scait quand il luy plait venger le sang des siens, y faut que je confesse que je resens fort particu-



There was no disguise as to the impoverished condition to which the Nassau family had been reduced by the self devotion of its chief. They were obliged to ask alms of England, until the „sapling should become a tree.” „Since it is the will of God,” wrote the Princess to Davison, „I am not ashamed to declare the necessity of our house, for it is in His cause that it has fallen. I pray you, Sir, therefore, to do me and these children the favour to employ your thoughts in this regard.” 1 If there had been any strong French proclivities on their part—as had been so warmly asserted—they were likely to disappear. Villiers, who had been a confidential friend of William the Silent, and a strong favourer of France, in vain endeavoured to keep alive the ancient sentiments towards that country, although he was thought to be really endeavouring to bring about a submission of the Nassaus to Spain. „This Villiers,” said Leicester, „is a most vile traitorous knave, and doth abuse a young nobleman here extremely, the Count Maurice. For all his religion, he is a more earnest persuader secretly to have him yield to a reconciliation than Sainte Aldegonde was. He shall not tarry ten days neither in Holland nor Zeeland. He is greatly hated here of all sorts, and it shall go hard but I will win the young Count.” 2

As for Hohenlo, whatever his opinions might once have been regarding the comparative merits of Frenchmen and

Englishmen, he was now warmly in favour of England, and expressed an intention of putting an end to the Villiers influence by simply drowning Villiers. The announcement of this summary process towards the counsellor was not untinged wit rudeness towards the pupil. „The young Count,” said Leicester, „by Villier’s means, was not willing to have Flushing rendered, which the Count Hollock perceiving, told the Count Maurice, in a great rage, that if he took any course than that of the Queen of England, and swore by no beggars, he would drown his priest in the haven before his face, and turn himself and his mother-in-law out of their house there, and thereupon went with Mr. Davison to the delivery of it.” 1 Certainly, if Hohenlo permitted himself such startling demonstrations towards the son and widow of William the Silent, it must have been after his habitual potations had been of the deepest. Nevertheless it was satisfactory for the new chieftain to know that the influence of so vehement a partisan was secured for England. The Count’s zeal deserved gratitude upon Leicester’s part, and Leicester was grateful. „This man must be cherished,” said the Earl; „he is sound and faithful, and hath indeed all the chief holds in his hands, and at his commandment. Ye shall do well to procure him a letter of thanks, taking knowledge in general of his good-will to her Majesty. He is a right Almayn in manner and fashion, free of his purse and of his drink, yet do I wish him her Majesty’s pensioner before any prince in Germany, for he loves her and is able to serve her, and doth desire to be known her servant. He hath been laboured by his nearest kinsfolk and friends in Germany to have left the States and to have the King of Spain’s pension and very great reward; but he would not.

lièrement ceste joye commune a tout l’eglise de Dieu; comme ny ayant personne qui eust receu plus d’offence de ces massacreurs, et m’estime heureuse parmi tous mes malheurs de ce que Dieu a permis que j’en aye veu la vengeance. Ces commencemens me font esperer que j’en verrai encores d’autres, qui ne seront moins utiles aux gens de bien, et en particulier en votre royaume et en ces Isles.” Princess of Orange to Sir F. Walsingham, <sup>1</sup>/<sub>11</sub> Jan. 1586. (S. P. Office MS.)

1 Princess of Orange to Davison, 7 Jan. 1586. (S. P. Office MS.)

2 Bruce, 73, <sup>22</sup>/<sub>1</sub> Jan., 1585-6.

1 Bruce, 74, 75, date just quoted.

I trust her Majesty will accept of his offer to be her servant during his life, being indeed a very noble soldier." 1 The Earl was indeed inclined to take so cheerful view of matters as to believe that he should even effect a reform in the noble soldier's most unpleasant characteristic. „Hollock is a wise gallant gentleman," he said, „and very well esteemed. He hath only one fault, which is drinking; but good hope that he will amend it. Some make me believe that I shall be able to do much with him, and I mean to do my best, for I see no man that knows all these countries, and the people of all sorts, like him, and this fault overthrows all." 2

Accordingly, so long as Maurice continued under the tutelage of thus uproarious cavalier—who, at a later day, was to become his brother-in-law—he was not likely to interfere with Leicester's authority. The character of the young Count was developing slowly. More than his father had ever done, he deserved the character of the taciturn. A quiet keen observer of men and things, not demonstrative nor talkative, nor much given to writing—a modest, calm, deeply reflecting student of military and mathematical science—he was not at that moment deeply inspired by political ambition. He was perhaps more desirous of raising the fallen fortunes of his house than of securing the independence of his country. Even at that early age, however, his mind was not easy to read, and his character was somewhat of a puzzle to those who studied it. „I see him much discontented with the States," said Leicester; „he hath a sullen deep wit. The young gentleman is yet to be won only to her Majesty, I perceive, of his own inclination. The house is marvellous poor and little regarded by the States, and if they get anything it

is like to be by her Majesty, which should be altogether, and she may easily do for him to win him sure. I will undertake it." 1 Yet the Earl was ever anxious about some of the influences which surrounded Maurice, for he thought him more easily guided than he wished him to be by any others but himself. „He stands upon making and marring," he said, „as he meets with good counsel." 2 And at another time he observed. „The young gentleman hath a solemn sly wit; but, in troth, if any be to be doubted toward the King of Spain, it is he and his counsellors, for they have been altogether, so far, French, and so far in dislike with England as they cannot almost hide it." 3

And there was still another member of the house of Nassau who was already an honour to his illustrious race. Count William Lewis, hardly more than a boy in years, had already served many campaigns, and had been desperately wounded in the cause for which so much of the heroic blood of his race had been shed. Of the five Nassau brethren, his father Count John was the sole survivor, and as devoted as ever to the cause of Netherland liberty. The other four had already laid down their lives in its defence. And William Lewis was worthy to be the nephew of William and Lewis, Henry and Adolphus, and the son of John. Not at all a beautiful or romantic hero in appearance, but an odd-looking little man, with a round bullet-head, close-clipped hair, a small, twinkling, sagacious eye, rugged, somewhat puffy features screwed whimsically awry, with several prominent warts dotting without ornamenting all that was visible of a

1 Bruce, 74, 75, date just quoted.

2 Bruce, 61, <sup>14</sup>/<sub>24</sub> Jan. 1586.

1 Bruce's, *Leyc. Corresp.*, '61, 62, <sup>14</sup>/<sub>24</sub> Jan. 1585-6.

2 *Ibid.* 374, <sup>29 July</sup>/<sub>3 Aug.</sub>, 1586.

3 *Ibid.* 74 <sup>22 Jan.</sup>/<sub>1 Feb.</sub>, 1586.

face which was buried up to the ears in a furzy thicket of yellow brown beard, the tough young stadholder of Friesland, in his iron corslet, and halting upon his maimed leg, had come forth with other notable personages to the Hague. He wished to do honour heartily and freely to Queen Elizabeth and her representative. And Leicester was favourably impressed with his new acquaintance. „Here is another little fellow,” he said, „as little as may be, but one of the gravest and wisest young men that ever I spake withal; it is the Count Guiliam of Nassau. He governs Friesland; I would every Province had such another.”<sup>1</sup>

Thus upon the great question which presented itself upon the very threshold—the nature and extent of the authority to be exercised by Leicester—the most influential Netherlands were in favour of a large and liberal interpretation of his powers. The envoys in England, the Nassau family, Hohenlo, the prominent members of the States, such as the shrewd, plausible Menin, the „honest and painful” Falk,<sup>2</sup> and the chancellor of Gelderland—„that very great, wise, old man Leoninus,”<sup>3</sup> as Leicester called, him—were all desirous that he should assume an absolute governor-generalship over the whole country. This was a grave and a delicate matter, and needed to be severely scanned, without delay. But besides the natives, there were two Englishmen—together with ambassador Davison—who were his official advisers. Bartholomew Clerk, LL.D., and Sir Henry Killigrew had been appointed by the Queen to be members of the council of the United States, according to the provisions of the August treaty. The learned Bartholomew hardly seemed equal to his

responsible position among those long-headed Dutch politicians. Philip Sidney—the only blemish in whose character was an intolerable tendency to puns—observed that „Doctor Clerk was of those clerks that are not always the wisest, and so my lord too late was finding him.”<sup>1</sup> The Earl himself, who never undervalued the intellect of the Netherlands whom he came to govern, anticipated but small assistance from the English civilian. „I find no great stuff in my little colleague,” he said, „nothing that I looked for. It is a pity you have no more of his profession, able men to serve. This man hath good will, and a pretty scholar’s wit; but he is too little for these big fellows, as heavy as her Majesty thinks them to be. I would she had but one or two, such as the worst of half a score be here.”<sup>2</sup> The other English state-counsellor seemed more promising. „I have one here,” said the Earl, „in whom I take no small comfort; that is little Hal Killigrew. I assure you, my lord, he is a notable servant, and more in him than ever I heretofore thought of him, though I always knew him to be an honest man and an able.”<sup>3</sup>

But of all the men that stood by Leicester’s side, the most faithful, devoted, sagacious, experienced, and sincere of his counsellors, English or Flemish, was envoy Davison. It is important to note exactly the opinion that had been formed of him by those most competent to judge, before events in which he was called on to play a prominent and responsible though secondary part, had placed him in a somewhat false position.

„Mr. Davison,” wrote Sidney, „is here very careful in her Majesty’s causes, and in your Lordship’s. He takes great

1 Bruce 61, <sup>14</sup> Jan. 1586.  
<sup>24</sup>

2 Ibid. 33, <sup>26</sup> Dec. 1585.  
<sup>5</sup> Feb. 1586.

3 Leicester to Burghley, 18th Feb. 1586.  
(S. P. Office MS.)

1 Gray’s Sidney, p. 313. Thus: „Turner, I hope, will serve my turn well;” and again, „Mr. Paul Bus hath too many busses in his head,” and so on. (Ibid. 313, 327.)

2 Bruce’s, Leyc. Corresp. 33.

3 Leicester to Burghley, 18 Feb. 1586. (S. P. Office MS.)



pains and goes to great charges for it." 1 The Earl himself was always vehement in his praise. „Mr. Davison," said he at another time, „has dealt most painfully and chargeably in her Majesty's service here, and you shall find him as sufficiently able to deliver the whole state of this country as any man that ever was in it, acquainted with all sorts here that are men of dealing. Surely, my Lord, you shall do a good deed that he may be remembered with her Majesty's gracious consideration, for his being here has been very chargeable, having kept a very good countenance, and a very good table, all his abode here, and of such credit with all the chief sort, as I know no stranger in any place hath the like. As I am a suitor to you to be his good friend to her Majesty, so I must heartily pray you, good my Lord, to procure his coming hither shortly to me again, for I know not almost how to do without him. I confess it is a wrong to the gentlemen, and I protest before God, if it were for mine own particular respect, I would not require it for 5000*l*. But your Lordship doth little think how greatly I have to do, as also how needful for her Majesty's service his being here will be. Wherefore, good my Lord, if it may not offend her Majesty, be a mean for this my request, for her own service' sake wholly." 2

Such were the personages who surrounded the Earl on his arrival in the Netherlands, and such their sentiments respecting the position that it was desirable for him to assume. But there was one very important fact. He had studiously concealed from Davison that the Queen had peremptorily and distinctly forbidden his accepting the office of

governor-general. It seemed reasonable, if he came thither at all, that he should come in that elevated capacity. The States wished it. The Earl ardently longed for it. The ambassador, who knew more of Netherland politics and Netherland humours than any man did, approved of it. The interests of both England and Holland seemed to require it. No one but Leicester knew that her Majesty had forbidden it.

Accordingly, no sooner had the bell-ringing, cannon-explosions, bonfires, and charades, come to an end, and the Earl got fairly housed in the Hague, than the States took the affair of government seriously in hand.

On the 9th January, Chancellor Leoninus and Paul Buys waited upon Davison, and requested a copy of the commission granted by the Queen to the Earl. The copy was refused, but the commission was read; 1 by which it appeared that he had received absolute command over her Majesty's forces in the Netherlands by land and sea, together with authority to send for all gentlemen and other personages out of England that he might think useful to him. On the 10th the States passed a resolution to offer him the governor-generalship over all the Provinces. On the same day another committee waited upon his „Excellency"—as the States chose to denominate the Earl, much to the subsequent wrath of the Queen—and made an appointment for the whole body to wait upon him the following morning. 2

Upon that day accordingly—New Year's Day, by the English reckoning, 11th January by the New Style—the 1 Jan. 1586. deputies of all the States at 11 an early hour came to his lodgings, with much pomp, preceded by

1 Sidney to Leicester, 22 Nov. 1585. Brit. Mus. Galba, C. viii. 213, MS. Same to same,

1 Feb, 1586. (S. P. Office MS.)

2 Leicester to Burghley, 27 Dec. 1585. (S. P. Office MS.)

1 Resolutien van de Staten General, a<sup>c</sup> 1586. (Hague Archives, MS., 9 Jan 1586.

2 Ibid. Compare Bor, ii. 686 seq.

a herald and trumpeters. Leicester, not expecting them quite so soon, was in his dressing-room, getting ready for the solemn audience, when, somewhat to his dismay, a flourish of trumpets announced the arrival of the whole body in his principal hall of audience. Hastening his preparations as much as possible, he descended to that apartment, and was instantly saluted by a flourish of rhetoric still more formidable; for that „very great, and wise old Leoninus,” forthwith began an oration, which promised to be of portentous length and serious meaning. The Earl was slightly flustered, when, fortunately, some one whispered in his ear that they had come to offer him the much-coveted prize of the stadholderate-general. Thereupon he made bold to interrupt the flow of the chancellor’s eloquence in its first outpourings. „As this is a very private matter,” said he, „it will be better to treat of it in a more private place. I pray you therefore to come into my chamber, where these things may be more conveniently discussed.” 1

„You hear what my Lord says,” cried Leoninus, turning to his companions; „we are to withdraw into his chamber.” 2

Accordingly they withdrew, accompanied by the Earl, and by five or six select counsellors, among whom were Davison and Dr. Clerk. Then the chancellor once more commenced his harangue, and went handsomely through the usual forms of compliment, first to the Queen, and then to her representative, concluding with an earnest request that the Earl—although her Majesty had declined the sovereignty—„would take the name and place of absolute governor and general of all their forces and soldiers, with the disposition of their whole revenues and taxes.” 3

So soon as the oration was concluded, Leicester, who did not speak French, directed Davison to reply in that language.

The envoy accordingly, in name of the Earl, expressed the deepest gratitude for this mark of the affection and confidence of the States-General towards the Queen. He assured them that the step thus taken by them would be the cause of still more favour and affection on the part of her Majesty, who would unquestionably, from day to day, augment the succour that she was extending to the Provinces in order to relieve men from their misery. For himself, the Earl protested that he could never sufficiently recompense the States for the honour which had thus been conferred upon him, even if he should live one hundred lives. Although he felt himself quite unable to sustain the weight of so great an office, yet he declared that they might repose with full confidence on his integrity and good intentions. Nevertheless, as the authority thus offered to him was very arduous, and as the subject required deep deliberation, he requested that the proposition should be reduced to writing, and delivered into his hands. He might then come to a conclusion thereupon, most conducive to the glory of God and the welfare of the land. 1

Three days afterwards, 14th January, the offer, drawn up formally in writing, was presented to envoy Davison, according to the request of Leicester. 4 Jan. 1586. Three days later, 14

1 Resol. Stat. General,  $\frac{1}{11}$  Jan. 1586. (Hague

Archives, ‘MS.’) According to the Earl’s own account of his speech, through the mouth of Davison, he had much more distinctly expressed his reluctance to accept the authority offered, placing his refusal, not on the ground of unfitness, but on the unexpected nature of the proposition, and upon its „being further than had past in the contract with her Majesty.” The account in the text from the MS. journal of the Sessions of the States-General, kept from day to day by the clerk of that assembly.

1 Bruce’s, ‘Leyc. Corresp.’ p. 58,  $\frac{14}{24}$  Jan. 1586.

2 Ibid. 3 Bruce, 58,  $\frac{14}{24}$  Jan 1586.

17th January, his Excellency 7 Jan. 1586. having deliberated upon the 17 proposition, requested a committee of conference. 1 The conference took place the same day, and there was some discussion upon matters of detail, principally relating to the matter of contributions. The Earl, according to the report of the committee, manifested no repugnance to the acceptance of the office, provided these points could be satisfactorily adjusted. He seemed, on the contrary, impatient, rather than reluctant; for, on the day following the conference, he sent his secretary Gilpin with a somewhat importunate message. „His Excellency was surprised,” said the secretary, „that the States were so long in coming to a resolution on the matters suggested by him in relation to the offer of the government-general; nor could his Excellence imagine the cause of the delay.” 2

For, in truth, the delay was caused by an excessive, rather than a deficient, appetite for power on the part of his Excellency. The States, while conferring what they called the „absolute” government—by which it afterwards appeared that they meant absolute, in regard to time, not to function—were very properly desirous of retaining a wholesome control over that government by means of the state-council. They wished not only to establish such a council, as a check upon the authority of the new governor, but to share with him at least in the appointment of the members who were to compose the board. But the aristocratic Earl was already restive under the thought of any restraint—most of all the restraint of individuals belonging to what he considered the humbler classes.

„Cousin, my lord ambassador,” said

he to Davison, „among your sober companions be it always remembered, I beseech you, that your cousin have no other alliance but with gentle blood. By no means consent that he be linked in faster bonds than their absolute grant may yield him a free and honourable government, to be able to do such service as shall be meet for an honest man to perform in such a calling, which of itself is very noble. But yet it is not more to be embraced, if I were to be led in alliance by such keepers as will sooner draw my nose from the right scent of the chace, than to lead my feet in the true pace to pursue the game I desire to reach. Consider, I pray you, therefore, what is to be done, and how unfit it will be in respect of my poor self, and how unacceptable to her Majesty, and how advantageous to enemies that will seek holes in my coat, if I should take so great a name upon me, and so little power. They challenge acceptance already, and I challenge their absolute grant and offer to me, before they spoke of any instructions; for so it was when Leóninus first spoke to me with them all on New Year's-Day, as you heard—offering in his speech all manner of absolute authority. If it please them to confirm this, without restraining instructions, I will willingly serve the States, or else, with such advising instructions as the Dowager of Hungary had.” 1

This was explicit enough, and Davison, who always acted for Leicester in

1 Leicester to Davison,  $\frac{11}{21}$  Jan. 1586. (S.

P. Office MS.) Davison answered in the same strain, assuring the Earl that he had taken the Estates well to task for wishing to „prescribe instructions after their grant of an authority absolute,” and informing him that they were „very sorry any thing should fall out might justly distaste him.” Davison to Leicester,  $\frac{12}{22}$  Jan. 1586. Brit. Mus. Galba,

C. viii. p. 4, MS.  $\frac{14}{24}$  Jan. 1586. See Bruce, p. 59.

1 Resol. Stat. Gen.  $\frac{4}{14}$ — $\frac{7}{17}$  Jan. 1586.

2 Resol. Stat. Gen.  $\frac{8}{18}$  Jan. 1586. (MSS.)



the negotiations with the States, could certainly have no doubt as to the desires of the Earl, on the subject of „absolute” authority. He did accordingly what he could to bring the States to his Excellency’s way of thinking; nor was he unsuccessful.

On the 22nd January, a committee of conference was sent by the States to Leyden, in which city Leicester was making a brief visit. They were instructed to procure his consent, if possible, to the appointment, by the States themselves, of a council consisting of members from each Province. If they could not obtain this concession, they were directed to insist as earnestly as possible upon their right to present a double list of candidates, from which he was to make nominations. And if the one, and the other proposition should be refused, the States were then to agree that his Excellency should freely choose and appoint a council of state, consisting of native residents from every Province, for the period of one year. The committee was further authorised to arrange the commission for the governor, in accordance with these points; and to draw up a set of instructions for the state-council, to the satisfaction of his Excellency. The committee was also empowered to conclude the matter at once, without further reference to the States. <sup>1</sup>

Certainly a committee thus instructed was likely to be sufficiently pliant. It had need to be, in order to bend to the humour of his Excellency, which was already becoming imperious. The adulation which he had received, the triumphal marches, the Latin orations, the flowers strewn in his path, had produced their effect, and the Earl was almost inclined to assume the airs of royalty. The committee waited upon him at Leyden. He affected a reluctance to

accept the „absolute” government, but his coyness could not deceive such experienced statesmen as the „wise old Leoninus,” or Menin, Maalzoom, Floris Thin, or Aitzma, who composed the deputation. It was obvious enough to them that it was not a moment for complaining. The governor-elect insisted, of course, that the two Englishmen, according to the treaty with her Majesty, should be members of the council. He also, at once, nominated Leoninus, Meetkerk, Brederode, Falck, and Paul Buys, to the same office; thinking no doubt, that these were five keepers—if keepers he must have—who would not draw his nose off the scent, nor prevent his reaching the game he hunted, whatever that game might be. It was reserved for the future, however, to show, whether the five were like to hunt in company with him as harmoniously as he hoped. As to the other counsellors, he expressed a willingness that candidates should be proposed for him, as to whose qualifications he would make up his mind at leisure. <sup>1</sup>

This matter being satisfactorily adjusted—and certainly unless the game pursued by the Earl was a crown royal, he ought to have been satisfied with his success—the States received a letter from their committee at Leyden, informing them that his Excellency, after some previous protestations, had accepted the government (24th January, 1586). <sup>2</sup>

It was agreed that he should be inaugurated Governor-General of the United Provinces of Gelderland and Zutphen, Flanders, Holland, Zeeland, Utrecht, Friesland, and all others in confederacy with them. He was to have supreme military command by land and sea. He was to exercise supreme authority in matters civil and political, according to the customs prevalent in the

<sup>1</sup> Resol. Stat. Gen.  $\frac{9}{19} \frac{12}{22}$  Jan. 1586, MS.

<sup>1</sup> Resol. Stat. Gen.  $\frac{14}{24}$  Jan. 1586, MS.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid.

reign of the Emperor Charles V. All officers, political, civil, legal, were to be appointed by him out of a double or triple nomination made by the States of the Provinces in which vacancies might occur. The States-General were to assemble whenever and wherever he should summon them. They were also—as were the States of each separate Province—competent to meet together by their own appointment. The Governor-General was to receive an oath of fidelity from the States, and himself to swear the maintenance of the ancient laws, customs, and privileges of the country. 1

The deed was done. In vain had an emissary of the French court been exerting his utmost to prevent the consummation of this close alliance. For the wretched government of Henry III., while abasing itself before Philip II., and offering the fair cities and fertile plains of France as a sacrifice to that insatiable ambition which wore the mask of religious bigotry, was most anxious that Holland and England should not escape the meshes by which it was itself enveloped. The agent at the Hague came nominally upon some mercantile affairs, but in reality, according to Leicester, „to impeach the States from binding themselves to her Majesty. 2 But he was informed that there was then no leisure for his affairs, „for the States would attend to the service of the Queen of England before all princes in the world.” The agent did not feel complimented by the coolness of this reception; yet it was reasonable enough, certainly, that the Hollanders should remember with bitterness the contumely which they had experienced the previous year in France. The emissary was, however, much disgusted. „The fellow,” said Leicester, „took it in such snuff, that he came proudly to the States, and offered his

letters, saying, „Now I trust you have done all your sacrifices to the Queen of England, and may yield me some leisure to read my master’s letters.” „But they so shook him up,” continued the Earl, „for naming her Majesty in scorn—as they took it—that they hurled him his letters, and bid him content himself,” and so on, much to the agent’s discomfiture, who retired in greater „snuff” than ever. 1

So much for the French influence. And now Leicester had done exactly what the most imperious woman in the world, whose favour was the breath of his life, had expressly forbidden him to do. The step having been taken, the prize so tempting to his ambition having been snatched, and the policy which had governed the united action of the States and himself seeming so sound, what ought he to have done in order to avert the tempest which he must have foreseen? Surely a man who knew so much of woman’s nature, and of Elizabeth’s nature, as he did, ought to have attempted to conciliate her affections, after having so deeply wounded her pride. He knew his power. Besides the graces of his person and manner—which few women, once impressed by them, could ever forget—he possessed the most insidious and flattering eloquence, and, in absence, his pen was as wily as his tongue. For the Earl was imbued with the very genius of courtship. None was better skilled than he in the phrases of rapturous devotion, which were music to the ear both of the woman and the queen; and he knew his royal mistress too well not to be aware that the language of passionate idolatry, however extravagant, had rarely fallen unheeded upon her soul. It was strange, therefore, that, in this emergency, he should not at once throw himself upon her compassion without any mediator.

1 Groot Plakaatboek, iv. 81. Bor, ii. 686. Wagenaar, viii. 115-117.

2 Bruce, 47, 31 Dec. 1585.  
10 Jan. 1586.

1 Ibid. 47, 31 Dec. 1585.  
10 Jan. 1586.

Yet, on the contrary, he committed the monstrous error of entrusting his defence to envoy Davison, whom he determined to despatch at once with instructions to the Queen, and towards whom he committed the grave offence of concealing from him her previous prohibitions. But how could the Earl fail to perceive that it was the woman, not the queen, whom he should have implored for pardon; that it was Robert Dudley, not William Davison, who ought to have sued upon his knees? This whole matter of the Netherland sovereignty and the Leicester stadholderate forms a strange psychological study, which deserves and requires some minuteness of attention; for it was by the characteristics of these eminent personages that the current history was deeply stamped.

Certainly, under the peculiar circumstances of the case, the first letter conveying intelligence so likely to pique the pride of Elizabeth should have been a letter from Leicester. On the contrary, it proved to be a dull, formal epistle from the States.

And here again the assistance of the indispensable Davison was considered necessary. On the 3rd February the ambassador—having announced 3rd Feb., his intention of going to Eng- 1586. land, by command of his Excellency, so soon as the Earl should have been inaugurated, for the purpose of explaining all these important transaction to her Majesty—waited upon the States with the request that they should prepare as speedily as might be their letter to the Queen, with other necessary documents, to be entrusted to his care. He also suggested that the draft or minute of their proposed epistle should be submitted to him for advice—„because the humours of her Majesty were best known to him.” 1

Now the humours of her Majesty were best known to Leicester of all men

in the whole world, and it is inconceivable that he should have allowed so many days and weeks to pass without taking these humours properly into account. But the Earl's head was slightly turned by his sudden and unexpected success. The game that he had been pursuing had fallen into his grasp, almost at the very start, and it is not astonishing that he should have been somewhat absorbed in the enjoyment of his victory.

Three days later (6th February) the minute of a letter to Elizabeth, drawn up by Menin, was submitted to the ambassador; eight days after that (14th February) Mr. Davison took leave of the States, and set forth for the Brill on his way to England; and three or four days later yet, he was still in that seaport, waiting for a favourable wind.” 1 Thus from the 11th January, N.S.; upon which day the first offer of the absolute government had been made to Leicester, nearly forty days had elapsed during which long period the disobedient Earl had not sent one line, private or official, to her Majesty on this most important subject. And when at last the Queen was to receive information of her favourite's delinquency, it was not to be in his well-known handwriting and accompanied by his penitent tears and written caresses, but to be laid before her with all the formality of parchment and sealing-wax, in the stilted diplomatic jargon of those „highly-mighty, very learned, wise, and very foreseeing gentlemen, my lords the States-General.” Nothing could have been managed with less adroitness.

Meantime, not heeding the storm gathering beyond the narrow seas, the new governor was enjoying the full 4th Feb., sunshine of power. On the 1586. 4th February the ceremony of his inauguration took place, with great pomp and ceremony, at the Hague.” 2

1 Resol. Stat. Gen. 3 Feb. 1586, MS.

1 *Ibid.* 6-20 Feb. 1586, MS.

2 *Ibid.* 4 Feb. 1586, MS.



The beautiful, placid, village-capital of Holland wore much the same aspect at that day as now. Clean, quiet, spacious streets, shaded with rows of whispering poplars and umbrageous limes, broad sleepy canals—those liquid highways along which glided in phantom silence the bustle, and traffic, and countless cares of a stirring population—quaint toppling houses, with tower and gable; ancient brick churches, with slender spire and musical chimes, thatched cottages on the outskirts, with stork-nests on the roofs—the whole without fortification, save the watery defences which enclosed it with long-drawn lines on every side;—such was the Count's Park, or s'Graven Haage, in English called the Hague.

It was embowered and almost buried out of sight by vast groves of oaks and beeches. Ancient Badhuennan forests of sanguinary Druids, the „wild wood without mercy” of Saxon savages, where, at a later period, sovereign Dirks and Florences, in long succession of centuries, had ridden abroad with lance in rest, or hawk on fist, or under whose boughs, in still nearer days, the gentle Jacqueline had pondered and wept over her sorrows, stretched out in every direction between the city and the neighbouring sea. In the heart of the place stood the ancient palace of the counts, built in the thirteenth century by William II. of Holland, King of the Romans, with massive brick walls, cylindrical turrets, pointed gable and rose-shaped windows, and with spacious courtyard, enclosed by feudal moat, drawbridge, and portcullis.

In the great banqueting-hall of the ancient palace, whose cedarn-roof of magnificent timber-work, brought by crusading counts from the Holy Land, had rung with the echoes of many a gigantic revel in the days of chivalry—an apartment one hundred and fifty feet long and forty feet high—there had been arranged an elevated platform, with a

splendid chair of state for the „absolute” governor, and with a great profusion of gilding and velvet tapestry, hangings, gilt emblems, complimentary devices, lions, unicorns, and other imposing appurtenances. Prince Maurice, and all the members of his house, the States-General in full costume, and all the great functionaries, civil and military, were assembled. There was an elaborate harangue by orator Menin, in which it was proved, by copious citations from Holy Writ and from ancient chronicle, that the Lord never forsakes his own; so that now, when the Provinces were at their last gasp by the death of Orange and the loss of Antwerp, the Queen of England and the Earl of Leicester had suddenly descended, as if from heaven, to their rescue. Then the oaths of mutual fidelity were exchanged between the governor and the States, and, in conclusion, Dr. Bartholomew Clerk ventured to measure himself with the „big fellows,” by pronouncing an oration which seemed to command universal approbation. And thus the Earl was duly installed Governor-General of the United States of the Netherlands. 1

But already the first mutterings of the storm were audible. A bird in the air had whispered to the Queen that her favourite was inclined to disobedience. „Some flying tale hath been told me here,” wrote Leicester to Walsingham, „that her Majesty should mislike my name of Excellency. But if I had delighted, or would have received titles, I refused a title higher than Excellency, as Mr. Davison, if you ask him, will tell you; and that I, my own self, refused most earnestly that, and, if I might have done it, this also.” 2 Certainly, if the Queen objected to this

1 Resol. Stat. Gen. 4 Feb. 1586, MS. Bor., ii. 688, 689. Wagenaar, viii. 115 seq. Ho-  
linshed, iv, 647 seq. Stowe, 715 seq.

2 Bruce's ,Leyc. Corresp.' 94 <sup>7</sup>/<sub>17</sub> Feb. 1586.

common form of address, which had always been bestowed upon Leicester, as he himself observed, ever since she had made him an earl, <sup>1</sup> it might be supposed that her wrath would mount high when she should hear of him as absolute governor-general. It is also difficult to say what higher title he had refused, for certainly the records show that he had refused nothing, in the way of power and dignity, that it was possible for him to obtain.

But very soon afterwards arrived authentic intelligence that the Queen had been informed of the proposition made on New Year's Day (O.S.), and that, although she could not imagine the possibility of his accepting, she was indignant that he had not peremptorily rejected the offer.

„As to the proposal made to you,” wrote Burghley, „by the mouth of Leoninus, her Majesty hath been informed that you had thanked them in her name, and alleged that there was no such thing in the contract, and that therefore you could not accept nor knew how to answer the same.” <sup>2</sup>

Now this information was obviously far from correct, although it had been furnished by the Earl himself to Burghley. We have seen that Leicester had by no means rejected, but very gratefully entertained, the proposition as soon as made. Nevertheless the Queen was dissatisfied, even without suspecting that she had been directly disobeyed. „Her Majesty,” continued the Lord-Treasurer, „is much offended with this proceeding. She allows not that you should give them thanks, but findeth it very strange that you did not plainly

declare to them that they did well know how often her Majesty had refused to have any one for her take any such government there, and that she had always so answered peremptorily. Therefore there might be some suspicion conceived that by offering on their part and refusal on hers, some further mischief might be secretly hidden by some odd person's device to the hurt of the cause. But in that your Lordship did not flatly say to them that yourself did know her Majesty's mind therein, that she never meant, in this sort, to take the absolute government, she is offended; considering, as she saith, that none knew her determination therein better than yourself. For at your going hence, she did peremptorily charge you not to accept any such title and office; and therefore her straight commandment now is that you shall not accept the same, for she will never assent thereto, nor avow you with any such title.” <sup>1</sup>

If Elizabeth was so wrathful, even while supposing that the offer had been gratefully declined, what were likely to be her emotions when she should be informed that it had been gratefully accepted! The Earl already began to tremble at the probable consequences of his mal-adroitness. Grave was the error he had committed in getting himself made governor-general against orders; graver still, perhaps fatal, the blunder of not being swift to confess his fault, and cry for pardon, before other tongues should have time to aggravate his offence. Yet even now he shrank from addressing the Queen in person, but hoped to conjure the rising storm by means of the magic wand of the Lord-Treasurer. He implored his friend's interposition to shield him in the emergency, and begged that at least her Majesty and the lords of council would suspend their judgment until Mr. Davison should deliver those messages and explanations with which

<sup>1</sup> Compare Camden, iii. 399, „being derided by those that envied him, and the title of Excellency, which, of all Englishmen, he was the first that ever used, exploded and tripped off the stage.”

<sup>2</sup> Burghley (in his own hand) to Leicester, 26 Jan. 1586. (S. P. Office MS.)

5 Feb.

<sup>1</sup> Burghley to Leicester, MS. just cited.

fully freighted, he was about to set sail from the Brill.

„If my reasons seem to your wisdoms,” said he, „other than such as might well move a true and a faithful, careful man to her Majesty to do as I have done, I do desire, for my mistaking offence, to bear the burden of it; to be disavowed with all displeasure and disgrace: a matter of as great reproach and grief as ever can happen to any man.” He begged that another person might be sent as soon as possible in his place—protesting, however, by his faith in Christ, that he had done only what he was bound to do by his regard for her Majesty’s service—and that when he set foot in the country he had no more expected to be made Governor of the Netherlands than to be made King of Spain. 1 Certainly he had been paying dear for the honour, if honour it was, and he had not intended on setting forth for the Provinces to ruin himself, for the sake of an empty title. His motives—and he was honest when he so avowed them—were motives of state at least as much as of self-advancement. 2 „I have no cause,” he said, „to have played the fool thus far for myself; first, to have her Majesty’s displeasure, which no kingdom in the world could make me willingly deserve; next, to undo myself in my later days; to consume all that should have kept me all my life in one half-year. But I must thank God for all, and am most heartily grieved at her Majesty’s heavy displeasure. I neither desire to live, nor to see my country with it.” 3

And at this bitter thought, he began to sigh like a furnace, and to shed the big tears of penitence.

„For if I have not done her Majesty good service at this time,” he said, „I

shall never hope to do her any, but will withdraw me into some out-corner of the world, where I will languish out the rest of my few—too many—days, praying ever for her Majesty’s long and prosperous life, and with this only comfort to live an exile, that this disgrace hath happened for no other cause but for my mere regard for her Majesty’s estate.” 1

Having painted this dismal picture of the probable termination to his career—not in the hope of melting Burghley, but of touching the heart of Elizabeth—he proceeded to argue the point in question with much logic and sagacity. He had satisfied himself on his arrival in the Provinces, that, if he did not take the governor-generalship, some other person would; and that it certainly was for the interest of her Majesty that her devoted servant, rather than an indifferent person, should be placed in that important position. He maintained that the Queen had intimated to him in private her willingness that he should accept the office in question, provided the proposition should come from the States, and not from her; he reasoned that the double nature of his functions—being general and counsellor for her, as well as general and counsellor for the Provinces—made his acceptance of the authority conferred on him almost indispensable; that for him to be merely commander over five thousand English troops, when an abler soldier than himself, Sir John Norris, was at their head, was hardly worthy her Majesty’s service or himself, and that in reality the Queen had lost nothing by his appointment, but had gained much benefit and honour by thus having „the whole command of the Provinces, of their forces by land and sea, of their towns and treasures, with knowledge of all their secrets of state.” 2

1 Bruce’s, *Leyc. Corresp.* ’96, 97,  $\frac{8}{18}$  Feb. 1586.

2 Ibid.

3 Bruce, 96, 97,  $\frac{8}{18}$  Feb. 1586.

1 Ibid., 98,  $\frac{8}{18}$  Feb. 1586.

2 Ibid. 100-102,  $\frac{8}{18}$  Feb. 1586.



Then, relapsing into a vein of tender but reproachful melancholy, he observed that if it had been any man but himself that had done as he had done, he would have been thanked, not censured. „But such is now my wretched case,” he said, „as for my faithful, true, and loving heart to her Majesty and my country, I have utterly undone myself. For favour, I have disgrace; for reward, utter spoil and ruin. But if this taking upon me the name of governor is so evil taken as it hath deserved dishonour, discredit, disfavor, with all griefs that may be laid upon a man, I must receive it as deserved of God and not of my Queen, whom I have revered with all humility, and whom I have loved with all fidelity.” 1

This was the true way, no doubt, to reach the heart of Elizabeth, and Leicester had always plenty of such shafts in his quiver. Unfortunately he had delayed too long, and even now he dared not take a direct aim. He feared to write to the Queen herself, thinking that his so doing, „while she had such concepts of him, would only trouble her,” and he therefore continued to employ the Lord-Treasurer and Mr. Secretary as his mediators. Thus he committed error upon error.

Meantime, as if there had not been procrastination enough, Davison was loitering at the Brill, detained by wind and weather. Two days after the letter just cited had been despatched to Walsingham, Leicester sent an impatient message to the envoy. „I 10 Feb. 1585. am heartily sorry, with 20 all my heart,” he said, „to hear of your long stay at Brill, the wind serving so fair as it hath done these two days. I would have laid any wager that you had been in England ere this. I pray you make haste, lest our cause take too great a prejudice there ere you come, although I cannot fear it, be-

cause it is so good and honest. I pray you imagine in what care I dwell till I shall hear from you, albeit some way very resolute.” 1

Thus it was obvious that he had no secret despair of his cause when it should be thoroughly laid before the Queen. The wonder was that he had added the offence of long silence to the sin of disobedience. Davison had sailed, however, before the receipt of the Earl's letter. He had been furnished with careful instructions upon the subject of his mission. He was to show how eager the States had been to have Leicester for their absolute governor—which was perfectly true—and how anxious the Earl had been to decline the proffered honour—which was certainly false, if contemporary record and the minutes of the States-General are to be believed. He was to sketch the general confusion which had descended upon the country, the quarrelling of politicians, and the discontent of officers and soldiers, from out of all which chaos one of two results was sure to arise: the election of a single chieftain, or a reconciliation of the Provinces with Spain. That it would be impossible for the Earl to execute the double functions with which he was charged—of general of her Majesty's forces, and general and chief counsellor of the States—if any other man than himself should be appointed governor, was obvious. It was equally plain that the Provinces could only be kept at her Majesty's disposition by choosing the course which, at their own suggestion, had been adopted. The offer of the government by the States, and its acceptance by the Earl, were the logical consequence of the step which the Queen had already taken. It was thus only that England could retain her hold upon the country, and even upon the cau-

1 Bruce, 100-102, just cited.

1 Leicester to Davison,  $\frac{10}{20}$  Feb. 1585. (S. P. Office MS.)

tionary towns. As to a reconciliation of the Provinces with Spain—which would have been the probable result of Leicester's rejection of the proposition made by the States—it was unnecessary to do more than allude to such a catastrophe. No one but a madman could doubt that, in such an event, the subjugation of England was almost certain. <sup>1</sup>

But, before the arrival of the ambassador, the Queen had been thoroughly informed as to the whole extent of the Earl's delinquency. Dire was the result. The wintry gales which had been lashing the North Sea, and preventing the unfortunate Davison from setting forth on his disastrous mission, were nothing to the tempest of royal wrath which had been shaking the court-world to its centre. The Queen had been swearing most fearfully ever since she read the news, which Leicester had not dared to communicate directly to herself. No one was allowed to speak a word in extenuation of the favourite's offence. Burghley, who lifted up his voice somewhat feebly to appease her wrath, was bid, with a curse, to hold his peace. So he took to his bed—partly from prudence, partly from gout—and thus sheltered himself for a season from the peltings of the storm. Walsingham, more manful, stood to his post, but could not gain a hearing. It was the culprit that should have spoken, and spoken in time. „Why, why did you not write yourself?” was the plaintive cry of all the Earl's friends, from highest to humblest. „But write to her now,” they exclaimed, „at any rate; and, above all, send her a present, a love-gift.” „Lay out two or three hundred crowns in some rare thing, for a token to her Majesty,” said Christopher Hatton. <sup>2</sup>

Strange that his colleagues and his

rivals should have been obliged to advise Leicester upon the proper course to pursue; that they—not himself—should have been first to perceive that it was the enraged woman, even more than the offended sovereign, who was to be propitiated and soothed. In truth, all the woman had been aroused in Elizabeth's bosom. She was displeased that her favourite should derive power and splendour from any source but her own bounty. She was furious that his wife, whom she hated, was about to share in his honours. For the mischievous tongues of courtladies had been collecting or fabricating many unpleasant rumours. A swarm of idle but piquant stories had been buzzing about the Queen's ears, and stinging her into a frenzy of jealousy. The Countess—it was said—was on the point of setting forth for the Netherlands, to join the Earl, with a train of courtiers and ladies, coaches, and side-saddles, such as were never seen before—where the two were about to establish themselves in conjugal felicity, as well as almost royal state. What a prospect for the jealous and imperious sovereign! „Coaches and side-saddles! She would show the upstarts that there was one Queen, and that her name was Elizabeth, and that there was no court but hers.” And so she continued to storm, and swear, and threaten unutterable vengeance, till all her courtiers quaked in their shoes. <sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> „It was told her Majesty,” wrote Thomas Dudley, „that my lady was prepared presently to come over to your Excellency, with such a train of ladies and gentlewomen, and such rich coaches, litters, and side-saddles, as her Majesty had none such; and that there should be such a court of ladies as should far pass her Majesty's court here. This information (though most false) did not a little stir her Majesty to extreme choler and dislike of all your doings there; saying, with great oaths, she would have no more courts under her obeisance than her own, and would revoke you from thence with all speed. This Mr. Vice Chamberlain (Hatton) told me in great secret, and afterwards Mr. Secretary, and last of all my Lord-

<sup>1</sup> Remembrances for Mr. Davison, in Bruce, 80-82, Feb. 1586.

<sup>2</sup> Bruce's ,Leyc. Corresp.' 113, 114. <sup>11</sup>  
Feb. 1586. <sup>21</sup>

Thomas Dudley, however, warmly contradicted the report, declaring, of his own knowledge, that the Countess had no wish to go to the Provinces, nor the Earl any intention of receiving her there. This information was at once conveyed to the Queen, „and,” said Dudley, „it did greatly pacify her stomach.”<sup>1</sup> His friends did what they could to maintain the governor's cause; but Burghley, Walsingham, Hatton, and the rest of them, were all „at their wits' end,”<sup>2</sup> and were nearly distraught at the delay in Davison's arrival. Meantime the Queen's stomach was not so much pacified but that she was determined to humiliate the Earl with the least possible delay. Having waited sufficiently long for his explanations, she now appointed Sir Thomas Heneage as special commissioner to the States, without waiting any longer. Her wrath vented itself at once in the preamble to the instructions for this agent.

„Whereas,” she said, „we have been given to understand that the Earl of Leicester hath in a very contemptuous sort—contrary to our express commandment given unto him by ourself, accepted of an offer of a more absolute government made by the States unto him, than was agreed on between us and their commissioners—which kind of contemptible manner of proceeding giveth the world just cause to think that there is not that reverent respect carried towards us by our subjects as in duty appertaineth; especially seeing so notorious a contempt committed by one whom we have raised up and yielded in the eye of the world, even from the beginning of our reign, as great portion of our favour as ever subject enjoyed at any prince's hands; we therefore, holding nothing dearer than our honour, and considering that no one thing could more touch our reputation than to in-

duce so open and public a faction of a prince, and work a greater reproach than contempt at a subject's hand, without reparation of our honour, have found it necessary to send you unto him, as well to charge him with the said contempt, as also to execute such other things as we think meet to be done for the justifying of ourselves to the world, as the repairing of the indignity cast upon us by his undutiful manner of proceeding towards us. . . . And for that we find ourselves also not well dealt withal by the States, in that they have pressed the said Earl, without our assent or privity, to accept of a more absolute government than was agreed on between us and their commissioners, we have also thought meet that you shall charge them therewith, according to the directions hereafter ensuing. And, to the end there may be no delay used in the execution of that which we think meet to be presently done, you shall charge the said States, even as they tender the continuance of our good-will towards them, to proceed to the speedy execution of our request.”<sup>1</sup>

After this trumpet-like preamble it may be supposed that the blast which followed would be piercing and shrill. The instructions, in truth, consisted in wild, scornful flourishes upon one theme. The word contempt had occurred five times in the brief preamble. It was repeated in almost every line of the instructions.

„You shall let the Earl” (our cousin no longer) „understand,” said the Queen, „how highly and justly we are offended with his acceptance of the government, which we do repute to be a very *great and strange contempt*, least looked for at our hands, being, as he is, a creature of our own.” His omission to acquaint her by letter with the causes

Treasurer.” Bruce's, *Leyc. Corresp.* 112, 11

Feb. 1586.

1 Ibid.

2 Ibid.

1 The Queen to Sir Thomas Heneage, 10 Feb. 1586. (S. P. Office MS.) The rest of the document is given in Bruce, 105 *seq.*



moving him „so contemptuously to break” her commandment, his delay in sending Davison „to answer the said *contempt*,” had much „aggravated the fault,” although the Queen protested herself unable to imagine any „excuse for so manifest a *contempt*.” The States were to be informed that she „held it strange” that „this creature of her own” should have been pressed by them to „commit so notorious a *contempt*” against her, both on account of this very exhibition of contempt on Leicester’s part, and because they thereby „showed themselves to have a very slender and weak conceit of her judgment, by pressing a minister of hers to accept that which she had refused, as though her long experience in government had not taught her to discover what was fit to do in matters of state.” As the result of such a proceeding would be to disgrace her in the eyes of mankind, by inducing an opinion that her published solemn declaration on this great subject had been intended to abuse the world, he was directed—in order to remove the hard conceit justly to be taken by the world, „in consideration of the said *contempt*,” —to make a public and open resignation of the government in the place where had accepted the same. 1

Thus it had been made obvious to the unlucky „creature of her own,” that the Queen did not easily digest „contempt.” Nevertheless these instructions to Heneage were gentle, compared with the fierce billet which she addressed directly to the Earl. It was brief, too, as the posy of a ring; and thus it ran:—„To my Lord of Leicester, from the Queen, by Sir Thomas Heneage. How contemptuously we conceive ourself to have been used by you, you shall by this bearer understand, whom we have expressly sent unto you to charge you withal. We could never

have imagined, had we not seen it fall out in experience, that a man raised up by ourself, and extraordinarily favoured by us above any other subject of this land, would have, in so contemptible a sort, broken our commandment, in a cause that so greatly toucheth us in honour; whereof, although you have showed yourself to make but little account, in most undutiful a sort, you may not therefore think that we have so little care of the reparation thereof as we mind to pass so great a wrong in silence unredressed. And therefore our express pleasure and commandment is, that—all delays and excuses laid apart—you do presently, upon the duty of your allegiance, obey and fulfil whatsoever the bearer hereof shall direct you to do in our name. Whereof fail not, as you will answer the contrary at your uttermost peril.” 1

Here was no billing and cooing, certainly, but a terse, biting phraseology, about which there could be no misconception.

By the same messenger the Queen also sent a formal letter to the States-General; the epistle—*mutatis mutandis*—being also addressed to the state-council.

In this document her Majesty expressed her great surprise that Leicester should have accepted their offer of the absolute government, „both for police and war,” when she had so expressly rejected it herself. „To tell the truth,” she observed, „you seem to have treated us with very little respect, and put a too manifest insult upon us, in presenting anew to one of our subjects the same proposition which we had already declined, without at least waiting for our answer whether we should like it or

1 Bruce’s *Leyc. Corresp.* 110,  $\frac{10}{20}$  Feb.

1586. S. P. Office,  $\frac{10}{20}$  and  $\frac{14}{24}$  Feb. 1586, MS.

1 The Queen to Sir Thomas Heneage, just cited.

no; as if we had not sense enough to be able to decide upon what we ought to accept or refuse." 1 She proceeded to express her dissatisfaction with the course pursued, because so repugnant to her published declaration, in which she had stated to the world her intention of aiding the Provinces, without meddling in the least with the sovereignty of the country. „The contrary would now be believed," she said, „at least by those who take the liberty of censuring, to their pleasure, the actions of princes." Thus her honour was at stake. She signified her will, therefore, that, in order to convince the world of her sincerity, the authority conferred should be revoked, and that „the Earl," whom she had decided to recall very soon, 2 should, during his brief residence there, only exercise the power agreed upon by the original contract. She warmly reiterated her intention, however, of observing inviolably the promise of assistance which she had given to the States. „And if," she said, „any malicious or turbulent spirits should endeavour, perchance, to persuade the people that this our refusal proceeds from lack of affection or honest disposition to assist you—instead of being founded only on respect for our honour, which is dearer to us than life—we beg you, by every possible means, to shut their mouths, and prevent their pernicious designs." 3

Thus, heavily laden with the royal wrath, Heneage was on the point of leaving London for the Netherlands, on the very day upon which Davison arrived, charged with deprecatory missives from that country. After his long detention

he had a short passage, crossing from the Brill to Margate in a single night. Coming immediately to London, he sent to Walsingham to inquire which way the wind was blowing at court, but received a somewhat discouraging reply. „Your long detention by his Lordship," said the Secretary, „has wounded the whole cause;" adding, that he thought her Majesty would not speak with him. On the other hand, it seemed indispensable for him to go to the court, because if the Queen should hear of his arrival before he had presented himself, she was likely to be more angry than ever, 1

So, the same afternoon, Davison waited upon Walsingham, and found him in a state of despondency. „She takes his Lordship's acceptance of the government most haynously," said Sir Francis, „and has resolved to send Sir Thomas Heneage at once, with orders for him to resign the office. She has been threatening you and Sir Philip Sidney, whom she considers the chief actors and persuaders in the matter, according to information received from some persons about my Lord of Leicester." 2

Davison protested himself amazed at the Secretary's discourse, and at once took great pains to show the reasons by which all parties had been influenced in the matter of the government. He declared roundly that if the Queen should carry out her present intentions, the Earl would be most unworthily disgraced, the cause utterly overthrown, the Queen's honour perpetually stained, and that her kingdom would incur great disaster.

Directly after this brief conversation, Walsingham went up-stairs to the Queen, while Davison proceeded to the apartments of Sir Christopher Hatton. Thence he was soon summoned to the

1 Minute to the States-General: the like to the Council of State—*mutatis mutandis*. (S. P. Office MS., Feb. 13, 1586.)

2 „Lequel sommes deliberée de rappeler bientôt," &c. MS. *ubi sup*.

3 „Vous taschiez par tous moyens de cloire la bouche et empêcher les pernicleux desseins de tels dangereux instruments," &c. MS. *ubi sup*.

1 Bruce's *Leyc. Corresp.* 117, 118, 17  
Feb. 1586. 27  
2 *Ibid*.

royal presence, and found that he had not been misinformed as to the temper of her Majesty. The Queen was indeed in a passion; and began swearing at Davison so soon as he got into the chamber; abusing Leicester for having accepted the offer of the States, against her many times repeated commandment, and the ambassador for not having opposed his course. The thing had been done, she said, in contempt of her, as if her consent had been of no consequence, or as if the matter in no way concerned her.

So soon as she paused to take breath, the envoy modestly, but firmly, appealed to her reason, that she would at any rate lend him a patient and favourable ear, in which case he doubted not that she would form a more favourable opinion of the case than she had hitherto done. He then entered into a long discourse upon the state of the Netherlands before the arrival of Leicester, the inclination in many quarters for a peace, the „despair that any sound and good fruit would grow of her Majesty's cold beginning,” the general unpopularity of the States' government, the „corruption, partiality and confusion,” which were visible everywhere, the perilous condition of the whole cause, and the absolute necessity of some immediate reform.

„It was necessary,” said Davison, „that some one person of wisdom and authority should take the helm. Among the Netherlands none was qualified for such a charge. Lord Maurice is a child, poor, and of but little respect among them. Elector Truchsess, Count Hohenlo, Meurs, and the rest, strangers and incapable of the burden. These considerations influenced the States to the step which had been taken, without which all the rest of her benevolence was to little purpose.” Although the contract between the commissioners and the Queen had not literally provided for such an arrangement, yet it had always

been contemplated by the States, who had left themselves without a head until the arrival of the Earl.

„Under one pretext or another,” continued the envoy, „my Lord of Leicester had long delayed to satisfy them,” —(and in so stating he went somewhat further in defence of his absent friend than the facts would warrant), „for he neither flatly refused it, nor was willing to accept it, until your Majesty's pleasure should be known.”<sup>1</sup> Certainly the records show no reservation of his acceptance until the Queen had been consulted; but the defence by Davison of the offending Earl was so much the more courageous.

„At length, wearied by their impotency, moved with their reasons, and compelled by necessity, he thought it better to take the course he did,” proceeded the diplomatist, „for otherwise he must have been an eye-witness of the dismemberment of the whole country, which could not be kept together but by a reposed hope in her Majesty's found favour, which had been utterly despaired of by his refusal. He thought it better, by accepting, to increase the honour, profit, and surety, of her Majesty, and the good of the cause, than, by refusing, to utterly hazard the one, and overthrow the other.”<sup>2</sup>

To all this and more, well and warmly urged by Davison, the Queen listened by fits and starts, often interrupting his discourse by violent abuse of Leicester, accusing him of contempt for her, charging him with thinking more of his own particular greatness than of her honour and service, and then „digressing into old griefs,” said the envoy, „too long and tedious to write.” She vehemently denounced Davison also for dereliction of duty in not opposing the measure, but he manfully declared that he never deemed so meanly of her Majesty or of his Lordship as to suppose

<sup>1</sup> Bruce, 120, same date.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid.



that she would send him, or that he would go to the Provinces, merely „to take command of the relics of Mr. Norris's worn and decayed troops." Such a charge, potested Davison, was utterly unworthy a person of the Earl's quality, and utterly unsuited to the necessity of the time and state. 1

But Davison went farther in defence of Leicester. He had been present at many of the conferences with the Netherland envoys during the preceding summer in England, and he now told the Queen stoutly to her face that she herself, or at any rate one of her chief counsellors, in her hearing and his, had expressed her royal determination not to prevent the acceptance of whatever authority the States might choose to confer, by any one whom she might choose to send. She had declined to accept it in person, but she had been willing that it should be wielded by her deputy; and this remembrance of his had been confirmed by that of one of the commissioners since their return. Se had never—Davison maintained—sent him one single line having any bearing on the subject. Under such circumstances, „I might have been accused of madness," said he, „to have dissuaded an action in my poor opinion so necessary and expedient for Majesty's honour, surety, and greatness." If it were to do over again, he avowed, and „were his opinion demanded, he could give no other advice than that which he had given, having received no contrary commandment from her Highness." 2

And so ended the first evening's long and vehement debate, and Davison departed, „leaving her," as he said, „much qualified, though in many points unsatisfied." 3 She had, however, absolutely refused to receive a letter from Leicester, with which he had been charged,

but which, in her opinion, had better have been written two months before.

The next day, it seemed, after all, that Heneage was to be despatched, „in great heat," upon his mission. Davison accordingly requested an immediate audience. So soon as admitted to the presence he burst into tears, and implored the Queen to pause before she should inflict the contemplated disgrace on one whom she had hitherto so highly esteemed, and, by so doing, dishonour herself and imperil both countries. But the Queen was more furious than ever that morning, returning at every pause in the envoy's discourse to harp upon the one string—„How dared he come to such a decision without at least imparting it to me?"—and so on, as so many times before. And again Davison, with all the eloquence and with every soothing art he had at command, essayed to pour oil upon the waves. Nor was he entirely unsuccessful; for presently the Queen became so calm again that he ventured once more to present the rejected letter of the Earl. She broke the seal, and at sight of the well-known handwriting she became still more gentle, and so soon as she had read the first of her favourite's honeyed phrases she thrust the precious document into her pocket, in order to read it afterwards, as Davison observed, at her leisure. 1

The opening thus successfully made, and the envoy having thus, „by many insinuations," prepared her to lend him a „more patient and willing ear than she had vouchsafed before," he again entered into a skilful and impassioned argument to show the entire wisdom of the course pursued by the Earl. 2

1 Ibid. 122, <sup>17</sup> Feb. 1586.

2 Bruce, 122, same date. „The beginning of our comedy was uncommon sharp," said Davison, „but this much I do be bold to assure you, that, if I had not arrived as I did, both his Lordship had been utterly disowned and the cause overthrown." Davison to Herle, 17 Feb. 1586. (Brit. Mus. Galba C. viii. 38, MS.)

1 Bruce, 121, same date.

2 Ibid.

3 Ibid. 122, same date

It is unnecessary to repeat the conversation. Suffice to say that no man could have more eloquently and faithfully supported an absent friend under difficulties than Davison now defended the Earl. The line of argument is already familiar to the reader, and, in truth, the Queen had nothing to reply, save to insist upon the governor's delinquency in maintaining so long and inexplicable a silence. And at this thought, in spite of the envoy's eloquence, she went off again in a paroxysm of anger, abusing the Earl, and deeply censuring Davison for his „peremptory and partial dealing.”<sup>1</sup>

„I had conceived a better opinion of you,” she said, „and I had intended more good to you than I now find you worthy of.”

„I humbly thank your Highness,” replied the ambassador, but „I take yourself to witness that I have never affected or sought any such grace at your hands. And if your Majesty persists in the dangerous course on which you are now entering, I only pray your leave, in recompense for all my travails, to retire myself home, where I may spend the rest of my life in praying for you, whom Salvation itself is not able to save, if these purposes are continued. Henceforth, Madam, he is to be deemed happiest who is least interested in the public service.”<sup>2</sup>

And so ended the second day's debate. The next morning the Lord-Treasurer, who, according to Davison, employed himself diligently—as did also Walsingham and Hatton<sup>3</sup>—in dissuading the Queen from the violent measures which she had resolved upon, ef-

fected so much of a change as to produce the insertion of those qualifying clauses in Heneage's instructions which had been previously disallowed. The open and public disgrace of the Earl, which was to have been peremptorily demanded, was now to be deferred, if such a measure seemed detrimental to the public service. Her Majesty, however, protested herself as deeply offended as ever, although she had consented to address a brief, somewhat mysterious, but benignant letter of compliment to the States.<sup>1</sup>

Soon after this Davison retired for a few days from the court, having previously written to the Earl that „the heat of her Majesty's offence to his Lordship was abating every day somewhat, and that she was disposed both to hear and to speak more temperately of him.”<sup>2</sup>

He implored him accordingly to a „more diligent entertaining of her by wise letters and messages, wherein his slackness hitherto appeared to have bred a great part of this unkindness.”<sup>3</sup> He observed also that the „traffic of peace

1 „Monsieur Davison nous a bien aulong discouru et representé,” said the Queen, „de quel zele vous avez été poussees a faire l'offre du gouvernement absolu de ces pays la au Comte de Leycestra, avec les plus grandes signes et demonstrations d'une vehemente et devotionnee affection envers nous, qu'on scauroit desirer, dont on nous pourroit à bon droit taxer d'ingratitude, si eussions oublié de vous en remercier bien expressement, et de vous rendre certains des effects reciproques que cela cause en nous d'une entiere affection envers vous, combien que pour plusieurs grandes et importantes considerations ne puissions nous accorder à l'acceptation du dit offre. . . . Nous asseurant que si scaviez de quelle consequence sont les raisons et considerations que ne nous pouvons communiquer pour plusieurs respects d'importance, et sur les quelles notre repos est fondé, vous memes seriez de notre avis, et demureriez contents du dict refus, lequel sera cause d'augmenter encores de tant plus le soin qu'avons promis d'avoir du bien et conservation de ces pays la.” Minute of H. Majesty's Letter to the States General. (S. P. Office MS. Feb. 1581.)

2 Bruce, 124, <sup>17</sup>/<sub>27</sub> Feb. 1586.

3 Ibid. 125, same date.

1 Bruce, 123, same date.

2 Ibid. 124, same date.

3 Ibid. 143, <sup>28 Feb.</sup>/<sub>10 Mar.</sub> 1586; but to Walsing-

ham Leicester „owed more,” according to Davison, „for his constant friendship and sufferance for his sake, than to all others at court.” Davison to Herle. (Brit. Mus. Galba, C. viii. MS.)

was still going on underhand; but whether to use it as a second string to our bow, if the first should fail, or of any settled inclination thereunto, he could not affirm." 1

Meantime Sir Thomas Heneage was despatched on his mission to the States, despite all the arguments and expostulations of Walsingham, Burghley, Hutton, and Davison. All the Queen's counsellors were unequivocally in favour of sustaining Leicester; and Heneage was not a little embarrassed as to the proper method of conducting the affair. Everything, in truth, was in a most confused condition. He hardly understood to what power he was accredited, „Heneage writes even now unto me," said Walsingham to Davison, „that he cannot yet receive any information who be the States, which he thinketh will be a great mainer unto him in his negotiation. I have told him that it is an assembly much like that of our burghesses that represent the State, and that my Lord of Leicester may cause some of them to meet together, unto whom he may deliver his letters and messages." 2 Thus the new envoy was to request the culprit to summon the very assembly by which his downfall and disgrace were to be solemnized as formally as had been so recently his elevation to the height of power. The prospect was not an agreeable one, and the less so because of his general want of familiarity with the constitutional forms of the country he was about to visit. Davison accordingly, at the request of Sir Francis, furnished Heneage with much valuable information and advice upon the subject. 3

Thus provided with information, forewarned of danger, furnished with

and besides his lieutenancy from the Queen. The nature of his authority reaches to an absolute command in matters belonging to the wars, though in civil things limited to the lawful power of other governors-general in times past, as you shall better perceive by the commission and acts themselves, which I know my Lord will not conceal from you. The contributions towards the war of 200,000 florins, or 20,000*l.* the month, agreed to by the four provinces of Holland, Zeeland, Friesland, and Utrecht, are to be levied chiefly on the ordinary means of consumption, or things spent and consumed in the country, which, in Holland alone, doth now amount to 90,000 florins monthly, besides the quota of the other provinces, and over and above their customs upon all merchandize going out and coming in, and, besides, all this may be levied in the other provinces of Gelderland, Overijssel, Brabant, and Flanders. They are to put into my Lord's hand the letting and farming of these impositions yet in force till April next, which, coming short of the general sum, they have promised to supply by a contribution extraordinary, such as tax on land and other things, whereof my Lord can and will thoroughly inform you. The sovereignty, notwithstanding, remains *penes ordines*, which we call the Estates. These consist of the whole provinces united, to the number ordinarily of some eighteen or twenty persons, each province deputing some four or five, as the occasion and time require. These are chosen out by their provinces, and are sent to the general assembly upon extraordinary occasions—as when there is occasion for making some new ordinance, either for contributions or other occurrences, concerning the whole generality. The place of their ordinary meeting is the Hague. The time of their continuance together is not longer than till the matter in question be resolved, or remitted to a new report, which often happeneth. These, having remained together upon my Lord's coming till he had agreed to the acceptance of the government, were to depart home—about the time of my coming thence—to return within some few days after for the determining of a new proposition for the increase of their ordinary contributions, and are by this time, I think, dissolved again. In this case, your letters to them—if you have any—must tarry a new convocation, for to them only it appertains to answer the matter of my Lord's election, forasmuch as concerneth the country. The council of estate, resident with my Lord, hath been chosen since his election to the government, composed of some ten or twelve persons, at the denomination of the provinces, and my Lord's election. These you shall find attending upon my Lord as his ordinary

1 Bruce, 125, same date.

2 Walsingham to Davison, 25 Feb. 1586. (S. P. Office MS.)

3 „The government as it is now," said he, „you shall find altered from the form whereof I delivered you some notes the last year. The general commandment rests presently in the hands of my Lord of Leicester, as governor of the countries for them, over



a double set of letters from the Queen to the States—the first expressed in language of extreme exasperation, the others couched in almost affectionate terms—and laden with messages brim-full of wrathful denunciation from her Majesty to one who was notoriously her Majesty's dearly-beloved, Sir Thomas Heneage set forth on his mission. These were perilous times for the Davisons and the Heneages, when even Leicesters and Burghleys were scarcely secure.

Meantime the fair weather at court could not be depended upon from one day to another, and the clouds were perpetually returning after the rain.

„Since my second and third day's audience,” said Davison, „the storms I met with at my arrival have overblown and abated daily. On Saturday again she

assistants in all matters concerning the public government, but to them it belongeth not to deliver anything touching this case of my Lord's, without special direction. And thus much touching the form of that government, as far forth as the time will suffer me to discourse unto you, or may belong to your present charge, leaving you for other things to be more particularly satisfied by Sir Philip Sidney, Mr. Killigrew, and others of your friends, at your arrival there.”

Having given this correct and graphic outline of the government to which Heneage had thus been despatched, upon such delicate and perilous business, Davison proceeded to whisper a word of timely caution in his ear.

„I cannot but let you know,” he said, „how heartily sorry I am that it is not more plausible to my Lord, and profitable to that poor country, What may move her Majesty to take this course I know not, but this I protest unto you before God, that I know not what other course the Estates or my Lord might have taken than they have done, nor how the country may be saved, if this act be discountenanced and overthrown. To advise you how to carry yourself I will not take upon me, and yet dare be bold to affirm this much, that your message, if it be not all the better handled in your wisdom, cannot but breed utter dishonour to my Lord, ruin to the cause, and repentance ere long to her Majesty's self which will better appear unto you when you shall be there to look into their estate. But, seeing God hath so disposed thereof, I will cast my care upon his providence, and recommend the cause to Him that governs all.” Davison to Heneage, 28 Feb. 1586. (S. P. Office MS.)

fell into some new heat, which lasted not long. This day I was myself at the court, and found her in reasonable good terms, though she will not yet seem satisfied to me either with the matter or manner of your proceeding, notwithstanding all the labour I have taken in that behalf. Yet I find not her Majesty altogether so sharp as some men look, though her favour has outwardly cooled in respect both of this action and of our plain proceeding with her here in defence thereof” 1

The poor Countess—whose imaginary exodus, with the long procession of coaches and side-saddles, had excited so much ire—found herself in a most distressing position. „I have not seen my Lady these ten or twelve days,” said Davison. „To-morrow I hope to do my duty towards her. I found her greatly troubled with tempestuous news she received from court, but somewhat comforted when she understood how I had proceeded with her Majesty. . . . But, these passions overblown, I hope her Majesty will have a gracious regard both towards myself and the cause.” 2

But the passions seemed not likely to blow over so soon as was desirable. Leicester's brother, the Earl of Warwick, took a most gloomy view of the whole transaction, and hoarser than the raven's was his boding tone.

„Well, our mistress's extreme rage doth increase rather than diminish,” he wrote, „and she giveth out great threatening words against you. Therefore make the best assurance you can for yourself, and trust not her oath, for that her malice is great and unquenchable in the wisest of their opinions here, and as for other friendships, as far as I can learn, it is as doubtful as the other. Wherefore, my good brother, repose your whole trust in God, and

1 Bruce's, *Leyc. Corresp.* '142, <sup>28 Feb. 1586,</sup>

2 *Ibid.* 144. MS. just. cited. <sup>10 Mar.</sup>

He will defend you in despite of all your enemies. And let this be a great comfort to you, and so it is likewise to myself and all your assured friends, and that is, that you were never so honoured and loved in your life amongst all good people as you are at this day, only for dealing so nobly and wisely in this action as you have done; so that, whatsoever cometh of it, you have done your part. I praise God from my heart for it. Once again, have great care of yourself, (I mean for your safety) and if she will needs revoke you, to the overthrowing of the cause, if I were as you, if I could not be assured *I would go to the farthest part of Christendom rather than ever come into England again.* Take heed whom you trust, for that *you have some false boys about you.*" 1

And the false boys were busy enough, and seemed likely to triumph in the result of their schemes. For a glance into the secret correspondence of Mary of Scotland has already revealed the Earl to us constantly surrounded by men in masks. Many of those nearest his person, and of highest credit out of England, were his deadly foes, sworn to compass his dishonour, his confusion, and eventually his death, and in correspondence with his most powerful adversaries at home and abroad. Certainly his path was slippery and perilous along those icy summits of power, and he had need to look well to his footsteps.

Before Heneage had arrived in the Netherlands, Sir Thomas Shirley, despatched by Leicester to England with a commission to procure supplies for the famishing soldiers, and, if possible, to mitigate the Queen's wrath, had been admitted more than once to her Majesty's presence. He had fought the Earl's battle as manfully as Davison had done, and,

like that envoy, had received nothing in exchange for his plausible arguments but bitter words and big oaths. Eight days after his arrival he was introduced by Hatton into the privy chamber, and at the moment of his entrance was received with a volley of execrations. 1

"I did expressly and peremptorily forbid his acceptance of the absolute government, in the hearing of divers of my council," said the Queen.

Shirley.—"The necessity of the case was imminent, your Highness. It was his Lordship's intent to do all for your Majesty's service. Those countries did expect him as a governor at his first landing, and the States durst do no other than satisfy the people also with that opinion. The people's mislike of their present government is such and so great as that the name of States is grown odious amongst them. Therefore the States, doubting the furious rage of the people, conferred the authority upon his Lordship with incessant suit to him to receive it. Notwithstanding this, however, he did deny it until he saw plainly both confusion and ruin of that country if he should refuse. On the other hand, when he had seen into their estates, his Lordship found great profit and commodity like to come unto your Majesty by your acceptance of it. Your Highness may now have garrisons of English in as many towns as pleaseth you, without any more charge than you are now at. Nor can any peace be made with Spain at any time hereafter, but through you and by you. Your Majesty should remember, likewise, that if a man of another nation had been chosen governor it might have wrought great danger. Moreover it would have been an indignity that your lieutenant-general should of necessity be under him that so should have been elected. Finally, this is a stop to any other that may affect the place of government there."

1 Bruce's 'Leyc. Corresp.' 150, 161 6  
March, 1586. 16

1 Ibid. 172, 14  
24 March, 1586.

Queen (who has manifested many signs of impatience during this discourse).— „Your speech is all in vain. His Lordship's proceeding is sufficient to make me infamous to all princes, having protested the contrary, as I have done, in a book which is translated into divers and sundry languages. His Lordship, being my servant, a creature of my own, ought not, in duty towards me, have entered into this course without my knowledge and good allowance.”

Shirley.—„But the world hath conceived a high judgment of your Majesty's great wisdom and providence, shown by your assailing the King of Spain at one time both in the Low Countries and also by Sir Francis Drake. I do assure myself that the same judgment which did first cause you to take this in hand must continue a certain knowledge in your Majesty that one of these actions must needs stand much better by the other. If Sir Francis do prosper, then all is well. And though he should not prosper, yet this hold that his Lordship hath taken for you on the Low Countries must always assure an honourable peace at your Highness's pleasure. I beseech your Majesty to remember that to the King of Spain the government of his Lordship is no greater matter than if he were but your lieutenant-general there; but the voyage of Sir Francis is of much greater offence than all.”

Queen (interrupting).—„I can very well answer for Sir Francis. Moreover, if need be, the gentleman careth not if I should disavow him.”

Shirley —„Even so standeth my Lord, if your disavowing of him may also stand with your Highness's favour towards him. Nevertheless, should this bruit of your mislike of his Lordship's authority there come unto the ears of those people—being a nation both sudden and suspicious, and having been heretofore used to stratagem—I fear it may work some strange notion in them,

considering that, at this time, there is an increase of taxation raised upon them, the bestowing whereof perchance they know not of. His Lordship's giving up of the government may leave them altogether without government, and in worse case than they were ever in before. For *now the authority of the States is dissolved, and his Lordship's government is the only thing that holdeth them together.* I do beseech your Highness, then, to consider well of it, and if there be any private cause for which you take grief against his Lordship, nevertheless to have regard unto the public cause, and to have a care of your own safety, which, in many wise men's opinions, standeth much upon the good maintenance and upholding of this matter.”

Queen.—„I believe nothing of what you say concerning the dissolving of the authority of the States. I know well enough that the States do remain states still. I mean not to do harm to the cause, but only to reform that which his Lordship hath done beyond his warrant from me.” 1

And with this the Queen swept suddenly from the apartment. Sir Thomas, at different stages of the conversation, had in vain besought her to accept a letter from the Earl which had been entrusted to his care. She obstinately refused to touch it. Shirley had even had recourse to stratagem: affecting ignorance on many points concerning which the Queen desired information, and suggesting that doubtless she would find those matters fully explained in his Lordship's letter. 2 The artifice was in vain, and the discussion was, on the whole, unsatisfactory. Yet there is no doubt that the Queen had had the worst of the argument, and she was far too sagacious a politician not to feel the

1 Bruce's „Leyc. Corresp.’ 171-176, <sup>14</sup>/<sub>24</sub> March, 1586.      2 Ibid.



weight of that which had been urged so often in defence of the course pursued. But it was with her partly a matter of temper and offended pride, perhaps even of wounded affection.

On the following morning Shirley saw the Queen walking in the garden of the palace, and made bold to accost her. Thinking, as he said, „to test her affection to Lord Leicester by another means,” the artful Sir Thomas stepped up to her, and observed that his Lordship was seriously ill. „It is feared,” he said, „that the Earl is again attacked by the disease of which Dr. Goodrowse did once cure him. Wherefore his Lordship is now a humble suitor to your Highness that it would please you to spare Goodrowse, and give him leave to go thither for some time.”

The Queen was instantly touched.

„Certainly—with all my heart, with all my heart, he shall have him,” she replied, „and sorry I am that his Lordship hath that need of him.”

„And indeed,” returned sly Sir Thomas, „your Highness is a very gracious prince, who are pleased not to suffer his Lordship to perish in health, though otherwise you remain deeply offended with him.”

„You know my mind,” returned Elizabeth, now all the queen again, and perhaps suspecting the trick; „I may not endure that my man should alter my commission and the authority that I gave him, upon his own fancies and without me.”

With this she instantly summoned one of her gentlemen, in order to break off the interview, fearing that Shirley was about to enter again upon a discussion of the whole subject, and again to attempt the delivery of the Earl's letter. <sup>1</sup>

In all this there was much of super-

annuated coquetry, no doubt, and much of Tudor despotism, but there was also a strong infusion of artifice. For it will soon be necessary to direct attention to certain secret transactions of an important nature in which the Queen was engaged, and which were even hidden from the all-seeing eye of Walsingham—although shrewdly suspected both by that statesman and by Leicester—but which were most influential in modifying her policy at that moment towards the Netherlands.

There could be no doubt, however, of the stanch and strenuous manner in which the delinquent Earl was supported by his confidential messengers and by some of his fellow-councillors. His true friends were urgent that the great cause in which he was engaged should be forwarded sincerely and without delay. Shirley had been sent for money; but to draw money from Elizabeth was like coining her life-blood, drachma by drachma.

„Your Lordship is like to have but a poor supply of money at this time,” said Sir Thomas. „To be plain with you, I fear she groweth weary of the charge, and will hardly be brought to deal thoroughly in the action.”

He was also more explicit than he might have been—had he been better informed as to the disposition of the chief personages of the court, concerning whose temper the absent Earl was naturally anxious. Hatton was most in favour at the moment, and it was through Hatton that the communications upon Netherland matters passed; „for,” said Shirley, „she will hardly endure Mr. Secretary (Walsingham) to speak unto her therein.”

„And truly, my Lord,” he continued, „as Mr. Secretary is a noble, good, and true friend unto you, so doth Mr. Vice-Chamberlain show himself an honourable, true, and faithful gentleman, and doth carefully and most like a good friend for your Lordship.”

<sup>1</sup> Bruce's 'Leyc. Corresp.' 175, 176, same date.

And thus very succinctly and graphically had the envoy painted the situation to his principal. „Your Lordship now sees things just as they stand,” he moralized. „Your Lordship is exceeding wise. *You know the Queen and her nature best of any man.* You know all men here. Your Lordship can judge the sequel by this that you see: only this I must tell your Lordship; I perceive that fears and doubts from thence are like to work better effects here than comforts and assurance. I think it my part to send your Lordship this as it is, rather than to be silent.” 1

And with these rather ominous insinuations the envoy concluded for the time his narrative.

While these storms were blowing and „overblowing” in England, Leicester remained greatly embarrassed and anxious in Holland. He had sown the wind more extensively than he had dreamed of when accepting the government, and he was now awaiting, with much trepidation, the usual harvest. And we have seen that it was rapidly ripening. Meantime, the good which he had really effected in the Provinces by the course he had taken was likely to be neutralized by the sinister rumours as to his impending disgrace, while the enemy was proportionally encouraged. „I understand credibly,” he said, „that the Prince of Parma feels himself in great jollity that her Majesty doth rather dislike than allow of our doings here, which, if it be true, let her be sure her own sweet self shall first smart.” 2

Moreover, the English troops were, as we have seen, mere shoeless, shivering, starving vagabonds. The Earl had generously advanced very large sums of money from his own pocket to relieve their necessity. The States, on the other hand, had voluntarily increased the

monthly contribution of 200,000 florins, to which their contract with Elizabeth obliged them, 1 and were more disposed than ever they had been since the death of Orange to proceed vigorously and harmoniously against the common enemy of Christendom. Under such circumstances it may well be imagined that there was cause on Leicester's part for deep mortification at the tragical turn which the Queen's temper seemed to be taking.

„I know not,” he said, „how her Majesty doth mean to dispose of me. In hath grieved me more than I can express that for faithful and good service she should so deeply conceive against me. God knows with what mind I have served her Highness, and perhaps some others might have failed. Yet she is neither tied one jot by covenant or promise by me in any way, nor at one groat the more charges, but myself two or three thousand pounds sterling more than now is like to be well spent. I will desire no partial speech in my favour. If my doings be ill for her Majesty and the realm, let me feel the smart of it. The cause is now well forward; let not her Majesty suffer it to quail. If you will have it proceed to good effect, send away Sir William Pelham with all the haste you can. I mean not to complain, but with so

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1 „They have, I say, added,” wrote Lord North to Lord Burghley, „to their first offer as much more, which amounteth to at least forty thousand pounds a month.” 28 Feb. 1586. (S. P. Office MS.)

But he seems to have much overstated the amount. The regular contribution of the States was twenty thousand pound (or 200,000 florins, as it was then always reckoned) a month, and they had recently granted, at Leicester's urgent request, an additional sum of forty thousand pounds (400,000 florins) for four months, making thirty thousand pounds a month. It is, however, quite impossible to ascertain at this day the exact sums voted or collected in the republic for war-expenses, although there is no doubt that their efforts were enormous. Comp. Bruce,

1 Bruce's „Leyc. Corresp.” just cited.

2 Bruce, 14e,  $\frac{3}{13}$  March, 1586.

„Leyc. Corresp.” 135,  $\frac{24 \text{ Feb.}}{6 \text{ Mar.}}$  1586.

weighty a cause as this is, few men have been so weakly assisted. Her Majesty hath far better choice for my place, and with any that may succeed me let Sir William Pelham be first that may come. I speak from my soul for her Majesty's service. I am for myself upon an hour's warning to obey her good pleasure." 1

Thus far the Earl had maintained his dignity. He had yielded to the solicitations of the States, and had thereby exceeded his commission, and gratified his ambition, but he had in no wise forfeited his self-respect. But, so soon as the first unquestionable intelligence of the passion to which the Queen had given way at his misdoings reached him, he began to whimper. The straightforward tone which Davison had adopted in his interviews with Elizabeth, and the firmness with which he had defended the cause of his absent friend at a moment when he had plunged himself into disgrace, was worthy of applause. He deserved at least a word of honest thanks.

Ignoble, however, was the demeanour of the Earl towards the man for whom he had but recently been unable to invent eulogies sufficiently warm, so soon as he conceived the possibility of sacrificing his friend as the scapegoat for his own fault. An honest schoolboy would have scorned to leave thus in the lurch a comrade who had been fighting his battles so honestly.

„How earnest I was," he wrote to the lords of the council, 9th March, 1586, „not only to acquaint her Majesty, but, immediately upon the first motion made by the States, to send Mr. Davison over to her with letters, I doubt not but he will truly affirm for me; yea, and how far against my will it was, notwithstanding any reasons delivered me, that he and others per-

sisted in, to have me accept first of this place. . . . The extremity of the case, and my being persuaded that Mr. Davison might have better satisfied her Majesty *than I perceive he can*, caused me—neither arrogantly nor contemptuously, but even merely and faithfully—to do her Majesty the best service." 1

He acknowledged, certainly, that Davison had been influenced by honest motives, although his importunities had been the real cause of the Earl's neglect of his own obligations. But he protested that he had himself only erred through an excessive pliancy to the will of others. „My yielding was my own fault," he admitted, „whatsoever his persuasions; but far from a contemptuous heart, or else God pluck out both heart and bowels with utter shame." 2

So soon as Sir Thomas Heneage had presented himself, and revealed the full extent of the Queen's wrath, the Earl's disposition to cast the whole crime on the shoulders of Davison became quite undisguised.

„I thank you for you letters," wrote Leicester to Walsingham, „though you can send me no comfort. Her Majesty doth deal hardly to believe so ill of me. It is true I faulted, . . . but she doth not consider what commodities she hath withal, and herself no way engaged for it, as Mr. Davison might have better declared it, if it had pleased him. And I must thank him only for my blame, and so he will confess to you, for, I protest before God, no necessity here could have made me leave her Majesty unacquainted with the cause before I would have accepted of it, *but only his so earnest pressing me with his faithful assured promise to discharge me, however her Majesty should take it.* For you all see there she had no other cause to be offended but this

1 Leicester to Burghley, 18 Feb. 1586. (S. P. Office, MS.)

1 Bruce's, Leyc. Corresp.' 162, <sup>9</sup>/<sub>19</sub> March 1586.

2 Ibid 163, same date.



and, by the Lord, he was the only cause; albeit it is no sufficient allegation, being as I am. . . . He had, I think, saved all to have told her, as he promised me. *But now it is laid upon me*, God send the cause to take no harm, my grief must be the less. . . . How far Mr. Heneage's commission shall deface me I know not. He is wary to observe his commission, and I consent withal. I know the time will be her Majesty will be sorry for it. In the mean time I am too, too weary of the high dignity. I would that any that could serve her Majesty were placed in it, and I to sit down with all my losses." 1

In more manful strain he then alluded to the sufferings of his army. „Whatsoever become of me," he said, „give me leave to speak for the poor soldiers. If they be not better maintained, being in this strange country, there will be neither good service done, nor be without great dishonour to her Majesty. . . . Well, you see the wants, and it is one cause that will glad me to be rid of this heavy high calling, and wish *me at my poor cottage again*, if any I shall find. But let her Majesty pay them well, and appoint such a man as Sir William Pelham to govern them, and she never won more honour than these men here will do, I am persuaded." 2

That the Earl was warmly urged by all most conversant with Netherland politics to assume the government was a fact admitted by all. That he manifested rather eagerness than reluctance on the subject, and that his only hesitation arose from the proposed restraints upon the power, not from scruples about accepting the power, are facts upon record. There is nothing save his own assertion to show any backwardness on his part to snatch the coveted

prize; and that assertion was flatly denied by Davison, and was indeed refuted by every circumstance in the case. It is certain that he had concealed from Davison the previous prohibitions of the Queen. He could anticipate much better than could Davison, therefore, the probable indignation of the Queen. It is strange then that he should have shut his eyes to it so wilfully, and stranger still that he should have relied on the envoy's eloquence instead of his own to mitigate that emotion. Had he placed his defence simply upon its true basis, the necessity of the case, and the impossibility of carrying out the Queen's intentions in any other way, it would be difficult to censure him; but that he should seek to screen himself by laying the whole blame on a subordinate, was enough to make any honest man who heard him hang his head. „I meant not to do it, but Davison told me to do it, please your Majesty, and if there was naughtiness in it, he said he would make it all right with your Majesty." Such, reduced to its simplest expression, was the defence of the magnificent Earl of Leicester.

And as he had gone cringing and whining to his royal mistress, so it was natural that he should be brutal and blustering to his friend.

„By your means," said he, 1 „I have fallen into her Majesty's deep displeasure. . . . If you had delivered to her the truth of my dealing, her Highness never could have conceived, as I perceive she doth. . . . Nor doth her Majesty know *how hardly* 2 I was drawn to accept this place before I had acquainted her—as to which you

1 Leicester to Davison, with his comments in reply written in the margin. Bruce, 168-171, 10 March, 1586.

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2 The words italicized in the text were underscored by Davison, with the marginal comment—„Let Sir Philip Sidney and others witness."

1 Bruce's, 'Leyc. Corresp.' 165-167, <sup>9</sup> March, 1586.

2 Ibid.

promised you would not only give her full satisfaction, but would procure me great thanks. . . . You did chiefly persuade me to take this charge upon me. . . . You can remember how many treaties you and others had with the States, before I agreed, for all *yours and their persuasion to take it.* 1 . . . . You gave me assurance to satisfy her Majesty, but I see not that you have done anything. . . . I did not hide from you the doubt I had of her Majesty's ill taking it. . . . *You chiefly brought me into it,* 2 . . . . and it could no way have been heavy to you, though you had told the uttermost of your own doing, as you faithfully promised you would. . . . *I did very unwillingly come into the matter,* 3 doubting that to fall out which is come to pass, . . . . and it doth so *fall out by your negligent carelessness, whereof I many hundred times told you that you would* 4 both mar the goodness of the matter, and breed me her Majesty's displeasure. . . . Thus fare you well, and except your embassages have better success, I shall have no cause to commend them."

And so was the unfortunate Davison ground into finest dust between the upper and lower millstones of royal wrath and loyal subserviency.

Meantime the other special envoy had made his appearance in the Netherlands; the other go-between between the incensed Queen and the backsliding favourite. It has already been made sufficiently obvious, by the sketch given of

1 „All this while there was no note of any contrary commandment.”—Comment of Davison.

2 „Absolutely denied.”—Comment of Davison.

3 „Hereof let the world judge.”—Davison.

4 Words underscored by Davison, with the comment—„You might doubt it, but if you had uttered so much, you should have employed some other in the journey, which I had no reason to affect much, preseeing well enough how thankless it would be.” Bruce, 170.

his instructions, that his mission was a delicate one. In obedience to those instructions, Heneage accordingly made his appearance before the council, and, in Leicester's presence delivered to them the severe and biting reprimand which Elizabeth had chosen to inflict upon the governor. The envoy performed his ungracious task as daintily as he could, and after preliminary consultation with Leicester; but the proud Earl was deeply mortified. „The fourteenth day of this month of March,” said he, „Sir Thomas Heneage delivered a very sharp letter from her Majesty to the council of estate, besides his message—myself being present, for so was her Majesty's pleasure, as he said, and I do think he did but as he was commanded. How great a grief it must be to an honest heart and a true, faithful servant, before his own face, to a company of very wise and grave counsellors, who had conceived a marvellous opinion before of my credit with her Majesty, to be charged now with a manifest and wilful contempt! Matter enough to have broken any man's heart that looked rather for thanks, as God doth know I did when I first heard of Mr. Heneage's arrival—I must say to your Lordship, for discharge of my duty, I can be no fit man to serve here—my disgrace is too great—protesting to you that since that day I cannot find it in my heart to come into that place where, by mine own sufferings torn, I was made to be thought so lewd a person.” 1

He then comforted himself—as he had a right to do—with the reflection that this disgrace inflicted was more than he deserved, and that such would be the opinion of those by whom he was surrounded.

„Albeit one thing,” he said, „did greatly comfort me, that they all best knew the wrong was great I had, and

1 Leicester to Burghley, 17 March, 1586. (S. P. Office MS.)

that her Majesty was very wrongfully informed of the state of my cause. I doubt not but they can and will discharge me, howsoever they shall satisfy her Majesty. And as I would rather wish for death than justly to deserve her displeasure, so, good my Lord, this disgrace not coming for any ill service to her, pray procure me a speedy resolution, that I may go hide me and pray for her. My heart is broken, though thus far I can quiet myself, that I know I have done her Majesty as faithful and good service in these countries as ever she had done her since she was Queen of England. . . . Under correction, my good Lord, I have had Halifax law—to be condemned first and inquired upon after, I pray God that no man find this measure that I have done, and deserved no worse.”<sup>1</sup>

He defended himself—as Davison had already defended him—upon the necessities of the case.

„I, a poor gentleman,” he said, „who have wholly depended upon herself alone—and now, being commanded to a service of the greatest importance that ever her Majesty employed any servant in, and finding the occasion so serving me, and the necessity of time such as would not permit such delays, flatly seeing that if that opportunity were lost, the like again for her service and the good of the realm was never to be looked for, presuming upon the favour of my prince, as many servants have done, exceeding somewhat thereupon, rather than breaking any part of my commission, taking upon me a place whereby I found these whole countries could be held at her best devotion, without binding her Majesty to any such matter as she had forbidden to the States before—finding, I say, both the time and opportunity to serve, and no lack but to trust to her gracious acceptation, I now feel that how good, how honourable, how pro-

fitable soever it be, it is turned to a worse part than if I had broken all her commissions and commandments, to the greatest harm, and dishonour, and danger, that may be imagined against her person, state, and dignity.”<sup>1</sup>

He protested, not without a show of reason, that he was like to be worse punished „for well-doing than any man that had committed a most heinous or traitorous offence,” and he maintained that if he had not accepted the government, as he had done, „the whole State had been gone and wholly lost.”<sup>2</sup> All this—as we have seen—had already been stoutly urged by Davison, in the very face of the tempest, but with no result, except to gain the enmity of both parties to the quarrel. The ungrateful Leicester now expressed confidence that the second go-between would be more adroit than the first had proved. „The causes why,” said he, „Mr. Davison could have told—no man better,—but Mr. Heneage can now tell, who hath sought to the uttermost the bottom of all things. I will stand to his report, whether glory or vain desire of title caused me to step one foot forward in the matter. My place was great enough and high enough before, with much less trouble than by this, besides the great indignation of her Majesty. . . . If I had overslipt the good occasion then in danger, I had been worthy to be hanged, and to be taken for a most lewd servant to her Majesty, and a dishonest wretch to my country.”<sup>3</sup>

But diligently as Heneage had sought to the bottom of all things, he had not gained the approbation of Sidney. Sir Philip thought that the new man had only ill botched a piece of work that had been most awkwardly contrived from the beginning. „Sir Thomas Heneage,” said he, „hath with as much honesty, in my opinion, done as much hurt as

<sup>1</sup> Leicester to Burghley. (MS. last cited.)

<sup>1</sup> Leicester to Burghley. (MS. last cited.)

<sup>2</sup> Ibid.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid.



any man this twelvemonth hath done with naughtiness. But I hope in God, when her Majesty finds the truth of things, her graciousness will not utterly overthrow a cause so behooveful and costly unto her." 1

He briefly warned the government that most disastrous effects were likely to ensue, if the Earl should be publicly disgraced, and the recent action of the States reversed. The penny-wise economy, too, of the Queen, was rapidly proving a most ruinous extravagance. „I only cry for Flushing," said Sidney, „but, unless the moneys be sent over, there will some terrible accident follow, particularly to the cautionary towns, if her Majesty mean to have them cautions." 2

The effect produced by the first explosion of the Queen's wrath was indeed one of universal suspicion and distrust. The greatest care had been taken, however, that the affair should be delicately handled, for Heneage, while doing as much hurt by honesty as others by naughtiness, had modified his course as much as he dared in deference to the opinions of the Earl himself, and that of his English counsellors. The great culprit himself, assisted by his two lawyers, Clerk and Killigrew, had himself drawn the bill of his own indictment. The letters of the Queen to the States, to the council, and to the Earl himself, were, of necessity, delivered, but the reprimand which Heneage had been instructed to fulminate was made as harmless as possible. It was arranged that he should make a speech before the council, but abstain from a protocol. The oration was duly pronounced, and it was, of necessity, stinging. Otherwise the disobedience to the Queen would have been flagrant. But the pain inflicted was to disappear with the first castigation. The

humiliation was to be public and solemn, but it was not to be placed on perpetual record.

„We thought best," said Leicester, Heneage, Clerk, and Killigrew—„according to her Majesty's secret instructions—to take that course which might least endanger the weak estate of the Provinces—that is to say, to utter so much in words as we hoped might satisfy her excellent Majesty's expectation, and yet leave them nothing in writing to confirm that which was secretly spread in many places to the hindrance of the good course of settling these affairs. Which speech, after Sir Thomas Heneage had devised, and we both perused and allowed, he, by our consent and advice, pronounced to the council of state. This we did think needful, especially because every one of the council that was present at the reading of her Majesty's first letters was of the full mind that, if her Majesty should again show the least mislike of the present government, or should not by her next letters confirm it, they were all undone—for *that every man would cast with himself which way to make his peace.*" 1

Thus adroitly had the „poor gentleman, who could not find it in his heart to come again into the place, where—by his own sufferings torn—he was made to appear so lewd a person"—provided that there should remain no trace of that lewdness and of his sovereign's displeasure upon the record of the States. 2 It was not long, too,

1 „The Resolution of my Lord, &c., for the speech I should use to the Council of the States upon the letters written from H. Majesty in March. 14 March, 1586." Signed by Leicester, Heneage, Clerk, and Killigrew. (S. P. Office MS.)

2 In the foreign correspondence, or „despatch books," between the States-General and England, there are no letters either from Queen Elizabeth, or from Ortel, who was in England during the whole of the year 1586, as agent of Holland and Zeeland, and, at the close of the year, was added to the number of commissioners sent by the States-

1 Sir P. Sidney to Burghley, 18 March, 1586. (S. P. Office MS.)

2 Sir Philip Sidney to Burghley. (MS. just ited.)

before the Earl was enabled to surmount his mortification; but the end was not yet.

The universal suspicion, consequent on these proceedings, grew most painful. It pointed in one invariable quarter. It was believed by all that the Queen was privately treating for peace, and that the transaction was kept a secret not only from the States but from her own most trusted counsellors also. It would be difficult to exaggerate the pernicious effects of this suspicion. Whether it was a well-grounded one or not, will be shown in a subsequent chapter, but there is no doubt that the vigour of the enterprise was thus sapped at a most critical moment. The Provinces had never been more heartily banded together since the fatal 10th of July, 1584, than they were in the early spring of 1586. They were rapidly organizing their own army, and, if the Queen had manifested more sympathy

General to the Queen. Nor are there any letters addressed to Elizabeth or to Ortel, although there are a few notes (which I have used) made by the persons to whom was entrusted the task of drawing up letters to be sent by Davison in the middle of February 1586, and afterwards. There are, indeed, no letters of 1586 relative to England, or to the Leicester government, to be found in the archives of the Hague; nor is there in the daily registers of the sessions of the States-General for 1586—which I have examined, page by page, very carefully—a trace of the dissatisfaction of the Queen, or of the angry correspondence which ensued, after the acceptance by Leicester of the „absolute” government. All the pieces have been lost—probably secreted at the period; so that no one could tell at present, by consulting the Hague Archives only, that there had been a quarrel. Bor, Meteren, and other contemporaries, give an account of the transaction, in the main correct, although most of them are of the opinion that the Queen's anger was mere pretence, and that she was desirous of assuming the sovereignty, in case the Provinces were deemed by Leicester capable of maintaining their own cause. This view, as we have seen, was quite erroneous.

It is remarkable that between 23 Feb. and 11 April, 1586, the States-General were not in session.

with her own starving troops, the united Englishmen and Hollanders would have been invincible even by Alexander Farnese.

Moreover, they had sent out nine war-vessels to cruise off the Cape Verd Islands for the homeward-bound Spanish treasure-fleet from America, with orders, if they missed it, to proceed to the West Indies; so that, said Leicester, „the King of Spain will have enough to do between these men and Drake.”<sup>2</sup> All parties had united in conferring a generous amount of power upon the Earl, who was, in truth, stadholder-general under grant from the States—and both Leicester and the Provinces themselves were eager and earnest for the war. In war alone lay the salvation of England and Holland. Peace was an impossibility. It seemed to the most experienced statesmen of both countries even an absurdity. It may well be imagined, therefore, that the idea of an underhand negotiation by Elizabeth would cause a frenzy in the Netherlands. In Leicester's opinion, nothing short of a general massacre of the English would be the probable consequence. „No doubt,” said he, „the very way it is to put us all to the sword here. For mine own part it would be happiest for me, though I wish and trust to lose my life in better sort.”<sup>3</sup>

1 „I will not trouble your Lordship,” wrote Leicester to Burghley on the 15th March, 1586, „with anything that may privately concern myself. I see what the acceptance of my services is, and how little it availeth to allege most just reasons in defence of them. But though I see I am, and must be, disgraced, which God I hope will give me strength to bear patiently, yet let me entreat your L<sup>p</sup> to be a mean to her M. that the poor soldiers be not beaten for my sake. There came no penny of treasure over since my coming hither. That which then came was most part due before it came. There is much due to them. They cannot get a penny. Their credit is spent. They perish for want of victual and clothing in great numbers. The whole and some are ready to mutiny,” &c. S. P. Office MS.

2 Leicester to Burghley, 17 March, 1586. (S. P. Office MS.)

3 Ibid.

Champagny, however, was giving out mysterious hints that the King of Spain could have peace with England when he wished for it. Sir Thomas Cecil, son of Lord Burghley, on whose countenance the States especially relied, was returning on sick-leave from his government of the Brill, and this sudden departure of so eminent a personage, joined with the public disavowal of the recent transaction between Leicester and the Provinces, was producing a general and most sickening apprehension as to the Queen's good faith. The Earl did not fail to urge these matters most warmly on the consideration of the English council, setting forth that the States were staunch for the war, but that they would be beforehand with her if she attempted by underhand means to compass a peace. „If these men once smell any such matter,” wrote Leicester to Burghley, „be you sure they will soon come before you, to the utter overthrow of her Majesty and state for ever.”<sup>1</sup>

The Earl was suspecting the „false boys,” by whom he was surrounded, although it was impossible for him to perceive, as we have been enabled to do, the wide-spread and intricate meshes by which he was enveloped. „Your Papists in England,” said he, „have sent over word to some in this company, that all that they ever hoped for is come to pass; that my Lord of Leicester shall be called away in greatest indignation with her Majesty, and, to confirm this of Champagny, I have myself seen a letter that her Majesty is in hand with a secret peace. God forbid! for if it be so, her Majesty her realm, and we, are all undone.”<sup>2</sup>

The feeling in the Provinces was still sincerely loyal towards England. „These men,” said Leicester, „yet honour and most dearly love her Majesty, and hardly, I know, will be brought to

believe ill of her any way.” Nevertheless these rumours, to the discredit of her good faith, were doing infinite harm; while the Earl, although keeping his eyes and ears wide open, was anxious not to compromise himself any further with his sovereign, by appearing himself to suspect her of duplicity. „Good my Lord,” he besought Burghley, „do not let her Majesty know of this concerning Champagny as coming from me, for she will think it is done for my own cause, which, by the Lord God, it is not, but even on the necessity of the case for her own safety, and the realm, and us all. Good my Lord, as you will do any good in the matter, let not her Majesty understand any piece of it to come from me.”<sup>1</sup>

The States-General, on the 25th March, N. S., addressed a respectful letter to the Queen, in reply <sup>15</sup> to her vehement chidings. <sup>25</sup> Mar. 1586. They expressed their deep regret that her Majesty should be so offended with the election of the Earl of Leicester as absolute governor. They confessed that she had just cause of displeasure, but hoped that when she should be informed of the whole matter she would rest better satisfied with their proceedings. They stated that the authority was the same which had been previously bestowed upon governors-general; observing that by the word „absolute,” which had been used in designation of that authority, nothing more had been intended than to give to the Earl full power to execute his commission, while the *sovereignty of the country was reserved to the people*. This commission, they said, could not be without danger revoked. And therefore they most humbly besought her Majesty to approve what had been done, and to remember its conformity with her own advice to them, that a multitude of heads, whereby

<sup>1</sup> Leicester to Burghley, MS. last cited.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid.

<sup>1</sup> Ibid.



confusion in the government is bred, should be avoided. 1

Leicester, upon the same occasion, addressed a letter to Burghley and Walsingham, expressing himself as became a crushed and contrite man, never more to raise his drooping head again, but warmly and manfully urging upon the attention of the English government—for the honour and interest of the Queen herself—, the miserable state of the poor soldiers." The necessity of immediate remittances, in order to keep them from starving, was most imperious. For himself, he was smothering his wretchedness until he should learn her Majesty's final decision as to what was to become of him. „Meantime," said he, „I carry my grief inward, and will proceed till her Majesty's full pleasure come with as little discouragement to the cause as I can. I pray God her Majesty may do that may be best for herself. For my own part my heart is broken, but not by the enemy." 2

1 The letter is given in Meteren, xii. 234. Wagenaar (viii. 121, note 4) observes very correctly, that, when the States were thus glibly explaining away the word „absolute," they had either not read over very carefully the commission granted by themselves to Leicester, or trusted that the Queen would not closely examine that document. In this original contract with the Earl were these words: „Item, his Excellency shall have full authority and absolute power (volle macht en absoluut geweld) within the Provinces in the matter of polity and justice (in 't stuck van de politie en justitie)." Comp. Bor. ii. 686. Groot Plakaat Boek, iv. 81. Meteren, *ubi sup.*

Bor, Meteren, and many contemporary writers, as well as Wagenaar and other more modern authorities, are quite mistaken in representing the whole angry demonstration made by the Queen in regard to his acceptance by Leicester of the „absolute," government as a farce, and a farce which had been previously arranged. We have seen from the private letters of the period how very genuine was the ill humour of Elizabeth.

The state-council also, on the 27 March, 1586 (N.S.), addressed a letter to the Queen, of similar tenour to that written by the States General. Printed in Bruce's „Leyc. Corresp.' Append. 468, 469.

2 Leicester to Burghley and Walsingham. 15 March, 1586. (S. P. Office MS.)

There is no doubt that the public disgrace thus inflicted upon the broken-hearted governor, and the severe censure administered to the States by the Queen, were both ill-timed and undeserved. Whatever his disingenuousness towards Davison, whatever his disobedience to Elizabeth, however ambitious his own secret motives may have been, there is no doubt at all that thus far he had borne himself well in his great office.

Richard Cavendish—than whom few had better opportunities of judging—spoke in strong language on the subject. „It is a thing almost incredible," said he, „that the care and diligence of any one man living could, in so small time, have so much repaired so disjointed and loose an estate as my Lord found this country in. But, lest he should swell in pride of that his good success, your Lordship knoweth that God hath so tempered the cause with the construction thereof, as may well hold him in good consideration of human things." 1 He alluded with bitterness—as did all men in the Netherlands who were not open or disguised Papists—to the fatal rumours concerning the peace-negotiation in connection with the recall of Leicester. „There be here advertisements of most fearful instance," he said, „namely, that Champagny doth not spare most liberally to bruit abroad that he hath in his hands the conditions of peace offered by her Majesty unto the King his master, and that it is in his power to conclude at pleasure—which fearful and mischievous plot, if in time it be not met withal by some notable encounter, it cannot but prove the root of great ruin." 2

The „false boys" about Leicester were indefatigable in spreading these rumours, and in taking advantage—with the assistance of the Papists in the obedient Provinces and in England—of the dis-

1 Cavendish to Burghley, 18 March 1586. (S. P. Office MS.)

2 Ibid.

graced position in which the Queen had placed the favourite. Most galling to the haughty Earl—most damaging to the cause of England, Holland, and liberty—were the tales to his discredit, which circulated on the Bourse at Antwerp, Middelburg, Amsterdam, and in all the other commercial centres. The most influential bankers and merchants were assured by a thousand chattering—but as it were invisible—tongues, that the Queen had for a long time disliked Leicester; that he was a man of no account among the statesmen of England; that he was a beggar and a bankrupt; that, if he had waited two months longer, he would have made his appearance in the Provinces with one man and one boy for his followers; that the Queen had sent him thither to be rid of him; that she never intended him to have more authority than Sir John Norris had; that she could not abide the bestowing the title of Excellency upon him, and that she had not disguised her fury at his elevation to the post of governor-general. 1

All who attempted a refutation of these statements were asked, with a sneer, whether her Majesty had ever written a line to him, or in commendation of him, since his arrival. Minute inquiries were made by the Dutch merchants of their commercial correspondents, both in their own country and in England, as to Leicester's real condition and character at home. What was his rank, they asked, what his ability, what his influence at court? Why, if he were really of so high quality as had been reported, was he thus neglected, and at last disgraced? Had he any landed property in England? Had he really ever held any other Office but that of master of the horse? „And then,” asked one particular busybody, who made him-

self very unpleasant on the Amsterdam exchange, „why has her Majesty forbidden all noblemen and gentlemen from coming hither, as was the case at the beginning? Is it because she is hearkening to a peace? And if it be so,” quoth he, „we are well handled; for if her Majesty hath sent a disgraced man to amuse us, while she is secretly working a peace for herself, when we—on the contrary—had broken off all our negotiations, upon confidence of her Majesty's goodness, such conduct will be remembered to the end of the world, and the Hollanders will never abide the name of England again,” 1

On such a bed of nettles there was small chance of repose for the governor. Some of the rumours were even more stinging. So incomprehensible did it seem that the proud sovereign of England should send over her subjects to starve or beg in the streets of Flushing and Ostend, that it was darkly intimated that Leicester had embezzled the funds, which, no doubt, had been remitted for the poor soldiers. 2 This was the most cruel blow of all. The Earl had been put to enormous charges. His household at the Hague cost him a thousand pounds a month. He had been paying and furnishing five hundred and fifty men out of his own purse. He had also a choice regiment of cavalry, numbering seven hundred and fifty horse, three hundred and fifty of which number were over and above those allowed for by the Queen, and were entirely at his expense. He was most liberal in making presents of money to every gentleman in his employment. He had deeply mortgaged his estates in order to provide for these heavy demands upon him, and professed his willingness „to spend more, if he might have got any more money for his land that

1 Bruce's „*Leyc. Corresp.*’ 214-219,  $\frac{5}{15}$   
April, 1586.

1 Bruce's „*Leyc. Corresp.*’ last cited.

2 „*Leyc. Corresp.*’ 216,  $\frac{5}{15}$  April, 1586.

was left;" and in the face of such unquestionable facts—much to the credit certainly of his generosity<sup>1</sup>—he was accused of swindling a Queen whom neither Jew nor Gentile had ever yet been sharp enough to swindle; while he was in reality plunging forward in a course of reckless extravagance in order to obviate the fatal effects of her penuriousness.

Yet these sinister reports were beginning to have a poisonous effect. Already an alteration of mien was perceptible in the States-General. „Some buzzing there is amongst them," said Leicester, „whatsoever it be. They begin to deal very strangely within these few days." <sup>2</sup> Moreover, the industry of the Poleys, Blunts, and Pagets, had turned these unfavourable circumstances to such good account that a mutiny had been near breaking out among the English troops. „And, before the Lord I speak it," said the Earl, „I am sure some of these good towns had been gone ere this, but for my money. As for the States, I warrant you, they see day at a little hole. God doth know what a forward and a joyful country here was within a month. God send her Majesty to recover it so again, and to take care of it, on the condition she send me after Sir Francis Drake to the Indies, my service here being to more acceptable." <sup>3</sup>

Such was the aspect of affairs in the Provinces after the first explosion of the Queen's anger had become known. Meanwhile the court-weather was very changeable in England, being sometimes serene, sometimes cloudy, always treacherous. Mr. Vavasour, sent by the Earl with despatches to her Majesty and the council, had met with a sufficiently benignant reception. She accepted the letters, which, however, owing to a bad cold

with a defluxion in the eyes, she was unable at once to read; but she talked ambiguously with the messenger. Vavasour took pains to show the immediate necessity of sending supplies, so that the armies in the Netherlands might take the field at the earliest possible moment. „And what," said she, „if a peace should come in the mean time?" <sup>1</sup>

„If your Majesty desireth a convenient peace," replied Vavasour, „to take the field is the readiest way to obtain it; for as yet the King of Spain hath had no reason to fear you. He is daily expecting that your own slackness may give your Majesty an overthrow. Moreover, the Spaniards are soldiers, and are not to be moved by shadows." <sup>2</sup>

But the Queen had no ears for these remonstrances, and no disposition to open her coffers. A warrant for twenty-four thousand pounds <sup>3</sup> had been signed by her at the end of the month of March, and was about to be sent, when Vavasour arrived; but it was not possible for him, although assisted by the eloquence of Walsingham and Burghley to obtain an enlargement of the pitance. „The storms are overblown," said Walsingham, „but I fear your Lordship shall receive very scarce measure from hence. You will not believe how the sparing humour doth increase upon us." <sup>4</sup>

Nor were the storms so thoroughly overblown but that there were not daily indications of returning foul weather. Accordingly—after a conference with Vavasour—Burghley and Walsingham

<sup>1</sup> Bruce's, *Leyc. Corresp.* 194, 195, 31 March, 1586.

<sup>2</sup> 10 April  
<sup>3</sup> Ibid.

<sup>3</sup> This sum, added to the 52,000<sup>l</sup> already advanced, made 76,000<sup>l</sup>. in all, „which" said Burghley, „her Majesty doth often repeat with great offence." *Leyc. Corresp.* 199, 31 March, 1586.

<sup>4</sup> 10 April

<sup>4</sup> Bruce's, *Leyc. Corresp.* 191, 28 March 1586. 7 April

<sup>1</sup> *Leyc. Corresp.* 214-219.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid.

<sup>3</sup> *Leyc. Corresp.* last cited.



had an interview with the Queen, in which the Lord Treasurer used bold and strong language. He protested to her that he was bound, both by his duty to himself and his oath as her councillor, to declare that the course she was holding to Lord Leicester was most dangerous to her own honour, interest, and safety. If she intended to continue in this line of conduct, he begged to resign his office of Lord Treasurer; wishing, before God and man, to wash his hands of the shame and peril which he saw could not be avoided. The Queen, astonished at the audacity of Burghley's attitude and language, hardly knew whether to chide him for his presumption or to listen to his arguments. She did both. She taxed him with insolence in daring to address her so roundly, and then finding he was speaking even in *amaritudine animæ* and out of a clear conscience, she became calm again, and intimated a disposition to qualify her anger against the absent Earl. <sup>1</sup>

Next day, to their sorrow, the two counsellors found that the Queen had again changed her mind—, „as one that had been by some adverse council seduced.” She expressed the opinion that affairs would do well enough in the Netherlands, even though Leicester were displaced. A conference followed between Walsingham, Hatton, and Burghley, and then the three went again to her Majesty. They assured her that if she did not take immediate steps to satisfy the States <sup>2</sup> and the people of the Provinces, she would lose those countries and her own honour at the same time; and that then they would prove a source of danger to her instead of protection and glory. At this she was greatly troubled, and agreed to do anything they might advise

consistently with her honour. It was then agreed that Leicester should be continued in the government which he had accepted until the matter should be further considered, and letters to that effect were at once written. Then came a messenger from Sir Thomas Heneage, bringing despatches from that envoy, and a second and most secret one from the Earl himself. Burghley took the precious letter which the favourite had addressed to his royal mistress, and had occasion to observe its magical effect. <sup>1</sup> Walsingham and the Lord Treasurer had been right in so earnestly remonstrating with him on his previous silence.

„She read your letter,” said Burghley, „and, in very truth, I found her princely heart touched with favourable interpretation of your actions; affirming them to be only offensive to *her* in that she was not made privy to them; not now mistaking that you had the authority.” <sup>2</sup>

Such, at fifty-three, was Elizabeth Tudor. A gentle whisper of idolatry from the lips of the man she loved, and she was wax in his hands. Where now were the vehement protestations of horror that her public declaration of principles and motives had been set at nought? Where now were her vociferous denunciations of the States, her shrill invectives against Leicester, her big oaths, and all the *hysterica passio*, which had sent poor Lord Burghley to bed with the gout, and inspired the soul of

<sup>1</sup> This letter was probably very tender and personal, for no trace of it is to be found in the English archives.

<sup>2</sup> Bruce's, *Leyc. Corresp.* 198, 199, <sup>31 Mar.</sup> 10 April, 1586; and, three weeks later, after the news of the success of the Earl before Grave (to be described in a subsequent chapter) had reached England. Walsingham observed to Leicester, „I do assure your Lordship I think her Majesty took as much joy upon the view of your letter, in seeing you restored to your former comfort, grounded upon her favour, as she did in the overthrow of the enemy.”

<sup>1</sup> *Ibid.* 230, <sup>21 April,</sup> 1 May, 1586.

<sup>1</sup> Bruce's, *Leyc. Corresp.* 197, <sup>31 March</sup> 10 April, 1586.

<sup>2</sup> Bruce's, *Leyc. Corresp.* 199, last cited.

Walsingham with dismal forebodings? Her anger had dissolved into a shower of tenderness, and if her parsimony still remained it was because that could only vanish when she too should cease to be.

And thus, for a moment, the grave diplomatic difference between the crown of England and their high mightinesses the United States—upon the solution of which the fate of Christendom was hanging—seemed to shrink to the dimensions of a lover's quarrel. Was it not strange that the letter had been so long delayed?

Davison had exhausted argument in defence of the acceptance by the Earl of the authority conferred by the States, and had gained nothing by his eloquence, save abuse from the Queen, and acrimonious censure from the Earl. He had deeply offended both by pleading the cause of the erring favourite, when the favourite should have spoken for himself. „Poor Mr. Davison,” said Walsingham, „doth take it very grievously that your Lordship should conceive so hardly of him as you do. I find the conceit of your Lordship's disfavour hath greatly dejected him. But at such time as he arrived her Majesty was so incensed, as all the arguments and orators in the world could not have wrought any satisfaction.”<sup>1</sup>

But now a little *billet-doux* had done what all the orators in the world could not do. The arguments remained the same, but the Queen no longer „misliked that Leicester should have the authority.” It was natural that the Lord Treasurer should express his satisfaction at this auspicious result.

„I did commend her princely nature,” he said, „in allowing your good intention, and excusing you of any spot of evil meaning; and I thought good to

hasten her resolution, which you must now take to come from a favourable good mistress. You must strive with your nature to throw over your shoulder that which is past.”<sup>1</sup>

Sir Walter Raleigh, too, who had been „falsely and pestilently” represented to the Earl as an enemy, rather than what he really was, a most ardent favourer of the Netherland cause, wrote at once to congratulate him on the change in her Majesty's demeanour. „The Queen is in very good terms with you now,” he said, „and, thanks be to God, well pacified, and you are again her 'sweet Robin.’”<sup>2</sup>

Sir Walter wished to be himself the bearer of the comforting despatches to Leicester, on the ground that he had been represented as an „ill instrument against him,” and in order that he might justify himself against the charge with his own lips. The Queen, however while professing to make use of Shirley as the messenger, bade Walsingham declare to the Earl, upon her honour, that Raleigh had done good offices for him, and that, in the time of her anger, he had been as earnest in his defence as the best friend could be. It would have been singular, indeed, had it been otherwise. „Your Lordship,” said Sir Walter, „doth well understand my affection toward Spain, and how I have consumed the best part of my fortune, hating the tyrannous prosperity of that state. It were strange and monstrous that I should now become an enemy to my country and conscience. All that I have desired at your Lordship's hands is that you will evenmore deal directly with me in all matters of suspect doubleness; and so ever esteem me as you shall find me deserving good or bad. In the mean time, let no poetical scribe work your

<sup>1</sup> Bruce, „Leyc. Corresp.” 206,  $\frac{1}{10}$  April,

<sup>1</sup> Ibid. 199,  $\frac{31 \text{ March}}{10 \text{ April}}$ , 1586.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid. 193, 194,  $\frac{29 \text{ March}}{8 \text{ April}}$ , 1586.

Lordship by any device to doubt that I am a hollow or cold servant to the action." 1

It was now agreed that letters should be drawn up authorising Leicester to continue in the office which he held, until the state-council should devise some modification in his commission. As it seemed, however, very improbable that the board would devise anything of the kind, Burghley expressed the belief that the country was like to continue in the Earl's government without any change whatever. The Lord Treasurer was also of opinion that the Queen's letters to Leicester would convey as much comfort as he had received discomfort; although he admitted that there was a great difference. The former letters he knew had deeply wounded his heart, while the new ones could not suddenly sink so low as the wound. 2

The despatch to the States-General was benignant, elaborate, slightly diffuse. The Queen's letter to 'sweet Robin' was caressing but argumentative.

"It is always thought," said she, "in the opinion of the world, a hard bargain when both parties are losers, and so doth fall out in the case between us two. You, as we hear, are greatly grieved in respect of the great displeasure you find we have conceived against you. We are no less grieved that a subject of ours of that quality that you are, a creature of our own, and one that hath always received an extraordinary portion of our favour above all our subjects, even from the beginning of our reign, should deal so carelessly, not to say contemptuously, as to give the world just cause to think that we are had in contempt by him that ought most to respect and reverence us, which, we do assure you, hath wrought as great grief

in us as any one thing that ever happened unto us.

"We are persuaded that you, that have so long known us, cannot think that ever we could have been drawn to have taken so hard a course therein had we not been provoked by an extraordinary cause. But for that your grieved and wounded mind hath more need of comfort than reproof, who, we are persuaded, though the act of contempt can no ways be excused, had no other meaning and intent than to advance our service, we think meet to forbear to dwell upon a matter wherein we ourselves do find so little comfort, assuring you that whosoever professeth to love you best taketh not more comfort of your well doing, or discomfort of your evil doing, than ourself." 1

After this affectionate preface she proceeded to intimate her desire that the Earl should take the matter as nearly as possible into his own hands. It was her wish that he should retain the *authority* of absolute governor, but—if it could be so arranged—that he should dispense with the *title*, retaining only that of her lieutenant-general. It was not her intention, however, to create any confusion or trouble in the Provinces, and she was therefore willing that the government should remain upon precisely the same footing as that on which it then stood, until circumstances should permit the change of title which she suggested. And the whole matter was referred to the wisdom of Leicester, who was to advise with Heneage and such others as he liked to consult, although it was expressly stated that the present arrangement was to be considered a provisional and not a final one." 2

1 Bruce, 'Leyc. Corresp.' 209, April <sup>1</sup>/<sub>11</sub> 1586.

2 Ibid. Queen to Leicester, <sup>March 30</sup>/<sub>April 10</sub> 1586. (S. P. Office MS.) On the day before, she had addressed a shorter letter of similar tenour to the Earl.

1 Bruce, 'Leyc. Corres. just cited.

2 Ibid. 202, <sup>31 March</sup>/<sub>10 April</sub> 1586.



Until this soothing intelligence could arrive in the Netherlands the suspicions

concerning the underhand negotiations with Spain grew daily more rife, and

In her letters of the same date to Heneage, she congratulated both herself and the envoy that he had not been so precipitate in executing, as she had been in ordaining, the condign and public chastisement of the great delinquent. Sir Thomas might, in the humour in which the Queen now found herself, have even ventured upon a still longer delay, and a more decided mitigation, of the sentence. Tender, indeed, was the tone, compared with that in which she had so lately communicated her sentiments to the departing diplomatist, in which she now expressed her satisfaction that he had not been hasty in obeying, her secret directions touching the revocation of her cousin the Earl's government."

"We perceive by your letters," she observed, "that if the same had been executed according to our first purpose, it would have wrought some dangerous alteration in the state there, and utterly have overthrown the reputation and credit of our cousin, no less prejudicial to our service than the utter defacing and overthrow of one whom we ourselves have raised up, and have always found as greatly devoted to our service as ever sovereign found any subject. Though in his late proceeding touching the absolute government he did greatly forget himself, yet we would never have proceeded against him so severely had not our honour been touched. We are well persuaded that this offence and error grew not out of any evil meaning toward us, whose service we know he doth prefer even before his own life. And although we have assured him so much by our own letters, directed to him, yet we think meet you should labour, by all means, to comfort him, whose mind—as we understand from yourself and others—is greatly wounded and overthrown, and also to remove any hard opinion that may be formed against him, as a man quite shaken out of our favour." Queen to Heneage, April <sup>1</sup>/<sub>11</sub> 1586.

(S. P. Office MS.)

She reiterated her instructions as to the repairing, as handsomely as possible, of the Earl's broken heart, in a style which was almost pathetic.

"You have been an eye-witness," she said, "of the great love we have always borne him above any subject we have, and therefore you can easily guess the grief we should conceive if he should miscarry. We doubt not therefore that you will leave nothing undone that may salve his wounded mind, and repair his credit, if you find the same decayed."

She was desirous that Sir Thomas should be the medium through which the Earl's pardon should be communicated to the States, as he had already been the vehicle

which had borne to them her wrath. Although, therefore, she had written to themselves very much at length, she had yet reserved certain points upon which they were referred to the envoy for details. This proceeding she intended as an especial compliment to Heneage. "Forasmuch," so she expressed herself, "as you have already yielded the one part of the scorpion which is to wound, we think that we should do you wrong if you should not deliver some matter of contentment, whereby you may cure" (Ibid.)

She then proceeded to handle the two points contained in the last missive of the States-General to herself. Upon the first, namely, that the absolute government conferred on the Earl was not repugnant to the original treaty, and was offensive rather in name than in matter, she reasoned at considerable length. Her grounds of objection are, however, sufficiently well known. She considered that the acceptance without her permission savoured of contempt, and that an implied permission on her part was an impeachment on the self-denying nature of her original declarations. She had been most anxious, therefore, lest "the world should condemn her, as guilty of cunning and unprincipled dealing;" nor had she seen the need of the extreme haste with which the matter had been concluded without previous communication to herself.

As to the second point in the message of the States—that the Queen would be pleased to "stay the revocation of the authority granted" to Leicester, because of the imminent danger of such a proceeding—her Majesty's benignity, compared with her ferocity but a few short weeks before, seemed almost incredible.

"You shall proceed, in the answering of this point," said she, "according to such resolution as shall be taken by our cousin the Earl, upon debating the matter with you and such others as he shall call unto him for that purpose." (Ibid.)

Just one fortnight before, the Earl had been forced to stand, as it were in a white sheet, with candle in hand, before the state-council. His heart had been broken in consequence, and he had resolved never again to appear in that chamber where he had been made to enact so sorry a part. Now a blank paper was furnished to himself and Heneage, which they were to inscribe with the most flattering expressions that could be desired from royal lips.

"You shall use all the persuasions you may," said Elizabeth, "to remove any opinion that may be conceived by the council of state to the hindrance or prejudice of our cousin the Earl's former reputation, as though the qualification which we now seek proceeded of any mislike that we had of any

the discredit cast upon the Earl more embarrassing. The private letters which

honour that hath been or may be yielded to him. . . . Assure them that they can no way better show the good-will they bear towards us than by continuing their former devotion toward the Earl, of whose love and devotion towards us, you may tell them, we make that account as of no other subject more." (Ibid.)

She then alluded to the reports, "thrown abroad" that she had a secret intention of treating for her own peace with the enemy apart, as "malicious bruits":—"For as our fortune," said she, in the most explicit language which pen could write, "is so joined with theirs, that the good or evil success of their affairs must needs harm or prosper ours, so you may assure them that we, for our part, are resolved to do nothing that may concern them without their own knowledge and good liking." (Ibid.)

The despatch to the States-General was very explicit on the subject of the title, but most affectionate in style.

"We find by your late letters," said the Queen, "that you are greatly grieved through some mislike conceived by us against you, in respect of the offer to our cousin of Leicester of the absolute government of the United Provinces being made without our privy, and contrary to our express commandment, to the said Earl. We pray you, is this case, to consider that we were not rashly carried into this mislike, neither could we have been drawn into so hard and severe a course, had we not been provoked by two things that do greatly import us in honour. The one, that the Earl's acceptance, contrary to our commandment, might work in the opinion of the world, that it proceeded of contempt; the other, that we sought to abuse the world, in pretending outwardly that our proceedings with those countries tended only to relieve them in their distressed state against such as sought to tyrannise them, when the acceptance of the absolute government by the Earl, being a creature of our own, and known to be wholly at our devotion, could not but give them just cause to conceive otherwise of us. As matter we had just cause to look into, considering what a number of evil and malignant spirits do reign in these days, that are apt, upon the least advantage that may be, to deliver out hard and wicked censures of princes' doings." Queen to the States-General, 30 March,

9 April,

1586. (S. P. Office MS.)

The States were then reminded that, although there was nothing absolutely incompatible in the absolute government as accepted by Leicester with the nature of the original treaty, the Queen had resolutely set her face from the beginning against any such step, because she was "loath to give the

passed between the Earl's enemies in Holland and in England contained matter

world cause to think that she was moved by any other respect to assist them than by the love she bore them and the commiseration she had for their affliction." (Ibid.)

"And therefore," she continued, "seeing there was no special matter contained in the treaty that might any way give him any authority to accept the offer, reason would that before the matter had been proceeded in, we had been first made acquainted therewith. For we do not see, for anything that yet hath been declared unto us touching certain pretended dangers, but that the acceptance thereof might have been delayed until our pleasure had been first known. We hope that you have put on that conceit of us, as we would have been loath, either in respect of yourselves or of our cousin the Earl, to have proceeded so severely as we intended, if we had not been justly provoked thereunto. For yourselves, our love towards you cannot more plainly appear than in that we do oppose ourselves, for your sake, unto one of the mightiest potentates in Europe, without regard either to the expense of our treasure, or of our subjects' lives. And as touching the Earl, all the world knoweth that he is one of our own raising, and we do acknowledge that no man can carry more love than he had ever shewed to bear towards us. And touching the cause of this our present offence, we do acknowledge our persuasion that the same proceeded of no evil meaning towards us, though good intents many times bring forth dangerous and evil fruits. If the offence had not grown out of a public and open action, none would have been more ready to have hidden the same than ourselves. Therefore, we pray you to think that this mislike of ours hath grown rather out of grief, in respect of the love we bear him, than out of indignation, as one of whom we have conceived a sinister opinion, whom we do esteem as greatly devoted towards us as ever subject was to prince; and so we hope you will use him, without either diminishing any part of that good-will and love that you have hitherto professed towards him, or leaving that respect that is due unto him as our minister, or that he may justly challenge at your hands, who, for your sakes, is content to expose both his life and fortune unto any peril, which is not the least cause why we esteem so greatly of him. And whereas, by your late letters, you have signified that the commission and authority granted unto him cannot be revoked without great peril to the state, we have given authority to our cousin the Earl, and to our servant Sir Thomas Heneage, to confer with you upon some course to be taken, as we conceive both our honour may be saved and the peril avoided. We pray you to bend

more damaging to himself and to the cause which he had at heart than the more public reports of modern days can disseminate, which, being patent to all, can be more easily contradicted. Leicester incessantly warned his colleagues of her Majesty's council against the malignant manufacturers of intelligence. „I pray you, my Lords, as you are wise,” said he, „beware of them all. You shall find them here to be *shrewd pick-thinks*, and hardly worth the hearkening unto.”<sup>1</sup>

He complained bitterly of the disgrace that was heaped upon him, both publicly and privately, and of the evil consequences which were sure to follow from the course pursued. „Never was man so villainously handled by letters out of England as I have been,” said he, „not only advertising her Majesty's great dislike with me before this my coming over, but that I was an odious man in England, and so long as I tarried here that no help was to be looked for, that her Majesty would send no more men or money, and that I was used here but for a time till a peace were concluded between her Majesty and the Prince of Parma. What the continuance of a man's discredit thus will turn out is to be thought of, for better I were a thousand times displaced than that her Majesty's great advantage of so notable Provinces should be hindered.”<sup>2</sup>

As to the peace-negotiations—which, however cunningly managed, could not remain entirely concealed—the Earl declared them to be as idle as they were disingenuous. „I will boldly pronounce that all the peace you can make in the world, leaving these countries,” said he to Burghley, „will never prove other

than a fair spring for a few days, to be all over blasted with a hard storm after.”<sup>1</sup> Two days later her Majesty's comforting letters arrived, and the Earl began to raise his drooping head. Heneage, too, was much relieved, but he was, at the same time, not a little perplexed. It was not so easy to undo all the mischief created by the Queen's petulance. The „scorpion's sting”—as her Majesty expressed herself—might be balsamed; but the poison had spread far beyond the original wound.

„The letters just brought in,” wrote Heneage to Burghley, „have well relieved a most noble and sufficient servant, but I fear they will not restore the much-repaired wrecks of these far-decayed noble countries into the same state I found them in. A loose, disordered, and unknit state needs no shaking, but propping. A subtle and fearful kind of people should not be made more distrustful, but assured.”<sup>2</sup> He then expressed annoyance at the fault already found with him, and surely if ever man had cause to complain of reproofs administered him, in quick succession, for not obeying contradictory directions following upon each other as quickly, that man was Sir Thomas Heneage. He had been, as he thought, over cautious in administering the rebuke to the Earl's arrogance, which he had been expressly sent over to administer; but scarcely had he accomplished his task, with as much delicacy as he could devise, when he found himself censured, not for dilatoriness, but for haste. „*Fault, I perceive,*” said he to Burghley, „*is found in me, not by your Lordship, but by some other, that I did not stay proceeding if I found the public cause might take hurt.* It is true I had good warrant for the manner, the place, and

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yourselves to do that, as both the one and the other may be provided for.” (Ibid.)

1 Leicester to Burghley,  $\frac{6}{16}$  April, 1586.

(S. P. Office MS.)

2 Leicester to Burghley, MS. last cited.

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1 Ibid.

2 Heneage to Burghley,  $\frac{8}{18}$  April, 1586.

(S. P. Office MS.)



the persons, but for *the matter none, for done it must be*. Her Majesty's offence must be declared. Yet if I did not all I possibly could to uphold the cause, and to keep the tottering cause upon the wheels, I deserve no thanks, but reproof." 1

Certainly when the blasts of royal rage are remembered, by which the envoy had been, as it were, blown out of England into Holland, it is astonishing to find his actions censured for undue precipitancy. But it was not the first, nor was it likely to be the last time for comparatively subordinate agents in Elizabeth's government to be distressed by contradictory commands, when the sovereign did not know, or did not choose to make known, her own mind on important occasions. „Well, my Lord," said plaintive Sir Thomas, „wiser men may serve more pleasingly and happily, but never shall any serve her Majesty more faithfully and heartily. And so I cannot be persuaded her Majesty thinketh; for from herself I find nothing but most sweet and gracious favour, though by others' censures I may gather otherwise of her judgment, which I confess doth cumber me." 2

He was destined to be cumbered more than once before these negotiations should be concluded, but meantime there was a brief gleam of sunshine. The English friends of Leicester in the Netherlands were enchanted with the sudden change in the Queen's humour; and to Lord Burghley, who was not, in reality, the most staunch of the absent Earl's defenders, they poured themselves out in profuse and somewhat superfluous gratitude. 3

1 Letter to Burghley, MS. last cited.

2 Ibid.

3 North to Burghley,  $\frac{9}{19}$  April, 1586.

(S. P. Office MS.)

No greater mistake could have been made than to insinuate, as Leicester's English correspondents had insinuated, that North was a secret enemy to Leicester, and had ma-

Cavendish, in strains exultant, was sure that Burghley's children, grandchildren, and remotest posterity, would rejoice that their great ancestor, in such a time of need, had been „found and felt to be indeed a pater patriæ, a good father to a happy land." And, although unwilling to „stir up the old Adam" in his Lordship's soul, he yet took the liberty of comparing the Lord Treasurer, in his old and declining years, to Mary Magdalen, assuring him, that for ever after, when the tale of the preservation of the Church of God, of her Majesty, and of the Netherland cause, which were all one, should be told, his name and well-doing would be held in memory also. 1

And truly there was much of honest and generous enthusiasm, even if couched in language somewhat startling to the ears of a colder and more material age, in the hearts of these noble volunteers. They were fighting the cause of England, of the Netherland republic, and of human

ligned him in his letters to influential personages at home. I have read many of North's unpublished letters to Burghley and other statesmen, and they all speak of the Earl in strongest language of admiration and attachment.

1 Richard Cavendish to Burghley,  $\frac{8}{18}$  April, 1586. (S. P. Office MS.)

„It may please you to think with yourself what a favour the Lord hath herein bestowed upon you in these your old and declining years, namely, from your good and happy labours to adorn your posterity with the note of this most just and worthy renown, that such a father, a grandfather, or ancestor of theirs, in such a needful time, was both found and felt to be indeed pater patriæ, a good father to a happy land. Suspicion of flattery ought of right to be secluded, where assured truth doth enforce the conclusion. Neither do I write this to stir up in your Lordship old Adam, but knowing you well have learned Christ, I do it only to quicken in you the joy of well-doing, grounded upon faith. For if the Lord himself refrained not to add unto Mary Magdalen's well-doing this ornament unto her name for ever, that whosoever the Gospel should be preached, there should also the memorial of that her act be had in record, then doubt I not but that example may well warrant me," &c.

liberty, with a valour worthy the best days of English chivalry, against manifold obstacles, and they were certainly not too often cheered by the beams of royal favour.

It was pity that a dark cloud was so soon again to sweep over the scene. For the temper of Elizabeth at this important juncture seemed as capricious as the April weather in which the scenes were enacting. We have seen the genial warmth of her letters and messages to Leicester, to Heneage, to the States-General on the first of the month. Nevertheless it was hardly three weeks after they had been despatched, when Walsingham and Burghley found her Majesty one morning in a towering passion, because the Earl had not already laid down the government. The Lord Treasurer ventured to remonstrate, but was bid to hold his tongue. Ever variable and mutable as woman, Elizabeth was perplexing and baffling to her counsellors, at this epoch, beyond all divination. The „sparing humour” was increasing fearfully, and she thought it would be easier for her to slip out of the whole expensive enterprise, provided Leicester were merely her lieutenant-general, and not stadholder for the Provinces. Moreover the secret negotiations for peace were producing a deleterious effect upon her mind. Upon this subject, the Queen and Burghley, notwithstanding his resemblance to Mary Magdalen, were better informed than the Secretary, whom, however, it had been impossible wholly to deceive. The man who could read secrets so far removed as the Vatican was not to be blinded to intrigues going on before his face. The Queen, without revealing more than she could help, had been obliged to admit that informal transactions were pending, but had authorised the Secretary to assure the United States that no treaty would be made without their knowledge and full concurrence. „She doth think,” wrote Walsingham to Leicester, „that

you should, if you shall see no cause to the contrary, acquaint the council of state there that certain overtures of peace are daily made unto her, but that she meaneth not to proceed therein *without their good liking and privy*, being persuaded that there can no peace be made profitable or sure for her that shall not also stand with their safety; and she doth acknowledge hers to be so linked with theirs as nothing can fall out to their prejudice, but she must be partaker of their harm.”<sup>1</sup>

This communication was dated on the 21st April, exactly three weeks after the Queen’s letter to Heneage, in which she had spoken of the „malicious bruits” concerning the pretended peace-negotiations; and the Secretary was now confirming, by her order, what she had then stated under her own hand, that she would „do nothing” that might concern them without *their omn knowledge and good liking*.”

And surely nothing could be more reasonable. Even if the strict letter of the August treaty between the Queen and the States did not provide against any separate negotiations by the one party without the knowledge of the other, there could be no doubt at all that its spirit absolutely forbade the clandestine conclusion of a peace with Spain by England alone, or by the Netherlands alone, and that such an arrangement would be disingenuous, if not positively dishonourable.

Nevertheless it would almost seem that Elizabeth had been taking advantage of the day when she was writing her letter to Heneage on the 1st of April. Never was painstaking envoy more elaborately trifled with. On the 26th of the month—and only five days after the communication by Walsingham just noticed—the Queen was furious that

<sup>1</sup> Bruce’s .Leyc. Corresp.’ 232, <sup>21 April</sup>  
1586. <sup>1 May</sup>

any admission should have been made to the States of their right to participate with her in peace-negotiations.

„We find that Sir Thomas Heneage,” said she to Leicester, „hath gone further—in assuring the States that we would make no peace without their privy and assent—than he had commission; for that our direction was—if our meaning had been well set down, and not mistaken by our Secretary—that they should have been only let understand that, in any treaty that might pass between us and Spain, they might be well assured we would have no less care of their safety than of our own.”<sup>1</sup>

Secretary Walsingham was not likely to mistake her Majesty’s directions in this or any other important affair of state.<sup>2</sup> Moreover, it so happened that the Queen had, in her own letter to Heneage, made the same statement which she now chose to disavow. She had often a convenient way of making herself misunderstood, when she thought it desirable to shift responsibility from her own shoulders upon those of others; but upon this occasion she had been sufficiently explicit. Nevertheless, a scapegoat was necessary, and unhappy the subordinate who happened to be within her Majesty’s reach when a vicarious sacrifice was to

be made. Sir Francis Walsingham was not a man to be brow-beaten or hoodwinked, but Heneage was doomed to absorb fearful amount of royal wrath.

„What phlegmatical reasons soever were made you,” wrote the Queen, who but three weeks before had been so gentle and affectionate to her ambassador, „how happeneth it that you will not remember, that when a man hath faulted and committed by abettors thereto, neither the one nor the other will willingly make their own retreat. Jesus! what availeth wit, when it fails the owner at greatest need? Do that you are bidden, and leave your considerations for your own affairs. For in some things you had clear commandment, which you did not, and in others none, and did. We princes be wary enough of our bargains. Think you I will be bound by your own speech to *make no peace for mine own matters without their consent?* *It is enough that I injure not their country nor themselves in making peace for them without their-consent.* I am assured of your dutiful thoughts, but I am utterly at squares with this childish dealing.”<sup>1</sup>

Blasted by this thunderbolt falling upon his head out of serenest sky, the said Sir Thomas remained, for a time, in a state of political annihilation. „Sweet Robin” meanwhile, though stunned, was unscathed—thanks to the convenient conductor at his side. For, in Elizabeth’s court, mediocrity was not always golden, nor was it usually the loftiest mountains that the lightnings smote. The Earl was deceived by his royal mistress, kept in the dark as to important transactions, left to provide for his famishing soldiers as he best might; but the Queen at that moment, though angry, was not disposed to trample upon him. Now that

<sup>1</sup> Queen to Leicester, <sup>26 April</sup>/<sub>6 May</sub>, 1586. (S.

P. Office MS.)

Almost the same words were used in a letter to Sir Thomas Heneage of the same date, <sup>26 April</sup>/<sub>6 May</sub>, 1586. (S. P. Office MS.) Printed also in Bruce, p. 241, from a copy in the

handwriting of Heneage in the Brit. Mus.

<sup>2</sup> „When she chargeth your Lordship,” wrote Walsingham to Leicester (<sup>20</sup>/<sub>30</sub> May, 1586),

„with the acquainting the council of State there with the overtures of peace made unto her by the Prince of Parma as a fault, herein your Lordship is wronged, for the fault is mine, if any were committed. *But in very truth, she gave me commandment to direct you to acquaint them withal, though now she does deny it.* I have received, within these few days, many of these hard measures.” Bruce’s ,Leyc. Corresp.’ p. 272.

<sup>1</sup> Queen to Heneage, <sup>26 April</sup>/<sub>6 May</sub>, 1586. (S.

P. Office MS.) Printed also in Bruce (p. 243), from a copy in the handwriting of Heneage in the Brit. Mus.



his heart was known to be broken and his sole object in life to be retirement to remote regions—India<sup>1</sup> or elsewhere—there to languish out the brief remainder of his days in prayer for Elizabeth's happiness, Elizabeth was not inclined very bitterly to upbraid him. She had too recently been employing herself in binding up his broken heart, and pouring balm into the „scorpion's sting,” to be willing so soon to deprive him of those alleviations.

Her tone was, however, no longer benignant, and her directions were extremely peremptory. On the 1st of April she had congratulated Leicester, Heneage, the States and all the world, that her secret commands had been stayed, and that the ruin which would have followed, had those decrees been executed according to her first violent wish, was fortunately averted. Heneage was even censured, not by herself, but by courtiers in her confidence, and with her concurrence, for being *over hasty* in going before the state-council, as he had done, with her messages and commands. On the 26th of April she expressed astonishment that Heneage had dared to be *so dilatory*, and that the title of governor had not been laid down by Leicester „*out of hand*.”<sup>2</sup> She marvelled greatly, and found it very strange that „ministers in matters of moment should presume to do things of their own head without direction.”<sup>3</sup> She accordingly gave orders that there should be no more dallying, but that the Earl should immediately hold a conference with the state-council in order to arrange a modification in his commission. It was her pleasure that he should retain all the authority granted to him by the States, but, as already intimated by her, that he should abandon the title of

„absolute governor,” and retain only that of her lieutenant-general. <sup>1</sup>

Was it strange that Heneage, placed in so responsible a situation, and with the fate of England, of Holland, and perhaps of all Christendom, hanging in great measure upon this delicate negotiation, should be amazed at such contradictory orders, and grieved by such inconsistent censures?

„To tell you my griefs and my lacks,” said he to Walsingham, „would little please you or help me. Therefore I will say nothing, but think there was never man in so great a service received so little comfort and so contrarious directions. But „*Dominus est adiutor in tribulationibus*.” If it be possible, let me receive some certain direction, in following which I shall not offend her Majesty, what good or hurt soever I do besides.”<sup>2</sup>

This certainly seemed a loyal and reasonable request, yet it was not one likely to be granted. Sir Thomas, perplexed, puzzled, blindfolded, and brow-beaten, always endeavouring to obey orders, when he could comprehend them, and always hectoring and lecturing whether he obeyed them or not—ruined in purse by the expenses of a mission on which he had been sent without adequate salary—appalled at the disaffection waxing more formidable every hour in Provinces which were recently so loyal to her Majesty, but which were now pervaded by a suspicion that there was double-dealing upon her part—because quite sick of his life. He fell seriously ill, and was disappointed, when, after a time, the physicians declared him convalescent. For when he rose from his sick-bed, it was only to plunge once more, without a clue, into

<sup>1</sup> Bruce's, *Leyc. Corresp.* p. 217.

<sup>2</sup> Queen to Leicester, <sup>26 Apr.</sup><sub>6 May</sub>, 1586. (S. P.

Office MS.)

<sup>3</sup> Ibid.

<sup>1</sup> Ibid. See also Queen to Heneage, same date. (S. P. Office MS.; and printed in Bruce, p. 242.)

<sup>2</sup> Heneage to Walsingham, <sup>3</sup><sub>13</sub> May, 1586. (S. P. Office MS.)

the labyrinth where he seemed to be losing his reason.

„It is not long,” said he to Walsingham, „since I looked to have written you no more letters, my extremity was so great. . . . But God’s will is best; otherwise I could have liked better to have cumbered the earth no longer, where I find myself contemned, and which I find no reason to see will be the better in the wearing. . . . It were better for her Majesty’s service that the directions which come were not contrarious one to another, and that those you would have serve might know what is meant, else they cannot but much deceive you, as well as displease you.” 1

Public opinion concerning the political morality of the English court was not gratifying, nor was it rendered more favourable by these recent transactions. „I fear,” said Heneage, „that the world will judge what Champagny wrote in one of his letters out of England (which I have lately seen) to be over true. His words be these, *Et de vray, c’est le plus fascheux et le plus incertain negocier de ceste court, que je pense soit au monde.*” 2 And so „hasting,” as he said, „with a weak body and a willing mind, to do, he feared, no good work,” he set forth from Middelburg to rejoin Leicester at Arnheim, in order to obey, as well as he could, the Queen’s latest directions. 3

But before he could set to work there

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1 Same to same,  $\frac{7}{27}$  May, 1586. (S. P.

Office MS.)

2 Ibid.

3 Heneage to Burghley, same date (S. P. Office MS.) „For her Majesty’s service,” said he to the Lord Treasurer, as he had said to the Secretary of State, „it were very convenient, that such as you would have serve you here might know truly what you mean, and might accordingly have certain directions what to do. And surely hitherto, so have not I had, which is the only cause why I cannot in this service please you there, which God knoweth I most care for, if I could tell how.”

came more „contrarious” orders. The last instructions, both to Leicester and himself, were that the Earl should resign the post of governor absolute „out of hand,” and the Queen had been vehement in denouncing any delay on such an occasion. He was now informed that, after consulting with Leicester and with the state-council, he was to return to England with the result of such deliberations. It could be afterwards decided how the Earl could retain all the authority of governor absolute, while bearing only the title of the Queen’s lieutenant-general. 1 „For her meaning is not,” said Walsingham, „that his Lordship should presently give it over, for she foreseeth in her princely judgment that his giving over the government upon a sudden, and leaving those countries without a head or director, cannot but breed a most dangerous alteration there.” 2 The secretary, therefore stated the royal wish at present to be that the „renunciation of the title” should be delayed till Heneage could visit England, and subsequently return to Holland with her Majesty’s further directions. Even the astute Walsingham was himself puzzled, however, while conveying these ambiguous orders; and he confessed that he was doubtful whether he had rightly comprehended the Queen’s intentions. Burghley, however, was better at guessing riddles than he was, and so Heneage was advised to rely chiefly upon Burghley. 3

But Heneage had now ceased to be interested in any enigmas that might

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1 Walsingham to Heneage,  $\frac{14}{24}$  May, 1586

(S. P. Office MS.)

2 Same to same. Same date.

3 Ibid. „This I take to be the substance of her Majesty’s pleasure,” said Sir Francis, „which she willed both the Lord Treasurer and Mr. Vice-Chamberlain, together with myself, to signify unto you, praying you, for that I tink my Lord Treasurer hath best conceived her Majesty’s meaning, that you will chiefly rely upon such direction as you shall receive from him.” MS. last cited.

he propounded by the English court, nor could he find comfort, as Walsingham had recommended he should do, in railing. „I wish I could follow your counsel,” he said, „but sure the uttering of my choler doth little ease my grief or help my case.”<sup>1</sup>

He rebuked, however, the inconsistency and the tergiversations of the government with a good deal of dignity. „This certainly shall I tell her Majesty,” he said, „if I live to see her, that except a more constant course be taken with this inconstant people, it is not the blaming of her ministers will advance her Highness’s service, or better the state of things. And shall I tell you what they now say here of us—I fear not without some cause—even as Lipsius wrote of the French, *De Gallis quidem enigmata veniunt, non veniunt, volunt, nolunt, audent, timent, omnia, ancipiti metu, suspensa et suspecta.*’ God grant better, and ever keep you and help me.”<sup>2</sup>

He announced to Burghley that he was about to attend a meeting of the state-council the next day, for the purpose of a conference on these matters at Arnheim, and that he would then set forth for England to report proceedings to her Majesty. He supposed, on the whole, that this was what was expected of him, but acknowledged it hopeless to fathom the royal intentions. Yet if he went wrong, he was always sure to make mischief, and, though innocent, to be held accountable for others’ mistakes. „Every prick I make,” said he, „is made a gash; and to follow the words of my directions from England is not enough, except I likewise see into your minds. And surely mine eyesight is not so good. But I will pray to God for his help herein. With all the wit I have, I will use all the care I

can—first, to satisfy her Majesty, as God knoweth I have ever most desired; then, not to hurt this cause, but that I despair of.”<sup>1</sup> Leicester, as may be supposed, had been much discomfited and perplexed during the course of contradictory and perverse directions. There is no doubt whatever that his position had been made discreditable and almost ridiculous, while he was really doing his best, and spending large sums out of his private fortune to advance the true interests of the Queen. He had become a suspected man in the Netherlands, having been, in the beginning of the year, almost adored as a Messiah. He had submitted to the humiliation which had been imposed upon him, of being himself the medium to convey to the council the severe expressions of the Queen’s displeasure at the joint action of the States-General and himself. He had been comforted by the affectionate expressions with which that explosion of feminine and royal wrath had been succeeded. He was now again distressed by the peremptory command to do what was a disgrace to him, and an irreparable detriment to the cause, yet he was humble and submissive, and only begged to be allowed, as a remedy for all his anguish, to return to the sunlight of Elizabeth’s presence. He felt that her course, if persisted in, would lead to the destruction of the Netherland commonwealth, and eventually to the downfall of England; and that the Provinces, believing themselves deceived by the Queen, were ready to revolt against an authority to which, but a short time before, they were so devotedly loyal. Nevertheless, he only wished to know what his sovereign’s commands distinctly were, in order to set himself to their fulfilment. He had come from the camp before Nymegen in order to attend the conference with the state-council at Arn-

<sup>1</sup> Heneage to Walsingham, <sup>25 May</sup>, 1586.

<sup>4 June</sup>

<sup>1</sup> P. Office MS.)

<sup>2</sup> Ibid.

<sup>1</sup> Ibid.



heim, and he would then be ready and anxious to despatch Heneage to England, to learn her Majesty's final determination.

He protested to the Queen that he had come upon this arduous and perilous service only because he considered her throne in danger, and that this was the only means of preserving it; that, in accepting the absolute government, he had been free from all ambitious motives, but deeply impressed with the idea that only by so doing could he conduct the enterprise entrusted to him to the desired consummation; and he declared with great fervour that no advancement to high office could compensate him for this enforced absence from her. To be sent back even in disgrace would still be a boon to him, for he should cease to be an exile from her sight. He knew that his enemies had been busy in defaming him, while he had been no longer there to defend himself, but his conscience acquitted him of any thought which was not for her happiness and glory. „Yet grievous it is to me,” said he in a tone of tender reproach, „that having left all—yea, all that may be imagined—for you, you have left me for very little, even to the uttermost of all hard fortune. For what have I, unhappy man, to do here either with cause or country but for you?”<sup>1</sup>

He stated boldly that his services had not been ineffective, that the enemy had never been in worse plight than now, that he had lost at least five thousand men in divers overthrows, and that, on the other hand, the people and towns of the Seven Provinces had been safely preserved. „Since my arrival,” he said, „God hath blessed the action which you have taken in hand, and committed to the charge of me

your poor unhappy servant. I have good cause to say somewhat for myself, for that I think I have as few friends to speak for me as any man.”<sup>1</sup>

Nevertheless—as he warmly protested—his only wish was to return; for the country in which he had lost her favour, which was more precious than life, had become odious to him. The most lowly office in her presence was more to be coveted than the possession of unlimited power away from her. It was by these tender and soft insinuations, as the Earl knew full well, that he was sure to obtain what he really coveted—her sanction for retaining the absolute government in the Provinces. And most artfully did he strike the key.

„Most dear and gracious Lady,” he cried, „my care and service here do breed me nothing but grief and unhappiness. I have never had your Majesty's good favour since I came into this charge—a matter that from my first beholding your eyes hath been most dear unto me above all earthly treasures. Never shall I love that place or like that soil which shall cause the lack of it. Most gracious Lady, consider my long, true, and faithful heart toward you. Let not this unfortunate place here bereave me of that which, above all the world, I esteem there, which is your favour and your presence. I see my service is not acceptable, but rather more and more disliketh you. Here I can do your Majesty no service; there I can do you some, at the least rub your horse's heels—a service which shall be much more welcome to me than this, with all that these men may give me. I do, humbly and from my heart, prostrate at your feet, beg this grace at your sacred hands, that you will be pleased to let me return to my home-service, with your favour, let the revocation be used in what sort shall please and like you. But if ever

I Leicester to the Queen, <sup>23 May</sup>, 1586.  
<sup>3 June</sup>

(S. P. Office MS.)

1 Ibid.

spark of favour was in your Majesty toward your old servant, let me obtain this my humble suit; protesting before the Majesty of all Majesties, that there was no cause under Heaven but his and yours, even for your own special and particular cause, I say, could have made me take this absent journey from you in hand. If your Majesty shall refuse me this, I shall think all grace clean gone from me, and I know my days will not be long."

She must melt at this, thought „sweet Robin" to himself; and meantime, accompanied by Heneage, he proceeded with the conferences in the state council-chamber, touching the modification of the title and the confirmation of his authority. This, so far as Walsingham could divine, and Burghley fathom, was the present intention of the Queen. He averred that he had ever sought most painfully to conform his conduct to her instructions as fast as they were received, and that he should continue so to do. On the whole, it was decided by the conference to let matters stand as they were for a little longer, and until after Heneage should have time once more to go and come. „The same manner of proceeding that was is now," said Leicester. „Your pleasure is declared to the council here as you have willed it. How it will fall out again in your Majesty's construction, the Lord knoweth." 2

Leicester might be forgiven for referring to higher powers for any possible interpretation of her Majesty's changing humour; but meantime, while Sir Thomas was getting ready for his expedition to England, the Earl's heart was somewhat gladdened by more gracious messages from the Queen. The alternation of emotions would however prove too much

for him, he feared, and he was reluctant to open his heart to so unwonted a tenant as joy.

„But that my fear is such, most dear and gracious Lady," he said, „as my unfortunate destiny will hardly permit, whilst I remain here, any good acceptance of so simple a service as mine, I should greatly rejoice and comfort myself with the hope of your Majesty's most prayed-for favour. But of late, being by your own sacred hand lifted even up into Heaven with joy of your favour, I was bye and bye without any new desert or offence at all, cast down and down again into the depth of all grief. God doth know, my dear and dread Sovereign, that after I first received your resolute pleasure by Sir Thomas Heneage, I made neither stop nor stay, nor any excuse to be rid of this place, and to satisfy your command. . . . So much I mislike this place and fortune of mine, as I desire nothing in the world so much as to be delivered, with your favour, from all charge here, fearing still some new cross of your displeasure to fall upon me, trembling continually with the fear thereof, in such sort as till I may be fully confirmed in my new regeneration of your wonted favour, I cannot receive that true comfort which doth appertain to so great a hope. Yet I will not only acknowledge with all humbleness and dutiful thanks the exceeding joy these last blessed lines brought to my long-wearied heart, but will, with all true loyal affection, attend that further joy from your sweet self which may utterly extinguish all consuming fear away." 1

Poor Heneage—who likewise received a kind word or two after having been so capriciously and petulantly dealt with—was less extravagant in his expressions of gratitude. „The Queen hath sent me

1 Leicester to the Queen, <sup>23 May</sup>/<sub>2 June</sub>, 1586, MS. last cited.

2 Same to same, <sup>27 May</sup>/<sub>6 June</sub>, 1586. (S. P. Office MS.)

1 Leicester to the Queen, <sup>27 May</sup>/<sub>6 June</sub>, 1586. (S. P. Office MS.)

a paper plaister, which must please for a time," he said. „God Almighty bless her Majesty ever, and best direct her." 1 He was on the point of starting for England, the bearer of the States' urgent entreaties that Leicester might retain the government, and of despatches announcing the recent success of the allies before Grave. „God prospereth the action in these countries beyond all expectation," he said, „which all amongst you will not be over glad of, for somewhat I know." 2 The

1 Heneage to Walsingham, <sup>28 May</sup>, 1586.  
June

(S. P. Office MS.)

2 Heneage to Walsingham, MS. just cited. Just before the envoy had signified to the States the last change in the royal humour, the Netherland council of state had addressed a letter to the Queen. In this document they had excused the celerity with which, moved by the necessity of the case, they had conferred the absolute government upon the Earl. This measure, they said, passed by the unanimous vote of the Provinces, had wonderfully elevated the collapsed minds of the patriots, and filled the enemy with extreme consternation. The renewal of a general authority had laid an excellent foundation for completely restoring the republic, had curbed the ferocious hearts of the enemy, had restrained the progress of a hostile army exulting in a career of extraordinary victories, and, with the blessing of God, had changed the fortunes of the war. The prosperity of the United Provinces had been restored by the dignity, virtue, and assiduous solicitude of the illustrious Earl, and was daily on the increase. They had therefore thanked her Majesty for accepting so benignantly their excuses for the authority conferred, and for no longer requiring its diminution. They expressed the opinion that it would be perilous—in the fragile condition of the republic—to change the word (*vocabulum*) absolute government, which could only be done at a special session of the States, called for that purpose. They feared that, by such a step, at the very moment of restored authority, they should throw prostrate all authority, and overwhelm the commonwealth with confusion. They declared their determination to cherish the dignity and honour of Leicester, as being under God and Her Majesty the foundation of their existence and their felicity. The States of the Provinces, and all individuals, were agreed in admiring and venerating his extraordinary prudence and assiduity. They acknowledged that the safety of the whole republic depended upon the care of the governor, who, moved by his zeal for the true

intrigues of Grasnign, Champagny, and Bodman, with Croft, Burghley, and the others, were not so profound a secret as they could wish.

The tone adopted by Leicester has been made manifest in his letters to the Queen. He had held the same language of weariness and dissatisfaction in his communications to his friends. He would

religion, and his pity for their afflicted fortunes, had abandoned his private interests, his country, and the presence of his sovereign, to encounter all the adverse chances of their perturbed republic. (Bruce, 469-471, 1 May, 1576.)

Six weeks later (June 11, 1586, N.S.), after receiving the last communications of the Queen, the council again addressed her in a similar strain, entrusting their despatches to Heneage, who was setting forth according to her commands. They expressed their deep affliction that she should again so urgently demand the abrogation of the government-general. Not to comply with a requisition so seriously and repeatedly made, was, as they acknowledged, a grave offence. To comply with it, however, without manifest peril to the republic, was impossible. For the whole conservation of authority depended upon the title and office of governor. If that should shake and vacillate, they feared that in this very beginning of their prosperity, which was, through Divine Providence, every day augmenting, all things would fall headlong into utter ruin, to the joy of the common enemy, to whom the authority conferred upon the Earl was most formidable. For the lieutenantancy of the Queen, however great in itself, could never suffice to the administration of political affairs, without the government-general, which could not be adjoined to the lieutenantancy, but must proceed from the superior power residing in the States-General. Again, therefore, they most earnestly besought her Majesty to pardon the error which they had committed, through immoderate devotion to herself, and through the necessity of the times. Her sacred breast would, it was hoped, be moved to pretermitt the proposed revocation, which could only be accomplished by solemn convocation of the orders, and by exposing the whole affair to the world, a step which, on account of the fluctuation of men's minds, and the insidious suggestions of the enemy, would be attended with infinite peril. They therefore most urgently demanded that the execution of her demand should be deferred, at least, to a more convenient season. For the rest they referred the whole matter to the report of Heneage, who as about to return to England, fully instructed as to the views and wishes of the States. Bruce's *Leyc. Corresp.* 472, June 11, 1586, N.S.



not keep the office, he avowed, if they should give him „all Holland and Zeeland, with all their appurtenances,” and he was ready to resign at any moment. He was not „ceremonious for reputation,” he said, but he gave warning that the Netherlands would grow desperate if they found her Majesty dealing weakly or carelessly with them. As for himself he had already had enough of government. „I am weary, Mr. Secretary,” he plaintively exclaimed, „indeed I am weary; but neither of pains nor travail. My ill hap that I can please her Majesty no better hath quite discouraged me.”<sup>1</sup>

He had recently, however—as we have seen—received some comfort, and he was still farther encouraged, upon the eve of Heneage’s departure, by receiving another affectionate epistle from the Queen. Amends seemed at last to be offered for her long and angry silence, and the Earl was deeply grateful.

„If it hath not been, my most dear and gracious Lady,” said he in reply, „no small comfort to your poor old servant to receive but one line of your blessed handwriting in many months, for the relief of a most grieved, wounded heart, how far more exceeding joy must it be, in the midst of all sorrow, to receive from the same sacred hand so many comfortable lines as my good friend Mr. George hath at once brought me! Pardon me, my sweet Lady, if they cause me to forget myself. Only this I do say, with most humble dutiful thanks, that the scope of all my service hath ever been, to content and please you; and if I may do that, then is all sacrifice, either of life or whatsoever, well offered for you.”<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Bruce’s ‚Leyc. Corresp.’ pp. 262, 263,  
<sup>8</sup> May, 1586.

<sup>2</sup> Leicester to the Queen, <sup>14</sup><sub>24</sub> June, 1586.  
(S. P. Office MS.)

The matter of the government absolute having been so fully discussed during the preceding four months, and the last opinions of the state-council having been so lucidly expounded in the despatches to be carried by Heneage to England, the matter might be considered as exhausted. Leicester contented himself, therefore, with once more calling her Majesty’s attention to the fact that if he had not himself accepted the office thus conferred upon him by the States, it would have been bestowed upon some other personage. It would hardly have comported with her dignity, if Count Maurice of Nassau, or Count William, or Count Moeurs, had been appointed governor absolute, for in that case the Earl, as general of the auxiliary English force, would have been subject to the authority of the chieftain thus selected. It was impossible, as the state-council had very plainly shown, for Leicester to exercise supreme authority, while merely holding the military office of her Majesty’s lieutenant-general. The authority of governor or stadholder could only be derived from the supreme power of the country. If her Majesty had chosen to accept the sovereignty, as the States had ever desired, the requisite authority could then have been derived from her, as from the original fountain. As she had resolutely refused that offer, however, his authority was necessarily to be drawn from the States-General, or else the Queen must content herself with seeing him serve as an English military officer, only subject to the orders of the supreme power, wherever that power might reside. In short, Elizabeth’s wish that her general might be clothed with the privileges of her viceroy, while she declined herself to be the sovereign, was illogical, and could not be complied with.<sup>1</sup>

Very soon after inditing these last epistles to the Provinces, the Queen

<sup>1</sup> Leicester to the Queen. MS. last cited.

became more reasonable on the subject; and an elaborate communication was soon received by the state-council, in which the royal acquiescence was signified to the latest propositions of the States. The various topics, suggested in previous despatches from Leicester and from the council, were reviewed, and the whole subject was suddenly placed in a somewhat different light from that in which it seemed to have been previously regarded by her Majesty. She alluded to the excuse offered by the state-council, which had been drawn from the necessity of the case, and from their „great liking for her cousin of Leicester,” although in violation of the original contract. „As you acknowledge, however,” she said, „that therein you were justly to be blamed, and do crave pardon for the same, we cannot, upon this acknowledgment of your fault, but remove our former dislike.” 1

Nevertheless it would now seem that her „mistake” had proceeded, not from the excess, but from the insufficiency of the powers conferred upon the Earl, and she complained, accordingly, that they had given him shadow rather than substance. 2

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1 Queen to Council of State <sup>16</sup>/<sub>26</sub> June, 1586  
(S. P. Office MS.); much corrected in Burghley's handwriting.

2 Ibid. „Yet when we look,” she proceeded, into the little profit that the common cause hath received hitherto by the yielding unto him rather in words and writings a title of a kind of absolute government, than any effect of the authority signified by the words of the grant; for that by virtue thereof we understand that he can neither be made thoroughly acquainted with the true state of your affairs there, requisite for such an office as you have given him in name, nor yet receive the due performance of such contributions of money and other necessities as were specially promised unto him before the acceptance of the government; inasmuch as, for the lack of due satisfaction of the things promised, he hath been enforced to employ part of our treasure—sent over for the payment of such of our people as by the contract we promised to maintain—to pay and relieve such other forces as

Simultaneously with this royal communication, came a joint letter of Leicester, from Burghley, Walsingham, and Hatton, depicting the long and strenuous conflict which they had maintained in his behalf with the rapidly varying inclinations of the Queen. They expressed a warm sympathy with the difficulties of his position, and spoke in strong terms of the necessity that the Netherlands and England should work heartily together. For otherwise, they said, „the cause will fall, the enemy will rise, and we must stagger.” Notwithstanding the secret negotiations with the enemy, which Leicester and Walsingham suspected, and which will be more fully examined in a subsequent chapter, they held a language on that subject, which in the Secretary's mouth at least was sincere. „Whatsoever speeches be blown abroad of parleys of peace,” they said, „all will be but smoke, yea, fire will follow.” 1

They excused themselves for their previous and enforced silence by the fact that they had been unable to communicate any tidings but messages of distress, but they now congratulated the Earl that her Majesty, as he would see by her letter to the council, was firmly resolved, not only to countenance his governorship, but to sustain him in the most thorough manner. It would be therefore quite out of the question *for them to listen to his earnest propositions to be recalled.* 2

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were entertained by the States. . . . besides many other like burdens laid upon our cousin, contrary to our expectation; all this doth give us cause to *mislike not so much the title itself, as the lack of performance* which the title carries show of—a matter, yea, of things most necessary for your own defence; a matter that, without speedy redress, cannot but breed both imminent peril to those countries and dishonour to us.”

1 Burghley, Hatton and Walsingham, to Leicester, <sup>17</sup>/<sub>27</sub> June, 1856, (S. P. Office MS.)

2 Ibid. „Her Majesty is not only minded,” they said, „but, as we perceive, resolutely

Moreover, the Lord Treasurer had already apprized Leicester that Heneage had safely arrived in England, that he had made his report to the Queen, and that her Majesty was „very well contented with him and his mission.” 1

It may be easily believed that the Earl would feel a sensation of relief, if not of triumph, at this termination to the embarrassments under which he had been labouring ever since he listened to the oration of the wise Leonius upon New Year's Day. At last the Queen had formally acquiesced in the action of the States, and in his acceptance of their offer. He now saw himself undisputed, „governor absolute,” having been six months long a suspected, discredited, almost disgraced man. It was natural that he should express himself cheerfully.

„My great comfort received, oh my most gracious Lady,” he said, „by your most favourable lines written by your own sacred hand, I did most humbly acknowledge by my former letter; albeit I can no way make testimony oft enough of the great joy I took thereby. And seeing *my wounded heart is by this means almost made whole*, I do pray unto God that either I may never feel the like again from you, or not be suffered to live, rather than I should fall again into those torments of your displeasure. Most gracious Queen, I beseech you, therefore, make perfect that which you have begun. Let not the common danger, nor any ill, incident to the place I serve you in, be accompanied with greater troubles and fears indeed than all the horrors of death can bring me. My strong hope doth

now so assure me, as I have almost won the battle against despair, and I do arm myself with as many of those wonted comfortable conceits as may confirm my new revived spirits reposing myself evermore under the *shadow of those blessed beams* that must yield the only nourishment to this disease.” 1

But however nourishing the shade of those blessed beams might prove to Leicester's disease, it was not so easy to bring about a very sunny condition in the Provinces. It was easier for Elizabeth to mend the broken heart of the governor than to repair the damage which had been caused to the commonwealth by her caprice and her deceit. The dispute concerning the government absolute had died away, but the authority of the Earl had got a „crack in it” which never could be handsomely made whole. 2 The States, during the long period of Leicester's discredit—feeling more and more doubtful as to the secret intentions of Elizabeth—disappointed in the condition of the auxiliary troops and in the amount of supplies furnished from England, and, above all, having had time to regret their delegation of a power which they began to find agreeable to exercise with their own hands, became indisposed to entrust the Earl with the administration and full inspection of their resources. To the enthusiasm which had greeted the first arrival of Elizabeth's representative had succeeded a jealous, carping suspicious sentiment. The two hundred thousand florins monthly were paid, according to the original agreement, but the four hundred thousand of extra service-money subsequently voted were withheld,

determined,—yea, persuaded fully—that it is necessary for your Lordship not only to continue in the government, but to have it more amply established and perfected to all purposes for your credit and strength, and especially with money and men for maintenance of those countries against the enemy. We should greatly err, therefore, if we should at this time move her Majesty to recal you.”

1 Bruce, 307.

1 Leicester to the Queen,  $\frac{20}{80}$  June, 1586.

(S. P. Office MS.)

2 „My credit hath been cracked ever since her Majesty sent Sir Thomas Heneage hither, as all men can tell you.” Bruce's, *Leyc.*

Corresp. 424, Oct.  $\frac{2}{12}$ , 1586.



and withheld expressly on account of Heneage's original mission to disgrace the governor." 1

"The late return of Sir Thomas Heneage," said Lord North, "hath put such busses in their heads, as they march forward with leaden heels and doubtful hearts." 2

In truth, through the discredit cast by the Queen upon the Earl in this important affair, the supreme authority was forced back into the hands of the States, at the very moment when they had most freely divested themselves of power. After the Queen had become more reasonable, it was too late to induce them to part, a second time, so freely with the immediate control of their own affairs. Leicester had become to a certain extent disgraced and disliked by the Estates. He thought himself, by the necessity of the case, forced to appeal to the people against their legal representatives, and thus the foundation of a nominally democratic party, in opposition to the municipal one, was already laid. Nothing could be more unfortunate at that juncture; for we shall, in future, find the Earl in perpetual opposition to the most distinguished statesmen in the Provinces; to the very men indeed who

I — "As to the not paying by the States of the 200,000 florins a month, agreed upon," said Leicester to the Queen, "I must needs say that they have paid that 200,000, but that I stand upon of late with them is 200,000 more, which they long since agreed upon, and I sent word to you Majesty. And herein, indeed, they have been very slack; but if your Majesty will pardon me to speak the truth of that stay, it grew only upon Sir Thomas Heneage's coming with the message of your displeasure; for from that time till this they have not only sought to hinder the agreement, but to intermeddle wholly again with all things which did appertain to my office. To withstand them—to be plain—I durst not, and they have applied it diligently since to work that conceit into every man's head," &c. &c. Leicester to the Queen, <sup>14</sup> June,

1586. (S. P. Office MS.)

2 North to Burghley, <sup>29 May</sup> 8 June, 1586. (S. P. Office MS.)

had been most influential in offering the sovereignty to England, and in placing him in the position which he had so much coveted. No sooner therefore had he been confirmed by Elizabeth in that high office than his arrogance broke forth, and the quarrels between himself and the representative body became incessant.

"I stand now in somewhat better terms than I did," said he; "I was not in case till of late to deal roundly with them as I have now done. I have established a chamber of finances, against some of their wills, whereby I doubt not to procure great benefit to increase our ability for payments hereafter. The people I find still best devoted to her Majesty, though of late many lewd practices have been used to withdraw their good wills. But it will not be; they still pray God that her Majesty may be their sovereign. She should then see what a contribution they will all bring forth. *But to the States they will never return, which will breed some great mischief, there is such mislike of the States universally.* I would your Lordship had seen the case I had lived in among them these four months, especially after her Majesty's mislike was found. You would then marvel to see how I have waded, as I have done, through no small obstacles, without help, counsel, or assistance." 1

Thus the part which he felt at last called upon to enact was that of an aristocratic demagogue, in perpetual conflict with the burgher-representative body.

It is now necessary to lift a corner of the curtain, by which some international—or rather interpalatial—intrigues were concealed, as much as possible, even from the piercing eyes of Walsingham. The Secretary was, however, quite aware

1 Leicester to Burghley, <sup>18</sup> June, 1586. (S. P. Office MS.)

—despite the pains taken to deceive him—of the nature of the plots and of

the somewhat ignoble character of the actors concerned in them.

## CHAPTER VIII.

**Forlorn Condition of Flanders—Parma's secret Negotiations with the Queen—Grafigni and Bodman—Their Dealings with English Counsellors—Duplicity of Farnese—Secret Offers of the English Peace-Party—Letters and Intrigues of De Loo—Drake's Victories and their Effect—Parma's Perplexity and Anxiety—He is relieved by the News from England—Queen's secret Letters to Parma—His Letters and Instructions to Bodman—Bodman's secret Transactions at Greenwich—Walsingham detects and exposes the Plot—The Intriguers baffled—Queen's Letter to Parma and his to the King—Unlucky Results of the Peace Intrigues—Unhandsome Treatment of Leicester—Indignation of the Earl and Walsingham—Secret Letter of Parma to Philip—Invasion of England recommended—Details of the Project.**

ALEXANDER FARNESE and his heroic little army had been left by their sovereign in as destitute a condition as that in which Lord Leicester and his unfortunate „paddy persons” had found themselves since their arrival in the Netherlands. These mortal men were but the weapons to be used and broken in the hands of the two great sovereigns, already pitted against each other in mortal combat. That the distant invisible potentate, the work of whose life was to do his best to destroy all European nationality, all civil and religious freedom, should be careless of the instruments by which his purpose was to be effected, was but natural. It is painful to reflect that the great champion of liberty and of Protestantism was almost equally indifferent to the welfare of the human creatures enlisted in her cause. Spaniards and Italians, English and Irish, went half naked and half starving through the whole inclement winter, and perished of pestilence in droves after confronting the less formidable dangers of battle-field and leaguer. Manfully and sympathetically did the Earl of Leicester—while whining in

absurd hyperbole over the angry demeanour of his sovereign towards himself—represent the imperative duty of an English government to succour English troops.

Alexander Farnese was equally plain-spoken to a sovereign with whom plain-speaking was a crime. In bold, almost scornful language, the Prince represented to Philip the sufferings and destitution of the little band of heroes, by whom that magnificent military enterprise, the conquest of Antwerp, had just been effected. „God will be weary of working miracles for us,” he cried, and nothing but miracles can save the troops from starving.” There was no question of paying them their wages, there was no pretence at keeping them reasonably provided with lodging and clothing, but he asserted the undeniable proposition that they „could not pass their lives without eating,”<sup>1</sup> and he implored his sovereign to send at least money enough to buy the soldiers shoes. To go foodless and barefoot without complaining, on the frozen swamps of Flanders in January, was more than was to be expected from Spaniards and Italians. The country itself was eaten bare. The obedient Provinces had reaped absolute ruin as the reward of their obedience. Bruges, Ghent, and the other cities of Brabant and Flanders, once so opulent and powerful, had become mere dens of thieves and paupers. Agriculture, commerce, manufactures—all were dead. The condition of Antwerp was most tragical. The city, which had been so recently the commercial centre of the earth, was

<sup>1</sup> „No se puede passar la vida sin comer.”  
Parma to Philip II. 28 Feb. 1586. (Archivo de Simancas, MS.)

reduced to absolute beggary. Its world-wide traffic was abruptly terminated, for the mouth of its great river was controlled by Flushing, and Flushing was in the firm grasp of Sir Philip Sindney, 'as governor of the English Queen. Merchants and bankers, who had lately been possessed of enormous resources, were stripped of all. Such of the industrial classes as could leave the place had wandered away to Holland and England. There was no industry possible, for there was no market for the products of industry. Antwerp was hemmed in by the enemy on every side, surrounded by royal troops in a condition of open munity, cut off from the ocean, deprived of daily bread, and yet obliged to contribute out of its poverty to the maintenance of the Spanish soldiers, who were there for its destruction. Its burghers, compelled to furnish four hundred thousand florins, as the price of their capitulation, and at least six hundred thousand more for the repairs of the dykes, the destruction of which, too long deferred, had only spread desolation over the country without saving the city, and over and above all forced to rebuild, at their own expense, that fatal citadel, by which their liberty and lives were to be perpetually endangered, might now regret at leisure that they had not been as stedfast during their siege as had been the heroic inhabitants of Leyden in their time of trial, twelve years before. Obedient Antwerp was, in truth, most forlorn. But there was one consolation

1 Parma to Philip II. 19 April, 1586. (Arch. de Sim. MS.)

The contemporary historians of the country do not paint more frightful pictures of the desolation of Antwerp, and of the obedient Provinces generally, than those furnished by the Prince of Parma in his secret letters to his sovereign. Compare Bor, ii. 934; Meteren, xiii. 253<sup>o</sup>; Hoofd Vervolgh, 251, *et mult. al.* „Grandissima lastima,” said Farnese of Antwerp, „ver perdida tan principal villa, y la navegacion de ribera tan linda provechosa no solo para el pais mas para todo el mundo.” MS. before cited.

for her and for Philip, one bright spot in the else universal gloom. The ecclesiastics assured Parma, that, notwithstanding the frightful diminution in the population of the city, they had confessed and absolved more persons than Easter than they had ever done since the commencement of the revolt. Great was Philip's joy in consequence. 1 „You cannot imagine my satisfaction,” he wrote, „at the news you give me concerning last Easter.” 2

With a ruined country, starving and mutinous troops, a bankrupt exchequer, and a desperate and pauper population, Alexander Farnese was not unwilling to gain time by simulated negotiations for peace. It was strange, however, that so sagacious a monarch as the Queen of England should suppose it for her interest to grant at that moment the very delay which was deemed most desirable by her antagonist.

Yet it was not wounded effection alone, nor insulted pride, nor startled parsimony, that had carried the fury of the Queen to such a height on the occasion of Leicester's elevation to absolute government. It was still more, because the step was thought likely to interfere with the progress of those negotiations into which the Queen had allowed herself to be drawn.

A certain Grafigni—a Genoese merchant residing much in London and in Antwerp, a meddling intrusive and irresponsible kind of individual, whose occupation was gone with the cessation of Flemish trade—had recently made his appearance as a volunteer diplomatist. The principal reason for accepting or rather for winking at his services, seemed to be the possibility of disavowing him, on both sides, whenever it

I Letter to Philip II. just cited.

2 „No podreys pensar el cotento que me ha dado el aviso de la frecuencia que hubo a los sacramentos la pasqua pasada,” &c. Philip II. to Parma, 5 July, 1586. (Arch. de Sim. MS.)



should be thought advisable. He had a partner or colleague, too, named Bodman, who seemed a not much more creditable negotiator than himself. The chief director of the intrigue was, however, Champagny, brother of Cardinal Granville, restored to the King's favour and disposed to atone by his exuberant loyalty for his heroic patriotism on a former and most memorable occasion. 1 Andrea de Loo, another subordinate politician, was likewise employed at various stages of the negotiation.

It will soon be perceived that the part enacted by Burghley, Hatton, Croft, and other counsellors, and even by the Queen herself, was not a model of ingenuousness towards the absent Leicester and the States-General. The gentlemen sent at various times to and from the Earl and her Majesty's government,—Davison, Shirley, Vavasor, Heneage, and the rest,—had all expressed themselves in the strongest language concerning the good faith and the friendliness of the Lord-Treasurer and the Vice-Chamberlain, 2 but they were not so well informed as they would have been, had they seen the private letters of Parma to Philip II.

Walsingham, although kept in the dark as much as it was possible, discovered from time to time the mysterious practices of his political antagonists, and warned the Queen of the danger and dishonour she was bringing upon herself. 3 Elizabeth, when thus boldly charged, equivocated and stormed alternately. She authorized Walsingham to communicate the secrets—which he had thus surprised—to the States-Ge-

neral, and then denied having given any such orders. 1

In truth, Walsingham was only entrusted with such portions of the negotiations as he had been able, by his own astuteness, to divine; and as he was very much a friend to the Provinces and to Leicester, he never failed to keep them instructed, to the best of his ability. It must be confessed, however, that the shuffling and paltering among great men and little men, at that period, forms a somewhat painful subject of contemplation at the present day.

Grafigni, having some merchandise to convey from Antwerp to London, went early in the year to the Prince of Parma, at Brussels, in order to procure a passport. 2 They entered into some conversation upon the misery of the country, and particularly concerning the troubles to which the unfortunate merchants had been exposed. Alexander expressed much sympathy with the commercial community, and a strong desire that the ancient friendship between his master and the Queen of England might be restored. Grafigni assured the Prince—as the result of his own observation in England—that the Queen participated in those pacific sentiments. „You are going to England,” replied the Prince, „and you may say to the ministers of her Majesty, that, after my allegiance to my King, I am most favourably and affectionately inclined towards her. If it pleases them that I, as *Alexander Farnese*, should attempt to bring about an accord, and if our commissioners could be assured of a hearing in England, I would take care that everything should be conducted with due regard to the honour and reputation of her Majesty.” 3

1 In the memorable Antwerp fury. See *Rise of the Dutch Republic*, vol. iii.

2 Bruce's *Leyc. Corresp.* pp. 112, 124, 143, 161, 176, 231. Leicester to Burghley, 18 March, 1586. (S. P. Office MS.)

3 Bruce's *Leyc. Corresp.* 231,  $\frac{21 \text{ April}}{1 \text{ May}}$ , 1586; 272,  $\frac{20}{36} \text{ May}$ , 1586.

1 Ibid. 240,  $\frac{26 \text{ April}}{6 \text{ May}}$ , 1586; 272,  $\frac{20}{30} \text{ May}$  1586.

2 Copia del Papel de Agostino Grafigna, anno 1586. (Arch. de Sim. MS.)

3 Ibid. „Che io, como Alessandro Farnese, praticassi a pico d' accordo con mio

Grafigni then asked for a written letter of credence. „That cannot be” replied Alexander; „but if you return to me I shall believe your report, and then a proper person can be sent, with authority from the King to treat with her Majesty.” <sup>1</sup>

Grafigni proceeded to England, and had an interview with Lord Cobham. A few days later that nobleman gave the merchant a general assurance that the Queen had always felt a strong inclination to maintain firm friendship with the House of Burgundy. Nevertheless, as he proceeded to state, the bad policy of the King’s ministers, and the enterprises against her Majesty, had compelled her to provide for her own security and that of her realm by remedies differing in spirit from that good inclination. Being, however, a Christian princess, willing to leave vengeance to the Lord and disposed to avoid bloodshed, she was ready to lend her ear to a negotiation for peace, if it were likely to be a sincere and secure one. Especially she was pleased that his Highness of Parma should act as mediator of such a treaty, as she considered him a most just and honourable prince in all his promises and actions. Her Majesty would accordingly hold herself in readiness to receive the honourable commissioners alluded to, feeling sure that every step taken by his Highness would comport with her honour and safety. <sup>2</sup>

At about the same time the other partner in this diplomatic enterprise, William Bodman, communicated to Alexander the result of his observations in England. He stated that Lords Burghley, Buckhurst, and Cobham, Sir Christopher Hatton, and Comptroller Croft, were secretly desirous of peace with Spain,

and that they had seized the recent opportunity of her pique against the Earl of Leicester <sup>1</sup> to urge forward these underhand negotiations. Some progress had been made; but as no accredited commissioner arrived from the Prince of Parma, and as Leicester was continually writing earnest letters against peace, the efforts of these counsellors had slackened. Bodman found them all, on his arrival, anxious, as he said, „to get their necks out of the matter;” <sup>2</sup> declaring everything which had been done to be pure matter of accident, entirely without the concurrence of the Queen, and each seeking to out rival the other in the good graces of her Majesty. <sup>3</sup> Grafigni informed Bodman, however, that Lord Cobham was quite to be depended upon in the affair, and would deal with him privately, while Lord Burghley would correspond with Andrea de Loo at Antwerp. Moreover, the servant of Comptroller Croft would direct Bodman as to his course, and would give him daily instructions. <sup>4</sup>

Now it so happened that this servant of Croft, Norris by name, was a Papist, a man of bad character, and formerly a spy of the Duke of Anjou. <sup>5</sup> „If your Lordship or myself should use such instruments as this,” wrote Walsingham to Leicester, „I know we should bear no small reproach; but it is the good hap of hollow and doubtful men to be best thought of.” <sup>6</sup> Bodman thought the lords of the peace-faction and their adherents not sufficiently strong to oppose the other party with success. He assured Farnese that almost

Re, y che li nostri commessi fussino sentiti in Ingleterra, tenerei modo che le cose passeriano con ogni hanore & reputazione di S. Ma.” &c.

<sup>1</sup> Ibid.

<sup>2</sup> Papel de Grafigna, MS. before cited.

<sup>1</sup> „Algun disgusto contra el Conde de Lester,” &c., from a document entitled „Lo que en particular siente Guillemo Bodeman de las intenciones de Inglaterra, anno 1586.” (Archivo de Simancas, MS.)

<sup>2</sup> „Sacar el cuello y salirse a fuera.” (Ibid.)

<sup>3</sup> Ibid.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid.

<sup>5</sup> Bruce’s, *Leyc. Corresp.* 231, <sup>21 April</sup>  
<sup>1 May</sup>

1586.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid.

all the gentlemen and the common people of England stood ready to risk their fortunes and to go in person to the field to maintain the cause of the Queen and religious liberty, and that the chance of peace was desperate unless something should turn the tide, such as, for example, the defeat of Drake, or an invasion by Philip of Ireland or Scotland. 1

As it so happened that Drake was just then engaged in a magnificent career of victory, sweeping the Spanish Main and startling the nearest and the most remote possessions of the King with English prowess, his defeat was not one of the cards to be relied on by the peace-party in the somewhat deceptive game which they had commenced. Yet, strange to say, they used, or attempted to use, those splendid triumphs as if they had been disasters.

Meantime there was an active but very secret correspondence between Lord Cobham, Lord Burghley, Sir James Croft, and various subordinate personages in England, on the one side, and Champagny, President Richardot, La Motte, governor of Gravelines, Andrea de Loo, Grafigni, and other men in the obedient Provinces, more or less in Alexander's confidence, on the other side. Each party was desirous of forcing or wheedling the antagonist to show his hand. „You were employed to take soundings off the English coast in the Duke of Norfolk's time,” said Cobham to La Motte; „you remember the Duke's fate. Nevertheless, her Majesty hates war, and it only depends on the King to have a firm and lasting peace.” 2

„You must tell Lord Cobham,” said Richardot to La Motte, „that you are not at liberty to go into a correspon-

dence, until assured of the intentions of Queen Elizabeth. Her Majesty ought to speak first, in order to make her good-will manifest,” 1 and so on.

„The *friend*’ can confer with you,” said Richardot to Champagny; „but his Highness is not to appear to know anything at all about it. The Queen must signify her intentions.” 2

„You answered Champagny correctly,” said Burghley to De Loo, „as to what I said last winter concerning her Majesty's wishes in regard to a pacification. *The Netherlands must be compelled to return to obedience to the King*; but their ancient privileges are to be maintained. You omitted, however, to say a word about toleration, in the Provinces, of the reformed religion. But I said then, as I say now, that this is a condition indispensable to peace.” 3

This was a somewhat important omission on the part of De Loo, and gives the measure of his conscientiousness or his capacity as a negotiator. Certainly for the Lord-Treasurer of England to offer, on the part of her Majesty, to bring about the reduction of her allies under the yoke which they had thrown off without her assistance, and this without leave asked of them, and with no provision for the great principle of religious liberty, which was the cause of the revolt, was a most flagitious trifling with the honour of Elizabeth and of England. Certainly the more this mysterious correspondence is examined, the more conclusive is the justification of the vague and instinctive jealousy felt by Leicester and the States-General as to English diplomacy during the winter and spring of 1586.

Burghley summoned De Loo, accord-

1 Richardot de La Motte, 23 March, 1586. (Arch. de Sim. MS.)

2 Richardot to Champagny, 24 March, 1586. (Arch. de Sim. MS.)

3 „Lettera del Sr. Gran Thesoriero d'Inghilterra a Andrea de Loo, verbatim traslatata dalla sua lingua in questa, 6 Marte, 1586.” (Arch. de Sim. MS.)

1 „Lo que en particular siente G. Bodeman,” &c. MS. last cited.

2 Lord Cobham to Sigr. de la Motte, 2 March, 1586. (Arch. de Sim. MS.)



ingly, to recall to his memory all that had been privately said to him on the necessity of protecting the reformed religion in the Provinces. If a peace were to be perpetual, toleration was indispensable, he observed, and her Majesty was said to desire this condition most earnestly <sup>1</sup>

The Lord-Treasurer also made the not unreasonable suggestion, that, in case of a pacification, it would be necessary to provide that English subjects—peaceful traders, mariners, and the like—should no longer be shut up in the Inquisition-prisons of Spain and Portugal, and there starved to death, as, with great multitudes, had already been the case. <sup>2</sup>

Meantime Alexander, while encouraging and directing all the underhand measures, was carefully impressing upon his master that he was not, in the least degree, bound by any such negotiations. „Queen Elizabeth,” he correctly observed to Philip, „is a woman: she is also by no means fond of expense. The kingdom, accustomed to repose, is already weary of war: therefore, they are all pacifically inclined.” <sup>3</sup> „It has been intimated to me,” he said, „that if I would send a properly qualified person, who should declare that your Majesty had not absolutely forbidden the coming of Lord Leicester, such an agent would be well received, and perhaps *the Earl would be recalled.*” <sup>4</sup> Alexander then proceeded, with the coolness befitting a trusted governor of Philip II., to comment upon the course which he was pursuing. He could at any time denounce the negotiations which he was secretly prompting. Meantime immense advantages could be obtained by the deception practised

upon an enemy whose own object was to deceive.

The deliberate treachery of the scheme was cynically enlarged upon, and its possible results mathematically calculated. Philip was to proceed with the invasion while Alexander was going on with the negotiation. If, meanwhile, they could receive back Holland and Zeeland from the hands of England, that would be an immense success. <sup>1</sup> The Prince intimated a doubt, however, as to so fortunate a result, because, in dealing with heretics and persons of similar quality, nothing but trickery was to be expected. The chief good to be hoped for was to „chill the Queen in her plots, leagues, and alliances, and, during the chill, to carry forward their own great design.” <sup>2</sup> To slacken not a whit in their preparations, to „put the Queen to sleep,” <sup>3</sup> and, *above all, not to leave the French for a moment unoccupied with internal dissensions and civil war;*—such was the game of the King and the governor, as expounded between themselves. <sup>4</sup>

President Richardot, at the same time, stated to Cardinal Granvelle that the English desire for peace was considered certain at Brussels. Grafini had informed the Prince of Parma and his counsellors that the Queen was most amicably disposed, and that there would be no trouble on the point of religion, her Majesty not wishing to obtain more than she would herself be willing to grant. „In this,” said Richardot, „there is both hard and soft;” <sup>5</sup> for, knowing that the Spanish game was deception, pure and simple, the excellent President could not bring himself to suspect a

<sup>1</sup> „Lettera,” &c., just cited.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid.

<sup>3</sup> „La reyna, por ser muger, y sentir el gasto que la conviene hacer, y cansarse aquel Reyno acostumbrado a su reposo.” &c. Parma to Philip II. 30 Mar. 1586. (Arch. de Sim. MS.)

<sup>4</sup> Parma to Philip II., MS. last cited.

<sup>1</sup> Ibid.

<sup>2</sup> „Que haya de serbir mas para enfriarla en sus tramas, ligas, y adherencias,” &c. (Ibid.)

<sup>3</sup> „Parma adormecerla.” (Ibid.)

<sup>4</sup> Parma to Philip II., MS. last cited.

<sup>5</sup> „En cecy il y a du dur & du mol,” Richardot to Granvelle, 30 Mars, 1586. (Arch. de Sim. MS.)

possible grain of good faith in the English intentions. Much anxiety was perpetually felt in the French quarter, her Majesty's government being supposed to be secretly preparing an invasion of the obedient Netherlands across the French frontier, in combination, not with the Béarnese, but with Henry III. So much in the dark were even the most astute politicians. „I can't feel satisfied in this French matter,” said the President: „we mustn't tickle ourselves to make ourselves laugh.”<sup>1</sup> Moreover, there was no self-deception nor self-tickling possible as to the unmitigated misery of the obedient Netherlands. Famine was a more formidable foe than Frenchmen, Hollanders, and Englishmen combined; so that Richardot avowed that the „negotiation would be indeed holy, if it would restore Holland and Zeeland to the King without fighting. The prospect seemed on the whole rather dismal to loyal Netherlanders like the old leaguers, intriguing, Hispaniolized president of the privy council. „I confess,” said he plaintively, „that England needs chastisement; but I don't see how we are to give it to her. Only let us secure Holland and Zeeland, and then we shall always find a stick whenever we like to beat the dog.”<sup>2</sup>

Meantime Andrea de Loo had been bustling and buzzing about the ears of the chief counsellors at the English court during all the early spring. Most busily he had been endeavouring to efface the prevalent suspicion that Philip and Alexander were only trifling by these informal negotiations. We have just seen whether or not there was ground for that suspicion. De Loo, being impor-

tunate, however—, „as he usually was,” according to his own statement—obtained in Burghley's hand a confirmation, by order of the Queen, of De Loo's letter of the 26th December. The matter of religion gave the worthy merchant much difficulty; and he begged Lord Buckhurst, the Lord-Treasurer, and many other counsellors, not to allow this point of toleration to ruin the whole affair; „for,” said he, „his Majesty will never permit any exercise of the reformed religion.”<sup>1</sup>

At last Buckhurst sent for him, and, in presence of Comptroller Croft, gave him information that he had brought the Queen to his conclusion: firstly, that she would be satisfied with as great a proportion of religious toleration for Holland, Zeeland, and the other United Provinces, as his Majesty could concede with safety to his conscience and his honour; 2 secondly; that she required an act of amnesty; thirdly, that she claimed reimbursement by Philip for the money advanced by her to the States.<sup>3</sup>

Certainly a more wonderful claim was never made than this—a demand upon an absolute monarch for indemnity for expenses incurred in fermenting a rebellion of his own subjects. The measure of toleration proposed for the Provinces—the conscience, namely, of the greatest bigot ever born into the world—was likely to prove as satisfactory as the claim for damages propounded by the most parsimonious sovereign in Christendom. It was, however, stipulated that the non-conformists of Holland and Zeeland who should be forced into exile were to have their property administered

1 „Il ne faut pas que nous nous chatouillons pour nous faire rire.” (Ibid.) Neither Richardot nor Parma himself could then foresee that within two months Henry III. would be proposing to Philip II. a joint invasion of England!

2 „Et nous sera aysé de trouver le baston quand nous voulons battre le chien.” (Ibid.)

1 Memorial d'Andrea de Loo del negotiato alla corte d'Inghilterra nel mese di Febraio e Marzo, 1586. (Archivo de Simancas, MS.)

2 „Imprimis, che S. M<sup>ta</sup>. si contenta di on estar altrimenti sul punto della religione che d'ottenere dal Re quella tanta tolerantia per la Hollandia y la Zelanda con le altre provincie unite, che potra concedere con sua salva coscienza et honore.” (Ibid.)

3 Ibid.

by Papist trustees; and further that the Spanish Inquisition was not to be established in the Netherlands. Philip could hardly demand better terms than these last, after a career of victory. That they should be offered now by Elizabeth was hardly compatible with good faith to the States.

On account of Lord Burghley's gout, it was suggested that the negotiators had better meet in England, as it would be necessary for him to take the lead in the matter, and as he was but an indifferent traveller.<sup>1</sup> Thus, according to De Loë, the Queen was willing to hand over the United Provinces to Philip, and to toss religious toleration to the winds, if she could only get back the seventy thousand pounds—more or less—which she had invested in an unpromising speculation. A few weeks later, and at almost the very moment when Elizabeth had so suddenly overturned her last vial of wrath upon the discomfited Heneage for having communicated—according to her express command—the fact of the pending negotiations to the Netherland States; at that very instant Parma was writing secretly, and in cipher, to Philip. His communication—could Sir Thomas have read it—might have partly explained her Majesty's rage.

Parma had heard, he said, through Bodman, from Comptroller Croft, that the Queen would willingly receive a proper envoy. It was very easy to see, he observed, that the English counsellors were seeking every means of entering into communication with Spain, and that they were doing so with the participation of the Queen.<sup>2</sup> Lord-Treasurer Burghley and Comptroller Croft had

expressed surprise that the Prince had not yet sent a secret agent to her Majesty, under pretext of demanding explanations concerning Lord Leicester's presence in the Provinces, but in reality to treat for peace. Such an agent, it had been intimated, would be well received.<sup>1</sup> The Lord-Treasurer and the Comptroller would do all in their power to advance the negotiation, so that, with their aid and with the pacific inclination of the Queen, the measures proposed in favour of Leicester would be suspended, and perhaps the Earl himself and all the English would be recalled.<sup>2</sup>

The Queen was further represented as taking great pains to excuse both the expedition of Sir Francis Drake to the Indies and the mission of Leicester to the Provinces. She was said to throw the whole blame of these enterprises upon Walsingham and other ill-intentioned personages, and to avow that she now understood matters better; so that, if Parma would at once send an envoy, peace would, without question, soon be made.<sup>3</sup>

Parma had expressed his gratification at these hopeful dispositions on the part of Burghley and Croft, and held out hopes of sending an agent to treat with them, if not directly with her Majesty. For some time past—according to the Prince—the English government had not seemed to be honestly seconding the Earl of Leicester, nor to correspond with his desires. „This makes me think,” he said, „that the coun-

<sup>1</sup> Ibid.

<sup>2</sup> „Y con esto y la inclinacion que tiene la Reyna á la paz, se suspenderian las proposiciones que se hazen en favor del Conde de Lestre, y quiza seria revocado el con todos los Ingleses.” (Ibid.)

<sup>3</sup> „Esmerando se mucho en excusarla Reyna assi de la yda de Drake a las Indias como de la venida de Leicester. echando la culpa a Walsingham y a otros mal intencionados, y que ya la Reyna comenzava a conocerlo,” &c. (Ibid.)

<sup>1</sup> MS. just cited.

<sup>2</sup> „Bien claro echa de ver que van buscando todos los que les parecen a proposito para entrar en comunicacion, y que lo hazen con la participacion de la Reyna.” Parma to Philip II., 29 April, 1586. (Arch. de Sm. MS.)



sellers before mentioned, being his rivals, are trying to trip him up." <sup>1</sup>

In such a caballing, prevaricating age, it is difficult to know which of all the plotters and counterplotters engaged in these intrigues could accomplish the greatest amount of what—for the sake of diluting in nine syllables that which could be more forcibly expressed in one—was then called diplomatic dissimulation. It is to be feared, notwithstanding her frequent and vociferous denials, that the robes of the „imperial votaress” were not so unsullied as could be wished. We know how loudly Leicester had complained—we have seen how clearly Walsingham could convict; but Elizabeth, though convicted, could always confute: for an absolute sovereign, even without resorting to Philip’s syllogisms of axe and faggot, was apt in the sixteenth century to have the best of an argument with private individuals.

The secret statements of Parma—made, not for public effect, but for the purpose of furnishing his master with the most accurate information he could gather as to English policy—are certainly entitled to consideration. They were doubtless founded upon the statement of individuals rejoicing in no very elevated character; but those individuals had no motive to deceive their patron. If they clashed with the vehement declarations of very eminent personages, it must be admitted, on the other hand, that they were singularly in accordance with the silent eloquence of important and mysterious events.

As to Alexander Farnese—without deciding the question whether Elizabeth and Burghley were deceiving Walsingham and Leicester, or only trying to delude Philip and himself—he had no hesitation, of course, on his part in recommending to Philip the employment

of unlimited dissimulation. Nothing could be more ingenuous than the intercourse between the King and his confidential advisers. It was perfectly understood among them that they were always to deceive every one, upon every occasion. Only let them be false, and it was impossible to be wholly wrong; but grave mistakes might occur from occasional deviations into sincerity. It was no question at all, therefore, that it was Parma’s duty to delude Elizabeth and Burghley. Alexander’s course was plain. He informed his master that he would keep these difficulties alive as much as it was possible. In order to „put them all to sleep with regard to the great enterprise of the invasion,” <sup>1</sup> he would send back Bodman to Burghley and Croft, and thus keep this unofficial negotiation upon its legs. The King was quite uncommitted, and could always disavow what had been done. Meanwhile he was gaining, and his adversaries losing, much precious time. „If by this course,” said Parma, „we can induce the English to hand over to us the places which they hold in Holland and Zeeland, that will be a great triumph.” Accordingly he urged the King not to slacken, in the least, his preparations for invasion, and, above all, to have a care that the French were kept entangled and embarrassed among themselves, which was a most substantial point. <sup>2</sup>

Meantime Europe was ringing with the American successes of the bold corsair Drake. San Domingo, Porto Rico, Santiago, Carthagena, Florida, were sacked and destroyed, and the supplies drawn so steadily from the oppression of the Western World to maintain Spanish tyranny in Europe were for a time extinguished. Parma

<sup>1</sup> „Per endormecerlos por lo que toca el negocio principal.” (Ibid.)

<sup>2</sup> „Que los franceses se entretengan embarracados entre se, que es punto sustantissimo.” (Ibid.)

<sup>1</sup> Que estos, como sus contrarios, deven de yrie a la mano,” &c. (Ibid.)

was appalled at these triumphs of the Sea-King—„a fearful man to the King of Spain”<sup>1</sup>—as Lord Burghley well observed. The Spanish troops were starving in Flanders, all Flanders itself was starving, and Philip, as usual, had sent but insignificant remittances to save his perishing soldiers. Parma had already exhausted his credit. Money was most difficult to obtain in such a forlorn country; and now the few rich merchants and bankers of Antwerp that were left looked very black at these crushing news from America. „They are drawing their purse-strings very tight,” said Alexander, „and will make no accommodation. The most contemplative of them ponder much over this success of Drake, and think that your Majesty will forget our matters here altogether.”<sup>2</sup> For this reason he informed the King that it would be advisable to drop all further negotiation with England for the time, as it was hardly probable that, with such advantages gained by the Queen, she would be inclined to proceed in the path which had been just secretly opened.<sup>3</sup> Moreover, the Prince was in a state of alarm as to the intentions of France. Mendoza and Tassis had given him to understand that a very good feeling prevailed between the court of Henry and of Elizabeth, and that the French were likely to come to a pacification among themselves.<sup>4</sup> In this the Spanish envoys were hardly anticipating so great an effect as we have seen had the right to do from their own indefatigable exertions; for, thanks to their zeal, backed by the moderate subsidies furnished by their master, the civil war in France already seemed likely to be as enduring as that of the Netherlands. But Parma—still quite in

the dark as to French politics—was haunted by the vision of seventy thousand foot and six thousand horse ready to be let slip upon him at any moment, out of a pacified and harmonious France; while he had nothing but a few starving and crippled regiments to withstand such an invasion. When all these events should have taken place, and France, in alliance with England, should have formally declared war against Spain. Alexander protested that he should have learned nothing new.<sup>2</sup>

The Prince was somewhat mistaken as to political affairs; but his doubts concerning his neighbours, blended with the forlorn condition of himself and army, about which there was no doubt at all, showed the exigencies of his situation. In the midst of such embarrassments it is impossible not to admire his heroism as a military chieftain, and his singular adroitness as a diplomatist. He had painted for his sovereign a most faithful and horrible portrait of the obedient Provinces. The soil was untilled; the manufactories had all stopped; trade had ceased to exist. It was a pity only to look upon the raggedness of his soldiers. No language could describe the misery of the reconciled Provinces—Artois, Hainault, Flanders. The condition of Bruges would melt the hardest heart; other cities were no better; Antwerp was utterly ruined; its inhabitants were all starving. The famine throughout the obedient Netherlands was such as had not been known for a century. The whole country had been picked bare by the troops, and the plough was not put into the ground. Deputations were constantly with him from Bruges, Dendermonde, Bois-le-Duc, Brussels, Antwerp, Nymegen, proving to him by the most palpable evidence that the whole population of those cities had almost literally nothing to eat. He had nothing, however, but exhortations to patience to feed them

<sup>1</sup> Bruce's „Leyc. Correspond.' 199, 31 March, 1586.

<sup>2</sup> 10 April  
<sup>3</sup> Parma to Philip II., 9 May, 1586. (Arch. de Sim. MS.)

<sup>4</sup> Ibid.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid.

1 Ibid.

2 Ibid.

withal. He was left without a groat even to save his soldiers from starving, and he wildly and bitterly, day after day, implored his sovereign for aid. 1 These pictures are not the sketches of a historian striving for effect, but literal transcripts from the most secret revelations of the Prince himself to his sovereign. On the other hand, although Leicester's complaints of the destitution of the English troops in the republic were almost as bitter, yet the condition of the United Provinces was comparatively healthy. Trade, external and internal, was increasing daily. Distant commercial and military expeditions were fitted out, manufactures were prosperous, and the war of independence was gradually becoming—strange to say—a source of prosperity to the new commonwealth.

Philip—being now less alarmed than his nephew concerning French affairs, and not feeling so keenly the misery of the obedient Provinces, or the wants of the Spanish army—sent to Alexander six hundred thousand ducats by way of Genoa. In the letter submitted by his secretary recording this remittance, the King made, however, a characteristic marginal note:—„See if it will not be as well to tell him something concerning the two hundred thousand ducats to be deducted for Mucio, for fear of more mischief, if the Prince should expect the whole six hundred thousand.” 2

Accordingly Mucio got the two hundred thousand. One-third of the meagre supply destined for the relief of the King's starving and valiant little army in the Netherlands was cut off to go into the pockets of the intriguing Duke of Guise. „We must keep the French,”

said Philip, „in a state of confusion at home, and feed their civil war. We must not allow them to come to a general peace, which would be destruction for the Catholics. I know you will put a good face on the matter; and, after all, 'tis in the interest of the Netherlands. Moreover, the money shall be immediately refunded.” 1

Alexander was more likely to make a wry face, notwithstanding his views of the necessity of fomenting the rebellion against the House of Valois. Certainly if a monarch intended to conquer such countries as France, England, and Holland, without stirring from his easy chair in the Escorial, it would have been at least as well—so Alexander thought—to invest a little more capital in the speculation. No monarch ever dreamed of arriving at universal empire with less personal fatigue or exposure, or at a cheaper rate, than did Philip II. His only fatigue was at his writing-table. But even here his merit was of a subordinate description. He sat a great while at a time,—he had a genius for sitting,—but he now wrote few letters himself. A dozen words or so, scrawled in hieroglyphics at the top, bottom, or along the margin of the interminable despatches of his secretaries, contained the suggestions, more or less luminous, which arose in his mind concerning public affairs. But he held firmly to his purpose. He had devoted his life to the extermination of Protestantism, to the conquest of France and England, to the subjugation of Holland. These were vast schemes. A king who should succeed in such enterprises, by his personal courage and genius, at the head of his armies, or by consummate diplomacy, or by a masterly system of finance—husbanding and concentrating the resources of his almost boundless realms—

1 Letters of Parma to Philip II., 19 April, 1586; 9 May, 1586; 27 May, 1586, *et al.* (Arch. de Sim. MSS.)

2 „Mirad si es bien decirle algo de los 200<sup>m</sup> ducados para Mucio, en caso que sean menester—porque despues no se haga mas de mal, esperando todo 600<sup>m</sup>.” Philip II. to Parma, 14 May, 1586. (Arch. de Sim. MS.)

1 „Sustentando los (franceses) el ruido en su casa, y no les dejando conseguir la paz general, que no ha de ser sino destruccion de los Catolicos,” &c. (Ibid.)



might be in truth commended for capacity. Hitherto, however, Philip's triumph had seemed problematical; and perhaps something more would be necessary than letters to Parma, and paltry remittances to Mucio, notwithstanding Alexander's splendid but local victories in Flanders.

Parma, although in reality almost at bay, concealed his despair, and accomplished wonders in the field. The military events during the spring and summer of 1586 will be sketched in a subsequent chapter. For the present it is necessary to combine into a complete whole the subterranean negotiations between Brussels and England.

Much to his surprise and gratification, Parma found that the peace-party were not inclined to change their views in consequence of the triumphs of Drake. He soon informed the King that—according to Champagny and Bodman—the Lord Treasurer, the Comptroller, Lord Cobham, and Sir Christopher Hatton, were more pacific than they had ever been. These four were represented by Grafigni as secretly in league against Leicester and Walsingham, and very anxious to bring about a reconciliation between the crowns of England and Spain. 1 The merchant-diplomatist, according to his own statement, was expressly sent by Queen Elizabeth to the Prince of Parma, although without letter of credence or signed instructions, but with the full knowledge and approbation of the four counsellors just mentioned. He assured Alexander that the Queen and the majority of her council felt a strong desire for peace, and had *manifested much repentance for what had been done*. 2 They had explained their proceedings by the necessity of self-defence. They

had avowed—in case they should be made sure of peace—that they should, not with reluctance and against their will, but, on the contrary, with the utmost alacrity and at once, surrender to the King of Spain the territory which they possessed in the Netherlands, and especially the fortified towns in Holland and Zeeland; 1 for the English object had never been conquest. Parma had also been informed of the Queen's strong desire that he should be employed as negotiator, on account of her great confidence in his sincerity. They had expressed much satisfaction on hearing that he was about to send an agent to England, and had protested themselves rejoiced at Drake's triumphs, only because of their hope that a peace with Spain would thus be rendered the easier of accomplishment. They were much afraid, according to Grafigni, of Philip's power, and dreaded a Spanish invasion of their country, in conjunction with the Pope. They were now extremely anxious that Parma—as he himself informed the King—should send an agent of good capacity, in great secrecy, to England. The Comptroller had said that he had pledged himself to such a result, and, if it failed, that they would probably cut off his head. 2 The four counsellors were excessively solicitous for the negotiation, and each of them was expecting to gain favour by advancing it to the best of his ability.

Parma hinted at the possibility that all these professions were false, and that the English were only intending to keep the King from the contemplated invasion. At the same time he drew Philip's attention to *the fact that Burghley and his party had most evidently been doing everything in their power to obstruct*

1 Parma to Philip II., 11 June, 1586. (Arch. de Sim. MS.)

2 „La inclinacion y desco que tiene la Reyna y la mayor parte de su consejo de la paz, y de acomodarse con V. M., y del arrepentimiento que muestran de lo hecho.” (Ibid.)

1 „Antes, se allanran en volver y entregar a V. M<sup>d</sup>. lo que ocupan y poseen y en particular las fuerzas de Hollanda y Zelanda,” &c. (Ibid.)

2 „Que le corten la cabeza.” Parma to Philip II., MS. just cited.

*Leicester's progress in the Netherlands, and to keep back the reinforcements of troops and money which he so much required.* 1

No doubt these communications of Parma to the King were made upon the faith of an agent not over-scrupulous, and of no elevated or recognised rank in diplomacy. It must be borne in mind, however, that he had been made use of by both parties; perhaps because it would be easy to throw off and discredit him whenever such a step should be convenient; and that, on the other hand, coming fresh from Burghley and the rest into the presence of the keen-eyed Farnese, he would hardly invent for his employer a budget of falsehoods. That man must have been a subtle negotiator who could outwit such statesmen as Burghley and the other counsellors of Elizabeth, and a bold one who could dare to trifle on a momentous occasion with Alexander of Parma.

Leicester thought Burghley very much his friend, and so thought Davison and Heneage; and the Lord-Treasurer had, in truth, stood stoutly by the Earl in the affair of the absolute governorship; —, „a matter more severe and cumbersome to him and others,” said Burghley, „than any whatsoever since he was a counsellor.” 2 But there is no doubt that these negotiations were going forward all the spring and summer, that they were most detrimental to Leicester's success, and that they were kept—so far as it was possible—a profound secret from him, from Walsingham, and from the States-General. Nothing was told them except what their own astuteness had discovered beforehand; and the game of the counsellors—so far as their attitude towards Leicester and Walsingham was concerned—seems both disingenuous and impolitic.

Parma, it was to be feared, was more than a match for the English governor-general in the field; and it was certainly hopeless for poor old Comptroller Croft, even though backed by the sagacious Burghley, to accomplish so great an amount of dissimulation in a year as the Spanish cabinet, without effort, could compass in a week. Nor were they attempting to do so. It is probable that England was acting towards Philip in much better faith than he deserved, or than Parma believed; but it is hardly to be wondered at that Leicester should think himself injured by being kept perpetually in the dark.

Elizabeth was very impatient at not receiving direct letters from Parma, and her anxiety on the subject explains much of her caprice during the quarrel about the governor-generalship. Many persons in the Netherlands thought those violent scenes a farce, and a farce that had been arranged with Leicester beforehand. In this they were mistaken; for an examination of the secret correspondence of the period reveals the motives—which to contemporaries were hidden—of many strange transactions. The Queen was, no doubt, extremely anxious, and with cause, at the tempest slowly gathering over her head; but the more the dangers thickened, the more was her own official language to those in high places befitting the sovereign of England.

She expressed her surprise to Farnese that he had not written to her on the subject of the Gragnani and Bodman affair. The first, she said, was justified in all which he had narrated, save in assertion that she had sent him. The other had not obtained audience, because he had not come provided with any credentials, direct or indirect. Having now understood from Andrea de Loo and the Seigneur de Champagny that Parma had the power to conclude a peace, which he seemed very much to desire, she observed that it was not

1 „Que le corten la cabeza.” Parma to Philip II., MS. just cited.

2 „Leyc. Corresp.” 269, <sup>18</sup>/<sub>53</sub> May, 1586.

necessary for him to be so chary in explaining the basis of the proposed negotiations. It was better to enter into a straightforward path, than by ambiguous words to spin out to great length matters which princes should at once conclude. 1

„Do not suppose,” said the Queen, „that I am seeking what belongs to others. God forbid. I seek only that which is mine own. But be sure that I will take good heed of the sword which threatens me with destruction, nor think that I am so craven-spirited as to endure a wrong, or to place myself at the mercy of my enemy. Every week I see advertisements and letters from Spain that this year shall witness the downfall of England; for the Spaniards—like the hunter who divided, with great liberality, among his friends the body and limbs of the wolf, before it had been killed—have partitioned this kingdom and that of Ireland before the conquest has been effected. But my royal heart is no whit appalled by such threats. 2 I trust, with the help of the Divine hand—which has thus far miraculously preserved me—to smite all these braggart powers into the dust, and to preserve my honour, and the kingdoms which He has given me for my heritage.

„Nevertheless, if you have authority to enter upon and to conclude this negotiation, you will find my ears open to hear your propositions, and I tell you further, if a peace is to be made, that I wish you to be the mediator thereof. Such is the affection I bear you, notwithstanding that some letters, written by your own hand, might easily have effaced such sentiments from my mind.” 3

Soon afterwards, Bodman was again

despatched to England, Grafigni being already there. He was provided with unsigned instructions, according to which he was to say that the Prince, having heard of the Queen's good intentions had despatched him and Grafigni to her court. They were to listen to any suggestions made by the Queen to her ministers; but they were to do nothing but listen. If the counsellors should enter into their grievances against his Majesty, and ask for explanations, the agents were to say that they had no authority or instructions to speak for so great and Christian a monarch. Thus they were to cut the thread of any such discourse, or any other observations not to the purpose. 1

Silence, in short, was recommended, first and last, as the one great business of their mission; and it was unlucky that men whose talent for taciturnity was thus signally relied upon should be somewhat remarkable for loquacity. Grafigni was also the bearer of a letter from Alexander to the Queen—of which Bodman received a copy—but it was strictly enjoined upon them to keep the letter, their instructions, and the objects of their journey, a secret from all the world. 2

The letter of the Prince consisted mainly of complimentary flourishes. He had heard, he said, all that Agostino Grafigni had communicated, and he now begged her Majesty to let him understand the course which it was proper to take; assuring her of his gratitude for her good opinion touching his sincerity, and his desire to save the effusion of blood, and so on; concluding of course with expressions of most profound consideration and devotion. 3

1 Queen Elizabeth to Prince of Parma, without date. (Arch. de Sim. MS.)

2 „Non resta che'l mio cuore regale sia punto sbigottito da queste minaccie,” &c. (Ib.)

3 MS. just cited.

1 Instruzione embiada á Gulielmo Bodeman, 20 June, 1586. (Arch. de Sim. MS.) „Cortando el hilo a la platca y discursos como atos dolos demas quenohacen a proposito,” &c. 2 Ibid.

3 Parma to Queen Elizabeth, 20 June, 1586. (Arch. de Sim. MS.)



Early in July Bodman arrived in London. He found Grafigni in very low spirits. He had been with Lord Cobham, and was much disappointed with his reception, for Cobham—angry that Grafigni had brought no commission from the King—had refused to receive Parma's letter to the Queen, and had expressed annoyance that Bodman should be employed on this mission, having heard that he was very ill-tempered and passionate. The same evening, he had been sent for by Lord Burghley—who had accepted the letter for her Majesty without saving a word—and on the following morning, he had been taken to task by several counsellors, on the ground that the Prince, in that communication, had stated that the Queen had expressed a desire for peace.<sup>1</sup>

It has just been shown that there was no such intimation at all in the letter; but as neither Grafigni nor Bodman had read the epistle itself, but only the copy furnished them, they could merely say that such an assertion, if made by the Prince, had been founded on no statement of theirs. Bodman consoled his colleague, as well as he could, by assurances that when the letter was fairly produced, their vindication would be complete, and Grafigni, upon that point, was comforted. He was, however, very doleful in general, and complained bitterly of Burghley and the other English counsellors. He said that they had forced him, against his will, to make this journey to Brussels, that they had offered him presents, that they would leave him no rest in his own house, but had made him neglect all his private business, and caused him a great loss of time and money, in order that he might serve them. They had manifested the strongest desire that Parma should open this communication, and had led

him to expect a very large recompense for his share in the transaction. „And now,” said Grafigni to his colleague, with great bitterness, „I find no faith nor honour in them at all. They don't keep their word, and every one of them is trying to slide out of the very business, in which each was but the other day striving to outrival the other, in order that it might be brought to a satisfactory conclusion.”<sup>1</sup>

After exploding in this way to Bodman, he went back to Cobham, and protested, with angry vehemence, that Parma had never written such a word to the Queen, and that so it would prove, if the letter were produced.

Next day, Bodman was sent for to Greenwich, where her Majesty was, as usual, residing. A secret pavilion was indicated to him, where he was to stay until sunset. When that time arrived, Lord Cobham's secretary came with great mystery, and begged the emissary to follow him, but at a considerable distance, towards the apartments of Lord Burghley in the palace. Arriving there, they found the Lord-Treasurer accompanied by Cobham and Croft. Burghley, instantly opened the interview by a defence of the Queen's policy in sending troops to the Netherlands, and in espousing their cause, and then the conversation proceeded to the immediate matter in hand.<sup>2</sup>

Bodman (after listening respectfully to the Lord-Treasurer's observations).—„His Highness has, however, been extremely surprised that my Lord Leicester should take an oath as governor-general of the King's Provinces. He is shocked likewise by the great demonstrations of hostility on the part of her Majesty.”

Burghley.—„The oath was indispen-

<sup>1</sup> Relacion de lo sucedido en Inglaterra a G. Bodeman con los señores de aque consejo,' &c., 30 July, 1586.

<sup>1</sup> „No hallaba fé, palabra, ni honra entre ellos, porque cada uno queria salirse afuera que de antes estribaban quien primero lo podria acabar.” Relacion de lo sucedido,' &c. (Arch. de Sim. MS. last cited.)

<sup>2</sup> Ibid.

sable. The Queen was obliged to tolerate the step on account of the great urgency of the States to have a head. But her Majesty has commanded us to meet you on this occasion, in order to hear what you have to communicate on the part of the Prince of Parma."

Bodman (after a profusion of complimentary phrases).—,"I have no commission to say anything. I am only instructed to listen to anything that may be said to me, and that her Majesty may be pleased to command."

Burghley.—,"Tis very discreet to begin thus. But time is pressing, and it is necessary to be brief. We beg you therefore to communicate, without further preface, that which you have been charged to say."

Bodman.—,"I can only repeat to your Lordship, that I have been charged to say nothing."

After this Barmecide feast of diplomacy, to partake of which it seemed hardly necessary that the guests should have previously attired themselves in such garments of mystery, the parties separated for the night. 1

In spite of their care, it would seem that the Argus-eyed Walsingham had been able to see after sunset; for, the next evening—after Bodman had been introduced with the same precautions to the same company, in the same place—Burghley, before a word had been spoken, sent for Sir Francis. 2

Bodman was profoundly astonished, for he had been expressly informed that Walsingham was to know nothing of the transaction. 3 The Secretary of State could not so easily be outwitted; however, and he was soon seated at the table, surveying the scene, with his grave melancholy eyes, which had looked quite through the whole paltry intrigue.

Burghley.—,"Her Majesty has com-

manded us to assemble together, in order that, in my presence, it may be made clear that she did not commence this negotiation. Let Grafigni be summoned."

Grafigni immediately made his appearance.

Burghley.—,"You will please to explain how you came to enter into this business."

Grafigni.—,"The first time I went to the States, it was on my private affairs; I had no order from any one to treat with the Prince of Parma. His Highness having accidentally heard, however, that I resided in England, expressed a wish to see me. I had an interview with the Prince. I told him, out of my own head, that the Queen had a strong inclination to hear propositions of peace, and that—as some of her counsellors were of the same opinion—I believed that if his Highness should send a negotiator, some good would be effected. The Prince replied that he felt by no means sure of such a result; but that, if I should come back from England, sent by the Queen or her council, he would then despatch a person with a commission to treat of peace. This statement, together with other matters that had passed between us, was afterwards drawn up in writing by command of his Highness."

Burghley.—,"Who bade you say, after your second return to Brussels, that you came on the part of the Queen? For you well know that her Majesty did not send you."

Grafigni.—,"I never said so. I stated that my Lord Cobham had set down in writing what I was to say to the Prince of Parma. It will never appear that I represented the Queen as desiring peace. I said that her Majesty *would lend her ears to peace*. Bodman knows this too; and he has a copy of the letter of his Highness."

Walsingham to Bodman.—,"Have you the copy still?"

Bodman.—,"Yes, Mr. Secretary."

Walsingham.—,"Please to produce it,

1, *Relacion de lo sucedido*, &c. MS. last cited.

2 *Ibid*.

3 *Ibid*.

in order that this matter may be sifted to the bottom."

Bodman.—„I supplicate your Lordships to pardon me, but indeed that cannot be. My instructions forbid my showing the letter."

Walsingham (rising).—„I will forthwith go to her Majesty, and fetch the original." A pause. Mr. Secretary returns in a few minutes, having obtained the document, which the Queen, up to that time, had kept by her, without showing it to any one. 1

Walsingham (after reading the letter attentively, and aloud).—„There is not such a word, as that her Majesty is desirous of peace, in the whole paper." 2

Burghley (taking the letter, and slowly construing it out of Italian into English).—„It would seem that his Highness hath written this, assuming that the Signor Grafigni came from the Queen, although he had received his instructions from my Lord Cobham. It is plain, however, that the negotiation was commenced accidentally."

Comptroller Croft (nervously, and with the air of a man fearful of getting into trouble).—„You know very well, Mr. Bodman, that my servant came to Dunkirk only to buy and truck away horses; and that you then, by chance, entered into talk with him about the best means of procuring a peace between the two kingdoms. My servant told you of the good feeling that prevailed in England. You promised to write on the subject to the Prince, and I immediately informed the Lord-Treasurer of the whole transaction." 3

Burghley.—„That is quite true."

Croft.—„My servant subsequently

returned to the Provinces in order to learn what the Prince might have said on the subject."

Bodman (with immense politeness, 1 but very decidedly).—„Pardon me, Mr. Comptroller; but, in this matter, I must speak the truth, even if the honour and life of my father were on the issue. I declare that your servant Norris came to me, directly commissioned for that purpose by yourself, and informed me from you, and upon your authority, that if I would solicit the Prince of Parma to send a secret agent to England, a peace would be at once negotiated. Your servant entreated me to go to his Highness at Brussels. I refused, but agreed to consider the proposition. After the lapse of several days; the servant returned to make further enquiries. I told him that the Prince had come to no decision. Norris continued to press the matter. I excused myself. He then solicited and obtained from me a letter of introduction to De Loo, the secretary of his Highness. Armed with this, he went to Brussels and had an interview—as I found, four days later—with the Prince. In consequence of the representations of Norris, those of Signor Grafigni, and those by way of Antwerp, his Highness determined to send me to England."

Burghley to Croft.—„Did you order your servant to speak with Andrea de Loo?"

Croft.—„I cannot deny it."

Burghley.—„The fellow 2 seems to have travelled a good way out of his commission. His master sends him to buy horses, and he commences a peace-negotiation between two kingdoms. It would be well he were chastised. As regards the Antwerp matter, too, we have had many letters, and I have seen one from the Seigneur de Cham-

1 ‚Relacion de lo sucedido,' &c. MS. before cited.

2 ‚Relacion,' &c. Compare Bruce's ‚Leyc. Corresp. 321,  $\frac{24 \text{ June}}{4 \text{ July}}$  1586; and 327,

$\frac{30 \text{ June}}{16 \text{ July}}$  1586,

3 ‚Relacion,' &c. MS.

1 „Con buena crianza," &c. ‚Relacion,' &c. MS.

2 „Mozo." (Ibid.



pagny, to the same effect as that of all the rest."

Walsingham.—,"I see not to what end his Highness of Parma hath sent Mr. Bodman hither. The Prince avows that he hath no commission from Spain."

Bodman.—,"His Highness was anxious to know what was her Majesty's pleasure. So soon as that should be known, the Prince could obtain ample authority. He would never have proceeded so far without meaning a good end."

Walsingham.—,"Very like. I dare say that his Highness will obtain the commission. Meantime as Prince of Parma, he writes these letters, and assists his sovereign perhaps more than he doth ourselves." 1

Here the interview terminated. A few days later, Bodman had another conversation with Burghley and Cobham.

14th July, Reluctantly, at their urgent request, he set down in writing all that he had said concerning his mission. The Lord Treasurer said that the Queen and her counsellors were „ready to embrace peace when it was treated of sincerely." Meantime the Queen had learned that the Prince had been sending letters to the cautionary towns in Holland and Zeeland, stating that her Majesty was about to surrender them to the king of Spain. These were tricks to make mischief, and were very detrimental to the Queen.

Bodman replied that these were merely the idle stories of quidnuncs; and that the Prince and all his counsellors were dealing with the utmost sincerity.

Burghley answered that he had intercepted the very letters, and had them in his possession.

A week afterwards, Bodman saw Walsingham alone, and was informed by

20th July, him that the Queen had written an answer to Parma's letter, and that negotiations for the future were to be carried on in the

usual form, or not at all. Walsingham, having thus got the better of his rivals, and dived below their mines, dismissed the agent with brief courtesy. Afterwards the discomfited Mr. Comptroller wished a private interview with Bodman. Bodman refused to speak with him except in presence of Lord Cobham. This Croft refused. In the same way Bodman contrived to get rid, as he said, of Lord Burghley and Lord Cobham, declining to speak with either of them alone. Soon afterwards he returned to the Provinces. 1

The Queen's letter to Parma was somewhat caustic. It was obviously composed through the inspiration of Walsingham rather than that of Burghley. The letter brought by a certain Grafigni and a certain Bodman, she said, was a very strange one, and written under a delusion. It was a very grave error that, in her name, without her knowledge, contrary to her disposition, and to the prejudice of her honour, such a person as this Grafigni, or any one like him, should have the audacity to commence such a business, as if she had by messages to the Prince sought a treaty with his King, who had so often returned evil for her good. Grafigni, after representing the contrary to his Highness, had now denied in presence of her counsellors having received any commission from the Queen. She also briefly gave the result of Bodman's interviews with Burghley and the others, just narrated. That agent had intimated that Parma would procure authority to treat for peace, if assured that the Queen would lend her ear to any propositions.

She replied by referring to her published declarations, as showing her

1 'Relacion de lo sucedido,' &c. MS. A similar account, with less detail, of these secret proceedings is in the State Paper Office, in the Holland Correspondence, entitled 'A declaration of the manner of treating of peace underhand to the Earl of Leicester.' MS. A<sup>o</sup> 1586.

1 'Relacion,' &c. MS.

powerful motives for interfering in these affairs. It was her purpose to save her own realm, and to rescue her ancient neighbours from misery and from slavery. To this end she should still direct her actions, notwithstanding the sinister rumours which had been spread that she was inclined to peace before providing for the security and liberty of her allies. She was determined never to separate their cause from her own. Propositions tending to the security of herself and of her neighbours would always be favourably received. 1

Parma, on his part, informed his master that there could be no doubt that the Queen and the majority of her council abhorred the war, and that already much had been gained by the fictitious negotiation. Lord-Treasurer Burghley had been interposing endless delays and difficulties in the way of every measure proposed for the relief of Lord Leicester, and the assistance rendered him had been most lukewarm. Meantime the Prince had been able, he said, to achieve much success in the field, and the English had done nothing to prevent it. Since the return of Grafigni and Bodman, however, it was obvious that the English government had disowned these noncommittal diplomatists. The  
4th August, 1586.

whole negotiation and all the negotiators were now discredited, but there was no doubt that there had been a strong desire to treat, and great disappointment at the result. Grafigni and Andrea de Loo had been publishing everywhere in Antwerp that England would consider the peace as made, so soon as his Majesty should be willing to accept any propositions. 2

1 Carta descifrada de la Reyna de Inglaterra a Principe de Parma, 8 July. 1586. (Arch. de Sim. MS.)

A copy is also—written in the Italian language—in the S.P. Office, Flanders Correspondence MS.

2 Parma to Philip II. 4 Aug. 1586. (Arch. de Sim. MS.)

His Majesty, meanwhile, sat in his cabinet, without the slightest intention of making or accepting any propositions save those that were impossible. He smiled benignantly at his nephew's dissimulation and at the good results which it had already produced. He approved of gaining time, he said, by fictitious negotiations and by the use of a mercantile agent; for, no doubt, such a course would prevent the proper succours from being sent to the Earl of Leicester. If the English would hand over to him the cautionary towns held by them in Holland and Zeeland, promise no longer to infest the seas, the Indies, and the Isles, with their corsairs, and guarantee the complete obedience to their King and submission to the holy Catholic Church of the rebellious Provinces, perhaps something might be done with them; but, on the whole, he was inclined to think that they had been influenced by knavish and deceitful motives from the beginning.

1586. He enjoined it upon Parma, therefore, to proceed with equal knavery—taking care, however, not to injure his reputation—and to enter into negotiations wherever occasion might serve, in order to put the English off their guard and to keep back the reinforcements so imperatively required by Leicester. 1

And the reinforcements were indeed kept back. Had Burghley and Croft been in the pay of Philip II. they could hardly have served him better than they had been doing by the course pursued. Here then is the explanation of the shortcomings of the English government towards Leicester and the States during the memorable spring and summer of 1586. No money, no soldiers, when most important operations in the field were required. The first general of the age was to be opposed by a man who had

1 Philip II. to Parma, 18 July, 1586. (Arch. de Sim. MS.)

certainly never gained many laurels as a military chieftain, but who was brave and confident, and who, had he been faithfully supported by the government which sent him to the Netherlands, would have had his antagonist at a great disadvantage. Alexander had scarcely eight thousand effective men. Famine, pestilence, poverty, mutiny, beset and almost paralyzed him. Language could not exaggerate the absolute destitution of the country. Only miracles could save the King's cause, as Farnese repeatedly observed. A sharp vigorous campaign, heartily carried on against him by Leicester and Hohenlo, with plenty of troops and money at command, would have brought the heroic champion of Catholicism to the ground. He was hemmed in upon all sides; he was cut off from the sea; he stood as it were in a narrowing circle, surrounded by increasing dangers. His own veterans, maddened by misery, stung by their King's ingratitude, naked, starving, ferocious, were turning against him. Mucio, like his evil genius, was spirit-ing away his supplies just as they were reaching his hands; a threatening tempest seemed rolling up from France; the whole population of the Provinces which he had „reconciled”—a million of paupers—were crying to him for bread; great commercial cities, suddenly blasted and converted into dens of thieves and beggars, were cursing the royal author of their ruin, and uttering wild threats against his viceroy; there seemed in truth, nothing left for Alexander but to plunge headlong into destruction, when, lo! Mr. Comptroller Croft, advancing out of the clouds, like a propitious divinity, disguised in the garb of a foe—and the scene was changed.

The feeble old man, with his shuffling, horse-trucking servant, ex-spy of Monsieur, had accomplished more work for Philip and Alexander than many regiments of Spaniards and Walloons could have done. The arm of Leicester

was paralyzed upon the very threshold of success. The picture of these palace-intrigues has been presented with minute elaboration, because, however petty and barren in appearance, they were in reality prolific of grave results. A series of victories by Parma was substituted for the possible triumphs of Elizabeth and the States.

The dissimulation of the Spanish court was fathomless. The secret correspondence of the times reveals to us that its only purpose was to deceive the Queen and her counsellors, and to gain time to prepare the grand invasion of England and subjugation of Holland—that double purpose which Philip could only abandon with life. There was never a thought, on his part, of honest negotiation. On the other hand, the Queen was sincere; Burghley and Hatton and Cobham were sincere; Groft was sincere, so far as Spain was concerned. At least they had been sincere. In the private and doleful dialogues between Bodman and Grafigni which we have just been overhearing, these intriguers spoke the truth, for they could have no wish to deceive each other, and no fear of eaves-droppers not to be born till centuries afterwards. These conversations have revealed to us that the Lord-Treasurer and three of his colleagues had been secretly doing their best to cripple Leicester, to stop the supplies for the Netherlands, and to patch up a hurried and unsatisfactory, if not a disgraceful peace; and this, with the concurrence of her Majesty. After their plots had been discovered by the vigilant Secretary of State, there was a disposition to discredit the humbler instruments in the cabal. Elizabeth was not desirous of peace. Far from it. She was qualmish at the very suggestion. Dire was her wrath against Bodman, De Loo, Grafigni, and the rest, at their misrepresentations on the subject. But she would „lend her ear.” And that royal ear was lent, and almost fatal was the distilment poured



into its porches. The pith and marrow of the great Netherland enterprise was sapped by the slow poison of the ill-timed negotiation. The fruit of Drake's splendid triumphs in America was blighted by it. The stout heart of the vainglorious but courageous Leicester was sickened by it, while meantime, the maturing of the great armada-scheme, by which the destruction of England was to be accomplished, was furthered, through the unlimited procrastination so precious to the heart of Philip.

Fortunately the subtle Walsingham was there upon the watch to administer the remedy before it was quite too late; and to him England and the Netherlands were under lasting obligations. While Alexander and Philip suspected a purpose on the part of the English government to deceive them, they could not help observing that the Earl of Leicester was both deserted and deceived. Yet it had been impossible for the peace-party in the government wholly to conceal their designs, when such prating fellows as Grafigni and De Loo were employed in what was intended to be a secret negotiation. In vain did the friends of Leicester in the Netherlands endeavour to account for the neglect with which he was treated, and for the destitution of his army. Hopelessly did they attempt to counteract those "advertisements of most fearful instance," as Richard Cavendish expressed himself, which were circulating everywhere. 1

Thanks to the babbling of the very men whose chief instructions had been to hold their tongues and to listen with all their ears, the secret negotiations between Parma and the English counsellors became the town talk at Antwerp, the Hague, Amsterdam, Brussels, London. It is true that it was impossible to know what was actually said and done; but that there was something doing, concerning which Leicester was not to be informed, was certain. Grafigni, during one of his visits to the obedient Provinces, brought a brace of greyhounds and a couple of horses from England, as a present to Alexander, 1 and he perpetually went about bragging to every one of important negotiations which he was conducting, and of his intimacy with great personages in both countries. Leicester, on the other hand, was kept in the dark. To him Grafigni made no communications, but he once sent him a dish of plums, "which," said the Earl with superfluous energy, "I will boldly say to you, by the living God, is all that I have ever had since I came into these countries." 2 When it is remembered that Leicester had spent many thousand pounds in the Netherland cause, 3 that he had deeply mortgaged his property in order to provide more funds, that he had never received a penny of salary from the Queen, 4 that

*can easily conclude for themselves, how, with least mischief, to become miserable again."*

1, *Leyc. Corresp.* 289,  $\frac{6}{16}$  June, 1586.

2 *Ibid.* 246,  $\frac{28 \text{ April}}{8 \text{ May}}$ , 1586.

3 "I myself have prested," wrote the Earl to Burghley, "above 3000*l.* among our men here since I came, and yet what need they be in, even when there is most need of service, all the world here doth see. Here hath been as lewd and dangerous mutinies as I cannot but grieve to think on it," &c. March 29, 1586. (S. P. Office MS.)

4 On the 14 May, 1586, the States-General resolved, in consequence of repeated applications on behalf of Leicester, for money for his own personal expenses by way of salary, that, although the Queen had expressly agreed, by the contract with the

1 Cavendish. to Burghley, 18 March, 1586. (S. P. Office MS.)

"Champaigny doth not spare most liberally to bruit abroad," said Cavendish, "that he hath in his hands the conditions of peace offered by her Majesty unto the King his master, and that it is in his power to conclude at pleasure, wherein he affirmeth that one or two of the chiefest, counsellors about her are to handle the cause with him. This fearful and mischievous plot cannot but prove the root of great ruin; for this people, beaten with tedious, long, and sharp miseries, is made wonderful provident and suspicious; saying, that, if they would suffer the Spanish yoke anew, they need no mediator, for they

his soldiers were „ragged and torn like rogues pity to see them,” 1 and were left without the means of supporting life; that he had been neglected, deceived, humiliated, until he was forced to describe himself as a „forlorn man set upon a forlorn hope,” 2 it must be conceded that Grafigni's present of a dish of plums could hardly be sufficient to make him very happy.

From time to time he was enlightened by Sir Francis, who occasionally forced his adversaries' hand, and who always faithfully informed the Earl of everything he could discover. „We are

States, to pay the salary of the governor-general and other military chiefs, they would themselves very willingly provide for his salary and maintenance, according to his petition. They previously requested Mr. Killigrew, however, to furnish them information as to how much monthly allowance her Majesty was then paying the lieutenant-general.

On the 16 May, 1586, the committee of the States appointed to confer with Mr. Killigrew concerning the amount of monthly allowance paid to the Earl of Leicester, reported that Mr. Killigrew had openly and roundly declared that his Excellency, up to that hour, had never received one stiver of salary, and that his Excellency had told him so, on the word of a prince. „Dezelve Heere Killigrew hen opentlyk ende rondelyk heeft vercleert dat Zyne Ex<sup>te</sup> tot op deze ure toe nyet eenen styver voer tractement hadde ontfangen van heere Ma<sup>t</sup>, ende dat dezelve Zyne Ex<sup>te</sup> hem hadde geseyt en parole de prince, dat van zyn tractement by heere Ma<sup>t</sup>. nyet een woort was gesproken.” „Resolutien van de Staten-generaal, a<sup>o</sup> 1586.” Hague Archives MS.

It was subsequently voted by the States-General (4 July, 1586) that the Earl should receive a salary of 60,000 florins yearly, to be drawn from the general duties upon cloth; and that, in case her Majesty should continue in her refusal to contribute to his salary, the annual allowance furnished by the States should be increased to 100,000 florins.

Ten thousand pounds sterling a year in the sixteenth century was certainly a princely salary, and it was hardly becoming in the Queen, who refused to pay her own favourite „a stiver,” to censure any shortcomings of the States, who proved themselves so much more liberal than herself. „Resolutien,” &c. *ubi sup.*

1 ,Leyc. Corresp.' 285,  $\frac{31 \text{ May}}{10 \text{ June}}$ , 1586.

2 ,Leyc. Corresp.' 290,  $\frac{6}{16}$  June, 1586.

so greedy of a peace, in respect of the charges of the wars,” he wrote in April, „as in the procuring thereof we weigh neither honour nor safety. Somewhat here is a-dealing underhand, wherein there is great care taken that I should not be made acquainted withall.” 1 But with all their great care, the conspirators, at it has been seen, were sometimes outwitted by the Secretary, and, when put to the blush, were forced to take him into half-confidence. „Your Lordship may see,” he wrote, after getting possession of Parma's letter to the Queen, and unravelling Croft's intrigues, „what effects are wrought by such weak ministers. *They that have been the employers of them are ashamed of the matter.*” 2

Unutterable was the amazement, as we have seen, of Bodman and Grafigni when they had suddenly found themselves confronted in Burghley's private apartments in Greenwich Palace, whither they had been conducted so mysteriously after dark from the secret pavilion—by the grave Secretary of State, whom they had been so anxious to deceive; and great was the embarrassment of Croft and Cobham, and even of the imperishable Burghley.

And thus patiently did Walsingham pick his course, plummet in hand, through the mists and along the quicksands, and faithfully did he hold out signals to his comrade embarked on the same dangerous voyage. As for the Earl himself, he was shocked at the short-sighted policy of his mistress, mortified by the neglect to which he was exposed, disappointed in his ambitious schemes. Vehemently and judiciously he insisted upon the necessity of vigorous field-operations throughout the spring and summer thus frittered away in

1 Ibid. 223,  $\frac{11}{21}$  April, 1586.

2 Ibid. 321,  $\frac{24 \text{ June}}{+ \text{ July}}$ , 1586.

frivolous negotiations. He was for peace, if a lasting and honourable peace could be procured; but he insisted that the only road to such a result was through a „good sharp war.”<sup>1</sup> His troops were mutinous for want of pay, so that he had been obliged to have a few of them executed, although he protested that he would have „rather gone a thousand miles a-foot”<sup>2</sup> than have done so; and he was crippled by his government at exactly the time when his great adversary's condition was most forlorn. Was it strange that the proud Earl should be fretting his heart away when such golden chances were eluding his grasp? He would „creep upon the ground,” he said, „as far as his hands and knees would carry him, to have a good peace for her Majesty, but his care was to have a peace indeed, and not a show of it.”<sup>3</sup> It was the cue of Holland and England to fight before they could expect to deal upon favourable terms with their enemy. He was quick enough to see that his false colleagues at home were playing into the enemy's hands. Victory was what was wanted; victory the Earl pledged himself, if properly seconded, to obtain; and, braggart though he was, it is by no means impossible that he might have redeemed his pledge. „If her Majesty will use her advantage,” he said, „she shall bring the King, and specially this Prince of Parma, to seek peace in other sort than by way of merchants.”<sup>4</sup> Of courage and confidence the governor had no lack. Whether he was capable of outgeneralling Alexander Farnese or no, will be better seen, perhaps, in subsequent chapters; but there is no doubt that he was reasonable enough

in thinking, at that juncture, that a hard campaign rather than a „merchant's brokerage”<sup>1</sup> was required to obtain an honourable peace. Lofty, indeed, was the scorn of the aristocratic Leicester that „merchants and pedlars should be paltering in so weighty a cause,”<sup>2</sup> and daring to send him a dish of plums when he was hoping half-a-dozen regiments from the Queen; and a sorry business, in truth, the pedlars had made of it.

Never had there been a more delusive diplomacy, and it was natural that the lieutenant-general abroad and the statesman at home should be sad and indignant, seeing England drifting to utter shipwreck while pursuing that phantasm of a pacific haven. Had Walsingham and himself tampered with the enemy, as some counsellors he could name had done, Leicester asserted that the gallows would be thought too good for them; <sup>3</sup> and yet he hoped he might be hanged if the whole Spanish faction in England could procure for the Queen a peace fit for her to accept.<sup>4</sup>

Certainly it was quite impossible for the Spanish faction to bring about a peace. No human power could bring it about. Even if England had been willing and able to surrender Holland, bound hand and foot, to Philip, even then she could only have obtained a hollow armistice. Philip had sworn in his inmost soul the conquest of England and the dethronement of Elizabeth. His heart was fixed. It was only by the subjugation of England that he hoped to recover the Netherlands. England was to be his stepping-stone to Holland. The invasion was slowly but steadily maturing, and nothing could have diverted the King from his great purpose. In the very

1 ,Leyc. Corresp.' 254, 30 April, 1586.  
15 May

2 Leicester to Burghley, 29 March, 1586.  
(S. P. Office MS.)

3 ,Leyc. Corresp.' 253, 30 April, 1586.  
10 May

4 Ibid. 251, same date.

1 Ibid. 247, 28 April, 1586,  
8 May

2 Ibid. 254, 30 April, 1586.  
10 May

3 ,Leyc. Corresp.' 254.

4 Ibid.



midst of all these plots and counterplots, Bodmans and Grafnis, English geldings and Irish greyhounds, dishes of plums and autograph letters of her Majesty and his Highness, the Prince was deliberately discussing all the details of the invasion, which, as it was then hoped, would be ready by the autumn of the year 1586. Although he had sent a special agent to Philip, who was to state by word of mouth that which it was deemed unsafe to write, <sup>1</sup> yet Alexander, perpetually urged by his master, went at last more fully into particulars than he had ever ventured to do before; and this too at the very moment when Elizabeth was most seriously „lending her ear” to negotiation, and most vehemently expressing her wrath at Sir Thomas Heneage for dealing candidly with the States-General. <sup>2</sup>

The Prince observed that when, two or three years before, he had sent his master an account of the coasts, anchoring-places, and harbours of England, he had then expressed the opinion that the conquest of England was an enterprise worthy of the grandeur and Christianity of his Majesty, and not so difficult as to be considered altogether impossible. To make himself absolutely master of the business, however, he had then thought that the King should have no associates in the scheme, and should make no account of the inhabitants of England. <sup>3</sup> Since that time the project had become more difficult of accomplishment, because it was now a stale and common topic of conversation everywhere—in Italy, Germany, and France—so that there could be little

doubt that rumours on the subject were daily reaching the ears of Queen Elizabeth and of every one in her kingdom. Hence she had made a strict alliance with Sweden, Denmark, the Protestant princes of Germany, and even with the Turks and the French. Nevertheless, in spite of these obstacles, the King, placing his royal hand to the work, might well accomplish the task; for the favour of the Lord, whose cause it was, would be sure to give him success.

Being so Christian and Catholic a king, Philip naturally desired to extend the area of the Holy Church; and to come to the relief of so many poor innocent martyrs in England, crying aloud before the Lord for help. <sup>1</sup> Moreover Elizabeth had fomented rebellion in the King's provinces for a long time secretly, and now, since the fall of Antwerp, and just as Holland and Zeeland were falling into his grasp, openly.

Thus, in secret and in public, she had done the very worsts he could do; and it was very clear that the Lord, for her sins, had deprived her of understanding. <sup>2</sup> in order that his Majesty might be the instrument of that chastisement which she so fully deserved. A monarch of such great prudence, valour, and talent as Philip, could now give all the world to understand that those who dared to lose a just and decorous respect for him, as this good lady had done, would receive such chastisement as royal power guided by prudent counsel could inflict. <sup>3</sup> Parma assured his sovereign, that, if the conquest of England were effected, that of the Netherlands would be finished with much

<sup>1</sup> Parma to Philip II., 20 April, 1586. (Arch. de Sim. MS.) Also a paper epigraphed —, Lo que dijo J. B. Piata (the agent alluded to in the text) a Don Juan de Idiaquez, 24 Juny, 1586. (Arch. de Sim. MS)

<sup>2</sup> MS. Letter of Parma to Philip, 20 April, 1586, before cited.

<sup>3</sup> „No haciendo caso de los proprios del pais.” (MS. Letter of Parma to Philip, &c., just cited.)

<sup>1</sup> „Tantos pobres y inocentes y martires. qui sean exclamando delante del divino respecto,” &c. (Ibid.)

<sup>2</sup> „Que nuestro Senor por pus pecados le ha quitado de todo punto el entendimiento.” (Ibid.)

<sup>3</sup> „Que no se han a perder el decoro y respeto a V. M. como lo ha hecho esta buena dama,” &c. (MS. Letter of Parma to Philip, last cited.)

facility and brevity; but that otherwise, on account of the situation, strength, and obstinacy of those people, it would be a very long, perilous, and at best doubtful business.<sup>1</sup>

„Three points,” he said, „were most vital to the invasion of England—secrecy, maintenance of the civil war in France, and judicious arrangement of matters in the Provinces.”

The French, if unoccupied at home, would be sure to make the enterprise so dangerous as to become almost impossible; for it might be laid down as a general maxim that that nation, jealous of Philip's power, had always done and would always do what it could to counteract his purposes.

With regard to the Netherlands, it would be desirable to leave a good number of troops in those countries—at least as many as were then stationed there—besides the garrisons, and also to hold many German and Swiss mercenaries in „wartgeld.” It would be further desirable that Alexander should take most of the personages of quality and sufficiency in the Provinces over with him to England, in order that they should not make mischief in his absence.<sup>2</sup>

With regard to the point of secrecy, that was, in Parma's opinion, the most important of all. All leagues must become more or less public, particularly those contrived at or with Rome. Such being the case, the Queen of England would be well aware of the Spanish projects, and, besides her militia at home, would levy German infantry and cavalry, and provide plenty of vessels, relying therein upon Holland and Zealand, where ships and sailors were in such abundance. Moreover, the English

and the Netherlanders knew the coasts, currents, tides, shallows, quicksands, ports, better than did the pilots of any fleets that the King could send thither. Thus, having his back assured, the enemy would meet them in front at a disadvantage. Although, notwithstanding this inequality, the enemy would be beaten, yet if the engagement should be warm, the Spaniards would receive an amount of damage which could not fail to be inconvenient, particularly as they would be obliged to land their troops, and to give battle to those who would be watching their landing. Moreover the English would be provided with cavalry, of which his Majesty's forces would have very little, on account of the difficulty of its embarkation.<sup>1</sup>

The obedient Netherlands would be the proper place in which to organize the whole expedition. There the regiments could be filled up, provisions collected, the best way of effecting the passage ascertained, and the force largely increased without exciting suspicion; but with regard to the fleet, there were no ports there capacious enough for large vessels. Antwerp had ceased to be a seaport; but a large number of flat-bottomed barges, hoys, and other barks, more suitable for transporting soldiers, could be assembled in Dunkirk, Gravelines, and Newport, which, with some five-and-twenty larger vessels, would be sufficient to accompany the fleet.

The Queen, knowing that there were no large ships, nor ports to hold them in the obedient Provinces, would be unsuspicious, if no greater levies seemed to be making than the exigencies of the Netherlands might apparently require.

The flat-bottomed boats, drawing two or three feet of water, would be more appropriate than ships of war drawing twenty feet. The passage across, in

<sup>1</sup> „Se acabará con harta facilidad y brevedad lo de aca (viz. the Netherlands) qu de otra manera, por la situacion, fortaleza, y obstinacion de estas gentes, sera negocio largo, peligroso, y aun dudoso.” (Ibid.)

<sup>2</sup> Ibid.

<sup>1</sup> MS. Letter of Parma to Philip II., last cited.

favourable weather, might occupy from eight to twelve hours.

The number of troops for the invading force should be thirty thousand infantry, besides five hundred light troopers, with saddles, bridles, and lances, but without horses, because, in Alexander's opinion, it would be easier to mount them in England. Of these thirty thousand there should be six thousand Spaniards, six thousand Italians, six thousand Walloons, nine thousand Germans, and three thousand Burgundians.

Much money would be required; at least three hundred thousand dollars the month for the new force, besides the regular one hundred and fifty thousand for the ordinary provision in the Netherlands; and this ordinary provision would be more necessary than ever, because a mutiny breaking forth in the time of the invasion would be destruction to the Spaniards both in England and in the Provinces.

The most appropriate part of the coast for landing would, in Alexander's opinion, be between Dover and Margate, because the Spaniards, having no footing in Holland and Zeeland, were obliged to make their starting-point in Flanders. The country about Dover was described by Parma as populous; well-wooded, and much divided by hedges; advantageous for infantry, and not requiring a larger amount of cavalry than the small force at his disposal, while the people there were domestic in their habits, rich, and therefore less warlike, less trained to arms, and more engrossed by their occupations and their comfortable ways of life. <sup>1</sup> Therefore, although some encounters would take place, yet after the commanders of the invading troops had given distinct and clear orders, it would be necessary to leave the rest in the hands of God who governs

all things, and from whose bounty and mercy it was to be hoped that He would favour a cause so eminently holy, just, and His own. <sup>1</sup>

It would be necessary to make immediately for London, which city, not being fortified, would be very easily taken. This point gained, the whole framework of the business might be considered as well put together. <sup>2</sup> If the Queen should fly—as, being a woman, she probably would do—everything would be left in such confusion, as, with the blessing of God, it might soon be considered that the holy and heroic work had been accomplished. <sup>3</sup> Her Majesty, it was suggested, would probably make her escape in a boat before she could be captured; but the conquest would be nevertheless effected. Although, doubtless, some English troops might be got together to return and try their fortune, yet it would be quite useless; for the invaders would have already planted themselves upon the soil, and then, by means of frequent excursions and forays hither and thither, about the islands all other places of importance would be gained, and the prosperous and fortunate termination of the adventure assured. <sup>4</sup>

As, however, everything was to be provided for, so, in case the secret could not be preserved, it would be necessary for Philip, under pretext of defending himself against the English and French corsairs, to send a large armada to sea, as doubtless the Queen

1 „En manos de Dios qui gobierna todas las cosas, y de cuya bondad y misericordia se debe esperar que favorecera causa tan santa, justa, y propria suya.” (Ibid.)

2 „Sara tan facil de ganar, lo cual conseguido, se puede tener por tan buen entablado el negocio.” (Ibid.)

3 „Se acogiesse, como siendo muger es de creer . . . con la ayuda de nro Señor, podria tener por acabada obra tan suya y herocia.” Ibid.

4 „Discurriendo la isla, ganando plazas de importancia . . . y se puede tener por asegurado el prospero y felice fin.” MS. Letter to Parma before cited.

1 „Domestica y rica, y la gente de ella con siguiente es menos armigera y bellicosa, y dada a sus trabajos y comodidades.” MS. Letter of Parma, before cited.



would take the same measure. If the King should prefer, however, notwithstanding Alexander's advice to the contrary, to have confederates in the enterprise,—then, the matter being public, it would be necessary to prepare a larger and stronger fleet than any which Elizabeth, with the assistance of her French and Netherland allies, could oppose to him. That fleet should be well provided with vast stores of provisions, sufficient to enable the invading force, independently of forage, to occupy three or four places in England at once, as the enemy would be able to come from various towns and strong places to attack them.

As for the proper season for the expedition, it would be advisable to select the month of October of the current year, because the English barns would then be full of wheat and other forage, and the earth would have been sown for the next year—points of such extreme importance, that if the plan could not be executed at that time, it would be as well to defer it until the following October. 1

The Prince recommended that the negotiations with the League should be kept spinning, without allowing them to come to a definite conclusion; because there would be no lack of difficulties perpetually offering themselves, 2 and the more intricate and involved the policy of France, the better it would be for the interests of Spain. Alexander expressed the utmost confidence that

his Majesty, with his powerful arm, would overcome all obstacles in the path of his great project, and would show the world that he „could do a little more than what was possible.” 1 He also assured his master, in most extravagant language, of his personal devotion, adding that it was unnecessary for him to offer his services in this particular enterprise, because, ever since his birth, he had dedicated and consecrated himself to execute his royal commands.

He further advised that old Peter Ernest Mansfeld should be left commander-in-chief of the forces in the Netherlands during his own absence in England. „Mansfeld was an honourable cavalier,” he said, „and a faithful servant of the King; and although somewhat ill-conditioned at times, yet he had essential good qualities, and was the only general fit to be trusted alone. 2

The reader, having thus been permitted to read the inmost thoughts of Philip and Alexander, and to study their secret plans for conquering England in October, while their frivolous yet mischievous negotiations with the Queen had been going on from April to June, will be better able than before to judge whether Leicester were right or no in doubting if a good peace could be obtained by a „merchant's brokerage.”

And now, after examining these pictures of interaulic politics and backstairs diplomacy, which represent so large and characteristic a phasis of European history during the year 1586, we must throw a glance at the external, more stirring, but not more significant public events which were taking place during the same period.

1 „Discurriendo la isla, ganando plazas de importancia . . . y se puede tener por asegurado el prospero y felice fin.” MS. Letter to Parma before cited.

2 „Que la pítica de la liga vaya adelante sin concluirse, alagardola todo lo que se pudiese, pues no faltaran dificultades que se ofrecieran.” (Ibid.)

1 „Y se llegará a hacer algo mas de lo posible.” MS. Letter of Parma before cited.

2 Ibid.

## CHAPTER IX.

Military Plans in the Netherlands—The Elector and Electorate of Cologne—Martin Schenk—His Career before serving the States—Franeker University founded—Parma attempts Grave—Battle on the Meuse—Success and Vainglory of Leicester—St. George's Day triumphantly kept at Utrecht—Parma not so much appalled as it was thought—He besieges and reduces Grave—And is Master of the Meuse—Leicester's Rage at the Surrender of Grave—His Revenge—Parma on the Rhine—He besieges and assaults Neusz—Horrible fate of the Garrison and City—Which Leicester was unable to relieve—Axel surprised by Maurice and Sidney—The Zeeland Regiment given to Sidney—Condition of the Irish and English Troops—Leicester takes the Field—He reduces Doesburg—He lays siege to Zutphen—Which Parma prepares to relieve—The English intercept the Convoy—Battle of Warnsfeld—Sir Philip Sidney wounded—Results of the Encounter—Death of Sidney at Arnheim—Gallantry of Edward Stanley.

FIVE great rivers hold the Netherlands territory in their coils. Three are but slightly separated—the Yssel, Waal, and ancient Rhine, while the Scheldt and Meuse are spread more widely asunder. Along each of these streams were various fortified cities, the possession of which, in those days, when modern fortification was in its infancy, implied the control of the surrounding country. The lower part of all the rivers, where they mingled with the sea and became wide estuaries, belonged to the Republic, for the coasts and the ocean were in the hands of the Hollanders and English. Above, the various strong places were alternately in the hands of the Spaniards and of the patriots.

Thus Antwerp, with the other Scheldt cities, had fallen into Parma's power, but Flushing, which controlled them all, was held by Philip Sidney for the Queen and States. On the Meuse, Maastricht and Roermond were Spanish, but Venloo, Grave, Meghem, and other towns, held for the commonwealth. On the Waal, the town of Nymegen had, through the dexterity of Martin Schenk, been recently transferred to the royal-

ists, while the rest of that river's course was true to the republic. The Rhine, strictly so called, from its entrance into Netherland, belonged to the rebels. Upon its elder branch, the Yssel, Zutphen was in Parma's hands, while, a little below, Deventer had been recently and adroitly saved by Leicester and Count Meurs from falling into the same dangerous grasp.

Thus the triple Rhine, after it had crossed the German frontier, belonged mainly, although not exclusively, to the States. But on the edge of the Batavian territory, the ancient river, just before dividing itself into its three branches, flowed through a debateable country which was even more desolate and forlorn, if possible, than the land of the obedient Provinces. <sup>1</sup>

This unfortunate district was the archiepiscopal electorate of Cologne. The city of Cologne itself, Neusz, and Rheinberg, on the river, Werl and other places in Westphalia, and the whole country around, were endangered, invaded, ravaged, and the inhabitants plundered, murdered, and subjected to every imaginable outrage, by rival bands of highwaymen, enlisted in the support of the two rival bishops—beggars, outcasts, but highborn and learned churchmen both—who disputed the electorate.

At the commencement of the year a portion of the bishopric was still in the control of the deposed protestant elector Gebhard Truchsess, assisted of course by the English and the States. The city of Cologne was held by the Catholic elector, Ernest of Bavaria, bishop of Liege; but Neusz and Rheinberg were in the hands of the Dutch republic.

The military operations of the year were, accordingly, along the Meuse, where the main object of Parma was

<sup>1</sup> Meteren, xiii. 235<sup>o</sup>.

to wrest Grave from the Netherlands; along the Waal, where, on the other hand, the patriots wished to recover Nymegen; on the Yssel, where they desired to obtain the possession of Zutphen; and in the Cologne electorate, where the Spaniards meant, if possible, to transfer Neusz and Rheinberg from Truchsess to Elector Ernest. To clear the course of these streams, and especially to set free that debateable portion of the river-territory which hemmed him in from neutral Germany, and to cut off the supplies from his starving troops, was the immediate design of Alexander Farnese.

Nothing could be more desolate than the condition of the electorate. Ever since Gebhard Truchsess had renounced the communion of the Catholic Church for the love of Agnes Mansfeld, and so gained a wife and lost his principality, he had been a dependant upon the impoverished Nassaus, or a suppliant for alms to the thrifty Elizabeth. The Queen was frequently implored by Leicester, without much effect, to send the ex-electoral a few hundred pounds to keep him from starving, as „he had not one groat to live upon,”<sup>1</sup> and, a little later, he was employed as a go-between, and almost a spy, by the Earl, in his quarrels with the patrician party rapidly forming against him in the States.

At Godesberg—the romantic ruins of which stronghold the traveller still regards with interest, placed as it is in the midst of that enchanting region where Drachenfels looks down on the crumbling tower of Roland and the convent of Nonnenwerth—the unfortunate Gebhard had sustained a conclusive defeat. A small, melancholy man, accomplished, religious, learned, „very poor, but very wise,” comely, but of mean stature, altogether an un-

lucky and forlorn individual, 1 he was not, after all, in very much inferior plight to that in which his rival, the Bavarin bishop, had found himself. Prince Ernest, archbishop of Liege and Cologne, a hanger-on of his brother, who sought to shake him off, and a stipendiary of Philip, who was a worse paymaster than Elizabeth, had a sorry life of it, notwithstanding his nominal possession of the see. He was forced to go, disguised and in secret, to the Prince of Parma, at Brussels, 2 to ask for assistance, and to mention, with lacrymose vehemence, that both his brother and himself had determined to renounce the episcopate, unless the forces of the Spanish King could be employed to recover the cities on the Rhine. If Neusz and Rheinberg were not wrested from the rebels, Cologne itself would soon be gone. Ernest represented most eloquently to Alexander, that if the Protestant archbishop were

1 „When I spake of the Elector here,” said Leicester, „I assure you he is a very wise gentleman; and if it were possible to set him in his place again, these countries were soon at quiet. . . . He is exceeding poor, and great pity. Believe me, my Lord, he is worthy to be esteemed. He doth greatly love and honour her Majesty. I would to God your Lordship could but procure her Majesty to bestow 500 or 600 pound on him for a token. I have received more comfort and good advice of him than of any man here. He is very virtuous, and very sound in religion; very grave, and a comely person, but of a mean stature. His adversary doth all he can to put the King of Spain into his territories, yea, even into Cologne itself.—He is very poor, and weary of his keeping that place with such charge. His bishopric of Liege is all spoiled also with these wars, and he no longer able to maintain his charges. A small matter would set up this man now. He hath many friends in Germany, and more of late than ever he had.” Leicester to Burghley, 28 Feb. 1586. (S. P. Office MS.)

Lord North had also conceived a favourable opinion of Truchsess, whom he spoke of as a „rare gentleman, notably furnished with excellent gifts, religious, and worthy of all honour and estimation.” North to Burghley, 28 Feb. 1586. (S. P. Office MS.)

2 Parma to Philip II. 28 Feb. 1586 (Archivo de Simancas, MS.) Compare Strada, ii. 426.

1 ‚Leyc. Corresp.’ 378.



reinstated in the ancient see, it would be a most perilous result for the ancient church throughout all northern Europe. Parma kept the wandering prelate for a few days in his palace in Brussels, and then dismissed him, disguised and on foot, in the dusk of the evening, through the park-gate. 1 He encouraged him with hopes of assistance, he represented to his sovereign the importance of preserving the Rhenish territory to Bishop Ernest and to Catholicism, but hinted that the declared intention of the Bavarian to resign the dignity, was probably a trick, because the archiepiscopate was no such very bad thing after all. 2

The archiepiscopate might be no very bad thing, but it was a most uncomfortable place of residence, at the moment, for prince or peasant, Overrun by hordes of brigands, and crushed almost out of existence by that most deadly of all systems of taxations, the „brandschätzung,” it was fast becoming a mere den of thieves. The „brandschätzung” had no name in English, but it was the well-known impost, levied by roving commanders, and even by respectable generals of all nations. A hamlet, cluster of farm-houses, country district, or wealthy city, in order to escape being burned and ravaged, as the penalty of having fallen into a conqueror's hands, paid a heavy sum of ready money on the nail at command of the conqueror. The free companions of the sixteenth century drove a lucrative

business in this particular branch of industry; and when to this was added the more direct profits derived from actual plunder, sack, and ransoming, it was natural that a large fortune was often the result to the thrifty and persevering commander of free lances,

Of all the professors of this comprehensive art, the terrible Martin Schenk was pre-eminent; and he was now ravaging the Cologne territory, having recently passed again to the service of the States. Intimately connected with the chief military events of the period which now occupies us, he was also the very archetype of the marauders whose existence was characteristic of the epoch. Born in 1549 of an ancient and noble family of Gelderland, Martin Schenk had inherited no property but a sword. Serving for a brief term as page to the Seigneur of Ysselstein, he joined, while yet a youth, the banner of William of Orange, at the head of two men-at-arms. The humble knight-errant, with his brace of squires, was received with courtesy by the Prince and the Estates, but he soon quarrelled with his patrons. There was a castle of Blyenbeek, belonging to his cousin, which he chose to consider his rightful property, because he was of the same race, and because it was a convenient and productive estate and residence. The courts had different views of public law, and supported the ousted cousin. Martin shut himself up in the castle, and having recently committed a rather discreditable homicide, which still further increased his unpopularity with the patriots, he made overtures to Parma. 1 Alexander was glad to enlist so bold a soldier on his side, and assisted Schenk in his besieged stronghold. For years afterwards, his services under the King's banner were most brilliant, and he rose to the highest military command, while

1 Parma to Philip II. (MS. last cited.) Compare Strada, who appears to be very much mistaken in representing the Elector Ernest as having been dismissed by Parma with great state, and with a magnificent escort of Belgian nobility,—„because no mask can ever entirely disguise a prince, and because suns, even when under a cloud, have more spectators than ever.”

„Nempe nulla larva totum principem tegit; immo soles, etiam isti quum deficiunt, tunc maxime spectatores habent,” and so on, ii. 427.

2 „Porque no le esta tan mal el electorado.” MS. Letter of Parma last cited.

1 Meteren, xiii. 231. „Levensbeschrijving Nederl. Mannen,” vol. ii. in voce. Strada, ii. 633, *et aliunde*.

his coffers, meantime, were rapidly filling with the results of his robberies and and „brandschätzungs.“ „’Tis a most courageous fellow,” said Parma, „but rather a desperate highwayman than a valiant soldier.”<sup>1</sup> Martin’s couple of lances had expanded into a corps of free companions, the most truculent, the most obedient, the most rapacious in Christendom. Never were freebooters more formidable to the world at large, or more docile to their chief, than were the followers of General Schenk. Never was a more finished captain of highwaymen. He was a man who was never sober, yet who never smiled. His habitual intoxication seemed only to increase both his audacity and his taciturnity, without disturbing his reason. He was incapable of fear, of fatigue, of remorse. He could remain for days and nights without dismounting—eating, drinking, and sleeping in the saddle; so that to this terrible centaur his horse seemed actually a part of himself. His soldiers followed him about like hounds, and were treated by him like hounds. He habitually scourged them, often took with his own hand the lives of such as displeased him, and had been known to cause individuals of them to jump from the top of church steeples<sup>2</sup> at his command; yet the pack were ever stanch to his orders, for they knew that he always led them where the game was plenty. While serving under Parma he had twice most brilliantly defeated Hohenlo. At the battle of Hardenberg Heath he had completely outgeneralled that distinguished chieftain, slaying fifteen hundred of his soldiers at the expense of only fifty or sixty of his own. By this triumph he had preserved the important city of Groningen for Philip, during an additional quarter of a century, and had been received in that city with rapture. Several startling years of vic-

tory and rapine he had thus run through as a royalist partisan. He became the terror and scourge of his native Gelderland, and he was covered with wounds received in the King’s service. He had been twice captured and held for ransom. Twice he had effected his escape. He had recently gained the city of Nymegen. He was the most formidable, the most unscrupulous, the most audacious Netherlander that wore Philip’s colours; but he had received small public reward for his services, and the wealth which he earned on the high-road did not suffice for his ambition. He had been deeply disgusted, when, at the death of Count Renneberg. Verdugo, a former stable-boy of Mansfeld, a Spaniard who had risen from the humblest rank to be a colonel and general, had been made governor of Friesland. He had smothered his resentment for a time, however, but had sworn within himself to desert at the most favourable opportunity. At last, after he had brilliantly saved the city of Breda from falling into the hands of the patriots, he was more enraged than he had ever been before, when Haultepenne, of the house of Berlaymont, was made governor of that place in his stead.

On the 25th of May, 1585, at an hour after midnight, he had a secret interview with Count Meurs, stadholder for the States of Gelderland, and agreed to transfer his mercenary allegiance to the republic. He made good terms. He was to be lieutenant-governor of Gelderland, and he was to have rank as marshal of the camp in the States’ army, with a salary of twelve hundred and fifty guilders a month. He agreed to resign his famous castle of Blyenbeek, but was to be reimbursed with estates in Holland and Zeeland, of the annual value of four thousand florins. <sup>1</sup>

After this treaty, Martin and his free lances served the States faithfully,

<sup>1</sup> Parma to Philip II., 6 June, 1585. (Arch. de Sim. MS.)

<sup>2</sup> Archer, in Stowe, 739.

<sup>1</sup> „Nederl. Mannen,” &c., *ubi sup.*

and became sworn foes to Parma and the King. He gave and took no quarter, and his men, if captured, „paid their ransom with their heads.”<sup>1</sup> He ceased to be the scourge of Gelderland, but he became the terror of the electorate. Early in 1586, accompanied by Herman Kloet, the young and daring Dutch commandant of Neusz, he had swept down into the Westphalian country, at the head of five hundred foot and five hundred horse. On the 18th of March he captured the city of Werll by a neat stratagem. The citizens, hemmed in on all sides by marauders, were in want of many necessities of life, among other things, of salt. Martin had, from time to time, sent some of his soldiers into the place, disguised as boors from the neighbourhood, and carrying bags of that article. A pacific trading-intercourse had thus been established between the burghers within and the banditti without the gates. Agreeable relations were formed within the walls, and a party of townsmen had agreed to cooperate with the followers of Schenk. One morning a train of waggons laden with soldiers neatly covered with salt, made their appearance at the gate. At the same time a fire broke out most opportunely within the town. The citizens busily employed themselves in extinguishing the flames, The salted soldiers, after passing through the gateway, sprang from the waggons, and mastered the watch. The town was carried at a blow. Some of the inhabitants were massacred as a warning to the rest; others were taken prisoners and held for ransom; a few, more fortunate, made their escape to the citadel. That fortress was stormed in vain, but the city was thoroughly sacked. Every house was rifled of its contents. Meantime Haultepenne collected a force of nearly four thousand men, boors, citi-

zens, and soldiers, and came to besiege Schenk in the town, while, at the same time, attacks were made upon him from the castle. It was impossible for him to hold the city, but he had completely robbed it of everything valuable. Accordingly he loaded a train of waggons with his booty, took with him thirty of the magistrates as hostages, with other wealthy citizens, and marching in good order against Haultepenne, completely routed him, killing a number variously estimated at from five hundred to two thousand, and effected his retreat, desperately wounded in the thigh, but triumphant and laden with the spoils, to Venlo on the Meuse, of which city he was governor.”<sup>1</sup>

„Surely this is a noble fellow, a worthy fellow,” exclaimed Leicester, who was filled with admiration at the bold marauder's progress, and vowed that he was „the only soldier in truth that they had for he was never idle, and had succeeded hitherto very happily.”<sup>2</sup>

And thus, at every point of the doomed territory of the little commonwealth, the natural atmosphere in which the inhabitants existed was one of blood and rapine. Yet during the very slight lull, which was interposed in the winter of 1585-6 to the eternal clang of arms in Friesland, the Estates of that Province, to their lasting honour, founded the university of Franeker. A dozen years before, the famous institution at Leyden had been established, as a reward to the burghers for their heroic defence of the city. And now this new proof was given of the love of Netherlanders, even in the midst of their misery and their warfare, for the more humane

<sup>1</sup> Meteren, Strada, „Nederl. Mannen,” &c., *ubi sup.* Bor. ii. 699, 700. Bruce's „Leyc. Corresp.” 79, 139, 141, 167, 227, 265, 475. Lord North to Burghley, Feb. 28, 1586. (S. P. Office MS.) Leicester to Burghley same date. *Ibid.* MS. Leicester to Burghley, and Walsingham, 15 March, 1586. *Ibid.* MS.

<sup>2</sup> Leicester to Burghley and Walsingham. MS. *ubi sup.*

<sup>1</sup> Doyle to Burghley, June 24, 1586, (S. P. Office MS.)



arts. The new college was well endowed from ancient church-lands, and not only was the education made nearly gratuitous, while handsome salaries were provided for the professors, but provision was made by which the poorer scholars could be fed and boarded at a very moderate expense. There was a table provided at an annual cost to the student of but fifty florins (5*l.*), and a second and third table at the very low price of forty and thirty florins respectively. Thus the sum to be paid by the poorer class of scholars for a year's maintenance was less than three pounds sterling a year. The voice with which this infant seminary of the Muses first made itself heard above the din of war was but feeble, but the institution was destined to thrive, and to endow the world, for many successive generations, with the golden fruits of science and genius. <sup>1</sup>

Early in the spring, the war was seriously taken in hand by Farnese. It has already been seen that the republic had been almost entirely driven out of Flanders and Brabant. The Estates, however, still held Grave, Megem, Batenburg, and Venlo upon the Meuse. That river formed, as it were, a perfect circle of protection for the whole Province of Brabant, and Farnese determined to make himself master of this great natural moat. Afterwards, he meant to possess himself of the Rhine, flowing in a parallel course, about twenty-five miles farther to the east. In order to gain and hold the Meuse, the first step was to reduce the city of Grave. That town, upon the left or Brabant bank, was strongly fortified on its land-side, where it was surrounded by low and fertile pastures, while, upon the other, it depended upon its natural foss, the river. It was, according to Lord North and the Earl of Leicester, the „strongest

town in all the Low Countries, though but a little one.” <sup>1</sup>

Baron Hemart, a young Gueldrian noble, of small experience in military affairs, commanded in the city, his garrison being eight hundred soldiers, and about one thousand burgher guards. <sup>2</sup> As early as January, Farnese had ordered Count Mansfeld to lay siege to the place. Five forts had accordingly been constructed, above and below the town, upon the left bank of the river, while a bridge of boats thrown across the stream led to a fortified camp on the opposite side. Mansfeld, Mondragon, Bobadil, Aquila, and other distinguished veterans in Philip's service, were engaged in the enterprise. A few unimportant skirmishes between Schenk and the Spaniards had taken place, but the city was already had pressed, and, by the series of forts which environed it, was cut off from its supplies. It was highly important, therefore, that Grave should be relieved with the least possible delay.

Early in Easter week, a force of three thousand men, under Hohenlo and Sir John Norris, was accordingly despatched by Leicester, with April <sup>5</sup> ~~15~~ orders, at every hazard, to 1586. throw reinforcements and provisions into the place. They took possession, at once, of a stone sence, called the Mill-Fort, which was guarded by fifty men, mostly boors of the country. <sup>3</sup> These were nearly all hanged for „using malicious words,” and for „railing against Queen Elizabeth,” <sup>4</sup> and—a sufficient number of men being left to maintain the fort—the whole relieving

<sup>1</sup> North to Burghley, 29 May, 1586. (S. P. Office MS.) Leicester to Queen Elizabeth, 16 June, 1586. (S. P. Office MS.)

<sup>2</sup> Bor, ii. 707, 708. Hoofd Verv. 154, 155. Strada, ii. 410. Wagenaar, viii. 126.

<sup>3</sup> Occurrences from Holland, April <sup>11</sup> ~~21~~, 1586.

(S. P. Office MS.)

<sup>4</sup> Ibid. Compare „Leycest. Corresp.” p. 218, April 5, 1586.

force marched with great difficulty—for the river was rapidly rising, and flooding the country—along the right bank of the Meuse, taking possession of Batenburg and Ravenstein castles, as they went. A force of four or five hundred Englishmen was then pushed forward to a point almost exactly opposite Grave, and within an English mile of the head of the bridge constructed by the Spaniards. Here, in the night of Easter Tuesday, they rapidly formed an entrenched camp upon the dyke along the river, and, although molested by some armed vessels, succeeded in establishing themselves in a most important position. 1

On the morning of Easter Wednesday, April 16, Mansfeld, perceiving that the enemy had thus stolen a march upon him, ordered one thousand picked troops, all Spaniards, under April 6, Casco and other veterans, to 16, assault this advanced post. 2 1586.

A reserve of two thousand was placed in readiness to support the attack. The Spaniards slowly crossed the bridge, which was swaying very dangerously with the current, and then charged the entrenched camp at a run. A quarrel between the different regiments as to the right of precedence precipitated the attack, before the reserve, consisting of some picked companies of Mondragon's veterans had been able to arrive. Coming in breathless and fatigued, the first assailants were readily repulsed in their first onset. Aquila then opportunely made his appearance, and the attack was renewed with great vigour. The defenders of the camp yielded at the third charge and fled in dismay, while the Spaniards, leaping the barriers, scattered hither and thither in the ardour of pursuit. The routed Englishmen fled swiftly along the oozy dyke, in hopes

of joining the main body of the relieving party, who were expected to advance, with the dawn, from their position six miles farther down the river. Two miles long the chase lasted, and it seemed probable that the fugitives would be overtaken and destroyed, when, at last, from behind a line of mounds which stretched towards Batenburg and had masked their approach, appeared Count Hohenlo and Sir John Norris, at the head of twenty-five hundred Englishmen and Hollanders. This force advanced as rapidly as the slippery ground and the fatigue of a two hours' march would permit to the rescue of their friends, while the retreating English rallied, turned upon their pursuers, and drove them back over the path along which they had just been charging in the full career of victory. The fortune of the day was changed, and in a few minutes Hohenlo and Norris would have crossed the river and entered Grave, when the Spanish companies of Bobadil and other commanders were seen marching along the quaking bridge.

Three thousand men on each side now met a push of pike on the bank of the Meuse. 1 The rain was pouring in torrents, the wind was blowing a gale, the stream was rapidly rising, and threatening to overwhelm its shores. By a tacit and mutual consent, both armies paused for a few moments in full view of each other. After this brief interval they closed again, breast to breast, in sharp and steady conflict. The ground, slippery with rain and with blood, which was soon flowing almost as fast as the rain, afforded an unsteady footing to the combatants. They staggered like drunken men, fell upon their knees, or upon their backs, and still, kneeling or rolling prostrate, maintained the deadly conflict. For the space of an hour and a half the fierce

1 Occurrences from Holland, MS.

2 Strada, ii. 413 seq. Hoofd Vervolg, 154, 155. Occurrences, &c. MS. Bruce's 'Leyceat Corresp.' 223, 226.

1 Strada, ii. 413, 414. Occurrences from Holland, MS.

encounter of human passion outmastered the fury of the elements, Norris and Hohenlo fought at the head of their columns, like paladins of old. The Englishman was wounded in the mouth and breast, the Count was seen to gallop past one thousand musketeers and calivermen of the enemy, and to escape unscathed. But as the strength of the soldiers exhausted itself, the violence of the tempest increased. The floods of rain and the blasts of the hurricane at last terminated the affray. The Spaniards, fairly conquered, were compelled to a retreat, lest the rapidly rising river should sweep away the frail and trembling bridge, over which they had passed to their unsuccessful assault. The English and Netherlanders remained masters of the field. The rising flood, too, which was fast converting the meadows into a lake, was as useful to the conquerors as it was damaging to the Spaniards.

In the course of the few following days, a large number of boats was despatched before the very eyes of Parma,

April 6 from Batenburg into Grave; 16<sup>1</sup> Hohenlo, who had „most 1586. desperately adventured his person” throughout the whole affair, entering the town himself. A force of five hundred men, together with provisions enough to last a year. was thrown into the city, and the course of the Meuse was, apparently, secured to the republic. In this important action about one hundred and fifty Dutch and English were killed, and probably four hundred Spaniards, including several distinguished officers. 1

1 Leicester to Burghley, April 6<sup>1</sup> 1586. (S. P. Office MS.) R. Cavendish to Burghley, April 8<sup>1</sup> 1586. (S. P. Office MS.) Lord Willoughby to Burghley, 9<sup>1</sup> April, 1586. (S. P. Office MS.) Occurrences from Holland, MS.) Bruce's ‚Leyc. Corresp.’ 226, 244, 245, 252, 253. Parma to Philip II. 27<sup>1</sup> April, and 9 May, 1586. (Archivo de Simancas, MS.)

The Earl of Leicester was incredibly elated so soon as the success of this enterprise was known. „Oh that her Majesty knew,” he cried, „how easy a match now she hath with the King of Spain, and what millions of afflicted people she hath relieved in these countries. This summer, this summer, I say, would make an end to her immortal glory.” 1 He was no friend to his countryman, the gallant Sir John Norris—whom, however, he could not help applauding on this occasion,—but he he was in raptures with Hohenlo. Next to God, he assured the Queen’s government that the victory was owing to the Count. „He is both a valiant man and a wise man, and the painfullest that ever I knew,” he said; adding—as a secret—that „five hundred Englishmen of the best Flemish training had flatly and shamefully run away,” when the fight had been renewed by Hohenlo and Norris. He recommended that her Majesty should send her picture to the Count, worth two hundred pounds, which he would value at more than one thousand pounds in money, and he added that „for her sake the Count had greatly left his drinking.” 2

As for the Prince of Parma, Lei-

\* Lord North to Burghley, 2<sup>1</sup> May, 1586.

S. P. Office MS.) „Count Hollock performed this service with wisdom and most valiantly in his own person. I cannot give him too much praise, because there is so much due to him.”

Compare Strada, ii. 413, 414; Meteren, xiii. 234; Hoofd, 155 *seq. et al.* It is of slight consequence, at the present day, to know the exact number of the combatants who perished in this hotly-contested, but now forgotten, field. As a specimen of conflicting statistics after a battle, it is worth while to observe that, according to some *eye-witnesses*, nine hundred Spaniards were killed, and, according to others thirty; while, on the other hand, the statement of the loss sustained by their antagonists varied from fifty to seven hundred.

1 Bruce's ‚Leycest. Corresp.’ 264 May 8<sup>1</sup> 1586.

2 Bruce's ‚Leyc. Corresp.’ 245.



cester looked upon him as conclusively beaten. He spoke of him as „marvelously appalled” by this overthrow of his forces, but he assured the government that if the Prince’s „choler should press him to seek revenge,” he should soon be driven out of the country. The Earl would follow him „at an inch,” and effectually frustrate all his undertakings. „If the Spaniard have such a May as he has had an April,” said Lord North, „it will put water in his wine.”<sup>1</sup>

Meantime, as St. George’s Day was approaching, and as the Earl was fond of banquets and ceremonies, it was thought desirable to hold a great triumphal feast at Utrecht. His journey to that city from the Hague was a triumphal procession. In all the towns through which he passed he was entertained with military display, pompous harangues, interludes, dumb shows, and allegories. At Amsterdam—a city which he compared to Venice for situation and splendour, and where one thousand ships were constantly lying—he was received with „sundry great whales and other fishes of hugeness;” that gambolled about his vessel, and convoyed him to the shore. These monsters of the deep presented him to the burgomaster and magistrates who were awaiting him on the quay. The burgomaster made him a Latin oration, to which Dr. Bartholomew Clerk responded, and then the Earl was ushered to the grand square, upon which, in his honour, a magnificent living picture was exhibited, in which he figured as Moses at the head of the Israelites smiting the Philistines hip and thigh.<sup>2</sup> After much mighty banquetting in Amsterdam, as in the other cities, the governor-general came to Utrecht. Through the streets of this antique and most pic-

turesque city flows the palsied current of the Rhine, and every barge and bridge were decorated with the flowers of spring. Upon this spot, where, eight centuries before, the Anglo-Saxon Willebrod had first astonished the wild Frisians with the pacific doctrines of Jesus, and had been stoned to death as his reward, stood now a more arrogant representative of English piety. The balconies were crowded with fair women, and decorated with scarves and banners. From the Earl’s residence—the ancient palace of the Knights of Rhodes—to the cathedral, the way was lined with a double row of burgher guards, wearing red roses on their arms, and apparelled in the splendid uniforms for which the Netherlands were celebrated. Trumpeters in scarlet and silver, barons, knights, and great officers, in cloth of gold and silks of all colours; the young Earl of Essex, whose career was to be so romantic, and whose fate so tragic; those two ominous personages, the deposed little archbishop-elect of Cologne, with his melancholy face, and the unlucky Don Antonio, Pretender of Portugal, for whom, dead or alive, thirty thousand crowns and a dukedom were perpetually offered by Philip II.; young Maurice of Nassau, the future controller of European destinies; great counsellors of state, gentlemen, guardsmen, and portcullis-herald, with the coat of arms of Elizabeth, rode in solemn procession along. Then great Leicester himself, „most princelike in the robes of his order,” guarded by a troop of burghers, and by his own fifty halberdmen in scarlet cloaks trimmed with white and purple velvet, pranced gorgeously by.<sup>2</sup>

The ancient cathedral, built on the spot where Saint Willebrod had once ministered, with its light, tapering,

<sup>1</sup> North to Burghley,  $\frac{2}{12}$  May, 1586. (S. P. Office MS.)  
<sup>2</sup> Leye. Corresp. 476 seq.

<sup>1</sup> Declaration of Don Antonio, in Bor. ii. 769.

<sup>2</sup> Holinshed, iv. 658 seq. Stowe, 717. Hoofd Vervolgh, 145.

brick tower, three hundred and sixty feet in height, its exquisitely mullioned windows, and its elegantly foliated columns, soon received the glittering throng. Hence, after due religious ceremonies, and an English sermon from Master Knewstubs, Leicester's April, chaplain, was a solemn march 1586.

back again to the palace, where a stupendous banquet was already laid in the great hall. 1

On the dais at the upper end of the table, blazing with plate and crystal, stood the royal chair, with the Queen's plate and knife and fork before it, exactly as if she had been present, while Leicester's trencher and stool were set respectfully quite at the edge of the board. In the neighbourhood of this post of honour sat Count Maurice, the Elector, the Pretender, and many illustrious English personages, with the fair Agnes Mansfeld, Princess Chimay, the daughters of William the Silent, and other dames of high degree.

Before the covers were removed, came limping up to the dais grim-visaged Martin Schenk, freshly wounded, but triumphant, from the sack of Werll, and black John Norris scarcely cured of the spear-wounds in his face and breast received at the relief of Grave. The sword of knighthood was laid upon the shoulder of each hero, by the Earl of Leicester, as her Majesty's vicegerent; and then the ushers marshalled the mighty feast. Meats in the

shape of lions, tigers, dragons, and leopards, flanked by peacocks, swans, pheasants, and turkeys „in their natural feathers as in their greatest pride,” disappeared, course after course,—sonorous metal blowing meanwhile the most triumphant airs. After the banquet came dancing, vaulting, tumbling, together with the „forces of Hercules, which gave great delight to the strangers,” after which the company separated until evensong.

Then again, „great was the feast,” says the chronicler,—a mighty supper following hard upon the gigantic dinner. After this there was tilting at the barriers, the young Earl of Essex and other knights bearing themselves more chivalrously than would seem to comport with so much eating and drinking. Then, horrible to relate, came another „most sumptuous banquet of sugar-meats for the men at arms and the ladies,” after which, it being now midnight, the Lord of Leicester bade the whole company good rest, and the men at arms and ladies took their leave. 1

But while all this chivalrous banquetting and holidaymaking was in hand, the Prince of Parma was in reality not quite so much „appalled” by the relief of Grave as his antagonist had imagined. The Earl, flushed with the success of Hohenlo, already believed himself master of the country, and assured his government that, if he should be reasonably well supplied, he would have Antwerp back again and Bruges besides „before mid June.” 2

Never, said he, was the Prince of Parma so dejected nor so melancholy since he came into these countries, nor so far out of courage.” 3 And it is quite true that Alexander had reason to be discouraged. He had but eight or nine thousand men, and no money

1 Holinshed, iv. 658 seq. Stowe, 717. Hoofd Vervolgh, 145.

2 Bor, ii. 699. 700. Stowe, Holinshed, *ubi sup.* ,Leyc. Corresp.' 252, 253, April <sup>16</sup>/<sub>26</sub>, 1586.

„Shenks is a worthy fellow,” said Leicester, who never could get nearer than this to the name of the terrible partisan. He also mentioned that he had given the worthy fellow a chain, as from her Majesty; adding, with an eye to Elizabeth's thrift, that if she thought he had paid too much for it, he would cheerfully pay the balance over what seemed the right sum out of his own pocket. ,Leyc. Corresp.' 227, 228.

1 Stowe, Holinshed, Bor, Hoofd, *ubi supra*.

2 ,Leyc. Corresp.' 251, <sup>30 April</sup>/<sub>10 May</sub>, 1586.

3 Ibid.

to pay even this little force. The soldiers were perishing daily, and nearly all the survivors were described by their chief as sick or maimed. The famine in the obedient Provinces was universal, the whole population was desperate with hunger; and the merchants, frightened by Drake's successes, and appalled by the ruin all around them, drew their purse-strings inexorably. 1 „I know not to what saint to devote myself,” said Alexander. 2 He had been compelled, by the movement before Grave, to withdraw Haultepenne from the projected enterprise against Neusz, and he was quite aware of the cheerful view which Leicester was inclined to take of their relative positions. „The English think they are going to do great things,” said he, „and consider themselves masters of the field.” 3

Nevertheless, on the 11th May, the dejected melancholy man had left Brussels, and joined his little army, consisting of three thousand Spaniards and five thousand of all other nations. 4 His veterans, though unpaid, ragged, and half-starved, were in raptures to have their idolised commander among them again, and vowed that under 11th May, his guidance there was no- 1586. thing which they could not accomplish. The King's honour, his own, that of the army, all were pledged to take the city. On the success of that enterprise, he said, depended all his past conquests, and every hope for the future. Leicester and the English, whom he called the head and body of the rebel forces, were equally pledged to relieve the place, and were bent upon meeting him in the field. 5 The Earl had taken some forts

in the Batavia—Betuwe, or „good meadow,” which he pronounced as fertile and about as large as Herefordshire, 1—and was now threatening Nymegen, a city which had been gained for Philip by the last effort of Schenk, on the royalist side. He was now observing Alexander's demonstrations against Grave, but, after the recent success in virtualising that place, he felt a just confidence in its security.

On the 31st May the trenches were commenced, and on the 5th June the batteries were opened. The work went 31st May, rapidly forward when Farnese 1586. was in the field. „The Prince of Parma doth batter it like a prince,” 2 said Lord North, admiring the enemy with the enthusiasm of an honest soldier. On the 6th of June, as Alexander rode through the camp to reconnoitre, previous to an attack, a well-directed cannonball carried away the hinder half of his horse. 3 The Prince fell to the ground, and, for a moment, dismay was in the Spanish ranks. At the next instant, though somewhat bruised, he was on his feet again, and, having found the breach sufficiently promising, he determined on the assault.

As a preliminary measure, he wished to occupy a tower which had been battered nearly to ruins, situate near the river. Captain de Solis was ordered, with sixty veterans, to take possession of this tower, and to „have a look at the countenance of the enemy, without amusing himself with anything else.” 4 The tower was soon secured, but Solis, in disobedience to his written instructions 5 led his men against the ravelin, which was still in a state of perfect defence. A musket-ball soon stretched

1 „Cierran la bolsa.” Parma to Philip, 9 May, 1586. (Arch. de Simancas MS.)

2 Same to same, 27 April, 1586. (Arch. de Simancas, MS.)

3 Letter of 9 May, MS.

4 Parma to Philip II. 27 May, 1586. (Arch. de Sim. MS.)

5 Parma to Philip II., 27 May, 11 June, 1586. (Ibid.)

1 Leicester to the Queen, 27 May, 1586. (S. P. Office MS.)

2 North to Burghley, 29 May, 1586. (S. P. Office MS.)

3 Stowe, 718. Strada, ii. 416.

4 Parma to Philip, 11 June, 1586. (Arch. de Simancas, MS.)

5 Parma to Philip II., MS. just cited.



him dead beneath the wall, and his followers, still attempting to enter the impracticable breach, were repelled by a shower of stones and blazing pitch-hoops. Hot sand, too, poured from sieves and baskets, insinuated itself within the armour of the Spaniards, and occasioned such exquisite suffering, that many threw themselves into the river to allay the pain. Emerging refreshed, but confused, they attempted in vain to renew the onset. Several of the little band were slain, the assault was quite unsuccessful, and the trumpet sounded a recall. 1 So completely discomfited were the Spaniards by this repulse, and so thoroughly at their ease were the besieged, that a soldier let himself down from the ramparts of the town for the sake of plundering the body of Captain Solis, who was richly dressed, and, having accomplished this feat, was quietly helped back again by his comrades from above. 2

To the surprise of the besiegers, however, on the very next morning came a request from the governor of the city, Baron Hemart, to negotiate for a surrender. Alexander was, naturally, but too glad to grant easy terms, and upon the 7th of June the garrison left the town with colours displayed and drums beating, and the Prince of Parma marched into it, at the head of his troops. He found a year's provision there for six thousand men, while, at the same time, the walls had suffered so little, that he must have been obliged to wait long for a practicable breach. 3

„There was no good reason even for women to have surrendered the place,” exclaimed Leicester, when he heard the

news. 1 And the Earl had cause to be enraged at such a result. He had received a letter only the day before, signed by Hemart himself and by all the officers in Grave, asserting their determination and ability to hold the place for a good five months, or for an indefinite period, and until they should be relieved. And indeed all the officers, with three exceptions, had protested against the base surrender. But at the bottom of the catastrophe—of the disastrous loss of the city and the utter ruin of young Hemart—was a woman. The governor was governed by his mistress, a lady of good family in the place, but of Spanish inclinations, and she, for some mysterious reasons, had persuaded him thus voluntarily to capitulate. 2

Parma lost no time, however, in exulting over his success. Upon the same day the towns of Megen and Batenburg surrendered to him, and immediately afterwards siege was laid to Venlo, a town of importance, lying thirty miles farther up the Meuse. The wife and family of Martin Schenck were in the city, together with two hundred horses, and from forty to one hundred

1 Bruce's, *Leyc. Corresp.* 288.

2 Meteren, xiii. 235. Bruce's, *Leyc. Corresp.* 299-310. Strada, ii. 418. Leicester to the Queen,

6 June, 1586. (S. P. Office MS.) North to 16

Burghley, 16 June, 1586. (Ibid).

„The governor, Hemart,” said North „is a gentleman of Gelder, of great kindred, living, and acquaintance. There be many vehement presumptions to argue a treacherous practice with the enemy. The best that can be made of it was most vile cowardice, mixed with such negligence as is unspeakable. In the time of that siege he spent his time in his house, followed with his harlot, and when he came abroad, he could not be gotten by entreaty of captains, burghers, or soldiers to do anything for the defence of the town, but straightway entered into a contenance of the people, wishing rather to give up the town than suffer the blood of so many innocents to be spilt. Which purpose he did prosecute with speed, and sent a drum to the enemy for parley. The town was impossible to be assaulted,” &c. &c.

1 Strada, ii. 417. Bor, ii. 707, 708.

2 Bruce's, *Leyc. Corresp.* 288.

3 Strada, ii. 418. Bor, ii. 707, 708. Parma to Philip II. 27 May, 11 June, 1586. (Arch. de Simancas MS.) North to Burghley, 29 May 1586. (S. P. Office MS.) Leicester

8 June to the Queen, 6 June, 1586. (Ibid.) 16

thousand crowns in money, plate, and furniture belonging to him.<sup>1</sup>

That bold partisan, accompanied by the mad Welshman, Roger Williams, at the head of one hundred and thirty English lances and thirty of Schenk's men, made a wild nocturnal attempt to cut their way through the besieging force, and penetrate to the city. They passed through the enemy's lines, killed all the corps-de-garde, and many Spanish troopers—the terrible Martin's own hand being most effective in this midnight slaughter—and reached the very door of Parma's tent, where they killed his secretary and many of his guards. It was even reported, and generally believed, that Farnese himself had been in imminent danger, that Schenk had fired his pistol at him unsuccessfully, and had then struck him on the head with its butt-end, and that the Prince had only saved his life by leaping from his horse, and scrambling through a ditch.<sup>2</sup> But these seem to have been fables. The alarm at last became general, the dawn of a summer's day was fast approaching, the drums beat to arms, and the bold marauders were obliged to effect their retreat, as they best might, hotly pursued by near two thousand men. Having slain many of the Spanish army, and lost nearly half their own number, they at last obtained shelter in Wachtendonk.<sup>3</sup>

Soon afterwards the place capitulated, without waiting for a battery, upon moderate terms. Schenk's wife was sent away courteously with her 28th June, family, in a coach and four, 1586.

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1 North to Burghley, <sup>26 June</sup>/<sub>6 July</sub>, 1586. (S. P. Office MS.) T. Doyley to Burghley, <sup>24 June</sup>/<sub>4 July</sub>, 1586. (S. P. Office MS.)

2 North to Burghley, <sup>16</sup>/<sub>26</sub> June, 1586. (S. P. Office MS.)

3 Ibid. Meteren, xiii. 235. Doyley to Burghley, <sup>24 June</sup>/<sub>4 July</sub>, 1586. (S. P. Office MS.)

and with as much „apparel” as might be carried with her. His property was confiscated, for „no fair wars could be made with him.”<sup>1</sup>

Thus, within a few weeks after taking the field, the „dejected, melancholy” man, who was so „out of courage,” and the soldiers who were so „marvellously beginning to run away”—according to the Earl of Leicester—had swept their enemy from every town on the Meuse. That river was now, throughout its whole course, in the power of the Spaniards. The Province of Brabant became thoroughly guarded again by its foss, and the enemy's road was opened into the northern Provinces.

Leicester, meantime, had not distinguished himself. It must be confessed that he had been sadly outgeneralled. The man who had talked of following the enemy inch by inch, and who had pledged himself not only to protect Grave, and any other place that might be attacked, but even to recover Antwerp and Bruges within a few weeks, had wasted the time in very desultory operations. After the St. George feasting, Knewstub sermons, and forces of Hercules, were all finished, the Earl had taken the field with five thousand foot and fifteen hundred horse. His intention was to clear the Yssel, by getting possession of Doesburg and Zutphen, but, hearing of Parma's demonstration upon Grave, he abandoned the contemplated siege of those cities, and came to Arnhem. He then crossed the Rhine into the Isle of Batavia, and thence, after taking a few sconces of inferior importance—while Schenk, meanwhile, was building on the Island of Gravenweert, at the bifurcation of the Rhine and Waal, the sconce so celebrated a century

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1 Doyley to Burghley, *ubi sup.* Leicester to the Queen, <sup>26 June</sup>/<sub>6 July</sub>, 1586. (S. P. Office MS.) North to Burghley, same date. (S. P. Office MS.) Parma to Philip II. 8 July, 1586. (Arch. de Simancas, MS.) Compare Strada, ii. 423. Meteren, xiii. 235.

later as „Schenk's Fort" (Schenken-schans)—he was preparing to pass the Waal in order to attack Farnese, when he heard, to his astonishment, of the surrender of Grave. 1

He could therefore—to his chagrin—no longer save that important city, but he could, at least, cut off the head of the culprit. Leicester was in Bommel when he heard of Baron Hemart's faint-heartedness or treachery, and his wrath was extravagant in proportion to the exultation with which his previous success had inspired him. He breathed nothing but revenge against the coward and the traitor, who had delivered up the town in „such lewd and beastly sort." 2

„I will never depart hence," he said, „till by the goodness of God I be satisfied someway of this villain's treachery." 3 There could be little doubt that Hemart deserved punishment. There could be as little that Leicester would mete it out to him in ample measure. „The lewd villain who gave up Grave," said he, „and the captains as deep in fault as himself, shall all suffer together." 4

Hemart came boldly to meet him. „The honest man came to me at Bommel," said Leicester, and he assured the government that it was in the hope of persuading the magistrates of that and other towns to imitate his own treachery. 5

But the magistrates straightway delivered the culprit to the governor-general, who immediately placed him under arrest. 26th June, A court-martial was summoned 1586. ed 26th of June, at Utrecht, consisting of Hohenlo, Essex, and other distinguished officers. They found that

the conduct of the prisoner merited death, but left it to the Earl to decide whether various extenuating circumstances did not justify a pardon. 1 Hohenlo and Norris exerted themselves to procure a mitigation of the young man's sentence, and they excited thereby the governor's deep indignation. Norris, according to Leicester, was in love with the culprit's aunt, and was therefore especially desirous of saving his life. 2 Moreover, much use was made of the discredit which had been thrown by the Queen on the Earl's authority, and it was openly maintained, that, being no longer governor-general, he had no authority to order execution upon a Netherland officer. 3

The favourable circumstances urged in the case, were, that Hemart was a young man, without experience in military matters, and that he had been overcome by the supplications and outcries of the women, panic-struck after the first assault. There were no direct proofs of treachery, or even of personal cowardice. He begged hard for a pardon, not on account of his life, but for the sake of his reputation. He earnestly implored permission to serve under the Queen of England, as a private soldier, without pay, on land or sea, for as many years as she should specify, and to be selected for the most dangerous employments, in order that, before he died, he might wipe out the disgrace, which, through his fault, in an hour of weakness, had come upon an ancient and honourable house. 4 Much interest was made for him—his family connections being powerful—and a general impression prevailing that he had erred through folly

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1 North to Burghley,  $\frac{16}{26}$  June, 1586. (S.

P. Office MS.) Hoofd Vervolgh, 156.

2 Bruce's „Leyc. Corresp.' 301, 310, 313.

3 Leicester to the Queen,  $\frac{14}{24}$  June, 1586.

(S. P. Office MS.)

4 Hoofd Vervolgh, 156. Meteren, xiii. 235vo.

1 Meteren, xiii. 235vo.

2 Leicester to the Queen,  $\frac{6}{16}$  June, 1586.

(S. P. Office MS.)

3 Bruce's „Leyc. Corresp.' 285.

4 Ibid, 287.

5 Leicester to the Queen, MS. before cited.



rather than deeper guilt. But Leicester, beating himself upon the breast—as he was wont when excited—swore that there should be no pardon for such a traitor. 1 The States of Holland and Zeeland, likewise, were decidedly in favour of a severe example. 2

Hemart was accordingly led to the scaffold on the 28th June. He spoke to the people with great calmness, and, in two languages, French and 28th June, Flemish, declared that he was 1586.

guiltless of treachery, but that the terror and tears of the women, in an hour of panic, had made a coward of him. 3 He was beheaded, standing. The two captains, Du Ban and Koeboeckum, who had also been condemned, suffered with him. 4 A third captain, likewise convicted, was, „for very just cause,” pardoned by Leicester. 5 The Earl persisted in believing that Hemart had surrendered the city as part of a deliberate plan, and affirmed that in such a time, when men had come to think no more of giving up a town than of abandoning a house, it was highly necessary to afford an example to traitors and satisfaction to the people. 6 And the people were thoroughly satisfied, according to the governor, and only expressed their regret that three or four members of the States-General could not have their heads cut off as well, being as arrant knaves as Hemart; „and so I think they be,” added Leicester. 7

Parma having thus made himself master of the Meuse, lost no time in

making a demonstration upon the parallel course of the Rhine, thirty miles farther east. 1 Schenk, Kloet, and other partisans, kept that portion of the archiepiscopate and of Westphalia in a state of perpetual commotion. 2 Early in the preceding year, Count de Meurs had, by a fortunate stratagem, captured the town of Neusz for the deposed elector, and Herman Kloet, a young and most determined Geldrian soldier, now commanded in the place. 3

The Elector Ernest had made a visit in disguise to the camp of Parma, and had represented the necessity of recovering the city. It had become the stronghold of heretics, rebels, and banditti. The Rhine was in their hands, and with it the perpetual power of disturbing the loyal Netherlands. It was as much the interest of his Catholic Majesty as that of the Archbishop that Neusz should be restored to its lawful owner. Parma had felt the force of this reasoning, and had early in the year sent Haultepenne to invest the city. He had been obliged to recal that commander during the siege of Grave. The place being reduced, Alexander, before the grass could grow beneath his feet, advanced to the Rhine in person. Early in July he appeared before the walls of Neusz with eight thousand foot and two thousand horse. The garrison under Kloet numbered scarcely more than sixteen hundred effective soldiers, 4 all Netherlanders and Germans, none being English.

The city is twenty miles below Cologne. It was so well fortified that a century before it had stood a year's siege from the famous Charles the Bold, who, after all, had been obliged to retire. 5 It had also resisted the strenuous efforts of Charles the Fifth, 6 and it was now

1 Hoofd, *ubi sup.*

2 Resol. Holl., 24 June, 1 July, 1586 bl. 220. Wagenaar, viii. 128.

3 Hoofd, Meteren, Wagenaar, *ubi sup.*

4 Ibid.

5 Leicester to Burghley,  $\frac{18}{28}$  June, 1586

(S. P. Office MS.)

6 Bruce's 'Leyc. Corresp.' 309 seq.

7 Leicester to the Queen,  $\frac{14}{24}$  June, 1586.

Saine to Burghley  $\frac{18}{28}$  June, 1586. (S. P. Office, MSS.)

1 Parma to Philip 11. 8 July, 1586. (Arch. de Simancas, MS.)

2 Wagenaar, viii. 131. Hoofd Vervolgh, 154.

3 Strada, ii. 425. Wagenaar, viii. 182.

4 Strada, &c., MS. just cited.

5 Meteren, xiii. 235<sup>vo</sup>.

6 Ibid.

stronger than it ever had been. It was thoroughly well provisioned, so that it was safe enough, „if those within it,” said Leicester; „be men.”<sup>1</sup> The Earl expressed the opinion, however, that „those fellows were not good to defend towns, unless the besiegers obliged to swim to the attack.”<sup>2</sup> The issue was to show whether the sarcasm were just or not. Meantime the town was considered by the governor-general to be secure, „unless towns were to be had for the asking.”<sup>3</sup>

Neusz is not immediately upon the Rhine, but that river, which sweeps away in a north-easterly direction from the walls, throws out an arm which completely encircles the town. A part of the place, cut into an island by the Erpt, was strengthened by two redoubts. This island was abandoned, as being too weak to hold, and the Spaniards took possession of it immediately.<sup>4</sup> There were various preliminary and sanguinary sorties and skirmishes, during which the Spaniards, after having been once driven from the island, again occupied that position. Archbishop Ernest came into the camp, and, before proceeding to a cannonade, Parma offered to the city certain terms of capitulation, which were approved by that prelate. Kloet replied to this proposal, that he was wedded to the town and to his honour, which were as one. These he was incapable of sacrificing, but his life he was ready to lay down.<sup>5</sup> There was, through some misapprehension, a delay in reporting this answer to Farnese. Meantime that general became impatient, and advanced to the battery

of the Italian regiment. Pretending to be a plenipotentiary from the commander-in-chief, he expostulated in a loud voice at the slowness of their counsels. Hardly had he begun to speak, when a shower of balls rattled about him. His own soldiers were terrified at his danger, and a cry arose in the town that „Holofernese”—as the Flemings and Germans were accustomed to nickname Farnese—was dead.<sup>1</sup> Strange to relate, he was quite unharmed, and walked back to his tent with dignified slowness and a very frowning face. It was said that this breach of truce had been begun by the Spaniards, who had fired first, and had been immediately answered by the town. This was hotly denied, and Parma sent Colonel Tassis with a flag of truce to the commander, to rebuke and to desire an explanation of this dishonourable conduct.<sup>2</sup>

The answer given, or imagined, was that Commander Kloet had been sound asleep, but that he now much regretted this untoward accident. The explanation was received with derision, for it seemed hardly probable that so young and energetic a soldier would take the opportunity to refresh himself with slumber at a moment when a treaty for the capitulation of a city under his charge was under discussion. This terminated the negotiation.<sup>3</sup>

A few days afterwards, the feast of St. James was celebrated in the Spanish camp, with bonfires and other demonstrations of hilarity. The townsmen are said to have desecrated the same holiday by roasting alive in the market-place two unfortunate soldiers, who had been captured in a sortie a few days before; besides burning the body of the holy Saint Quirinus, with other holy relics.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Bruce's, *Leyc. Corresp.* 250.

<sup>2</sup> Leicester to Burghley, <sup>20</sup>/<sub>30</sub> July, 1586.

(S. P. Office MS.)

<sup>3</sup> Same to the Queen, <sup>8</sup>/<sub>18</sub> July. (S. P. Office MS.)

<sup>4</sup> Strada, ii. 430.

<sup>5</sup> North to Burghley, 26 July 1586. (S. P. Office MS.)

<sup>1</sup> Hoofd Vervolgh, 179.

<sup>2</sup> Strada, ii. 433. Hoofd, *ubi sup.*

<sup>3</sup> Hoofd. Strada, *ubi sup.* Meteren, xiii. 236 *seq.*

<sup>4</sup> Parma to Philip II. 4 Aug. 1586. (Arch. de Simancas, MS.) Compare Strada, ii. 434.

The detestable deed was to be most horribly avenged.

A steady cannonade from forty-five great guns was kept up from 2 A.M. of July 15 until the dawn of the following day; the cannoneers<sup>1</sup> being all provided with milk and vinegar to cool the pieces. At daybreak the assault was ordered. Eight separate attacks were made with the usual impetuosity of Spaniards, and were steadily repulsed.<sup>2</sup> At the ninth, the outer wall was carried, and the Spaniards shouting „Santiago,” poured over it, bearing back all resistance. An Italian Knight of the Sepulchre, Cesar Guidicioni by name, and a Spanish ensign, one Alphonso de Mesa, with his colours in one hand and a ladder in the other, each claimed the honour of having first mounted the breach. Both being deemed equally worthy of reward, Parma, after the city had been won, took from his own cap a sprig of jewels and a golden wheat-ear ornamented with a gem, which he had himself worn in place of a plume, and thus presented each with a brilliant token of his regard.<sup>3</sup> The wall was then strengthened against the inner line of fortification, and all night long a desperate conflict was maintained in the dark upon the narrow space between the two barriers. Before daylight Kloet, who then, as always, had led his men in the most desperate adventures, was carried into the town, wounded in five places, and with his leg almost severed at the thigh.<sup>4</sup> „Tis the bravest man,” said the enthusiastic Lord North, „that was ever heard of in the world.”<sup>5</sup> He is but a boy,” said Alexander

Farnese, „but a commander of extraordinary capacity and valour.”<sup>1</sup>

Early in the morning, when this mishap was known, an officer was sent to the camp of the besiegers to treat. The soldiers received him with furious laughter, and denied him access to the general. „Commander Kloet had waked from his nap at a wrong time,” they said, „and the Prince of Parma was now sound asleep, in his turn.”<sup>2</sup> There was no possibility of commencing a negotiation. The Spaniards, heated by the conflict, maddened by opposition, and inspired by the desire to sack a wealthy city, overpowered all resistance. „My little soldiers were not to be restrained,”<sup>3</sup> said Farnese, and so compelling a reluctant consent on the part of the commander-in-chief to an assault, the Italian and Spanish legions poured into the town at two opposite gates, which were no longer strong enough to withstand the enemy. The two streams met in the heart of the place, and swept every living thing in their path out of existence. The garrison was butchered to a man, and subsequently many of the inhabitants—men, women, and children—also, although the women, to the honour of Alexander, had been at first secured from harm in some of the churches, where they had been ordered to take refuge. The first blast of indignation was against the commandant of the place. Alexander, who had admired his courage, was not unfavourably disposed towards him, but Archbishop Ernest vehemently demanded his immediate death, as a personal favour to himself.<sup>4</sup> As the

There is no authority but that of Farnese for the statement of this horrible crime, but I feel it my duty to record it.

<sup>1</sup> North to Burghley, 26 July, 1586. (S. P. Office MS.)

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>3</sup> Strada, ii. 435.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.* 436. North to Burghley, MS.

<sup>5</sup> North to Burghley, MS.

<sup>1</sup> Parma to Philip, 4 Aug. 1586. MS.

<sup>2</sup> Strada, ii. 437.

<sup>3</sup> Parma to Philip, 4 Aug. 1586. (Arch. de Simancas, MS.)

<sup>4</sup> The Jesuit Strada, ii. 438, is the authority for the statement, founded upon Alexander's own letters; more of which were before him than can now be found in any single collection of documents. I have noticed very few of the Simancas letters relating to Par-



churchman was nominally sovereign of the city, although in reality a beggarly dependant on Philip's alms, Farnese felt bound to comply. The manner in which it was at first supposed that the Bishop's Christian request had been complied with, sent a shudder through every heart in the Netherlands. „They took Kloet, wounded as he was,” said Lord North, „and first strangled him, then smeared him with pitch, and burnt him with gunpowder; thus, with their holiness, they made a tragical end of an heroical service. It is wondered that the Prince would suffer so great an outrage to be done to so noble a soldier, who did but his duty.”<sup>1</sup>

But this was an error. A Jesuit priest<sup>2</sup> was sent to the house of the commandant, for a humane effort was thought necessary in order to save the soul of the man whose life was forfeited for the crime of defending his city. The culprit was found lying in bed. His wife, a woman of remarkable beauty,<sup>3</sup> with her sister, was in attendance upon him. The spectacle of those two fair women, nursing a wounded soldier fallen upon the field of honour, might have

nese that do not seem to have been at Strada's disposal—although, of course, he only gives a very brief epitome of them in the Latin language—while he has used many others of which there are no copies at Simancas.

1 North to Burghley, <sup>26 July</sup> 5 Aug., 1586. (S.

P. Office MS.) Leicester's account was still more horrible:—„After Kloet was brought to the market place,” he wrote to Walsingham, „being sore wounded before, they laid him upon a table, and bound him, and anointed him with tar all over his body, and half-strangling him, burnt him cruelly.”

Bruce's, Leyc. Corresp.' 369, <sup>29 July</sup> 8 Aug., 1586.

Other English letters described the fate of the commandant in a similar manner, but the crime, although odious, was not quite so atrocious as it was at first believed to be.

2 „Ad quem lecto jacentem misso Societatis Jesu sacerdote, cujus operâ in eo saltem mortis articulo a secunda se morte præeriperat,” &c. Strada, ii. 438.

3 Strada, ii. MS. last cited.

softened devils with sympathy. But the Jesuit was closely followed by a band of soldiers, who, notwithstanding the supplications of the women, and the demand of Kloet to be indulged with a soldier's death, tied a rope round the commandant's neck, dragged him from his bed, and hanged him from his own window. The Calvinist clergyman, Fosserus of Oppenheim, the deacons of the congregation, two military officers, and—said Parma—„forty other rascals,” were murdered in the same way at the same time.<sup>1</sup> The bodies remained at the window till they were devoured by the flames, which soon consumed the house. For a vast conflagration, caused none knew whether by accident, by the despair of the inhabitants, by the previous arrangements of the commandant, by the latest-arrived bands of the besiegers enraged that the Italians and Spaniards had been beforehand with them in the spoils, or—as Farnese more naturally believed—by the special agency of the Almighty, offended with the burning of Saint Quirinus,<sup>2</sup> now came to complete the horror of the scene. Three quarters of the town were at once in a blaze. The churches, where the affrighted women had been cowering during the sack and slaughter, were soon on fire, and now, amid the crash of falling houses and the uproar of the drunken soldiery, those unhappy victims were seen flitting along the flaming streets, seeking refuge against the fury of the elements in the more horrible cruelty of man. The fire lasted all day and night, and not one stone would have been left upon another, had not the body of a second saint, saved on a former occasion from the heretics by the piety of a citizen,

1 „Se ahorcaron con el comandante, el ministro, los consistoriantes, y quaranta otros vellacos,” &c. Parma to Philip, 4 Aug. 1586. (Arch. de Simancas, MS.) Compare Strada, ii. 438. Meteren, xiii. 236. Hoofd Vervolgh, 179, 180. Bor, ii. 738.

2 Strada, ii. 441, 442.

been fortunately deposited in his house. At this point the conflagration was stayed—for the flames refused to consume these holy relics 1—but almost the whole of the town was destroyed, while at least four thousand people, citizens and soldiers, had perished by sword or fire.” 2

Three hundred survivors of the garrison took refuge in a tower. Its base was surrounded, and, after brief parley, they descended as prisoners. 4th August, The Prince and Haultepenne 1586. attempted in vain to protect them against the fury of the soldiers, and every man of them was instantly put to death. 3

The next day, Alexander gave orders that the wife and sister of the commandant should be protected—for they had escaped, as if by miracle, from all the horrors of that day and night—and sent, under escort, to their friends. 4 Neusz had nearly ceased to exist, for, according to contemporaneous accounts, but eight houses had escaped destruction. 5

And the reflection was most painful to Leicester and to every generous Englishman or Netherlander in the country, that this important city and its heroic defenders might have been preserved, but for want of harmony and want of money. 6 Twice had the

Earl got together a force of four thousand men for the relief of the place, and twice had he been obliged to disband them again for the lack of funds to set them in the field. He had pawned his plate and other valuables, 1 exhausted his credit, and had nothing for it but to wait for the Queen's tardy remittances, and to wrangle with the States; for the leaders of that body were unwilling to accord large supplies to a man who had become personally suspected by them, and was the representative of a deeply-suspected government. Meanwhile, one-third at least of the money which really found its way from time to time out of England, was filched from the „poor starved wretches,” as Leicester called his soldiers, by the dishonesty of Norris, uncle of Sir John and army-treasurer. This man was growing so rich on his speculations, on his commissions, and on his profits from paying the troops in a depreciated coin, that Leicester declared the whole revenue of his own landed estates in England to be less than that functionary's annual income. 2

to him to change this government for that of Harlingen in Friesland, where Lord North was then installed. But Cecil observed that he was „resolved to keep the Brill still, as one that would rather keep a shrew he knoweth than a shrew he knoweth not.” He was much disgusted with the perpetual discord which had succeeded the brief enthusiasm upon Leicester's arrival. The wrangling between Leicester and his officers, and between them all and the States, offended the young soldier so much that he was anxious to leave the Netherlands. „Bravely was Nuys defended by Kloet, but evil relieved by us,” he wrote to his father. „Our affairs here be such as that which we conclude overnight is broke in the morning, we agree not one with another, but we are divided in many factions, so as if the enemy were as strong as we are factious and irresolute, I think we should make shipwreck of the cause this summer.” Sir T. Cecil to Lord Burghley, <sup>21</sup>/<sub>31</sub> July, 1586. (S. P. Office MS.)

1 Leicester to Burghley, <sup>10</sup>/<sub>20</sub> Aug. 1586. (S. P. Office MS.)

2 Bruce's „Leyc. Corresp.” 260, 264, 269, 303.

1 Strada, ii. 440.

2 Ibid. 442.

3 Ibid. 439.

4 Ibid. 438.

5 Bor. ii. 738. Stowe, 734. Hoofd Vervolgh, 179, 180. Meteren, xiii. 236 seq. Strada, ii. 436-442. Parma to Philip II. 4 Aug. 1586. (Arch. de Simancas, MS.)

North to Burghley, <sup>26</sup>/<sub>5</sub> July, 1586. Same to

same, <sup>12</sup>/<sub>22</sub> Aug. 1586. Leicester to Burghley,

<sup>29</sup>/<sub>5</sub> July. T. Cecil to same, <sup>21</sup>/<sub>31</sub> July. B. Clerke

to same, <sup>24</sup>/<sub>2</sub> July. W. Knollys to same,

<sup>1</sup>/<sub>11</sub> Aug. T. Doyley to same, <sup>8</sup>/<sub>18</sub> Aug. (S. P. Office MSS.)

6 Sir Thomas Cecil, eldest son of the Lord Treasurer, was then governor of the cautionary town of Brill. It had been proposed

Thus it was difficult to say whether the „ragged rogues” of Elizabeth or the maimed and neglected soldiers of Philip were in the more pitiable plight.

The only consolation in the recent reduction of Neusz was to be found in the fact that Parma had only gained a position, for the town had ceased to exist; and in the fiction that he had paid for his triumph by the loss of *six thousand* soldiers, killed and wounded.<sup>1</sup> In reality not more than five hundred of Farnese's army lost their lives; 2 and although the town, excepting some churches, had certainly been destroyed, yet the Prince was now master of the Rhine as far as Cologne, and of the Meuse as far as Grave. The famine which pressed so sorely upon him might now be relieved, and his military communications with Germany be considered secure.

The conqueror now turned his attention to Rheinberg, twenty-five miles farther down the river.<sup>3</sup>

Sir Philip Sidney had not been well satisfied by the comparative idleness in which, from these various circumstances, he had been compelled to remain. Early in the spring he had been desirous of making an attack upon Flanders by capturing the town of Steenberg. The faithful Roger Williams had strongly seconded the proposal. „We wish to show your Excellency,” said he to Leicester, „that we are not sound asleep.”<sup>4</sup>

The Welshman was not likely to be accused of somnolence, but on this occasion Sidney and himself had been overruled. At a later moment, and during the siege of Neusz, Sir Philip had the satisfaction of making a successful foray into Flanders.

The expedition had been planned by Prince Maurice of Nassau, and was his earliest military achievement. He proposed carrying by surprise the city of Axel, a well-built, strongly-fortified town on the south-western edge of the great Scheldt estuary, and very important from its position. Its acquisition would make the hold of the patriots and the English upon Sluys and Ostend more secure, and give them many opportunities of annoying the enemy in Flanders.

Early in July, Maurice wrote to the Earl of Leicester, communicating the particulars of his scheme, but begging that the affair might be „very secretly handled,” and kept from every one but Sidney. Leicester accordingly sent his nephew to Maurice, that they might consult together upon the enterprise, and make sure „that there was no ill intent, there being so much treachery in the world.”<sup>1</sup> Sidney found no treachery in young Maurice, but only a noble and intelligent love of adventure, and the two arranged their plans in harmony.

Leicester, then, in order to deceive the enemy, came to Bergen-op-Zoom, with five hundred men, where he 16, 17 July, remained two days, not sleeping a wink, as he averred, during the whole time. In the night of Tuesday, 16th of July, the five hundred English soldiers were despatched by water, under charge of Lord Willoughby, „who,” said the Earl, would needs go with them.” Young

<sup>1</sup> Bruce, „Leyc. Corresp.” 363. „He has lost 3000 of his soldiers and as many hurt.” (<sup>1</sup>) Leicester to Walsingham, 27 July, 1586. „Of the enemy not less than 3000 slain,” said North, 26 July, MS. *ubi supra*. „The town is gone, clean burnt to the ground,” wrote Leicester to Burghley, „and to the number of 4000 dead in the ditches.” Letter of <sup>29</sup> July MS. *ubi supra*.  
8 Aug.

<sup>2</sup> North to Burghley, <sup>13</sup>/<sub>22</sub> Aug. MS.

Bor, Hoofd, Meteren, Strada, *ubi supra*.

<sup>4</sup> Williams to Leicester, <sup>17</sup>/<sub>27</sub> Feb. 1586.

[Brit. Mus. Galba, C. ix. p. 85, MS.]

<sup>1</sup> Leicester to the Queen, <sup>8</sup>/<sub>18</sub> July, 1586.  
(S. P. Office MS.)



Hatton, too, son of Sir Christopher, also volunteered on the service, „as his first nursling.” 1 Sidney had five hundred of his own Zeeland regiment in readiness, and the rendezvous was upon the broad waters of the Scheldt, opposite Flushing. 2 The plan was neatly carried out, and the united flotilla, in a dark, calm, midsummer’s night, rowed across the smooth estuary and landed at Ter Neuse, about a league from Axel. Here they were joined by Maurice with some Netherland companies, and the united troops, between two and three thousand strong, marched at once to the place proposed. Before two in the morning they had reached Axel, but found the moat very deep. Forty soldiers immediately plunged in, however, carrying their ladders with them, swam across, scaled the rampart, killed the guard, whom they found asleep in their beds, and opened the gates for their comrades. The whole force then marched in, the Dutch companies under Colonel Pyron being first, Lord Willoughby’s men being second, and Sir Philip with his Zeelanders bringing up the rear. 3 The garrison, between five and six hundred in number, though surprised, resisted gallantly, and were all put to the sword. Of the invaders, not a single man lost his life. Sidney most generously rewarded from his own purse the adventurous soldiers who had swum the moat; and it was to his care and intelligence that the success of Prince Maurice’s scheme was generally attributed. The achievement was hailed with great satisfaction, and it somewhat raised

the drooping spirits of the patriots after their severe losses at Grave and Venlo. „This victory hath happened in good time,” wrote Thomas Cecil to his father, „and hath made us somewhat to lift up our heads.” 1 A garrison of eight hundred, under Colonel Pyron, was left in Axel, and the dykes around were then pierced. Upwards of two millions’ worth of property in grass, cattle, corn, was thus immediately destroyed 2 in the territory of the obedient Netherlands.

After an unsuccessful attempt to surprise Gravelines, 3 the governor of which place, the veteran La Motte, was not so easily taken napping, Sir Philip, having gained much reputation by this conquest of Axel, then joined the main body of the army, under Leicester, at Arnheim. 4

Yet, after all, Sir Philip had not grown in favour with her Majesty during his service in the Low Countries. He had also been disappointed in the government of Zeeland, to which post his uncle had destined him. The cause of Leicester’s ambition had been frustrated by the policy of Barneveld and Buys, in pursuance of which Count or Prince Maurice—as he was now purposely designated, in order that his rank might surpass that of the Earl 5—had become

1 Cecil to Burghley, *ubi supra*.

2 Leicester to Burghley, <sup>29 July</sup>/<sub>8 Aug.</sub>, 1586.

(S. P. Office MS.)

„Your Lordship will not believe how the town of Axel is like to annoy these parts. There is already so much corn, cattle, and grass destroyed, as is worth two millions of florins.”

3 Meteren, xiii. 236v.

4 Letters of Leicester and of Sir T. Cecil above cited. Compare Meteren, xlii. 236. Brooke’s Life of Sidney, ii. 15. Hoofd Vervolg, 181, 182; Bor, ii. 738; Wagenaar, viii. 134. Bruce’s, *Leyc. Corresp.* 337, 338.

5 His elder brother Philip William, son of William the Silent, by his first wife Anna de Buren, was Prince of Orange, but was still detained captive in Spain. The title of Prince was given by courtesy to Maurice, on the ground that in Germany all the sons succeed to the father’s title.

As the principality of Orange was not in

1 Bruce’s, *Leyc. Corresp.* 338.

2 „Before Flushing, upon the water, that it might be less noted.” Leicester to the Queen, MS. before cited.

3 Sir T. Cecil to Lord Burghley, <sup>8</sup>/<sub>18</sub> July, 1586. (S. P. Office MS.)

Leicester, however, says, „My nephew Sidney, with his band, would needs have the first entry, as the messenger told me.” (Letter to the Queen, *ubi sup.*); but the messenger seems to have been mistaken.

stadholder and captain-general both of Holland and Zeeland. The Earl had given his nephew, however, the colonelcy of the Zeeland regiment, vacant by the death of Admiral Haultain on the Kowenstyn Dyke. This promotion had excited much anger among the high officers in the Netherlands, who, at the instigation of Count Hohenlo, had presented a remonstrance upon the subject to the governor-general. It had always been the custom, they said, with the late Prince of Orange, to confer promotion according to seniority, without regard to social rank, and they were therefore unwilling that a young foreigner, who had just entered the service, should thus be advanced over the heads of veterans who had been campaigning there so many weary years. 1 At the same time the gentlemen who signed the paper protested to Sir Philip, in another letter, „with all the samehands,” that they had no personal feeling towards him, but, on the contrary, that they wished him all honour. 2

Young Maurice himself had always manifested the most friendly feelings towards Sidney, although influenced in his action by the statesmen who were already organizing a powerful opposition to Leicester. „Count Maurice showed himself constantly kind in the matter of the regiment,” said Sir Philip, „but Mr. Paul Buss has so many busses in his head, such as you shall find he will be to God and man about one pitch. Happy is the communication of them that join in the fear of God.” 3 Ho-

henlo, too, or Hollock, as he was called by the French and English, was much governed by Buys and Olden-Barneveld. Reckless and daring, but loose of life and uncertain of purpose, he was most dangerous, unless under safe guidance. Roger Williams—who vowed that but for the love he bore to Sidney and Leicester, he would not remain ten days in the Netherlands—was much disgusted by Hohenlo’s conduct in regard to the Zeeland regiment. „’Tis a mutinous request of Hollock,” said he, „that strangers should not command Netherlanders. He and his Alemaynes are farther born from Zeeland than Sir Philip is. Either you must make Hollock assured to you, or you must disgrace him. If he will not be yours, I will show you means to disinherit him of all his commands at small danger. What service doth he, Count Solms, Count Overstein, with their Alemaynes, but spend treasure and consume great contributions?” 1

It was very natural that the chivalrous Sidney, who had come to the Netherlands to win glory in the field, should be desirous of posts that would bring danger and distinction with them. He was not there merely that he might govern Flushing, important as it was, particularly as the garrison was, according to his statement, about as able to maintain the town, „as the Tower was to answer for London.” He disapproved of his wife’s inclination to join him in Holland, for he was likely—so he wrote to her father, Walsingham—,to run such a course as would not be fit for any of the feminine gender.” 2 He had been, however, grieved to the heart, by the spectacle which was perpetually exhibited of the Queen’s parsimony, and of the consequent suffering of the soldiers. Twelve or fifteen thousand Eng-

Germany, and as the title of William in that country was only that of Count, it was difficult to see any claim of Maurice to be entitled Prince so long as his brother was alive. Leicester always considered his assumption of this superior rank as a personal affront to himself.

1 Sidney to Davison, 24 Feb. 1586. (Brit. Mus. Galba C. ix. 75, MS.) Compare letters of Hohenlo in Bor. iii. 123 *seq.* Hoofd Vervolgh, 156, 157. Wagenaar, viii. 129.

2 Sidney to Davison, *ubi supra*.

3 *Ibid*.

1 R. Williams to Leicester,  $\frac{17}{27}$  Feb. 1586. (Brit. Mus. Galba, C. ix. 85, MS.)

2 Letters in Gray’s Life of Sidney, 291.

glishmen were serving in the Netherlands—more than two-thirds of them in her Majesty's immediate employment. No troops had ever fought better, or more honourably maintained the ancient glory of England. But rarely had more ragged and wretched warriors been seen than they, after a few months' campaigning.

The Irish Kernes—some fifteen hundred of whom were among the auxiliaries—were better off, for they habitually dispensed with clothing; an apron from waist to knee being the only protection of these wild Kelts, who fought with the valour, and nearly in the costume of Homeric heroes. Fearing nothing, needing nothing, sparing nothing, they stalked about the fens of Zeeland upon their long stilts, or leaped across running rivers, scaling ramparts, robbing the highways, burning, butchering, and maltreating the villages and their inhabitants, with as little regard for the laws of Christian warfare as for those of civilized costume. 1

Other soldiers, more sophisticated as to apparel, were less at their ease. The generous Sidney spent all his means, and loaded himself with debt, in order to relieve the necessities of the poor soldiers. He protested that if the Queen would not pay her troops, she would lose her troops, but that no living man should say the fault was in him. „What relief I can do them I will,” he wrote to his father-in-law; „I will spare no danger, if occasion serves. I am sure that no creature shall lay injustice to my charge.” 2

Very soon it was discovered that the starving troops had to contend not only with the Queen's niggardliness but with the dishonesty of her agents. Treasurer Norris was constantly accused by Leicester and Sidney of gross speculation. Five per cent., according to Sir Philip,

was lost to the Zeeland soldiers in every payment, „and God knows,” he said, „they want no such hindrance, being scarce able to keep life with their entire pay. Truly it is but poor increase to her Majesty, considering what loss it is to the miserable soldier.” Discipline and endurance were sure to be sacrificed, in the end, to such shortsighted economy. „When soldiers,” said Sidney, „grow to despair, and give up towns, then it is too late to buy with hundred thousands what might have been saved with a trifle.” 1

This plain dealing, on the part of Sidney, was anything but agreeable to the Queen, who was far from feeling regret that his high-soaring expectations had been somewhat blighted in the Provinces. He often expressed his mortification that her Majesty was disposed to interpret everything to his disadvantage. „I understand,” said he, „that I am called ambitious and very proud at home, but certainly, if they knew my heart, they would not altogether so judge me.” 2 Elizabeth had taken part with Hohenlo against Sir Philip in the matter of the Zeeland regiment, and in this perhaps she was not entirely to be blamed. But she inveighed needlessly against his ambitious seeking of the office, and—as Walsingham observed—„she was very apt, upon every light occasion, to find fault with him.” 3 It is probable that his complaints against the army-treasurer, and his manful defence of the „miserable soldiers,” more than counterbalanced, in the Queen's estimation, his chivalry in the field.

Nevertheless he had now the satisfaction of having gained an important city in Flanders; and on subsequently joining the army under his uncle, he indulged the hope of earning still greater distinction.

Martin Schenk had mean while been

1 Reyd, v. 101. Hoofd Vervolgh, 220. Strada, ii. 446.

2 Letters, in Gray, 290.

1 Ibid. 214, 321.

2 Ibid. 290. Bruce's, *Leyc. Corresp.*

3 Letters, in Gray, &c., just cited.



successfully defending Rheinberg, for several weeks, against Parma's forces. It was necessary, however, that Leicester, notwithstanding the impoverished condition of his troops, should make some diversion, while his formidable antagonist was thus carrying all before him.

He assembled, accordingly, in the month of August, all the troops that could be brought into the field, and reviewed them, with much ceremony, in the neighbourhood of Arnheim. His army barely numbered seven thousand foot and two thousand horse, <sup>1</sup> but he gave out, very extensively, that he had fourteen thousand under his command, <sup>2</sup> and he was moreover expecting a force of three thousand reiters, and as many pikemen recently levied in Germany. Lord Essex was general of the cavalry, Sir William Pelham <sup>3</sup>—a distinguished

soldier, who had recently arrived out of England, after the most urgent solicitations to the Queen, for that end, by Leicester—was lord-marshal of the camp, and Sir John Norris was colonel-general of the infantry.

After the parade, two sermons were preached upon the hill-side to the soldiers, and then there was a council of war. It was decided—notwithstanding the Earl's announcement of his intentions to attack Parma in person—that the condition of the army did not warrant such an enterprise. It was thought better to lay siege to Zutphen. This step, if successful, would place in the power of the republic and her ally a city of great importance and strength. In every event the attempt would probably compel Farnese to raise the siege of Berg.

Leicester, accordingly, with „his

<sup>1</sup> Leicester to the Queen, 11 Oct. 1586. (S. P. Office MS.) Huddleston to Burghley, 6 Sept. 1586. (S. P. Office MS.)

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.* Compare Strada, who states the number of Leicester's forces at 13,000 foot and 2000 horse, besides reinforcements of 1000 English and Scotch who were shortly expected. *Bor.* ii. 738. *Wagenaar*, viii. 135.

<sup>3</sup> Sir William Pelham had been out of favour with the Queen for many months. He had been held responsible for some abuses in the Ordnance Office, and a heavy claim made upon him by the crown had reduced him to insolvency. The Queen was excessively indignant at his conduct, and refused for a long time to allow him to accept the responsible post under Leicester which the Earl was anxious to confer upon him. Leicester, who was the most generous of men, sent him large sums of money to extricate him from his difficulties, but it was many months before the Queen relented. The Earl had an exalted opinion of Pelham's military capacity, knew him to be one of his own most devoted adherents, and earnestly desired his support to keep down the hostility and insubordination of Sir John Norris and his brothers. „I begin to be prettily accompanied now with men,” he wrote to the Queen, „only lacking governors and leaders, especially a marshal. I must still say to your Majesty it had been better to have wanted the use of 20,000 than the service of Sir W. Pelham here this long. It is not only an insufferable want to all our people, but the enemy hath bragged of it. I do assure your Majesty, by the allegiance I owe you, I

know the Prince of Parma hath spoken it some months past, that he was sure neither Pelham nor the Lord Gray should come, nor that any more men by your licence or muster should pass, which falls out somewhat to be true, to our discomfort. But if either Pelham or Lord Gray, or rather both, may come, I trust your Majesty shall reap the greatest honour and good by it; but first Sir William, for he is readiest. *For God's sake and your honour's sake, let him come.* We have now some numbers increased, but no man fit for such a government as Sir W. Pelham is. I beseech your Majesty trust me, and believe me there is not one, no, not one for it, whatsoever you have heard or may hear, or of whomsoever, that I know to be employed at this time here. I find it, I feel it, to my great hindrance and no less danger every day. I know here be worthy and very valiant gentlemen, but for so great a charge, believe me, there is not one yet here for it. I am loath to hinder any man. It hath not been my custom to your Majesty. I beseech you that all men may have their deserts, and your poor army here comforted. Let all the haste possible be used with Sir W. Pelham, on whose coming with that worthy gentleman Sir W. Stanley, I trust your Majesty shall hear well of us.” &c. &c. It was natural that Sir John Norris should be indignant at being supplanted by Pelham, and their mutual rivalry did infinite mischief. Leicester to the Queen, <sup>14</sup> June; 1586. (S. P. Office MS.)

Compare „*Leyc. Corresp.*’ 37, 45, 55, 125.

brave troop of able and likely men" 1 —five thousand of the infantry being English 2—advanced as far as Doesburg. This city, seated at the confluence of the ancient canal of Drusus and the Yssel, five miles above Zutphen, it was necessary, as a preliminary measure, to secure. It was not a very 30th Aug. strong place, being rather slight- 9th Sept. ly walled with brick, and with 1586. not more than three feet of water. 3 By the 30th August it had been completely invested.

On the same night, at ten o'clock, Sir William Pelham came to the Earl to tell him „what beastly pioneers the Dutchmen were." Leicester accordingly determined, notwithstanding the lord-marshal's entreaties, to proceed to the trenches in person. There being but faint light, the two lost their way, and soon found themselves nearly at the gate of the town. Here, while groping about in the dark, and trying to effect their retreat, they were saluted with a shot, which struck Sir William in the stomach. For an instant, thinking himself mortally injured, he expressed his satisfaction that he had been between the commander-in-chief and the blow, and made other „comfortable and resolute speeches." Very fortunately, however, it proved that the marshal was not seriously hurt, and, after a few days, he was about his work as usual, although obliged—as the Earl of Leicester expressed it—„to carry a bullet in his belly as long as he should live." 4

Roger Williams too, that valiant adventurer—„but no more valiant than wise, and worth his weight in gold," according to the appreciative Leicester—was shot through the arm. For the dare-devil Welshman, much to the Earl's regret, persisted in running up and down the trenches „with a great

plume of feathers in his gilt morion," and in otherwise making a very conspicuous mark of himself „within point-blank of a caliver." 1

Notwithstanding these mishaps, however, the siege went successfully forward. Upon the 2nd September the Earl began to batter, and after a brisk cannonade, from dawn till two in the afternoon, he had considerably damaged Friday, the wall in two places. One 2 Sept. of the breaches was eighty 12 Sept. feet wide, the other half as 1586. large, but the besieged had stuffed them full of beds, tubs, logs of wood, boards, and „such like trash," by means whereof the ascent was not so easy as it seemed. 2. The soldiers were excessively eager for the assault. Sir John Norris came to Leicester to receive his orders as to the command of the attacking party. The Earl referred the matter to him. „There is no man," answered Sir John, „fitter for that purpose than myself; for I am colonel-general of the infantry." 3

But Leicester, not willing to indulge so unreasonable a proposal, replied that he would reserve him for service of less hazard and greater importance. Norris being, as usual, „satis prodigus magnæ animæ," 4 was out of humour at the refusal, and ascribed it to the Earl's persistent hostility to him and his family. It was then arranged that the assault upon the principal breach should be led by younger officers, to be supported by Sir John and other veterans. The other breach was assigned to the Dutch and Scotch—black Norris scowling at them the while with jealous eyes; fearing that they might get the start of the English party, and be first to enter the town. 5 A party of noble

1 Ibid.

2 Huddleston to Burghley, 6 Sept. 1586.

(S. P. Office MS.)

3 MS. last cited.

5 Ibid.

4 Ibid.

1 Huddleston to Burghley, MS. before cited.

2 Ibid.

3 Ibid.

4 Bruce's, *Leyc. Corresp.* 401, 407.

volunteers clustered about Sir John—Lord Burgh, Sir Thomas Cecil, Sir Philip Sidney, and his brother Robert among the rest—most impatient for the signal. The race was obviously to be a sharp one. The governor-general forbade these violent demonstrations, but Lord Burgh, „in a most vehement passion, waived the countermand,”<sup>1</sup> and his insubordination was very generally imitated. Before the signal was given, however Leicester sent a trumpet to summon the town to surrender, and could with difficulty restrain<sup>2</sup> Sept. his soldiers till the answer <sup>12</sup> should be returned. To the 1586.

universal disappointment, the garrison agreed to surrender. Norris himself then stepped forward to the breach, and cried aloud the terms, lest the returning herald, who had been sent back by Leicester, should offer too favourable a capitulation.<sup>3</sup> It was arranged that the soldiers should retire without arms, with white wands in their hands—the officers remaining prisoners—and that the burghers, their lives, and property, should be at Leicester's disposal.<sup>3</sup> The Earl gave most peremptory orders that persons and goods should be respected, but his commands were disobeyed. Sir William Stanley's men committed frightful disorders, and thoroughly rifled the town.”

„And because, said Norris, „I found fault herewith, Sir William began to quarrel with me, hath braved me extremely, refuseth to take any direction from me, and although I have sought for redress, yet it is proceeded in so coldly, that he taketh encouragement

rather to increase the quarrel than to leave it.”<sup>1</sup>

Notwithstanding therefore the decree of Leicester, the expostulations and anger of Norris, and the energetic efforts of Lord Essex and other generals, who went about smiting the marauders on the head, the soldiers sacked the city, and committed various disorders, in spite of the capitulation.<sup>2</sup>

Doesburg having been thus reduced, the Earl now proceeded toward the more important city which he had determined to besiege. Zutphen, or South-Fen, an antique town of wealth and elegance, was the capital of the old Landgraves of Zutphen. It is situate on the right bank of the Yssel, that branch of the Rhine which flows between Gelderland and Overijssel into the Zuyder Zee.

The ancient river, broad, deep, and languid, glides through a plain of almost boundless extent, till it loses itself in the flat and misty horizon. On the other side of the stream, in the district called the Veluwe,<sup>3</sup> or bad meadow, were three sconces, one of them of remarkable strength. An island between the city and the shore was likewise well fortified. On the landward side the town was protected by a wall and moat sufficiently strong in those infant days of artillery. Near the hospital-gate, on the east, was an external fortress guarding the road to Warnsfeld. This was a small

<sup>1</sup> Norris to Wilkes, MS.

<sup>2</sup> Huddleston to Burghley, 3 Sept. 1586. (S. P. Office MS.) Leicester to Privy Council, 6 Sept. 1586. (S. P. Office MS.) (Sir John Norris to Wilkes, 6 Sept. 1586. (S. P. Office MS.) Compare Hoofd Vervolgh, 184. Bor., ii. 75C. Stowe, 736. Bruce', Leyc. Corresp. 406, 407.

The town was „rifled,” but it was „but poor, with nothing to answer the need and greediness of the soldiers,” said Huddleston, adding that, „divers disorders were committed, as in such cases it happeneth, though (God be thanked) none specially notorious.”

<sup>3</sup> Veluwe, „bad meadow,” in opposition to Betuwe (Batavia), „good meadow.” Bet is the positive, now obsolete in German, Dutch, and English, of the comparative, better.

<sup>1</sup> MS. last cited.

<sup>2</sup> „Lest the trumpet should offer too largely, I stepped to the breach myself and proposed the conditions,” &c. Sir John Norris to Mr. Wilkes, <sup>6</sup>/<sub>16</sub> Sept. 1586. (S. P. Office MS.)

<sup>3</sup> Leicester to the Privy Council, <sup>3</sup>/<sub>13</sub> Sept.

1586. Sir J. Norris to Wilkes, *ubi sup.* (S. P. Office MS.)



village, with a solitary slender church-spire, shooting up above a cluster of neat one-storied houses. It was about an English mile from Zutphen, in the midst of a wide, low, somewhat fenny plain, which, in winter, became so completely a lake, that peasants were not unfrequently drowned in attempting to pass from the city to the village. In summer, the vague expanse of country was fertile and cheerful of aspect. Long rows of poplars marking the straight highways, clumps of pollard willows scattered around the little meres, snug farm-houses, with kitchen-gardens and bailliant flower-patches dotting the level plain, verdant pastures sweeping off into seemingly infinite distance, where the innumerable cattle seemed to swarm like insects, windmills swinging their arms in all directions, like protective giants, to save the country from inundation, the lagging sail of market-boats shining through rows of orchard trees—all gave to the environs of Zutphen a tranquil and domestic charm.

Deventer and Kampen, the two other places on the river, were in the hands of the States. It was, therefore, desirable for the English and the patriots, by gaining possession of Zutphen, to obtain control of the Yssel; driven, as they had been, from the Meuse and Rhine.

Sir John Norris, by Leicester's direction, took possession of a small rising-ground, called „Gibbet Hill,” on the land-side, where he established a fortified camp, and proceeded to invest the city. With him were Count Lewis William of Nassau, and Sir Philip Sidney, while the Earl himself, crossing the Yssel on a bridge of boats which he had constructed, reserved for himself the reduction of the forts upon the Veluwe side.

Farnese, meantime, was not idle; and Leicester's calculations proved correct. So soon as the Prince was informed of this important demonstration of the enemy he broke up—after brief debate

with his officers—his camp before Rheinberg, and came to Wesel. 1 At this place he built a bridge over the Rhine, and fortified it with two block-houses. These he placed under command of Claude Berlot, who was ordered to watch strictly all communication up the river with the city of Rheinberg, which he thus kept in a partially beleaguered state. Alexander then advanced rapidly by way of Groll and Burik, both which places he took possession of, to the neighbourhood of Zutphen. He was determined, at every hazard, to relieve that important city; and although, after leaving necessary detachments on the way, he had but five thousand men under his command, besides fifteen hundred under Verdugo—making sixty-five hundred in all—he had decided that the necessity of the case, and his own honour, required him to seek the enemy, and to leave, as he said, the issue with the God of battles, whose cause it was. 2

Tassie, lieutenant-governor of Gelderland, was ordered into the city with two cornets of horse and six hundred foot. As large a number had already been stationed there. Verdugo, who had been awaiting the arrival of the Prince at Borkelo, a dozen miles from Zutphen, with four hundred foot and two hundred horse, now likewise entered the city. 3

On the night 29th August (St. Nov.) Alexander himself entered Zutphen, for the purpose of encouraging the garrison by promises of relief, and of 29th Aug. ascertaining the position of 1586. the enemy by personal observation. His presence, as it always did, inspired the soldiers with enthusiasm, so that they could with difficulty be restrained from rushing forth to assault the besiegers. 4 In regard to the enemy, he found that Gibbet Hill was still occupied by Sir

1 Strada, ii. 448.

2 Parma to Philip, 30 Oct. 1586. (Arch. de Simancas, MS.)

3 Ibid. Compare Strada, ii. 448, 450.

4 Letter to Philip, *ubi sup.*

John Norris, „the best soldier, in his opinion, that they had,” 1 who had entrenched himself very strongly, and was supposed to have thirty-five hundred men under his command. His position seemed quite impregnable. The rest of the English were on the other side of the river, and Alexander observed, with satisfaction, that they had abandoned a small redoubt, near the leper-house, outside the Loor-Gate, through which the reinforcements must enter the city. The Prince determined to profit by this mistake, and to seize the opportunity thus afforded of sending those much-needed supplies. During the night the enemy were found to be throwing up works „most furiously,” 2 and skirmishing parties were sent out of the town to annoy them. In the darkness nothing of consequence was effected, but a Scotch officer was captured, who informed the Spanish commander that the enemy was fifteen thousand strong—a number which was nearly double that of Leicester’s actual force. In the morning Alexander returned to his camp at Berkelo—leaving Tassis in command of the Veluwe Forts, and Verdugo in the city itself—and he at once made rapid work in collecting victuals. He had soon wheat and other supplies in readiness, sufficient to feed four thousand mouths for three months, and these he determined to send into the city immediately, and at every hazard.

The great convoy which was now to be dispatched required great care and a powerful escort. Twenty-five hundred musketeers and pikemen, of whom one thousand were Spaniards, and six hundred cavalry, Epirotes, Spaniards, and 1 Oct., N.S. Italians, under Hannibal 1586, Gonzaga, George Crescia, Bentivoglio, Sesa, and others, were accordingly detailed for this expedition. 3

The Marquis del Vasto, to whom was entrusted the chief command, was ordered to march from Berkelo at midnight on Wednesday, October 1 (St. Nov.). It was calculated that he would reach a certain hillock not far from Warnsfeld by dawn of day. Here he was to pause, and send forward an officer towards the town, communicating his arrival, and requesting the cooperation of Verdugo, who was to make a sortie with one thousand men, according to Alexander’s previous arrangements. The plan was successfully carried out. The Marquis arrived by daybreak at the spot indicated, and dispatched Captain de Vega, who contrived to send intelligence of the fact. A trooper, whom Parma had himself sent to Verdugo with earlier information of the movement, had been captured on the way. Leicester had, therefore, been apprized, at an early moment, of the Prince’s intentions, but he was not aware that the convoy would be accompanied by so strong a force as had really been detailed.

He had accordingly ordered Sir John Norris, who commanded on the outside of the town near the road which the Spaniards must traverse, to place an ambuscade in his way. Sir John, always ready for adventurous enterprises, took a body of two hundred cavalry, all picked men, and ordered Sir William Stanley, with three hundred pikemen, to follow. A much stronger force of infantry was held in reserve and readiness, but it was not thought that it would be required. The ambuscade was successfully placed, before the dawn of Thursday morning, in the Oct. 2 N.S. neighbourhood of Warnsfeld 1586. 1 church. On the other hand, the Earl

to Philip, as above.) Every historian gives a different statement one from another. Leicester declared that Crescia told him „upon his honour, that there were fifteen cornets of horse and 3000 foot.” Bruce’s *Leyc. Corresp.* 417.

1 Thursday, Sept 22, 1586.  
Oct. 2

1 Letter to Philip, *ubi sup.*

2 Parma to Philip, „a furia.” MS. before cited.

3 These are Parma’s own figures. Letter

of Leicester himself, anxious as to the result, came across the river just at daybreak. He was accompanied by the chief gentlemen in his camp, who could never be restrained when blows were passing current.

The business that morning was a commonplace and practical, though an important, one—to „impeach” a convoy of wheat and barley, butter, cheese, and beef—but the names of those noble and knightly volunteers, familiar throughout Christendom, sound like the roll-call for some chivalrous tournament. There were Essex and Audley, Stanley, Pelham, Russell, both the Sidneys, all the Norrises, men whose valour had been proved on many a hard-fought battle-field. There, too, was the famous hero of British ballad, whose name was so often to ring on the plains of the Netherlands—

„The brave Lord Willoughby,  
Of courage fiece and fell,  
Who would not give one inch of way  
For all the devils in hell.”

Twenty such volunteers as these sat on horseback that morning around the stately Earl of Leicester. It seemed an incredible extravagance to send a handful of such heroes against an army.

But the English commander-in-chief had been listening to the insidious tongue of Roland York—that bold, plausible, unscrupulous partisan, already twice a renegade, of whom more was ere long to be heard in the Netherlands and England. Of the man’s courage there could be no doubt, and he was about to fight that morning in the front rank at the head of his company. But he had for some mysterious reason, been bent upon persuading the Earl that the Spaniards were no match for Englishmen at a hand-to-hand contest. When they could ride freely up and down, he said, and used their lances as they liked, they were formidable. But the English were stronger men, better riders, better mounted, and better armed. The Spaniards hated helmets and proof ar-

mour, while the English trooper, in casque, cuirass, and greaves, was a living fortress, impregnable to Spanish or Italian light horsemen. And Leicester seemed almost convinced by his reasoning. 1

It was five o’clock of a chill autumn morning. It was time for day to break, but the fog was so thick that a man Oct. 2nd, at the distance of five yards 1586. was quite invisible. The creaking of waggon-wheels and the measured tramp of soldiers soon became faintly audible, however, to Sir John Norris and his five hundred as they sat there in the mist. Presently came galloping forward in hot haste those nobles and gentlemen, with their esquires, fifty men in all—Sidney, Willoughby, and the rest—whom Leicester had no longer been able to restrain from taking part in the adventure.

A force of infantry, the amount of which cannot be satisfactorily ascertained, had been ordered by the Earl to cross the bridge at a later moment. Sidney’s cornet of horse was then in Deventer, to which place it had been sent in order to assist in quelling an anticipated revolt, so that he came like most of his companions, as a private volunteer and knight-errant.

The arrival of the expected convoy was soon more distinctly heard, but no scouts or outposts had been stationed to give timely notice of the enemy’s movements. 2 Suddenly the fog, which had shrouded the scene so closely, rolled away like a curtain, and in the

1 Reyd, v. 82, 83 Bor, ii. 750, 751. Compare Meteren, xiii. 237, who says that York was suspected of being secretly in league with Farnese, to contrive this ambuscade, and thus to bring so many English nobles of distinction to death or captivity. There is no doubt that when he deserted the Spanish for the English party, he pledged himself to Parma to do him good service, and that he was always secretly in league with the enemy. We shall see at a later day whether he was ready to redeem his pledge.

2 Hoofd Vervolgh, 186.



full light of an October morning the Englishmen found themselves face to face with a compact body of more than three thousand men. The Marquis del Vasto rode at the head of the force, surrounded by a band of mounted arquebus men. The cavalry, under the famous Epirote chief George Crescia, Hannibal Gonzaga, Bentivoglio, Sesa, Conti, and other distinguished commanders, followed; the columns of pikemen and musketeers lined the hedgerows on both sides the causeway; while between them the long train of waggons came slowly along under their protection. 1 The whole force had got in motion after having sent notice of their arrival to Verdugo, who, with one or two thousand men, was expected to sally forth almost immediately from the city-gate.

There was but brief time for deliberation. Notwithstanding the tremendous odds there was no thought of retreat. Black Norris called to Sir William Stanley, with whom he had been at variance so lately at Doesburg:—

„There hath been ill-blood between us,” he said. „Let us be friends together this day, and die side by side, if need be, in her Majesty’s cause.”

„If you see me not serve my prince with faithful courage now,” replied Stanley, „account me for ever a coward. Living or dying I will stand or lie by you in friendship.”

As they were speaking these words the young Earl of Essex, general of the horse, cried to his handful of troopers:—

„Follow me, good fellows, for the honour of England and of England’s Queen!” 2

As he spoke he dashed, lance in rest, upon the enemy’s cavalry, overthrew the foremost man, horse and rider, shivered his own spear to splinters, and

then, swinging his curtel-axe, rode merrily forward. 1 His whole little troop, compact as an arrow-head, flew with an irresistible shock against the opposing columns, pierced clean through them, and scattered them in all directions. At the very first charge one hundred English horsemen drove the Spanish and Albanian cavalry back upon the musketeers and pikemen. Wheeling with rapidity, they retired before a volley of musket-shot, by which many horses and a few riders were killed, and then formed again to renew the attack. Sir Philip Sidney, on coming to the field, having met Sir William Pelham, the veteran lord marshal, lightly armed, had with chivalrous extravagance thrown off his own cuishes, and now rode to the battle with no armour but his cuirass. 2 At the second charge his horse was shot under him, but, mounting another, he was seen everywhere in the thick of the fight, behaving himself with a gallantry which extorted admiration even from the enemy.

For the battle was a series of personal encounters in which high officers were doing the work of private soldiers. Lord North, who had been lying „bed-ridden” with a musket-shot in the leg, had got himself put on horseback, and „with one boot on and one boot off,” bore himself „most lustily” through the whole affair. 3 „I desire that her Majesty may know,” he said, „that I live but to serve her. A better barony than I have could not hire the Lord North to live on meaner terms.” 4 Sir William Russell laid about him with his curtel-axe to such purpose that the Spaniards pronounced him a devil and not a man. „Wherever,” said an eye-witness, „he

1 Ibid.

2 Brooke’s Sidney, ii. 31, 32.

3 Archer, in Stowe, *ubi sup.* Bruce’s, Leye. Corresp. 417.

4 North to Burghley, 29 May, 1586. (S. P. 8 June

Office MS.

1 Parma to Philip II. 30 Oct. 1586. (Arch. de Simancas, MS.) Compare Strada, ii. 450, 452. Bentivoglio, p. ii. I. iv. 311. Bor. ii. 50 751.

Archer in Stowe, 736.

saw five or six of the enemy together, thither would he; and with his hard knocks soon separated their friendship." 1 Lord Willoughby encountered George Crescia, general of the famed Albanian cavalry, unhorsed him at the first shock, 2 and rolled him into the ditch. „I yield me thy prisoner," called out the Epirote in French, „for thou art a *preux chevalier*;" while Willoughby, trusting to his captive's word, galloped onward, and with him the rest of the little troop, till they seemed swallowed up by the superior numbers of the enemy. His horse was shot under him, his basses were torn from his legs, and he was nearly taken a prisoner, but fought his way back with incredible strength and good fortune. Sir William Stanley's horse had seven bullets in him, but bore his rider unhurt to the end of the battle. Leicester declared Sir William and „old Reade" to be „worth their weight in pearl." 3

Hannibal Gonzaga, leader of the Spanish cavalry, fell mortally wounded. 4 The Marquis del Vasto, commander of the expedition, nearly met the same fate. An Englishman was just cleaving his head with a battle-axe, when a Spaniard transfixed the soldier with his pike. 5 The most obstinate struggle took place about the train of waggons. The teamsters had fled in the beginning of the action, but the English and Spanish soldiers, struggling with the horses, and pulling them forward and

backward, tried in vain to get exclusive possession of the convoy which was the cause of the action. 1 The carts at last forced their way slowly nearer and nearer to the town, while the combat still went on, warm as ever, between the hostile squadrons. The action lasted an hour and a half, and again and again the Spanish horsemen wavered and broke before the handful of English, and fell back upon their musketeers. Sir Philip Sidney, in the last charge, rode quite through the enemy's ranks till he came upon their entrenchments, when a musket-ball from the camp struck him upon the thigh, three inches above the knee. Although desperately wounded in a part which should have been protected by the cuishes which he had thrown aside, he was not inclined to leave the field; but his own horse had been shot under him at the beginning of the action, and the one upon which he was now mounted became too restive for him, thus crippled, to control. He turned reluctantly away, and rode a mile and a half back to the entrenchments, suffering extreme pain, for his leg was dreadfully shattered. As he passed along the edge of the battle-field his attendants brought him a bottle of water to quench his raging thirst. At that moment a wounded English soldier, „who had eaten his last at the same feast," looked up wistfully in his face, when Sidney instantly handed him the flask, exclaiming, „Thy necessity is even greater than mine." 2 He then pled-

1 Archer in Stowe, 737.

2 Ibid. Leicester to Burghley, Sept. 1586. (S. P. Office MS.)

3 „I will leave no labour nor danger," said Lord North, „but serve as a private soldier, and have thrust myself for service on foot under Captain Reade, whom I find a noble and notable soldier." (North to Burghley, MS. last cited.) This is the mettle the gallants of Elizabeth's court were made of. Compare *Leyc. Corresp.* 417.

4 „The Count Hannibal Gonzaga was killed, with three others whose names we know not, but they had cassocks all embroidered and laced with silver and gold." Leicester to Burghley, Sept. 1586. (S. P. Office MS.)

5 Strada, ii. 452.

1 Ibid.

2 Brooke's Sidney, ii. 32. It is to be regretted that Lord Brooke does not give the authority for this beautiful and universally cherished anecdote. I have searched in vain for its confirmation through many contemporary letters and chronicles. There is no reason for rejecting its authenticity, but it would have been an exquisite pleasure to find it recorded, for instance, in a letter from Pelham, or North, or Norris, or Leicester—all of whom speak of Sidney's gallantry in the action, but not one of whom was acquainted with, or thought it worth while to mention, the characteristic and touching trait.

ged his dying comrade in a draught, and was soon afterwards met by his uncle. „Oh, Philip,” cried Leicester, in despair, „I am truly grieved to see thee in this plight.” But Sidney comforted him with manful words, and assured him that death was sweet in the cause of his Queen and country. Sir William Russell, too, all blood-stained from the fight, threw his arms around his friend, wept like a child, and, kissing his hand, exclaimed. „Oh! noble Sir Philip, never did man attain hurt so honourably or serve so valiantly as you.”<sup>1</sup> Sir William Pelham declared „that Sidney’s noble courage in the face of our enemies had won him a name of continuing honour.”<sup>2</sup>

The wounded gentleman was borne back to the camp, and thence in a barge to Arnheim. The fight was over. Sir John Norris bade Lord Leicester „be merry, for, said he, „you have had the honourablest day. A handful of men has driven the enemy three times to retreat.”<sup>3</sup> But, in truth, it was now time for the English to retire in their turn. Their reserve never arrived. The whole force engaged against the thirty-five hundred Spaniards had never exceeded two hundred and fifty horse and three hundred foot, and of this number the chief work had been done by the fifty or sixty volunteers and their followers.<sup>4</sup> The heroism which had been displayed was fruitless, except as a proof—and so Leicester wrote to the Palatine John Casimir—„that Spaniards were not invincible.”<sup>5</sup> Two thousand men now sallied from the Loor-Gate, under Verdugo and Tassis, 6 to join the force under Vasto, and the

English were forced to retreat. The whole convoy was then carried into the city, and the Spaniards remained masters of the field. 1

Thirteen troopers and twenty-two foot-soldiers, upon the English side, were killed. The enemy lost perhaps two hundred men. They were thrice turned from their position, and thrice routed, but they succeeded at last in their attempt to carry their convoy into Zutphen. Upon that day and the succeeding ones the town was completely victualled. Very little, therefore, save honour was gained by

<sup>1</sup> Ibid. Leicester observes in his letter to Burghley (Sept. —, 1586, (S. P. Office MS.) that, „notwithstanding all these troops, the Prince did not put in one waggon, save thirty which got in in the night.” Alexander, however states expressly the reverse, and congratulates Philip on the entire success of the undertaking:—

„Pero nos debemos contentar con lo sucedido, pues allende de haber quedado la campaña por nosotros, y salido con nuestra pretension, y a la barba de tan buen numero con tanta poca gente (!) haber metido y sacado tanto carnage,” &c. Letter to Philip, 30 Oct. 1586. MS.

There can be no doubt whatever that the Prince was entirely correct in his statement. The result proves it, if there could be any question of it before. It is difficult to see how Leicester could be mistaken, but he had a temptation to misrepresent an affair in which his own bad generalship had been as signal as the heroism which it had called forth. Certainly Zutphen, on that and the succeeding days, was thoroughly relieved. The errors, wilful or otherwise, as to the numbers engaged and respectively lost were greater on both sides than usual on such occasions, but this kind of misstatement has always been universal.

Compare Sidney Papers, i. 104, containing a letter of Leicester to Heneage; I have not found the original. Strada, ii. 450, 452. Bor, ii. 750, 751. Stowe, 737, 738. Hoofd Vervolgh, 186, 187. Reyd, v. 83, 84. Meteren, xiii. 237. Bentivoglio, p. ii. l. iv. 311, *et mult. al.*

See also R. W. Tadama, 'Geschiedenis der Stad Zutphen' (Arnheim en Zutphen, 1586), an interesting work, carefully written, and of great research; composed mainly from original unpublished documents. I desire to express my thanks to the learned author for the kindness with which he guided me over Zutphen and its neighbourhood, pointing out everything connected with the battle and the siege.

1 Stowe, 737.

2 Pelham to Walsingham, 26 Sept. 1586.  
6 Oct.

(S. P. Office MS.)

3 Stowe, *ubi sup.*

4 Bruce's, Leyc. Corresp.' 417.

5 Reyd, v. 83.

6 Parma to Philip, 30 Oct. 1586. MS.



the display of English valour against overwhelming numbers—five hundred against near four thousand. Never in the whole course of the war had there been such fighting, for the troops upon both sides were picked men and veterans. For a long time afterwards it was the custom of Spaniards and Netherlands, in characterising a hardy-contested action, to call it as warm as the fight at Zutphen. 1

„I think I may call it,” said Leicester, „the most notable encounter that hath been in our age, and it will remain to our posterity famous.” 2

1 Strada, ii. 451.

2 Bruce's „Leyc. Corresp.” 416:—„That Thursday may run amongst any of our Thursdays,” said the Earl, („Leyc. Corresp.” 480), adding, with a most ingenuous reference to himself, „In my former letters I forgot one, who not only on that day but at every day's service hath been a *principal actor himself*. *A tall, wise, rare servant he is*, as any I know, and of marvellous good government and judgement. That gentleman may take a great charge upon him, I warrant you.” Self-depreciation was not the Earl's foible.

There is hardly a battle on record about which the accounts are so hopelessly conflicting as are those which relate to the battle of Zutphen. The reason is obvious. The skirmish was a comparatively unimportant one. The fate of Sidney has invested it with undying interest, but it was not supposed at that time that he was mortally wounded. Lord North, whose letters are always spirited, went into the field in such a disabled condition that it was not in his power to send any account of the action, as he doubtless would otherwise have done, to Lord Burghley. Pelham, Norris, and Leicester, are all meagre on this occasion in details. Archer, in Stowe, is fuller, but Parma, in his letters to Philip, though copious, is confused. As a specimen of conflicting statistics it may be observed that the number of English actually engaged, according to the statement of the commander-in-chief to his government, was 550, horse and foot together. The Spanish, according to Farnese's letter to Philip, were about 8100 in all. Strada gives the same number, writing from other letters of Parma, and puts the English at 3000 *foot and 400 horse*, exactly the same number that is given in the MS. letters of Simancas, and about seven times as many as were really in the field. Leicester puts the Spaniards at 1200 horse and 3000 foot—about 1000 more than the actual numbers. No doubt the numbers engaged on each side should be taken as correctly stated

Nevertheless it is probable that the encounter would have been forgotten by posterity but for the melancholy close upon that field to Sidney's bright career. And perhaps the Queen of England had as much reason to blush for the incompetency of her general and favourite as to be proud of the heroism displayed by her officers and soldiers.

„There were too many indeed at this skirmish of the better sort,” said Leicester; „only a two hundred and fifty horse, and most of them the best of this camp, and *unawares to me*. I was offended when I knew it, but could not fetch them back; but since they all so well escaped (save my dear nephew), I would not for ten thousand pounds but they had been there, since they have all won that honour they have. Your Lordship never heard of such desperate charges as they gave upon the enemies in the face of their muskets.” 1

He described Sidney's wound as „very dangerous, the bone being broken in pieces;” but said that the surgeons were in good hope. „I pray God to save his life,” said the Earl, and I care not how lame he be.” Sir Philip was carried to Arnheim, where the best surgeons were immediately in attendance upon him. He submitted to their examination and the pain which they inflicted, with great cheerfulness, although himself persuaded that his wound was mortal. For many days the result was doubtful, and messages were sent day by day to England that he was

by the respective generals. There were therefore about 3100 Spaniards to 550 English.

Leicester gives the number of killed and wounded as 33 English and from 250 to 350 Spaniards.

Parma states the number of Spaniards killed as 9 (!), wounded 29, while he reports 200 English killed.

It seems impossible that there could have been less than 150 or 200 Spaniards killed, which is not more than half the number claimed by Leicester on the authority of Spaniards themselves. But it is a waste of time to indulge in these fruitless calculations.

1 Letter to Burghley, MS. before cited.

convalescent—intelligence which was hailed by the Queen and people as a matter not of private but of public rejoicing. He soon began to fail, however. Count Hohenlo was badly wounded a few days later before the great fort of Zutphen. A musket-ball entered his mouth, and passed through his cheek, carrying off a jewel which hung in his ear. 1. Notwithstanding his own critical condition, however. Hohenlo sent his surgeon, Adrian van den Spiegel, a man of great skill, to wait upon Sir Philip, 2 but Adrian soon felt that the case was hopeless. Meantime fever and gangrene attacked the Count himself; and those in attendance upon him, fearing for his life, sent for his surgeon. Leicester refused to allow Adrian to depart, and Hohenlo very generously acquiescing in the decree, but also requiring the surgeon's personal care, caused himself to be transported in a litter to Arnheim. 3

Sidney was first to recognise the symptoms of mortification, which made a fatal result inevitable. His demeanour during his sickness and upon his death-bed was as beautiful as his life. He discoursed with his friends concerning the immortality of the soul, comparing the doctrines of Plato and of other ancient, philosophers, whose writings were so familiar to him, with the revelations of Scripture and with the dictates of natural religion. He made his will with minute and elaborate provisions, leaving bequests, remembrances, and rings, to all his friends. Then he indulged himself with music, and listened particularly to a strange song which he had himself composed during his illness, and which he had entitled, *La Cuisse rompue*.<sup>4</sup> He took leave of the friends around him with perfect calmness, saying to his brother Robert,

„Love my memory. Cherish my friends. Above all, govern your will and affections by the will and word of your Creator; in me beholding the end of this world with all her vanities.”

And thus this gentle and heroic spirit took its flight.

Parma, after thoroughly victualling Zutphen, turned his attention to the German levies which Leicester was expecting under the care of Count Meurs. „If the enemy is reinforced by these six thousand fresh troops,” said Alexander, „it will make him master of the field,” 2. And well he might hold this opinion, for, in the meagre state of both the Spanish and the liberating armies, the addition of three thousand fresh reiters and as many infantry would be enough to turn the scale. The Duke of Parma—for, since the recent death of his father, Farnese had succeeded to his title 3—determined in person to seek the German troops, and to destroy them if possible. But they never gave him the chance. 4 Their muster-place was Bremen, but when they heard that the terrible „Holofernese” was in pursuit of them, and that the commencement of their service would be a pitched battle with his Spaniards and Italians, they broke up and scattered about the country. 5 Soon afterwards the Duke tried another method of effectually dispersing them, in case they still retained a wish to fulfil their engagement with

1 Brooke's Sidney, ii. 32, 40. Sidney Papers, 104 seq.

2 Parma to Philip, 30 Oct. 1586. (Arch. de Simancas, MS.)

3 Philip II. to Parma, 19 Oct. 1586 (Arch. de Simancas, MS.) „Henceforth,” said the King, „I will be both father and mother to you.”

4 Bentivoglio is much mistaken (p. ii. l. iv. 311) in giving an account of a pitched battle between Alexander and these mercenaries, in which they are represented as having been utterly defeated. The victory was quite bloodless, and it cost the victor only a couple of gold chains.

5 Parma to Philip, 30 Oct. 1586. MS. last cited.

1 Stowe, 738. Bor. ii. 728.

2 Letter of Hohenlo in Bor. iii. 123.

3 Ibid.

Leicester. He sent a messenger to treat with them, and in consequence two of their „rittmeisters” paid him a visit. He offered to give them higher pay, and „ready money in place of tricks and promises.” The mercenary heroes listened very favourably to his proposals, although they had already received—besides the tricks and promises—at least one hundred thousand florins out of the States’ treasury. 1

After proceeding thus far in the negotiation, however, Parma concluded, as the season was so far advanced, that it was sufficient to have dispersed them, and to have deprived the English and patriots of their services. So he gave the two majors a gold chain a-piece, and they went their way thoroughly satisfied. „I have got them away from the enemy for this year,” said Alexander; „and this I hold to be one of the best services that has been rendered for many a long day to your Majesty.” 2

1 Meteren, xiii. 236.

2 Parma to Philip, MS. last cited.

According to Meteren (*ubi sup.*) this mysterious dispersion of the German troops was owing to the intrigues of Leicester’s English advisers, who were unwilling that he should send the money of the States anywhere but to England, and who therefore by their machinations contrived to spirit away this auxiliary force just at the moment when by its function with his own army the Earl was about to have Farnese in his power, „From this time forth,” says Meteren, „it was obvious that Leicester was governed entirely by English counsels,” and soon. It has just been shown by the Duke’s private letters that the generally most accurate chronicler was mistaken in this instance, and that the deed was accomplished by Alexander’s clever management alone. Some of the German princes in whose territories these levies had been made, were honourably indignant at the treachery which had been thus practised on the States. Some of the officers were punished with imprisonment, degradation, and loss of nobility and armorial bearings, and the money paid as their „waartgeld” was sent back to Holland. (Le Petit, *Grand Chronique*, ii. 536.)

Reyd is still more severe. He maintains that Leicester withheld the pay which the States had furnished for these important levies, whose arrival at the time agreed upon would have changed the fortune of the war;

During the period which intervened between the action at Warnsfeld and the death of Sidney, the siege-operations before Zutphen had been continued. The city, strongly garrisoned and well supplied with provisions, as it had been by Parma’s care, remained impregnable; but the sconces beyond the river and upon the island fell into Leicester’s hand. 1 The great fortress which commanded the Veluwe, and which was strong enough to have resisted Count Hohenlo on a former occasion for nearly a whole year, was the scene of much hard fighting. It was gained at last by the signal valour of Edward Stanley, lieutenant to Sir William. That officer, at the commencement of an assault upon a not very practicable breach, sprang at the long pike of a Spanish soldier, who was endeavouring to thrust him from the wall, and seized it with both hands. The Spaniard struggled to maintain his hold of the weapon, Stanley to wrest it from his grasp. A dozen other soldiers broke their pikes upon his cuirass or shot at him with their muskets. Conspicuous by his dress, being all in yellow but his corslet, he was in full sight of Leicester and of five thousand men. The earth was so shifty and sandy that the soldiers who were to follow him were not able to climb the wall. Still Stanley grasped his adversary’s pike, but, suddenly changing his plan, he allowed the Spaniard to

and that he secretly prevented their coming, from a fear that they would adhere too closely to Hohenlo and Count William Lewis. Count Ysselstein, who had been sent by the Earl to deal with these mercenaries and to promise their money, was furious at the treachery of which he conceived Leicester guilty, and did not scruple to say in large companies: „Leicester has done two great things in his life. He has made my old page, Martin Schenk, a knight, and myself a liar.” (Reyd, *Nederl. Geschied.* v. 85.)

The suspicion, as we have seen, was quite groundless, and Ysselstein and the historian (who was private secretary to Count William Lewis) very much mistaken.

1 Strada, ii. 453, 454. Hoofd Vervolg, 138. Bor, ii. 752. Wagenaar, viii. 136.



lift him from the ground. Then, assisting himself with his feet against the wall, he, much to the astonishment of the spectators, scrambled quite over the parapet, and dashed sword in hand among the defenders of the fort. Had he been endowed with a hundred lives it seemed impossible for him to escape death. But his followers, stimulated by his example, made ladders for themselves of each other's shoulders, scrambled at last with great exertion over the broken wall, overpowered the garrison, and made themselves masters of the sconce. Leicester, transported with enthusiasm for this noble deed of daring, knighted Edward Stanley upon the spot, besides presenting him next day with forty pounds in gold and an annuity of one hundred marks sterling for life. „Since I was born, I did never see any man behave himself as he did,” said the Earl. „I shall never forget it, if I live a thousand years, and he shall have a part of my living for it as long as I live.” 1

1 Bruce's 'Leyc. Corresp.' 428. Compare Strada, ii. 455, 456. Hoofd Vervolgh, 188. Meteren, xlii. 237, who says that Leicester

The occupation of these forts terminated the military operations of the year, for the rainy season, precursor of the winter, had now set in. Leicester—leaving Sir William Stanley, with twelve hundred English and Irish horse, in command of Deventer; Sir John Burrows, with one thousand men, in Doesburg; and Sir Robert Yorke, with one thousand more, in the great sconce before Zutphen—took his departure for the Hague. 1 Zutphen seemed so surrounded as to authorise the governor to expect ere long its capitulation. Nevertheless, the results of the campaign had not been encouraging. The States had lost ground, having been driven from the Meuse and Rhine, while they had with difficulty maintained themselves on the Flemish coast and upon the Yssel.

It is now necessary to glance at the internal politics of the Republic during the period of Leicester's administration, and to explain the position in which he found himself at the close of the year.

presented Stanley with a life-rent of six hundred florins (660).

1 Bor, ii. 753.

## CHAPTER X.

Should Elizabeth accept the Sovereignty?—The Effects of her Anger—Quarrels between the Earl and States—The Earl's three Counsellors—Leicester's Finance-Chamber—Discontent of the Mercantile Classes—Paul Buys and the Opposition—Keen Insight of Paul Buys—Truchsess becomes a spy upon him—Intrigues of Buys with Denmark—His Imprisonment—The Earl's Unpopularity—His Quarrels with the States—And with the Norrises—His Counsellors Wilkes and Clerke—Letter from the Queen to Leicester—A Supper Party at Hohenlo's—A drunken Quarrel—Hohenlo's Assault upon Edward Norris—Ill Effects of the Riot.

THE brief period of sunshine had been swiftly followed by storms. The Governor Absolute had, from the outset, been placed in a false position. Before he came to the Netherlands the Queen

had refused the sovereignty. Perhaps it was wise in her to decline so magnificent an offer; yet certainly her acceptance would have been perfectly honourable. The constituted authorities of the Provinces formally made the proposition. There is no doubt whatever that the whole population ardently desired to become her subjects. So far as the Netherlands were concerned, then, she would have been fully justified in extending her sceptre over a free people, who, under no compulsion and without any diplomatic chicanery, had selected her for their hereditary chief. So far as regarded England, the annexation to that country of a continental cluster of

states, inhabited by a race closely allied to it by blood, religion, and the instinct for political freedom, seemed, on the whole, desirable.

In a financial point of view, England would certainly lose nothing by the union. The resources of the Provinces were at least equal to her own. We have seen the astonishment which the wealth and strength of the Netherlands excited in their English visitors. They were amazed by the evidences of commercial and manufacturing prosperity, by the spectacle of luxury and advanced culture which met them on every side. Had the Queen—as it had been generally supposed—desired to learn whether the Provinces were able and willing to pay the expenses of their own defence before she should definitely decide on their offer of sovereignty, she was soon thoroughly enlightened upon the subject. 1 Her confidential agents all held one language. If she would only accept the sovereignty, the amount which the Provinces would pay was in a manner boundless. She was assured that the revenue of her own hereditary realm was much inferior to that of the possessions thus offered to her sway. 2

1 Hoofd, xxiii. 1039, 1042. Wagenaar, viii. 102, 104; 141, 142.

2 „Neither do I easily see,” wrote Richard Cavendish, „how the cause may be remedied, unless it may please her most excellent Majesty to take that upon her which the whole people (and specially they of the wiser sort) both crave and cry for, namely, the sovereignty. . . . There is no doubt but the revenues will suffice to the driving of the enemy out of these countries for ever and afterward in clear profit her Majesty far surmount the receipts at home.” Cavendish to Burghley, 9 April, 1586. (S. P. Office MS.)

„The people,” said Leicester, „still pray God that her Majesty will be their sovereign. She would then see what a contribution they will all bring forth.” Leicester to Burghley, 18 June, 1586. (S. P. Office MS.)

„I may safely say to your Majesty,” said he at about the same period, „that if your aid had been in such apparent sort to the countries that they might assure themselves of any certain time of continuance of the same, and that you had taken their cause indeed to heart, I am verily persuaded that

In regard to constitutional polity, the condition of the Netherlands was at least as satisfactory as that of England. The great amount of civil freedom enjoyed by those countries—although perhaps an objection in the eyes of Elizabeth Tudor—should certainly have been a recommendation to her liberty-loving subjects. The question of defence had been satisfactorily answered. The Provinces, if an integral part of the English empire, could protect themselves, and would become an additional element of strength, not a troublesome encumbrance.

The difference of language was far less than that which already existed between the English and their Irish fellow-subjects, while it was counterbalanced by sympathy, instead of being aggravated by mutual hostility in the matter of religion.

With regard to the great question of abstract sovereignty, it was certainly impolitic for an absolute monarch to recognize the right of a nation to repudiate its natural allegiance. But Elizabeth had already countenanced that step by assisting the rebellion against Philip. To allow the rebels to transfer their obedience from the King of Spain to herself was only another step in the same direction. The Queen, should she annex the Provinces, would certainly be accused by the world of ambition; but the ambition was a noble one, if, by thus consenting to the urgent solicitations of a free people, she extended the region of civil and religious liberty, and raised up a permanent bulwark against sacerdotal and royal absolutism.

A war between herself and Spain was inevitable if she accepted the sovereignty, but peace had been already rendered

they would have given very good testimonies by their very large contributions to maintain their wars for such certain number of years to be set down as your Majesty should appoint, and no prince nor practise of any person living able to draw them from you.” Leicester to the Queen, 27 June, 1586. (S. P. Office MS.)

impossible by the treaty of alliance. It is true that the Queen imagined the possibility of combining her engagements towards the States with a conciliatory attitude towards their ancient master, but it was here that she committed the gravest error. The negotiations of Parma and his sovereign with the English court were a masterpiece of deceit on the part of Spain. We have shown, by the secret correspondence, and we shall in the sequel make it still clearer, that Philip only intended to amuse his antagonists; that he had already prepared his plan for the conquest of England, down the minutest details; that the idea of tolerating religious liberty had never entered his mind; and that his fixed purpose was not only thoroughly to chastise the Dutch rebels, but to deprive the heretic Queen who had fostered their rebellion both of throne and life. So far as regarded the Spanish King, then, the quarrel between him and Elizabeth was already mortal; while, in a religious, moral, political, and financial point of view, it would be difficult to show that it was wrong or imprudent for England to accept the sovereignty over his ancient subjects. The cause of human freedom seemed likely to gain by the step, for the States did not consider themselves strong enough to maintain the independent republic which had already risen.

It might be a question whether, on the whole, Elizabeth made a mistake in declining the sovereignty. She was certainly wrong, however, in wishing the lieutenant-general of her six thousand auxiliary troops to be clothed, as such, with viceregal powers. The States-General, in a moment of enthusiasm, appointed him governor absolute, and placed in his hands, not only the command of the forces, but the entire control of their revenues, imposts, and customs, together with the appointment of civil and military officers. Such an amount of power could only be delegated

by the sovereign. Elizabeth had refused the sovereignty: it then rested with the States. They only, therefore, were competent to confer the power which Elizabeth wished her favourite to exercise simply as her lieutenant-general.

Her wrathful and vituperative language damaged her cause and that of the Netherlands more severely than can now be accurately estimated. The Earl was placed at once in a false, a humiliating, almost a ridiculous position. The authority which the States had thus a second time offered to England was a second time and most scornfully thrust back upon them. Elizabeth was indignant that „her own man” should clothe himself in the supreme attributes which she had refused. The States were forced by the violence of the Queen to take the authority into their own hands again, and Leicester was looked upon as a disgraced man.

Then came the neglect with which the Earl was treated by her Majesty and her ill-timed parsimony towards the cause. No letters to him in four months, no remittances for the English troops, not a penny of salary for him. The whole expense of the war was thrown for the time upon their hands, and the English soldiers seemed only a few thousand starving, naked, dying vagrants, an incumbrance instead of an aid. 1

The States, in their turn, drew the purse-strings. The two hundred thousand

1 „I find the most part of the bands that came over in August and September,” said Quartermaster Digges, „more than half wasted, dead and gone, and many of the remainder sick, lame, and shrewdly enfeebled, fitter to be relieved at home in hospitals than to take her Majesty’s pay here for soldiers. . . . Our soldiers, notwithstanding great numbers of them be paid with earth in their graves, yet the rest are so ill contented of their due for the time past, that, if pay come not speedily, before they be drawn to deal with the enemy, I doubt some worse adventure than I will divine beforehand.” Advertisement of the present state of these Low Countries, by T. Digges, <sup>8</sup>/<sub>13</sub> March, 1586. (S. P.



florins monthly were paid. The four hundred thousand florins which had been voted as an additional supply were for a time held back, as Leicester expressly stated, because of the discredit which had been thrown upon him from home. 1

The military operations were crippled for want of funds, but more fatal than everything else were the secret negotiations for peace. Subordinate individuals, like Grafigny and De Loo, went up and down, bringing presents out of England for Alexander Farnese, 2 and bragging that Parma and themselves could have peace whenever they liked to make it, and affirming that Leicester's opinions were of no account whatever. Elizabeth's coldness to the Earl and to the Netherlands was affirmed to be the Prince of Parma's sheet-anchor; while meantime a house was ostentatiously 3 prepared in Brussels by their

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1 Strangely enough, Elizabeth was under the impression that the *extra* grant of 400,000 florins (40,000*l.*) for four months was four hundred thousand *pounds sterling!* . . . "The rest that was granted by the States, as extraordinary to levy an army, which was 400,000 florins, not pounds, as I hear your Majesty taketh it. It is forty thousand pounds, and to be paid in March, April, May, and June last," &c. Leicester to the Queen, 11 Oct. 1586. (S. P. Office MS.)

She had certainly formed already an exalted idea of the capacity of the Provinces to protect themselves. She had in a year paid but seventy thousand pounds herself and believed the States able, *over and above their regular* contributions, to furnish an extraordinary supply of one hundred thousand pounds a month.

2 Leicester to the Queen, 6 June, 1586. (S. P. Office MS.)

3 "Amongst all the enemy's means to persuade his discontented and ill fed companions," said Cavendish, "this seemeth to be his sheet-anchor, namely, that were the only comfort of this people dependeth wholly upon her Majesty's most gracious relief and support, now is the disposition thereof in her so cooled, as she very faintly stretched forth her hand thereunto, which evidently appears, as well by the many disgraces which here my Lord hath received from her Maj., to the great blemish of his authority, as also by the slack payment of her troops . . . and so long as my Lord shall be unable to

direction for the reception of an English ambassador, who was every moment expected to arrive. 1 Under such circumstances it was in vain for the governor-general to protest that the accounts of secret negotiations were false, and quite natural that the States should lose their confidence in the Queen. An unfriendly and suspicious attitude towards her representative was a necessary result, and the demonstrations against the common enemy became still more languid. But for these underhand dealings, Grave, Venlo, and Neusz, might have been saved, 2 and the current of the Meuse and Rhine have remained in the hands of the patriots.

The Earl was industrious, generous, and desirous of playing well his part. His personal courage was undoubted, and, in the opinion of his admirers—themselves, some of them, men of large military experience—his ability as a commander was of a high order. 3 The valour displayed by the English nobles and gentlemen who accompanied him was magnificent, worthy the descendants of the victors at Crecy, Poitiers, and Agincourt; and the good behaviour of their followers—with a few rare excep-

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front him in the field, so long will this people be without hope, and the enemy inflamed with assured hope of victory." Cavendish to Burghley, 15 June, 1586. (S. P. Office MS.)

1 "It is certainly known that the enemy hath not a little prevailed with that stratagem, causing to be published that there was a treaty of peace between her Majesty and him, and that the same should be shortly concluded; and to make this device to carry the more show of truth, he caused a house to be prepared in Brussels, saying that it was for an ambassador coming out of England to conclude the peace, by which means he hath contained divers towns in terms of obedience that were ready to revolt, in respect of their misery, poverty, and famine." Wilkes to Burghley, 7 Aug. 1586. (S. P. Office MS.)

2 Leicester to the Queen, 20 June, 1586. (S. P. Office MS.)

3 North to Burghley, 23 May, 1586. Same to same, 29 May, 1586. Heneage to Walsingham, 25 May, 1586. (S. P. Office MSS.)

tions—had been equally signal. But now the army was dwindling to a ghastly array of scare-crows, and the recruits, as they came from England, were appalled by the spectacle presented by their predecessors. 1 Our old ragged rogues here have so discouraged our new men," said Leicester; "as I protest to you they look like dead men." 2 Out of eleven hundred freshly-arrived Englishmen, five hundred ran away in two days. 3 Some were caught and hanged, and all seemed to prefer hanging to remaining in the service, while the Earl declared that he would be hanged as well rather than again undertake such a charge without being assured payment for his troops beforehand. 4

The valour of Sidney and Essex, Wiltoughby and Pelham, Roger Williams and Martin Schenk, was set at nought by such untoward circumstances. Had not Philip also left his army to starve and Alexander Farnese to work miracles, it would have fared still worse with Holland and England, and with the cause of civil and religious liberty in the year 1586.

The States having resumed, as much as possible, their former authority, were on very unsatisfactory terms with the governor-general. Before long, it was impossible for the twenty or thirty individuals called the States to be in the same town with the man whom at the commencement of the year they had greeted so warmly. 5 The hatred between the Leicester faction and the municipalities became intense, for the foundation of the two great parties which were long to divide the Netherland commonwealth was already laid. The mercantile patrician interest, embodied in the states

of Holland and Zeeland, and inclined to a large toleration in the matter of religion, which afterwards took the form of Arminianism, was opposed by a strict Calvinist party, which desired to subject the political commonwealth to the reformed church; which nevertheless indulged in very democratic views of the social compact; and which was controlled by a few refugees from Flanders and Brabant, who had succeeded in obtaining the confidence of Leicester.

Thus the Earl was the nominal head of the Calvinist democratic party; while young Maurice of Nassau, stadholder of Holland and Zeeland, and guided by Barneveld, Buys, and other leading statesmen of these Provinces, was in an attitude precisely the reverse of the one which he was destined at a later and equally memorable epoch to assume. The chiefs of the faction which had now succeeded in gaining the confidence of Leicester were Reingault, Burgrave, and Deventer, all refugees.

The laws of Holland and of the other United States were very strict on the subject of citizenship, and no one but a native was competent to hold office in each Province. Doubtless, such regulations were narrow-spirited; but to fly in the face of them was the act of a despot, and this is what Leicester did. Reingault was a Fleming. He was a bankrupt merchant, who had been taken into the protection of Lamoral Egmont, and by that nobleman recommended to Granvelle for an office under the Cardinal's government. The refusal of this favour was one of the original causes of Egmont's hostility to Granvelle. Reingault subsequently entered the service of the Cardinal, however, and rewarded the kindness of his former benefactor by great exertions in finding, or inventing, evidence to justify the execution of that unfortunate nobleman. He was afterwards much employed by the Duke of Alva and by the Grand Commander Requesens; but after the pacification of Ghent he

1 Leicester to Burghley, 18 June, 1586. (S. P. Office MS.) Bruce's, *Leyc. Corresp.* 388.

2 Bruce's, *Leyc. Corresp.* 338.

3 Leicester to Burghley, MS. last cited. Bruce, *ubi sup.* 4 *Ibid.*

5 Doyley to Burghley, 8 Aug. 1586. (S. P. Office MS.) Compare Wagenaar viii. 142, 143.

had been completely thrown out of service. He had recently, in a subordinate capacity, accompanied the legations of the States to France and to England, and had now contrived to ingratiate himself with the Earl of Leicester. He affected great zeal for the Galvanistic religion—an exhibition which, in the old servant of Granville and Alva, was far from edifying—and would employ no man or maidservant in his household until their religious principles had been thoroughly examined by one or two clergymen. In brief, he was one of those, who, according to a homely Flemish proverb, are wont to hang their piety on the bell-rope; but, with the exception of this brief interlude in his career, he lived and died a Papist. 1

Gerard Proninck, called Deventer, was a respectable inhabitant of Bois-le-Duc, who had left that city after it had again become subject to the authority of Spain. He was of decent life and conversation, but a restless and ambitious demagogue. As a Brabantine, he was unfit for office; and yet, through Leicester's influence and the intrigues of the democratic party, he obtained the appointment of burgomaster in the city of Utrecht. The States-General, however, always refused to allow him to appear at their sessions as representative of that city. 2

Daniel de Burgrave was a Flemish mechanic, who, by the exertion of much energy and talent, had risen to the post of procureur-general of Flanders. After the conquest of the principal portion of that Province by Parma, he had made himself useful to the English governor-general in various ways and particularly as a linguist. He spoke English—a tongue with which few Netherlands of that day were familiar—and as the Earl knew no other, except (very imperfectly) Italian, he found his services

in speaking and writing a variety of languages very convenient. He was the governor's private secretary, and, of course, had no entrance to the council of state, but he was accused of frequently thrusting himself into their hall of sessions, where, under pretence of arranging the Earl's table, or portfolio, or papers, he was much addicted to whispering into his master's ear, listening to conversation,—to eaves-dropping, in short, and general intrusiveness. 1

„A most faithful, honest servant is Burgrave,” said Leicester; „a substantial, wise man. 2 'Tis as sufficient a man as ever I met withal of any nation; very well learned, exceeding wise, and sincere in religion. I cannot commend the man too much. He is the only comfort I have had of any of this nation.” 3

These three personages were the leaders of the Leicester faction. They had much influence with all the refugees from Flanders, Brabant, and the Walloon Provinces. In Utrecht, especially, where the Earl mainly resided, their intrigues were very successful. Deventer was appointed, as already stated, to the important post of burgomaster; many of the influential citizens were banished, without cause or trial; the upper branch of the municipal government, consisting of the clerical delegates of the colleges, was in an arbitrary manner abolished and finally, the absolute sovereignty of the Province, without condition, was offered to the Queen in England. 4

Leicester was now determined to carry out one of the great objects which the Queen had in view when she sent him to the Netherlands. She desired thoroughly to ascertain the financial resources of the Provinces, and their capacity to defend themselves. 5 It was supposed

1 Hoofd Vervolgh, 142, 143. Reydani, V. 89, 90.

2 Hoofd Vervolgh, &c. just cited.

1 Hoofd, Reyd, *ubi sup.*

2 Bruce's *Leyc. Corresp.* 363, 422.

3 Leicester to Walsingham, 27 July, 1586. (S. P. Office MS.)

4 Bor, ii. 722.

5 Hoofd, 1039, 1042. Wagenaar viii. 143.



by the States, and hoped by the Earl and by a majority of the Netherland people, that she would, in case the results were satisfactory, accept, after all, the sovereignty. She certainly was not to be blamed that she wished to make this most important investigation, but it was her own fault that any new machinery had been rendered necessary. The whole control of the finances had, in the beginning of the year, been placed in the Earl's hands, 1 and it was only by her violently depriving him of his credit and of the confidence of the country that he had not retained it. He now established a finance-chamber, under the chief control of Reingault, who promised him mountains of money, and who was to be chief treasurer. 2 Paul Buys was ap-

pointed by Leicester to fill a subordinate position in the new council. He spurned the offer with great indignation, saying that Reingault was not fit to be his clerk, and that he was not likely himself, therefore, to accept a humble post under the administration of such an individual. This scornful refusal filled to the full the hatred of Leicester against the ex-Advocate of Holland. 1

The mercantile interest at once took the alarm, because it was supposed that the finance-chamber was intended to crush the merchants. Early in April an Act had been passed by the state-council, prohibiting commerce with the Spanish possessions. The embargo was intended to injure the obedient Provinces and their sovereign, but it was shown that its effect would be to blast the commerce of Holland. It forbade the exportation from the republic not only of all provisions and munitions of war, but of all goods and merchandize whatever, to Spain, Portugal, the Spanish Netherlands, or any other of Philip's territories, either in Dutch or neutral vessels. 2 It would certainly seem, at first

1 Bruce's 'Leyc. Corresp.' 1585; „And,” said he to the Lord Mayor and Aldermen of London, „you may all sleep quietly in England, so long as these countries may be held in their earnest good-will.”

2 Bor, ii. 722.

Leicester to Burghley, 28 June, 1586. Cavendish to same, 19 June, 1586. Leicester to the Queen, 26 June, 1586. Same to same, 27 June, 1586. Wilkes to same, 27 June, 1586. Wilkes to Lords of Council 20 Aug. 1586. (S. P. Office. MSS.)

„The Prince of Orange,” said Cavendish (MS. *ubi sup.*), „being not ignorant of the frauds of the States, often levelled at this matter (a finance-council), but was never able to hit it, because they know he was poor, and had no way else to live but upon their alms-basket. . . . Amongst other things, there is one impost granted by favour to some parties for 100*l.* by the year, which is indeed worth 8000*l.* With these tricks have they enriched themselves, all which devices must now quail.” If such stories, which were daily whispered into Leicester's ears, had a shadow of foundation, it was not surprising that he should expect to increase the revenue by a more judicious farming. But he never found his „mountains of gold,” nor any collector who could turn a hundred pounds into eight thousand. „I have,” said Leicester (Letters to the Queen, *ubi sup.*), „established, against the wills of some here, a chamber of finance, by which I shall be sure to be privy to the levying and bestowing of all their revenues—a matter your Majesty hath often sought to understand thereof, but, with all the wit and means I could never certainly bring it to pass, nor never will, but by this only way. I trust shortly

to have very assured knowledge to satisfy your Majesty of the States' ability, which thing I have gone about from the beginning. I hope, within twenty days, to give your Majesty some near reckoning of all their revenues every way. Your Majesty doth suppose I deal weakly with these men, but I would you knew how I have dealt with them of late, to bring the office of finance to pass. I had a good will to have dealt long since roundly with them, I confess, but my case was too well known to them. But as soon as my heartening came from mine old supporter, I was found a more shrew than your Majesty will believe, for mine old patience hath been too much tried since I came from my quiet home to this wayward generation.” „I find that until the time of my coming hither,” said Wilkes (Letter to Council, *ubi sup.*), „the States have been contented to disguise and conceal the truth of many particularities, which now they profess to discover, meaning, as they say, to *anatomise unto her Majesty* the whole state of their strength.”

1 Bor, ii. 722.

2 Bor, ii. 703 *seq.*, who is, however, mistaken in ascribing the measure to the inspiration of Leicester.

sight, that such an act was reasonable, although the result would really be, not to deprive the enemy of supplies, but to throw the whole Baltic trade into the hands of the Bremen, Hamburg, and „Osterling” merchants. Leicester expected to derive a considerable revenue by granting passports and licences to such neutral traders, but the edict became so unpopular that it was never thoroughly enforced, and was before long rescinded. 1

The odium of the measure was thrown upon the governor-general, yet he had in truth opposed it in the state-council, and was influential in procuring its repeal. 2

Another important Act had been directed against the mercantile interest, and excited much general discontent. The Netherlands wished the staple of the English cloth manufacture to be removed from Emden—the petty sovereign of which place was the humble servant of Spain—to Amsterdam or Delft. The desire was certainly natural, and

1 Bor, ii. 703 *seq.* Wagenaar, viii. 147, *seq.*, who is in this matter even more unjust to the Earl than contemporary authorities.

2 Leicester to the Queen, 11 Oct. 1586, (S. P. Office MS.)

„I have very good testimony of all the council here,” said the Earl, „that I only in council stood against the placard, inasmuch it lay a month by, for indeed I thought it unreasonable and that it would give all princes just cause of offence toward this country, and, by all duty to your Majesty, I did refuse to let it pass. At length, both States and council renewed the matter again to me, and showed me presently how the like had been done, and what profit it would bring, pressing me to give it some consideration in council to be debated. It went so through them all as there was not a man spake against it, yet my resolution being to be had, I would give no consent till I had advertised your Majesty thereof, which they all liked well. And after it was agreed and published, it was again by my means revoked and qualified, as doth appear by record.”

Compare Meteren, xlii. 234°. Wagenaar, *ubi sup.* Bor, *ubi sup.*, who seems to be mistaken on this point

The real author of the edict was Rein-gault. (Meteren, *ubi sup.*)

the Dutch merchants sent a committee to confer with Leicester. He was much impressed with their views, and with the sagacity of their chairman, one Mylward, „a wise fellow and well languaged, an ancient man and very religious,” as the Earl pronounced him to be. 1

Notwithstanding the wisdom of this well-languaged fellow, however, the Queen, for some strange reason, could not be induced to change the staple from Emden, although it was shown that the public revenue of the Netherlands would gain twenty thousand pounds a year by the measure. „All Holland will cry out for it,” said Leicester; but I had rather they cried than that England should weep.” 2

Thus the mercantile community, and especially the patrician families of Holland and Zeeland, all engaged in trade, became more and more hostile to the governor-general and to his financial trio who were soon almost as unpopular as the famous Consulta of Cardinal Granvelle had been. It was the custom of the States to consider the men who surrounded the Earl as needy, unprincipled renegades and adventurers. It was the policy of his advisers to represent the merchants and the States—which mainly consisted of, or were controlled by, merchants—as a body of corrupt, selfish, greedy money-getters. 3

1 Leicester to Burghley, 29 July, 1586. (S. P. Office MS.)

2 Leicester to Burghley, 10 Aug. 1586. (S. P. Office MS.)

3 „The wonderful cunning dealing of those fellows here called the States concerning the finances and the receipt of revenue, whereupon the people rest greatly grieved, and themselves, as is thought, no less enriched.” Cavendish to Burghley, 9 April, 1586. (S. P. Office MS.)

„The States be sly persons,” said Lord North, „inconstant and treacherous, the most of them Papists (!), and so rich as they will do any turn to serve themselves. If they again find that her Majesty likes not of my Lord’s authority, they will doubt of their own safety, practise their own peace, and leave my Lord and all his to the spirit of

The calumnies put in circulation against the States by Reingault and his associates grew at last so outrageous,

the enemy." North to Burghley, 23 May, 1586. (S. P. Office MS.)

"These be dainty and dangerous people to deal withal," said Leicester, "specially when they shall be desperate of their hope, and disappointed of their help. I must say truly to your Majesty I do find some of the best sort as honest and as thankful as ever I knew men, and some others as perverse and as ingrate as might well be spared out of all good company. There are also men who are able, and do most hurt. . . . These men begin utterly to despair of your Majesty's good assistance, and an apt time is offered now for the lewd and bad disposed persons to work their feat." Leicester to the Queen, 6 June, 1586. (S. P. Office MS.)

"The whole people," said Cavendish, "are here so addicted to her Majesty, and in respect of her to my Lord, in whom they find such incessant travail and care for her service and their general good, and in respect of whom they would willingly cashier or rather hang all those called States. Your Lordship may think I write vehemently, but I know I write truly." Cavendish to Burghley, 19 June, 1586. (S. P. Office MS.)

"It will be a harder matter," said Leicester again, "than you can imagine, to bring this State in that tune it was three months past. It will require a whole and full countenance from her Majesty and with all speed possible, if you will have it kept from the enemy. And beware these fellows do not prevent her Majesty. If they do you can consider how harmful it is like to prove, and though they be counted dullards and drunkards, they have shrewd and subtle heads as ever I found anywhere. . . . The best man in England were not too good, as matters stand, to be employed hither, either to encourage them thoroughly, or to understand their estate more deeply." Leicester to Burghley, 20 July, 1586. (S. P. Office MS.)

"I did never see such heady people as these States are," said the Earl, one more, "I cannot blame the common sort to mislike them, for there is no reasoning against their resolutions. . . . There must be very wise and good handling had in these causes. There is no more such people to deal withal again.

mean these that be rich and politic fellows. They hunt after their own wealth and surety, and without an assurance of a strange assistance they will be suddenly gone, and it is nigh time to look into the course her Majesty will take hereafter." Same to same, 29 July, 1586. (S. P. Office MS.)

"They have given to my Lord Leicester," said Wilkes, "a government with the word *absolute*, but with so many restrictions that his authority is limited almost to nothing, and he is in truth for the politic government

and the prejudice created in the mind of Leicester and his immediate English adherents so intense, that it was rendered necessary for the States of Holland and Zeeland to write to their agent Ortell in London, that he might forestall the effect of these perpetual misrepresentations on her Majesty's government. 1 Leicester, on the other hand, under

but their servant; having reserved to themselves, besides the sovereignty, the disposing of all the contributions (saving the monthly allowance), the church goods, confiscations, choice of officers . . . and to keep themselves from rendering account of anything, they do impugn his court of finances now erected, alleging that he hath not authority to erect any such court, or to establish offices without their licence." Wilkes to Lords of Council, 20 Aug. 1586. (S. P. Office MS.)

"The exactions and excises are incredible that are laid on this people," said Digges, "and such as in all probability do amount to three times as much (!) as the 200,000 florins monthly which they allow his Excellency to prosecute the war. The rest they divide among themselves. . . giving great stipends to Count Hollock, Count Maurice, Count Meurs, Count William, and many Colonels. But for all this, the States offer that there shall be new impositions to levy more." T. Digges's, Advertisement of present state of the Low Countries,

<sup>3</sup> March, 1586. (S. P. Office MS.)

1 "You have doubtless understood," said the States, "of the erection of the finance-council for the better husbanding of the money furnished by these countries, of the which Jacques Ringault is ordained treasurer . . . Stephen Perret (a seditious person, often imprisoned, and a fraudulent bankrupt) being come out of Antwerp after the yielding up of the same, hath kept correspondence with Ringault, whilst he was in England. Very shortly after the coming of his Excellency into these countries, he hath sought by all possible means to bring him in suspicion and jealousy by the Estates of the country, and propounded manifold novelties unto his Excellency whereby to levy money, and in the propounding thereof shamefully slandered the Estates with injurious, seditious, and untrue reports and drifts. After Ringault's arrival here, he hath found means to get in better credit by his Excellency, and, laying their heads together, and either being set awork by the enemy or else thinking to enrich themselves out of the calamity and misery of these countries, have made agreement between them in April last that all that which they, by means of any new invention by them already propounded or yet to be propounded unto his Excellency, should get or enjoy, that the same should be divided



the inspiration of his artful advisers, was vehement in his entreaties that Ortell should be sent away from England.<sup>1</sup>

The ablest and busiest of the opposition party, the „nimblest head”<sup>2</sup> in the States-General, was the Ex-Advocate of Holland, Paul Buys. This man was then the foremost statesman in the Netherlands. He had been the firmest friend to the English alliance; he had resigned his office when the States were offering the sovereignty to France, and

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*between them.* And after that he sought of his Excellency the 20th penny of all that which should proceed of his pretended inventions. To which end Ringault, with his own hand, has drawn an octroi, or warrant, and got his Excellency to sign the same, without knowledge of the council, or any of the secretaries, namely, that he should have the 30th penny. They have also taken great pains to change the course of the common means, which so laudably and with such great travail his Excellency of worthy memory (William of Orange) brought in train, and so to bring it into collection, thereby to intrude themselves and such other (having no credit) to farm any of the said general means in the collection. The foresaid Perret and Ringault have also travailed by all means to set misunderstanding between his Excellency and the Estates and the council of state, and practised many unlawful devices to alter the estate of the countries, and to get his Excellency to do all that which they imagined to serve to their intent. To which end they have used many unheard-of and indecent proceedings without order of law, and against the privileges and customs of these countries, and against the estate and welfare of the same, through a company of inconstant and base persons, for the greater part being strangers, applying unto themselves and their friends (a company of strangers) many offices and receipts, thinking to deal with the same according to their own pleasure and appetite. All which we have at large imparted to Mr. Wilkes, showed him the original pieces, and given him good instruction by writing thereof, to the end he may give her Majesty and her honourable council to understand the personage of these two spirits.” States of Holland and Zealand to Ortell, 12 Sept. 1586. (S. P. Office MS.)

1 „You have there his (Paul Buys’s) agent, Ortell. It were well he were thence. I did send twice for him, but he excuseth himself.” Leicester to Burghley, 20 July, 1586. (S. P. Office MS.) Compare Leyc. Corresp. 311.

2 Bart. Clerk to Burghley, 24 July, 1586. (S. P. Office MS.)

had been on the point of taking service in Denmark. He had afterwards been prominent in the legation which offered the sovereignty to Elizabeth, and, for a long time, had been the most firm, earnest, and eloquent advocate of the English policy. Leicester had originally courted him, caressed him, especially recommended him to the Queen’s favour, given him money—as he said, „two hundred pounds sterling thick at a time”—and openly pronounced him to be „in ability above all men.”<sup>1</sup> No man hath ever sought a man,” he said, „as I have sought P. B.”<sup>2</sup>

The period of their friendship was, however, very brief. Before many weeks had passed there was no vituperative epithet that Leicester was not in the daily habit of bestowing upon Paul. The Earl’s vocabulary of abuse was not a limited one, but he exhausted it on the head of the Advocate. He lacked at last words and breath to utter what was like him. He pronounced his former friend „a very dangerous man, altogether hated of the people and the States;” „a lewd sinner, nursled in revolutions;” „a most covetous, bribing fellow, caring for nothing but to bear the sway and grow rich;” „a man who had played many parts, both lewd and audacious;” „a very knave, a traitor to his country;” „the most ungrateful wretch alive, a hater of the Queen and of all the English; a most unthankful man to her Majesty; a practiser to make himself rich and great, and nobody else;” „among all villains the greatest,” „a bolsterer of all papists and ill men, a dissembler, a devil, an atheist,” a „most naughty man, and a most notorious drunkard in the worst degree.”

Where the Earl hated, his hatred was apt to be deadly, and he was determined, if possible, to have the life of

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1 Leicester to Burghley, 10 Aug. 1586. (S. P. Office MS.)

2 Ibid.

the detested Paul. „You shall see I will do well enough with him, and that shortly,” he said. „I will course him as he was not so this twenty year. I will warrant him hanged and one or two of his fellows, but you must not tell your shirt of this yet;” and when he was congratulating the government on his having at length procured the execution of Captain Hemart, the surrenderer of Grave, he added pithily, „and you shall hear that Mr. P. B. shall follow.”<sup>1</sup>

Yet the Earl's real griefs against Buys may be easily summed up. The lewd sinner, nursed in revolutions, had detected the secret policy of the Queen's government, and was therefore perpetually denouncing the intrigues going on with Spain. He complained that her Majesty was tired of having engaged in the Netherland enterprise; he declared that she would be glad to be fairly out of it; that her reluctance to spend a farthing more in the cause than she was obliged to do was hourly increasing upon her; that she was deceiving and misleading the States-General; and that she was hankering after a peace. He said that the Earl had a secret intention to possess himself of certain towns in Holland, in which case the whole question of peace and war would be in the hands of the Queen, who would also have it thus in her power to reimburse herself at once for all expenses that she had incurred.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Leicester to Burghley, 20 June, 1586. Same to same, 10 Aug. 1586. Same to same, 20 July, 1586. B Clerk to same, 24 July. (S. P. Office MSS.)

Bruce's, *Leyc. Corresp.* 130, 291, 303, 310, 311, 312, 352. Cavendish observed that „there were many false brethren in the higher form among the people, of whom he feared that Paul Buys would not prove the *puisé*.” Cavendish to Burghley, 15 June, 1586. (S. P. Office MS.)

<sup>2</sup> „Paul Buys—still giving out slanderous speeches—for that I only sought to . . . *get their towns* . . . that thereby, whensoever her Majesty should think good to treat for peace, . . . I should hereby be able to com-

pel them to what end she should think good.” Leicester to Walsingham, 20 July, 1586, in Bruce, 376.

It would be difficult to show that there was anything very calumnious in these charges, which, no doubt, Paul was in the habit of making. As to the economical tendencies of her Majesty, sufficient evidence has been given already from Leicester's private letters. „Rather than spend one hundred pounds,” said Walsingham, „she can be content to be deceived of five thousand.”<sup>1</sup> That she had been concealing from the States, from Walsingham, from Leicester, during the whole summer, her secret negotiations with Spain, has also been made apparent. That she was disgusted with the enterprise in which she had embarked, Walsingham, Burghley, Hatton, and all the other statesmen of England, most abundantly testified. Whether Leicester had really an intention to possess himself of certain cities in Holland—a charge made by Paul Buys, and denounced as especially slanderous by the Earl—may better appear from his own private statements.

„*This I will do,*” he wrote to the Queen, „*and I hope not to fail of it, to get into my hands three or four most principal places in North Holland, which will be such a strength and assurance for your Majesty, as you shall see you shall both rule these men, and make war or peace as you list, always provided—whatsoever you hear, or is—part not with the Brill; and having these places in your hands, whatsoever should chance to these countries, your Majesty, I will warrant sure enough to make what peace you will in an hour, and to have your debts and charges readily answered.*”<sup>2</sup> At a somewhat later moment it will be seen what came of these secret designs. For the present, Leicester was very

pel them to what end she should think good.” Leicester to Walsingham, 20 July, 1586, in Bruce, 376.

<sup>1</sup> Bruce's, *Leyc. Corresp.* 273.

<sup>2</sup> Leicester to the Queen, 27 June, 1586. (S. P. Office MS.)

angry with Paul for daring to suspect him of such treachery.

The Earl complained, too, that the influence of Buys with Hohenlo and young Maurice of Nassau was most pernicious. Hohenlo had formerly stood high in Leicester's opinion. He was a „plain, faithful soldier, a most valiant gentleman,” and he was still more important, because about to marry Mary of Nassau, eldest daughter of William the silent, and coheirress with William to the Buren property. But he had been tampered with by the intriguing Paul Buys, and had then wished to resign his office under Leicester. Being pressed for reasons, he had „grown solemn,” and withdrawn himself almost entirely.

Maurice, with his „solemn sly wit,” also gave the Earl much trouble, saying little, but thinking much, and listening to the insidious Paul. He „stood much on making or marring,” so Leicester thought, „as he met with good counsel.” He had formerly been on intimate terms with the governor-general, who affected to call him his son; but he had subsequently kept aloof, and in three months had not come near him. 1 The Earl thought that money might do much, and was anxious for Sir Francis Drake to come home from the Indies with millions of gold, that the Queen might make both Hohenlo and Maurice

a handsome present before it should be too late. 1

Meantime he did what he could with Elector Truchsess to lure them back again. That forlorn little prelate was now poorer and more wretched than ever. He was becoming paralytic, though young, and his heart was broken through want. Leicester, always generous as the sun, gave him money, four thousand florins at a time, and was most earnest that the Queen should put him on her pension list. 2 „His wisdom, his behaviour, his languages, his person,” said the Earl, „all would like her well. He is in great melancholy for his town of Neusz, and for his poverty, having a very noble mind. If he be lost, her Majesty had better lose a hundred thousand pounds.” 3

The melancholy Truchsess now became a spy and a go-between. He insinuated himself into the confidence of Paul Buys, wormed his secrets from him, and then communicated them to Hohenlo and to Leicester; „but he did it very wisely,” said the Earl, „so that he was not mistrusted.” 4 The governor always affected, in order to screen the elector from suspicion, to obtain his information from persons in Utrecht, and he had indeed many spies in that city, who diligently reported Paul's table-talk. Nevertheless, that „noble gentleman, the elector,” said Leicester, „hath dealt most deeply with him, to seek out the bottom.” 5 As the ex-Advocate of Holland was very communicative in his cups, and very bitter against the governor-general, there was soon such a fund of information collected on the subject by various eaves-droppers, that Leicester was in hopes very soon hanging Mr. Paul Buys, as we have already seen.

The burthen of the charges against the culprit was his statement that the

1 „The Count Maurice hath not been three months with his Lordship. He is utterly discontented, and much advised by Ste. Aldegonde, who is assuredly the King of Spain's, and practiseth (as an instrument of sedition) to animate the Count, by all means possible, to thwart my Lord in the course of her Majesty's service. The Count, well advised by Ste. Aldegonde and Villiers, repineth secretly that her Majesty should have anything to do in the government of the country. It is to be feared his hidden malice will do much mischief, and many ill offices in the common cause now in hand.” „Matters to be related to her Majesty by a special messenger from the Earl of Leicester,” 20 June, 1586. (S. P. Office MS.)

The opinion here expressed in regard to Sainte Aldegonde was subsequently and distinctly contradicted by Wilkes.

1 Bruce's *Leyc. Corresp.* 374.

2 *Ibid.* 378. 3 *Ibid.* 374. 4 *Ibid.* 377.

5 *Ibid.*



Provinces would be gone if her Majesty did not declare herself, vigorously and generously, in their favour; but, as this was the perpetual cry of Leicester himself, there seemed hardly hanging matter in that. That noble gentleman, the elector, however, had nearly saved the hangman his trouble, having so dealt with Hohenlo as to „bring him into as good a mind as ever he was;” and the first fruits of this good mind were, that the honest Count—a man of prompt dealing—walked straight to Paul’s house in order to kill him on the spot. 1 Something fortunately prevented the execution of this plan; but for a time at least the energetic Count continued to be „governed greatly” by the ex-archbishop, and „did impart wholly unto him his most secret heart.”

Thus the „deep wise Truxy,” as Leicester called him, continued to earn golden opinions, and followed up his conversion of Hohenlo by undertaking to „bring Maurice into tune again also,” and the young Prince was soon on better terms with his „affectionate father” than he had ever been before. 2

Paul Buys was not so easily put down, however, nor the two magnates so thoroughly gained over. Before the end of the season Maurice stood in his old position, the nominal head of the Holland or patrician party, chief of the opposition to Leicester, while Hohenlo had become more bitter than ever against the Earl. The quarrel between himself and Edward Norris, to which allusion will soon be made, tended to increase the dissatisfaction, although he singularly misunderstood Leicester’s sentiments throughout the whole affair. Hohenlo recovered of his wound before Zutphen; but, on his recovery, was more malcontent than ever. 3 The Earl was obliged at last to confess that „he was a very dangerous man, inconstant,

envious, and hateful to all our nation, and a very traitor to the cause. There is no dealing to win him,” he added, „I have sought it to my cost. His best friends tell me he is not to be trusted.” 1

Meantime that lewd sinner, the indefatigable Paul, was plotting desperately—so Leicester said and believed—to transfer the sovereignty of the Provinces to the King of Denmark. Buys, who was privately of opinion that the States required an absolute head, „though it were but an onion’s head,” 2 and that they would thankfully continue under Leicester as governor absolute if Elizabeth would accept the sovereignty, had made up his mind that the Queen would never take that step. He was therefore disposed to offer the crown to the King of Denmark, and was believed to have brought Maurice—who was to espouse that King’s daughter 3—to the same way of thinking. Young Count Rantzan, son of a distinguished Danish statesman, made a visit to the Netherlands in order to confer with Buys. Paul was also anxious to be appointed envoy to Denmark, ostensibly to arrange for the two thousand cavalry, which the King had long before promised for the assistance of the Provinces, but, in reality, to examine the details of this new project; and Leicester represented to the Queen very earnestly how powerful the Danish monarch would become, thus rendered master of the narrow seas, and how formidable to England. 4

1 Ibid. 446. Wilkes had also formed an unfavourable opinion of the Count. „I do not find that the States or people,” he said, „have any great affection for him. The man is doubtless valiant, but rash, bloody, unfortunate, and subject to many imperfections. They would willingly berid of him, if they might without danger.” Wilkes to the Lords of Council, 20 Aug. 1586. (S. P. Office MS.)

2 Notes by Paul Buys, 1586. (S. P. Office MS.) 3 Ibid.

4 Paul Buys . . perceiving of late,” said Leicester, „that your Maj. meaneth not to proceed so far in these countries as he looked for, or rather not finding himself the abso-

1 Bruce’s, *Leyc. Corresp.* 372.

2 Ibid. 376.

3 Ibid. 378.

In the midst of these plottings, real or supposed, a party of armed men,

lute director and governor as he would be, is secretly working to make a king indeed over these two countries, Holland and Zealand, and one he doth insinuate unto men's minds already all that ever he can, is the King of Denmark—a matter not unlike to come to pass, if your Ma. shall not assure these people of the continuance of your favor, which if they should be, all the princes of the world cannot win them from you. But this lewd sinner loseth no time, where he can be heard, to inform men how fickle a trust there is to be had of your Majesty's favor or promise, repenting withal greatly that he ever procured me over, being indeed, as he says, since fallen out in no better grace with you. . . . If the King should have these two provinces absolutely as king, you must assure yourself he will be lord and commander over the narrow seas, and all your traffics, east and northward, wholly under his restraint, for *he will be the only mighty prince by sea*. . . . I refused P. B. to go to the King as ambassador, being marvellous earnest therein. . . . but I trust to come to further knowledge of this matter, and to prevent Master Buys well enough. P. B. hath flatly said to me, of late, that the King of Denmark were the fittest lord for them in Christendom, *next your Majesty*." Leicester to the Queen, 20 June, 1586, (S. P. Office MS.)

"It is feared," said Cox, specially deputed by Leicester to report this matter to the Queen's government, "that the King of Denmark is alienated, and would be glad to have the sovereignty of these countries himself. Paul Buys hath not spared of late to intend such a practice, and participating the same with Count Maurice, alleging plainly to his Lordship, that it is commonly spoken and received as current money, that her Majesty will abandon that cause and people at Michaelmas, and this being so, that it were fit for them to think of some other prince, who might protect and defend them, before they should fall into further misery. He was of opinion that the King of Denmark would most gladly entertain the action. He was strong in shipping, and best able, in that respect, to defend the best part of their countries, which was Holland and Zealand. His speeches were often intermingled with many coloured protestations how much he desired that her Maj. would continue their gracious lady in the cause, as the fittest princess to yield them comfort in their calamities, yet hath his Lordship been certainly informed that he practiseth with all earnestness to bring this matter to pass for the King of Denmark, and hath greatly desired that he may be the man to go into Denmark to solicit for the 2000 horses promised, for the end he may better disguise his purpose under this colour," &c. Matters

one fine summer's morning, suddenly entered Paul's bedroom as he lay asleep at the house of the burgomaster, seized his papers, and threw him into prison in the wine-cellar of the town-house. „Oh my papers, oh my papers!" cried the unfortunate politician, according to Leicester's statement; „the Queen of England will for ever hate me." The Earl disavowed all participation in the arrest; but he was not believed. He declared himself not sorry that the measure had been taken, and promised that he would not „be hasty to release him," not doubting that „he would be found faulty enough." Leicester maintained that there was stuff enough discovered to cost Paul his head; but he never lost his head, nor was anything treasonable or criminal ever found against him. The intrigue with Denmark—never proved—and commenced, if undertaken at all, in utter despair of Elizabeth's accepting the sovereignty, was the gravest charge. He remained, however, six months in prison, and at the beginning of 1587 was released, without trial or accusation, at the request of the English Queen. 1

The States could hardly be blamed for their opposition to the Earl's administration, for he had thrown himself completely into the arms of a faction, whose object was to vilipend and traduce them, and it was now difficult for him to recover the functions of which the Queen had deprived him. „The government they had given from themselves to me stuck in their stomachs always," he said. Thus, on the one

to be related to her Majesty,' 20 June, 1586. (S. P. Office MS.)

Robert Sidney was subsequently sent to Denmark by Leicester to look into this matter. Wilkes to Lords of Council, 20 Aug. 1586. (S. P. Office MS.)

1 Bor, ii. 725, 726, 889, 890. Hoofd Vervolgh, 165. Wagenaar, viii. 161-163. Bruce's, Leyc. Corresp. 352, 362-364, 386, 436.

Leicester to Burghley, 20 July, 1586. B. Clerk to same, 24 July, 1586. (S. P. Office MSS.)

side, the States were „growing more stately than ever,” and were always „jumbling underhand, while the aristocratic Earl, on his part, was resolute not to be put down by „churls and tinkers.”<sup>1</sup> He was sure that the people were with him, and that, „having always been governed by some prince, they never did nor could consent to be ruled by bakers, brewers, and hired advocates. I know they hate them,”<sup>2</sup> said this high-born tribune of the people. He was much disgusted with the many-headed chimæra, the monstrous republic, with which he found himself in such unceasing conflict, and was disposed to take a manful stand. „I have been fain of late,” he said, „to set the better leg foremost, to handle some of my masters somewhat plainly, for they thought I would droop; and whatsoever becomes of me, you shall hear I will keep my reputation, or die for it.”<sup>3</sup>

But one great accusation made against the churls and tinkers, and bakers and hired advocates, and Mr. Paul Buys at their head, was that they were liberal towards the Papists. They were willing that Catholics should remain in the country and exercise the rights of citizens, provided they conducted themselves like good citizens. For this toleration—a lesson which statesmen like Buys and Barneveld had learned in the school of William the Silent—the opposition-party were denounced as bolsterers of Papists, and Papists themselves at heart, and „worshippers of idolatrous idols.”<sup>4</sup>

From words, too, the government of Leicester passed to acts. Seventy Papists were banished from the city of Utrecht at the time of the arrest of Buys.<sup>5</sup> The Queen had constantly enforced upon

Leicester the importance of dealing justly with the Catholics in the Netherlands, on the ground that they might be as good patriots and were as much interested in the welfare of their country as were the Protestants; and he was especially enjoined „not to meddle in matters of religion.” This wholesome advice it would have been quite impossible for the Earl, under the guidance of Reingault, Burgrave, and Stephen Perret, to carry out. He protested that he should have liked to treat Papists and Calvinists „with indifference,” but that it had proved impossible; that the Catholics were perpetually plotting with the Spanish faction, and that no towns were safe except those in which Papists had been excluded from office. „They love the Pope above all,” he said, „and the Prince of Parma hath continual intelligence with them.” Nor was it the Catholics alone who gave the governor trouble. He was likewise very busy in putting down other denominations that differed from the Calvinists. „Your Majesty will not believe,” he said, „the number of sects that are in most towns; especially Anabaptists, Families of Love, Georgians, and I know not what. The godly and good ministers were molested by them in many places, and ready to give over; and even such diversities grew among magistrates in towns, being caused by some sedition-sowers here.”<sup>2</sup> It is, however, satisfactory to reflect that the Anabaptists and Families of Love, although discouraged and frowned upon, were not burned alive, buried alive, drowned in dungeons, and roasted at slow fires, as had been the case with them and with every other species of Protestants, by thousands and tens of thousands, so long as Charles V. and Philip II. had ruled the territory of that commonwealth. Humanity had ac-

<sup>1</sup> Bruce's *Leyc. Corresp.* 312.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.* 424.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.* 312.

<sup>4</sup> Digges's *Advertisement of the Present State*, &c. (S. P. Office MS. before cited.)

<sup>5</sup> B. Clerk to Burghley, 24 July, 1586. (S. P. Office MS.)

<sup>1</sup> Leicester to the Queen, 26 June 1586. (S. P. Office MS.)

<sup>2</sup> Leicester to the Queen, just cited.



quired something by the war which the Netherlands had been waging for twenty years, and no man or woman was ever put to death for religious causes after the establishment of the republic.

With his hands thus full of business, it was difficult for the Earl to obey the Queen's command not to meddle in religious matters; for he was not of the stature of William the Silent, and could not comprehend that the great lesson taught by the sixteenth century was that men were not to meddle with men in matters of religion.

But besides his especial nightmare—Mr. Paul Buys—the governor-general had a whole set of incubi in the Norris family. Probably no two persons ever detested each other more cordially than did Leicester and Sir John Norris. Sir John had been commander of the forces in the Netherlands before Leicester's arrival, and was unquestionably a man of larger experience than the Earl. He had, however, as Walsingham complained, acquired by his services in „countries where neither discipline military nor religion carried any sway,” a very rude and licentious kind of government. „Would to God,” said the secretary, „that, with his value and courage, he carried the mind and reputation of a religious soldier.”<sup>1</sup> But that was past praying for. Sir John was proud, untractable, turbulent, very difficult to manage. He hated Leicester, and was furious with Sir William Pelham, whom Leicester had made marshal of the camp.<sup>2</sup> He complained, not unjustly, that from the first place in the army, which he had occupied in the Netherlands, he had been reduced to the fifth.<sup>3</sup> The governor-general—who chose to call Sir John the son of his ancient enemy, the Earl of Sussex—often denounced him in good set terms. „His

brother Edward is as ill as he,” he said, „but John is right the late Earl of Sussex' son; he will so dissemble and crouch, and so cunningly carry his doings, as no man living would imagine that there were half the malice or vindictive mind that plainly his words prove to be.”<sup>1</sup> Leicester accused him of constant insubordination, insolence, and malice, complained of being traduced by him everywhere in the Netherlands and in England, and declared that he was followed about by „a pack of lewd audacious fellows,” whom the Earl vowed he would hang, one and all, before he had done with them.<sup>2</sup> He swore openly, in presence of all his camp, that he would hang Sir John likewise; so that both the brothers, who had never been afraid of anything since they had been born into the world, affected to be in danger of their lives.<sup>3</sup>

The Norrises were on bad terms with many officers—with Sir William Pelham of course, with „old Reade,” Lord North, Roger Williams, Hohenlo, Essex, and other nobles—but with Sir Philip Sidney, the gentle and chivalrous, they were friends.<sup>4</sup> Sir John had quarrelled in former times—according to Leicester—with Hohenlo and even with the „good and brave” La Noue, of the iron arm; „for his pride,” said the Earl, „was the spirit of the devil.”<sup>5</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Bruce's, *Leyc. Corresp.* 301.

<sup>2</sup> *Notes of Remembrances*, by Mr. Edward Norris, Sept. 1586. (S. P. Office MS.)

<sup>3</sup> „His Excellency did not only not mislike withal that Lord North, Captain Williams, and others, should rail at him, but in his own presence did suffer divers captains and noblemen to brave him, and did himself also grow in great rages against him, disallowing him openly for wise man, honest man, or soldier; preferring many men's wisdom and experience, saying his patience and slyness should not save him, not sparing openly to threaten him to hang him; so that of every honest man it is feared lest some mischief shall shortly be wrought him.” (Ibid.)

<sup>4</sup> Sir John Norris to Walsingham, 25 Oct. 1586. (S. P. Office MS.)

<sup>5</sup> Leicester to Wilkes, 22 Aug. (S. P. Office MS.)

<sup>1</sup> Bruce's, *Leyc. Corresp.* 222.

<sup>2</sup> „He stomachs greatly the Marshal,” said Leicester. (Ibid. 379.)

<sup>3</sup> Ibid. 380.

The governor complained every day of his malignity, and vowed that he „neither regarded the cause of God, nor of his prince, nor country.”<sup>1</sup>

He consorted chiefly with Sir Thomas Cecil, 2 governor of Brill, son of Lord Burghley, and therefore no friend to Leicester; but the Earl protested that „Master Thomas should bear small rule,”<sup>3</sup> so long as he was himself governor-general. „Now I have Pelham and Stanley, we shall do well enough,” he said, „though my young master would countenance him. I will be master while I remain here, will they, nill they.”<sup>4</sup>

Edward Norris, brother of Sir John, gave the governor almost as much trouble as he; but the treasurer Norris, uncle to them both, was, if possible, more odious to him than all. He was—if half Leicester’s accusations are to be believed—a most infamous peculator. One-third of the money sent by the Queen for the soldiers stuck in his fingers. He paid them their wretched fourpence a-day in depreciated coin, so that for their „naughty money they could get but naughty ware.”<sup>5</sup> Never was such „fleecing of poor soldiers,” said Leicester.<sup>6</sup>

On the other hand, Sir John maintained that his uncle’s accounts were

always ready for examination, and earnestly begged the home government not to condemn that functionary without a hearing.<sup>1</sup> For himself, he complained that he was uniformly kept in the background, left in ignorance of important enterprises, and sent on difficult duty with inadequate forces. It was believed that Leicester’s course was inspired by envy, lest any military triumph that might be gained should redound to the glory of Sir John, one of the first commanders of the age, rather than to that of the governor-general. He was perpetually thwarted, crossed, calumniated, subjected to coarse and indecent insults, even from such brave men as Lord North and Roger Williams, and in the very presence of the commander-in-chief, so that his talents were of no avail, and he was most anxious to be gone from the country.<sup>2</sup>

Thus with the tremendous opposition formed to his government in the States-General, the incessant bickerings with the Norrises; the peculations of the treasurer, the secret negotiations with Spain, and the impossibility of obtaining money from home for himself or for his starving little army, the Earl was in anything but a comfortable position. He was severely censured in England; but he doubted, with much reason, whether there were many who would take his office, and spend twenty thousand pounds sterling out of their own pockets, as he had done.<sup>3</sup> The Earl

<sup>1</sup> Leicester to Wilkes, just cited.

Wilkes on the contrary, had a very favourable opinion of Norris, and always secretly defended him to the Queen’s government against Leicester’s charges. „Besides the value, wisdom, and many other good parts that are in the man,” he said, „I have noted a wonderful patience and modesty in bearing many apparent injuries done unto him, which I have known to be countenanced and nourished, contrary to all reason, to disgrace him. Whatsoever may be reported maliciously to his disadvantage, I dare avouch that the Queen hath not a second subject of his place and quality so able to serve in these countries as he.” Wilkes to Burghley, 17 Nov. 1586. (S. P. Office MS.)

<sup>2</sup> Letter to Wilkes, MS. last cited.

<sup>3</sup> Bruce’s ‚Leyce. Corresp.’ 380.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid. 299, 303.

<sup>6</sup> Leicester to the Queen, 27 June, 1586. (S. P. Office MS.)

<sup>1</sup> Sir J. Norris to Burghley, 25 May, 1586. (S. P. Office MS.)

<sup>2</sup> ‚Notes of Remembrance,’ by Ed. Norris. (MS. before cited.) „His Excellency doth wonderfully hate my brother. . . . I only gather these causes,” said Captain Norris: „first, an envy of some unworthy men about him, who put into his Excellency’s head that as long as Norris were here, the honour of everything would be attributed to him, and that he would be a continual hindrance to the course that his Excellency meant to hold concerning some things, neither should his Excellency have any absolute commandment as long as his credit continued.”

<sup>3</sup> Leicester to the Queen, 27 June, 1586. „I pray God I may live to see you employ

was generous and brave as man could be, full of wit, quick of apprehension; but inordinately vain, arrogant, and withal easily led by designing persons. He stood up manfully for the cause in which he was embarked, and was most strenuous in his demands for money. „Personally he cared,” he said, „not sixpence for his post, but would giye five thousand sixpences, and six thousand shillings beside, to be rid of it;”<sup>1</sup> but it was contrary to his dignity to „stand hucking with the States” for his salary. „Is it reason;” he asked, „that I, being sent from so great a prince as our sovereign is, must come to strangers to beg my entertainment? If they are to pay me, why is there no remembrance made of it by her Majesty’s letters, or some of the lords?”<sup>2</sup>

The Earl and those around him perpetually and vehemently-urged upon the Queen to reconsider her decision, and accept the sovereignty of the Provinces at once. There was no other remedy for the distracted state of the country—no other safeguard for England. The Netherland people anxiously, eagerly desired it. Her Majesty was adored by all the inhabitants, who would gladly hang the fellows called the States. Lord North was of this opinion—so was Cavendish: Leicester had always held it. „Sure I am,” he said, „there is but one way for our safety, and that is, that her Majesty may take that upon her which I fear she will not.”<sup>3</sup> Thom-

some of them that are thus careless of me, to see whether they will spend 20,000*l.* of their own for you in seven months; but all is in mine own heart so little, though the greatest portion of all my land pay for it, so your Majesty do well accept of it,” &c.

The Earl expended—according to his own report to the States—three hundred thousand florins (30,000*l.*) in the course of the year 1587. (Bor. ii. 788; Hoofd Vervolgh, 206.) Of course, he had a claim for such disbursements on the Queen’s exchequer, and was like to enforce it at the proper season.

<sup>1</sup> Leyc. Corresp. 378.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.* 323.

<sup>3</sup> Leicester to Burghley, 10 Aug. 1586. (S. P. Office MS.)

as Wilkes, who now made his appearance on the scene, held the same language. This distinguished civilian had been sent by the Queen, early in August, to look into the state of Netherland affairs. Leicester having expressly urged the importance of selecting as wise a politician as could be found—because the best man in England would hardly be found a match for the dullards and drunkards, as it was the fashion there to call the Dutch statesmen—had selected Wilkes. After fulfilling this important special mission, he was immediately afterwards to return to the Netherlands as English member of the state-council at forty shillings a-day, in the place of „little Hal Killigrew,” whom Leicester pronounced a „quicker and stouter fellow” than he had at first taken him for, although he had always thought well of him. The other English counsellor, Dr. Bartholomew Clerk, was to remain, and the Earl declared that he too, whom he had formerly undervalued, and thought to have „little stuff in him,” was now „increasing greatly in understanding.”<sup>2</sup> But, notwithstanding this intellectual progress, poor Bartholomew, who was no beginner, was most anxious to retire. He was a man of peace, a professor, a doctor of laws, fonder of the learned leisure and the trim gardens of England than of the scenes which now surrounded him. „I beseech your good Lordship to consider,” he dismally observed to Burghley, „what a hard case it is for a man that these fifteen years hath had *eitam sedentariam*, unworthily in a place judicial, always in his long robe, and who, twenty-four years since, was a public reader in the University (and therefore cannot be young), to come now among guns and drums, tumbling up and down, day and night, over waters and banks, dykes

<sup>1</sup> Same to same, 20 July, 1586.

<sup>2</sup> Leyc. Corresp. 375.



and ditches, upon every occasion that falleth out; hearing many insolences with silence, bearing many hard measures with patience—a course most different from my nature, and most unmeet for him that hath ever professed learning.”<sup>1</sup>

Wilkes was of sterner stuff. Always ready to follow the camp and to face the guns and drums with equanimity, and endowed beside with keen political insight, he was more competent than most men to unravel the confused skein of Netherland politics. He soon found that the Queen's secret negotiations with Spain, and the general distrust of her intentions in regard to the Provinces, were like to have fatal consequences. Both he and Leicester painted the anxiety of the Netherland people as to the intention of her Majesty in vivid colours. 2

The Queen could not make up her mind—in the very midst of the Greenwich secret conferences, already described—to accept the Netherland sovereignty. „She gathereth from your letter,” wrote Walsingham, „that the only salve for this sore is to make herself proprietary of the country, and to put in such an army as may be able to make head to the enemy. These two things being so contrary to her Majesty's disposition—the one, for that it breedeth a doubt of a perpetual war, the other, for that it requireth an increase of charges—do *marvellously distract her, and make her repent that ever she entered into the action.*”<sup>3</sup>

Upon the great subject of the sovereignty, therefore, she was unable to adopt the resolution so much desired by Leicester and by the people of the Provinces; but she answered the Earl's communications concerning Maurice and

Hohenlo, Sir John Norris and the treasurer, in characteristic but affectionate language. And thus she wrote:—

„Rob, I am afraid you will suppose, by my wandering writings, that a midsummer's moon hath taken large possession of my brains this month; but you must needs take things as they come in my head, though order be left behind me. When I remember your request to have a discreet and honest man that may carry my mind, and see how all goes there, I have chosen this bearer (Thomas Wilkes), whom you know and have made good trial of. I have fraught him full of my conceits of those country matters, and imparted what way I mind to take and what is fit for you to use. I am sure you can credit him, and so I will be short with these few notes. First, that Count Maurice and Count Hollock (Hohenlo) find themselves trusted of you, esteemed of me, and to be carefully regarded, if ever peace should happen, and of that assure them on my word, that yet never deceived any. And for Norris and other captains that *voluntarily, without commandment, have many years ventured their lives and won our nation honour and themselves fame*, let them not be discouraged by any means, neither by new-come men nor by old trained soldiers elsewhere. If there be fault in using of soldiers, or making of profit by them, let them hear of it without open shame, and doubt not I will well chasten them therefore. It frets me not a little that the poor soldiers that hourly venture life should want their due, that well deserve rather reward; and look, in whom the fault may truly be proved, let them smart therefore. And if the treasurer be found untrue or negligent, according to desert he shall be used. But you know my old wont, that love not to discharge from Office without desert. God forbid! I pray you let this bearer know what may be learned herein, and for the treasure I have joined Sir Thomas

<sup>1</sup> B. Clerk to Burghley, 11 Aug. 1586. (S. P. Office MS.)

<sup>2</sup> Wilkes to the Queen, 7 Aug. 1586. Leicester to the Queen, 27 June, 1586. (S. P. Office MSS.)

<sup>3</sup> Bruce's 'Leyc. Corresp.' 340, 9th July, 1586.

Shirley to see all this money discharged in due sort, where it needeth and behoveth.

„Now will I end, that do imagine I talk still with you, and therefore loathly say farewell one hundred thousand times, though ever I pray God bless you from all harm, and save you from all foes. With my million and legion of thanks for all your pains and cares,

„As you know ever the same,

„E. R.

„P.S. Let Wilkes see that he is acceptable to you. If anything there be that W. shall desire answer of be such as you would have but me to know, write it to myself. You knew I can keep both others' counsel and mine own. Mistrust not that anything you would have kept shall be disclosed by me, for although this bearer ask many things, yet you may answer him such as you shall think meet, and write to me the rest." 1

Thus, not even her favourite Leicester's misrepresentations could make the Queen forget her ancient friendship for „her own crow;" but meantime the relations between that „bunch of brethren," black Norris and the rest, and Pelham, Hollock, and other high officers in Leicester's army, had grown worse than ever.

One August evening there was a supper-party at Count Hollock's 2 quarters in Gertruydenberg. A military foray into Brabant had just taken Aug. 6th, place, under the lead of the 1585

Count, and of the Lord Marshal, Sir William Pelham. The marshal had requested Lord Willoughby, with his troop of horse and five hundred foot, to join in the enterprise, but, as usual, particular pains had been taken that Sir John Norris should know nothing of the affair. 1 Pelham and Hollock—who was „greatly in love with Mr. Pelham" 2—had invited several other gentlemen high in Leicester's confidence to accompany the expedition; and, among the rest, Sir Philip Sidney, telling him that he „should see some good service." Sidney came accordingly, in great haste, from Flushing, bringing along with him Edward Norris—that hot-headed young man, who, according to Leicester, „greatly governed his elder brother,"—but they arrived at Gertruydenberg too late. The foray was over, and the party—"having burned a village, and killed some boors"—were on their return. Sidney, not perhaps much regretting the loss of his share in this rather inglorious shooting-party, went down to the water-side, accompanied by Captain Norris, to meet Hollock and the other commanders.

As the Count stepped on shore he scowled ominously, and looked very much out of temper.

„What has come to Hollock?" whispered Captain Patton, a Scotchman, to Sidney. „Has he a quarrel with any of the party? Look at his face! He means mischief to somebody."

But Sidney was equally amazed at the sudden change in the German general's countenance, and as unable to explain it.

Soon afterwards, the whole party, Hollock, Lewis William of Nassau, Lord Carew, Lord Essex, Lord Willoughby, both the Sidneys, Roger Williams, Pel-

1 Queen to Leicester, 19 July 1586. (S. P. Office MS.)

2 It has been already stated that Hohenlo was uniformly called Hollach or Hollock by the English and French, and very often by the Nederlanders. In our text, sometimes the one, sometimes the other, appellation is used. The reader will understand that there was but one of the name in the Provinces—Count Philip William Hohenlo or Hohenlohe, oftener called Hollock.

1 „Whereunto the colonel-general must not in any wise be made privy." „Advertisement of a difference at Gertruydenberg," 8 Aug. 1586. (S. P. Office MS.)

2 Bruce's, Leyc. Corresp.' 374.

ham, Edward Norris, and the rest, went to the Count's lodgings, where they supped, and afterwards set themselves seriously to drinking.

Norris soon perceived that he was no welcome guest; for he was not—like Sidney—a stranger to the deep animosity which had long existed between Sir John Norris and Sir William Pelham and his friends. The carouse was a tremendous one, as usually was the case where Hollock was the Amphitryon, and, as the potations grew deeper, an intention became evident on the part of some of the company to behave unhand-somely to Norris.

For a time the young Captain ostentatiously restrained himself, very much after the fashion of those meek individuals who lay their swords on the tavern-table, with „God grant I may have no need of thee!” The custom was then prevalent at banquets for the reveliers to pledge each other in rotation, each draining a great cup, and exacting the same feat from his neighbour, who then emptied his goblet as a challenge to his next comrade.

The Lord Marshal took a beaker, and called out to Edward Norris—„I drink to the health of my Lord Norris, and of my lady, your mother.” So saying, he emptied his glass.

The young man did not accept the pledge.

„Your Lordship knows,” he said somewhat sullenly, that I am not wont to drink deep. Mr. Sidney there can tell you that, for my health's sake, I have drunk no wine these eight days. If your Lordship desires the pleasure of seeing me drunk, I am not of the same mind; I pray you at least to take a smaller glass.”

Sir William insisted on the pledge. Norris then, in no very good humour, emptied his cup to the Earl of Essex.

Essex responded by draining a goblet to Count Hollock.

„A Norris's father,” said the young

Earl, as he pledged the Count, who was already very drunk, and looking blacker than ever.

„An 'orse's father—an 'orse's father!” growled Hollock; „I never drink to horses, nor to their fathers either:” and with this wonderful witticism he declined the pledge.

Essex explained that the toast was Lord Norris, father of the Captain; but the Count refused to understand, and held fiercely, and with damnable iteration, to his jest.

The Earl repeated his explanation several times with no better success. Norris meanwhile sat swelling with wrath, but said nothing.

Again the Lord Marshal took the same great glass, and emptied it to the young Captain.

Norris, not knowing exactly what course to take, placed the glass at the side of his plate, and glared grimly at Sir William.

Pelham was furious. Reaching over the table, he shoved the glass towards Norris with an angry gesture.

„Take your glass, Captain Norris,” he cried; „and if you have a mind to jest, seek other companions. I am not to be trifled with; therefore, I say, pledge me at once.”

„Your Lordship shall not force me to drink more wine than I list,” returned the other. „It is your plasure to take advantage of your military rank. Were we both at home, you would be glad to be my companion.”

Norris was hard beset, and although his language was studiously moderate, it was not surprising that his manner should be somewhat insolent. The veteran Lord Marshal, on the other hand, had distinguished himself on many battle-fields, but his deportment at this banqueting-table was not much to his credit. He paused a moment, and Norris, too, held his peace, thinking that his enemy would desist.

It was but for a moment.



„Captain Norris,” cried Pelham, „I bid you pledge me without more ado. Neither you nor your best friends shall use me as you list. I am better born than you and your brother, the colonel-general, and the whole of you,”

„I warn you to say nothing disrespectful against my brother,” replied the Captain. „As for yourself, I know how to respect your age and superior rank.”

„Drink, drink, drink!” roared the old Marshal. „I tell you I am better born than the best of you. I have advanced you all too, and you know it; therefore drink to me.”

Sir William was as logical as men in their cups are prone to be.

„Indeed, you have behaved well to my brother Thomas,” answered Norris, suddenly becoming very courteous, „and for this I have ever loved your Lordship, and would do you any service.”

„Well, then,” said the Marshal, becoming tender in his turn, „forget what hath past this night, and do as you would have done before.”

„Very well said, indeed!” cried Sir Philip Sidney, trying to help the matter into the smoother channel towards which it was tending.

Norris, seeing that the eyes of the whole company were upon them, took the glass accordingly, and rose to his feet.

„My Lord Marshal,” he said, „you have done me more wrong this night than you can easily make satisfaction for. But I am unwilling that any trouble or offence should grow through me. Therefore once more I pledge you.”

He raised the cup to his lips. At that instant Hollock, to whom nothing had been said, and who had spoken no word since his happy remark about the horse's father, suddenly indulged in a more practical jest; and seizing the heavy gilt cover of a silver vase, hurled it at the head of Norris. It struck him full on the forehead, cutting him to the

bone. The Captain, stunned for a moment, fell back in his chair, with the blood running down his eyes and face. The Count, always a man of few words, but prompt in action, now drew his dagger, and strode forward, with the intention of despatching him upon the spot. Sir Philip Sidney threw his arms around Hollock, however, and, with the assistance of others in the company, succeeded in dragging him from the room. The affair was over in a few seconds.

Norris, coming back to consciousness, sat for a moment as one amazed, rubbing the blood out of his eyes; then rose from the table to seek his adversary; but he was gone.

Soon afterwards he went to his lodgings. The next morning he was advised to leave the town as speedily as possible; for, as it was under the government of Hollock, and filled with his soldiers, he was warned that his life would not be safe there an hour. Accordingly he went to his boat, accompanied only by his man and his page, and so departed with his broken head, breathing vengeance against Hollock, Pelham, Leicester, and the whole crew, by whom he had been thus abused.

The next evening there was another tremendous carouse at the Count's, and, says the reporter of the preceding scene, „they were all on such good terms, that not one of the company had falling band or ruff left about his neck. All were clean torn away, and yet there was no blood drawn.”<sup>1</sup>

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1 „Advertisement of a difference at Gertruydenberg,” 8 August, 1586. T. Doyley to Burghley, 8 Aug. 1586. B. Clerk to same, 11 Aug. 1586. E. Norris to Leicester, 21 Nov. 1586. (S. P. Office MSS.) Compare Bor. ii. 786-788; Bruce's „Leyc. Corresp.” 390-392.

I have painted this uproarious scene thus minutely and in detail, because its consequences upon the relations between England and Holland, between Leicester, the Queen, and the Norrises, Pelham, Hohenlo, and others, were so long, complicated, and important; because the brawl, although brutal

Edward Norris—so soon as might be afterwards—sent a cartel to the Count, demanding mortal combat with sword and dagger. 1 Sir Philip Sidney bore the message. Sir John Norris, of course, warmly and violently espoused the cause of his brother, and was naturally more incensed against the Lord Marshal than ever, for Sir William Pelham was considered the cause of the whole affray. „Even if the quarrel is to be excused by drink,” said an eye-witness, „’tis but a slender defence for my Lord to excuse himself by his cups; and often drink doth bewray men’s humours and unmask their malice. Certainly the Count Hollock thought to *have done a pleasure* to the company in killing him.” 2

Nothing could be more ill-timed than this quarrel, or more vexatious to Leicester. The Count—although considering himself excessively injured at being challenged by a simple captain and an untitled gentleman, whom he had attempted to murder—consented to waive his privilege, and grant the meeting.

Leicester interposed, however, to delay, and, if possible, to patch up the affair. They were on the eve of active military operations, and it was most vexatious for the commander-in-chief to see, as he said, „the quarrel with the enemy changed to private revenge among ourselves.” The intended duel did not take place, for various influential personages succeeded in deferring the meeting. Then came the battle of Zutphen. Sidney fell, and Hollock was dangerously wounded

in the attack which was soon afterwards made upon the fort. He was still pressed to afford the promised satisfaction, however, and agreed to do so whenever he should rise from his bed. 1

Strange to say, the Count considered Leicester, throughout the whole business, to have taken part against him. 2

Yet there is no doubt whatever that the Earl—who detested the Norrises, and was fonder of Pelham than of any man living—uniformly narrated the story most unjustly, to the discredit of the young Captain. He considered him extremely troublesome, represented him as always quarrelling with some one—with Colonel Morgan, Roger Williams, old Raad, and all the rest—while the Lord Marshal, on the contrary, was depicted as the mildest of men. „This I must say,” he observed, „that all present, except my two nephews (the Sidneys), who are not here yet, declare the greatest fault to be in Edward Norris, and that he did most arrogantly use the Marshal.” 3

It is plain, however, that the old Marshal, under the influence of wine, was at least as much to blame as the young Captain; and Sir Philip Sidney sufficiently showed his sense of the matter by being the bearer of Edward Norris’s cartel. After Sidney’s death, Sir John Norris, in his letter of condolence to Walsingham for the death of his illustrious son-in-law, expressed the deeper

1 Bor, ii. 786-788. Hoofd Vervolgh, 209.

2 Letter of Hohenlo, in Bor, iii. 123 *seq.*

3 Bruce’s *Leyc. Corresp.* 391.

and vulgar, assumed the dignity of a political matter; because, on account of the distinguished personages engaged in it, and the epoch at which it occurred, the event furnishes us with a valuable interior picture of English and Dutch military life; and because, lastly, in the MSS. which I have consulted, are preserved the *ipsissima verba* of the actors in the riot. It is superfluous to repeat what has so often been stated, that no historical personage is ever made, in the text, to say or write anything, save what, on ample evidence, he is known to have said or written.

1 Bor, *ubi sup.* Bruce’s *Leyc. Corresp.* 474.

2 *Advertisement,* &c. (MS. already cited.)

„In all actions,” wrote Sir J. Norris to Burghley, „I am crossed, and sought to be disgraced, and suffered to be braved by the worst and simplest in the company, only to draw me into quarrels. These things I am fain to endure, lest the hindrance of the service should be laid to my charge—a thing greatly sought for. . . . The dishonourable violence offered to my brother in Count Hollock’s house is so coldly proceeded in as I fear the despair of orderly repairing his honour will drive him to a more dangerous course, and, in truth, it is used as if we were the basest in the company.” Sir J. Norris to Burghley, 16 Aug. 1586. (S. P. Office MS.)

regret at his loss because Sir Philip's opinion had been that the Norrises were wronged. 1 Hollock had conducted himself like a lunatic, but this he was apt to do whether in his cups or not. He was always for killing some one or another on the slightest provocation, and, while the dog-star of 1586 was raging, it was not his fault if he had not already despatched both Edward Norris and the objectionable „Mr. P. B.”

For these energetic demonstrations against Leicester's enemies he considered himself entitled to her Earl's eternal gratitude, and was deeply disgusted at his apparent coldness. The governor was driven almost to despair by these quarrels. His colonel-general, his lord-marshal, his lieutenant-general, were all at daggers drawn. „Would God I were rid of this place!” he exclaimed. „What man living would go to the field and have his officers divided almost into mortal quarrel? One blow but by any of their lackeys brings us altogether by the ears.”<sup>2</sup>

It was clear that there was not room enough on the Netherland soil for the Earl of Leicester and the brothers Norris. The Queen, while apparently siding

with the Earl, intimated to Sir John that she did not disapprove his conduct, that she should probably recall him to England, and that she should send him back to the Provinces after the Earl had left that country. 1

Such had been the position of the governor-general towards the Queen; towards the States-General, and towards his own countrymen, during the year 1586.

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1 „I had not much to do,” wrote Wilkes to Sir John, „to re-establish in her Majesty and Mr. Secretary a singular good opinion of you and your actions. . . . Believe me, I do not find any man on that side equal with you in her Majesty's grace. She protests to me she will not have your safety hazarded for any treasure, and hath resolved to revoke you. . . . I do find a disposition in her Majesty to return you thither again, after his Excellency shall be come home, which her Majesty meaneth directly, although there is much variety of opinion here, whether it be fit to revoke him or not. Such as desire the good of that State do hold that question affirmatively, but such as do not love him (who are the greater number) do maintain the negative. Her Majesty and her council do greatly stagger at the excessive charge of those wars under his Excellency's government for the past six months, affirming (as it is true) that the realm of England is not able to supply the moiety of that charge, notwithstanding the necessity of the defence of those countries is so conjoined with her Majesty's own safety as the same is not to be abandoned.” Wilkes to Sir J. Norris, 23 Sept. 1586. (S. P. Office MS.)

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2 J. Norris to Walsingham, 25 Oct. 1586. (S. P. Office MS.) B. Clerk to Burghley, 11 Aug. 1586. (S. P. Office MS.)

3 Bruce's „Leyc. Corresp.’ 392.

## CHAPTER XI.

Drake in the Netherlands—Good Results of his Visit—The Babington Conspiracy—Leicester decides to visit England—Exchange of parting Compliments.

LATE in the autumn of the same year an Englishman arrived in the Netherlands, bearer of despatches from the Queen. He had been entrusted by her Majesty with a special mission to the States-General, and he had soon an interview with that assembly at the Hague.

He was a small man, apparently

forty-five years of age, of a fair but somewhat weather-stained complexion, with light-brown, closely-curling hair, an expansive forehead, a clear blue eye, rather commonplace features, a thin, brown, pointed beard, and a slight moustache. Though low of stature, he was broad-chested, with well-knit limbs. His hands, which were small and nervous, were brown and callous with the marks of toil. There was something in



his brow and glance not to be mistaken, and which men willingly call master; yet he did not seem to have sprung of the born magnates of the earth. He wore a heavy gold chain about his neck, and it might be observed that upon the light full sleeves of his slashed doublet the image of a small ship on a terrestrial globe was curiously and many times embroidered.

It was not the first time that he had visited the Netherlands. Thirty years before the man had been apprentice on board a small lugger, which traded between the English coast and the ports of Zeeland. Emerging in early boyhood from his parental mansion—an old boat, turned bottom upwards on a sandy down—he had naturally taken to the sea, and his master, dying childless not long afterwards, bequeathed to him the lugger. But in time his spirit, too much confined by coasting in the narrow seas, had taken a bolder flight. He had risked his hard-earned savings in a voyage with the old slave-trader, John Hawkins—whose exertions, in what was then considered an honourable and useful vocation, had been rewarded by Queen Elizabeth with her special favour, and with a coat of arms, the crest whereof was a negro's head, proper, chained—but the lad's first and last enterprise in this field was unfortunate. Captured by Spaniards, and only escaping with life, he determined to revenge himself on the whole Spanish nation; and this was considered a most legitimate proceeding according to the „sea divinity” in which he had been schooled. His subsequent expeditions against the Spanish possessions in the West Indies were eminently successful, and soon the name of Francis Drake rang through the world, and startled Philip in the depths of his Escorial. The first Englishman, and the second of any nation, he then ploughed his memorable „furrow round the earth,” carrying amazement and destruction to the Spaniards as he sailed, and after

three years brought to the Queen treasure enough, as it was asserted, to maintain a war with the Spanish King for seven years, and to pay himself and companions, and the merchant-adventurers who had participated in his enterprise, forty-seven pounds sterling for every pound invested in the voyage. The speculation had been a fortunate one both for himself and for the kingdom.

The terrible Sea-King was one of the great types of the sixteenth century. The self-helping private adventurer, in his little vessel the *Golden Hind*,<sup>1</sup> one hundred tons burthen, had waged successful war against a mighty empire, and had shown England how to humble Philip. When he again set foot on his native soil he was followed by admiring crowds, and became the favourite hero of romance and ballad; for it was not the ignoble pursuit of gold alone, through toil and peril, which had endeared his name to the nation. The popular instinct recognized that the true means had been found at last for rescuing England and Protestantism from the overshadowing empire of Spain. The Queen visited him in his *Golden Hind*, and gave him the honour of knighthood.

The treaty between the United Netherlands and England had been followed by an embargo upon English vessels, persons, and property, in the ports of Spain; and, after five years of unwonted repose, the privateersman again set forth with twenty-five small ves- 1585.  
sels—of which five or six only were armed—under his command, conjoined with that of General Carlisle. This time the voyage was undertaken with full permission and assistance of the Queen, who, however, intended to disavow him, if she should find such a step convenient.<sup>1</sup> This was the expedition in which Philip Sidney had desired to take part. The Queen watched its result with intense anxiety, for the

<sup>1</sup> *Leyc. Corresp.* 173.

fate of her Netherland adventure was thought to be hanging on the issue. „Upon Drake's voyage, in very truth, dependeth the life and death of the cause, according to man's judgment," said Walsingham. 1

The issue was encouraging, even if the voyage—as a mercantile speculation—proved not so brilliant as the previous enterprises of Sir Francis had been. He returned in the midsummer of 1586, having captured and brandschatzed St. Domingo and Carthagena, and burned St. Augustine. „A fearful man to the King of Spain is Sir Francis Drake," said Lord Burghley. 2 Nevertheless, the Queen and the Lord-Treasurer—as we have shown by the secret conferences at Greenwich—had, notwithstanding these successes, expressed a more earnest desire for peace than ever.

A simple, seafaring Englishman, with half-a-dozen miserable little vessels, had carried terror into the Spanish possessions all over the earth; but even then the great Queen had not learned to rely on the valour of her volunteers against her most formidable enemy. 3

Drake was, however, bent on another enterprise. The preparations for Philip's great fleet had been going steadily forward in Lisbon, Cadiz, and other ports of Spain and Portugal, and, despite assurances to the contrary, there was a growing belief that England was to be invaded. To destroy those ships before the monarch's face, would be, indeed, to „sing his beard." But whose arm was daring enough for such a stroke? Whose but that of the Devonshire skipper who had already accomplished so much?

And so Sir Francis, „a man true to his word, merciful to those under him, and hating nothing so much as idleness," 1 had come to the Netherlands to talk over his project with the States-General, and with the Dutch merchants and sea-captains. 2 His visit was not unfruitful. As a body the assembly did nothing; but they recommended that in every maritime city of Holland and Zeeland one or two ships should be got ready, to participate in all the future enterprises of Sir Francis and his comrades. 3

The martial spirit of volunteer sailors,

1 Fuller.

2 Wagenaar, viii. 233-234, who is however, mistaken in saying that „they had no ears for Drake in the Netherlands."

3 „The voyage of Sir Francis Drake into these countries," wrote Wilkes, „is not likely to be unfruitful, although at his arrival he found no disposition in the States and people at all to assent of his motions. They cannot yield to assist his voyage with any general contribution, but are contented to deal with the inhabitants of the principal maritime towns, to furnish in every of them a ship or two, according to the ability of the merchants there residing, from whom the States-General, now assembled at the Hague, do expect a speedy answer and resolution; so as if her Majesty shall determine that Sir F. Drake do venture again to the Indies, it is not to be doubted that he shall have some good assistance from hence. Of what necessity it is that the Queen's principal enemy be attempted that way, your honour can best perceive; but we find it more than probable here, that if he may enjoy his Indies quietly, he will make her Majesty and these countries soon weary of their defence. I have partly instructed Sir F. Drake of the state of these countries. How and in what sort my Lord of Leicester departeth hence, he hath best discerned by his own experience, which, because it is long to be written, I am bold to refer your honour to his declaration. I do find the state of things here so disjointed and unsettled, that I have just cause to fear some dangerous alteration in the absence of our governor. Therefore I beseech you, as you tender the preservation of her Majesty's estate, depending, as you know, upon the maintenance of this, that you will procure some speedy resolution at home, and the return of some governor of wisdom and value, to reunite these distracted provinces, who, for lack of a head, are apt enough to be the workers of their own ruin." Wilkes to Walsingham, 17 Nov. 1586. (S. P. Office MS.)

1 ,Leyc. Corresp.' 341.

2 Ibid. 199.

3 For the life and adventures of Drake, see Fuller, 'The Holy State and the Profane State,' in *vocs. Stowe's Chronicle*, 805-812. Em. v. Meteren, 175 seq. 'The World Encompassed,' and particularly the 'Life, Voyages, and Exploits of Admiral Sir Francis Drake,' By John Barrow. 1843.

and the keen instinct of mercantile speculation, were relied upon—exactly as in England—to furnish men, ships, and money, for these daring and profitable adventures. The foundation of a still more intimate connection between England and Holland was laid, and thenceforth Dutchmen and Englishmen fought side by side, on land and sea, wherever a blow was to be struck in the cause of human freedom against despotic Spain.

The famous Babington conspiracy, discovered by Walsingham's „travail and cost,” had come to convince the Queen and her counsellors—if further proof were not superfluous—that her throne and life were both incompatible with Philip's deep designs, and that to keep that monarch out of the Netherlands was as vital to her as to keep him out of England. „She is forced by this discovery to countenance the cause by all outward means she may,” said Walsingham, „for it appeareth unto her most plain, that *unless she had entered into the action, she had been utterly undone*, and that if she do not prosecute the same she cannot continue.”<sup>1</sup> The Secretary had sent Leicester information at an early day of the great secret, begging his friend to „make the letter a heretic after he had read the same,” and expressing the opinion that „the matter, if well handled, would break the neck of all dangerous practices during her Majesty's reign.”<sup>2</sup>

The tragedy of Mary Stuart—a sad but inevitable portion of the vast drama in which the emancipation of England and Holland, and, through them, of half Christendom, was accomplished—approached its catastrophe; and Leicester could not restrain his anxiety for her immediate execution. He reminded Walsingham that the great seal had been put upon a warrant for her execution

for a less crime seventeen years before, on the occasion of the Northumberland and Westmorland rebellion. „For who can warrant these villains from her,” he said, „if that person live, or shall live any time? God forbid! And be you all stout and resolute in this speedy execution, or be condemned of all the world for ever. It is most certain, if you will have her Majesty safe, it must be done, for justice doth crave it beside policy.”<sup>1</sup> His own personal safety was deeply compromised. „Your Lordship and I,” wrote Burghley, „were very great motes in the traitors' eyes; for your Lordship there and I here should first, about one time, have been killed. Of your Lordship they thought rather of poisoning than slaying. After us two gone, they purposed her Majesty's death.”<sup>2</sup>

But on this great affair of state the Earl was not swayed by such personal considerations. He honestly thought—as did all the statesmen who governed England—that English liberty, the very existence of the English commonwealth, was impossible so long as Mary Stuart lived.<sup>3</sup> Under these circumstances he was not impatient, for a time at least, to leave the Netherlands. His administration had not been very successful.

<sup>1</sup> Ibid. 431. (10 Oct. 1586.) See also 447. „That the proceeding of justice against the Queen of Scots is deferred until a parliament, whereat I do greatly marvel if it should be true, considering how dangerous such delay might be, for the mischief that might in the mean time be practised against her Majesty's person. Though some small branches of these conspiracies be taken away, yet the greater boughs are not unknown to remain. To whom it were not good, in my opinion, to give that opportunity which might be taken, while a parliament may be called, and such a cause debated and determined,” &c. Leicester to Walsingham, 9 Sept. 1586. (S. P. Office MS.)  
<sup>2</sup> Bruce's „Leyc. Corresp.” 412. (15 Sept. 1586.)

<sup>3</sup> One of the Babington conspirators, Ralph Salisbury, was a tenant of Leicester's and had „a farm under the very castle-wall of Denbigh.” Leicester to Burghley, 29 Aug. 1586. (S. P. Office MS.)

<sup>1</sup> Bruce's „Leyc. Corresp.” 341.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid. 342.



He had been led away by his own vanity, and by the flattery of artful demagogues, but the immense obstacles with which he had to contend in the Queen's wavering policy, and in the rivalry of both English and Dutch politicians, have been amply exhibited. That he had been generous, courageous, and zealous, could not be denied; and, on the whole, he had accomplished as much in the field as could have been expected of him with such meagre forces, and so barren an exchequer. 1

It must be confessed, however, that his leaving the Netherlands at that moment was a most unfortunate step, both for his own reputation and for the security of the Provinces. Party-spirit was running high, and a political revolution was much to be dreaded in so grave a position of affairs, both in England and Holland. The arrangements—and particularly the secret arrangements which he made at his departure—were the most fatal measures of all; but these will be described in the following chapter.

On the 31st October, the Earl announced to the state-council his intention of returning to England, stating, 31<sup>st</sup> Oct. 1586. as the cause of this sudden determination, that he had been summoned to attend the parliament then sitting in Westminster. Wilkes, who was of course present, having now succeeded Killigrew as one of the two English members, observed that „the States and council used but slender entreaty to his Excellency for his stay and countenance there among them, whereat his Excellency and we that

were of the council for her Majesty did not a little marvel.” 1

Some weeks later, however, upon the 21st November, Leicester summoned Barneveld, and five other of the States-General, to discuss the necessary measures for his departure, when those gentlemen remonstrated very earnestly upon the step, pleading the danger and confusion of affairs which must necessarily ensue. The Earl declared that he was not retiring from the country because he was offended, although he had many causes for offence; and he then alluded to the Navigation Act, to the establishment of the finance-council, and spoke of Burgrave and Reingault, for his employment of which individuals so much obloquy had been heaped upon his head. Burgrave he pronounced, as usual, a substantial, wise, faithful, religious personage, entitled to fullest confidence; while Reingault—who had been thrown into prison by the States on charges of fraud, peculation, and sedition—he declared to be „a great financier, who had promised, on penalty of his head, to bring great sums into the treasury for carrying on the war, without any burthen to the community.” 2 Had he been able to do this, he had certainly a claim to be considered the greatest of financiers; but the promised „mountains of gold” were never discovered, and Reingault was now awaiting his trial.” 3

1 Bruce's „Leyc. Corresp.’ 443 note.

2 Bor, ii. 777-779. Hoofd, 207-209. Wagenaar, viii. 183-187.

3 „I must pray you and require you to be careful in satisfying the States touching Reingault,” said Leicester: „I did promise upon mine honour he should be brought back again, and so I have done, but I will be no butcher to the greatest monarch in the world, much less the betrayer of a man's life, whom I myself caused to be apprehended to please them, and kept him in safe-guard. And know I have been advertised of the intent in proceeding with him, and with what violence, and what some of themselves have sworn and vowed touching his death, you know, and I pray you declare, for as I will

1 „Oh Lord! who would think it possible,” he cried on one occasion, „for any man sent as we are, and in action for that realm (of England) chiefly, and for all Christendom also, to be so carelessly and overwillingly overthrown for ordinary wants. . . . To-morrow and to-morrow they shall have . . . What opportunities we have lately lost! We are ready to eat our own flesh for anger, but hat cannot help.” „Leyc. Corresp.’ 366.

The deputies replied that the concessions upon the Navigation Act had satisfied the country, but that Reingault was a known instrument of the Spaniards, and Burgrave a mischief-making demagogue, who consorted with malignants, and sent slanderous reports concerning the States and the country to her Majesty. They had in consequence felt obliged to write private despatches to envoy Ortel in England, not because they suspected the Earl, but in order to counteract the calumnies of his chief advisers. They had urged the agent to bring the imprisonment of Paul Buys before her Majesty, but for that transaction Leicester boldly disclaimed all responsibility. 1

It was agreed between the Earl and the deputies that, during his absence, the whole government, civil and military, should devolve upon the state-council, and that Sir John Norris should remain in command of the English forces. 2

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keep promise with them for the prison of the man, so do I look to have mine own honour regarded at their hands, seeing more malice than just desert against him. I take the man to have faults enough, but no capital." Leicester to Wilkes, 20 Nov. 1586. (S. P. Office MS.)

Wilkes, finding that the States of Holland were furious against Reingault, and were demanding his execution, had managed to place him under the charge of the provost marshal of the English troops at Utrecht. When he had thus saved the culprit's life, he informed Barneveld of what he had done, and that statesman severely censured the act, on the ground that grave consequences might follow this interposition in behalf of so signal an offender. Reingault's life was preserved, however, and he subsequently was permitted to retire to the Spanish Netherlands, where the violent democrat and Calvinist ended his days an obedient subject of Philip II., and an exemplary papist. Wilkes to Leicester, 3 and 12 Dec. 1586. (S. P. Office MS.) *Reyd*, v. 82.

Burgrave accompanied the Earl to England, as his chief secretary and adviser in Netherlands matters, while Deventer remained in Utrecht, principal director of the Leicesterian party, and centre of all its cabals against the States.

1 Wilkes to Leicester, &c. MS. just cited.

2 Wagenaar, viii. 186.

Two days afterwards Leicester, who knew very well that a legation was about to proceed to England, without any previous concurrence on his part, summoned a committee of the States-General, together with Barneveld, into the State-council. Counsellor Wilkes on his behalf then made a speech, in which he observed that more ample communications on the part of the States were to be expected. They had in previous colloquies touched upon comparatively unimportant matters, but he now begged to be informed why these commissioners were proceeding to England, and what was the nature of their instructions. Why did not they formally offer the sovereignty of the Provinces to the Queen without conditions? That step had already been taken by Utrecht. 1

The deputies conferred apart for a little while, and then replied that the proposition made by Utrecht was notoriously factious, illegal, and altogether futile. Without the sanction of all the United States, of what value was the declaration of Utrecht? Moreover, the charter of that province had been recklessly violated, its government overthrown, and its leading citizens banished. The action of the Province under such circumstances was not deserving of comment; but should it appear that her Majesty was desirous of assuming the sovereignty of the Provinces upon reasonable conditions, the States of Holland and of Zeeland would not be found backward in the business. 2

Leicester proposed that Prince Maurice of Nassau should go with him to England, as nominal chief of the embassy, and some of the deputies favoured the suggestion. It was, however, vigorously and successfully opposed by Barneveld, who urged that to leave the country without a head in such a dangerous position of affairs, would be an act of

madness. 1 Leicester was much annoyed when informed of this decision. He was suspected of a design, during his absence, of converting Maurice entirely to his own way of thinking. If unsuccessful, it was believed by the Advocate and by many others that the Earl would cause the young Prince to be detained in England as long as Philip William, his brother, had been kept in Spain. He observed peevishly that he knew how it had all been brought about. 2

Words, of course, and handsome compliments were exchanged between the Governor and the States-General on his departure. He protested that he had never pursued any private ends during his administration, but had ever sought to promote the good of the country and the glory of the Queen, and that he had spent three hundred thousand florins of his own money in the brief period of his residence there. 3

The advocate, on the part of the States, assured him that they were all aware that in the friendship of England lay their only chance of salvation, but that united action was the sole means by which that salvation could be effected, and the one which had enabled the late Prince of Orange to maintain a contest unequalled by anything recorded in history. There was also much disquisition on the subject of finance—the Advocate observing that the States now raised as much in a month as the Provinces in the time of the Emperor used to levy in a year—and expressed the hope that the Queen would increase her contingent to ten thousand foot and two thousand horse. He repudiated, in the name of the States-General and his

own, the possibility of peace-negotiations; deprecated any allusion to the subject as fatal to their religion, their liberty, their very existence, and equally disastrous to England and to Protestantism, and implored the Earl, therefore, to use all his influence in opposition to any pacific overtures to or from Spain. 1

On the 24th November, acts were drawn up and signed by the Earl, according to which the supreme government 24th Nov. of the United Netherlands 1586. was formally committed to the state-council during his absence. Decrees were to be pronounced in the name of his Excellency, and countersigned by Maurice of Nassau.

On the following day, Leicester, being somewhat indisposed, requested a deputation of the States-General to wait upon him in his own house. This was done, and a formal and affectionate farewell was then read to him by his secretary, Mr. Atye. It was responded to in complimentary fashion by Advocate Barneveld, who again took occasion at this parting interview to impress upon the governor the utter impossibility, in his own opinion and that of the other deputies, of reconciling the Provinces with Spain. 2

Leicester received from the States—as a magnificent parting present—a silver gilt vase, „as tall as a man,” and then departed for Flushing, to take shipping for England. 3

1 Bor, Hoofd, Wagenaar, *ubi sup.* Reyd, v. 108, 109. 2 Ibid. Meteren, xiii. 238.

3 Bor, ii. 754. Reyd, Holl. 4 Oct. 9 Nov. 442, 493. Wagenaar, viii. 173.

The vase or cup (kop), as it was called, had cost 9000 florins. The States pronounced it „as singular a jewel as could be found in any of the surrounding kingdoms.” It was said that, on account of its size, it could only have been gilded at the peril of the artisan's life. Van Wyn op Wagen, viii. 62.

1 Bor, *ubi sup.* Hoofd Vervolgh, 206. Wagenaar, viii. 185. 2 Bor, *ubi sup.*

3 Bor, ii. 785. Hoofd, *ubi sup.*



## CHAPTER XII.

Ill-timed Interregnum in the Provinces—  
 Firmness of the English and Dutch People  
 —Factions during Leicester's Government  
 —Democratic Theories of the Leicestrians  
 —Suspicious as to the Earl's Designs—  
 Extreme Views of the Calvinists—Political  
 Ambition of the Church—Antagonism of  
 the Church and States—The States inclined  
 to Tolerance—Desolation of the Obedient  
 Provinces—Pauperism and Famine—Pros-  
 perity of the Republic—The Year of Ex-  
 pectation.

It was not unnatural that the Queen should desire the presence of her favourite at that momentous epoch, when the dread question, „*aut fer aut feri*,“ had at last demanded its definite solution. It was inevitable, too, that Leicester should feel great anxiety to be upon the spot where the great tragedy, so full of fate to all Christendom, and in which his own fortunes were so closely involved, was to be enacted. But it was most cruel to the Netherlands—whose well-being was nearly as important to Elizabeth as that of her own realm—to plunge them into anarchy at such a moment. Yet this was the necessary result of the sudden retirement of Leicester.

He did not resign his government. He did not bind himself to return. The question of sovereignty was still unsettled, for it was still hoped by a large and influential party that the English Queen would accept the proposed annexation. It was yet doubtful, whether, during the period of abeyance the States-General or the States-Provincial, each within their separate sphere, were entitled to supreme authority. Meantime, as if here were not already sufficient elements of dissension and doubt, came a sudden and indefinite interregnum, a provisional, an abnormal, and an impotent government. To the state-council was deputed the executive authority. But the state-council was a creature of the States-General, acting in concert with the governor-general,

and having no actual life of its own. It was a board of consultation, not of decision, for it could neither enact its own decrees nor interpose a veto upon the decrees of the governor.

Certainly the selection of Leicester to fill so important a post had not been a very fortunate one; and the enthusiasm which had greeted him, „as if he had been a Messiah,“ on his arrival, had very rapidly dwindled away, as his personal character became known. The leading politicians of the country had already been aware of the error which they had committed in clothing with almost sovereign powers the delegate of one who had refused the sovereignty. They were too adroit to neglect the opportunity, which her Majesty's anger offered them, of repairing what they considered their blunder. When at last the quarrel, which looked so much like a lovers' quarrel, between Elizabeth and „Sweet Robin,“ had been appeased to the satisfaction of Robin, his royal mistress became more angry with the States for circumscribing than she had before been for their exaggeration of his authority. Hence the implacable hatred of Leicester to Paul Buys and Barneveld.

Those two statesmen, for eloquence, learning, readiness, administrative faculty, surpassed by few who have ever wielded the destinies of free commonwealths, were fully equal to the task thrown upon their hands by the progress of events. That task was no slight one, for it was to the leading statesmen of Holland and England, sustained by the indomitable resistance to despotism almost universal in the English and Dutch nations, that the liberty of Europe was entrusted at that momentous epoch. Whether united under one crown, as the Netherlands ardently desired, or closely allied for aggression and defence, the two peoples were bound indissolubly

together. The clouds were rolling up from the fatal south, blacker and more portentous than ever; the artificial equilibrium of forces, by which the fate of France was kept in suspense, was obviously growing every day more uncertain; but the prolonged and awful interval before the tempest should burst over the lands of freedom and Protestantism, gave at least time for the prudent to prepare. The Armada was growing every day in the ports of Spain and Portugal, and Walsingham doubted as little as did Buys or Barneveld toward what shores that invasion was to be directed. England was to be conquered in order that the rebellious Netherlands might be reduced; and „Mucio” was to be let slip upon the unhappy Henry III. so soon as it was thought probable that the Béarnese and the Valois had sufficiently exhausted each other. Philip was to reign in Paris, Amsterdam, London, and Edinburgh, without stirring from the Escorial. An excellent programme, had there not been some English gentlemen, some subtle secretaries of state, some Devonshire skippers, some Dutch advocates and merchants, some Zeeland fly-boatsmen, and six million men, women, and children, on the two sides of the North Sea, who had the power of expressing their thoughts rather bluntly than otherwise in different dialects of old Anglo Saxon speech.

Certainly it would be unjust and ungracious to disperage the heroism of the great Queen, when the hour of danger really came, nor would it be legitimate for us, who can scan that momentous year of expectation, 1587, by the light of subsequent events and of secret contemporaneous record, to censure or even sharply to criticise the royal hankering for peace, when peace had really become impossible. But as we shall have occasion to examine rather closely the secrets of the Spanish, French, English, and Dutch councils, during this epoch, we

are likely to find, perhaps, that at least as great a debt is due to the English and Dutch people, in mass, for the preservation of European liberty at that disastrous epoch as to any sovereign, general, or statesman.

For it was in the great waters of the sixteenth century that the nations whose eyes were open discovered the fountain of perpetual youth, while others, who were blind, passed rapidly onward to decrepitude. England was, in many respects, a despotism so far as regarded governmental forms; and no doubt the Catholics were treated with greater rigour than could be justified even by the perpetual and most dangerous machinations of the seminary priests and their instigators against the throne and life of Elizabeth. The word liberty was never musical in Tudor ears, yet Englishmen had blunt tongues and sharp weapons which rarely rusted for want of use. In the presence of a parliament and the absence of a standing army, a people accustomed to read the Bible in the vernacular, to handle great questions of religion and government freely, and to bear arms at will, was most formidable to despotism. There was an advance on the olden time. A Francis Drake, a John Hawkins, a Roger Williams, might have been sold, under the Plantagenets, like an ox or an ass. A „female villain” in the reign of Henry III. could have been purchased for eighteen shillings—hardly the price of a fatted pig, and not one-third the value of an ambling palfrey—and a male villain, such an one as could in Elizabeth’s reign circumnavigate the globe in his own ship, or take imperial field-m Marshals by the beard, was worth but two or three pounds sterling in the market. Here was progress in three centuries, for the villains were now become admirals and generals in England and Holland, and constituted the mainstay of these two little commonwealths, while the commanders who governed

the „invincible” fleets and armies of omnipotent Spain, were all cousins of emperors, or grandees of bluest blood. Perhaps the system of the Reformation would not prove the least effective in the impending crisis.

It was most important, then, that these two nations should be united in council, and should stand shoulder to shoulder as their great enemy advanced. But this was precisely what had been rendered almost impossible by the course of events during Leicester's year of administration, and by his sudden but not final retirement at its close. The two great national parties which had gradually been forming had remained in a fluid state during the presence of the governor-general. During his absence they gradually hardened into the forms which they were destined to retain for centuries. In the history of civil liberty, these incessant contests, these oral and written disquisitions, these sharp discussions of opinion, and the still harder blows, which, unfortunately, were dealt on a few occasions by the combatants upon each other, make the year 1587 a memorable one. The great questions of the origin of government, the balance of dynastic forces, the distribution of powers, were dealt with by the ablest heads, both Dutch and English that could be employed in the service of the kingdom and republic. It was a war of protocols, arguments, orations, rejoinders, apostilles, and pamphlets, very wholesome for the cause of free institutions and the intellectual progress of mankind. The reader may perhaps be surprised to see with how much vigour and boldness the grave questions which underlie all polity were handled so many years before the days of Russell and Sidney, of Montesquieu and Locke, Franklin, Jefferson, Rousseau, and Voltaire; and he may be even more astonished to find exceedingly democratic doctrines propounded, if not believed in, by trained statesmen of the Eliza-

bethan school. He will be also apt to wonder that a more fitting time could not be found for such philosophical debate than the epoch at which both the kingdom and the republic were called upon to strain every sinew against the most formidable and aggressive despotism that the world had known since the fall of the Roman Empire.

The great dividing-line between the two parties, that of Leicester and that of Holland, which controlled the action of the States-General, was the question of sovereignty. After the declaration of independence and the repudiation of Philip, to whom did the sovereignty belong? To the people, said the Leicestrians. To the States-General and the States-Provincial, as legitimate representatives of the people, said the Holland party. Without looking for the moment more closely into this question, which we shall soon find ably discussed by the most acute reasoners of the time, it is only important at present to make a preliminary reflection. The Earl of Leicester, of all men in the world, would seem to have been precluded by his own action, and by the action of his Queen, from taking ground against the States. It was the States who, by solemn embassy, had offered the sovereignty to Elizabeth. She had not accepted the offer, but she had deliberated on the subject, and certainly she had never expressed a doubt whether or not the offer had been legally made. By the States, too, that governor-generalship had been conferred upon the Earl, which had been so thankfully and eagerly accepted. It was strange, then, that he should deny the existence of the power whence his own authority was derived. If the States were not sovereigns of the Netherlands, he certainly was nothing. He was but general of a few thousand English troops.

The Leicester party, then, proclaimed extreme democratic principles as to the origin of government and the sovereignty



of the people. They sought to strengthen and to make almost absolute the executive authority of their chief, on the ground that such was the popular will; and they denounced with great acrimony the insolence of the upstart members of the States, half a dozen traders, hired advocates, churls, tinkers, and the like—as Leicester was fond of designating the men who opposed him—in assuming these airs of sovereignty. 1

This might, perhaps, be philosophical doctrine, had its supporters nor forgotten that there had never been any pretence at an expression of the national will, except through the mouths of the States, The States-General and the States-Provincial, without any usurpation, but as a matter of fact and of great political convenience, had, during fifteen years, exercised the authority which had fallen from Philip's hands. The people hitherto had acquiesced in their action, and certainly there had not yet been any call for a popular convention, or any other device to ascertain the popular will. It was also difficult to imagine what was the exact entity of this abstraction called the „people” by men

1 „They which have all authority in this State,” said an honest German traveller who happened to be in Arnheim that winter, „are for the most part merchants, orators of towns, mechanic men, ignorant, loving gain naturally, without respect of honour; . . . born to obey rather than command; who, having once tasted the sweetness of authority, have by little and little persuaded themselves that they are sovereigns; insulting over the people, and controlling him to whom they had by oath referred the absolute and general government. . . . Seeing that the sovereignty really belongs to the people, to whom they are but servants and deputies. . . I see no other remedy for this mischief, but that the people be wary how they give such power and authority, and suffer it to continue so long in the hands of men of mechanic and base condition, who, grown proud with the command, abuse it daily, as well against the people as against the governors, to whom the people have referred the government both over themselves and over the whole estate.” Raymond Stockeler to a friend in England, 15 Feb. 1587. (S. P. Office MS.) The letter is printed in Grimstone's „Netherlands,” pp. 9. 9 seq.

who expressed such extreme contempt for „merchants, advocates, town-orators, churls, tinkers, and base mechanic men, born not to command but to obey.” Who were the people when the educated classes and the working classes were thus carefully eliminated? Hardly the simple peasantry—the boors—who tilled the soil. At that day the agricultural labourers less than all others dreamed of popular sovereignty, and more than all others submitted to the mild authority of the States. According to the theory of the Netherland constitutions, they were supposed—and they had themselves not yet discovered the fallacies to which such doctrines could lead—to be represented by the nobles and country-squires who maintained in the States of each Province the general farming interests of the republic. Moreover the number of agricultural peasants was comparatively small. The lower classes were rather accustomed to plough the sea than the land, and their harvests were reaped from that element, which to Hollanders and Zeelanders was less capricious than the solid earth. Almost every inhabitant of those sea-born territories was, in one sense or another, a mariner; for every highway was a canal; the soil was percolated by rivers and estuaries, pools and meres; the fisheries were the nurseries in which still more daring navigators rapidly learned their trade, and every child took naturally to the ocean as to its legitimate home.

The „people,” therefore, thus enthroned by the Leicestrians *over all the inhabitants* of the country, appeared to many eyes rather a misty abstraction, and its claim of absolute sovereignty a doctrine almost as fantastic as that of the divine right of kings. The Netherlanders were, on the whole, a law-abiding people, preferring to conduct even a revolution according to precedent, very much attached to ancient usages and traditions, valuing the liberties, as

they called them, which they had wrested from what had been superior force, with their own right hands, preferring facts to theories, and feeling competent to deal with tyrants in the concrete rather than to annihilate tyranny in the abstract by a bold and generalizing phraseology. Moreover the opponents of the Leicester party complained that the principal use to which this newly-discovered „people” had been applied, was to confer its absolute sovereignty unconditionally upon one man. The people was to be sovereign in order that it might immediately abdicate in favour of the Earl. 1

Utrecht, the capital of the Leicestrians, had already been deprived of its constitution. The magistracy was, according to law, changed every year. A list of candidates was furnished by the retiring board, and equal number of names was added by the governor of the Province, and from the catalogue thus composed

1 Even Leicester himself was astonished at the subserviency of the democratic party. „I remember,” said his confidential secretary, „that your Excellency told me once a *very wise word*—that those of Utrecht had given you more authority than they could well do.”

„Your council,” he said further, „cannot allow of all the doings of M. Deventer and of M. Modet. True it is that they both and all those of Utrecht do love you with all their hearts, but they do many things very rashly, and do disunite themselves from the generality of the United Provinces. Inasmuch that, at this present, those of the magistrates of Utrecht have disunited themselves from the States of their own Province, and work every day one against another . . . I had written to you by M. Modet and M. Rataller, but they both *stole away* secretly from hence, and surely this proceeding is not very well liked here of the best sort, as though he would have prevented the other party, and made his own reasons good first to your Excellency.” Otheman to Leicester, 7 Jan. 1587. (Br. Mus. Galba, C. xi. p. 72. MS.)

„Cupimus ut sua Excellentia (Leicestrius) *absolutè imperet*, et pro sua discretionè, salva religione et privilegiis suam Majestatem non offendentibus.” So ran a petition, to which Deventer procured signatures among the Utrecht citizens, and then handed it to Leicester. „Such a government as that would be,” says a Frisian contemporary, „was never seen in the Netherlands, and could hardly be found in Christendom.” Reyd, v. 86.

the governor with his council selected the new magistrates for the year. But De Villiers, the governor of the Province, had been made a prisoner by the enemy in the last campaign; Count Moeurs had been appointed provisional stadholder by the States; and, during his temporary absence on public affairs, the Leicestrians had seized upon the government, excluded all the ancient magistrates, banished many leading citizens from the town, and installed an entirely new board, with Gerard Proninck, called Deventer, for chief burgo-master, who was a Brabantine refugee just arrived in the Province, and not eligible to office until after ten years’ residence. 1

It was not unnatural that the Netherlands, who remembered the scenes of bloodshed and disorder produced by the memorable attempt of the Duke of Anjou to obtain possession of Antwerp and other cities, should be suspicious of Leicester. Anjou, too, had been called to the Provinces by the voluntary action of the States. He too had been hailed as a Messiah and a deliverer. In him too had unlimited confidence been reposed, and he had repaid their affection and their gratitude by a desperate attempt to obtain the control of their chief cities by the armed hand, and thus to constitute himself absolute sovereign of the Netherlands. The inhabitants had, after a bloody contest, averted the intended massacre and the impending tyranny; but it was not astonishing that—so very few years having elapsed since those tragical events—they should be inclined to scan severely the actions of the man who had already obtained by unconstitutional means the mastery of a most important city, and was supposed to harbour designs upon all.

No doubt it was a most illiberal and unwise policy for the inhabitants of the independent States to exclude from of-

1 Bor, ii. xxi. 722, 735. Reyd, v. 85, 86. Wagenaar, viii. 166, 168.

fice the wanderers, for conscience' sake, from the obedient Provinces. They should have been welcomed heart and hand by those who were their brethren in religion and in the love of freedom. Moreover, it was notorious that Hohenlo, lieutenant-general under Maurice of Nassau, was a German, and that, by the treaty with England, two foreigners sat in the state-council, while the army swarmed with English, Irish, and German officers in high command. Nevertheless, violently to subvert the constitution of a Province, and to place in posts of high responsibility men who were ineligible—some whose characters were suspicious, and some who were known to be dangerous, and to banish large numbers of respectable burghers—was the act of a despot. 1

1 It was especially unfortunate that Leicester should fall so completely into the control of Deventer. That subtle politician filled the governor's mind full with spite against the States-General, inspiring him perpetually with jealousy of all bodies or individuals that interfered with his hopes of attaining arbitrary, perhaps sovereign power. "The States-General," Deventer whispered in Leicester's ear, "are becoming more presumptuous daily. They have dared to retain our old members to the assembly whom we" (after the municipal revolution), "had recalled. They have released Paul Buys. We are all marvellously scandalized, for truly these States assume more jurisdiction than was ever done by the greatest tyrant that ever usurped in this land. You shall hear many particulars by an agent which it is best not to write . . . Let her Majesty reflect that hers will be the shame, on her head descends the scorn, and ruin to her realm will be the result. Let her break up this conspiracy by a sudden and heroic resolution, let her send your Excellency hither, with plenty of money and soldiers and we on our side will take care not to be dishonoured suddenly, while waiting for your return."

Such were the prudent counsels given to Queen Elizabeth, by Leicester's chief adviser, in a moment full of darkness and difficulty. To seize by violence on the cities of the Provinces, to subvert their ancient constitutions, to enact, in short, all that had been done or attempted by former tyrants, was the object proposed to the English sovereign and the English governor. G. de Proninck to Leicester, 20 Jan. 1587. (Br. Mus., Galba C. xi. 95. MS.)

Othemam, too, boldly assured the Queen, in a letter addressed directly to her Majesty,

Besides their democratic doctrines, the Leicestrians proclaimed and encouraged an exclusive and rigid Calvinism. It would certainly be unjust and futile to detract from the vast debt which the republic owed to the Geneva Church. The reformation had entered the Netherlands by the Walloon gate. The earliest and most eloquent preachers, the most impassioned converts, the sublimest martyrs, had lived, preached, fought, suffered, and died with the precepts of Calvin in their hearts. The fire which had consumed the last vestige of royal and sacerdotal despotism throughout the independent republic, had been lighted by the hands of Calvinists.

Throughout the blood-stained soil of France, too, the men who were fighting the same great battle as were the Netherlands against Philip II. and the Inquisition, the valiant cavaliers of Dauphiny and Provence, knelt on the ground, before the battle, smote their iron breasts with their mailed hands, uttered a Calvinistic prayer, sang a psalm of Marot, and then charged upon Guise, or upon Joyeuse, under the white plume of the Béarnese. And it was on the Calvinist weavers and clothiers of Rochelle that the great Prince relied in the hour of danger as much as on his mountain chivalry. In England, too, the seeds of liberty, wrapped up in Calvinism and hoarded through many trying years, were at last destined to float over land and sea, and to bear large harvests of temperate freedom for great commonwealths,

that the "root of the whole evil in the Netherlands was the *ochlocrasy* and bad government of the State," and that the reformation could only come from her. He was also of opinion that the country had been badly handled for a long time. "I believe, Madam," he observed, "that this sick person has had so many diseases for twenty years, and has had so many different doctors—some without experience and others without fidelity—that the more despairing the patient is of his own case, the more honour it will be to the one who cures him; and 'tis your Majesty alone who can now administer the remedy."—Othemam to the Queen, 15 Feb. 1587. (Dr. Mus., Galba C. xi. p. 263. MS.)



which were still unborn. Nevertheless there was a growing aversion in many parts of the States for the rigid and intolerant spirit of the reformed religion. There were many men in Holland who had already imbibed the true lesson—the only one worth learning of the Reformation—liberty of thought; but toleration in the eyes of the extreme Calvinistic party was as great a vice as it could be in the estimation of Papists. To a favoured few of other habits of thought, it had come to be regarded as a virtue; but the day was still far distant when men were to scorn the very word toleration as an insult to the dignity of man; as if for any human being, or set of human beings, in caste, class, synod, or church, the right could even in imagination be conceded of controlling the consciences of their fellow-creatures.

But it was progress for the sixteenth century that there were individuals, and prominent individuals, who dared to proclaim liberty of conscience for all. William of Orange was a Calvinist, sincere and rigid, but he denounced all oppression of religion, and opened wide the doors of the commonwealth to Papists, Lutherans, and Anabaptists alike. The Earl of Leicester was a Calvinist, most rigid in tenet, most edifying of conversation, the acknowledged head of the Puritan party of England, but he was intolerant, and was influenced only by the most intolerant of his sect. Certainly it would have required great magnanimity upon his part to assume a friendly demeanour towards the Papists. It is easier for us, in more favoured ages, to rise to the heights of philosophical abstraction, than for a man placed as was Leicester, in the front rank of a mighty battle, in which the triumph of either religion seemed to require the bodily annihilation of all its adversaries. He believed that the success of a Catholic conspiracy against the life of Elizabeth, or of a Spanish invasion

o England, would raise Mary to the throne and consign himself to the scaffold. He believed that the subjugation of the independent Netherlands would place the Spaniards instantly in England, and he frequently received information, true or false, of Popish plots that were ever hatching in various parts of the Provinces against the English Queen.<sup>1</sup> It was not surprising, therefore, although it was unwise, that he should incline his ear most seriously to those who counselled severe measures not only against Papists, but against those who were not persecutors of Papists, and that he should allow himself to be guided by adventurers, who wore the mask of religion only that they might plunder the exchequer and rob upon the highway.

Under the administration of this extreme party, therefore, the Papists were maltreated, disfranchised, banished, and plundered.<sup>2</sup> The distribution of the

<sup>1</sup> "May it please your sacred Majesty," wrote Wilkes, "there is come into my hands the copy of a letter written by the Prince of Parma to the Bishop of Liege, dated 24th of last month; by the which, among other things, doth appear, that there is yet some bloody purpose in hand to be executed upon your Majesty's sacred person, as by the same here inclosed doth appear. . . . It is signified by the letter, that, although the exterior of the treasons and practices plotted and contrived against your Majesty be discovered, yet the core and marrow thereof is not as yet uncovered or known, whereby your enemies doubt not but to achieve in time their wicked and horrible purposes against you." Wilkes to the Queen, 17 Dec. 1586. (S. P. Office MS.)

It can hardly excite surprise that the Queen, receiving almost every week such intimations out of the Spanish Netherlands of attempts against her life, should desire to deal severely with seminary priest and their associates coming from those regions.

<sup>2</sup> Yet, strange to say, it was Lord Buckhurst's opinion that the opponents of the Catholic religion were but a small minority of the Dutch people. "For the commonwealth of these Provinces," wrote that envoy, "consisting of divers parts and professions, as, namely, Protestants, Puritans, Anabaptists, and Spanish hearts, which are no small number, it is most certain, that, dividing this in five parts, the Protestants and Puritans do hardly contain even one part in five; although at this present, the Protestants and

heavy war-taxes, more than two-thirds of which were raised in Holland only, was confided to foreigners, and regulated mainly at Utrecht, where not one-tenth part of the same revenue was collected. This naturally excited the wrath of the merchants and manufacturers of Holland and the other Provinces, who liked not that these hard-earned and lavishly-paid subsidies should be meddled with by any but the cleanest hands.

The clergy, too, arrogated a direct influence in political affairs. Their demonstrations were opposed by the anti-Leicestrians, who cared not to see a Geneva theocracy in the place of the vanished Papacy. They had as little reverence in secular affairs for Calvinistic deacons as for the college of cardinals, and would as soon accept the infallibility of Sixtus V. as that of Herman Modet. The reformed clergy who had dispossessed and confiscated the property of the ancient ecclesiastics who once held a constitutional place in the Estates

Puritans, by having their rule and sovereignty in their hands, do wholly wage and command the captains and soldiers." Buckhurst to the Queen, 27 May, 1587. Printed in *'Cabala, or Mysteries of State,'* p. 87.

And again, in a letter to Walsingham, the same diplomatist remarks that the real object of the revolt of the Netherlands was not to defend their religious but their civil freedom, and that Catholics and Protestants were all united to that end. "If her Majesty," he said, "should not only refuse the sovereignty, but not give sufficient aid, it is in a manner certain that the people, *not being the fifth man a Protestant*, and not making their war in truth for religion, but for *their country and liberty* only, and to resist the tyranny of the Spaniards, whose hatred is ingraft in the hearts of them all, when they shall see her Majesty fail in their defence, will turn and revolt to the enemy," &c. &c. *Ibid.*, p. 11, 13, 13 April, 1587.

These sweeping statements may not be strictly accurate, but there is no doubt that Buckhurst was struck by the general and growing feeling of mutual toleration among the adherents to the various forms of religion in Holland, and by the instinct which prompted the whole commonwealth to strike for civil and religious liberty in one. Compare Kluit, *'Holl. Staatsreg.'* il. 360, who states expressly that the majority of every town and village in the Provinces were, in heart, faithful to the Roman Catholic religion.

of Utrecht—although many of those individuals were now married and had embraced the reformed religion—who had demolished, and sold at public auction, for 12,300 florins, 1 the time honoured cathedral where the earliest Christians of the Netherlands had worshipped, and St. Willibrod had ministered, were roundly rebuked, on more than one occasion, by the blunt Hollanders for meddling with matters beyond their sphere. 2

1 *Ibid.*, iii. xiii. 108.

2 *Ibid.*

"There is a controversy," wrote Wilken, "within the town and province of Utrecht (their estate being compounded of the nobility, clergy, and towns, containing three several members) between the towns and the clergy, whom the towns have inhibited to appear any more in the public assemblies meaning to cass them upon pretence that the clergy, their third member, is a hindrance to their good proceedings. The nobility taketh part with the clergy, and do not think it fit nor agreeable with order or justice that one third member, inferior to the other two, should take upon him to depose the first member, being the clergy, without the authority of the sovereign governor or the general assent of the Union. Al the beginning of the garboile, it was thought fit by this council to depute the Count Mœurs Mons. de Meetkerk, and Doctor Hottman persons of judgment, to hear the controversy . . . and as they were travelling to reduce them to an accord, there came a letter to the captains of the bourgeoisie of the town of Utrecht (being the principal movers of this dissension), written by Mr Herly, by which they have taken heart to persist obstinately in their purpose, persuading themselves that their proceedings will be avowed by her Majesty. And albeit this letter do not directly touch the matter, yet the large promises he maketh in her Majesty's name of her absolute purpose to embrace their cause *'avec la pleine main,'* as he termeth it, hath been occasion that they have uttered in public speeches that the letters of her Majesty's ambassador Herle hath given them sufficient hope that her Majesty will not mislike of their doings in going about to banish Popery out of that Province, which they make to be a show and countenance of the dealings. but, as I am informed, the most part of those that are of this clergy, and do hold the ecclesiastical livings, are married of the religion. And in truth, as far as I can perceive, their quarrel is not against the persons of the ecclesiastics, because they are contented that the persons should continue in their assemblies, but against the livings, which they mean to convert to some other uses. And although, for mine own

The party of the States-General, as opposed to the Leicester party, was guided by the statesmen of Holland. At a somewhat later period was formed the States-right party, which claimed sovereignty for each Province, and by necessary consequence the hegemony throughout the confederacy, for Holland. At present the doctrine maintained was that the sovereignty forfeited by Philip had naturally devolved upon the States-General. The statesmen of this party repudiated the calumny that it had therefore lapsed into the hands of half-a-dozen mechanics and men of low degree. The States of each Province were, they maintained, composed of nobles and country-gentlemen, as repre-

poor opinion, I think the church-livings were most fitly to be converted to the defence of the public cause, yet the manner of the doing thereof should be speedily prevented, for all men of judgment here are of opinion that if it be not stayed, it will hazard the loss of the town, and consequently of the whole Province. I am informed that the magistrates of Utrecht have despatched towards my lord-general and her Majesty one Herman Modet, their chief minister, to acquaint them with the matter, and to make good their proceedings. The said Modet, by the report of M. de Villiers, the minister, and Saravia, a great learned preacher of Leyden, is taken to be the greatest mutyne in all these countries; and it is avouched by them and others of the best condition that he was the only occasion of the loss of Ghent, upon the like matter begun by him within the town. The Prince of Orange, in his time, could never brook the same Modet, and, as the Count Maurice telleth me, he did always oppose himself against the counsel and designs of the Prince his father. I thought it not unfit to give you this taste of the condition of Modet, because I know that my Lord North, Mr. Killigrew, and Mr. Webbe have greatly supported him in his humours at Utrecht, and it is not to be doubted that they will do the like at home." Wilkes to Walsingham, Dec. 24, 1586. (S. P. Office MS.)

Such letters, written on the spot, by a man thoroughly acquainted with Netherland politics, and the experienced faithful representative of her Majesty in the state-council, explain the intrigues and the instruments of the Leicester party. It was by honest and lucid expositions like these, that the writer incurred the deadly hatred of the Earl, and was in danger of losing his life. (Compare Bor and Reynd, *ubi sup.* Le Petit, ii. xiv. 533. Wagenaar, viii. 168.)

senting the agricultural interest, and of deputies from the „vroedschappen,” or municipal governments, of every city and smallest town.

Such men as Adrian van der Werff, the heroic burgomaster of Leyden during its famous siege, John Van der Does, statesman, orator, soldier, poet, Adolphus Meetkerke, judge, financier, politician, Carl Roorda, Noel de Caron, diplomatist of most signal ability, Floris Thin, Paul Buys, and Olden-Barneveld, with many others, who would have done honour to the legislative assemblies and national councils in any country or any age, were constantly returned as members of the different vroedschaps in the commonwealth.

So far from its being true then that half-a-dozen ignorant mechanics had usurped the sovereignty of the Provinces, after the abjuration of the Spanish King, it may be asserted in general terms, that of the eight hundred thousand inhabitants of Holland at least eight hundred persons were always engaged in the administration of public affairs, that these individuals were perpetually exchanged for others, and that those whose names became most prominent in the politics of the day were remarkable for thorough education, high talents, and eloquence with tongue and pen. It was acknowledged by the leading statesmen of England and France, on repeated occasions throughout the sixteenth century, that the diplomatists and statesmen of the Netherlands were even more than a match for any politicians who were destined to encounter them, and the profound respect which Leicester expressed for these solid statesmen, these „substantial, wise, well-languaged” men, these „big fellows,” so soon as he came in contact with them, and before he began to hate them for outwitting him, has already appeared. They were generally men of the people, born



without any of the accidents of fortune; but the leaders had studied in the common schools, and later in the noble universities of a land where to be learned and eloquent was fast becoming almost as great an honour as to be wealthy or high born.

The executive, the legislative, and the judiciary departments were more carefully and scientifically separated than could perhaps have been expected in that age. The lesser municipal courts, in which city-senators presided, were subordinate to the supreme court of Holland, whose officers were appointed by the stadholders and council; the supplies were in the hands of the States-Provincial, and the supreme administrative authority was confided to a stadholder appointed by the States.

The States-General were constituted of similar materials to those of which the States-Provincial were constructed, and the same individuals were generally prominent in both. They were deputies appointed by the Provincial Estates, were in truth rather more like diplomatic envoys than senators, were generally bound very strictly by instructions, and were often obliged, by the jealousy springing from the States-right principle, to refer to their constituents, on questions when the times demanded a sudden decision, and when the necessary delay was inconvenient and dangerous.

In religious matters, the States-party, to their honour, already leaned to a wide toleration. Not only Catholics were not burned, but they were not banished, and very large numbers remained in the territory, and were quite undisturbed in religious matters within their own doors. There were even men employed in public affairs who were suspected of papistical tendencies, although their hostility to Spain and their attachment to their native land could not fairly be disputed. The leaders of the States-party had a rooted aversion to any po-

litical influence on the part of the clergy of any denomination whatever. Disposed to be lenient to all forms of worship they were disinclined to an established church, but still more opposed to allowing church-influence in secular affairs. As a matter of course, political matters were bitterly assailed by their rigid opponents. Barneveld with his „*nil scitissima fides*,“ was denounced as disguised Catholic or an infidel, and as for Paul Buys, he was a „bolster of Papists, an atheist, a devil,“ as it has long since been made manifest.

Nevertheless these men believed that they understood the spirit of their country and of the age. In encouragement to an expanding commerce, the elevation and education of the masses, the toleration of all creeds, and a wide distribution of political functions and rights, they looked for the salvation of their nascent republic from destruction, and the maintenance of the true interests of the people. They were still loyal to Queen Elizabeth, and desirous that she should accept the sovereignty of the Provinces. But they were determined that the sovereignty should be a constitutional one, founded upon and limited by the time-honoured laws and traditions of their commonwealth; for they recognised the value of a free republic with an hereditary chief, however anomalous it might in theory appear. They knew that in Utrecht the Leicestrian party were about to offer the Queen the sovereignty of their Province, *without conditions*, but they were determined that neither Queen Elizabeth nor any other monarch should ever reign in the Netherlands, *except* under conditions to be very accurately defined and well secured.

Thus contrasted, then, were the two great parties in the Netherlands, at the conclusion of Leicester's first year of administration. It may easily be understood that it was not an auspicious

moment to leave the country without a chief.

The strength of the States-party lay in Holland, Zeeland, Friesland. The mainstay of the democratic or Leicester faction was in the city of Utrecht, but the Earl had many partizans in Gelderland, Friesland, and in Overysse, the capital of which Province, the wealthy and thriving Deventer, second only in the republic to Amsterdam for commercial and political importance, had been but recently secured for the Provinces by the vigorous measures of Sir William Pelham.

The condition of the republic and of the Spanish Provinces was, at that moment, most signally contrasted. If the effects of despotism and of liberty could ever be exhibited at a single glance, it was certainly only necessary to look for a moment at the picture of the obedient and of the rebel Netherlands.

Since the fall of Antwerp, the desolation of Brabant, Flanders, and of the Walloon territories had become complete. The King had recovered the great commercial capital, but its commerce was gone. The Scheldt, which, till recently, had been the chief mercantile river in the world, had become as barren as if its fountains had suddenly dried up. It was as if it no longer flowed to the ocean, for its mouth was controlled by Flushing. Thus Antwerp was imprisoned and paralyzed. Its docks and basins, where 2500 ships had once been counted, were empty, grass was growing in its streets, its industrious population had vanished, and the Jesuits had returned in swarms. And the same spectacle was presented by Ghent, Bruges, Valenciennes, Tournay, and those other fair cities, which had once been types of vigorous industry and tumultuous life. The sea-coast was in the hands of two rising commercial powers, the great and free commonwealths of the future. Those powers were acting in concert, and commanding the traffic of the world,

while the obedient Provinces were excluded from all foreign intercourse and all markets, as the result of their obedience. Commerce, manufactures, agriculture, were dying lingering deaths. The thrifty farms, orchards, and gardens, which had been a proverb and wonder of industry, were becoming wildernesses. The demand for their produce by the opulent and thriving cities which had been the workshops of the world was gone. Foraging bands of Spanish and Italian mercenaries had succeeded to the famous tramp of the artizans and mechanics, which had often been likened to an army, but these new customers were less profitable to the gardeners and farmers. The clothiers, the fullers, the tapestry-workers, the weavers, the cutlers, had all wandered away, and the cities of Holland, Friesland, and of England, were growing skilful and rich by the lessons and the industry of the exiles to whom they afforded a home. There were villages and small towns in the Spanish Netherlands that had been literally depopulated. Large districts of country had gone to waste, and canals and squalid morasses usurped the place of yellow harvest-fields. The fox, the wild boar, and the wolf, infested the abandoned homes of the peasantry; children could not walk in safety in the neighbourhood even of the larger cities; wolves littered their young in the deserted farm-houses; two hundred persons, in the winter of 1586—7 were devoured by wild beasts in the outskirts of Ghent. 1 Such of the remaining labourers and artizans as had not been converted into soldiers, found their most profitable employment as brigands, so that the portion of the population spared by war and emigration was assisting the enemy in preying upon

1 Bor, ii. xxii. 984, 985. Meteren xiv. 253. Hoofd, Vervolg, 251. Wagenaar. viii. 224, 225. Van Wyn op Wagen, viii, 67  
„The bedsteads of the abandoned cottages,” says Meteren, „swarmed with little wolves,” *ubi sup.*

their native country. Brandschätzung, burglary, highway-robbery, and murder, had become the chief branches of industry among the working classes. Nobles and wealthy burghers had been changed to paupers and mendicants. Many a family of ancient lineage, and once of large possessions, could be seen begging their bread, at the dusk of evening, in the streets of great cities, where they had once exercised luxurious hospitality; and they often begged in vain. 1

For while such was the forlorn aspect of the country—and the portrait, faithfully sketched from many contemporary pictures, has not been exaggerated in any of its dark details—a great famine smote the land with its additional scourge. The whole population, soldiers and brigands, Spaniards and Flemings, beggars and workmen, were in danger of perishing together. Where the want of employment had been so great as to cause a rapid depopulation, where the demand for labour had almost entirely ceased, it was a necessary result, that, during the process, prices should be low, even in the presence of foreign soldiery, and despite the inflated profits, which such capitalists as remained required, by way not only a profit but insurance, in such troublous times. Accordingly, for the last year or two, the price of rye at Antwerp and Brussels had been one florin for the veertel (three bushels) of one hundred and twenty pounds; that of wheat, about one-third of a florin more. Five pounds of rye, therefore, were worth one penny sterling, reckoning, as was then usual, two shillings to the florin. A pound weight of wheat was worth about one farthing. 2 Yet this was forty-one years

after the discovery of the mines of Potosí (A.D. 1545), and full sixteen years after the epoch from which is dated that rapid fall in the value of silver which, in the course of seventy years, caused the average price of corn and of all other commodities, to be tripled or even quadrupled. At that very moment the average cost of wheat in England was sixty-four shillings the quarter, or about seven and sixpence sterling the bushel; 1 and in the markets of Holland, which in truth regulated all others, the same prices prevailed. 2 A bushel of wheat in England was equal therefore to eight bushels in Brussels.

Thus the silver mines, which were the Spanish King's property, had produced their effect everywhere more signally than within his obedient Provinces. The South American specie found its way to Philip's coffers, thence to the paymasters of his troops in Flanders, and thence to the commercial centres of Holland and England. Those countries, first to feel and obey the favourable expanding impulse of the age, were moving surely and steadily on before it to greatness. Prices were rising with unexampled rapidity, the precious metals were comparatively a drug, a world-wide commerce, such as had never

lution in the value of silver had begun. For one hundred and sixty florins (16*l.*) there were bought a last (108 bushels, or 80 bushels English) of wheat, a last of rye, a last of barley, a last of oats, a quarter hundredweight of butter, 300 pounds of lard, one hundred cheeses, a doublet, a pair of shoes, a bonnet, a bag, a barrel of excellent beer, and there were six stuyvers over for drinkmoney. „And let this serve as a memorial,” he piously observes, „of how much the wrath of God and how much his benignity can do for us.” Met. xiv. 253.

1 Tables in MacCulloch's edition of Adam Smith, p. 117.

2 Bor, Meteren. A veertel is about three bushels. A florin was then always reckoned at two shillings sterling. The price of a bushel of rye at Brussels and Antwerp was therefore eightpence; that of a bushel of wheat about one-third more, say eleven-pence, or seven and four-pence for the quarter (eight bushels), about an eighth or ninth of the price in England and Holland.

1 Bor, Meteren, Hoofd, Wagenaar.

2 A contemporary chronicler has preserved a droll medley of prices in the Netherlands in the year 1548, but one which, if accurate, furnishes a striking instance of the low money-valuation of the various necessities of life, before the great revo-



been dreamed of, had become an everyday concern, the arts and sciences and a most generous culture in famous schools and universities, which had been founded in the midst of tumult and bloodshed, characterized the republic, and the golden age of English poetry, which was to make the Elizabethan era famous through all time, had already begun.

In the Spanish Netherlands the newly-found treasure served to pay the only labourers required in a subjugated and almost deserted country, the pikemen of Spain and Italy, and the reiters of Germany. Prices could not sustain themselves in the face of depopulation. Where there was no security for property, no home-market, no foreign intercourse, industrial pursuits had become almost impossible. The small demand for labour had caused it, as it were, to disappear altogether. All men had become beggars, brigands, or soldiers. A temporary reaction followed. There were no producers. Suddenly it was discovered that no corn had been planted, and that there was no harvest. A famine was the inevitable result. Prices then rose with most frightful rapidity. The *veertel* of rye, which in the previous year had been worth one florin at Brussels and Antwerp, rose in the winter of 1586-7 to twenty, twenty-two, and even twenty-four florins; and wheat advanced from one and one-third florin to thirty-two florins the *veertel*.<sup>1</sup> Other articles were proportionally increased in market-value; but it is worthy of remark that mutton was quoted in the midst of this famine at nine *stuyvers* (a little more than nine-pence sterling) the pound, and beef at five-pence, while a single cod-fish sold for twenty-two florins.<sup>2</sup> Thus

<sup>1</sup> Bor, Meteren, Hoofd, *ubi sup*. A last of rye is quoted by Meteren (xiv. 253) at 8000 florins. A last is equal to 80 bushels, English measure. This is just ten florins, or one pound sterling, the bushel for rye, and one-third more or twenty-seven shillings—that is to say, 10*l.* 16*s.* the quarter, for wheat.

<sup>2</sup> Bor, Hoofd, Meteren, *ubi sup*.

wheat was worth sixpence sterling the pound weight (reckoning the *veertel* of one hundred and twenty pounds at thirty florins), which was a penny more than the price of a pound of beef; while an ordinary fish was equal in value to one hundred and six pounds of beef. No better evidence could be given that the obedient Provinces were relapsing into barbarism, that the only agricultural industry then practised was to allow what flocks and herds were remaining to graze at will over the ruined farms and that their fishermen were excluded from the sea.

The evil cured itself, however, and, before the expiration of another year, prices were again at their previous level. The land was sufficiently cultivated to furnish the necessities of life for a diminishing population, and the supply of labour was more than enough for the languishing demand. Wheat was again at ten-pence the bushel, and other commodities valued in like proportion, and far below the market-prices in Holland and England.<sup>1</sup>

On the other hand, the prosperity of the republic was rapidly increasing. Notwithstanding the war, which had been raging for a terrible quarter of a century without any interruption, population was increasing, property rapidly advancing in value, labour in active demand. Famine was impossible to a state which commanded the ocean. No corn grew in Holland and Zeeland, but their ports were the granary of the world. The fisheries were a mine of wealth equal to the famous Potosi, with which the commercial world was then ringing. Their commerce with the Baltic nations was enormous. In one month eight hundred vessels left their havens for the eastern ports alone. There was also no doubt whatever—and the circumstance was a source of constant complaint and of frequent ineffective legislation—that the rebellious Provinces

<sup>1</sup> Ibid.

were driving a most profitable trade with Spain and the Spanish possessions, in spite of their revolutionary war. The mines of Peru and Mexico were as fertile for the Hollanders and Zeelanders as for the Spaniards themselves. The war paid for the war, one hundred large frigates were constantly cruising along the coasts to protect the fast-growing traffic, and an army of twenty thousand foot-soldiers and two thousand cavalry were maintained on land. There were more ships and sailors at that moment in Holland and Zeeland than in the whole kingdom of England. 1

While the seaports were thus rapidly increasing in importance, the towns in the interior was advancing as steadily. The woollen manufacture, the tapestry, the embroideries of Gelderland, and Friesland, and Overijssel, were becoming as famous as had been those of Tournay, Ypres, Brussels, and Valenciennes. The emigration from the obedient Provinces and from other countries was very great. It was difficult to obtain lodgings in the principal cities; new houses, new streets, new towns, were rising every day. The single Province of Holland furnished regularly, for war-expenses alone, two millions of florins (two hundred thousand pounds) a-year, besides frequent extraordinary grants for the same purpose; yet the burthen imposed upon the vigorous young commonwealth seemed only to make it the more elastic. „The coming generations may see,” says a contemporary historian, „the fortifications erected at that epoch in the cities, the costly and magnificent havens, the docks, the great extension of the

cities; for truly *the war had become a great benediction* to the inhabitants.” 1

Such a prosperous commonwealth as this was not a prize to be lightly thrown away. There is no doubt whatever that a large majority of the inhabitants, and of the States by whom the people was represented, ardently and affectionately desired to be annexed to the English crown. Leicester had become unpopular, but Elizabeth was adored, and there was nothing unreasonable in the desire entertained by the Provinces of retaining their ancient constitutions, and of transferring their allegiance to the English Queen.

But the English Queen could not resolve to take the step. Although the great tragedy which was swiftly approaching its inevitable catastrophe, the execution of the Scottish Queen, was to make peace with Philip impossible—even if it were imaginable before—Elizabeth, during the year 1587, was earnestly bent on peace. This will be made manifest in subsequent pages, by an examination of the secret correspondence of her court. Her most sagacious statesmen disapproved her course, opposed it, and were often overruled, although never convinced; for her imperious will would have its way.

The States-General loathed the very name of peace with Spain. The people loathed it. All knew that peace with Spain meant the exchange of a thriving prosperous commonwealth, with freedom of religion, constitutional liberty, and self-government, for provincial subjection to the Inquisition and to despotism. To dream of any concession from Philip on the religious point was ridiculous. There was a mirror ever held up before their eyes by the obedient Provinces, in which they might see their own image, should they too return to obedience. And there was never a pretence, on the part of any honest adviser of

1 Six years later it was asserted by the magistrates of Amsterdam, in a communication made to the States-General, „that no one could doubt that in regard to the mercantile marine and the amount of tonnage the Provinces were so far superior to England that hardly any comparison could be made on the subject, &c. Koopvaardy-Schepen in Nederland ao 1593. Brief v. d. Burgemeesteren en Raden der stad Amsterdam aan de Staaten-General.” (Hague Archives, MS.)

Queen Elizabeth in the Netherlands, whether Englishman or Hollander, that the idea of peace-negotiation could be tolerated for a moment by States or people. Yet the sum of the Queen's policy, for the year 1587, may be summed up in one word—peace; peace for the Provinces, peace for herself, with their implacable enemy.

In France, during the same year of expectation, we shall see the long prologue to the tragic and memorable 1588 slowly enacting; the same triangular contest between the three Henrys and their partizans still proceeding. We shall see the misguided and wretched Valois lamenting over his victories; and rejoicing over his defeats; forced into hollow alliance with his deadly enemy; arrayed in arms against his only protector and the true champion of the realm; and struggling vainly in the toils of his own mother and his own secretary of state, leagued with his most powerful foes. We shall see „Mucio,” with one hand extended in mock friendship toward the King, and with the other thrust backward to grasp the purse of 300,000 crowns held forth to

aid his fellow-conspirator's dark designs against their common victim; and the Béarnese, ever with lance in rest, victorious over the wrong antagonist, foiled of the fruits of victory, proclaiming himself the English Queen's devoted knight, but railing at her parsimony; always in the saddle, always triumphant, always a beggar, always in love, always cheerful, and always confident to outwit the Guises and Philip, Parma and the Pope.

And in Spain we shall have occasion to look over the King's shoulder, as he sits at his study-table, in his most sacred retirement; and we shall find his policy for the year 1587 summed up in two words—invasion of England. Sincerely and ardently as Elizabeth meant peace with Philip, just so sincerely did Philip intend war with England, and the dethronement and destruction of the Queen. To this great design all others were now subservient, and it was mainly on account of this determination that there was sufficient leisure in the republic for the Leicestrians and the States-General to fight out so thoroughly their party-contests.

### CHAPTER XIII.

Barneveld's Influence in the Provinces—Unpopularity of Leicester—Intrigues of his Servants—Gossip of his Secretary—Its mischievous Effects—The Quarrel of Norris and Hollock—The Earl's Participation in the Affair—His increased Animosity to Norris—Seizure of Deventer—Stanley appointed its Governor—York and Stanley—Leicester's secret Instructions—Wilkes remonstrates with Stanley—Stanley's insolence and Equivocation—Painful Rumours as to him and York—Duplicity of York—Stanley's Banquet at Deventer—He surrenders the City to Tassis—Terms of the Bargain—Feeble Defence of Stanley's Conduct—Subsequent Fate of Stanley and York—Betrayal of Gelder to Parma—These Treasons cast Odium on the English—Miserable Plight of the English Troops—Honesty and Energy of Wilkes—Indignant Discussion in the Assembly.

down by Leicester on his departure. It had been provisionally delegated, as already mentioned, to the state-council. In this body—consisting of eighteen persons—originally appointed by the Earl, on nomination by the States, several members were friendly to the governor, and others were violently opposed to him. The States of Holland, by whom the action of the States-General was mainly controlled, were influenced in their action by Buys and Barneveld. Young Maurice of Nassau, nineteen years of age, was stadholder of Holland and Zeeland. A florid complexioned, fair-haired young man, of sanguine-bilious temperament; reserved, quiet, reflective,

THE government had not been laid



singularly self-possessed; meriting at that time, more than his father had ever done, the appellation of the taciturn; discreet, sober, studious. „Count Maurice saith but little, but I cannot tell what he thinketh,” wrote Leicester’s eaves-dropper-in-chief. <sup>1</sup> Mathematics, fortification, the science of war—these were his daily pursuits. „The sapling was to become the tree,” and meantime the youth was preparing for the great destiny which, he felt, lay before him. To ponder over the works and the daring conceptions of Stevinus, to build up and to batter the wooden blocks of mimic citadels, to arrange, in countless combinations great armies of pewter soldiers; these were the occupations of his leisure-hours. Yet he was hardly suspected of bearing within him the germs of the great military commander. „Small desire hath Count Maurice to follow the wars,” said one who fancied himself an acute observer at exactly this epoch. „And whereas it might be supposed that in respect of his birth and place, he would affect the chief military command in these countries, it is *found by experience had of his humour, that there is no chance of his entering into competition* with the others.” <sup>2</sup> A modest young man, who could bide his time—but who, meanwhile, under the guidance of his elders, was doing his best, both in field and cabinet, to learn the great lessons of the age—he had already enjoyed much solid practical instruction, under such a desperate fighter as Hohenlo, and under so profound a statesman as Barneveld. For at this epoch Olden-Barneveld was the preceptor, almost the political patron of Maurice, and Maurice, the official head of the Holland party, was the declared opponent of the democratic-Calvinist organization. It is not neces-

sary, at this early moment, to foreshadow the changes which time was to bring. Meantime it would be seen, perhaps ere long, whether or no it would be his humour to follow the wars. As to his prudent and dignified deportment, there was little doubt. „Count Maurice behaveth himself very discreetly all this while,” wrote one, who did not love him, to Leicester, who loved him less: „He cometh every day to the council, keepeth no company with Count Hollock, nor with any of them all, and never drinks himself full with any of them, as they do every day among themselves.” <sup>1</sup>

Certainly the most profitable intercourse that Maurice could enjoy with Hohenlo was upon the battle-field. In winter-quarters, that hard-fighting, hard-drinking, and most turbulent chieftain, was not the best Mentor for a youth whose destiny pointed him out as the leader of a free commonwealth. After the campaigns were over—if they ever could be over—the Count and other nobles from the same country were too apt to indulge in those mighty potations, which were rather characteristic of their nation and the age.

„Since your Excellency’s departure,” wrote Leicester’s secretary, „there hath been among the Dutch Counts nothing but dancing and drinking, to the grief of all this people, which foresee that there can come no good of it. Specially Count Hollock, who hath been drunk almost a fortnight together.” <sup>2</sup>

Leicester had rendered himself unpopular with the States-General, and with all the leading politicians and generals; yet, at that moment, he had deeply mortgaged his English estates in order to raise funds to expend in the Netherland cause. Thirty thousand pounds sterling—according to his own statement

<sup>1</sup> Otheman to Leicester. (Brit. Mus. Galba, C. xi. 216, 1 Feb. 1587, MS.)

<sup>2</sup> Project for the Government of the Provinces. (Cabala, p. 23.)

<sup>1</sup> Otheman to Leicester, 16 Jan. 1587. (Brit. Mus. Galba, C. xi. 99, MS.)

<sup>1</sup> Otheman to Leicester, 7 Jan. 1587. (Ibid. p. 72, MS.)

—he was already out of pocket, and, unless the Queen would advance him the means to redeem his property, his broad lands were to be brought to the hammer. 1 But it was the Queen, not the States-General, who owed the money; for the Earl had advanced these sums as a portion of the royal contingent. Five hundred and sixty thousand pounds sterling had been the cost of one year's war during the English governor's administration; and of this sum one hundred and forty thousand had been paid by England. 2 There was a portion of the sum, over and above their monthly levies, for which the States had contracted a debt, and they were extremely desirous to obtain, at that moment, an additional loan of fifty thousand pounds from Elizabeth; a favour which Elizabeth was very firmly determined not to grant. It was this terror at the expense into which the Netherland war was plunging her, which made the English sovereign so desirous for peace, and filled the anxious mind of Walsingham with the most painful forebodings.

Leicester, in spite of his good qualities—such as they were—had not that most necessary gift for a man in his position, the art of making friends. No man made so many enemies. He was an excellent hater, and few men have been more cordially hated in return. He was imperious, insolent, hot-tempered. He could brook no equal. He had also the fatal defect of enjoying the flattery of

his inferiors in station. Adroit intriguers burned incense to him as a god, and employed him as their tool. And now he had mortally offended Hohenlo, and Buys, and Barneveld, while he hated Sir John Norris with a most passionate hatred. Wilkes, the English representative, was already a special object of his aversion. The unvarnished statements made by the stiff counsellor, of the expense of the past year's administration, and the various errors committed, had inspired Leicester with such ferocious resentment, that the friends of Wilkes trembled for his life. 1 Cordiality

1 „It is generally bruited here,” wrote Henry Smith to his brother-in-law Wilkes, „of a most heavy displeasure conceived by my Lord of Leicester against you, and it is said to be so great as that he hath protested to be revenged of you; and to procure you the more enemies, it is said he hath revealed to my Lord Treasurer and Secretary Davison some injurious speeches (which I cannot report) you should have used of them to him at your last being with him. Furthermore some of the said Lord's secretaries have reported here that it were good for you never to return hither, or, if their Lord be appointed to go over again, it will be too hot for you to tarry there. These things thus coming to the ears of your friends have stricken a great fear and grief into the minds of such as love you, lest the wonderful force and authority of this man being bent against you, should do you hurt, while there is none to answer for you.” Smith to Wilkes, 26 Jan. 1587. (S. P. Office MS.)

Wilkes immediately wrote to Lord Burghley, indignantly denying that he had ever spoken disrespectfully or injuriously of him, as thus meanly reported of him by Leicester.

„I do briefly assure your Lordship,” he said, „which I will avow with mine oath upon the Holy Testament, that I am therein as falsely and injuriously abused as ever was poor man, and, upon that protestation, I utterly deny that ever I advised my Lord to beware of your Lordship, or of any counsellor at your devotion, or that I ever used unto him, or to any creature living, any vile, uncivil, lewd, or undutiful term of your Lordship. I trust in the observation you have made of my conversation, serving her Majesty a dozen years under your wing, did never see that I was so indiscreet as to speak irreverently of men of your Lordship's place, and I hope you have not found me so foolish as by such lightness to draw myself into the hatred of so great personages, to overthrow myself wilfully. I thank God I was never so-

1 List of the Earl of Leicester's mortgages, to raise money spent in doing her Majesty service in the Low Countries, (S. P. Office, 1587, MS.)

There were five different mortgages of estates and manors in England, amounting in all to 18,000*l*. „All the mortgages above written are past redemption, except on present payment of the due debts. His Lordship doth owe an infinite sum besides for his expenses made in these services, over and besides these debts.”

2 Wilkes to Walsingham, 12 Jan. 1587. Same to Burghley, 12 Jan. 1587. (S. P. Office MSS.)

between the governor-general and Count Maurice had become impossible. As for Willoughby and Sir William Pelham, they were both friendly to him, but Willoughby was a magnificent cavalry officer, who detested politics, and cared little for the Netherlands, except as the best battle-field in Europe, and the old marshal of the camp—the only man that Leicester ever loved—was growing feeble in health, was broken down by debt, and hardly possessed or wished for any general influence.

Besides Deventer of Utrecht, then, on whom the Earl chiefly relied during his absence, there were none to support him cordially, except two or three members of the state-council. „Madame de Brederode hath sent unto you a kind of rose,” said his intelligencer, „which you have asked for, and beseeches you to command anything she has in her garden, or wheresoever. M. Meetkerke,

mad, and I might speak it without vaunt, that there was no man in court of my sort that had more good-will of high and low than myself, before the acceptance of this cursed and unfortunate journey, which as I declared to your Lordship at the beginning, will be, I fear, the cause of my ruin: and then it pleased you to give me this advice, that I should serve her Majesty truly, and refer the rest to God. Your Lordship doth know the humours and disposition of my great adversary better than I; and can judge thereof accordingly, which, with silence, I will leave to plead for me in your grave conceipt, together with the unlikelihood that I, having no cause of offence and finding you my good Lord, and that I am not mad, or used to precipitate myself in that manner, should in any probability be so great an enemy to myself as to make your Lordship my foe by any such levity. . . . Your Lordship hath herein dealt with me according to yourself, that you have not directly condemned me before you heard me. . . . If my adversary were as mean in quality as myself, I would not doubt but by God's grace and help, to make mine innocence appear upon him with my hand.” Wilkes to Burghley, 17 Feb. 1587. (S. P. Office MS.)

Thus it appears that the Lord Treasurer's conduct towards the counsellor, who had been taking his advice of „serving her Majesty truly and referring the rest to God,” was as honourable as that of Leicester was base.

M. Brederode, and Mr. Dorius, wish your return with all their hearts. For the rest I cannot tell, and will not swear. But Mr. Barneveld is not your very great friend, whereof I can write no more at his time.” 1

This certainly was a small proportion out of a council of eighteen, when all the leading politicians of the country were in avowed hostility to the governor. And thus the Earl was, at this most important crisis, to depend upon the subtle and dangerous Deventer, and upon two inferior personages, the „fellow Junius,” 2 and a non-descript, whom Hohenlo characterised as a „long lean Englishman, with a little black beard.” 3 This meagre individual, however, seems to have been of somewhat doubtful nationality. He called himself Otheman, claimed to be a Frenchman, had lived much in England, wrote with greath fluency and spirit, both in French and English, but was said, in reality, to be named Robert Dale. 4

It was not the best policy for the representative of the English Queen to trust to such counsellors at a moment when the elements of strife between Holland and England were actively at work; and when the safety, almost the existence, of the two commonwealths depended upon their acting cordially in concert. „Overysse, Utrecht, Friesland, and Gelderland, have agreed to renew the offer of sovereignty to her Majesty,” said Leicester. „I shall be able to make a better report of their love and good inclination than I can of Holland.” 5

1 Otheman to Leicester, 16 Jan. 1587. (MS. already cited.)

2 Common expression of Hohenlo. (Bor. iii. xxiii. 28.)

3 Bor. iii. MS. last cited.

4 Fowler to Burghley, 7 Oct. 1589, in Murdin's State Papers, p. 639.

5 Speech of Leicester to the deputies of States-General, just before his departure, Nov. 1586 (S. P. Office MS.)

„The town of Utrecht,” said Wilkes a few weeks later, „doth dissent from the rest of the provinces in the manner of their sovereignty, who, seeming to be best affected to



It was thought very desirable by the English government that this great demonstration should be made once more, whatever might be the ultimate decision of her Majesty upon so momentous a measure. It seemed proper that a solemn embassy should once more proceed to England in order to confer with Elizabeth; but there was much delay in regard to the step, and much indignation, in consequence, on the part of the Earl. The opposition came, of course, from the Barneveld party. „They are in no great haste to offer the sovereignty,” said Wilkes. „First some towns of Holland made bones thereat, and now they say that Zeeland is not resolved.”<sup>1</sup>

The nature and the causes of the opposition offered by Barneveld and the States of Holland have been sufficiently explained. Buys, maddened by his long and unjustifiable imprisonment, had just been released by the express desire of Hohenlo; and that unruly chieftain, who guided the German and Dutch magnates, such as Moeurs and Overstein, and who even much influenced Maurice and his cousin Count Lewis William, was himself governed by Barneveld. It would have been far from impossible for Leicester, even then, to conciliate the whole party. It was highly desirable that he should do so, for not one of the Provinces where he boasted his strength was quite secure for England. Count Moeurs, a potent and wealthy noble, was governor of Utrecht and Gelderland, and he had already begun to favour the party in Holland which claimed for that Province a legal jurisdiction over the whole

her Majesty, do mean to yield her the same as Charles V. did hold it, reserving only their principal privileges and religion, which the rest do not intend to do, as I can learn, who do purpose to charge the same with many strange conditions. I would be glad to know your honour's opinion of her Majesty's purpose therein, whereby I may better direct my services here.” Wilkes to Walsingham, 19 Jan. 1587. (S. P. Office MS.)

<sup>1</sup> Wilkes to Leicester, 24 Dec. 1586. (S. P. Office MS.)

ancient episcopate. Under these circumstances common prudence would have suggested that as good an understanding as possible might be kept up with the Dutch and German counts, and that the breach might not be rendered quite irreparable.

Yet, as if there had not been administrative blunders enough committed in one year, the unlucky lean Englishman with the black beard, who was the Earl's chief representative, contrived—almost before his master's back was turned—to draw upon himself the wrath of all the fine ladies in Holland. That this should be the direful spring of unutterable disasters, social and political, was easy to foretell.

Just before the governor's departure Otheman came to pay his farewell respects, and receive his last commands. He found Leicester seated at chess with Sir Francis Drake.

„I do leave you here, my poor Otheman,” said the Earl, „but so soon as I leave you I know very well that nobody will give you a good look.”<sup>1</sup>

„Your excellency was a true prophet,” wrote the secretary a few weeks later, „for, my good Lord, I have been in as great danger of my life as ever man was. I have been hunted at Delft from house to house, and then besieged in my lodgings four or five hours; as though I had been the greatest thief, murderer, and traitor in the land.”

And why was the unfortunate Otheman thus hunted to his lair? Because he had chosen to indulge in *scandalum magnatum*, and had thereby excited the frenzy of all the great nobles whom it was most important for the English party to conciliate.

There had been gossip about the Princess of Chimay and one Calvaert, who lived in her house, much against the advice of all her best friends. One day she complained bitterly to Master

<sup>1</sup> Otheman to Leicester, 29 Jan. 1587. (S. P. Office MS.)

Otheman of the spiteful ways of the world.

„I protest,” said she, „that I am the unhappiest lady upon earth to have my name thus called in question.” 1

So said Otheman, in order to comfort her: „Your Highness is aware that such things are said of all. I am sure I hear every day plenty of speeches about lords and ladies, queens and princesses. You have little cause to trouble yourself for such matters, being known to live honestly and like a good Christian lady. Your Highness is not the only lady spoken of.”

The Princess listened with attention.

„Think of the stories about the Queen of England and my Lord of Leicester!” 2 said Otheman, with infinite tact. „No person is exempted from the tongues of evil speakers; but virtuous and godly men do put all such foolish matter under their feet. Then there is the Countess of Moeurs, how much evil talk does one hear about her!”

The Princess seemed still more interested and even excited; and the adroit Otheman having thus, as he imagined, very successfully smoothed away her anger, went off to have a little more harmless gossip about the Princess and the Countess, with Madame de Meetkerke, who had sent Leicester the rose from her garden.

But, no sooner had he gone, than away went her Highness to Madame de Moeurs, „a marvellous wise and well-spoken gentlewoman and a grave,” 3 and informed her and the Count, with some trifling exaggeration, that the vile Englishman, secretary to the odious Leicester, had just been there, abusing and calumniating the Countess in most lewd and abominable fashion.

1 Otheman to Leicester, last cited.

2 Ibid.—*totidem verbis*. It is somewhat amusing to find, in a letter to Leicester from his own secretary, these allusions to the „scandal about Queen Elizabeth.”

3 Leicester to Walsingham, in Bruce, p. 217.

He had also, she protested, used „very evil speeches of all the ladies in the country.” 1 For her own part the Princess avowed her determination to have him instantly murdered. 2 Count Moeurs was quite of the same mind, and desired nothing better than to be one of his executioners. Accordingly, the next Sunday, when the babbling secretary had gone down to Delft to hear the French sermon, a select party, consisting of Moeurs, Lewis William of Nassau, Count Overstein, and others, set forth for that city, laid violent hands on the culprit, and brought him bodily before Princess Chimay. There, being called upon to explain his innuendos, he fell into much trepidation, and gave the names of several English captains, whom he supposed to be at that time in England. „For if I had denied the whole matter,” said he, „they would have given me the lie, and used me according to their evil mind.” 3 Upon this they relented, and released their prisoner, but, the next day, they made another attack upon him, hunted him from house of house, through the whole city of Delft, and at last drove him to earth in his own lodgings, where they kept him besieged several hours. Through the intercession of Wilkes and the authority of the council of state, to which body he succeeded in conveying information of his dangerous predicament, he was, in his own language, „miraculously preserved,” although remaining still in daily danger of his life. „I pray God keep me hereafter from the anger of a woman,” he exclaimed, „quia non est ira supra iram mulieris.” 4

He was immediately examined before the council, and succeeded in clearing and justifying himself to the satisfaction of his friends. His part was afterwards taken by the councillors, by all the preachers and godly men, and by the

1 Otheman to Leicester. MS. before cited.

2 Ibid.

3 Ibid.

4 Ibid.

university of Leyden. But it was well understood that the blow and the affront had been levelled at the English governor and the English nation.

„All your friends do see,” said Otheman, „that this disgrace is not meant so much to me as to your Excellency; the Dutch earls having used such speeches unto me, and against all law, custom, and reason, used such violence to me, that your Excellency shall wonder to hear of it.”<sup>1</sup>

Now the Princess Chimay, besides being of honourable character, was a sincere and exemplary member of the Calvinist church, and well inclined to the Leicestrians. She was daughter of Count Meghem, one of the earliest victims of Philip II., in the long tragedy of Netherland independence, and widow of Lancelot Berlaymont. Count Moeurs was governor of Utrecht, and by no means, up to that time, a thorough supporter of the Holland party; <sup>2</sup> but thenceforward he went off most abruptly from the party of England, became hand and glove with Hohenlo, accepted the influence of Barneveld, and did his best to wrest the city of Utrecht from English authority. Such was the effect of the secretary's harmless gossip.

„I thought Count Moeurs and his wife better friends to your Excellency than I do see them to be,” said Otheman afterwards. „But he doth now disgrace the English nation many ways in his speeches—saying that they are no sol-

diers, that they do no good to this country, and that these Englishmen that are at Arnheim have an intent to sell and betray the town to the enemy.”<sup>2</sup>

But the disgraceful squabble between Hohenlo and Edward Norris had been more unlucky for Leicester than any other incident during the year, for its result was to turn the hatred of both parties against himself. Yet the Earl, of all men, was originally least to blame for the transaction. It has been seen that Sir Philip Sidney had borne Norris's cartel to Hohenlo, very soon after the outrage had been committed. The Count had promised satisfaction, but meantime was desperately wounded in the attack on Fort Zutphen. Leicester afterwards did his best to keep Edward Norris employed in distant places, for he was quite aware that Hohenlo, as lieutenant-general and count of the empire, would consider himself aggrieved at being called to the field by a simple English captain, however deeply he might have injured him. The governor accordingly induced the Queen to recall the young man to England, and invited him—much as he disliked his whole race—to accompany him on his departure for that country.

The Captain then consulted with his brother Sir John, regarding the pending dispute with Hohenlo. His brother advised that the Count should be summoned to keep his promise, but that Lord Leicester's permission should previously be requested.

A week before the governor's departure, accordingly, Edward Norris presented himself one morning in the dining-room, and, finding the Earl reclining on a window-seat, observed to him that „he desired his Lordship's favour towards the discharging of his reputation.”

„The Count Hollock is now well,” he proceeded, „and is feasting and

<sup>1</sup> Otheman to Leicester, 1 Feb. 1587. (Brit. Mus. Galba, C. xi. 218. MS.)

<sup>2</sup> On the contrary, although Hohenlo had been doing his best to gain him, having been drunk with him most conscientiously for a fortnight at a time, his wife, who was his commanding officer, had expressed aversion to the German party, and great affection for that of Leicester. „The Countess told me but yesterday,” Otheman had written only a few days before, „that her husband was not so foolish as to trust him who had deceived him so often, and that she will never permit her husband to go from the party of England.” Otheman to Leicester, 16 Jan. 1587. (Brit. Mus. Galba, C. xi. p. 99. MS.)

<sup>1</sup> Otheman to Leicester, 1 Feb. 1587. (MS. before cited.)



banqueting in his lodgings, although he does not come abroad."

"And what way will you take?" inquired Leicester, "considering that he keeps his house."

"Twill be best, I thought," answered Norris, "to write unto him, to perform his promise he made me to answer me in the field."

"To whom did he make that promise?" asked the Earl.

"To Sir Philip Sidney," answered the Captain.

"To my nephew Sidney," said Leicester musingly; "very well; do as you think best, and I will do for you what I can." 1

And the governor then added many kind expressions concerning the interest he felt in the young man's reputation. Passing to other matters, Norris then spoke of the great charges he had recently been put to by reason of having exchanged out of the State's service in order to accept a commission from his Lordship to levy a company of horse. This levy had cost him and his friends three hundred pounds, for which he had not been able to "get one groat."

"I beseech your Lordship to stand good for me," said he; "considering the meanest captain in all the country hath as good entertainment as I."

"I can do but little for you before my departure," said Leicester; "but at my return I will advise to do more."

After this amicable conversation Norris thanked his Lordship, took his leave, and straightway wrote his letter to Count Hollock. 2

That personage, in his answer, expressed astonishment that Norris should summon him, in his "weakness and indisposition;" but agreed to give him the desired meeting, with sword and dagger, so soon as he should be sufficiently recovered. Norris, in reply,

acknowledged his courteous promise, and hoped that he might be speedily restored to health. 1

The state-council, sitting at the Hague, took up the matter at once, however, and requested immediate information of the Earl. He accordingly sent for Norris and his brother Sir John, who waited upon him in his bed-chamber, and were requested to set down in writing the reasons which had moved them in the matter. This statement was accordingly furnished, together with a copy of the correspondence. The Earl took the papers, and promised "to allow most honourably of it in the Council." 2

Such is the exact narrative, word for word, as given by Sir John and Edward Norris, in a solemn memorial to the Lords of her Majesty's privy council, as well as to the states-council of the United Provinces. A very few days afterwards Leicester departed for England, taking Edward Norris with him.

Count Hohenlo was furious at the indignity, notwithstanding the politic language in which he had accepted the challenge. "Twas a matter punishable with death, he said, "in all kingdoms and countries, for a simple captain to send such a summons to a man of his station, without consent of the supreme authority. It was plain," he added, "that the English governor-general had connived at the affront, for Norris had been living in his family and dining at his table. Nay, more: Lord Leicester had made him a knight at Flushing just before their voyage to England." 3

1 Edward Norris to Leicester, (the correspondence with Hohenlo enclosed), Nov. 1586. (S. P. Office MS.) Compare Bruce's, *Leyc. Corresp.*, Appendix, 474, 475. Remonstrance of Count Hohenlo to the States-General, 3 Dec. 1587, *apud* Bor, iii. xxiii. 121-129. Reyd, v. 80, 81.

2 E. Norris to the Lords. J. Norris to Leicester. (MSS. before cited.) E. Norris to Leicester, 21 Nov. 1586. (S. P. Office MS.)

3 Remonstrance of Hohenlo, before cited. Hoofd Vervolgh, 209.

1 Edward Norris to the Lords, 28 July, 1587. Sir John Norris to Walsingham, same date. (S. P. Office MSS.) 2 Ibid.

There seems no good reason to doubt the general veracity of the brothers Norris, although, for the express purpose of screening Leicester, Sir John represented at the time to Hohenlo and others that the Earl had not been privy to the transaction. 1 It is very certain, however, that so soon as the general indignation of Hohenlo and his partizans began to be directed against Leicester, he at once denied, in passionate and abusive language, having had any knowledge whatever of Norris's intentions. He protested that he learned, for the first time, of the cartel from information furnished to the council of state.

The quarrel between Hohenlo and Norris was afterwards amicably arranged by Lord Buckhurst, during his embassy to the States, at the express desire of the Queen. Hohenlo and Sir John Norris became very good friends, while the enmity between them and Leicester grew more deadly every day. The Earl was frantic with rage whenever he spoke of the transaction, and denounced Sir John Norris as „a fool, liar, and coward” on all occasions, besides overwhelming his brother, Buckhurst, Wilkes, and every other person who took their part, with a torrent of abuse; and it is well known that the Earl was a master of Billingsgate. 2

„Hollock says that I did procure Edward Norris to send him his cartel,”

1 „For all this I will assure you that I did always, both to the Council, the States, and Count Hollock confidently deny [*i. e.* maintain] that my Lord knew not of it, because they should not for this matter have any advantage against his Lordship.” Sir John Norris to Sir F. Walsingham, before cited.

The two negatives do not here make an affirmative; but it is evident that Leicester made great use of this damaging denial on the part of Norris.

2 J. Norris to Walsingham, 14 March, 1587. Same to same, 3 June, 1587. (S. P. Office MSS.)

„The best is, such tales can no more irritate my Lord's anger against me,” said Sir John; for since he affirmeth that I am a fool, a coward, and a hinderer of all these services, I know not what more he can be provoked to.”

observed Leicester on one occasion, „wherein, I protest before the Lord, I was as ignorant as any man in England. His brother John can tell whether I did not send for him to have committed him for it; but that, in very truth, upon the perusing of it” (after it had been sent), „it was very reasonably written, and I did consider also the great wrong offered him by the Count, and so forbore it. I was so careful for the Count's safety after the brawl between him and Norris, that I charged Sir John, if any harm came to the Count's person by any of his or under him, that he should answer it. Therefore, I take the story to be bred in the bosom of some much like a thief or villain, whatsoever he were.” 1

And all this was doubtless true so far as regarded the Earl's original exertions to prevent the consequences of the quarrel, but did not touch the point of the *second correspondence* preceded by the conversation in the dining-room, eight days before the voyage to England. The affair, in itself of slight importance, would not merit so much comment at this late day had it not been for its endless consequences. The ferocity with which the Earl came to regard every prominent German, Hollander, and Englishman, engaged in the service of the States, sprang very much from the complications of this vulgar brawl. Norris, Hohenlo, Wilkes, Buckhurst, were all denounced to the Queen as calumniators, traitors, and villains; and it may easily be understood how grave and extensive must have been the effects of such vituperation upon the mind of Elizabeth, 2 who, until the last day of his

1 Leicester to Buckhurst, 30 April, 1587. Same to Walsingham, 4 Aug. 1587. (S. P. Office MSS.)

2 *E. g.* „The lies which Lord Buckhurst, Sir J. Norris, and Wilkes, did with their malicious wits and slanderous tongues devise and utter,” wrote Leicester to the Privy Council, „concern my honour and my life. I demand that I, being found clear, and they to have slandered me, may have that remedy

life, doubtless entertained for the Earl the deepest affection of which her nature was susceptible. Hohenlo, with Count Maurice, were the acknowledged chiefs of the anti-English party, and the possibility of cordial co-operation between the countries may be judged of by the entanglement which had thus occurred.

Leicester had always hated Sir John Norris, but he knew that the mother had still much favour with the Queen, and he was therefore the more vehement in his denunciations of the son, the more difficulty he found in entirely destroying his character, and the keener jealousy he felt that any other tongue but his should influence her Majesty. „The story of John Norris about the cartel is, by the Lord God, most false,” he exclaimed; „I do beseech you not to see me so dealt withal, but that especially her Majesty may understand these untruths, who perhaps, by *the mother's fair speeches and the son's smooth words*, may take some other conceit of my doings than I deserve.”<sup>1</sup>

He was most resolute to stamp the character of falsehood upon both the brothers, for he was more malignant towards Sir John than towards any man in the world; not even excepting Wilkes. To the Queen, to the Lords of the Privy Council, to Walsingham, to Burghley, he poured forth endless quantities of venom, enough to destroy the characters of a hundred honest men.

The declaration of the two Norrises for the cartel is most false, as I am a Christian,” he said to Walsingham. „I have a dozen witnesses, as good and some better than they, who will testify against them which is in justice due.” Leicester to the Privy Council, 19 Aug. 1587. (S. P. Office MS.)

<sup>1</sup> Leicester to Burghley, 11 Sept. 1587. (S. P. Office MS.) The meddling Otheman seems to have made himself privately very busy in this affair. He sent Leicester copies of the letters written by the brothers Norris, and declared that he was „enticed by them, in the Earl's absence, to become a forger and liar in this matter, but utterly refused.” MS. last cited.

that they were present when I misliked the writing of the letter before ever I saw it. And by the allegiance I owe to her Majesty, I never knew of the letter, nor gave consent to it, nor heard of it till it was complained of from Count Hollock. But, as they are false in this, so you will find J. N. as false in his other answers; so that he would be ashamed, but that his old conceit hath made him past shame, I fear. His companions in Ireland, as in these countries, report that *Sir John Norris* would often say that *he was but an ass and a fool, who, if a lie would serve his turn, would spare it. I remember I have heard that the Earl of Sussex would say so: and indeed this gentleman doth imitate him in divers things.*”<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Leicester to Walsingham, 12 Aug. 1587. (S. P. Office MS.) To the Lord Treasurer the Earl took pains to narrate the whole story, with much emphasis, and in minute detail, and it is important to lay it before the reader, as an offset to the simple and apparently truthful narrative of Edward Norris, because such intimate revelations indicate to us the really trifling springs of numerous great events. As before observed, the affair in itself is one which history should justly disdain, but it swells into considerable importance, both on account of its extensive results, and from the light which it throws on the character of Leicester, the most important personage, during his lifetime, in the whole kingdom of England.

„Would God,” said Leicester to Burghley „that it had pleased her Majesty to have suffered my Lord Buckhurst and Sir John Norris to have gone on with their plot, for they laid a most malicious plot against me. As for the answer that Sir John Norris and his brother have made touching their acquainting me with the cartel to Count Hollock, thus made now to your Lordship, if ever I knew or heard any news of this cartel, this complaint came to me from the Count, renounce my allegiance and fidelity to my Sovereign Lady. Therefore mark the arrogant boldness of those young fellows that will face a lie of that sort. But I have here Sir William Pelham and Sir William Russell, besides others that were present when I called Sir John to me, and threatened to lay his brother by the heels, and himself too, if I were privy to it. He then besought me to hear his brother and to see the letters, assuring me there was no such cartel as was reported. I commanded him to give me the copy of his letters, and bring it to me. Meanwhile, I was gone to the council, and while



But a very grave disaster to Holland and England was soon the fruit of

we were at council, an hour or two after, Edward Norris sent me his letters, which I took to Wilkes before I did so much as look into them. Being openly read there, we did indeed perceive so direct a cartel as could be made, and diverse of the council made the best of it, and so did I, declaring what the gent. was. Yet did I then declare to them all what order I had taken for Norris, that he should go with me to England, and that her Majesty had also sent for him, protesting to your Lordships, by all faith, honour, and truth, that neither the one nor the other did dare to use those speeches that they have set down; saving that one of the servants of Sir John Norris came to me, hearing that his brother should go over, to know how his credit should be saved with the Count Hollock, touching the disgrace he was in, with such like words. I answered, 'The Count Hollock is now sick and sore, and it were no honesty for Sir John's brother to offer him any quarrel. Besides, I will not suffer it, so long as I am here, and Edward Norris is commanded to go into England. *No doubt the Count will remember his promise, which—as Sir John Norris had told me—was, that when the camp was broken up, he will answer his brother in the field like a gentleman.*' Never was there more—never did any of them tell me of any cartel to be sent—never did any speak with me at Deventer.

Besides, after I was gone, lying on ship-board at Brill, Edward Norris being then in ship with me, there came a messenger from the Count Hollock, with a letter to me, about midnight. This messenger was only to let me know of the Count's having received such letters and brags from Norris, and that now he began to amend, Norris, as he heard, was gone away with me into England. He marvelled much he would do so, and sent his messenger to see if it were so. I answered him, it was so, for the gentleman, Sir Edward Norris, lay there asleep, and he was to go into England by her Majesty's express commandment. For my part, I said, I was willing also to carry him with me, for that I would be loth to leave any occasion behind me of trouble or discord, knowing already some mislike to be between his brother John and the Count. This was my answer. Now, judge how likely these tales be that I would consent that Norris should send a cartel, and yet take him away when he should perform the matter. Either he must show to be a coward, or else, if he were in earnest, he must seem to be angry with me for taking him away. If ever there were other speeches, either by the one Norris or the other, or if ever I knew of his cartel, directly or indirectly, more than your Lordship that was in England, till the complaint came to me of it, I am the falsest wretch that lives. If I had liked of their quarrels or

the hatred borne by Leicester to Sir John Norris. Immediately after the battle of Zutphen and the investment of that town by the English and Netherlanders, great pains were taken to secure the city of Deventer. This was, after Amsterdam and Antwerp, the most important mercantile place in all the Provinces. It was a large prosperous commercial and manufacturing capital, a member of the Hanseatic League, and the great centre of the internal trade of the Netherlands with the Baltic nations. There was a strong Catholic party in the town, and the magistracy were disposed to side with Parma. It was notorious that provisions and munitions were supplied from thence to the beleaguered Zutphen; and Leicester despatched Sir William Pelham, accordingly, to bring the inhabitants to reason. The stout Marshal made short work of it. Taking Sir William Stanley and the greater part of his regiment with him, he caused them, day by day, to steal into the town, in small parties of ten and fifteen. No objection was made to this proceeding on the part of the city-government. Then Stanley himself arrived in the morning, and the marshal in the evening, of the 20th of October. Pelham ordered the magistrates to present themselves

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cartels. there was means enough for me to leave them to their own revenge. I have troubled your Lordship too long with this trifle, but you should know the shameless audacity of these young fellows, whose cunning sly heads you had need look into.' Leicester to Burghley, 12 Aug. 1587. (Br. Mus. Galba, D. I. 240, MS.)

Thus the November letter was not seen by Leicester before it was sent, although he was aware that it was to be sent, and in that circumstance seemed to reside the whole strength of his case. So soon as it appeared that the state-council was angry, and that the Count considered himself outraged, the Earl seems to have taken advantage of a subterfuge, and to have made up by violence what he lacked in argument.

It is difficult to imagine a more paltry affair to occupy the attention of grave statesmen and generals for months, and to fill the archives of kingdom and commonwealth with mountains of correspondence.

forthwith at his lodgings, and told them, with grim courtesy, that the Earl of Leicester excused himself from making them a visit; not being able, for grief at the death of Sir Philip Sidney, to come so soon near the scene of his disaster. His Excellency had therefore sent him to require the town to receive an English garrison. „So make up your minds, and delay not,” said Pelham; „for I have many important affairs on my hands, and must send word to his Excellency at once. To-morrow morning, at eight o'clock, I shall expect your answer.”<sup>1</sup>

Next day, the magistrates were all assembled in the town-house before six. Stanley had filled the great square with his troops, but he found that the burghers—five thousand of whom constituted the municipal militia—had chained the streets and locked the gates. At seven o'clock Pelham proceeded to the town-house, and, followed by his train, made his appearance before the magisterial board. Then there was a knocking at the door, and Sir William Stanley entered, having left a strong guard of soldiers at the entrance to the hall.

„I am come for an answer,” said the Lord Marshal; „tell me straight.” The magistrates hesitated, whispered, and presently one of them slipped away.

„There's one of you gone,” cried the Marshal. „Fetch him straight back; or, by the living God, before whom I stand, there is not one of you shall leave this place with life.”

So the burgomasters sent for the culprit, who returned.

„Now, tell me,” said Pelham, „why you have, this night, chained your streets and kept such strong watch while your friends and defenders were in the town? Do you think we came over here to spend our lives and our goods,

and to leave all we have, to be thus used and thus betrayed by you? Nay, you shall find us trusty to our friends, but as politic as yourselves. Now, then, set your hands to this document,” he proceeded, as he gave them a new list of magistrates, all selected from staunch Protestants.

„Give over your government to the men here nominated. Straight; dally not!”

The burgomasters signed the paper.

„Now,” said Pelham, „let one of you go to the watch, discharge the guard, bid them unarm, and go home to their lodgings.”

A magistrate departed on the errand.

„Now fetch me the keys of the gate,” said Pelham, and that straightway, or before God, you shall die.”

The keys were brought, and handed to the peremptory old Marshal. The old board of magistrates were then clapped into prison, the new ones installed, and Deventer was gained for the English and Protestant party.<sup>1</sup>

There could be no doubt that a city so important and thus fortunately secured was worthy to be well guarded. There could be no doubt either that it would be well to conciliate the rich and influential papists in the place, who, although attached to the ancient religion, were not necessarily disloyal to the republic; but there could be as little that, under the circumstances of this sudden municipal revolution, it would be important to place a garrison of Protestant soldiers there, under the command of a Protestant officer of known fidelity.

To the astonishment of the whole commonwealth, the Earl appointed Sir William Stanley to be governor of the town, and stationed in it a garrison of twelve hundred wild Irishmen.<sup>2</sup>

Sir William was a cadet of one of the noblest English houses. He was the bravest of the brave. His gallantry at

<sup>1</sup> Letter of Henry Archer, from Utrecht, 23 Oct. 1587, in the Appendix to Mr. Bruce's admirably edited volume of *Leycester Correspondence*, 478-480.

<sup>1</sup> Letter of Henry Archer, &c., just cited.  
<sup>2</sup> Reyd, v. 85. J. Norris to Burghley, 21 Jan. 1587. (S. P. Office MS.)

the famous Zutphen fight had attracted admiration, where nearly all had performed wondrous exploits, but he was known to be an ardent Papist and a soldier of fortune, who had fought on various sides, and had even borne arms in the Netherlands under the ferocious Alva. 1 Was it strange that there should be murmurs at the appointment of so dangerous a chief to guard a wavering city which had so recently been secured?

The Irish kerns—and they are described by all contemporaries, English and Flemish, in the same language—were accounted as the wildest and fiercest of barbarians. There was something grotesque, yet appalling, in the pictures painted of these rude, almost naked brigands, who ate raw flesh, spoke no intelligible language, and ranged about the country, burning, slaying, plundering, a terror to the peasantry and a source of constant embarrassment to the more orderly troops in the service of the republic. „It seemed,” said one who had seen them, „that they belonged not to Christendom, but to Brazil.” 2 Moreover, they were all Papists, and, however much one might be disposed to censure that great curse of the age, religious intolerance—which was almost as flagrant in the councils of Queen Elizabeth as in those of Philip—it was certainly a most fatal policy to place such a garrison, at that critical juncture, in the newly-acquired city. Yet Leicester, who had banished Papists from Utrecht without cause and without trial, now placed most notorious Catholics in Deventer. 3

Zutphen, which was still besieged by the English and the patriots, was much crippled by the loss of the great fort, the capture of which, mainly through the brilliant valour of Stanley's brother Edward, has already been related. The

possession of Deventer and of this fort gave the control of the whole north-eastern territory to the patriots; but, as if it were not enough to place Deventer in the hands of Sir William Stanley, Leicester thought proper to confide the government of the fort to Rowland York. Not a worse choice could be made in the whole army.

York was an adventurer of the most audacious and dissolute character. He was a Londoner by birth, one of those „ruffling blades” inveighed against by the governor-general on his first taking command of the forces. A man of desperate courage, a gambler, a professional duellist, a bravo, famous in his time among the „common hacksters and swaggerers” as the first to introduce the custom of foining, or thrusting with the rapier in single combats—whereas before his day it had been customary among the English to fight with sword and shield, and held unmanly to strike below the girdle 1—he had perpetually changed sides in the Netherland wars, with the shameless disregard to principle which characterized all his actions. He had been lieutenant to the infamous John Van Imbyze, and had been concerned with him in the notorious attempt to surrender Dendermonde and Ghent to the enemy, which had cost that traitor his head. York had been thrown into prison at Brussels, but there had been some delay about his execution, and the conquest of the city by Parma saved him from the gibbet. He had then taken service under the Spanish commander-in-chief, and had distinguished himself, as usual, by deeds of extraordinary valour, having sprung on board the burning volcano-ship at the siege of Antwerp. Subsequently returning to England, he had, on Leicester's appointment, obtained the command of a company in the English contingent, and had been con-

1 Reynd, v. 85. J. Norris to Burghley, 21 Jan. 1587. (S. P. Office MS.) 2 Ibid.

3 Reynd, *ubi sup.* Le Petit, ii. xiv. 341. Bor, ii. xxii. 878-879. Wagenaar viii. 196. Meteren, xiv. 250.

1 Camden, iii. 397. Baker's, *Chronicle*, 375.



spicuous on the field of Warnsveld; for the courage which he always displayed under any standard was only equalled by the audacity with which he was ever ready to desert from it. Did it seem credible that the fort of Zutphen should be placed in the hands of Rowland York?

Remonstrances were made by the States-General at once. With regard to Stanley, Leicester maintained that he was, in his opinion, the fittest man to take charge of the whole English army, during his absence in England.<sup>1</sup> In answer to a petition made by the States against the appointment of York, „in respect to his perfidious dealings before,” the Earl replied that he would answer for his fidelity as for his own brother; adding peremptorily—„Do you trust me? Then trust York.”<sup>2</sup>

But, besides his other qualifications for high command, Stanley possessed an inestimable one in Leicester's eyes. He was, or at least had been, an enemy of Sir John Norris. To be this made a Papist pardonable. It was even better than to be a Puritan.

But the Earl did more than to appoint the traitor York and the Papist Stanley to these important posts. On the very day of his departure, and immediately after his final quarrel with Sir John about the Hohenlo cartel, which had renewed all the ancient venom, he signed a secret paper, by which he especially forbade the council of state to interfere with or set aside any appointments to the government of towns or forts, or to revoke any military or naval commissions, without his consent.<sup>3</sup>

Now supreme executive authority had been delegated to the state-council by the Governor-General during his absence. Command in chief over all the English

forces, whether in the Queen's pay or the States' pay, had been conferred upon Norris, while command over the Dutch and German troops belonged to Hohenlo; but, by virtue of the Earl's secret paper, Stanley and York were now made independent of all authority. The evil consequences natural to such a step were not slow in displaying themselves.

Stanley at once manifested great insolence towards Norris. That distinguished general was placed in a most painful position. A post of immense responsibility was confided to him. The honour of England's Queen and of England's soldiers was entrusted to his keeping, at a moment full of danger, and in a country where every hour might bring forth some terrible change; yet he knew himself the mark at which the most powerful man in England was directing all his malice, and that the Queen, who was wax in her great favourite's hands, was even then receiving the most fatal impressions as to his character and conduct. „Well I know,” said he to Burghley, „that the root of the former malice borne me is not withered, but that I must look for like fruits therefrom as before;”<sup>1</sup> and he implored the Lord-Treasurer, that when his honour and reputation should be called in question, he might be allowed to return to England and clear himself. „For myself,” said he, „I have not yet received any commission, although I have attended his Lordship of Leicester to his ship. It is promised to be sent me, and in the mean time I understand that my Lord hath granted separate commissions to Sir William Stanley and Rowland York, exempting them from obeying of me. If this be true, 'tis only done to nourish factions, and to interrupt any better course in our doings than before hath been.” He earnestly requested to be furnished with a com-

<sup>1</sup> Vilkes to Leicester, 24 Jan. 1587. (S. P. Office MS.)

<sup>2</sup> Ibid. Sir John Conway to Walsingham, 28 Jan. 1587. (S. P. Office MS.)

<sup>3</sup> Meteren. xiii. 238. Bor. ii. xxii. 786-787. Wagenaar, viii. 188, 189.

<sup>1</sup> J. Norris to Burghley, 17 Nov. 1587 (S. P. Office MS.)

mission directly from her Majesty. „The enemy is reinforcing,” he added. „We are very weak, our troops are unpaid these three months, and we are grown to our friends.” 1

Honest counsellor Wilkes, who did his best to conciliate all parties, and to do his duty to England and Holland, to Leicester and to Norris, had the strongest sympathy with Sir John. „Truly, besides the value, wisdom, and many other good parts that are in him,” he said, „I have noted wonderful patience and modesty in the man, in bearing many apparent injuries done unto him, which I have known to be countenanced and nourished, contrary to all reason, to disgrace him. Please, therefore, continue your honourable opinion of him in his absence, whatsoever may be maliciously reported to his disadvantage; for I dare avouch, of my own poor skill, that her Majesty hath not a second subject of his place and quality so able to serve in those countries as he. . . . I doubt not but God will move her Majesty in despite of the devil, to respect him as he deserves.” 2

Sir John disclaimed any personal jealousy in regard to Stanley's appointment, but, within a week or two of the Earl's departure, he already felt strong anxiety as to its probable results. „If it prove no hindrance to the service,” he said, „it shall nothing trouble me. I desire that my doings may show what I am; neither will I seek, by indirect means, to calumniate him or any other, but will let them show themselves.” 3

Early in December he informed the Lord-Treasurer that Stanley's own men were boasting that their master acknow-

ledged no superior authority to his own, and that he hath said as much himself to the magistracy of Deventer. The burghers had already complained, through the constituted guardians of their liberties, of his insolence and rapacity, and of the turbulence of his troops, and had appealed to Sir John; but the colonel-general's remonstrances had been received by Sir William with contumely and abuse, and by the vaunt that he had even a greater commission than any he had yet shown. 1

„Three sheep, an ox, and a whole hog,” were required weekly of the peasants for his table, in a time of great scarcity, and it was impossible to satisfy the rapacious appetites of the Irish kerns. 2 The paymaster-general of the English forces was daily appealed to by Stanley for funds—an application which was certainly not unreasonable, as her Majesty's troops had not received any payment for three months—but there „was not a denier in the treasury,” and he was therefore implored to wait. At last the States-General sent him a month's pay for himself and all his troops, although, as he was in the Queen's service, no claim could justly be made upon them. 3

1 Same to Burghley, 12 Dec. 1586. (S. P. Office MS.)

2 Wilkes to Walsingham, 19 Jan. 1587. (S. P. Office MS.)

3 „He is not contented with the entertainment of 40*l.* sterling a month allowed him by the States as governor of the place, but hath taken perforce from the commissioners lately sent thither to deliver a month's pay, an allowance of 10*l.* sterling a month over and besides for every company of his regiment, being, as he sayeth, ten companies, amounting by the muster to 1400 florins (140*l.*), besides a pay for his own company, which is more than is allowed to Sir J. Norris by 300 florins a month, and as much as is given for entertainment to Count Hohenlo, or to any earl that serveth in these countries. He is charged further to take within the country hereabouts, from the poor villagers, weekly, for the provisions of his table, one whole ox, three sheep, and one hog, or, in lieu of the hog, twenty shillings sterling; and if it be not brought every week, they sent the soldiers to take it perforce.” &c. &c. Wilkes

1 J. Norris to Burghley, 17 Nov. 1587. (S. P. Office MS.)

2 Wilkes to Burghley, 17 Nov. 1587. Same to Walsingham, 17 May, 1587. (S. P. Office MSS.)

3 J. Norris to Walsingham, 9 Dec. 1586. (S. P. Office MS.)

Wilkes, also, as English member of the state-council, faithfully conveyed to the governor-general in England the complaints which came up to all the authorities of the republic, against Sir William Stanley's conduct in Deventer. He had seized the keys of the gates, he kept possession of the towers and fortifications, he had meddled with the civil government, he had infringed all their privileges. Yet this was the board of magistrates, expressly set up by Leicester, with the armed hand, by the agency of Marshal Pelham and this very Colonel Stanley—a board of Calvinist magistrates placed but a few weeks before in power to control a city of Catholic tendencies. And here was a papist commander displaying Leicester's commission in their faces, and making it a warrant for dealing with the town as if it were under martial law, and as if he were an officer of the Duke of Parma. It might easily be judged whether such conduct were likely to win the hearts of Netherlanders to Leicester and to England. <sup>1</sup>

„Albeit, for my own part,” said Wilkes, „I do hold Sir William Stanley to be a wise and a discreet gent., yet when I consider that the magistracy is such as was established by your Lordship, and of the religion, and well affected to her Majesty, and that I see how heavily the matter is conceived of here by the States and council, I do fear that all is not well. The very bruit of this doth begin to draw hatred upon our nation. Were it not that I doubt some dangerous issue of this matter, and that I might be justly charged with negligence if I should not advertise you beforehand, I would have forborne to

mention this dissension, for the States are about to write to your Lordship and to her Majesty for reformation in this matter.” <sup>1</sup> He added that he had already written earnestly to Sir William, „hoping to persuade him to carry a mild hand over the people.”

Thus wrote Councillor Wilkes, as in duty bound, to Lord Leicester, so early as the 9th December, and the warning voice of Norris had made itself heard in England quite as soon. Certainly the governor-general, having, upon his own responsibility, and prompted, it would seem, by passion more than reason, made this dangerous appointment, was fortunate in receiving timely and frequent notice of its probable results.

And the conscientious Wilkes wrote most earnestly, as he said he had done, to the turbulent Stanley.

„Good Sir William,” said he, „the magistrates and burgesses of Deventer complain to this council, that you have by violence wrested from them the keys of one of their gates, that you assemble your garrison in arms to terrify them, that you have seized one of their forts, that the Irish soldiers do commit many extortions and exactions upon the inhabitants, that you have imprisoned their burgesses, and do many things against their laws and privileges, so that it is feared the best affected of the inhabitants towards her Majesty will forsake the town. Whether any of these things be true, yourself doth best know, but I do assure you that the apprehension thereof here doth make us and our government hateful. For mine own part, I have always known you for a gentleman of value, wisdom, and judgment, and therefore should hardly believe any such thing.... I earnestly require you to take heed of consequences, and to be careful of the honour of her Majesty and the reputation of our nation. You will consider that the gaining possession of the town grew

to Walsingham, 19 Jan. 1587. (S. P. Office MS.)

This certainly was stronger diet than the „bare cheese” of which Sir William complained. Compare Reynd, vi. 96-97. Bor, ii. xxiii. 878, 879.

<sup>1</sup> Wilkes to Leicester, 9 Dec. 1586. (S. P. Office MS.)

1 Ibid.



by them that are now in office, who being of the religion, and well affected to his Excellency's government, wrought his entry into the same. . . . I know that Lord Leicester is sworn to maintain all the inhabitants of the Provinces in their ancient privileges and customs. I know further that your commission carrieth no authority to warrant you to intermeddle any further than with the government of the soldiers and guard of the town. Well, you may, *in your own concept*, confer some words to authorize you in some larger sort, but, believe me, Sir, they will not warrant you sufficiently to deal any farther than I have said, for I have perused a copy of your commission for that purpose. I know the name itself of a governor of a town is odious to this people, and hath been ever since the remembrance of the Spanish government, and if we, by any lack of foresight, should give the like occasion, *we should make ourselves as odious as they are*, which God forbid.

„You are to consider that we are not come into these countries for their defence only, but for the defence of her Majesty and our own native country, knowing that *the preservation of both dependeth altogether upon the preserving of these*. Wherefore I do oftsoons intreat and require you to forbear to intermeddle any further. If there shall follow any dangerous effect of your proceedings after this my friendly advice, I shall be heartily sorry for your sake, but I shall be able to testify to her Majesty that I have done my duty in admonishing you.” 1

Thus spake the stiff councillor, earnestly and well, in behalf of England's honour and the good name of England's Queen.

But the brave soldier, whose feet were fast sliding into the paths of destruction, replied, in a tone of indig-

nant innocence, more likely to aggravate than to allay suspicion. „Finding,” said Stanley, „that you already threaten, I have gone so far as to scan the terms of my commission, which I doubt not to execute, *according to his Excellency's meaning and mine honour*. First, I assure you that I have maintained justice, and that severely; else hardly would the soldiers have been contented with bread and bare cheese.” 1

He acknowledged possessing himself of the keys of the town, but defended it on the ground of necessity, and of the character of the people, „who thrust out the Spaniards and Amaynes, and afterwards never would obey the Prince and States.” „I would be,” he said, „the sorriest man that lives, if by my negligence the place should be lost. Therefore I thought good to seize the great tower and ports. If I meant evil, I needed no keys, for here is force enough.” 2

With much effrontery, he then affected to rely for evidence of his courteous and equitable conduct towards the citizens, upon the very magistrates who had been petitioning the States-General, the state-council, and the English Queen, against his violence.

„For my courtesy and humanity,” he said, „I refer me unto the magistrates themselves. But I think they sent some *rhetoricians*, who could allege of little grief, and speak pitiful, and truly I find your ears have been as pitiful in so timorously condemning me. I assure you that *her Majesty hath not a better servant than I nor a more faithful in these parts*. This I will prove with my flesh and blood. Although I know there be divers flying reports spread by my enemies, which are come to my ears, I doubt not my virtue and truth will prove them calumniators 3 and men of

1 Stanley to Wilkes, 14 Dec. 1586. (S. P. Office MS.)

2 Ibid.

3 „*Callaminators*,” so Sir William called the men who were speaking the truth about

1 Wilkes to Stanley, 9 Dec. 1586. (S. P. Office MS.)

little. So, good Mr. Wilkes, I pray you, consider gravely, give ear discreetly, and advertise into England soundly. For me, I have been and am your friend, and glad to hear any admonition from one so wise as yourself."

He then alluded ironically to the „good favour and money" with which he had been so contented of late, that if Mr. Wilkes would discharge him of his promise to Lord Leicester, he would take his leave with all his heart. Captain, officers, and soldiers, had been living on half a pound of cheese a day. For himself, he had received but one hundred and twenty pounds in five months, and was living at three pounds by the day. „This my wealth will not long hold out," he observed, „but yet I will never fail of my promise to his Excellency, whatsoever I endure. It is for her Majesty's service and for the love I bear to him."

He bitterly complained of the unwillingness of the country-people to furnish viviers, waggons, and other necessities, for the fort before Zutphen. „Had is not been," he said, „for the travail extraordinary of myself, *and patience of my brother York*, that fort would have been in danger. But, according to *his desire and forethought*, I furnished that place with cavalry and infantry; for I know the troops there be marvellous weak." 1

In reply, Wilkes stated that the complaints had been made „by no *rhetorician*, but by letter from the magistrates themselves (on whom he relied so confidently) to the state-council. The councillor added, rather tartly, that since his honest words of defence and of warning, had been „taken in so scoffing a manner," Sir William might be sure of not being

troubled with any more of his letters. 1

But, a day or two before thus addressing him, he had already enclosed to Leicester very important letters addressed by the council of Gelderland to Count Moeurs, stadholder of the Province, and by him forwarded to the state-council. For there were now very grave rumours concerning the fidelity of „that patient and foreseeing brother York," whom Stanley had been so generously strengthening in Fort Zutphen. The lieutenant of York, a certain Mr. Zouch, had been seen within the city of Zutphen, in close conference with Colonel Tassis, Spanish governor of the place. 2 Moreover there had been a very frequent exchange of courtesies—by which the horrors of war seemed to be much mitigated—between York on the outside and Tassis within. The English commander sent baskets of venison, wild fowl, and other game, which were rare in the market of a besieged town. The Spanish governor responded with baskets of excellent wine and barrels of beer. 3 A very pleasant state of feeling, perhaps, to contemplate—as an advance in civilization over the not very distant days of the Haarlem and Leyden sieges, when barrels of prisoners' heads, cutt off a dozen or two at a time, were the social amenities usually exchanged between Spaniards and Dutchmen—but somewhat suspicious to those who had grown grey in this horrible warfare.

The Irish kernes, too, were allowed to come to mass within the city, and were received there with as much fraternity by the Catholic soldiers of Tassis as the want of any common dialect would allow—a proceeding which seemed better perhaps for the salvation of their

him. (MS. *ubi sup.*) He was more used to handle the sword than the pen, yet the untaught vigour of his style causes an additional regret that a man so brave and so capable should have thrown himself away.

1 Stanley to Wilkes, *ubi sup.*

1 Wilkes to Stanley, 18 Dec. 1586. (S. P. Office MS.)

2 Le Conseil de Gueldres au Comte de Moeurs et Nieuwenae, 14 Dec. 1586. Wilkes to Leicester, 16 Dec. 1586. (S. P. Office MSS.)

3 Hoofd, Vervolgh, 220. Reyd, vi. 95.

souls than for the advancement of the siege. 1

The state-council had written concerning these rumours to Rowland York, but the patient man had replied in a manner which Wilkes characterized as „unfit to have been given to such as were the executors of the Earl of Leicester's authority." The councillor implored the governor-general accordingly to send some speedy direction in this matter, as well to Rowland York as to Sir William Stanley; for he explicitly and earnestly warned him, that those personages would pay no heed to the remonstrances of the state-council. 2

Thus again and again was Leicester—on whole head rested, by his own deliberate act, the whole responsibility—forewarned that some great mischief was impending. There was time enough even then—for it was but the 16th December—to place full powers in the hands of the state-council, of Norris, or of Hohenlo, and secretly and swiftly to secure the suspected persons, and avert the danger. Leicester did nothing. How could he acknowledge his error? How could he manifest confidence in the detested Norris? How appeal to the violent and deeply incensed Hohenlo?

Three weeks more rolled by, and the much-enduring Rowland York was still in confidential correspondence with Leicester and Walsingham, although his social intercourse with the Spanish governor of Zutphen continued to be upon the most liberal and agreeable footing. He was not quite satisfied with the general aspect of the Queen's cause in the Netherlands, and wrote to the Secretary of State in a tone of despondency and mild expostulation. Walsingham would have been less edified by these communications, had he been aware that York, upon *first entering*

*Leicester's service*, had immediately opened a correspondence with the Duke of Parma, and had secretly given him to understand that his *object was to serve the cause of Spain*. This was indeed the fact, as the Duke informed the King, „but then he is such a scatter-brained, reckless dare-devil," said Parma, „that I hardly expected much of him." 1 Thus the astute Sir Francis had been outwitted by the adventurous Rowland, who was perhaps destined also to surpass the anticipations of the Spanish commander-in-chief.

Meantime York informed his English patrons, on the 7th January, that matters were not preceeding so smoothly in the political world as he could wish. He had found „many cross and indirect proceedings," and so, according to Lord Leicester's desire, he sent him a „discourse" on the subject, which he begged Sir Francis to „peruse, add to, or take away from," and then to enclose to the Earl. He hoped he should be forgiven if the style of the production was not quite satisfactory; for, said he, „the place where I am doth too much torment my memory, to call every point to my remembrance." 2

It must, in truth, have been somewhat a hard task upon his memory, to keep freshly in mind every detail of the parallel correspondence which he was carrying on with the Spanish and with the English government. Even a cool head like Rowland's might be forgiven for being occasionally puzzled. „So if there be anything hard to be understood," he observed to Walsingham, „advertise me; and I will make it plain-er." Nothing could be more ingenuous. He confessed, however, to being out of pocket. „Please your honour," said he, „I have taken great pains to make a

1 Wilkes to Stanley, 17 Dec. 1586. MS. strongly remonstrating against the practice. Hoofd, Reyd, *ubi sup.* Wagenaar, viii. 196.

2 Wilkes to Leicester, 16 Dec. 1586. (S. P. Office MS.)

1 Parma to Philip II. 12 Feb. 1587. „Tair liviano y arriscado," &c. (Arch. de Simancas MS.)

2 Rowland York to Walsingham, 7 Jan. 1587. (S. P. Office MS.)



bad place something, and it has cost me all the money I had, and here I can receive nothing but discontentment. I dare *not write you all* lest you should think it impossible," he added—and it is quite probable that even Walsingham would have been astonished, had Rowland written all. The game playing by York and Stanley was not one to which English gentlemen were much addicted.

"I trust the bearer, Edward Stanley, a discreet, brave gentleman," he said, "with details." And the remark proves that the gallant youth who had captured this very Fort Zutphen in so brilliant a manner was not privy to the designs of his brother and of York; for the object of the "discourse" was to deceive the English government.

"I humbly beseech that you will send for me home," concluded Rowland, "for true as I humbled my mind to please her Majesty, your honour, and the dead, I now am I content to humble myself lower to please myself, for now, since his Excellency's departure, there is no form of proceeding neither honourably nor honestly. 2

Three other weeks passed over, weeks of anxiety and dread throughout the republic. Suspicion grew darker than ever, not only as to York and Stanley, but as to all the English commanders, as to the whole English nation. An Anjou plot, a general massacre, was expected by many, yet there were no definite grounds for such dark anticipations. In vain had painstaking, truth-telling Wilkes summoned Stanley to his duty, and called on Leicester, time after time, to interfere. In vain did Sir John Norris, Sir John Conway, the members of the state-council, and all others who should have had authority, do their utmost to avert a catastrophe. Their hands were all tied by the fatal

letter of the 24th November. Most anxiously did all implore the Earl of Leicester to return. Never was a more dangerous moment than this for a country to be left to its fate. Scarcely ever in history was there a more striking exemplification of the need of a man—of an individual—who should embody the powers and wishes, and concentrate in one brain and arm the whole energy of a commonwealth. But there was no such man, for the republic had lost its chief when Orange died. There was much wisdom and patriotism now. Olden-Barneveld was competent, and so was Buys, to direct the councils of the republic, and there were few better soldiers than Norris and Hohenlo to lead her armies against Spain. But the supreme authority had been confided to Leicester. He had not perhaps proved himself extraordinarily qualified for his post, but he *was* the governor-in-chief, and his departure, without resigning his powers, left the commonwealth headless, at a moment when singleness of action was vitally important.

At last, very late in January, one Hugh Overing, a haberdasher from Ludgate Hill, was caught at Rotterdam, on his way to Ireland, with a bundle of letters from Sir William Stanley, and was sent, as a suspicious character, to the state-council at the Hague. 1 On the same day, another Englishman, a small youth, "well-favoured," rejoicing in a "very little red beard, and in very ragged clothes," unknown by name, but ascertained to be in the service of Rowland York and to have been the bearer of letters to Brussels, also passed through Rotterdam. By connivance of the innkeeper, one Joyce, also an Englishman, he succeeded in making his escape. 2 The information contained in the letters thus intercepted was important, but it came too late, even if then the state-council could have acted with-

1 By the dead, he meant Sir Philip Sidney, who had been deceived into a friendly feeling for the adventurer. Meteren, xiv. 250.

2 York to Walsingham. (MS. last cited.)

1 Conway to Walsingham, 28 Jan. 1587. (S. P. Office MS.)

2 Ibid.

out giving mortal offence to Elizabeth and to Leicester.

On the evening of 28th January (N.S.) Sir William Stanley entertained the magistrates of Deventer at a splendid banquet. There was free conversation at table concerning the idle suspicions which had been rife in the Provinces as to his good intentions and the censures which had been cast upon him for the repressive measures which he had thought necessary to adopt for the security of the city. He took that occasion to assure his guests that the Queen of England had not a more loyal subject than himself, nor the Netherlands a more devoted friend. The company expressed themselves fully restored to confidence in his character and purposes, and the burgomasters, having exchanged pledges of faith and friendship with the commandant in flowing goblets, went home comfortably to bed, highly pleased with their noble entertainer and with themselves. 1

Very late that same night, Stanley placed three hundred of his wild Irish in the Noorenbergh tower, a large white structure which commanded the Zutphen gate, and sent bodies of chosen troops to surprise all the burgher-guards at their respective stations. Strong pickets of cavalry were also placed in all the principal thoroughfares of the city. At three o'clock in the following morning he told his officers that he was about to leave Deventer for a few hours, in order to bring in some reinforcements for which he had sent, as he had felt much anxiety for some time past as to the disposition of the burghers. His officers, honest Englishmen, suspecting no evil and having confidence in their chief, saw nothing strange in this proceeding, and Sir William rode deliberately out of Zutphen. After he had been absent an hour or two, the clatter of hoofs and the tramp of infantry was heard without, and pre-

sently the commandant returned, followed by a thousand musketeers and three or four hundred troopers. It was still pitch-dark; but, dimly lighted by torches, small detachments of the fresh troops picked their way through the black narrow streets, while the main body poured at once upon the Brinck, or great square. Here, quietly and swiftly, they were marshalled into order, the cavalry, pikemen, and musketeers, lining all sides of the place, and a chosen band—among whom stood Sir William Stanley, on foot, and an officer of high rank on horseback—occupying the central space immediately in front of the town-house. 1

The drums then beat, and proclamation went forth through the city that all burghers, without any distinction—municipal guards and all—were to repair forthwith to the city-hall, and deposit their arms. As the inhabitants arose from their slumbers, and sallied forth into the streets to inquire the cause of the disturbance, they soon discovered that they had, in some mysterious manner, been entrapped: Wild Irishmen, with uncouth garb, threatening gesture, and unintelligible jargon, stood gibbering at every corner, instead of the comfortable Flemish faces of the familiar burgher-guard. The chief burgomaster, sleeping heavily after Sir William's hospitable banquet, aroused himself at last, and sent a militia-captain to inquire the cause of the unseasonable drum-beat and monstrous proclamation. Day was breaking as the trusty captain made his way to the scene of action. The wan light of a cold, drizzly, January morning showed him the wide, stately square—with its leafless lime-trees and its tall many-storied, gable-ended houses rising dim and spectral through the mist—filled to overflowing with troops, whose uniforms and banners resembled nothing that he

1 Bor, ii. xxii. 878-879. Reyd, vi. 96-97. Strada, ii. 467. Hoofd Vervolgh, 220-221. Le Petit, ii. 341. Wageenaar, viii. 196 *seq.*

remembered in Dutch and English regiments. Fires were lighted at various corners, kettles were boiling, and camp-followers and sutlers were crouching over them, half perished with cold—for it had been raining dismally all night—while burghers, with wives and children, startled from their dreams by the sudden reveillée, stood gaping about, with perplexed faces and despairing gestures. As he approached the town-house—one of those magnificent, many-towered, highly-decorated, municipal palaces of the Netherlands—he found troops all around it; troops guarding the main entrance, troops on the great external staircase leading to the front balcony, and officers, in yellow jerkin and black bandoleer, grouped in the balcony itself.

The Flemish captain stood bewildered, when suddenly the familiar form of Stanley detached itself from the central group and advanced towards him. Taking him by the hand with much urbanity, Sir William led the militia-man through two or three ranks of soldiers, and presented him to the strange officer on horseback. 2

„Colonel Tassis,” said he, „I recommend to you a very particular friend of mine. Let me bespeak your best offices in his behalf.”

„Ah God!” cried the honest burgher, „Tassis! Tassis! Then are we indeed most miserably betrayed.” 3

Even the Spanish colonel, who was of Flemish origin, was affected by the despair of the Netherlander.

„Let those look to the matter of treachery whom it concerns,” said he; „my business here is to serve the King my master.”

„Render unto Cæsar the things which are Cæsar’s, and unto God the things

which are God’s,” said Stanley, with piety. 1

The burgher-captain was then assured that no harm was intended to the city, but that it now belonged to his most Catholic Majesty of Spain—Colonel Stanley, to whom its custody had been entrusted, having freely and deliberately restored it to its lawful owner. He was then bid to go and fetch the burgo-master and magistrates.

Presently they appeared—a dismal group, weeping and woe-begone—the same board of strict Calvinists forcibly placed in office but three months before by Leicester, through the agency of this very Stanley, who had so summarily ejected their popish predecessors, and who only the night before had so handsomely feasted themselves. They came forward, the tears running down their cheeks, crying indeed so piteously that even Stanley began to weep bitterly himself. „I have not done this,” he sobbed, „for power or pelf. Not the hope of reward, but the love of God hath moved me.” 2

Presently some of the ex-magistrates made their appearance, and a party of leading citizens went into a private house with Tassis and Stanley to hear statements and explanations—as if any satisfactory ones were possible.

1 Ibid.

2 „Sir William Stanley did fetch some of the commons and magistrates to come and welcome Taxis. With weeping tears and sad countenances they gave him reverence, sorry to see themselves so betrayed.

„When Sir William Stanley did see the pitiful state and sorrowful hearts of the burghers, God made him have some feeling of his sins. His own conscience, it seemed, accused him, and he *wept with the burghers for company*, protesting with vehement words and oaths that he had done it with no covetous mind for profit, but only for the discharge of his conscience. It is now said he hath and shall have 30,000*l*.” Sir John Conway to Walsingham, 28 Jan. 1587. (S. P. Office MS.)

Compare Reynd, *ubi sup*. Wilkes to Leicester, MS. before cited. Norris to Burghley,

21 Jan. 1587. (S. P. Office MS.)

31

1 „Ongeacht dat ze de gantsche nacht gereyst hadden, in seer quaet en kout weder, ende dat het den selven voormiddags oock regende,” &c. Reynd. vi. 96.

2 Reynd, vi. 96.

3 Ibid.



Sir William, still in a melancholy tone, began to make a speech, through an interpreter, and again to protest that he had not been influenced by love of lucre. But as he stammered and grew incoherent as he approached the point, Tassis suddenly interrupted the conference. „Let us look after our soldiers,” said he, „for they have been marching in the foul weather half the night.” So the Spanish troops, who had been standing patiently to be rained upon after their long march, until the burghers had all deposited their arms in the city-hall, were now billeted on the townspeople. Tassis gave peremptory orders that no injury should be offered to persons or property on pain of death; and, by way of wholesome example, hung several Hibernians the same day who had been detected in plundering the inhabitants. 1

The citizens were, as usual in such cases, offered the choice between embracing the Catholic religion or going into exile, a certain interval being allowed them to wind up their affairs. They were also required to furnish Stanley and his regiment full pay for the whole period of their service since coming to the Provinces, and to Tassis three months' wages for his Spaniards in advance. 2 Stanley offered his troops the privilege of remaining with him in the service of Spain, or of taking their departure unmolested. The Irish troops were quite willing to continue under

their old chieftain, particularly as it was intimated to them that there was an immediate prospect of a brisk campaign in their native island against the tyrant Elizabeth, under the liberating banners of Philip. And certainly, in an age where religion constituted country, these fervent Catholics could scarcely be censured for taking arms against the sovereign who persecuted their religion and themselves. These honest barbarians had broken no oath, violated no trust, had never pretended sympathy with freedom or affection for their Queen. They had fought fiercely under the chief who led them into battle—they had robbed and plundered voraciously as opportunity served, and had been occasionally hanged for their exploits; but Deventer and Fort Zutphen had not been confided to their keeping; and it was a pleasant thought to them, that approaching invasion of Ireland.

„I will ruin the whole country from Holland to Friesland,” said Stanley to Captain Newton, „and then I will play such a game in Ireland as the Queen has never seen the like all the days of her life.” 1

Newton had already been solicited by Rowland York to take service under Parma, and had indignantly declined. Sir Edmund Carey and his men, four hundred in all, refused, to a man, to

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1 „Que le Colonel Stanley lui a proferé, Je me comporterai tellement que le pays jusqu'en Hollande et entre Wezel et Embden seront en tout ruiné dedans six jours; et causerai en Irlande tel jeu de guerre que la Reine n'a vu en sa vie.” Examination of Captain Thomas Newton touching the loss of Deventer, before the Council of State

21 Jan. 1587. (S. P. Office MS.)

31

„That he (Lieutenant John Reeman, in Stanley's service, an earnest man) may deliver to Sir Francis Walsingham some circumstances of the surrendering of Deventer, and what speeches passed from Sir William Stanley touching Ireland, whither he thinks to be sent to work her Majesty some trouble and annoy, if he shall be able.” Sir John Norris to F. Walsingham, 29 Jan. 1587. (S. P. Office MS.)

1 Reynd, *ubi sup.*

2 Wilkes to Leicester, 24 Jan. 1587. (S. P. Office MS.)

„From the market-place Taxis and Stanley went to the town-house, whither the woeful magistrates were called and made to welcome Taxis, and were then required with all expedition to furnish and make ready so much money as should pay all the arrearage due to Stanley and his regiment, sithence their coming into these countries, who had received a month's pay of the States not eight days before he received the enemy into the town. They were also required to furnish and deliver as much more money as might give three months to the troops of the enemy then newly entered.”

take part in the monstrous treason, and were allowed to leave the city. 1 This was the case with all the English officers. Stanley and York were the only gentlemen who on this occasion sullied the honour of England.

Captain Henchman, who had been taken prisoner in a skirmish a few days before the surrender of Deventer, was now brought to that city, and earnestly entreated by Tassis and by Stanley to seize this opportunity of entering the service of Spain.

„You shall have great advancement and preferment,” said Tassis. „His Catholic Majesty has got ready very many ships for Ireland, and *Sir William Stanley is to be general of the expedition.*”

„And you shall choose your own preferment,” said Stanley, „for I know you to be a brave man.”

„I would rather,” replied Henchman, „serve my prince in loyalty as a beggar, than to be known and reported a rich traitor, with breach of conscience.”

„Continue so,” replied Stanley, unabashed; „for this is the very principle of my own enlargement; for, before, I served the devil, and now I am serving God.”

The offers and the arguments of the Spaniard and the renegade were powerless with the blunt captain, and notwithstanding „divers other traitorous alledgements by Sir William for his most vile facts,” as Henchman expressed it, that officer remained in poverty and captivity until such time as he could be exchanged. 2

Stanley subsequently attempted in various ways to defend his character. He had a commission from Leicester, he said, to serve whom he chose—as if the governor-general had contemplated his serving Philip II. with that com-

mission; he had a passport to go whither he liked—as if his passport entitled him to take the city of Deventer along with him; he owed no allegiance to the States; he was discharged from his promise to the Earl; he was his own master; he wanted neither money nor preferment; he had been compelled by his conscience and his duty to God to restore the city to its lawful master, and so on, and so on. 1

But, whether he owed the States allegiance or not, it is certain that he had accepted their money to relieve himself and his troops eight days before his treason. That Leicester had discharged him from his promises to such an extent as to justify his surrendering a town committed to his honour for safe keeping, certainly deserved no answer; that his duty to conscience required him to restore the city argued a somewhat tardy awakening of that monitor in the breast of the man who three months before had wrested the place with the armed hand from men suspected of Catholic inclinations; that his first motive, however, was not the mere love of money, was doubtless true. Attachment to his religion, a desire to atone for his sins against it, the insidious temptings of his evil spirit, York, 2 who was the chief organizer of the conspiracy, and the prospect of gratifying

1 Bor, Reydt, Strada, Hoofd, Vervolgh, Le Petit, Wagenaar, *ubi sup.* Bentivoglio, p. ii. l. v. 312. F. Haraeus Ann. iii. 398. Camden, iii. 397-398.

2 According to Camden, York had persuaded Stanley that he had been accused by the conspirators of being engaged in the Babington plot, and that he was „forthwith to be sent into England, to be hanged.” Haraeus (*ubi sup.*) has a slight allusion to the same effect, but I have found no other intimation of this very improbable suspicion with regard to Sir William. The English historian also states that after the treason Stanley called his troops the Seminary regiment of soldiers, to defend the Romish religion by their swords, as the Seminary priests by their writings. Cardinal Allen praised his deed in his famous book, and excited all others to go and do likewise. Camden, b. iii. 398.

1 Wilkes to Leicester, 24 Jan. (MS. before cited.)

2 Henry Henchman to Walsingham, 22 March, 1587 (S. P. Office MS.), *totidem verbis*.

a wild and wicked ambition—these were the springs that moved him. Sums—varying from 30,000*l.* to a pension of 1500 pistolets a year—were mentioned, as the stipulated price of his treason, by Norris, Wilkes, Conway, and others; 1 but the Duke of Parma, in narrating the whole affair in a private letter to the King, explicitly stated that he had found Stanley „singularly disinterested.”

„The colonel was only actuated by religious motives,” he said, „asking for no reward, except that he might serve in his Majesty’s army thenceforth—and this is worthy to be noted.” 2

At the same time it appears from this correspondence that the Duke recommended, and that the King bestowed, a „merced,” which Stanley did not refuse; 3 and it was very well known that to no persons in the world was Philip apt to be so generous as to men of high rank, Flemish, Walloon, or English, who deserted the cause of his rebellious subjects to serve under his own banners. Yet, strange to relate, almost at the very moment that Stanley was communicating his fatal act of treason, in order that he might open a high career for his ambition, a most brilliant destiny was about to dawn upon him. The Queen had it in contemplation, in recompense for his dis-

tinguished services, and by advice of Leicester, to bestow great honours and titles upon him, and to appoint him Viceroy of Ireland—of that very country which he was now proposing, as an enemy to his sovereign and as the purchased tool of a foreign despot, to invade. 1

Stanley’s subsequent fate was obscure. A price of 3000 florins was put by the States upon his head and upon that of York. 2 He went to Spain, and afterwards returned to the Provinces. He was even reported to have become, through the judgment of God, a lunatic, 3 although the tale wanted confirmation; and it is certain that at the close of the year he had mustered his regiment under Farnese, prepared to join the Duke in the great invasion of England. 4

1 This is stated distinctly by Leicester in his letter to the States-General, on first being informed of the surrender of Deventer:—  
„L’affection et soing qu’ay toujours eu a la conservation de l’estat des provinces unies m’augmentent tant plus de regret qu’ay eu d’entendre la trahison de la ville de Deventer, qu’elle a este forme par la lascheté de celui auquel S. M. eut voulu confier royaumes entiers et lequell elle pensoit annoblir des plus grands titres avecq’ recompenses condignes, pour le promouvoir a la dignité de Vice Roy d’Irlande,” &c. Leicester to the States-General, <sup>2</sup> Feb. 1587. (Hague Archives, MS.)

2 Bor, ii. xxii. 882. Wagenaar, viii. 199.

3 „By letters from Deventer, they write that the traitor Stanley groweth frantic—a just punishment of God—and his men very poor and in misery. The other traitor, York, has been seen of late in Antwerp and Brussels, little regarded, whose determination is to go to Spain or Naples, there to live on his stipend, out of the stir of these wars, fearing that which I hope to God he shall never escape.” Captain Ed. Burnham to Walsingham, 7 March, 1587. (S. P. Office MS.)

„It is bruited that Stanley was now lately become a lunatic, void of government and discretion. . . . If this be true, as he was known for a traitor, so he may be noted for a kool.” Lloyd to Walsingham, 15 Oct. 1587. (S. P. Office MS.)

4 „Among them, Sir William Stanley was the leader of his companies, 800 or 900 men, the most part Irish and Scotch, and the rest English. I heard an Italian captain report that Stanley’s companies were the

1 MS. Letters before cited. Doyley to Walsingham, 25 March, 1587. (S. P. Office MS.)

2 „Que ha sido de nota,” &c. Parma to Philip, 12 Feb. 1587. (Arch. de Sim. MS.)

3 Ibid. Compare Bentivoglio, p. ii. l. v. 312. „Era Cattolico lo Stanley, e mostrò di farlo per zelo principalmente di Religione,” says the Cardinal, „contucciò ne fu premiato largamente dal Rè, e tanto piu, perche egli tirò seco nel medesimo servizio tutti gli Inglesi ch’ eravano in Deventer,” &c. This last statement we have seen to be entirely a mistake.

Compare Strada, ii. 468, 469, who is very emphatic with regard to the purity of Stanley’s motives: „Motum se ad dedendam urbem Stanlaeus adjunxit, non largitionibus, aut honorum titulis, proditorum pretiis; quae quamvis oblata respuerit uti aliena à majorum claritudine, vitaeque suae.” &c. The Jesuit adds, that the Duke warmly adjured his sovereign not to allow such disinterestedness to go unrewarded—and it did not.



Rowland York, who was used to such practices, cheerfully consummated his crime on the same day that witnessed the surrender of Deventer. He rode up to the gates of that city on the morning of the 29th January, inquired quietly whether Tassis was master of the place, and then galloped furiously back the ten miles to his fort. Entering, he called his soldiers together, bade them tear in pieces the colours of England, and follow him into the city of Zutphen. 1 Two companies of States' troops offered resistance, and attempted to hold the place; but they were overpowered by the English and Irish, assisted by a force of Spaniards, who, by a concerted movement, made their appearance from the town. He received a handsome reward, having far surpassed the Duke of Parma's expectations, when he made his original offer of service. He died very suddenly, after a great banquet at Deventer, in the course of the same year, not having succeeded in making his escape into Spain to live at ease on his stipend. It was supposed that he was poisoned; but the charge in those days was a common one, and nobody cared to investigate the subject. His body was subsequently exhumed—when Deventer came into the hands of the patriots—and with impotent and contemptible malice hanged upon a gibbet. This was the end of Rowland York. 2

Parma was highly gratified, as may be imagined, at such successful results. „Thus Fort Zutphen,” said he, „about which there have been so many fisticuffs, and Deventer—which was the real object of the last campaign, and which has cost the English so much blood and money, and is the safety of Groningen best that they make account of.” John Giles to Walsingham, 4 Dec. 1587. (S. P. Office MS.)

1 Wilkes to Leicester, 24 Jan. 1587. (S. P. Office MS.)

2 Bor, Reynd, Hoofd, Wagenaar, Strada, Bentivoglio, Camden, Le Petit, Haraeus, *locis citatis*. Baker's Chronicle, 385. Meteren, xiv. 249-250. MS. Letters already cited.

and of all those Provinces—is now your Majesty's. Moreover, the effect of this treason must be to sow great distrust between the English and the rebels, who will henceforth never know in whom they can confide.” 1

Parma was very right in this conjecture. Moreover, there was just then a fearful run against the States. The castle of Wauw, within a league of Bergen-op-Zoom, which had been entrusted to one Le Marchand, a Frenchman in the service of the republic, was delivered by him to Parma for 16,000 florins. „'Tis a very important post,” said the Duke, „and the money was well laid out.” 2

The loss of the city of Gelder, capital of the Province of the same name, took place in the summer. This town belonged to the jurisdiction of Martin Schenk, and was his chief place of deposit for the large and miscellaneous property acquired by him during his desultory, but most profitable, freebooting career. The famous partisan was then absent, engaged in a lucrative job in the way of his profession. He had made a contract—in a very business-like way—with the States, to defend the city of Rheinberg and all the country round against the Duke of Parma, pledging himself to keep on foot for that purpose an army of 3300 foot and 700 horse. For this extensive and important operation he was to receive 20,000 florins a month from the general exchequer, and in addition he was to be allowed the brandschatz—the black-mail, that is to say—of the whole country-side, and the taxation upon all vessels going up and down the river before Rheinberg; an ad valorem duty, in short, upon all river merchandise, assessed and

1 Parma to Philip II., 12 Feb. 1587. (Arch. de Simancas, MS.)

2 Parma to Philip II., 12 Feb. 1587. (Arch. de Simancas, MS.) Compare Bor, ii. xxii. 878; Strada, ii. 466; Wagenaar, viii. 196; Haraeus, iii. 397, *et mult. all.*

collected in summary fashion. 1 A tariff thus enforced was not likely to be a mild one; and although the States considered that they had got a „good pennyworth” by the job, it was no easy thing to get the better, in a bargain, of the vigilant Martin, who was as thrifty a speculator as he was a desperate fighter. A more accomplished highwayman, artistically and enthusiastically devoted to his pursuit, never lived. Nobody did his work more thoroughly—nobody got himself better paid for his work—and Thomas Wilkes, that excellent man of business, thought the States not likely to make much by their contract. 2 Nevertheless, it was a comfort to know that the work would not be neglected.

Schenk was accordingly absent, jobbing the Rheinberg siege, and in his place one Aristotle Patton, a Scotch colonel in the States’ service, was commandant of Gelders. Now the thrifty Scot had an eye to business too, and was no more troubled with qualms of conscience than Rowland York himself. Moreover he knew himself to be in great danger of losing his place, for Leicester was no friend to him, and intended to supersede him. Patton had also a decided grudge against Martin Schenk, for that truculent personage had recently administered to him a drubbing, which no doubt he had richly deserved. 3 Accordingly, when the Duke of Parma made a secret offer to him of 36,000 florins if he would quietly surrender the city entrusted to him, the colonel jumped at so excellent an opportunity of circumventing Leicester, feeding his grudge against Martin, and making a handsome fortune for himself. He knew his trade too well, however, to accept the offer too eagerly, and bar-

gained awhile for better terms, and to such good purpose, that is was agreed he should have not only the 36,000 florins, but all the horses, arms, plate, furniture, and other moveables in the city belonging to Schenk, that he could lay his hands upon. Here were revenge and solid damages for the unforgotten assault and battery—for Schenk’s property alone made no inconsiderable fortune—and accordingly the city, towards midsummer, was surrendered to the Seigneur d’Haultepenne. 1 Moreover, the excellent Patton had another and a loftier motive. He was in love. He had also a rival. The lady of his thoughts was the widow of Pontus de Noyelle, Seigneur de Bours, who had once saved the citadel of Antwerp, and afterwards sold that city and himself. His rival was no other than the great Seigneur de Champagny, brother of Cardinal Granvelle eminent as soldier, diplomatist, and financier, but now growing old, not in affluent circumstances, and much troubled with the gout. Madame de Bours had, however, accepted his hand, and had fixed the day for the wedding, when the Scotchman, thus suddenly enriched, renewed a previously unsuccessful suit. The widow then, partially keeping her promise, actually celebrated her nuptials on the appointed evening; but, to the surprise of the Provinces, she became not the *haute et puissante dame de Champagny*, but Mrs. Aristotle Patton. 2

For this last treason neither Leicester nor the English were responsible. Patton was not only a Scot, but a follower of Hohenlo, as Leicester loudly protested. 3

1 Ibid. Leicester to Walsingham, 4 July 4 Aug. 1587. Lloyd to Walsingham, 3 July, 1587. (S. P. Office MSS). But Strada states that the plate and other property were reserved to the Spanish government.

2 Baudart, *ubi sup.* Le Petit, ii. 346-347.

3 „It is so that Gelders is lost, given up by Patton, the Scotchman, and commanded thither by the Count Hollock, and hath been wholly at his direction and commandment. Yet for the good nature of Norris and Wil-

1 Wilkes to Leicester, 3 Dec. 1586. (S. P. Office MS.) 2 Ibid.

3 Strada, ii. 500. Baudartii Pelemographia, ii. 90. Compare Wagenaar, viii. 226, who is the authority for the illustrious pagan name of the Scot.

Le Marchant was a Frenchman. But Deventer and Zutphen were places of vital importance, and Stanley an Englishman of highest consideration, one who had been deemed worthy of the command in chief in Leicester's absence. Moreover, a cornet in the service of the Earl's nephew, Sir Robert Sidney, had been seen at Zutphen in conference with Tassis; and the horrible suspicion went abroad that even the illustrious name of Sidney was to be polluted also. <sup>1</sup> This fear was fortunately false, although the cornet was unquestionably a traitor, with whom the enemy had been tampering; but the mere thought that Sir Robert Sidney could betray the trust reposed in him was almost enough to make the still unburied corpse of his brother arise from the dead.

Parma was right when he said that all confidence of the Netherlands in the Englishmen would now be gone, and that the Provinces would begin to doubt their best friends. No fresh treasons followed, but they were expected every day. An organized plot to betray the country was believed in, and a howl of execration swept through the land. The noble deeds of Sidney and Wilmoughby, and Norris and Pelham, and Roger Williams, the honest and valuable services of Wilkes, the generosity and courage of Leicester, were for a season forgotten. The English were denounced in every city and village of the Netherlands as traitors and miscreants. Respectable English merchants went from hostelry to hostelry, and from town to town, and were refused a

lodging for love or money. The nation was put under ban. <sup>1</sup> A most melancholy change from the beginning of the year, when the very men who were now loudest in denunciation, and fiercest in hate, had been the warmest friends of Elizabeth, of England, and of Leicester.

At Hohenlo's table the opinion was loudly expressed, even in the presence of Sir Roger Williams, that it was highly improbable, if a man like Stanley, of such high rank in the kingdom of England, of such great connections and large means, could commit such a treason, that he could do so without the knowledge and consent of her Majesty. <sup>2</sup>

Barneveld, in council of state, declared that Leicester, by his restrictive letter of 24th November, had intended to carry the authority over the republic into England, in order to dispose of everything at his pleasure, in conjunction with the English cabinet-council, and that the country had never been so cheated by the French as it had now been by the English, and that their government had become insupportable. <sup>3</sup>

Councillor Carl Roorda maintained at the table of Elector Truchsess that the country had fallen *de tyrannide in tyrannidem*, and—if they had spurned the oppression of the Spaniards and the French—that it was now time to rebel against the English. Barneveld and Buyt loudly declared that the Provinces were able to protect themselves without foreign assistance, and that it was very injurious to impress a contrary opinion upon the public mind. <sup>4</sup>

kes, so soon as they heard of this, reported to the States that this Patton was a colonel of my preferment, to make the people to hate me," &c. Leicester to Walsingham, 2 July, 1587. (S. P. Office MS.)

It will be perceived that this occurrence has been placed in juxtaposition with similar occurrences in the narrative, although a few months removed from them in chronological sequence.

<sup>1</sup> Examination of Newton. (MS. before cited.) Compare Meteren, xiv. 249-250. Reynd. vi. 97-98.

<sup>1</sup> Wilkes to Hatton, 24 Jan. 1587. Memorial given to Sir Roger Williams, Feb. 1587. Wilkes to the Queen, 16 Feb. 1587. (S. P. Office MSS.)

<sup>2</sup> Abuses offered to her Majesty and his Excellency and the whole English nation by the States and others. April, 1587. (S. P. Office MS.) Sir J. Norris to Walsingham, 26 March, 1587. (S. P. Office MS.) <sup>3</sup> Ibid.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid. Compare Strada, ii. 469; Bentivoglio, p. ii. l. iv. 312-312; Bor, ii. xxii. 883; Wagenaar, viii. 199; *et mult. al.*



The whole college of the States-General came before the state-council, and demanded the name of the man to whom the Earl's restrictive letter had been delivered—that document by which the governor had dared surreptitiously to annul the authority which publicly he had delegated to that body, and thus to deprive it of the power of preventing anticipated crimes. After much colloquy the name of Brackel was given, and, had not the culprit fortunately been absent, his life might have been in danger, for rarely had grave statesmen been so thoroughly infuriated. 1

No language can exaggerate the consequences of this wretched treason. Unfortunately, too, the abject condition to which the English troops had been reduced by the niggardliness of their sovereign was an additional cause of danger. Leicester was gone, and, since her favourite was no longer in the Netherlands, the Queen seemed to forget that there was a single Englishman upon that fatal soil. In *five months not one penny* had been sent to her troops. While the Earl had been there one hundred and forty thousands pounds had been sent in seven or eight months. After his departure not five thousand pounds were sent in one half-year. 2

The English soldiers, who had fought so well in every Flemish battle-field of freedom, had become—such as were left of them—mere famishing, half-naked vagabonds and marauders. Brave soldiers had been changed by their sovereign into brigands, and now the universal odium which suddenly attached itself to the English name converted them into outcasts. Forlorn and crippled creatures swarmed about the Provinces, but were forbidden to come through the towns, and so wandered about, robbing hen-roost and pillaging the

peasantry. 1 Many deserted to the enemy. Many begged their way to England, and even to the very gates of the palace, and exhibited their wounds and their misery before the eyes of that good Queen Bess who claimed to be the mother of her subjects,—and begged for bread in vain. 2

The English cavalry, dwindled now to a body of five hundred, starving and mutinous, made a foray into Holland, rather as highwaymen than soldiers. Count Maurice commanded their instant departure, and Hohenlo swore that if, the order were not instantly obeyed, he would put himself at the head of his troops and cut every man of them to pieces. 3 A most painful and humiliating condition for brave men who had been fighting the battles of their Queen and of the republic, to behold themselves—through the parsimony of the one and the infuriated sentiment of the other—compelled to starve, to rob, or to be massacred by those whom they had left their homes to defend!

At last, honest Wilkes, ever watchful of his duty, succeeded in borrowing eight hundred pounds sterling for two months, by „pawning his own carcase,” as he expressed himself. This gave the troopers about thirty shillings a man, with which relief they became, for a time, contented and well-disposed. 4

1 Wilkes to the Queen, 16 Feb. 1587. Same to Walsingham, 19 Jan. 1587. (S. P. Office MSS.)

2 Memorial (in Burghley's hand) of things to be declared, Nov. 1587. (S. P. Office MS.)

3 Wilkes to Leicester, 12 March, 1587. (MS.)

4 Ibid. „So great is the lack of discipline among the garrisons,” wrote Wilkes, „especially of our nation, that I am ashamed to hear the continual complaints which come to this council against them. And albeit Sir John Norris and I have written often unto the captains and governors to see reformation had of the insolences and disorders of their soldiers within the towns, it is notwithstanding so slenderly respected as there followeth no amendment at all; so as we begin to grow as hateful to the people as the Spaniard himself, who governeth his towns of

1 Wilkes to Leicester, 24 Jan. 1587. (S. P. Office MS.)

2 J. Norris to Walsingham, 25 March, 1587. (S. P. Office MS.)

Is this picture exaggerated? Is it drawn by pencils hostile to the English conquest with a milder hand than we do our friends and allies. The causes hereof we find to be two. The one is for lack of pay, without which it is impossible to preserve discipline among the soldiers; and most of the troops in her Majesty's pay (excepting the garrisons of Brill and Flushing) have not been paid from the beginning of September last, being now about five months. The other is lack of government in the captains and officers, who for the most part are either such as never served before, and have no judgment—no not to rule themselves and such as make their profit of the poor soldiers so extremely as they are hateful to the companies, wherein if there is no redress, it were better her Majesty did revoke all; for, as the case of the common soldier now standeth, the States receive little or no service of them but spoil and ruin of their towns and countries." Wilkes to Walsingham, 19 Jan. 1587. (MS.)

And again he writes to the Queen, about "the weakness and confusion to which her troops are reduced for want of pay, having received nothing from 1 Sept. to that day" (16 Feb.). "The captains of the horsemen," he says, "are all in England, and thereby the most of the companies evil led and governed, committing daily upon the villages and people extreme spoils, insolences, and mischiefs, which, together with the example of the late treasons of Stanley and York, hath drawn our nation into the hatred of this people very deeply, so as they are for the most part turned out of the towns, and refused to be taken into garrison. The horsemen, destitute of money and food, are without order, entered now into Holland (an unfit place for their abode), where the people are risen against them, and they to the number of 500 or 600, in terms either themselves to do mischief, or themselves to be cut in pieces by the country—a case very lamentable to us that feel the grief of so hard a choice, and can find almost no way to prevent the peril. I have urged the States by earnest letters (myself being at this present sick, by God's visitation, to the danger of my life) to take some order to relieve your people in this distress, myself offering my carcase in pawn, to answer as much as they shall eat, after a certain rate. I find them reasonably inclined, yet affected by two impediments—a strange jealousy, by them conceived of all our nation; the other their own want. . . . The confusions are wonderful that are grown in this State in the absence of my Lord of Leicester, which hath opened many gaps to disorders," &c. Wilkes to the Queen, 16 Feb. 1587. (S. P. Office MS.)

And once more he writes, "I saw no remedy for them but to engage myself for some means to feed them until other order might be taken, whereupon with the help of mine

nation or the English Queen? It is her own generals and confidential counsellors who have told a story in all its painful details, which has hardly found a place in other chronicles. The parsimony of the great Queen must ever remain a blemish on her character, and it was never more painfully exhibited than towards her brave soldiers in Flanders in the year 1587. Thomas Wilkes, a man of truth, and a man of accounts, had informed Elizabeth that the expenses of one year's war, since Leicester had been governor-general, had amounted to exactly five hundred and seventy-nine thousand three hundred and sixty pounds and nineteen shillings, of which sum one hundred and forty-six thousand three hundred and eighty-six pounds and eleven shillings had been spent by her Majesty, and the balance had been paid, or was partly owing by the States. These were not agreeable figures, but the figures of honest accountants rarely flatter, and Wilkes was not one of those financiers who have the wish or the gift to make things pleasant. He had transmitted the accounts just as they had been delivered, certified by the treasurers of the States and by the English paymasters, and the Queen was appalled at the sum-totals. She could never proceed with such a war as that, she said, and she declined a loan of sixty thousand pounds which the States requested, besides stoutly refusing to advance her darling Robin a penny to pay off the mortgages upon two-thirds of his estates, on which the equity of redemption was fast expiring, or to give him the slightest help in furnishing him forth anew for the wars.

own credit, and pawn of my own carcase, to repay at the end of two months 800*l.* which I divided among the companies distressed, being eight in number, which extended to thirty shillings a man," &c. Wilkes to Leicester, 12 March, 1587. (S. P. Office MS.)

1 Wilkes to Walsingham, 12 Jan. 1587. Same to Burghley, 12 Jan. 1587. (S. P. Office MSS.)

Yet not one of her statesmen doubted that these Netherland battles were English battles, almost as much as if the fighting-ground had been the Isle of Wight or the coast of Kent, the charts of which the statesmen and generals of Spain were daily conning.

Wilkes, too, while defending Leicester stoutly behind his back, doing his best to explain his shortcomings, lauding his courage and generosity, and advocating his beloved theory of popular sovereignty with much ingenuity and eloquence, had told him the truth to his face. Although assuring him that if he came back soon, he might rule the States „as a schoolmaster doth his boys,”<sup>1</sup> he did not fail to set before him the disastrous effects of his sudden departure and of his protracted absence; he had painted in darkest colours the results of the Deventer treason, he had unveiled the cabals against his authority, he had repeatedly and vehemently implored his return; he had informed the Queen that, notwithstanding some errors of administration, he was much the fittest man to represent her in the Netherlands, and that he could accomplish, by reason of his experience, more in three months than any other man could do in a year. He had done his best to reconcile the feuds which existed between him and important personages in the Netherlands, he had been the author of the complimentary letters sent to him in the name of the States-General—to the great satisfaction of the Queen,—but he had not given up his friendship with Sir John Norris, because he said „the virtues of the man made him as worthy of love as any one living, and because the more he knew him, the more he had cause to affect and to admire him.”<sup>2</sup>

This was the unpardonable offence,

<sup>1</sup> Wilkes to Walsingham 17 Feb. 1587. (S. P. Office MS.)

<sup>2</sup> Ibid. Same to the Queen, 16 Feb. 1587. Same to Walsingham, 17 May, 1587. (S. P. Office MSS.)

and for this, and for having told the truth about the accounts, Leicester denounced Wilkes to the Queen as a traitor and a hypocrite, and threatened repeatedly to take his life. He had even the meanness to prejudice Burghley against him—by insinuating to the Lord-Treasurer that he too had been maligned by Wilkes—and thus most effectually damaged the character of the plain-spoken councillor with the Queen and many of her advisers; notwithstanding that he plaintively besought her to „allow him to reiterate his sorry song, as doth the cuckoo, that she would please not condemn her poor servant unheard.”<sup>1</sup>

Immediate action was taken on the Deventer treason, and on the general relations between the States-General and the English government. Barneveld immediately drew up a severe letter to the Earl of Leicester. On the 2nd February Wilkes came by chance into the assembly of the States-General with the rest of the councillors, and found Barneveld just demanding the public reading of that document. The letter was read. Wilkes then rose and made a few remarks.

„The letter seems rather sharp upon his Excellency,” he observed. „There is not a word in it,” answered Barneveld curtly, „that is not perfectly true:” and with this he cut the matter short, and made a long speech upon other matters which were then before the assembly.

Wilkes, very anxious as to the effect of the letter, both upon public feeling in England and upon his own position as English councillor, waited immediately upon Count Maurice, President van der Myle, and upon Villiers the clergyman, and implored their interposition to prevent the transmission of the epistle. They promised to make an effort to delay its despatch or to mitigate its tone. A fortnight afterwards, how-

<sup>1</sup> Wilkes to the Queen, 8 Feb. 1587. (S. P. Office MS.)



ever, Wilkes learned with dismay that the document (the leading passages of which will be given hereafter) had been sent to its destination. 1

Meantime, a consultation of civilians and of the family council of Count Maurice was held, and it was determined that the Count should assume the title of Prince more formally than he had hitherto done, 2 in order that the actual head of the Nassaus might be superior in rank to Leicester or to any man who could be sent from England. Maurice was also appointed by the States, pro-

1 Wilkes to Walsingham, 17 May. 1587. (S. P. Office MS.)

Compare Wagenaar, viii. 201, who states that the famous 4th of February letter was read and approved by Wilkes. This is an error, as appears in the narrative given in the text from the MS. letterbook of Wilkes.

2 Memorial given by Wilkes to Sir R. Williams, Feb. 1587. (S. P. Office MS.) Compare Le Petit, ii. xiv. 541. Wagenaar, viii. 203-204.

visionally, governor-general, with Hohenlo for his lieutenant-general. 1 That formidable personage, now fully restored to health, made himself very busy in securing towns and garrisons for the party of Holland, and in cashiering all functionaries suspected of English tendencies. Especially he became most intimate with Count Moeurs, stadholder of Utrecht—the hatred of which individual and his wife towards Leicester and the English nation, spicing originally from the unfortunate babble of Otheman, had grown more intense than ever,—„banqueting and feasting” with him all day long, and concocting a scheme, by which, for certain considerations, the province of Utrecht was to be annexed to Holland under the perpetual stadholderate of Prince Maurice.

1 Meteren, xiv. 350. Wagenaar, viii. 204. Reyd, vi. 100.

## CHAPTER XIV.

Leicester in England—Trial of the Queen of Scots—Fearful Perplexity at the English Court—Infatuation and Obstnacy of the Queen—Netherland Envoys in England—Queen's bitter Invective against them—Amazement of the Envoys—They consult with her chief Councillors—Remarks of Burghley and Davison—Fourth of February Letter from the States—Its severe Language towards Leicester—Painful position of the Envoys at Court—Queen's Parsimony towards Leicester.

THE scene shifts for a brief interval to England. Leicester had reached the court late in November. Those „blessed beams,” under whose shade he was wont to find so much „refreshment and nutrition,” had again fallen with full radiance upon him. „Never since I was born,” said he, „did I receive a more gracious welcome.” 1 Alas! there was not so much benignity for the starving English soldiers, nor for the Provinces, which were fast growing desperate; but although their cause was so intimately

connected with the „great cause,” which then occupied Elizabeth, almost to the exclusion of other matter, it was, perhaps, not wonderful, although unfortunate, that for a time the Netherlands should be neglected.

The „daughter of debate” had at last brought herself, it was supposed, within the letter of the law, and now began those odious scenes of hypocrisy on the part of Elizabeth, that frightful comedy—more melancholy even than the solemn tragedy which it preceded and followed—which must ever remain the darkest passage in the history of the Queen. It is unnecessary, in these pages, to make more than a passing allusion to the condemnation and death of the Queen of Scots. Who doubts her participation in the Babington conspiracy? Who doubts that she was the centre of one endless conspiracy by Spain and Rome against the throne and life of Elizabeth? Who doubts that her long

1 Leicester to Wilkes, 4 Dec. 1587. (S. P. Office MS.)

imprisonment in England was a violation of all law, all justice, all humanity? Who doubts that the fining, whipping, torturing, hanging, embowelling of men, women, and children, guilty of no other crime than adhesion to the Catholic faith, had assisted the Pope and Philip, and their band of English, Scotch, and Irish conspirators, to shake Elizabeth's throne and endanger her life? Who doubts that, had the English sovereign been capable of conceiving the great thought of religious toleration, her reign would have been more glorious than it was, the cause of Protestantism and freedom more triumphant, the name of Elizabeth Tudor dearer to human hearts? Who doubts that there were many enlightened and noble spirits among her Protestant subjects who lifted up their voices, over and over again, in parliament and out of it, to denounce that wicked persecution exercised upon their innocent Catholic brethren, which was fast converting loyal Englishmen, against their will, into traitors and conspirators? Yet who doubts that it would have required, at exactly that moment, and in the midst of that crisis, more elevation of soul than could fairly be predicated of any individual, for Elizabeth in 1587 to pardon Mary, or to relax in the severity of her legislation towards English Papists?

Yet, although a display of sublime virtue, such as the world has rarely seen, was not to be expected, it was reasonable to look for honest and royal dealing from a great sovereign brought at last face to face with a great event. The „great cause” demanded a great, straightforward blow. It was obvious, however, that it would be difficult, in the midst of the tragedy and the comedy, for the Netherland business to come fairly before her Majesty. „Touching the Low Country causes,” said Leicester, „very little is done yet, by reason of the continued business we have had about the Queen of Scots’

matters. All the speech I have had with her Majesty hitherto touching those causes hath been but private.”<sup>1</sup> Walsingham, longing for retirement, not only on account of „his infinite grief for the death of Sir Philip Sidney, which hath been the cause,” he said, that I have ever since betaken myself into solitariness, and withdrawn from public affairs,” but also by reason of the perverseness and difficulty manifested in the gravest affairs by the sovereign he so faithfully served, sent information, that, notwithstanding the arrival of some of the States’ deputies, Leicester was persuading her Majesty to proceed first in the great cause. „Certain principal persons, chosen as committees,” he said, „of both Houses are sent as humble suitors to her Majesty, to desire that she would be pleased to give order for the execution of the Scottish Queen. Her Majesty made answer that she was loath to proceed in so violent a course against the said Queen as the taking away of her life, and therefore prayed them to think of some other way which might be for her own and their safety. They replied, no other way but her execution. Her Majesty, though she yielded no answer to his their latter reply, is contented to give order that the proclamation be published, and so also it is hoped that she will be moved by this their earnest instance to proceed to the thorough ending of the cause.”<sup>2</sup>

And so the cause went slowly on to its thorough ending. And when „no other way” could be thought of but to take Mary’s life, and when „no other way” of taking that life could be „devised,” at Elizabeth’s suggestion, except by public execution, when none of the gentlemen „of the association,” nor Paulet nor Drury—how skilfully soever their „pulses had been felt”<sup>3</sup> by Eli-

<sup>1</sup> Ibid. 4 Dec. 1586. (S. P. Office MS.)

<sup>2</sup> Walsingham to Wilkes, 3 Dec. 1586. (S. P. Office MS.)

<sup>3</sup> Davison, in Camden, iii. 393.

zabeth's command—would commit assassination to serve a Queen who was capable of punishing them afterwards for the murder, the great cause came to its inevitable conclusion, and Mary Stuart was executed by command of Elizabeth's order. The world may continue to differ as to the necessity of the execution, but it has long since pronounced a unanimous verdict as to the respective display of royal dignity by the two Queens upon that great occasion.

During this interval the Netherlands matter, almost as vital to England as the execution of Mary, was comparatively neglected. It was not absolutely in abeyance, but the condition of the Queen's mind coloured every state-affair with its tragic hues. Elizabeth, harassed, anxious, dreaming dreams, and enacting a horrible masquerade, was in the worst possible temper to be approached by the envoys. She was furious with the Netherlands for having maltreated her favourite. She was still more furious because their war was costing so much money. Her disposition became so uncertain, her temper so ungovernable, as to drive her counsellors to their wits' ends. Burghley confessed himself „weary of his miserable life,” and protested „that the only desire he had in the world was to be delivered from the ungrateful burthen of service, which her Majesty laid upon him so very heavily.”<sup>1</sup> Walsingham wished himself „well established in Basle.”<sup>2</sup> The Queen set them all together by the ears. She wrangled spitefully over the sum totals from the Netherlands; she worried Leicester, she scolded Burghley for defending Leicester, and Leicester abused Burghley for taking part against him.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Burghley to Leicester, 7 Feb. 1587. (Brit. Mus. Galba, C. xi. 252. MS.)

<sup>2</sup> Walsingham to Wilkes, 3 May, 1587. (S. P. Office MS.)

<sup>3</sup> Burghley to Leicester. (MS. before cited.) „Your Lordship is greatly offended,” said the Lord Treasurer, „for my speeches in

The Lord-Treasurer, overcome with „grief which pierced both his body and his heart,” battled his way—as best he could—through the throng of dangers which beset the path of England in that great crisis. It was most obvious to every statesman in the realm that this was not the time—when the gauntlet had been thrown full in the face of Philip and Sixtus and all Catholicism, by the condemnation of Mary—to leave

her Majesty's presence. What you conceive, my good Lord, is best known to yourself; what I meant is best known to me; and I do avow in the presence of God that I no more meant to offend you in any thing I spoke than I meant to offend the best and dearest friend I can imagine in England. And yet her Majesty many times chargeth me that I conceit, I flatter, I dare not speak anything that you should mislike. I see my hard fortune continueth to be subject to your doubtful opinion, howsoever I do behave myself. . . . You believe me to have moved her Majesty to be offended with you for lack of your procuring a more certainty of the expenses and accounts of the last year's charges on the States' behalf. . . . But I never did say, nor mean to say, that your Lordship ought to be blamed for those accounts; for I did say, and do still say, that their accounts are obscure, confused, and without credit. . . . I say that they ought to have been commanded by your authority to have reformed the same, and made your Lordship more privy to their doings. For not doing so I condemned them, and not your Lordship, who had so often complained that you were not better obeyed by them in those points. And so your Lordship did fully answer my speeches, and I also did affirm the same by often repetition to her Majesty that both in that as in many other things the States had grossly and most rudely encountered your Lordship. And although her Majesty was disposed to leave the cause unrelieved, persisting on her misliking of the accounts, and so to take occasion to deny their requests, yet I trust that your Lordship and the rest did see how earnest I was to draw her Majesty from these reckonings of expenses, and to take regard to the cause which I said and do say may not now be left at random for respect to any charges. I do persist in the opinion that her Majesty may not abandon the cause without manifest injury to her state, as the case and time now forceth her. . . . Your Lordship hath seen and heard her tax me very sharply, that in not applauding to her censures, I do commonly flatter you; and that I do against my conscience hold opinions to please you—a very hard case held against me.”



the Netherland cause „at random,” and these outer bulwarks of her own kingdom insufficiently protected.

Your Majesty will hear, wrote Parma to Philip, „of the disastrous, lamentable, and pitiful end of the poor Queen of Scots.

Although for her it will be immortal glory, and she will be placed among the number of the many martyrs whose blood has been shed in the kingdom of England, and be crowned in heaven with a diadem more precious than the one she wore on earth, nevertheless one cannot repress one's natural emotions. I believe firmly that this cruel deed will be the concluding crime of the many which that Englishwoman has committed, and that our Lord will be pleased that she shall at last receive the chastisement which she has these many long years deserved, and which has been reserved till now for her greater ruin and confusion.”<sup>1</sup>

And with this, the Duke proceeded to discuss the all-important and rapidly preparing invasion of England. Farnese was not the man to be deceived by the affected reluctance of Elizabeth before Mary's scaffold, although he was soon to show that he was himself a master in the science of grimace. For Elizabeth—more than ever disposed to be friends with Spain and Rome, now that war to the knife was made inevitable—was wistfully regarding that trap of negotiation, against which all her best friends were endeavouring to warn her. She was more ill-natured than ever to the Provinces, she turned her back upon the Béarnese, she affronted Henry III. by affecting to believe in the fable of his envoy's complicity in the Stafford conspiracy against her life.<sup>2</sup>

I pray God to open her eyes,” said Walsingham, to see the evident peril of the course she now holdeth . . . If it had pleased her to have followed the advice given her touching the French ambassador, our ships had been released . . . but she has taken a very strange course by writing a very sharp letter unto the French King, which I fear will cause him to give ear to those of the League, and make himself a party with them, seeing so little regard had to him here. Your Lorpship may see that our courage doth greatly increase, for that we make no difficulty to fall out with all the world. . . . I never saw her worse affected to the poor King of Navarre, and yet doth she seek in no sort to yield contentment to the French King. If to offend all the world,” repeated the Secretary bitterly, „be a good cause of government, then can we not do amiss. . . . I never found her less disposed to take a course of prevention of the approaching mischiefs towards this realm than at this present. And, to be plain with you, there is none here that hath either credit or courage to deal effectually with her in any of her great causes.”<sup>1</sup>

Thus distracted by doubts and dangers, at war with her best friends, with herself, and with all the world, was Elizabeth during the dark days and months which preceded and followed the execution of the Scottish Queen. If the great fight was at last to be fought triumphantly through, it was obvious that England was to depend upon Englishmen of all ranks and classes, upon her prudent and far-seeing statesmen, upon her nobles and her adventurers, on her Anglo-Saxon and Anglo-Norman blood ever mounting against oppression, on Howard and Essex, Drake and Williams, Norris and Willoughby, upon highborn magnates, plebeian cap-

<sup>1</sup> Parma to Philip II., 22 March, 1587. Arch. de Simancas, MS.)

<sup>2</sup> Declaration of the Negotiations with the French Ambassador, l'Aubespine, at the Lord-Treasurer's house, 12 Jan. 1587, in Murdin, 579-583. Compare Mignet, *Hist. de Marie Stuart*, 3rd edition, ii. 344 seq.

<sup>1</sup> Walsingham to Leicester, 8 April 1587. Same to same, 10 April, 1587. (Brit. Mus. Galba, C. xi. 319-321 MSS.)

tains, London merchants, upon yeomen whose limbs were made in England, and upon Hollanders and Zeelanders whose fearless mariners were to swarm to the protection of her coasts, quite as much in that year of anxious expectation as upon the great Queen herself. Unquestionable as were her mental capacity and her more than woman's courage, when fairly brought face to face with the danger, it was fortunately not on one man or woman's brain and arm that Engeland's salvation depended in that crisis of her fate.

As to the Provinces, no one ventured to speak very boldly in their defence. „When I lay before her the peril,” said Walsingham, „she scorneth at it. The hope of a peace with Spain has put her into a most dangerous security.”<sup>1</sup> Nor would any man now assume responsibility. The fate of Davison—of the man who had already in so detestable a manner been made the scapegoat for Leicester's sins in the Netherlands, and who had now been so barbarously sacrificed by the Queen for faithfully obeying her orders in regard to the death-warrant, had sickened all courtiers and counsellors for the time. „The late severe dealing used by her Highness towards Mr. Secretary Davison,” said Walsingham to Wilkes, „maketh us very circumspect and careful not to proceed in anything but wherein we receive direction from herself, and therefore you must not find it strange if we now be more sparing than heretofore hath been accustomed.”<sup>2</sup>

Such being the portentous state of the political atmosphere, and such the stormy condition of the royal mind, 28 Jan. (O. S.) it may be supposed that 7 Feb. (N. S.) the interviews of the Netherland envoys with her Majesty during this period were not likely to be genial.

<sup>1</sup> Walsingham to Leicester, &c. MS. last cited.

<sup>2</sup> Walsingham to Wilkes, 13 April, 1587. (S. P. Office MS.)

Exactly at the most gloomy moment—thirteen days before the execution of Mary—they came first into Elizabeth's presence at Greenwich<sup>1</sup>

The envoys were five in number, all of them experienced and able statesmen—Zuylen van Nyvelt, Joos de Menyn, Nicasius de Silla, Jacob Valck, and Vitus van Kamminga.<sup>2</sup> The Queen was in the privy council-chamber, attended by the admiral of England, Lord Thomas Howard, Lord Hunsdon, great chamberlain, Sir Christopher Hatton, vice-chamberlain, Secretary Davison, and many other persons of distinction.

The letters of credence were duly presented, but it was obvious from the beginning of the interview that the Queen was ill-disposed towards the deputies, and had not only been misinformed as to matters of fact, but as to the state of feeling of the Netherlanders and of the States-General towards herself.<sup>3</sup>

Menyn, however, who was an orator by profession—being pensionary of Dort—made, in the name of his colleagues, a brief but pregnant speech, to which the Queen listened attentively, although with frequent indications of anger and impatience. He commenced by observing that the United Provinces still entertained the hope that her Majesty would conclude, upon further thoughts, to accept the sovereignty over them, with *reasonable conditions*; but the most important passages of his address were those relating to the cost of the war. „Besides our stipulated contributions,” said the pensionary, „of 200,000 florins the month, we have furnished 500,000 as an extraordinary grant, making for

<sup>1</sup> Brief van de Gedeputeerden uit England.

<sup>2</sup> 9 Feb. 1587. (Hague Arch., MS.) Compare, Bor. ii. xxii. 872 seq. Wagenaar, viii. 214 seq.

<sup>3</sup> 2 Menyn was pensionary of Dort; Silla, pensionary of Amsterdam; Valck, member of the state-council. Wagenaar, viii. 192.

<sup>3</sup> Letter of the Deputies last cited. (Hague Archives, MS.)

the year 2,900,000 florins, and this over and above the particular and special expenditures of the Provinces, and other sums for military purposes. We confess, Madam, that the succour of your Majesty is a truly royal one, and that there have been few princes in history who have given such assistance to their neighbours unjustly oppressed. It is certain that by means of that help, joined with the forces of the United Provinces, the Earl of Leicester has been able to arrest the course of the Duke of Parma's victories and to counteract his designs. Nevertheless, it appears, Madam, that these forces have not been sufficient to drive the enemy out of the country. We are obliged, for regular garrison-work and defence of cities, to keep up an army of at least 27,000 foot and 3500 horse. Of this number your Majesty pays 5000 foot and 1000 horse, and we are now commissioned, Madam, humbly to request an increase of your regular succour during the war to 10,000 foot and 2000 horse. We also implore the loan of 60,000*l.* sterling, in order to assist us in maintaining for the coming season a sufficient force in the field." 1

Such, in brief, was the oration of pensionary Menyn, delivered in the French language. He had scarcely concluded, when the Queen—evidently in a great passion 2—rose to her feet, and, without any hesitation, replied in a strain of vehement eloquence in the same tongue.

„Now I am not deceived, gentlemen," she said, „and that which I have been fearing has occurred. Our common adage, which we have in England, is a very good one. When one fears that an evil is coming, the sooner it arrives the better. Here is a quarter of a year that I have been expecting you, and certainly, for the great benefit I have conferred on you, you have exhibited a

great ingratitude, and I consider myself very ill treated by you. 'Tis very strange that you should begin by soliciting still greater succour without rendering me any satisfaction for your past actions, which have been so extraordinary, that I swear by the living God I think it impossible to find peoples or states more ungrateful or ill-advised than yourselves.

I have sent you this year fifteen, sixteen, aye seventeen or eighteen thousand men. You have left them without payment, you have let some of them die of hunger, driven others to such desperation that they have deserted to the enemy. Is it not mortifying for the English nation and a great shame for you that Englishmen should say that they have found more courtesy from Spaniards than from Netherlanders? Truly, I tell you frankly that I will never endure such indignities, Rather will I act according to my will, and you may do exactly as you think best.

„If I chose, I could do something very good without you, although some persons are so fond of saying that it was quite necessary for the Queen of England to do what she does for her own protection. No, no! Disabuse yourselves of that impression. These are but false persuasions. Believe boldly that I can play an excellent game without your assistance, and a better one than I ever did with it. 1 Nevertheless, I do not choose to do that, nor do I wish you so much harm. But likewise do I not choose that you should hold such language to me. It is true that I should not wish the Spaniard so near me if he should be my enemy. But why should I not live in peace, if we were to be friends to each other? At the commencement of my reign we lived honourably together, the King of Spain and I, and he even asked me to marry him, and,

1 „Que je ferois bien un bon parti sans vous y appeller, et meilleur que je nay fait oncques avecq vous." Reponse de Sa Majesté au Discours de Sr. de Menin. (Hague Archives, MS.)

1 Discours de Menin—Audience at Greenwich. (Hague Arch. MS.)

2 „Zeer gealterceert" MS. Letter, *ubi sup.*



after that, we lived a long time very peacefully, without any attempt having been made against my life. If we both choose, we can continue so to do.

„On the other hand, I sent you the Earl of Leicester, as lieutenant of my forces, and my intention was that he should have exact knowledge of your finances and contributions. But, on the contrary, he has never known anything about them, and you have handled them in your own manner and amongst yourselves. You have given him the title of governor, in order, under this name, to cast all your evils on his head. That title he accepted against my will, by doing which he ran the risk of *losing his life*, and his estates, and the grace and favour of his Princess, which was more important to him than all. But he did it in order to maintain your tottering state. And what authority, I pray you, have you given him? A shadowy authority, a purely imaginary one. This is but mockery. He is, at any rate, a gentleman, a man of honour and of counsel. You had no right to treat him thus. If I had accepted the title which you wished to give me, by the living God, I would not have suffered you so to treat me.

„But you are so badly advised that when there is a man of worth who discovers your tricks you wish him ill, and make an outcry against him; and yet some of you, in order to save your money, and others in the hope of bribes, have been favouring the Spaniard, and doing very wicked work. No; believe me that God will punish those who for so great a benefit wish to return me so much evil. Believe, boldly too, that the King of Spain will never trust men who have abandoned the party to which they belonged, and from which they have received so many benefits, and will never believe a word of what they promise him. Yet, in order to cover up their filth, they spread the story that the Queen of England is thinking of

treating for peace without their knowledge. No, I would rather be dead than that any one should have occasion to say that I had not kept my promise. But princes must listen to both sides, and that can be done without breach of faith. 1 For they transact business in a certain way, and with a princely intelligence, such as private persons cannot imitate. 2

„You are States, to be sure, but private individuals in regard to princes. Certainly, I would never choose to do anything without your knowledge, and I would never allow the authority which you have among yourselves, nor your privileges, nor your statutes, to be infringed. Nor will I allow you to be perturbed in your consciences. What, then, would you more of me? You have issued a proclamation in your country that no one is to talk of peace. Very well, very good. But permit princes likewise to do as they shall think best for the security of their state, provided it does you no injury. Among us princes we are not wont to make such long orations as you do, but you ought to be content with the few words that we bestow upon you, and make yourself quiet thereby. 3

„If I ever do anything for you again, I choose to be treated more honourably. I shall therefore appoint some personages of my council to communicate with you. And in the first place I choose to hear and see for myself what has taken place already, and have satisfaction about that. before I make any reply to what you

1 „Et encores que les princes oyent aucunes fois l'ung et l'autre, cela se peult faire sans. . . .” There is a broken sentence here in the original which seems to require a phrase similar to the one which I have supplied. „Reponse,” &c., just cited.

2 „Car ils besoignent avecq une maniere de faire et intelligence des princes, ce que les particuliers ne scauroient faire.” Ibid.

3 „Entre nous princes nous se scavon ainsi orer comme vous faictes, mais vous devriez estre contentz avecq ce peu de paroles qu'on vous dict, et vous asseurer dessus.” „Reponse,” &c., just cited.

have said to me as to greater assistance. And so I will leave you to-day, without troubling you further." 1

With this her Majesty swept from the apartment, leaving the deputies somewhat astounded at the fierce but adroit manner in which the tables had for a moment been turned upon them.

It was certainly a most unexpected blow, this charge of the States having left the English soldiers—whose numbers the Queen had so suddenly multiplied by three—unpaid and unfed. Those Englishmen who, as individuals, had entered the States' service had been—like all the other troops—regularly paid. This distinctly appeared from the statements of her own counsellors and generals. 2 On the other hand, the Queen's contingent, now dwindled to about half their original number, had been notoriously unpaid for nearly six months.

This has already been made sufficiently clear from the private letters of most responsible persons. That these soldiers were starving, deserting, and pillaging, was, alas! too true; but the envoys of the States hardly expected to be censured by her Majesty because she had neglected to pay her own troops. It was one of the points concerning which they had been especially enjoined to complain, that the English cavalry, converted into highwaymen by want of pay, had been plundering the peasantry, 3 and we have

seen that Thomas Wilkes had „pawnd his carcass" to provide for their temporary relief.

With regard to the insinuation that prominent personages in the country had been tampered with by the enemy, the envoys were equally astonished by such an attack. The great Deventer treason had not yet been heard of in England—for it had occurred only a week before this first interview—but something of the kind was already feared; for the slippery dealings of York and Stanley with Tassis and Parma had long been causing painful anxiety, and had formed the subject of repeated remonstrances on the part of the States to Leicester and to the Queen. The deputies were hardly prepared therefore to defend their own people against dealing privately with the King of Spain. The only man suspected of such practices was Leicester's own favourite and financier, Jacques Ringault, whom the Earl had persisted in employing against the angry remonstrances of the States, who believed him to be a Spanish spy; and the man was now in prison, and threatened with capital punishment.

To suppose that Buys or Barneveld, Roorda, Meetkerk, or any other leading statesman in the Netherlands, was contemplating a private arrangement with Philip II., was as ludicrous a conception as to imagine Walsingham a pensioner of the Pope, or Cecil in league with the Duke of Guise. The end and aim of the States' party was war. In war they not only saw the safety of the reformed religion, but the only means of maintaining the commercial prosperity of the commonwealth. The whole correspondence of the times shows that no politician in the country dreamed of peace, either by public or secret nego-

1 Ibid. Compare Bor. ii. xii. 873-874. Wagenaar, viii. 193-194.

2 Memorial given by Wilkes to Sir. R. Williams, Feb. 1587. (S. P. Office MS.)

3 „Les compagnies anglaises," wrote the States-General to Leicester, „tant de cheval que de pied à la charge de S. Majesté, ayans delaisé les frontières se sont jectez en Hollande, ou ils foulent et mangent le bon homme soubz pretexte qu'ils disent n'avoir reçu aucun payment en cinq mois, ce que cause grande alteration pardeus l'amoin-drissement des contributions du Plat Pays. Et comme ils tiennent journellement plusieurs propos estranges contre la dite province d'Hollande, et qu'ils y veulent pourchasser leur payement, a esté trouvé bon de less faire contenir on ils sont," &c. States-Gene-

ral to Leicester, 1 March, 1587. (Hague Archives, MS.)

The statement of Wilkes to his government, of like import, have been given in the notes on preceding pages.

tiation. On the other hand—as will be made still clearer than ever—the Queen was longing for peace, and was treating for peace at that moment through private agents, quite without the knowledge of the States, and in spite of her indignant disavowals in her speech to the envoys.

Yet if Elizabeth could have had the privilege of entering—as we are about to do—into the private cabinet of that excellent King of Spain, with whom she had once been such good friends, who had even sought her hand in marriage, and with whom she saw no reason whatever why she should not live at peace, she might have modified her expressions on this subject. Certainly, if she could have looked through the piles of papers—as we intend to do—which lay upon that library-table, far beyond the seas and mountains, she would have perceived some objections to the scheme of living at peace with that diligent letter-writer.

Perhaps, had she known how the subtle Farnese was about to express himself concerning the fast-approaching execution of Mary, and the as inevitably impending destruction of „that Englishwoman” through the schemes of his master and himself, she would have paid less heed to the sentiments couched in most exquisite Italian which Alexander was at the same time whispering in her ear, and would have taken less offence at the blunt language of the States-General.

Nevertheless, for the present, Elizabeth would give no better answer than the hot-tempered one which had already somewhat discomfited the deputies.

Two days afterwards, the five envoys had an interview with several members of her Majesty's council, in the private apartment of the Lord-Treasurer in Greenwich Palace. Burghley, being indisposed, was lying upon his bed, Leicester, Admiral Lord Howard, Lord Hunsdon, Sir Christopher Hatton, Lord

Buckhurst, and Secretary Davison, were present, and the Lord-Treasurer proposed that the conversation should be in Latin, that being the common language most familiar to them all. <sup>1</sup> Then, turning over the leaves of the report, a copy of which lay on his bed, he asked the envoys, whether, in case her Majesty had not sent over the assistance which she had done under the Earl of Leicester, their country would not have been utterly ruined.

„To all appearance, yes,” replied Menyn.

„But,” continued Burghley, still running through the pages of the document, and here and there demanding an explanation of an obscure passage or two, „you are now proposing to her Majesty to send 10,000 foot and 2000 horse, and to lend 60,000*l*. This is altogether monstrous and excessive. *Nobody will ever dare even to speak to her Majesty on the subject.* When you first came in 1585, you asked for 12,000 men, but you were fully authorized to accept 6000. No doubt that is the case now.” <sup>2</sup>

„On that occasion,” answered Menyn, „our main purpose was to induce her Majesty to accept the sovereignty, or at least the perpetual protection of our country. Failing in that, we broached the third point, and not being able to get 12,000 soldiers we compounded for 5000, the agreement being subject to ratification by our principals. We gave ample security in shape of the mortgages on cities. But experience has shown us that these forces and this succour are insufficient. We have therefore been sent to beg her Majesty to make up the contingent to the amount originally requested.”

„But we are obliged to increase th

<sup>1</sup> Rapport de la Légation. Conference de Députés avec les Commissaires de S. M.

<sup>7</sup> Feb. 1587. (Hague Archives, MS.)

<sup>17</sup> <sup>2</sup> Ibid.



garrisons in the cautionary towns," said one of the English councillors, „as 800 men in a city like Flushing are very little."

„Pardon me," replied Valck, „the burghers are not enemies but friends to her Majesty and, to the English nation. They are her dutiful subjects, like all the inhabitants of the Netherlands."

„It is quite true, said Burghley, after having made some critical remarks upon the military system of the Provinces, „and a very common adage, *quod tunc tua reis agitur, paries cum proximus ardet*, but, nevertheless, this war principally concerns you. Therefore you are bound to do your utmost to meet its expenses in your own country, quite as much as a man who means to build a house is expected to provide the stone and timber himself. But the States have not done their best. They have not at the appointed time come forward with their extraordinary contributions for the last campaign. „How many men," he asked, „are required for garrisons in all the fortresses and cities, and for the field?"

„But," interposed Lord Hunsdon, „not half so many men are needed in the garrisons; for the burghers ought to be able to defend their own cities. Moreover it is probable that your ordinary contributions might be continued and doubled, and even tripled." 1

„And on the whole," observed the Lord Admiral, „don't you think that *the putting an army in the field* might be dispensed with for this year? Her Majesty at present must get together and equip a fleet of war-vessels against the King of Spain, which will be an excessively large pennyworth, besides the assistance which she gives her neighbours."

„Yes, indeed," said Secretary Davison, „it would be difficult to exaggerate the enormous expense which her Majesty must encounter this year for

defending and liberating her own kingdoms against the King of Spain. That monarch is making great naval preparations, and is treating all Englishmen in the most hostile manner. We are on the brink of declared war with Spain, with the French King, who is arresting all English persons and property within his kingdom, and with Scotland, all which countries are understood to have made a league together *on account of the Queen of Scotland, whom it will be absolutely necessary to put to death in order to preserve the life of her Majesty*, and are about to make war upon England. This matter, then, will cost us, the current year, at least eight hundred thousand pounds sterling. Nevertheless her Majesty is sure to assist you so far as her means allow; and I, for my part, will do my best to keep her Majesty well disposed to your cause, even as I have ever done, as you well know." 1

Thus spoke poor Davison, but a few days before the fatal 8th of February, little dreaming that the day for his influencing the disposition of her Majesty would soon be gone, and that he was himself to be crushed for ever by the blow which was about to destroy the captive Queen. The political combinations resulting from the tragedy were not to be exactly as he foretold, but there is little doubt that in him the Netherlands, and Leicester, and the Queen of England, were to lose an honest, diligent, and faithful friend.

„Well, gentlemen," said the Lord-Treasurer, after a few more questions concerning the financial abilities of the States had been asked and answered, „it is getting late into the evening, and time for you all to get back to London. Let me request you, as soon as may be, to draw up some articles in writing, to which we will respond immediately. 2

Menyn then, in the name of the

1 MS. Report last cited.

1 Ibid.

2 Ibid.

deputies, expressed thanks for the urbanity shown them in the conference, and spoke of the deep regret with which they had perceived, by her Majesty's answer two days before, that she was so highly offended with them and with the States-General. He then, notwithstanding Burghley's previous hint as to the lateness of the hour, took up the Queen's answer, point by point, contradicted all its statements, appealing frequently to Lord Leicester for confirmation of what he advanced, and concluded by begging the councillors to defend the cause of the Netherlands to her Majesty. Burghley requested them to make an excuse or reply to the Queen in writing, and send it to him to present. 1

Thus the conference terminated, and the envoys returned to London. They were fully convinced by the results of these interviews, as they told their constituents, that her Majesty, by false statements and reports of persons either grossly ignorant or not having the good of the commonwealth before their eyes, had been very incorrectly informed as to the condition of the Provinces, and of the great efforts made by the States-General to defend their country against the enemy. It was obvious, they said, that their resources had been exaggerated in order to deceive the Queen and her council. 2

And thus statements and counter-statements, protocols and apostilles, were glibly exchanged, the heap of diplomatic rubbish was rising higher and higher, and the councillors and envoys, pleased with their work, were growing more and more amicable, when the court was suddenly startled by the news of the Deventer and Zutphen treason. The intelligence was accompanied by the famous 4th of February letter, which

descended like a bombshell in the midst of the decorous council-chamber. Such language had rarely been addressed to the Earl of Leicester, and, through him, to the imperious sovereign herself, as the homely truths with which Barneveld, speaking with the voice of the States-General, now smote the delinquent governor.

„My lord,” said he, „it is notorious, and needs no illustration whatever, with what true confidence and unfeigned affection we received your Excellency in our land; the States-General, the States-Provincial, the magistrates, and the communities of the chief cities in the United Provinces, all uniting to do honour to her serene Majesty of England and to yourself, and to confer upon you the government-general over us. And although we should willingly have placed some limitations upon the authority thus bestowed on you, in order that by such a course your own honour and the good and constitutional condition of the country might be alike preserved, yet, finding your Excellency not satisfied with those limitations, we postponed every objection, and conformed ourselves to your pleasure. Yet, before coming to that decision, we had well considered that by doing so we might be opening a door to many ambitious, avaricious, and pernicious persons, both of these countries and from other nations, who might seize the occasion to advance their own private profits, to the detriment of the country and the dishonour of your Excellency.

„And in truth, such persons have done their work so efficiently as to inspire you with distrust against the most faithful and capable men in the Provinces, against the Estates General and Provincial, magistrates, and private persons, knowing very well that they could never arrive at their own ends so long as you were guided by the constitutional authorities of the country. And precisely upon the distrust, thus

1 MS. Report last cited. Compare Bor, ii. xxii. 875-877 *seq.*

2 MS. Report,  $\frac{9}{19}$  Feb. 1587, before cited.

created as a foundation, they raised a back-stairs council, by means of which they were able to further their ambitious, avaricious, and seditious practices, notwithstanding the good advice and remonstrances of the council of state, and the States General and Provincial. 1

He proceeded to handle the subjects to the English rose-noble, put in circulation by Leicester's finance or back-stairs council at two florins above its value, to the manifest detriment of the Provinces, to the detestable embargo which had prevented them from using the means bestowed upon them by God himself to defend their country, to the squandering and embezzlement of the large sums contributed by the Provinces and entrusted to the Earl's administration, to the starving condition of the soldiers, maltreated by government, and thus compelled to prey upon the inhabitants—so that troops in the States' service had never been so abused during the whole war, although the States had never before voted such large contributions nor paid them so promptly,—to the placing in posts of high honour and trust men of notoriously bad character and even Spanish spies; to the taking away the public authority from those to whom it legitimately belonged, and conferring it on incompetent and unqualified persons; to the illegal banishment of respectable citizens, to the violation of time-honoured laws and privileges, to the shameful attempts to repudiate the ancient authority of the States, and to usurp a control over the communities and nobles by them represented, and to the perpetual efforts to foster dissension, disunion, and rebellion among the inhabitants. Having thus drawn up a heavy bill of indictment, nominally against the Earl's illegal counsellors, but in reality against the Earl himself,

he proceeded to deal with the most important matter of all.

„The principal cities and fortresses in the country have been placed in hands of men suspected by the States on legitimate grounds, men who had been convicted of treason against these Provinces, and who continued to be suspected, notwithstanding that your Excellency had pledged your own honour for their fidelity. Finally, by means of these scoundrels, 1 it was brought to pass, that—the council of state having been invested by your Excellency with supreme authority during your absence—a secret document was brought to light after your departure, by which the most substantial matters, and those most vital to the defence of the country, were withdrawn from the disposition of that council. And now, alas, we see the effects of these practices!

„Sir William Stanley, by you appointed governor of Deventer, and Rowland York, governor of Fort Zutphen, have refused, by virtue of that secret document, to acknowledge any authority in this country. And notwithstanding that since your departure they and their soldiers have been supported at our expense, and had just received a full month's pay from the States, they have traitorously and villanously delivered the city and the fortress to the enemy, with a declaration made by Stanley that he did the deed to ease his conscience, and to render to the King of Spain the city which of right was belonging to him. And this is a crime so dishonourable, scandalous, ruinous, and treasonable, as that, during this whole war, we have never seen the like. And we are now in daily fear lest the English commanders in Bergen-op-Zoom, Ostend, and other cities, should commit the same crime. And although we fully suspected the designs of Stanley and York, yet your Excellency's secret do-

1 Lettre des Etats à Leycester, 4 Feb. 1587. (Hague Archives, MS.) Compare Bor. ii. xxii. 944 seq. Wagenaar, viii. 202. Le Petit, ii. liv. 511.

1 „Gibier." MS. letter last cited.



current had deprived us of the power to act.

„We doubt not that her Majesty and your Excellency will think this strange language. But we can assure you, that we too think it strange and grievous that those places should have been confided to such men, against our repeated remonstrances, and that, moreover, this very Stanley should have been recommended by your Excellency for general of all the forces. And although we had many just and grave reasons for opposing your administration—even as our ancestors were often wont to rise against the sovereigns of the country—we have, nevertheless, patiently suffered for a long time, in order not to diminish your authority, which we deemed so important to our welfare, and in the hope that you would at last be moved by the perilous condition of the commonwealth, and awake to the artifices of your advisers.

„But at last—feeling that the existence of the state can no longer be preserved without proper authority, and that the whole community is full of emotion and distrust, on account of these great treasons—we, the States-General, as well as the States-Provincial, have felt constrained to establish such a government as we deem meet for the emergency. And of this we think proper to apprise your Excellency.”

He then expressed the conviction that all these evil deeds had been accomplished against the intentions of the Earl and the English government, and requested his Excellency so to deal with her Majesty that the contingent of horse and foot hitherto accorded by her „might be maintained in good order, and in better pay.”

Here, then, was substantial cholerie phraseology, as good plain-speaking as her Majesty had just been employing, and with quite as sufficient cause. Here was no pleasant diplomatic fencing, but straightforward vigorous thrusts. It was

no wonder that poor Wilkes should have thought the letter „too sharp,” when he heard it read in the assembly, and that he should have done his best to prevent it from being despatched. He would have thought it sharper could he have seen how the pride of her Majesty and of Leicester was wounded by it to the quick. Her list of grievances against the States seemed to vanish into air. Who had been tampering with the Spaniards now? Had that „shadowy and imaginary authority” granted to Leicester not proved substantial enough? Was it the States-General, the state-council, or was it the „absolute governor”—who had carried off the supreme control of the commonwealth in his pocket—that was responsible for the ruin effected by Englishmen who had scorned all „authority” but his own?

The States, in another blunt letter to the Queen herself, declared the loss of Deventer to be more disastrous to them than even the fall of Antwerp had been; for the republic had now been split asunder, and its most ancient and vital portions almost cut away. Nevertheless they were not „dazzled nor despairing,” they said, but more determined than ever to maintain their liberties, and bid defiance to the Spanish tyrant. And again they demanded of, rather than implored, her Majesty to be true to her engagements with them.

The interviews which followed were more tempestuous than ever. „I had intended that my Lord of Leicester should return to you,” she said to the envoys.

1 „Car si la perte d'Anvers a esté tres grande pour tout le pays, ceste cy tire avec soi plus grande consequence, tout au regard de plusieurs autres villes circonvoisines de Deventer, lesquelles ne pourront estre avic-tuallées que par force, que autrement. Non pas que nous disons cesq comme esblouys et par desespoir. . . . Car nous ne manquerons jamais en nos premieres resolutions de nous vouloir maintenir contre le Roi d'Espaigne, pour la conservation de la religion Chrestienne, nos privileges, franchises, et libertés.” States-General to the Queen, 6 Feb. 1587. (Hague Archives, MS.)

„But that shall never be. He has been treated with gross ingratitude, he has served the Provinces with ability, he has consumed his own property there, he has risked his life, he has lost his near kinsman, Sir Philip Sidney, whose life I should be glad to purchase with many millions, and, in place of all reward, he receives these venomous letters, of which a copy has been sent to his sovereign to blacken him with her.” She had been advising him to return, she added, but she was now resolved that he should never set foot in the Provinces again.”<sup>1</sup>

Here the Earl, who was present, exclaimed—beating himself on the breast—„A tali officio libera nos, Domine!”<sup>2</sup>

But the States, undaunted by these explosions of wrath, replied that it had ever been their custom, when their laws and liberties were invaded, to speak their mind boldly to kings and governors, and to procure redress of their grievances, as became free men.<sup>3</sup>

During that whole spring the Queen was at daggers drawn with all her leading counsellors, mainly in regard to that great question of questions—the relations of England with the Netherlands and Spain. Walsingham—who felt it madness to dream of peace, and who believed it the soundest policy to deal with Parma and his veterans upon the soil of Flanders, with the forces of the republic for allies, rather than to await his arrival in London—was driven almost to frenzy by what he deemed the Queen's perverseness.

„Our sharp words continue,” said the Secretary, „which doth greatly

disquiet her Majesty, and discomfort her poor servants that attend her. The Lord-Treasurer remaineth still in disgrace, and, behind my back, her Majesty giveth out very hard speeches of myself, which I the rather credit, for that I find, in dealing with her, I am nothing gracious; and if her Majesty could be otherwise served, I know I should not be used. . . . Her Majesty doth wholly bend herself to devise some further means to disgrace her poor council, in respect whereof she neglecteth all other causes. . . . The discord between her Majesty and her council hindereth the necessary consultations that were to be destined for the preventing of the manifold perils that hang over this realm. . . . Sir Christopher Hatton hath dealt very plainly and dutifully with her, which hath been accepted in so evil part as he is resolved to retire for a time. I assure you I find every man weary of attendance here. . . . I would to God I could find as good resolution in her Majesty to proceed in a princely course in relieving the United Provinces as I find an honourable disposition in your Lordship to employ yourself in this service.”<sup>1</sup>

The Lord-Treasurer was much puzzled, very wretched, but philosophically resigned. „Why her Majesty useth me thus strangely, I know not,” he observed. „To some she saith that she meant not I should have gone from the court; to some she saith, she may not admit me, nor give me contentment. I shall dispose myself to enjoy God's favour, and shall do nothing to deserve her disfavour. And if I be suffered to be a stranger to her affairs, I shall have a quieter life.”<sup>2</sup>

Leicester, after the first burst of his anger was over, was willing to return

<sup>1</sup> Walsingham to Leicester, 3 April 1587. Same to same, 10 April, 1587. (Brit. Mus. Galba, C. xi. 315-319.)

<sup>2</sup> Burghley to Leicester, 16 April, 1587. (Brit. Mus. Galba, C. xi. 333.)

<sup>1</sup> Bor. ii. xxii. 949.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid.

<sup>3</sup> „Nous sommes accoustumez, comme aussi ont ete nos predecesseurs, de remonstrer a nos princes et gouverneurs librement des desordres et contraventions que nous trouvons contre nos privileges et libertes, comme avons fait a V. E. etant ici,—ce que nous avons toujours tenu etre de notre devoir et vrai moyen pour parvenir au redres des dites desordres,” &c. States-General to Leicester, 1 March, 1587. (Hague Archives, MS.)

to the Provinces. He protested that he had a greater affection for the Netherlands people—not for the governing powers—even than he felt for the people of England. 1 „There is nothing sticks in my stomach,” he said, „but the goodwill of that poor afflicted people, for whom, I take God to record, I could be content to lose any limb I have to do them good.” 2 But he was crippled with debt, and the Queen resolutely refused to lend him a few thousand pounds, without which he could not stir. Walsingham in vain did battle with her parsimony, representing how urgently and vividly the necessity of his return had been depicted by all her ministers in both countries, and how much it imported to her own safety and service. But she was obdurate. „She would rather,” he said bitterly to Leicester, „hazard the increase of confusion there—which may put the whole country in peril—than supply your want. The like course she holdeth in the rest of her causes, which maketh me to wish myself from the helm.” 3 At last she

1 Bor, ii. xxii. 950-952.

2 Leicester to Walsingham, 16 April, 1587. (S. P. Office MS.)

3 „For the 10,000*l.* for your particular,” said Walsingham, „I have dealt very earnestly, but cannot prevail to win her Majesty to assent thereunto. I caused Mr. Barker to set down a note of your mortgages that stand upon forfeiture for lack of this promised support of the 10,000*l.* wherewith she has been made acquainted, but not moved thereby to relieve you.” Walsingham to Leicester, 6 April, 1587. (Brit. Mus. Galba, C. xi. 323, MS.)

And again, two days later—„I am sorry that her Majesty sticketh with you for the loan, for I see, without your return, both the cause and many an honest man that have showed them most constantly affected to you will go to ruin. I wish you had it, though it were but for two months. The enemy is not like to attempt any great matter in respect of his wants. But I am most sorry to see so great an advantage lost as her Majesty might have had, in case she had been induced to contribute towards the putting an army into the field.” Same to same, 8 April, 1587. Ibid p. 321-331. MS.

And once more, a week afterwards—„She can be content to furnish you with 10,000*l.*, so as you would devise, out of her enter-

agreed to advance him ten thousand pounds, but on so severe conditions, that the Earl declared himself heart-broken again, and protested that he would neither accept the money, nor ever set foot in the Netherlands. „Let Norris stay there,” he said in a fury; „he will do admirably, no doubt. Only let it not be supposed that I can be there also. Not for one hundred thousand pounds would I be in that country with him.” 1

tainment and the States, to pay her in one year the said sum, which she saith you promised unto herself, and therefore willed me to write to you to know whether you can make repayment in such order as she requireth.” Same to same, 14 April, 1587. Ibid. 326.

There was not much sentiment between the „throned vestal” and „Sweet Robin” when pounds and shillings were discussed; and it will be seen that the Earl was rendered quite frantic by the screwing process to which he found himself subjected by her whose „blessed beams” had formerly been so „nutritious.”

1 „I perceive by your letters,” said Leicester, „that her Majesty would now I should go over, and will lend me 10,000*l.* so she may be sure to receive it back within a year. I did offer to her Majesty heretofore that she should have all I receive of her entertainment, and as much besides as shall yield her 2000*l.*, paid either 1000*l.* at Michaelmas and the other at our Lady-day, or else both at our Lady, which is less than a year; and so long as I shall receive, then her Majesty shall receive after this sort till her 10,000*l.* be paid. And this is more, I am now persuaded, than I shall be able to do, and keep any countenance fit for the place. . . . but seeing I find her Majesty’s hardness continue still to me as it doth, I pray you let me your earnest and true furtherance for my abode at home and discharge . . . for my heart is more than half-broken, and I do think her Majesty had rather far continue Sir J. Norris there, in respect to the reconciliation between him and Count Hollock. . . . But I will never serve with him again as long as I live, no, not for to have 100,000*l.* given me . . . I know the man too well to trust to his service. I shall have no good thereby—not if I were an angel, for he cannot obey nor almost like of an equal . . . and already he hath taken advantage to curry favour with captains and soldiers. . . . He shall never bear sway under me; his disdain and craft hath no moderation; and I know, for all those speeches of my going, his friends: make full account that he shall remain there as her Majesty’s general of the forces.” Leicester to Walsingham, 16 April, 1587. (S. P. Office MS.)



Meantime it was agreed that Lord Buckhurst should be sent forth on what Wilkes termed a mission of expostulation, and a very ill-timed one. This new envoy was to inquire into the causes of the discontent, and to do his best to remove them: as if any man in England or in Holland doubted as to the causes, or as to the best means of removing them; or as if it were not absolutely certain that delay was the very worst specific that could be adopted—delay—which the Netherland statesmen, as well as the Queen's wisest counsellors, most deprecated, which Alexander and Philip most desired, and by indulging in which her Majesty was most directly playing into her adversary's hand. Elizabeth was preparing to put cards upon the table against an antagonist whose game was close, whose honesty was always to be suspected, and who was a consummate master in what was then considered diplomatic sleight of hand. So Lord Buckhurst was to go forth to

expostulate at the Hague, while transports were loading in Cadiz and Lisbon, reiters levying in Germany, pikemen and musketeers in Spain and Italy, for a purpose concerning which Walsingham and Barneveld had for a long time felt little doubt.

Meantime Lord Leicester went to Bath to drink the waters, and after he had drunk the waters, the Queen, ever anxious for his health, was resolved that he should not lose the benefit of those salubrious draughts by travelling too soon, or by plunging anew into the fountains of bitterness which flowed perennially in the Netherlands. 1

1 „Finding your presence here necessary," wrote Walsingham, „for the expedition of the Low Country causes, I moved her Majesty that I might be authorised in her name to hasten your repair hither, whereunto she would in no sort consent, pretending that, after the use of the Bath, it would be dangerous for your Lordship to take any extraordinary travail. There is some doubt that Ostend will be presently besieged," &c. &c. Walsingham to Leicester, 17 April, 1587. (B. Mus. Galba, C. xi. 327. MS.)

## CHAPTER XV.

Buckhurst sent to the Netherlands—Alarming State of Affairs on his Arrival—His Efforts to conciliate—Democratic Theories of Wilkes—Sophistry of the Argument—Dispute between Wilkes and Barneveld—Religious Tolerance by the States—Their Constitutional Theory—Deventer's bad Counsels to Leicester—Their pernicious Effect—Real and supposed Plots against Hohenlo—Mutual Suspicion and Distrust—Buckhurst seeks to restore good Feeling—The Queen angry and vindictive—She censures Buckhurst's Course—Leicester's Wrath at Hohenlo's charges of a Plot by the Earl to murder him—Buckhurst's eloquent Appeals to the Queen—Her perplexing and contradictory Orders—Despair of Wilkes—Leicester announces his Return—His Instructions—Letter to Junius—Barneveld denounces him in the States.

WE return to the Netherlands. If ever proof were afforded of the influence of individual character on the destiny of nations and of the world, it certainly was seen in the year 1587. We have lifted the curtain of the secret

council-chamber at Greenwich. We have seen all Elizabeth's advisers anxious to arouse her from her fatal credulity, from her almost as fatal parsimony. We have seen Leicester anxious to return, despite all fancied indignities, Walsingham eager to expedite the enterprise, and the Queen remaining obdurate, while month after month of precious time was melting away.

In the Netherlands, meantime, discord and confusion had been increasing every day; and the first great cause of such a dangerous condition of affairs was the absence of the governor. In this all parties agreed. The Leicestrians, the anti-Leicestrians, the Holland party, the Utrecht party, the English counsellors, the English generals, in private letter, in solemn act, all warned the Queen against the lamentable effects

resulting from Leicester's inopportune departure and prolonged absence.<sup>1</sup>

On the first outbreak of indignation after the Deventer affair, Prince Maurice was placed at the head of the general government, with the violent Hohenlo as his lieutenant.<sup>2</sup> The greatest exertions were made by these two nobles and by Barneveld, who guided the whole policy of the party, to secure as many cities as possible to their cause. Magistrates and commandants of garrisons in many towns willingly gave in their adhesion to the new government; others refused, especially Diedrich Sonoy, an officer of distinction, who was governor of Enkhuyzen, and influential throughout North Holland, and who remained a stanch partisan of Leicester.<sup>3</sup> Utrecht, the stronghold of the Leicestrians, was wavering and much torn by faction; Hohenlo and Moeurs had „banqueted and feasted” to such good purpose that they had gained over half the captains of the burgher-guard, and, aided by the branch of nobles, were making a good fight against the Leicester magistracy and the clerical force, enriched by the plunder of the old Catholic livings, who denounced as Papistical and Hispaniolized all who favoured the party of Maurice and Barneveld.

By the end of March the envoys returned from London, and in their company came Lord Buckhurst, as special ambassador from the Queen.<sup>4</sup>

Thomas Sackville, Lord Buckhurst—afterwards Earl of Dorset and lord-treasurer—was then fifty-one years of age. A man of large culture—poet, dramatist, diplomatist—bred to the bar; afterwards elevated to the peerage, endowed with high character and strong intellect; ready with tongue and pen, handsome of person, and with a fascinating address, he was as fit a person to

send on a mission of expostulation as any man to be found in England. But the author of the *Induction to the Mirror for Magistrates* and of *Gorboduc*, had come to the Netherlands on a forlorn hope. To expostulate in favour of peace with a people who knew that their existence depended on war, to reconcile those to delay who felt that delay was death, and to heal animosities between men who were enemies from their cradles to their graves, was a difficult mission. But the chief ostensible object of Buckhurst was to smooth the way for Leicester, and, if possible, to persuade the Netherlanders as to the good inclinations of the English government. This was no easy task, for they knew that their envoys had been dismissed, without even a promise of subsidy. They had asked for twelve thousand soldiers and sixty thousand pounds, and had received a volley of abuse. Over and over again, through many months, the Queen fell into a paroxysm of rage when even an allusion was made to the loan of fifty or sixty thousand pounds; and even had she promised the money, it would have given but little satisfaction. As Count Moeurs observed, he would rather see one English rosenoble than a hundred royal promises. So the Hollanders and Zeelanders—not fearing Leicester's influence within their little morsel of a territory—were concentrating their means of resistance upon their own soil, intending to resist Spain, and, if necessary, England, in their last ditch, and with the last drop of their blood.

While such was the condition of affairs, Lord Buckhurst landed at Flushing—four months after the departure of Leicester—on the 24th March, having been tossing three days and nights at sea in a great storm, „miserably sick and in great danger of drowning.”<sup>1</sup> Sir William Russell, governor of Flushing, informed him of the progress making

<sup>1</sup> Documents in Bor, iii. xxiii. 76-80.

<sup>2</sup> Wagenaar, viii. 204.

<sup>3</sup> Wagenaar, viii. 176, 185, 209-211, 270-278. Bor, iii. xxiii. 10 *seq.* Reynd, vi. 101.

<sup>4</sup> Bor, xxii. 952. Wagenaar, 216.

<sup>1</sup> Buckhurst to Walsingham, 26th March, 1587. (S. P. Office MS.)

by Prince Maurice in virtue of his new authority. He told him that the Zeeland regiment, vacant by Sidney's death, and which the Queen wished bestowed upon Russel himself, had been given to Count Solms—a circumstance which was very sure to excite her Majesty's ire; but that the greater number, and those of the better sort, disliked the alteration of government, and relied entirely upon the Queen. Sainte Aldegonde visited him at Middleburgh, and in a „long discourse” expressed the most friendly sentiments towards England, with free offers of personal service. „Nevertheless,” said Buckhurst, cautiously, „I mean to trust the effect, not his words, and so I hope he shall not much deceive me. His opinion is that the Earl of Leicester's absence hath chiefly caused this change, and that without his return it will hardly be restored again, but that upon his arrival all these clouds will prove but a summer-shower.”<sup>1</sup>

As a matter of course the new ambassador lifted up his voice, immediately after setting foot on shore, in favour of the starving soldiers of his Queen. „'Tis a most lamentable 'thing,'” said he, „to hear the complaints of soldiers and captains for want of pay.” . . . . Whole companies made their way into his presence, literally crying aloud for bread. „For Jesus' sake,” wrote Buckhurst, „hasten to send relief with all speed, and let such victuallers be appointed as have a conscience not to make themselves rich with the famine of poor soldiers. If her Majesty send not money, and that with speed, for their payment, I am afraid to think what mischief and miseries are like to follow.”<sup>2</sup>

Then the ambassador proceeded to the Hague, holding interviews with influential personages in private, and with the States-General in public. Such was the charm of his manner, and so firm

the conviction of sincerity and good-will which he inspired, that in the course of a fortnight there was already a sensible change in the aspect of affairs. The enemy, who, at the time of their arrival, had been making bonfires and holding triumphal processions for joy of the great breach between Holland and England, and had been „hoping to swallow them all up; while there were so few left who knew how to act,” were already manifesting disappointment.<sup>1</sup>

In a solemn meeting of the States-General with the state-council, Buckhurst addressed the assembly upon the general subject of her Majesty's goodness to the Netherlands. He spoke of the gracious assistance rendered by her, notwithstanding her many special charges for the common cause, and of the mighty enmities which she had incurred for their sake. He sharply censured the Hollanders for their cruelty to men who had shed their blood in their cause, but who were now driven forth from their towns, and left to starve on the highways, and hated for their nation's sake; as if the whole English name deserved to be soiled „for the treachery of two miscreants.” He spoke strongly of their demeanour towards the Earl of Leicester, and of the wrongs they had done him, and told them that, if they were not ready to atone to her Majesty for such injuries, they were not to wonder if their deputies received no better answer at her hands. „She who embraced your cause,” he said, „when other mighty princes forsook you, will still stand fast unto you, yea, and increase her goodness, if her present state may suffer it.”<sup>2</sup>

After being addressed in this manner the council of state made what Counsellor Clerk called a „very honest, modest, and wise answer;” but the

<sup>1</sup> Buckhurst to Walsingham, 26th March, 1587. (S. P. Office MS.)

<sup>2</sup> Buckhurst to Walsingham. MS. last cited.

<sup>1</sup> Bartholomew Clerk to Burghley, 12 April, 1587. (S. P. Office MS.)

<sup>2</sup> Bartholomew Clerk to Burghley, *ubi sup.*



States-General, not being able „so easily to discharge that which had so long boiled within them,” deferred their reply until the following day. They then brought forward a deliberate rejoinder, in which they expressed themselves devoted to her Majesty, and, on the whole, well disposed to the Earl. As to the 4th February letter, it had been written „in amaritudine cordis,” upon hearing the treasons of York and Stanley, and in accordance with „their custom and liberty used towards all princes, whereby they had long preserved their estate,” and in the conviction that the real culprits for all the sins of his Excellency’s government were certain „lewd persons who sought to seduce his Lordship, and to cause him to hate the States.”

Buckhurst did not think it well to reply, at that moment, upon the ground that there had been already crimination and recrimination more than enough, and that a „little bitterness more had rather caused them to determine dangerously than resolve for the best.”<sup>1</sup>

They then held counsel together—the envoys and the States-General, as to the amount of troops absolutely necessary—casting up the matter „as pinchingly as possibly might be.” And the result was, that 20,000 foot and 2000 horse for garrison work, and an army of 13,000 foot, 5000 horse, and 1000 pioneers, for a campaign of five or six months, were pronounced indispensable. This would require all their 240,000*l.* sterling a-year, regular contribution, her Majesty’s contingent of 140,000*l.*, and an extrasum of 150,000*l.* sterling. Of this sum the States requested her Majesty should furnish two-thirds, while they agreed to furnish the other third, which would make in all 240,000*l.* for the Queen, and 290,000*l.* for the States. As it was understood that the English subsidies were only a

loan, secured by mortgage of the cautionary towns, this did not seem very unreasonable, when the intimate blending of England’s welfare with that of the Provinces was considered.<sup>1</sup>

Thus it will be observed that Lord Buckhurst—while doing his best to conciliate personal feuds and heart-burnings—had done full justice to the merits of Leicester, and had placed in strongest light the favours conferred by her Majesty.

He then proceeded to Utrecht, where he was received with many demonstrations of respect, „with solemn speeches” from magistrates and burgher-captains, with military processions, and with great banquets, which were, however, conducted with decorum, and at which even Count Moeurs excited universal astonishment by his sobriety.<sup>2</sup> It was difficult, however, for matters to go very smoothly, except upon the surface. What could be more disastrous than for a little commonwealth—a mere handful of people, like these Netherlanders, engaged in mortal combat with the most powerful monarch in the world, and with the first general of the age, within a league of their borders—thus to be deprived of all organized government at a most critical moment, and to be left to wrangle with their allies and among themselves as to the form of polity to be adopted, while waiting the pleasure of a capricious and despotic woman?

And the very foundation of the authority by which the Spanish yoke had been abjured, the sovereignty offered to Elizabeth, and the government-general conferred on Leicester, was fiercely assailed by the confidential agents of Elizabeth herself. The dispute went into the very depths of the social contract. Already Wilkes, standing up stoutly for the democratic views of the governor, who

<sup>1</sup> Bartholomew Clerk to Burghley. MS. last cited.

<sup>2</sup> Gilpen to Wilkes, 25 April, 1587. (S. P. Office MS.)

<sup>1</sup> Bartholomew Clerk to Burghley, *ubi sup.*

was so foully to requite him, had assured the English government that the „people were ready to cut the throats” of the States-General at any convenient moment. The sovereign people, not the deputies, were alone to be heeded, he said, and although he never informed the world by what process he had learned the deliberate opinion of that sovereign, as there had been no assembly excepting those of the States-General and States-Provincial—he was none the less fully satisfied that the people were all with Leicester, and bitterly opposed to the States.

„For the sovereignty, or supreme authority,” said he, „through failure of a legitimate prince, belongs to the people, and not to you, gentlemen, who are only servants, ministers, and deputies of the people. You have your commissions or instructions surrounded by limitations—which conditions are so widely different from the power of sovereignty as the might of the subject is in regard to his prince, or of a servant in respect to his master. For sovereignty is not limited either as to power or as to time. Still less do you *represent* the sovereignty; for the people, in giving the general and absolute government to the Earl of Leicester, have conferred upon him at once the exercise of justice, the administration of polity, of naval affairs, of war, and of all the other points of sovereignty. Of these a governor-general is, however, only the depositary or guardian, until such time as it may please the prince or people to revoke the trust, there being no other in this state who can do this, seeing that it was the people who, through the instrumentality of your offices—through you as its servants—conferred on his Excellency this power, authority, and government. According to the common rule of law, therefore, *quo jure quid statuitur, eodem jure tolli debet*. You having been fully empowered by the provinces and cities, or, to speak more correctly, by your masters and superiors,

to confer the government on his Excellency, it follows that you require a like power in order to take it away either in whole or in part. If, then, you had no commission to curtail his authority, or even that of the state-council, and thus to tread upon and usurp his power as governor-general and absolute, there follows of two things one; either you did not well understand what you were doing, nor duly consider how far that power reached; or, much more probably, you have fallen into the sin of disobedience, considering how solemnly you swore allegiance to him.” 1

1 Kluit, „Holl. Staatsreg.” ii, 281. Compare Wagenaar, viii. 208.

It is very important to observe that Wilkes retracted these democratic views before the end of the summer, and gradually adopted the constitutional theory maintained by Holland. He informed the Queen, on the 12th July, 1587, that in case she refused the sovereignty, it „should remain with such as by the laws of the country do retain it, which is *not in the common people*, but in some fifty or sixty persons in every city and town called by the name of Vroedschap. . . . If the Earl of Leicester,” said he, „should attempt to remove any of those persons, constituting this Vroedschap, as it is rumoured he intends doing, it will hazard the ruin of the whole country, endanger the Earl greatly, and prove the loss of all her Majesty’s charge employed in the defence of the country. It is a mistake to suppose that it will be a facile matter to carry the common people into any such violence at any time against the States; for the magistrates of every city and town, upon premonition already given, are holding a vigilant eye and severe hand over any that shall stir within any of their jurisdiction.

„The remedy,” continued Wilkes, „to prevent any mischief that might ensue of any popular commotion, would be to leave that course, and to follow the example of the late Prince of Orange, who had quite as many difficulties to contend with as the Earl of Leicester, and yet forbore to discredit the States with the people—gaining five or six of the States’ members that had the most credit with the assemblies, and through them working upon all the rest, there being nothing determined or to be handled in their assemblies but he knew of it always beforehand; and whensoever he had anything to propound or bring to pass among them, he first consulted with these persons, and by them was made acquainted whether the matter would pass or be impugned, and acted accordingly. The Prince,”

Thus subtly and ably did Wilkes defend the authority of the man who had deserted his post at a most critical moment, and had compelled the States, by his dereliction, to take the government into their own hands.

For, after all, the whole argument of the English counsellor rested upon a quibble. The people were absolutely sovereign, he said, and had lent that sovereignty to Leicester. How had they made that loan? Through the machinery of the States-General. So long, then, as the Earl retained the absolute sovereignty, the States were not even representatives of the sovereign people. The sovereign people was merged in one English Earl. The English Earl had retired—indefinitely—to England. Was the sovereign people to wait for months or years before it regained its existence? And if not, how was it to reassert its vitality? How but through the agency of the States-General, who—according to Wilkes himself—*had been fully empowered by the Provinces and Cities to confer the government on the Earl?* The people then, after all, were the provinces and cities. And the States-General were at that moment as much qualified to represent those provinces and cities as they ever had been, and they claimed no more. Wilkes, nor any other of the Leicester party, ever hinted at a general assembly of the people. Universal suffrage was not dreamed of at that day. By the people he meant, if he meant anything, only that very small fraction of the inhabitants of a

said Wilkes, „never attempted anything of importance without consulting the States. The people are the same now as they were then, and do not love to be subject to any monarchical government.” Wilkes to the Queen, 12 July 1587. (S. P. Office MS.)

It is obvious, from this change of opinion on the part of the counsellor, that he would become liable to the disapprobation of Leicester; but it seems hardly credible that he should have thereby inspired the Earl with such a hatred and longing for revenge against him as he unquestionably did excite.

country who, according to the English system in the reign of Elizabeth, constituted its Commons. He chose, rather from personal and political motives than philosophical ones, to draw a distinction between the people and the „States,” but it is quite obvious, from the tone of his private communications, that by the „States” he meant the individuals who happened, for the time being, to be the deputies of the States of each province. But it was almost an affectation to accuse those individuals of calling or considering themselves „sovereigns,” for it was very well known that they sat as *envoys*, rather than as *members* of a congress, and were perpetually obliged to recur to their constituents, the States of each Province, for instructions. It was idle, because Buys and Barneveld, and Roorda, and other leaders, exercised the influence due to their talents, patriotism, and experience, to stigmatise them as usurpers of sovereignty, and to hound the rabble upon them as tyrants and mischief-makers. Yet to take this course pleased the Earl of Leicester, who saw no hope for the liberty of the people, unless absolute and unconditional authority over the people, in war, naval affairs, justice, and polity, were placed in his hands. This was the view sustained by the clergy of the Reformed Church, because they found it convenient, through such a theory, and by Leicester’s power, to banish Papists, exercise intolerance in matters of religion, sequester for their own private uses property of the Catholic Church, and obtain for their own a political power which was repugnant to the more liberal ideas of the Barneveld party.

The States of Holland—inspired as it were by the memory of that great martyr to religious and political liberty, William the Silent—maintained freedom of conscience.

The Leicester party advocated a different theory on the religious question.



They were also determined to omit no effort to make the States odious.

„Seeing their violent courses,” said Wilkes to Leicester, I have not been negligent, as well by solicitations to the ministers, as by my letters to such as have continued constant in affection to your Lordship, to have the people informed of the ungrateful and dangerous proceedings of the States. They have therein travailed with so good effect, as the people are now wonderfully well disposed, and have delivered everywhere in speeches, that if, by the overthwart dealings of the States, her Majesty shall be drawn to stay her succours and goodness to them, and that thereby your Lordship be also discouraged to return, they will cut their throats.”<sup>1</sup>

Who the „people” exactly were, that had been so wonderfully well disposed to throat-cutting by the ministers of the Gospel, did not distinctly appear. It was certain, however, that they were the special friends of Leicester, great orators, very pious, and the sovereigns of the country. So much could not be gainsaid.

„Your Lordship would wonder,” continued the councillor, „to see the people—who so lately, by the practice of the said States and the accident of Deventer, were notably alienated—so returned to their former devotion towards her Majesty, your Lordship, and our nation.”

Wilkes was able moreover to gratify the absent governor-general with the intelligence—of somewhat questionable authenticity, however—that the States were very „much terrified with these threats of the people.” But Barneveld came down to the council to inquire what member of that body it was who had accused the States of violating the Earl’s authority. „Whoever he is,” said the Advocate, let him deliver his mind frankly, and he shall be answered.” The man did not seem much terrified by the throat-cutting orations. „It is true,”

replied Wilkes, perceiving himself to be the person intended, „that you have very injuriously, in many of your proceedings, derogated from and trodden the authority of his Lordship and of this council under your feet.”<sup>1</sup>

And then he went into particulars, and discussed, *more suo*, the constitutional question, in which various Leicestrian counsellors seconded him.

But Barneveld grimly maintained that the States were the sovereigns, and that it was therefore unfit that the governor, who drew his authority from them, should call them to account for their doings. „It was as if the governors in the time of Charles V.,” said the Advocate, „should have taxed that Emperor for any action of his done in the government.”<sup>2</sup>

In brief, the rugged Barneveld, with threatening voice and lion port, seemed to impersonate the States, and to hold reclaimed sovereignty in his grasp. It seemed difficult to tear it from him again.

„I did what I could,” said Wilkes, „to beat them from this humour of their sovereignty, showing that upon that error they had grounded the rest of their wilful absurdities.”<sup>3</sup>

Next night he drew up sixteen articles, showing the disorders of the States, of their breach of oaths, and violations of the Earl’s authority; and with that commenced a series of papers interchanged by the two parties, in which the topics of the origin of government and the principles of religious freedom were handled with much ability on both sides, but at unmerciful length.

On the religious question, the States-General, led by Barneveld and by Francis Frank, expressed themselves manfully on various occasions during the mission of Buckhurst.

„The nobles and cities constituting

<sup>1</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>2</sup> Wilkes to Leicester, MS. last cited. Compare Kluit, ii. 281 *seq.* Bor, ii. xxii. 918, 921 *seq.* Wagenaar, viii. 208.

<sup>3</sup> Wilkes to Leicester, MS. last cited.

<sup>1</sup> Wilkes to Leicester, 12 March, 1587. (S. P. Office MS.)

the States," they said, „have been denounced to Lord Leicester as enemies of religion, by the self-seeking mischief-makers who surround him. Why? Because they had refused the demand of certain preachers to call a general synod, in defiance of the States-General, and to introduce a set of ordinances with a system of discipline according to *their arbitrary will*. This the late Prince of Orange and the States-General had always thought detrimental both to religion and polity. They respected the difference in religious opinions, and, leaving all churches in their freedom, they *chose to compel no man's conscience*—a course which all statesmen, knowing the diversity of human opinions, had considered necessary in order to maintain fraternal harmony." 1

Such words shine through the prevailing darkness of the religious atmosphere at that epoch, like characters of

1 Meteren, xiv. 250-253.

The States of Holland, under the guidance of Barneveld, took strong ground, on several occasions this year, against attempts made by the Reformed Church to meddle with secular matters. On the presentation of a petition relative to politics, by a committee of four preachers, representing the churches of Holland, answer was made, through the mouth of Barneveld, that „the States were very well acquainted with the matters mentioned in the petition, and with many other things besides; that the States were quite as much interested as the churches could be in the welfare of the land, and that they could provide for it, without the assistance of the preachers." The petitioners were accordingly advised to go home, and leave the States to manage the affairs of the country. (Bor, iii. xxiii. 76.)

A few days later, a resolution upon the subject of the petition was passed by the States, printed, and sent to all the cities in the Province, with an order to the magistrates to summon the preachers before them, deliver them a copy of the resolution, warn them to keep their congregations in tranquillity and harmony, and, for their own part, to occupy themselves with praying, teaching, and preaching, and to allow the States and the magistrates to administer the government.

The resolution itself—which the preachers characterised as a rude answer to a courteous request—was conceived much in the spirit of Barneveld's original verbal reply. (See the documents in Bor, iii. xxiii. 76, 85 seq.)

light. They are beacons in the upward path of mankind. Never before had so bold and wise a tribute to the genius of the Reformation been paid by an organized community. Individuals walking in advance of their age had enunciated such truths, and their voices had seemed to die away; but at last, a little, struggling, half-developed commonwealth had proclaimed the rights of conscience for all mankind—for Papists and Calvinists, Jews and Anabaptists—because, „having a respect for differences in religious opinions, and leaving all churches in their freedom, they chose to compel no man's conscience."

On the constitutional question, the States commenced by an astounding absurdity. „These mischief-makers, moreover," said they, „have not been ashamed to dispute, and to cause the Earl of Leicester to dispute, the lawful constitution of the Provinces; a matter which has not been *disputed for eight hundred years*." 1

This was indeed to claim a respectable age for their republic. Eight hundred years took them back to the days of Charlemagne, in whose time it would have been somewhat difficult to detect a germ of their States-General and States-Provincial. That the constitutional government—consisting of nobles and of the *vroedschaps* of chartered cities—should have been in existence four hundred and seventeen years before the first charter had ever been granted to a city, was a very loose style of argument. Thomas Wilkes, in reply, might as well have traced the English parliament to Hengist and Horsa. „For eight hundred years," they said, „Holland had been governed by Counts and Countesses, on whom the nobles and cities, representing the States, had legally conferred sovereignty." 2

Now the first incorporated city of

1 Bor, iii. xxiii. 76-84. Meteren, xiv. 250-253. Kluit, ii. 286 seq.

2 Bor, Meteren, Kluit, *ubi sup.*

Holland and Zeeland that ever existed was Middelburg, which received its charter from Count William I. of Holland and Countess Joan of Flanders, in the year 1217. The first Count that had any legal or recognized authority was Dirk the First, to whom Charles the Simple presented the territory of Holland, by letters-patent, in 922. Yet the States-General, in a solemn and eloquent document, gravely dated their own existence from the year 787, and claimed the regular possession and habitual delegation of sovereignty from that epoch down!

After this fabulous preamble, they proceeded to handle the matter of fact with logical precision. It was absurd, they said, that Mr. Wilkes and Lord Leicester should affect to confound the persons who appeared in the assembly with the States themselves; as if those individuals claimed or exercised sovereignty. Any man who had observed what had been passing during the last fifteen years knew very well that the supreme authority did not belong to the thirty or forty individuals who came to the meetings. . . . The nobles, by reason of their ancient dignity and splendid possessions, took counsel together over state matters, and then, appearing at the assembly, deliberated with the deputies of the cities. The cities had mainly one form of government—a college of counsellors, or wise men, 40, 32, 28, or 24 in number, of the most respectable out of the whole community. They were chosen for life, and vacancies were supplied by the colleges themselves out of the mass of citizens. These colleges 1

1 „These colleges,” says the document, „are as old as the cities; or so old at least, that there is no memory left of their commencement.”

Here, too, was a gross misstatement, for the colleges of Vroedschappen dated only from the time of Philip the Good—not much more than a century before the publication of this document; and the cities themselves, as organized corporations, were but 350 years

alone governed the city, and that which had been ordained by them was to be obeyed by all the inhabitants—a system against which there had never been any rebellion. The colleges again, united with those of the nobles, *represented* the whole state, the whole body of the population; and no form of government could be imagined, they said, that could resolve, with a more thorough knowledge of the necessities of the country, or that could execute its resolves with more unity of purpose and decisive authority. To bring the colleges into an assembly could only be done by means of deputies. These deputies, chosen by their colleges, and properly instructed, were sent to the place of meeting. During the war they had always been commissioned to resolve in common on matters regarding the liberty of the land. These deputies, thus assembled, *represented*, by commission, the States; but they are not in their own persons the States, and no one of them had any such pretension. „The people of this country,” said the States, „have an aversion to all ambition; and in these disastrous times, wherein nothing but trouble and odium is to be gathered by public employment, these commissions are accounted *munera necessaria*. . . . This form of government has, by God’s favour, protected Holland and Zeeland, during this war, against a powerful foe, without loss of territory, without any popular outbreak, without military mutiny, because all *business has been transacted with open doors*, and because the very smallest towns are all represented, and vote in the assembly.” 1

In brief, the constitution of the United Provinces was a matter of fact. It was there in good working order, and had, for a generation of mankind, and throughout a tremendous war, done good service. Judged by the principles of reason

old, at most. It is difficult to understand how such inaccuracies should find their way into so able a state-paper. (Compare Kluit, „Holl. Staatsregering,” ii. 291.)

1 Bor, Meteren, Kluit, *ubi sup.*



and justice, it was in the main a wholesome constitution, securing the independence and welfare of the state, and the liberty and property of the individual, as well certainly as did any polity then existing in the world. It seemed more hopeful to abide by it yet a little longer than to adopt the throat-cutting system by the people, recommended by Wilkes and Leicester as an improvement on the old constitution. This was the view of Lord Buckhurst. He felt that threats of throat-cutting were not the best means of smoothing and conciliating, and he had come over to smooth and conciliate. „To spend the time,” said he, „in private brabbles and piques between the States and Lord Leicester, when we ought to prepare an army against the enemy, and to repair the shaken and torn state, is not a good course for her Majesty’s service.”<sup>1</sup> Letters were continually circulating from hand to hand among the antagonists of the Holland party, written out of England by Leicester, exciting the ill-will of the populace against the organized government. „By such means to bring the States into hatred,” said Buckhurst, „and to stir up the people against them, tends to great damage and miserable end. This his Lordship doth full little consider, being the very way to dissolve all government, and so to bring all into confusion, and open the door for the enemy. But oh, how lamentable a thiaig it is, and how doth my Lord of Leicester abuse her Majesty, making her authority the means to uphold and justify, and under her name to defend and maintain, all hiss intolerable errors! I thank God that neither his might nor his malice shall deter me from laying open all those things which my conscience knoweth, and which appertaineth to be done for the good of this cause and of her Majesty’s service. Herein, though I were sure to lose my life, yet will I not offend

neither the one nor the other, knowing very well that I must die; and to die in her Majesty’s faithful service, and with a good conscience, is far more happy than the miserable life that I am in. If Leicester do in this sort stir up the people against the States to follow his revenge against them, and if the Queen do yield no better aid, and the minds of Count Maurice and Hohenlo remain thus in fear and hatred of him, what good end or service can be hoped for here?”<sup>1</sup>

Buckhurst was a man of unimpeached integrity and gentle manners. He had come over with the best intentions towards the governor-general, and it has been seen that he boldly defended him in his first interviews with the States. But as the intrigues and underhand plottings of the Earl’s agents were revealed to him, he felt more and more convinced that there was a deep-laid scheme to destroy the government, and to constitute a virtual and absolute sovereignty for Leicester. It was not wonderful that the States were standing vigorously on the defensive.

The subtle Deventer, Leicester’s evil genius, did not cease to poison the mind of the governor, during his protracted absence, against all persons who offered impediments to the cherished schemes of his master and himself. „Your Excellency knows very well,” he said, „that the state of this country is democratic, since, by failure of a prince, the sovereign disposition of affairs has returned to the people. That same people is every-where so incredibly affectionate towards you that the delay in your return drives them to extreme despair. Any one who would know the real truth has but to remember the fine fear the States-General were in when the news of your displeasure about the 4th February letter became known.”<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Ibid.

<sup>1</sup> Buckhurst to Walsingham, 13th June, 1587. (Br. Mus. Galba, D. 1, p. 96, MS.)

<sup>2</sup> G. de Proninck (Deventer) au Comte de Leycestre, 22 May, 1587. (Brit. Mus. Galba, D. 1, p. 16, MS.)

Had it not been for the efforts of Lord Buckhurst in calming the popular rage, Deventer assured the Earl that the writers of the letter would „have scarcely saved their skins;” and that they had always continued in great danger.

He vehemently urged upon Leicester the necessity of his immediate return—not so much for reasons drawn from the distracted state of the country, thus left to a provisional government and torn by faction—but because of the facility with which he might at once seize upon arbitrary power. He gratified his master by depicting in lively colours the abject condition into which Barneveld, Maurice, Hohenlo, and similar cowards, would be thrown by his sudden return.

„If,” said he, „the States’ members and the counts, every one of them, are so desperately afraid of the people, even while your Excellency is afar off, in what trepidation will they be when you are here! God, reason, the affection of the sovereign people, are on your side. There needs, in a little commonwealth like ours, but a wink of the eye, the slightest indication of dissatisfaction on your part, to take away all their valour from men who are only brave where swords are too short. A magnanimous prince like yourself should seek at once the place where such plots are hatching, and you would see the fury of the rebels change at once to cowardice. There is more than one man here in the Netherlands that brags of what he will do against the greatest and most highly endowed prince in England, because he thinks he shall never see him again, who, at the very first news of your return, my Lord, would think only of packing his portmanteau, greasing his boots, or, at the very least, of sneaking back into his hole.” 1

1 „Tel bravera es Pays Bas contre le plus grand et qualifié prince d’Angleterre, lequell il s’assure ne revoir jamais pardeça, qui aux dernières nouvelles de votre retour, Monseigneur, ne pensoit qu’à trousser bagage et faire graisser ses bottes, ou du moins se

But the sturdy democrat was quite sure that his Excellency, that most magnanimous prince of England, would not desert his faithful followers—thereby giving those „filthy rascals,” his opponents, a triumph, and „doing so great an injury to the sovereign people, who were ready to get rid of them all at a single blow, if his Excellency would but say the word.” 1

He then implored the magnanimous prince to imitate the example of Moses, Joshua, David, and that of all great emperors and captains, Hebrew, Greek, and Roman, to come at once to the scene of action, and to smite his enemies hip and thigh. He also informed his Excellency that, if the delay should last much longer, he would lose all chance of regaining power, because the sovereign people had quite made up their mind to return to the dominion of Spain within three months, if they could not induce his Excellency to rule over them. In that way at least, if in no other, they could circumvent those filthy rascals whom they so much abhorred, and frustrate the designs of Maurice, Hohenlo, and Sir John Norris, who were represented as occupying the position of the triumvirs after the death of Julius Cæsar.

To place its neck under the yoke of Philip II. and the Inquisition, after having so handsomely got rid of both, did not seem a sublime manifestation of sovereignty on the part of the people, and even Deventer had some misgivings as to the propriety of such a result. „What then will become of our beautiful

desrober en sataniere,” &c. (G. de Proninck, MS. last cited.)

1 „Mais un prince si tres magnanime, ne fera jamais ce tort ny a soy mesme, ni au bon peuple belge. Point a soy mesme, comme s’il avait cédé a la bravade des ponceux, dont toute sa posterité et histoires et memoires du temps a venir portera l’ignominie. Point au peuple, lequell, comme souverain, ne doit recevoir le tort de cette injure, puisque ne luy que l’information de vostre mescontentement pour se desfaire en un coup de cest obstacle,” &c. (Ibid.)

churches?" he cried. „What will princes say, what will the world in general say, what will historians say, about the honour of the English nation?" 1

As to the first question, it is probable that the prospect of the reformed churches would not have been cheerful, had the Inquisition been re-established in Holland and Utrecht, three months after that date. As to the second, the world and history were likely to reply, that the honour of the English nation was fortunately not entirely entrusted at that epoch to the „magnanimous prince" of Leicester, and his democratic counsellor-in-chief, burgomaster Deventer.

These are but samples of the ravings which sounded incessantly in the ears of the governor-general. Was it strange that a man, so thirsty for power, so gluttonous of flattery, should be influenced by such passionate appeals? Addressed in strains of fulsome adulation, convinced that arbitrary power was within his reach, and assured that he had but to wink his eye to see his enemies scattered before him, he became impatient of all restraint, and determined, on his return, to crush the States into insignificance.

Thus, while Buckhurst had been doing his best as a mediator to prepare the path for his return, Leicester himself and his partisans had been secretly exerting themselves to make his arrival the signal for discord, perhaps of civil war. The calm, then, immediately suc-

ceeding the mission of Buckhurst, was a deceitful one; but it seemed very promising. The best feelings were avowed, and perhaps entertained. The States professed great devotion to her Majesty and friendly regard for the governor. They distinctly declared that the arrangements by which Maurice and Hohenlo had been placed in their new positions were purely provisional ones, subject to modifications on the arrival of the Earl. 1 „All things are reduced to a quiet calm," said Buckhurst, „ready to receive my Lord of Leicester and his authority, whenever he cometh." 2

The quarrel of Hohenlo with Sir Edward Norris had been, by the exertions of Buckhurst, amicably arranged: 3 the Count became an intimate friend of Sir John, „to the gladding of all such as wished well to the country;" 4 but he nourished a deadly hatred to the Earl. He ran up and down like a madman whenever his return was mentioned. 5 „If the Queen be willing to take the sovereignty," he cried out at his own dinner-table to a large company, „and is ready to proceed roundly in this action, I will serve her to the last drop of my blood; but if she embrace it in no other sort than hitherto she hath done, and if Leicester is to return, then am I as good a man as Leicester, and will never be commanded by him. I mean to continue on my frontier, where all who love me can come and find me." 6

1 „Il plaira a V. Exce de nous veoir incontinent Espagnol, ou de nous en conserver par l'empeschement de ce desseing. . . . Car il ne peut tomber en aucune imagination raisonnable, en cas que ce desseing ne se renverse tout subit, que faute d'autorité jointe, un desespoir extreme ne nous rende à l'Espagnol devant l'issue de trois mois. Que sera ce alors de nos pauvres delassez? Que deviendront ces belles eglises, que dira le monde, que diront les princes, que diront les historiens, de l'honneur de la nation Anglaise? Le desespoir enragé du peuple choisira plutôt quel parti que ce soit avec l'Espagnol, que d'endurer ceux qui leur auront renversé le retour de Votre Excellence," &c. (G. de Proninck, MS. just cited.)

1 Wilkes to Walsingham, 8 April, 1587. Same to same, 13 and 19 April, 1587. Clerk to Burghley, 12 April, 1587. (S. P. Office MSS.) 2 Buckhurst to Burghley, 19 April, 1587 (S. P. Office MS.)

3 Wilkes to Walsingham, 8 April, 1587 (S. P. Office MS.)

4 Memorandum of a speech between the Lord Buckhurst and Count Hohenlo, 17 April 1587. (Br. Mus. Galba, xi. 345, MS.)

5 Otheman to Walsingham, 23rd March 1587. (S. P. Office MS.)

6 Wilkes to Walsingham, 29 April, 1587 (S. P. Office MS.)

„Hohenlo is their Hercules," said Wilkes „and a man fit for any desperate attempt altogether directed by Barneveld and Pau-



He declared to several persons that he had detected a plot on the part of Leicester to have him assassinated; and the assertion seemed so important, that Villiers came to Councillor Clerk to confer with him on the subject. The worthy Bartholomew, who had again, most reluctantly, left his quiet chambers in the Temple to come again among the guns and drums, which his soul abhorred, was appalled by such a charge. It was best to keep it a secret, he said, at least till the matter could be thoroughly investigated. Villiers was of the same opinion, and accordingly the councillor, in the excess of his caution, confided the secret only—to whom? To Mr. Atye, Leicester's private secretary. Atye, of course, instantly told his master—his master, in a frenzy of rage, told the Queen, and her Majesty, in a paroxysm of royal indignation at this new insult to her favourite, sent furious letters to her envoys, to the States-General, to everybody in the Netherlands—so that the assertion of Hohenlo became the subject of endless recrimination. Leicester became very violent, and denounced the statement as an impudent falsehood, devised wilfully in order to cast odium upon him and to prevent his return. 1 Unquestionably there was nothing in the story but table-talk; but the Count would have been still more ferocious towards Leicester than he was, had he known what was actually happening at that very moment.

While Buckhurst was at Utrecht, listening to the „solemn speeches” of the militia-captains and exchanging friendly

expressions at stately banquets with Moeurs, he suddenly received a letter in cipher from her Majesty. Not having the key, he sent to Wilkes at the Hague. Wilkes was very ill; both the despatch was marked pressing and immediate, so he got out of bed and made the journey to Utrecht. The letter, on being deciphered, proved to be an order from the Queen to decoy Hohenlo into some safe town, on pretence of consultation, and then to throw him into prison, on the ground that he had been tampering with the enemy, and was about to betray the republic to Philip. 1

The commotion which would have been excited by any attempt to enforce this order could be easily imagined by those familiar with Hohenlo and with the powerful party in the Netherlands of which he was one of the chiefs. Wilkes stood aghast as he deciphered the letter.

1 Queen to Buckhurst, 15 April, 1587. Wilkes to Walsingham, 29th April, 1587. Buckhurst to same, 29 April, 1587. Same to same, 30th April, 1587. (S. P. Office MSS.)

The Queen's Letter is as follows:—„Finding by a later letter written to our secretary by our ambassador Wilkes, that he hath been given to understand how Hollock should have some secret intelligence with the Prince of Parma, which being true, considering how the said Hollock is possessed of divers principal towns, in the which the captains and soldiers are altogether at his devotion, it is greatly to be doubted that he may be drawn by corruption to deliver up into the Prince of Parma's hands the said towns, whereby the enemy may have the more easy entry into those countries. We have therefore thought good, for prevention thereof, that you should confer with our servants Colonel Norris and Wilkes what course were meet to be taken therein, which as we perceive, may be best performed by staying of the person of Hollock; wherein, before the execution thereof, especial care would be had that he might be drawn, under colour of conference with you about matters of great importance contained in certain letters sent from us unto you in great diligence, into some of the towns which you shall understand to be devoted to us, and not affected to him; wherein you may take order for his restraint, being first well furnished with sufficient matter to charge him withal, which we wish to be done in the presence of such principal persons of the country as are held for good patriots and have credit with the people.”

Buy, who seeks (viz. P. B.) by all manner of devices to be revenged of Lord Leicester for his imprisonment.” Wilkes to the Queen, 12 July, 1587. (S. P. Office MS.)

1 Effect of what passed between Dr. Villiers and me, Bartholomew Clerk, touching the discontentment of Count Hohenlo, 22 May, 1587. (S. P. Office MS.)

Wilkes to Lord Chancellor, 3 June, 1587. (S. P. Office MS.) Compare letters of Leicester to Sonoy, and of Buckhurst to Treslong, in *Bor.* ii. xxii. 992. *Groen v. Prinst.* Archives, i. 63, 68, 69.

Buckhurst felt the impossibility of obeying the royal will. Both knew the cause, and both foresaw the consequences of the proposed step. Wilkes had heard some rumours of intrigues between Parma's agents at Deventer and Hohenlo, and had confided them to Walsingham, hoping that the Secretary would keep the matter in his own breast, at least till further advice. He was appalled at the sudden action proposed on a mere rumour, which both Buckhurst and himself had begun to consider an idle one. He protested, therefore, to Walsingham that to comply with her Majesty's command would not only be nearly impossible, but would, if successful, hazard the ruin of the republic. Wilkes was also very anxious lest the Earl of Leicester should hear of the matter. He was already the object of hatred to that powerful personage, and thought him capable of accomplishing his destruction in any mode. But if Leicester could wreak his vengeance upon his enemy Wilkes by the hand of his other deadly enemy Hohenlo, the councillor felt that this kind of revenge would have a double sweetness for him. The Queen knows what I have been saying, thought Wilkes, and therefore Leicester knows it; and if Leicester knows it, he will take care that Hohenlo shall hear of it too, and then wo be unto me. „Your honour knoweth,” he said to Walsingham, „that her Majesty *can hold no secrets, and if she do impart it to Leicester, then am I sped.*”<sup>1</sup>

Nothing came of it, however, and the relations of Wilkes and Buckhurst with Hohenlo continued to be friendly. It was a lesson to Wilkes to be more cautious even with the cautious Walsingham. „We had but bare suspicions,” said Buckhurst, „nothing fit, God knoweth, to come to such a reckoning. Wilkes saith he meant it but for a premonition to you there; but I think it will henceforth be a premonition to

himself—there being but bare presumptions, and yet shrewd presumptions.”<sup>1</sup>

Here then were Deventer and Leicester plotting to overthrow the government of the States; the States and Hohenlo arming against Leicester; the extreme democratic party threatening to go over to the Spaniards within three months; the Earl accused of attempting the life of Hohenlo; Hohenlo offering to shed the last drop of his blood for Queen Elizabeth; Queen Elizabeth giving orders to throw Hohenlo into prison as a traitor; Councillor Wilkes trembling for his life at the hands both of Leicester and Hohenlo; and Buckhurst doing his best to conciliate all parties, and imploring her Majesty in vain to send over money to help on the war, and to save her soldiers from starving.

For the Queen continued to refuse the loan of fifty thousand pounds which the Provinces solicited, and in hope of which the States had just agreed to an extra contribution of a million florins (100,000*l.*), a larger sum than had been levied by a single vote since the commencement of the war. It must be remembered, too, that the whole expense of the war fell upon Holland and Zeeland. The Province of Utrecht, where there was so strong a disposition to confer absolute authority upon Leicester, and to destroy the power of the States-General, contributed absolutely nothing. Since the loss of Deventer, nothing could be raised in the Provinces of Utrecht, Gelderland, or Overijssel; the Spaniards levying black mail upon the whole territory, and impoverishing the inhabitants till they became almost a nullity.<sup>2</sup> Was it strange then that the States of Holland and Zeeland, thus bearing nearly the whole burden of the war, should be dissatisfied with the hatred felt towards them by their sister Provinces so generously protected by them? Was it un-

<sup>1</sup> Buckhurst to Wilkes, 29 April, MS. already cited.

<sup>2</sup> Wilkes to Walsingham, 15 May, 1587. (S. P. Office MS.)

<sup>1</sup> Wilkes to Walsingham, 29 April, 1587.

natural that Barneveld, and Maurice, and Hohenlo, should be disposed to bridle the despotic inclinations of Leicester, thus fostered by those who existed, as it were, at their expense?

But the Queen refused the 50,000*l.*, although Holland and Zeeland had voted the 100,000*l.* „No reason that breedeth charges,” sighed Walsingham, „can in any sort be digested.” 1

It was not for want of vehement entreaty on the part of the Secretary of State and of Buckhurst that the loan was denied. At least she was entreated to send over money for her troops, who for six months past were unpaid. „Keeping the money in your coffers,” said Buckhurst, „doth yield no interest to you, and—which is above all earthly respects—it shall be the means of preserving the lives of many of your faithful subjects which otherwise must needs daily perish. Their miseries, through want of meat and money, I do protest to God so much moves my soul with commiseration of that which is past, and makes my heart tremble to think of the like to come again, that I humbly beseech your Majesty, for Jesus Christ’ sake, to have compassion on their lamentable estate past, and send some money to prevent the like hereafter.” 2

These were moving words, but the money did not come—charges could not be digested.

„The eternal God,” cried Buckhurst, „incline your heart to grant the petition of the States for the loan of the 50,000*l.*, and that speedily; for the dangerous terms of the State here and the mighty and forward preparation of the enemy admit no minute of delay, so that even to grant it slowly is to deny it utterly.” 3

He then drew a vivid picture of the capacity of the Netherlands to assist the endangered realm of England, if delay

were not suffered to destroy both commonwealths, by placing the Provinces in an enemy’s hand.

„Their many and notable havens,” he said, „the great number of ships and mariners, their impregnable towns, if they were in the hands of a potent prince that would defend them, and, lastly, the state of this shore, so near and opposite unto the land and coast of England—lo, the sight of all this daily in mine eye, conjoined with the deep, enrooted malice of that your so mighty enemy who seeketh to regain them; these things entering continually into the meditations of my heart—so much do they import the safety of yourself and your estate—do enforce me, in the abundance of my love and duty to your Majesty, most earnestly to *speake, write, and weep unto you*, lest when the occasion yet offered shall be gone by, this blessed means of your defence, by God’s provident goodness thus put into your hand, will then be utterly lost, lo, never, never more to be recovered again.” 1

It was a noble, wise, and eloquent appeal, but it was uttered in vain. Was not Leicester—his soul filled with petty schemes for reigning in Utrecht, and destroying the constitutional government of the Provinces—in full possession of the royal ear? And was not the same ear lent, at that most critical moment, to the insidious Alexander Farnese, with his whispers of peace, which were potent enough to drown all the preparations for the Invincible Armada?

Six months had rolled away since Leicester had left the Netherlands; six months long, the Provinces, left in a condition which might have become anarchy, had been saved by the wise government of the States-General; six months long the English soldiers had remained unpaid by their sovereign; and now for six weeks the honest, eloquent, intrepid, but gentle Buckhurst

1 Walsingham to Wilkes, 2 May, 1587. (S. P. Office MS.)

2 Buckhurst to the Queen, 19 April, 1587. (S. P. Office MS.)

3 Ibid.

1 Buckhurst to the Queen, MS. just cited.



had done his best to conciliate all parties, and to mould the Netherlands into an impregnable bulwark for the realm of England. But his efforts were treated with scorn by the Queen. She was still maddened by a sense of the injuries done by the States to Leicester. She was indignant that her envoy should have accepted such lame apologies for the 4th of February letter; that he should have received no better atonement for their insolent infringements of the Earl's orders during his absence; that he should have excused their contemptuous proceedings; and that, in short, he should have been willing to conciliate and forgive when he should have stormed and railed. „You conceived, it seemeth,” said her Majesty, „that a more sharper manner of proceeding would have exasperated matters to the prejudice of the service, and therefore you did think it more fit to wash the wounds rather with water than vinegar, wherein we would rather have wished, on the other side, that you had better considered that festering wounds had more need of corrosives than lenitives. Your own judgment ought to have taught that such a slight and mild kind of dealing with a people so ingrate and void of consideration as the said Estates have showed themselves towards us, is the ready way to increase their contempt.” 1

The envoy might be forgiven for believing that at any rate there would be no lack of corrosives or vinegar, so long as the royal tongue or pen could do their office, as the unfortunate deputies had found to their cost in their late interviews at Greenwich, and as her own envoys in the Netherlands were perpetually finding now. 2 The Queen was especially indignant that the Estates should defend the tone of their letters to the Earl on the ground that he had written a piquant epistle to them. „But

you can manifestly see their untruths in naming it a piquant letter,” said Elizabeth, „for it has no sour or sharp word therein, nor any clause of reprehension, but is full of gravity and gentle admonition. It deserved a thankful answer, and so you may maintain it to them to their reproof.” 1

The States doubtless thought that the loss of Deventer, and, with it, the almost ruinous condition of three out of the seven Provinces, might excuse on their part a little piquancy of phraseology, nor was it easy for them to express gratitude to the governor for his grave and gentle admonitions, after he had, by his secret document of 24th November, rendered himself fully responsible for the disaster they deplored,

She expressed unbounded indignation with Hohenlo, who, as she was well aware, continued to cherish a deadly hatred for Leicester. Especially she was exasperated, and with reason, by the assertion the Count had made concerning the governor's murderous designs upon him. „'Tis a matter,” said the Queen, „so foul and dishonourable that doth not only touch greatly the credit of the Earl, but also our own honour, to have one who hath been nourished and brought up by us, and of whom we have made show to the world to have extraordinarily favoured above any other of our own subjects, and used his service in those countries in a place of that reputation he held there, stand charged with so horrible and unworthy a crime. And therefore our pleasure is, even as you tender the continuance of our favour towards you, that you seek, by all the means you may, examining the Count Hollock, or any other party in this matter, to discover and to sift out how this malicious imputation hath been wrought; for we have reason to think that it hath grown out of some cunning device to stay the Earl's coming, and

1 Queen to Buckhurst, 3 May, 1587. (Br. Mus. Galba, D. I. 4, MS.)

2 Leicester to Walsingham.

1 Queen to Buckhurst. (MS. last cited.)

to discourage him from the continuance of his service in those countries." 1

And there the Queen was undoubtedly in the right. Hohenlo was resolved, if possible, to make the Earl's government of the Netherlands impossible. There was nothing in the story, however; and all that by the most diligent „sifting” could ever be discovered, and all that the Count could be prevailed upon to confess, was an opinion expressed by him that if he had gone with Leicester to England, it might perhaps have fared ill with him. 2 But men were given to loose talk in those countries. There was great freedom of tongue and pen; and as the Earl, whether with justice or not, had always been suspected of strong tendencies to assassination, it was not very wonderful that so reckless an individual as Hohenlo should promulgate opinions on such subjects without much reserve. „The number of crimes that have been imputed to me,” said Leicester, „would be incomplete, had this calumny not been added to all preceding ones.” 3 It is possible that assassination; especially poisoning, may have been a more commonplace affair in those days than our own. At any rate, it is certain that accusations of such crimes were of ordinary occurrence. Men were apt to die suddenly if they had mortal enemies, and people would gossip. At the very same moment, Leicester was deliberately accused not only of murderous intentions towards Hohenlo, but towards Thomas Wilkes and Count Lewis William of Nassau likewise. A trumpeter, arrested in Friesland, had just confessed that he had been employed by the Spanish governor of that province, Colonel Verdugo, to murder Count Lewis, and that four other persons had been entrusted with the same commission. The Count wrote to Verdugo, and received in reply an

indignant denial of the charge. „Had I heard of such a project,” said the Spaniard. „I would, on the contrary, have given you warning. And I give you one now.” He then stated, as a fact known to him on unquestionable authority, that the Earl of Leicester had assassins at that moment in his employ to take the life of Count Lewis, adding, that as for the trumpeter, who had just been hanged for the crime suborned by the writer, he was a most notorious lunatic. In reply, Lewis, while he ridiculed this plea of insanity set up for a culprit who had confessed his crime succinctly and voluntarily, expressed great contempt for the countercharge against Leicester. „His Excellency,” said the sturdy little Count, „is a virtuous gentleman, the most pious and God-fearing I have ever known. I am very sure that he could never treat his enemies in the manner stated, much less his friends. As for yourself, may God give me grace, in requital of your knavish trick, to make such a war upon you as becomes an upright soldier and a man of honour. 1

Thus there was at least one man—and a most important one—in the opposition-party who thoroughly believed in the honour of the governor-general.

The Queen then proceeded to lecture Lord Buckhurst very severely for having tolerated an instant the States' proposition to her for a loan of 50,000/. „The enemy,” she observed, is quite unable to attempt the siege of any town.” 2

Buckhurst was, however, instructed, in case the States' million should prove insufficient to enable the army to make head against the enemy, and in the event of „any alteration of the good-will of the people towards her, caused by her not yielding, in this their necessity, some convenient support,” to let them

1 Queen to Buckhurst. (MS. last cited.)

2 Buckhurst to Walsingham, 18th June, 1587. (Br. Mus. Galba, D. I. 96; MS.)

3 Groen v. Prinst. Archives, i. 36. Compare Bor, II. xxii. 992.

1 Letters of Verdugo and of Count Lewis William, in Bor, III. xxiii. p. 11.

2 Queen to Buckhurst, 3 May (MS. last cited.)

then understand, „as of himself, that if they would be satisfied with a loan of *ten or fifteen thousand pounds*, he would do his best endeavour to draw her Majesty to yield unto the furnishing of such a sum, with assured hope to obtain the same at her hands.”<sup>1</sup>

Truly Walsingham was right in saying that charges of any kind were difficult of digestion. Yet, even at that moment, Elizabeth had no more attached subjects in England than were the burghers of the Netherlands, who were as anxious as ever to 'annex their territory to her realms.

Thus, having expressed an affection for Leicester which no one doubted, having once more thoroughly browbeaten the States, and having soundly lectured Buckhurst—as a requital for his successful efforts to bring about a more wholesome condition of affairs—she gave the envoy a parting stab, with this postscript:—„There is small disproportion,” she said, „betwixt a fool who useth not wit because he hath it not, and him that useth it not when it should avail him.”<sup>2</sup> Leicester, too, was very violent in his attacks upon Buckhurst. The envoy had succeeded in reconciling Hohenlo with the brothers Norris, and had persuaded Sir John to offer the hand of friendship to Leicester, provided it were sure of being accepted. Yet in this desire to conciliate, the Earl found renewed cause for violence. „I would have had more regard of my Lord of Buckhurst,” he said, „if the case had been between him and Norris, but I must regard my own reputation the more that I see others would impair it. You have deserved little thanks of me, if I must deal plainly, who do equal me after this sort with him, whose best place is colonel under me, and once my servant, and preferred by me to all honorable place he had.”<sup>3</sup> And thus were

enterprises of great moment, intimately affecting the safety of Holland, of England, of all Protestantism, to be suspended between triumph and ruin, in order that the spleen of one individual—one Queen's favourite—might be indulged. The contempt of an insolent grandee for a distinguished commander—himself the son of a Baron, with a mother the dear friend of her sovereign—was to endanger the existence of great commonwealths. Can the influence of the individual for good or bad upon the destinies of the race be doubted, when the characters and conduct of Elizabeth and Leicester, Burghley and Walsingham, Philip and Parma, are closely scrutinized and broadly traced throughout the wide range of their effects?

„And I must now, in your Lordship's sight,” continued Leicester, „be made a counsellor with this companion, who never yet to this day hath done so much as take knowledge of my dislike of him; no, not to say this much, which I think would well become his better, that he was sorry to hear I had dislike to him, that he desired my suspension till he might either speak with me, or be charged from me, and if then he were not able to satisfy me, he would acknowledge his fault, and make me any honest satisfaction. This manner of dealing would have been no disparagement to his better. And even so I must think that your Lordship doth me wrong, knowing what you do, to make so little difference between John Norris; my man not long since, and now but my colonel under me, as though we were equals. And I cannot but more than marvel at this your proceeding, when I remember your promises of friendship, and your opinions resolutely set down. . . . You were so determined before you went hence, but must have become wonderfully enamoured of those men's unknown virtues in a few days of acquaintance, from the alteration that is grown by their own commen-

<sup>1</sup> Queen to Buckhurst, 3 May (MS. last cited.)      <sup>2</sup> Ibid.

<sup>3</sup> Leicester to Buckhurst, 30 April, 1587. (S. P. Office MS.)



dations of themselves. You knew very well that all the world should not make me serve with John Norris. Your sudden change from mislike to liking has, by consequence, presently cast disgrace upon me. But all is not gold that glitters, nor every shadow a perfect representation. . . . You knew he should not serve with me, but either you thought me a very inconstant man, or else a very simple soul, resolving with you as I did, for you to take the course you have done." 1 He felt, however, quite strong in her Majesty's favour. He knew himself her favourite, beyond all chance or change, and was sure, so long as either lived, to thrust his enemies, by her aid, into outer darkness. Woe to Buckhurst, and Norris, and Wilkes, and all others who consorted with his enemies. Let them flee from the wrath to come! And truly they were only too anxious to do so, for they knew that Leicester's hatred was poisonous. „He is not so facile to forget as ready to revenge," 2 said poor Wilkes, with neat alliteration. „My very heavy and mighty adversary will disgrace and undo me." 3

„It sufficeth," continued Leicester, „that her Majesty doth find my dealings well enough, and so, I trust, will graciously use me. As for the reconciliations and love-days you have made there, truly I have liked well of it; for you did show me your disposition therein before, and I allowed of it, and I had received letters both from Count Maurice and Hohenlo of their humility and kindness, but now in your last letters you say they have uttered the cause of their mislike towards me, which you forbear to write of, looking so speedily for my return." 4

1 Leicester to Buckhurst. The letter is from Croydon, and pathetically signed, „Your poor friend, R. Leycester."

2 Wilkes to Walsingham, 13 April, 1587. (S. P. Office MS.)

3 Same to the Lord Chancellor, 3rd June, 1587. (S. P. Office MS.)

4 Leicester to Buckhurst, 30 April. (MS. already cited.)

But the Earl knew well enough what the secret was, for had it not been specially confided by the judicious Bartholomew to Atye, who had incontinently told his master? „This pretence that I should kill Hohenlo," cried Leicester, „is a matter properly foisted in to bring me to choler. I will not suffer it to rest thus. Its authors shall be duly and severely punished. And albeit I see well enough the plot of this wicked device, yet shall it not work the effect the devisers have done it for. No, my Lord, he is a villain and a false, lying knave whosoever he be, and of what nation soever, that hath forged this device. Count Hohenlo doth know I never gave him cause to fear me so much. There were ways and means offered me to have quitted him of the country if I had so liked. This new monstrous villany which is now found out I do hate and detest, as I would look for the right judgment of God to fall upon myself, if I had but once imagined it. All this makes good proof of Wilkes's good dealing with me, that hath heard of so vile and villanous a reproach of me, and never gave me knowledge. But I trust your Lordship shall receive her Majesty's order for this, as for a matter that toucheth herself in honour, and me her poor servant and minister, as dearly as any matter can do; and I will so take it and use it to the uttermost." 1

We have seen how anxiously Buckhurst had striven to do his duty upon a most difficult mission. Was it unnatural that so fine a nature as his should be disheartened, at reaping nothing but sneers and contumely from the haughty sovereign he served, and from the insolent favourite who controlled her counsils. „I beseech your Lordship," he said to Burghley, „keep one ear for me, and do not hastily condemn me before you hear mine answer. For if I ever did or shall do any acceptable service to her Majesty, it was in the stay and

1 Ibid.

appeasing of these countries, ever ready at my coming to have cast off all good respect towards us, and to have entered even into some desperate cause. In the mean time I am hardly thought of by her Majesty, and in her opinion condemned before mine answer be understood. Therefore I beseech you to help me to return, and not thus to lose her Majesty's favour for my good desert, wasting here my mind, body, my wits, wealth, and all, with continual toils, cares, and troubles, more than I am able to endure." 1

But besides his instructions to smooth and expostulate, in which he had succeeded so well, and had been requited so ill, Buckhurst had received a still more difficult commission. He had been ordered to broach the subject of peace, as delicately as possible, but without delay; first sounding the leading politicians, inducing them to listen to the Queen's suggestions on the subject, persuading them that they ought to be satisfied with the principles of the pacification of Ghent, and that it was hopeless for the Provinces to continue the war with their mighty adversary any longer. 2

1 Buckhurst to Burghley, 27th May, 1587. (S. P. Office MS.)

2 „Whereas we have late used your service in an intended treaty of peace betwixt the King of Spain and us, dealt in by the Duke of Parma . . . we send you copies of such letters as have lately been written to ourself by the Duke, and by Champagny to the Controller. . . . We have taken order that the Duke shall be put in mind of the treaty of Ghent, anno '76 . . . which being afterwards approved by the King, was published in 1577, . . . having just cause to hope that, if the King be willing to embrace peace, and the Duke to further the same, as he pretendeth, he may be induced to assent to such a tolerance as in the said pacification is contained. Now it resteth that you should seek to frame the minds of the people of those countries to such good means as by you shall be thought expedient to content themselves with the said tolerance; for which purpose you shall, as of yourself, as one that wisheth well to those countries, deal with some well-chosen persons there, such as you shall learn to be good patriots, . . . laying before them how impossible it is for

Most reluctantly had Buckhurst fulfilled his sovereign's commands in this disastrous course. To talk to the Hollanders of the Ghent pacification seemed puerile. That memorable treaty, ten years before, had been one of the great landmarks of progress, one of the great achievements of William the Silent. By its provisions, public exercise of the reformed religion had been secured for the two Provinces of Holland and Zeeland, and it had been agreed that the secret practice of those rites should be elsewhere winked at, until such time as the States-General, under the auspices of Philip II., should otherwise ordain. But was it conceivable, that now,—after Philip's authority had been solemnly abjured, and the reformed worship had become the public dominant religion throughout all the Provinces,—the whole republic should return to the Spanish dominion, and to such toleration as might be sanctioned by an assembly professing loyalty to the Most Catholic King?

Buckhurst had repeatedly warned the Queen, in fervid and eloquent language, as to the intentions of Spain. „There was never peace well made," he observed, „without a mighty war preceding, and always, the sword in hand

them, by means of their contributions, with the burden whereof the people do already find themselves so much grieved, to continue the war, and to make head any longer against so mighty and puissant a prince as the King of Spain, and how unable ourselves shall be to supply them still with such relief as the necessity of their state shall require. . . . You may advise them to dispose both their own minds and those of the people to a sound peace, which, in your opinion, they cannot at any time treat of with greater advantage than at this present, the King of Spain being at so low an ebb both at home and in these countries, for want as well of victuals as of other necessary things to continue the wars. . . . And if you shall find that the using of these reasons and persuasions in our name may further the cause, by moving them rather to hearken unto peace, we leave it to yourself to use, in such case, your own discretion therein" &c. Queen to Buckhurst, May, 1587. (S. P. Office MS.)

is the best pen to write the conditions of peace."

"It ever prince had cause," he continued, "to think himself beset with doubt and danger, you, sacred Queen, have most just cause not only to think it, but even certainly to believe it. The Pope doth daily plot nothing else but how he may bring to pass your utter overthrow; the French King hath already sent you threatenings of revenge, and though for that pretended cause I think little will ensue, yet he is blind that seeth not the mortal dislike that boileth deep in his heart for other respects against you. The Scottish King, not only in regard of his future hope, but also by reason of some over-conceit in his heart, may be thought a dangerous neighbour to you. The King of Spain armeth and extendeth all his power to ruin both you and your estate. And if the Indian gold have corrupted also the King of Denmark, and made him likewise Spanish, as I marvellously fear; why will not your Majesty, beholding the flames of your enemies on every side kindling around, *unlock all your coffers and convert your treasure for the advancing of worthymen, and for the arming of ships and men-of-war that may defend you, since princes' treasures serve only to that end, and, lie they never so fast or so full in their chests, can no ways so defend them?*"

"The eternal God, in whose hands the hearts of kings do rest, dispose and guide your sacred Majesty to do that which may be most according to His blessed will, and best for you, as I trust he will, even for His mercy's sake, both toward your Majesty and the whole realm of England, whose desolation is thus sought and compassed." 1

Was this the language of a mischievous intriguer, who was sacrificing the true interests of his country, and whose proceedings were justly earning for him

rebuke and disgrace at the hands of his sovereign? Or was it rather the noble advice of an upright statesman, a lover of his Queen, who had looked through the atmosphere of falsehood in which he was doing his work, and who had detected, with rare sagacity, the secret purposes of those who were then misruling the world?

Buckhurst had no choice, however, but to obey. His private efforts were of course fruitless, but he announced to her Majesty that it was his intention very shortly to bring the matter—according to her wish—before the assembly.

But Elizabeth, seeing that her counsel had been unwise and her action premature, turned upon her envoy, as she was apt to do, and rebuked him for his obedience, so soon as obedience had proved inconvenient to herself.

"Having perused your letters," she said, "by which you so at large debate unto us what you have done in the matter of peace . . . we find it strange that you should proceed further. And although we had given you full and ample direction to proceed to a public dealing in that cause, yet your own discretion, seeing the difficulties and dangers that you yourself saw in the propounding of the matter, ought to have led you to delay till further command from us." 1

Her Majesty then instructed her envoy, in case he had not yet "propounded the matter in the state-house to the general assembly," to pause entirely until he heard her further pleasure. She concluded, as usual, with a characteristic postscript in her own hand.

"Oh! weigh deeplier this matter," she said, "than, with so shallow a judgment, to spill the cause, impair my honour, and shame yourself, with all your wit, that once was supposed better than to lose a bargain for the hand-ling." 2

1 Buckhurst to the Queen, 30 April, 1587. (Br. Mus. Galba, C. xi. p. 438, MS.)

1 Queen to Buckhurst; 4 June, 1587. (S. P. Office MS.)

2 Ibid.



Certainly the sphinx could have propounded no more puzzling riddles than those which Elizabeth thus suggested to Buckhurst. To make war without an army, to support an army without pay, to frame the hearts of a whole people to peace who were unanimous for war, and this without saying a word either in private or public; to dispose of the Netherlanders favourably to herself and to Leicester, by refusing them men and money, browbeating them for asking for it, and subjecting them to a course of perpetual insults, which she called „corrosives,” to do all this and more seemed difficult. If not to do it were to spill the cause and to lose the bargain, it was more than probable that they would be spilt and lost.

But the ambassador was no Œdipus—although a man of delicate perceptions and brilliant intellect—and he turned imploringly to a wise counsellor for aid against the tormentor who chose to be so stony-faced and enigmatical.

„Touching the matter of peace,” said he to Walsingham, „I have written somewhat to her Majesty in cipher, so as I am sure you will be called for to decipher it. *If you did know how infinitely her Majesty did at my departure and before—for in this matter of peace she hath specially used me this good while—command me, pray me, and persuade me to further and hasten the same with all the speed possible that might be, and how, on the other side, I have continually been the man and the mean that have most plainly dehorted her from such post-haste, and that she should never make good peace without a puissant army in the field, you would then say that I had now cause to fear her displeasure for being too slow, and not too forward. And as for all the reasons which in my last letters are set down, her Majesty hath debated them with me many times.*” 1

1 Buckhurst to Walsingham, 13 June, 1587.  
(Br. Mus Galba, D. I. 96. MS.)

And thus midsummer was fast approaching, the commonwealth was without a regular government, Leicester remained in England nursing his wrath and preparing his schemes, the Queen was at Greenwich, corresponding with Alexander Farnese, and sending riddles to Buckhurst, when the enemy—who, according to her Majesty, was „quite unable to attempt the siege of any town”—suddenly appeared in force in Flan- ders, and invested Sluys. This most important seaport, both for the destiny of the republic and of England at that critical moment, was insufficiently defended. It was quite time to put an army in the field, with a governor-general to command it.

On the 5th June there was a meeting of the state-council at the Hague. Count Maurice, Hohenlo, and Moeurs were present, besides several members of the States-General. Two propositions were before the council. The first was that it was absolutely necessary to the safety of the republic, now that the enemy had taken the field, and the important city of Sluys was besieged, for Prince Maurice to be appointed captain-general, until such time as the Earl of Leicester or some other should be sent by her Majesty. The second was to confer upon the state-council the supreme government in civil affairs, for the same period, and to repeal all limitations and restrictions upon the powers of the council made secretly by the Earl.

Chancellor Leoninus, „that grave, wise old man,” moved the propositions. The deputies of the States were requested to withdraw. The vote of each councillor was demanded. Buckhurst, who, as the Queen’s representative—together with Wilkes and John Norris—had a seat in the council, refused to vote. „It was a matter,” he discreetly observed, „with which he had not been instructed by her Majesty to inter-meddle.” Norris and Wilkes also begged to be excused from voting, and, al-

though earnestly urged to do so by the whole council, persisted in their refusal. Both measures were then carried. 1

No sooner was the vote taken, than an English courier entered the council-chamber, with pressing despatches from Lord Leicester. The letters were at once read. The Earl announced his speedy arrival, and summoned both the States-General and the council to meet him at Dort, where his lodgings were already taken. All were surprised, but none more than Buckhurst, Wilkes, and Norris; for no intimation of this sudden resolution had been received by them, nor any answer given to various propositions, considered by her Majesty as indispensable preliminaries to the governor's visit. 2

The council adjourned till after dinner, and Buckhurst held conference meantime with various counsellors and deputies. On the reassembling of the board, it was urged by Barneveld, in the name of the States, that the election of Prince Maurice should still hold good. „Although by these letters,” said he, „it would seem that her Majesty had resolved upon the speedy return of his Excellency, yet, inasmuch as the counsels and resolutions of princes are often subject to change upon new occasion, it does not seem fit that our late purpose concerning Prince Maurice should receive any interruption.”

Accordingly, after brief debate, both resolutions voted in the morning were confirmed in the afternoon.

„So now,” said Wilkes, „Maurice is general of all the forces, *et quid sequitur nescimus*” 3

But whatever else was to follow, it was very certain that Wilkes would not stay. His great enemy had sworn his destruction, and would now take his choice, whether to do him to death himself, or to throw him into the clutch of the ferocious Hohenlo. „As for my

own particular,” said the counsellor, „the word is go, whosoever cometh or cometh not,” 1 and he announced to Walsingham his intention of departing without permission, should he not immediately receive it from England. „I shall stay to be dandled with no love-days nor leave-taking,” he observed. 2

1 Wilkes to Walsingham, 29 April, 1587. (S. P. Office MS.)

2 Wilkes to Walsingham, 8 June, 1587. (S. P. Office MS.)

From the very moment of Leicester's arrival in England, he seems to have conceived a violent hatred to Concillor Wilkes. Yet a careful inspection of the correspondence shows that never was hatred more unjust. Wilkes had told the truth concerning the expenses incurred by England and the States during the Earl's first term of administration. He could not have done less without dereliction of duty, and he forwarded certified vouchers for all his statements. He always did his best to sustain the governor's character, and to carry out his legitimate views. As time wore on, he was obliged to state the disadvantages resulting from his protracted absence, and he was forced, at last, to admit the truth as to his great unpopularity. He even admitted privately, on one occasion, that, in consequence of that unpopularity, some other governor might be sent from England more acceptable to the Provinces. This was the sum of his offences in regard to Leicester. Towards the Queen he manifested himself an intelligent, honest, and most assiduous servant, but he had incurred the hostility of the favourite, and for that there was no redress. Even so early as January he felt that he had lost Leicester's favour, although he protested he „would repurchase it with the loss of his two best fingers.” (Wilkes to Leicester, 27 Jan. 1587.

—S. P. Office MS.); and he wrote at the same time to the Queen, complaining that he was in danger of his life, as recompense for his faithful service—a life which he hoped to venture in better sort for her Majesty's service. He was threatened at home, he said, and endangered abroad. Wilkes to the Queen, 30 Jan. 1587. (S. P. Office MS.) A few months later, matters had grown much worse. Leicester was intending to wreak his revenge upon him by means of third persons, who by his malignant insinuations had been made hostile to the counsellor. „Whereunto is now added the danger of my poor life,” he says, „and fortune, for that I am secretly given to understand, by a dear friend of mine, and inward with my great and heavy enemy, that he hath sworn and protested, even now of late, to take his revenge on me—how or in what sort I know not, but have good cause to doubt, considering the mind of my enemy, that he will not be satisfied

1 Wilkes to Walsingham, 8 June, 1587. (S. P. Office MS.) 2 Ibid. 3 Ibid.

But Leicester had delayed his coming too long. The country felt that it had

with any mere offence to be done unto me, which I suppose he will never do of himself, nor by any of his own, but a third means, whereunto he hath a gap opened unto him by my own letters written unto him from hence, wherein I had touched some persons of quality here for their indirect proceedings against her Majesty and our nation. . . . Therefore, I humbly beseech you to move her Majesty for my speedy return." Wilkes to Hatton, 19 April, 1587. (S. P. Office MS.) In a letter to Walsingham of same date, he alluded to the "deadly revenge threatened against him by the Earl with very bitter words," and indicates the same scheme by which third persons are to inflict it. "I would be loth to commit myself to his mercy," he says; "your honour knoweth him better than I do. . . . God is my witness, I have, since his departure from these countries, deserved as well of him as ever did any. . . I will stand to my justification, and prove that I have done him with her Majesty as many good offices as any man that came from hence," and he then most urgently solicited permission to depart. This permission the government were most reluctant to grant, and Wilkes protested loudly against his continuance in office at such "hazard to his poor life, without means of defence, in the quality of his ruin or death. 'Tis a hard reward for my faithful services," he said, "to be left to the mercy of such as have will and means by revenge to bereave her Majesty of a true and obedient servant, and me of life, in an obscure sort, to my perpetual infamy, to the pleasing of mine enemies, and the discomforting of all honest men, by an example, from serving of her Majesty with sincerity," &c. W. to Walsing., 29th April, 1587. (S. P. Office MS.) And he soon afterwards declared to Walsingham (15 May, 1587. S. P. Office MS.), that, in case he should be left there to the mercy of his great enemy, if he returned, he would venture "to hazard her Majesty's favour in returning home without license." His alarm was no greater for his life than for his reputation, both which Leicester, in his belief, was sworn to destroy. "I do find that my very heavy and mighty adversary," he writes to the Lord Chancellor (8 June, 1587. S. P. Office MS.), "doth perpetually travail with her Majesty to disgrace and undo me, and I have cause to doubt that he doth or shall prevail against me, considering the goodness of her Majesty's nature to be induced to believe whom she favoureth, and his subtlety to persuade. I have therefore no mean in respect of the great inequality between him and me, but either to be held up by my honourable friends, assisted with the wings of mine own integrity, or to fall to the ground with disgrace and infamy, to the discouragement of all that shall serve her Majesty in like places."

been trifled with by his absence—at so critical a period—of seven months. It was known too that the Queen was secretly treating with the enemy, and that Buckhurst had been privately sounding leading personages upon that subject, by her orders. This had caused a deep, suppressed indignation. Over and over again had the English government been warned as to the danger of delay. "Your length in resolving," Wilkes had said, "whatsoever your secret purposes may be, will put us to new plunges before long." 1 The mission of Buckhurst was believed to be, "but a stale, having some other intent than was expressed." And at last, the new plunge had been fairly taken. It seemed now impossible for Leicester to regain the absolute authority which he had for a brief season possessed. The States-General, under able leaders, had become used to a government which had been forced upon them, and which they had wielded with success. Holland and Zealand, paying the whole expense of the war, were not likely to endure again the absolute sovereignty of a foreigner, guided by a backstairs council of reckless politicians—most of whom were unprincipled, and some of whom had been proved to be felons—and established at Utrecht, which contributed nothing to the general purse. If Leicester were really coming, it seemed certain that he would be held to acknowledge the ancient constitution, and to respect the sovereignty of the States-General. It was resolved that he should be well bridled. The sensations of Barneveld and his party may therefore be imagined, when a private letter of Leicester to his secretary—, the fellow named Junius," as Hohenlo called him—having been intercepted at this moment, gave

Such passages paint the condition of the civil service in England, during the reign of Leicester and Elizabeth, more vividly than could be done by a long dissertation.

1 Wilkes to Walsingham, 17 May, 1587, (S. P. Office MS.)



them an opportunity of studying the Earl's secret thoughts.

The Earl informed his correspondent that he was on the point of starting for the Netherlands. He ordered him therefore to proceed at once to reassure those whom he knew well disposed as to the good intentions of her Majesty and of the governor-general. And if, on the part of Lord Buckhurst or others, it should be intimated that the Queen was resolved to treat for peace with the King of Spain, and wished to have the opinion of the Netherlanders on that subject, *he was to say boldly that Lord Buckhurst never had any such charge*, and that her Majesty had not been treating at all. She had only been attempting to sound the King's intentions towards the Netherlands, in case of any accord. Having received no satisfactory assurance on the subject, her Majesty was determined to proceed with the defence of these countries. This appeared by the expedition of Drake against Spain, and by the return of the Earl, with a good number of soldiers paid by her Majesty over and above her ordinary subsidy. 1

„You are also,” said the Earl, „to tell those who have the care of the people” (the ministers of the reformed church and others), „that I am returning in the confidence that they will, in future, cause all past difficulties to cease, and that they will yield to me a legitimate authority, such as befits for administering the sovereignty of the Provinces, without my being obliged to endure all the oppositions and counterminings of the States, as in times past. The States must content themselves with retaining the power which they claim to have exercised under the governors of the Emperor and the King, without attempting anything farther during my government, since I desire

to do nothing of importance without the advice of the council, which will be composed legitimately of persons of the country. You will also tell them that her Majesty commands me to return unless I can obtain from the States the authority which is necessary, in order not to be governor in appearance only and on paper. And I wish that those who are good may be apprized of all this, in order that nothing may happen to their prejudice and ruin, and contrary to their wishes.” 1

There were two very obvious comments to be made upon this document. Firstly, the States—*de jure*, as they claimed, and *de facto* most unquestionably—were in the position of the Emperor and King. They were the sovereigns. The Earl wished them to content themselves with the power which they exercised under the Emperor's governors. This was like requesting the Emperor, when in the Netherlands, to consider himself subject to his own governor. The second obvious reflection was that the Earl, in limiting his authority by a state-council, expected, no doubt, to appoint that body himself—as he had done before—and to allow the members only the right of talking and of voting, without the power of enforcing their decisions. In short, it was very plain that Leicester meant to be more absolute than ever.

As to the flat contradiction given to Buckhurst's proceedings in the matter of peace, that statement could scarcely deceive any one who had seen her Majesty's letters and instructions to her envoy.

It was also a singularly deceitful course to be adopted by Leicester towards Buckhurst and towards the Netherlands, because his own private instructions, drawn up at the same moment, expressly enjoined him to do exactly what Buckhurst had been doing. He was most strictly and earnestly commanded to deal

1 Leicester to Junius, Greenwich, 15 June, 1587. (S. P. Office MS.) Compare Meteren, xiv. 255. Hoofd, Vervolgh, 249, *et mult. al.*

1 Leicester to Junius, *ubi sup.*

privately with all such persons as had influence with the „common sort of people,” in order that they should use their influence with those common people in favour of peace, bringing vividly before them the excessive burthens of the war, their inability to cope with so potent a prince as Philip, and the necessity the Queen was under of discontinuing her contributions to their support. He was to make the same representations to the States, and he was further most explicitly to inform all concerned, that, in case they were unmoved by these suggestions, her Majesty had quite made up her mind to accept the handsome offers of peace held out by the King of Spain, and to leave them to their fate.

It seemed scarcely possible that the letter to Junius and the instructions for the Earl should have been dated the same week, and should have emanated from the same mind; but such was the fact.

He was likewise privately to assure Maurice and Hohenlo—in order to remove their anticipated opposition to the peace—that such care should be taken in providing for them as that „they should have no just cause to dislike thereof, but to rest satisfied withal.”

With regard to the nature of his authority, he was instructed to claim a kind of dictatorship in everything regarding the command of the forces, and the distribution of the public treasure. All offices were to be at his disposal. Every florin contributed by the States was to be placed in his hands, and spent according to his single will. He was also to have plenary power to prevent the trade in victuals with the enemy by death and confiscation.

If opposition to any of these proposals were made by the States-General, he was to appeal to the States of each Province, to the towns and communities, and in case it should prove impossible for him „to be furnished with the desired

authority,” he was then instructed to say that it was „her Majesty’s meaning to leave them to their own counsel and defence, and to withdraw the support that she had yielded to them; seeing plainly that the continuance of the confused government now reigning among them could not but work their ruin.”

Both these papers came into Barneveld’s hands, through the agency of Ortel, the States’ envoy in England, before the arrival of the Earl in the Netherlands. 2

Of course they soon became the topics of excited conversation and of alarm in every part of the country. Buckhurst, touched to the quick by the reflection upon those proceedings of his which had been so explicitly enjoined upon him, and so reluctantly undertaken, appealed earnestly to her Majesty. He reminded her, as delicately as possible, that her honour, as well as his own, was at stake by Leicester’s insolent disavowals of her authorised ambassador. He besought her to remember „what even her own royal hand had written to the Duke of Parma;” and how much his honour was interested „by the disavowing of his dealing about the peace begun by her Majesty’s commandment.” He adjured her with much eloquence to think upon the consequences of stirring up the common and unstable multitude against their rulers; upon the pernicious effects of allowing the clergy to inflame the passions of the people against the government. „Under the name of such as have charge over the people,” said Buckhurst, „are understood the ministers and chaplains of the churches in every town, by the means of whom it seems that his Lordship tendeth his whole purpose to attain to his desire of the administration of the sovereignty.” He assured the

1 Instructions for the Earl of Leicester, 20 June, 1587. Corrected by Lord Burghley and Secretary Walsingham. (S. P. Office MS.) Compare Bor, II. xxi. 906, 907.

2 Bor, II. xxii. 906, 907. „By the way,” writes Leicester to Burghley, „send away Ortel; he is a bad fellow.” Leicester to Burghley, 17th Aug. 1587. (S. P. Office MS.)

Queen that this scheme of Leicester to seize virtually upon that sovereignty would be a disastrous one. „The States are resolved,” said he, „since your Majesty doth refuse the sovereignty, to lay it upon no creature else, as a thing contrary to their oath and allegiance to their country.” He reminded her also that the States had been dissatisfied with the Earl’s former administration, believing that he had exceeded his commission, and that they were determined therefore to limit his authority at his return. „Your sacred Majesty may consider,” he said, „what effect all this may work among the common and ignorant people, by intimating that, unless they shall procure him the administration of such a sovereignty as he requireth, their ruin may ensue.”<sup>1</sup> Buckhurst also informed her that he had despatched Councillor Wilkes to England, in order that he might give more ample information on all these affairs by word of mouth than could well be written.

It need hardly be stated that Barneveld came down to the States’-house with these papers in his hand, and thundered against the delinquent and intriguing governor till the general indignation rose to an alarming height. False statements of course were made to Leicester as to the substance of the Advocate’s discourse. He was said to have charged upon the English govern-

<sup>1</sup> Buckhurst to the Queen, 28 June, 1587. (Brit. Mus. Galba, C. xi. p. 61, MS.)

ment an intention to seize forcibly upon their cities, and to transfer them to Spain on payment of the sums due to the Queen from the States, and to have declared that he had found all this treason in the secret instructions of the Earl.<sup>1</sup> But Barneveld had read the instructions, to which the attention of the reader has just been called, and had strictly stated the truth, which was damaging enough, without need of exaggeration.

<sup>1</sup> Memorial in Burghley’s hand, Sept. 1587. Killigrew and Beale to the Lords, 11th Sept. 1587. Leicester to Burghley, 17 Aug. 1587. Same to Same, 11 Sept. 1587. (S. P. Office MSS.)

„These persuasions of this fellow Barneveld,” says the Earl in the last cited letter, „wrought great impressions on many men that her Majesty had a former resolution in herself to make peace without these countries, and that my now sending was only to get authority here with the commandment of places and people, that, if these men would not agree to such peace as her Majesty would appoint, they should be compelled thereto by such forces as I should have at my disposition; alleging also that these few supplies which I brought was to augment my power the stronger for this only end. These informations, assisted with the report of the copy of my instructions and letters, for the verifying of which the party took new oath that they were the true copies which he had, and moved him to speak so plainly, which matters were very probable and greatly persuadable to the common sort; yet is the matter so used as notwithstanding all his allegations both of instructions and letters, all men are satisfied; and I have not denied but such words are in my instructions and such a letter written, and yet we made all to agree with an honourable and gracious intention in her Majesty towards them all,” &c. (Compare Meteren, xiv. 255 *seq.* Bor., II. xlii: 906, 907. Hoofd Vervolgh, 239. Wagen., viii, 223-224.

## CHAPTER XVI.

Situation of Sluys—Its Dutch and English Garrison—Williams writes from Sluys to the Queen—Jealousy between the Earl and States—Schemes to relieve Sluys—Which are feeble and unsuccessful—The Town capitulates—Parma enters—Leicester enraged—The Queen angry with the Anti-Leicesterians—Norris, Wilkes, and Buckhurst punished—Drake sails for Spain—

His Exploits at Cadiz and Lisbon—He is rebuked by Elizabeth.

WHEN Dante had passed through the third circle of the Inferno—a desert of red-hot sand, in which lay a multitude of victims of divine wrath, additionally



tortured by an ever-descending storm of fiery flakes—he was led by Virgil out of this burning wilderness along a narrow causeway. This path was protected, he said, against the showers of flame by the lines of vapour which rose eternally from a boiling brook. Even by such shadowy bulwarks, added the poet, do the Flemings between Kadzand and Bruges protect their land against the ever-threatening sea. 1

It was precisely among these slender dykes between Kadzand and Bruges that Alexander Farnese had now planted all the troops that he could muster in the field. It was his determination to conquer the city of Sluys; for the possession of that important seaport was necessary for him as a basis for the invasion of England, which now occupied all the thoughts of his sovereign and himself.

Exactly opposite the city was the island of Kadzand, once a fair and fertile territory, with a city and many flourishing villages upon its surface, but at that epoch diminished to a small dreary sand-bank by the encroachments of the ocean.

A stream of inland water, rising a few leagues to the south of Sluys, divided itself into many branches just before reaching the city, converted the surrounding territory into a miniature archipelago—the islands of which were shifting, treacherous sand-banks at low water, and submerged ones at flood—and then widening and deepening into a considerable estuary, opened for the city a capacious harbour, and an excellent although intricate passage to the sea. The city, which was well built and thriving, was so hidden in its labyrinth of canals and streamlets, that it seemed

almost as difficult a matter to find Sluys as to conquer it. It afforded safe harbour for five hundred large vessels; and its possession, therefore, was extremely important for Parma. Besides these natural defences, the place was also protected by fortifications, which were as well constructed as the best of that period. There was a strong rampire and many towers. There was also a detached citadel of great strength, looking towards the sea; and there was a ravelin, called St. Anne's, looking in the direction of Bruges. A mere riband of dry land in that quarter was all of solid earth to be found in the environs of Sluys.

The city itself stood upon firm soil, but that soil had been hollowed into a vast system of subterranean magazines, not for warlike purposes, but for cellars, an Sluys had been from a remote period the great entrepôt of foreign wines in the Netherlands. 1

While the eternal disputes between Leicester and the States were going on both in Holland and in England, while the secret negotiations between Alexander Farnese and Queen Elizabeth were slowly proceeding at Brussels and Greenwich, the Duke, notwithstanding the destitute condition of his troops, and the famine which prevailed throughout the obedient Provinces, had succeeded in bringing a little army of five thousand foot, and something less than one thousand horse, into the field. 2 A portion

1 Authorities last cited. Meteren, xiv. 254v, 255. Hoofd, Verv. 254.

2 Parma to Philip II., 6 Aug. 1587. (Arch. de Simancas, MS.)

This force was subsequently very much increased. It is impossible, however, to arrive at the exact numbers. They are not stated by Farnese in his letters to the King, preserved in the Archives of Simancas. Strada (ii. 489) gives the numbers as stated in the text. Roger Williams, however, in a letter to Queen Elizabeth, sent from Sluys at an early period of the siege, says that the Duke of Parma had come before the town, a week before, in person, with four regiments of Walloons, four of Germans, fifty-two companies of Spaniards, twenty-four cornets of horse, and forty-eight pieces of battery, and

1 „Hora cen porta l' un de' duri margini  
Et il fumo del ruscel' di sopra aduggia  
Si che dal fuoco salva l' acqua egl' argini  
Qual i Fiamminghi fra Guzzante e Bruggia  
Temendo il flotto che ver lor s' avventa  
Fanno li schermi acciochè 'l mar si fuggia.”  
*Inverno, Canto xv.*

Compare Guicciardini, *Descript. des Pays Bas*, ed. 1582, p. 379. Strada, ii. 487. Bentivoglio, p. ii. l. v. 313.

of this force he placed under the command of the veteran La Motte. That distinguished campaigner had assured the commander-in-chief that the reduction of the city would be an easy achievement. 1 Alexander soon declared that the enterprise was the most difficult one that he had ever undertaken. 2 Yet, two years before, he had carried to its triumphant conclusion the famous siege of Antwerp. He stationed his own division upon the isle of Kadzand, and strengthened his camp by additionally fortifying those shadowy bulwarks by which the island, since the age of Dante, had entrenched itself against the assaults of ocean.

On the other hand, La Motte, by the orders of his chief, had succeeded after a sharp struggle in carrying the fort of St. Anne. A still more important step was the surprising of Blankenberg, a small fortified place on the coast, about midway between Ostend and Sluys, by which the sea-communications with the former city, for the relief of the beleaguered town, were interrupted. 3

Parma's demonstrations against Sluys had commenced in the early days of June. The commandant of the place was Arnold de Groenevelt, a Dutch noble of ancient lineage and approved valour. His force was, however, very meagre, hardly numbering more than eight hundred, all Netherlands, but counting among its officers several most distinguished personages—Nicholas de Maulde, Adolphus de Meetkerke and his younger

brother, Captain Heraugiere, and other well-known partisans.

On the threatening of danger the commandant had made application to Sir William Russell, the worthy successor of Sir Philip Sidney in the government of Flushing. He had received from him, in consequence, a reinforcement of eight hundred English soldiers, under several eminent chieftains, foremost among whom were the famous Welshman Roger Williams, Captain Huntley, Baskerville, Sir Francis Vere, Ferdinando Gorges, and Captain Hart. This combined force, however, was but a slender one, there being but sixteen hundred men to protect two miles and a half of rampart, besides the forts and ravelins. 1

But, such as it was, no time was lost in vain regrets. The sorties against the besiegers were incessant and brilliant. On one occasion Sir Francis Vere—conspicuous in the throng in his red mantilla, and supported only by one hundred Englishmen and Dutchmen under Captain Baskerville—held at bay eight companies of the famous Spanish legion called the Terzo Veijo, at push of pike, took many prisoners, and forced the Spaniards from the position in which they were entrenching themselves. 2 On the other hand, Farnese declared that he had never in his life witnessed anything so unflinching as the courage of his troops; employed as they were in digging trenches where the soil was neither land nor water, exposed to inundation by the suddenly opened sluices, to a plunging fire from the forts, and to perpetual hand-to-hand combats with an active and fearless foe, and yet pumping away in the coffer-dams—which they had invented by way of obtaining a standing-ground for their operations—as steadily and sedately as if engaged

that the next day there arrived one regiment of Italians and one of Burgundians. This would give a total of at least 17,600 men, more than thrice as many as the historiographer of the Duke allows. B. Williams to the Queen <sup>9</sup>/<sub>19</sub> June, 1587. (Brit. Mus. Galba,

D. I. p. 40, MS.)

1 Parma to Philip II., 6 Aug. 1587. (Arch. de Simancas, MS.)

2 Ibid. „En mio poco juicio la mas dificultosa y laboriosa cosa que ho visto e acometida en Flandes.”

3 Strada, ii. 488. Meteren, *ubi sup.* Bor, II. xlii. 984. Bentivoglio, Hoofd, *ubi sup.*

1 Strada, Meteren, Bor, Bentivoglio, Hoofd, *ubi sup.* Roger Williams, 'Discourse of War,' apud Grimstone, 'Hist. Netherlands,' l. xiii. 962.

2 R. Williams, *ubi sup.*

in purely pacific employments. 1 The besieged were inspired by a courage equally remarkable. The regular garrison was small enough, but the burghers were courageous, and even the women organized themselves into a band of pioneers. This corps of amazons, led by two female captains, rejoicing in the names of 'May in the Heart' and 'Catharine the Rose,' actually constructed an important redoubt between the citadel and the rampart, which received, in compliment to its builders, the appellation of 'Fort Venus.' 2

The demands of the beleaguered garrison, however, upon the States and upon Leicester were most pressing. Captain Hart swam thrice out of the city with letters to the States, to the governor-general, and to Queen Elizabeth; and the same perilous feat was performed several times by a Netherland officer. 3 The besieged meant to sell their lives dearly; but it was obviously impossible for them, with so slender a force, to resist a very long time.

"Our ground is great and our men not so many," wrote Roger Williams to his sovereign; "but we trust in God and our valour to defend it. . . . We mean, with God's help, to make their downs red and black, and to let out every acre of our ground for a thousand of their lives, besides our own." 4

The Welshman was no braggart, and had proved often enough that he was more given to performances than promises. "We doubt not your Majesty will succour us," he said, "for our honest mind and plain dealing toward your royal person and dear country;" adding, as a bit of timely advice, "Royal Ma-

jesty, believe not over much your peacemakers. Had they their mind, they will not only undo your friends abroad, but, in the end, your royal estate." 1

Certainly it was from no want of wholesome warning from wise statesmen and blunt soldiers that the Queen was venturing into that labyrinth of negotiation which might prove so treacherous. Never had been so inopportune a moment for that princess to listen to the voice of him who was charming her so wisely, while he was at the same moment battering the place which was to be the basis of his operations against her realm. Her delay in sending forth Leicester, with at least a moderate contingent, to the rescue, was most pernicious. The States—ignorant of the Queen's exact relations with Spain, and exaggerating her disingenuousness into absolute perfidy—became on their own part exceedingly to blame. There is no doubt whatever that both Hollanders and Englishmen were playing into the hands of Parma as adroitly as if he had actually directed their movements. Deep were the denunciations of Leicester and his partisans by the State's party, and incessant the complaints of the English and Dutch troops shut up in Sluys against the inactivity or treachery of Maurice and Hohenlo.

"If Count Maurice and his base brother, the Admiral (Justinus de Nassau), be too young to govern, must Holland and Zeeland lose their countries and towns to make them expert men of war?" asked Roger Williams. 2 A pregnant question certainly, but the answer was, that by suspicion and jealousy, rather than by youth and inexperience, the arms were paralyzed which should have saved the garrison. "If these base fellows (the States) will make Count Hollock their instrument," continued

1 Parma to Philip II. <sup>30 July</sup>, 1587.  
6 Aug.

(Arch. de Simancas, MS.) Strada, ii. 491.

2 Bor, III. xxiii. 6 seq.

3 Meteren, Bor, R. Williams, *ubi sup.*

4 R. Williams to the Queen, <sup>9</sup> June, 1587.  
19

Brit. Mus., Galba, D. I. p. 40, MS.)

1 Ibid.

2 Williams to Walsingham, <sup>29 June</sup>, 1587.  
9 July  
(Brit. Mus. Galba, C. xi. 102, MS.)



the Welshman, „to cover and maintain their folly and lewd dealing, is it necessary for her royal Majesty to suffer it? These are too great matters to be rehearsed by me; but because I am in the town, and do resolve to sign with my blood my duty in serving my sovereign and country, I trust her Majesty will pardon me. I Certainly the gallant adventurer on whom devolved at least half the work of directing the defence of the city, had a right to express his opinions. Had he known the whole truth, however, those opinions would have been modified. And he wrote amid the smoke and turmoil of daily and nightly battle.

„Yesterday was the fifth sally we made,” he observed. „Since I followed the wars I never saw valianter captains, nor willinger soldiers. At eleven o’clock the enemy entered the ditch of our fort, with trenches upon wheels, artillery-proof. We sallied out, recovered their trenches, slew the governor of Dam, two Spanish captains, with a number of others, repulsed them into their artillery, kept the ditch until yesterday, and will recover it, with God’s help, this night, or else pay dearly for it. . . . I care not what may become of me in this world, so that her Majesty’s honour, with the rest of honourable good friends, *will think me an honest man.*”<sup>2</sup>

No one ever doubted the simple-hearted Welshman’s honesty, any more than his valour; but he confided in the candour of others who were somewhat more sophisticated than himself. When he warned her royal Majesty against the peace-makers, it was impossible for him to know that the great peacemaker was Elizabeth herself.

After the expiration of a month the work had become most fatiguing. The enemy’s trenches had been advanced

close to the ramparts, and desperate conflicts were of daily occurrence. The Spanish mines, too, had been pushed forward towards the extensive wine-caverns below the city, and the danger of a vast explosion or of a general assault from beneath their very feet, seemed to the inhabitants imminent. Eight days long, with scarcely an intermission, amid those sepulchral vaults, dimly-lighted with torches, Dutchmen, Englishmen, Spaniards, Italians, fought hand to hand, with pike, pistol, and dagger, within the bowels of the earth. 1

Meantime the operations of the States were not commendable. The ineradicable jealousy between the Leicestrians and the Barneveldians had done its work. There was no hearty effort for the relief of Sluys. There were suspicions that, if saved, the town would only be taken possession of by the Earl of Leicester, as an additional vantage-point for coercing the country into subjection to his arbitrary authority. Perhaps it would be transferred to Philip by Elizabeth as part of the price for peace. There was a growing feeling in Holland and Zeeland, that, as those Provinces bore all the expense of the war, it was an imperative necessity that they should limit their operations to the defence of their own soil. The suspicions as to the policy of the English government were sapping the very foundations of the alliance, and there was small disposition on the part of the Hollanders, therefore, to protect what remained of Flanders, and thus to strengthen the hands of her whom they were beginning to look upon as an enemy. 2

Maurice and Hohenlo made, however, a foray into Brabant, by way of diversion to the siege of Sluys, and thus compelled Farnese to detach a consi-

1 Williams to Walsingham, 29 June, 1587.  
9 July.

(Brit. Mus. Galba, C. xi. 102, MS.)

2 Ibid.

1 Strada, ii. 486-512. Meteren, *ubi sup.* Bor, III. xxiii. 5-9, 14-21. Haraeus, iii. 402-404.

2 A brief Report of the Proceedings of his Excellency for the Relief of Sluys, 26 July, 1587. (S. P. Office MS.)

derable force under Haultepenne into that country, and thereby to weaken himself. The expedition of Maurice was not unsuccessful. There was some sharp skirmishing between Hohenlo and Haultepenne, in which the latter, one of the most valuable and distinguished generals on the royal side, was defeated and slain; the fort of Engel, near Boisle-Duc, was taken, and that important city itself endangered; but, on the other hand, the contingent on which Leicester relied from the States to assist in relieving Sluys was not forthcoming. 1

For, meantime, the governor-general had at last been sent back by his sovereign to the post which he had so

24 June, long abandoned. Leaving Leicester House on the 4th July 1587. (N.S.), he had come on board

the fleet two days afterwards at Margate. He was bringing with him to the Netherlands three thousand fresh infantry, and thirty thousand pounds, of which sum fifteen thousand pounds had been at last wrung from Elizabeth as an extra loan, in place of the sixty thousand pounds which the States had requested. As he sailed past Ostend and towards Flushing, the Earl was witness to the constant cannonading between the besieged city and the camp of Farnese, and saw that the work could hardly be more serious; for in one short day more shots were fired than had ever been known before in a single day in all Parma's experience. 2

Arriving at Flushing, the governor-general was well received by the inhabitants; but the mischief which had been set a-foot six months before had done its work. The political intrigues, disputes, and the conflicting party-organizations, have already been set in great detail before the reader, in order that their effect might now be thoroughly

1 Bor, Meteren, Hoofd, Bentivoglio, Strada, *ubi sup.*

2 Authorities last cited. Lloyd to Walsingham, 25 June, 1587. (S. P. Office MS.) Baudart, Polemog. ii, 96, „17,800 shots.”

understood without explanation. The governor-general came to Flushing at a most critical moment. The fate of all the Spanish Netherlands, of Sluys, and with it the whole of Philip and Parma's great project, were, in Farnese's own language, hanging by a thread. 1

It would have been possible—had the transactions of the past six months, so far as regarded Holland and England, been the reverse of what they had been—to save the city, and, by a cordial and united effort, for the two countries to deal the Spanish power such a blow that summer, as would have paralyzed it for a long time to come, and have placed both commonwealths in comparative security.

Instead of all this, general distrust and mutual jealousy prevailed. Leicester had, previously to his departure from England, summoned the States to meet him at Dort upon his arrival. Not a soul appeared. Such of the state-councillors as were his creatures came to him, and Count Maurice made a visit of ceremony. Discussions about a plan for relieving the siege became mere scenes of bickering and confusion. The officers within Sluys were desirous that a fleet should force its way into the harbour, while, at the same time, the English army, strengthened by the contingent which Leicester had demanded from the States, should advance against the Duke of Parma by land. It was, in truth, the only way to succour the place. The scheme was quite practicable. Leicester recommended it, the Hollanders seemed to favour it, Commandant Groenevelt and Roger Williams urged it.

„I do assure you,” wrote the honest Welshman to Leicester, „if you will come afore this town, with as many galliots and as many flat-bottomed boats as can cause two men-of-war to enter, they cannot stop their passage, if your

1 Parma to Philip II., 6 Aug. 1587. (Arch. de Simancas, MS.) „Colgados da un hilo todos los estados y todo lo dependiente,” &c.

mariners will do a quarter of their duty as I saw them do divers times. Before they make their entrance, we will come with our boats, and fight with the greatest part, and show them there is no such great danger. Were it not for my wounded arm, I would be in your first boat to enter. Notwithstanding, I and other Englishmen will approach their boats in such sort, that we will force them to give their saker of artillery upon us. If your Excellency will give ear unto those false lewd fellows" (the Captain meant the States-General), „you shall lose great opportunity. Within ten or twelve days the enemy will make his bridge from Kadzand unto St. Anne, and force you to hazard battle before you succour this town. Let my Lord Willoughby and Sir William Russell land at Terhoven, right against Kadzand, with 4000, and entrench hard by the water-side, where their boats can carry them victual and munition. They may approach by trenches without engaging any dangerous fight. . . . We dare not show the estate of this town more than we have done by Captain Herte. We must fight this night within our rampart in the fort. You may assure the world here are no Hamerts, but valiant captains and valiant soldiers, such as, with God's help, had rather be buried in the place than be disgraced in any point that belongs to such a number of men-of-war." 1

But in vain did the governor of the place, stout Arnold Groenevelt, assisted by the rough and direct eloquence of Roger Williams, urge upon the Earl of Leicester and the States-General the necessity and the practicability of the plan proposed. The fleet never entered the harbour. There was no William of

Orange to save Antwerp and Sluys, as Leyden had once been saved, and his son was not old enough to unravel the web of intrigue by which he was surrounded, or to direct the whole energies of the commonwealth towards an all-important end. Leicester had lost all influence, all authority, nor were his military abilities equal to the occasion, even if he had been cordially obeyed.

Ten days longer the perpetual battles on the ramparts and within the mines continued, the plans conveyed by the bold swimmer, Captain Hart, for saving the place were still unattempted, and the city was tottering to its fall. „Had Captain Hart's words taken place," wrote Williams, bitterly, „we had been succoured, or, if my letters had prevailed, our pain had been no peril. All wars are best executed in sight of the enemy. . . . The last night of June (10th July, N.S.) the enemy entered the ditches of our fort in three several places, continuing in fight, in mine and on rampart for the space of eight nights. The ninth he battered us furiously, made a breach of five score paces saltable for horse and man. That day he attempted us in all places with a general assault for the space of almost five hours." 1

The citadel was now lost. It had been gallantly defended, and it was thenceforth necessary to hold the town itself, in the very teeth of an over- 6  
whelming force. „We were 16 July,  
forced to quit the fort," said 1587.

Sir Roger, „leaving nothing behind us but bare earth. But here we do remain resolutely to be buried, rather than to dishonoured in the least point." 2

It was still possible for the fleet to succour the city. „I do assure you," said Williams, „that your captains and mariners do not their duty unless they

1 Williams to Leicester, 29 June, 1587.  
9 July

(Brit. Mus. Galba, D. I. p. 152, MS.)

It will be remembered that Baron Hemart was the unfortunate officer who so disgracefully surrendered Grave in the first year of Leicester's administration.

1 Williams to Leicester, 9 July, 1587.  
19

(Brit. Mus. Galba, D. I. 179, MS.) Compare Bor, Meteren, Hoofd, Bentivoglio, Strada, Haraeus, *ubi sup.*, *et mult. al.*

2 Williams to Leicester. (MS. last cited.)



enter with no great loss; but you must consider that *no wars may be made without danger*. What you mean to do, we beseech you to do with expedition, and persuade yourself that we will die valiant honest men. Your Excellency will do well to thank the old President de Meetkerk for the honesty and valour of his son." 1

Count Maurice and his natural brother, the Admiral, now undertook the succour by sea; but, according to the Leicestersians, they continued dilatory and incompetent. At any rate, it is certain that they did nothing. At last, Parma had completed the bridge, whose construction was so much dreaded. The haven was now enclosed by a strong wooden structure, resting on boats, on a plan similar to that of the famous bridge with which he had two years before bridled the Scheldt, and Sluys was thus completely shut in from the sea. Fireships were now constructed, by order of Leicester—feeble imitations of the floating volcanoes of Gianibelli—and it was agreed that they should be sent against the bridge with the first-flood-tide. The propitious moment never seemed to arrive, however, and, meantime, the citizens of Flushing, of their own accord, declared that they would themselves equip and conduct a fleet into the harbour of Sluys. 2 But the Nassaus are said to have expressed great disgust that low-born burghers should presume to meddle with so im-

portant an enterprise, which of right belonged to their family. 1 Thus, in the midst of these altercations and contradictory schemes, the month of July wore away, and the city was reduced to its last gasp.

For the cannonading had thoroughly done its work. Eighteen days long the burghers and what remained of the garrison had lived upon the ramparts, never leaving their posts, but eating, sleeping, and fighting day and night. Of the sixteen hundred Dutch and English but seven hundred remained. At last a swimming messenger was sent out by the besieged with despatches for the States, to the purport that the city could hold out no longer. A breach in the wall had been effected wide enough to admit a hundred men abreast. Sluys had, in truth, already fallen, and it was hopeless any longer to conceal the fact. If not relieved within a day or two, the garrison would be obliged to surrender; but they distinctly stated, that they had all pledged themselves, soldiers and burghers, men, women, and all, unless the most honourable terms were granted, to set fire to the city in a hundred places, and then sally, in mass, from the gates, determined to fight their way through, or be slain in the attempt. The messenger who carried these despatches was drowned, but the letters were saved, and fell into Parma's hands. 2

1 „Burghers of Flushing proffered their services, which were accepted with thanks; but that upon Count Maurice and Admiral Nassau being applied to for necessities, they seemed to be touched very much in reputation that a piece of service so respectable should have been left to persons of base quality instead of to themselves, who readily would adventure their best means. His Excellency, fearing to offend them, gave his consent. . . . Maurice declared the enterprise to be impossible without better means, from which it appeared plainly that all had been devised on purpose of delay, until it should be too late to help the town." Willoughby, Russel, *et al.* to the Lords. (MS. last cited.)

2 Strada, Bor, Meteren, Hoofd, R. Williams, in Grimstone, *ubi sup et al.*

1 R. Williams to Walsingham,  $\frac{6}{16}$  July,

1587. (Brit. Mus. Galba, D. I. p. 179, MS.)

Compare „Discourse of War” apud Grimstone, xiii. 963. „Truly all the Dutch and Walloons,” says Sir Roger, „showed themselves constant, resolute, and valiant, especially those brave and valiant captains Meetkerke and Heraugiere.” He also especially commends the valour of Huntley, Udall, Scott, Ferdinando Gorges, St. Leger, and Nicholas Baskerville.

2 A brief Report of the Proceedings of his Excellency for the relief of Sluys, 26 July, 1587. (S. P. Office MS.) Willoughby, Russel, Pelham, and others, to the Lords, 12 Aug. 1587. (S. P. Office MS.)

At the same moment, Leicester was making, at last, an effort to raise the siege. He brought three or four thousand men from Flushing, and landed them at Ostend; thence he marched to Blanckenburg. He supposed that if he could secure that little port, and thus cut the Duke completely off from the sea, he should force the Spanish commander to raise (or at least suspend) the siege in order to give him battle. Meantime, an opportunity was afforded for Maurice and Hohenlo to force an entrance into the harbour of Sluys. In this conjecture he was quite correct; but unfortunately he did not thoroughly carry out his own scheme. If the Earl had established himself at Blanckenburg, it would have been necessary for Parma—as he himself subsequently declared—to raise the siege. 1 Leicester carried the outposts of the place successfully; but, so soon as Farnese was aware of this demonstration, he detached a few companies with orders to skirmish with the enemy until the commander-in-chief, with as large a force as he could spare, should come in person to his support. To the unexpected gratification of Farnese, however, no sooner did the advancing Spaniards come in sight, than the Earl, supposing himself invaded by the whole of the Duke's army, under their famous general, and not feeling himself strong enough for such an encounter, retired, with great precipitation, to his boats, re-embarked his troops with the utmost celerity, and set sail for Ostend. 2

The next night had been fixed for sending forth the fire-ships against the bridge, and for the entrance of the fleet into the harbour. One fire-ship floated a little way towards the bridge and exploded ingloriously. Leicester rowed in his barge about the fleet, superintending the soundings and markings of the channel, and hastening the prepa-

rations; but, as the decisive moment approached, the pilots who had promised to conduct the expedition came aboard his pinnace and positively refused to have aught to do with the enterprise, which they now declared an impossibility. 1 The Earl was furious with the pilots, with Maurice, with Hohenlo, with Admiral de Nassau, with the States, with all the world. He stormed and raged and beat his breast, but all in vain. His ferocity would have been more useful the day before, in face of the Spaniards, than now, against the Zeeland mariners. But the invasion by the fleet alone, unsupported by a successful land operation, was pronounced impracticable, and very soon the relieving fleet was seen by the distressed garrison sailing away from the neighbourhood, and it soon disappeared beneath the horizon. Their fate was sealed. They entered into treaty with Parma, who, secretly instructed, as has been seen, of their desperate intentions, in case any but the most honourable conditions were offered, granted those conditions. The garrison were allowed to go out with colours displayed, lighted matches, bullet in mouth, and with bag and baggage. Such of the burghers as chose to conform to the government of Spain and the church of Rome, were permitted to remain. Those who preferred to depart were allowed reasonable time to make their necessary arrangements." 2

„We have hurt and slain very near eight hundred,” said Sir Roger Williams.

1 Lloyd to Walsingham,  $\frac{27 \text{ July}}{6 \text{ Aug.}}$ , 1587,

(S. P. Office MS.)

2 Brief Report, &c. MS. already cited. Lloyd to Walsingham. MS. already cited. Leicester to same, 12 Aug. 1587. Willoughby and others to the Lords, 12 Aug. 1587. Leicester to same, 12 Aug. 1587. Same to Burghley, 27 July, 1587. Same to same, 13 July, 1587. Same to the Lords, 27 July, 1587. Same to same, 17 Aug. 1587. F. Needham to Walsingham, 12 Aug. 1587. (S. T. Office MSS.) Compare Bor, Meteren, Hoofd, Haraeus, Bentivoglio, Strada, R. Williams, *ubi sup.* Wagenaar, viii. 225-227. Baudart, Polemög, ii. 96, *et mult. al.*

1 Strada, ii. 508, 509, *seq.*

2 Strada, Bor, Meteren, Hoofd, Haraeus, Bentivoglio, *ubi sup.*

„We had not powder to fight two hours. There was a breach of almost four hundred paces, another of three score, another of fifty, saltable for horse and men. We had lain continually eighteen nights all on the breaches. He gave us honourable composition. Had the state of England lain on it, our lives could not defend the place three hours, for half the rapiers were his, neither had we any pioneers but ourselves. We were sold by their negligence who are now angry with us.”<sup>1</sup>

On the 5th August Parma entered the city. Roger Williams—with his gilt morion rather battered, and his great plume of feathers much bedraggled—was a witness to the victor's entrance. Alexander saluted respectfully an officer so well known to him by reputation, and with some complimentary remarks urged him to enter the Spanish service, and to take the field against the Turks.<sup>2</sup>

„My sword,” replied the doughty Welshman, „belongs to her royal Majesty, Queen Elizabeth, above and before all the world. When her Highness has no farther use for it, it is at the service of the King of Navarre.”<sup>3</sup>

Considering himself sufficiently answered, the Duke then requested Rir Roger to point out Captain Baskerville—very conspicuous by a greater plume of feathers than even that of the Welshman himself—and embraced that officer, when presented to him, before all his staff. „There serves no prince in Europe a braver man than this Englishman,” cried Alexander, who well knew how to appreciate high military qualities, whether in his own army or in that of his foes.<sup>4</sup>

The garrison then retired, Sluys became Spanish, and a capacious harbour, just opposite the English coast, was in Parma's hands. Sir Roger Williams was despatched by Leicester to bear the

melancholy tidings to his government, and the Queen was requested to cherish the honest Welshman, and at least to set him on horseback, for he was of himself not rich enough to buy even a saddle. It is painful to say that the captain did not succeed in getting the horse.<sup>1</sup>

The Earl was furious in his invectives against Hohenlo, against Maurice, against the States, uniformly ascribing the loss of Sluys to negligence and faction. As for Sir John Norris, he pro-

1 „I pray you be good to this bearer, Sir Roger Williams, for he is to be cherished. Her Majesty I trust will help him; and if these wars continue, return him with speed, but set him well on horseback, for he is not worth the saddle of a horse.” Leicester to Walsingham, 12 Aug. 1587. (S. P. Office MS.) Yet according to the report of Captain Needham, even Williams had at last become an object of the Earl's jealousy and suspicion, on account of the flattering offers made to him by Farnese. „The Duke of Parma had essayed,” says Needham, „by all possible means to gain Sir Roger Williams, but could not prevail, although he thought the hard usage he had received from the Earl of Leicester would be an occasion to make him leave his party. Themistocles (Leicester) had hereupon conceived great jealousy, and hath not spared to give warning to Sir W. Russell to beware of Williams as of one who would be his undoing, and as it seems reported as much to the Lord Sir North and Sir W. Pelham. . . The gentleman (Williams) was wonderfully perplexed that for his faithful service he should reap his utter undoing, and to be accounted a traitor to his prince. He wished he were at home, upon condition he should never bear arms here, for he knew the nature of Themistocles, as he would leave no means unsought to overthrow his credit. &c. The conversation of the Duke with the Welshman has been reported in the text.

„The Earl of Essex promises me, wrote Williams subsequently, „that her Majesty will do something for me. For my part I do hardly believe it, for I can get no countenance from her Highness. I humbly desire your Excellency to write this for me, either to give me something or discharge me away with nothing. . . I fear things will not fall out here as well as you would wish. Were your Excellency here, her Majesty would do more. The more the merrier. Without your presence your friends dare not speak what they would, for the simplest that speaks of the peace is better here than the wisest that contraries it. I fear me it is passed so far that the King of Navarre is like to smart for it,” &c. R. Williams to Leicester, 1 Sept. 1587. (Brit. Mus. Galba, D. II. p. 4, MS.)

<sup>1</sup> Williams to Leicester, 5 Aug. 1587. (Brit. Mus. Galba, D. I. p. 214, MS.)

<sup>2</sup> Needham to Walsingham, 12 Aug. 1587. (S. P. Office MS.)

<sup>3</sup> Ibid.

<sup>4</sup> R. Williams, in Grimstone, lxiii. 962.



tested that his misdeeds in regard to this business would, in King Henry VIII.'s time, have „cost him his pate.” 1

The loss of Sluys was the beginning, and foreshadowed the inevitable end of Leicester's second administration. The inaction of the States was one of the causes of its loss. Distrust of Leicester was the cause of the inaction. Sir William Russel, Lord Willoughby, Sir William Pelham, and other English officers, united in statements exonerating the Earl from all blame for the great failure to relieve the place. At the same time, it could hardly be maintained that his expedition to Blanckenburg and his pre-

cipitate retreat on the first appearance of the enemy were proofs of consummate generalship. He took no blame to himself for the disaster; but he and his partisans were very liberal in their denunciations of the Hollanders, 1 and Leicester was even ungrateful enough to censure Roger Williams, whose life had been passed, as it were, at push of pike with the Spaniards, and who was one of his own most devoted adherents.

The Queen was much exasperated when informed of the fall of the city. She severely denounced the Netherlanders, and even went so far as to express dissatisfaction with the great Leicester himself. 2 Meantime, Farnese was well satisfied with his triumph, for he had been informed that „all England was about to charge upon him,” in order to relieve the place. 3 All England, however, had been but feebly represented by three thousand raw recruits, with a paltry sum of 15,000*l.* to help pay a long bill of arrears.

Wilkes and Norris had taken their departure from the Netherlands before the termination of the siege, and immediately after the return of Leicester. They did not think it expedient to wait upon the governor before leaving the country, 4 for they had very good reason

1 Leicester to Walsingham, 12 Aug. 1587. (S. P. Office MS.)

„As for this matter of Sluys,” said the Earl, „I may stand before the tribunal seat of God for any fault in me. The greatest is that I did trust Count Maurice too much, but either I must have trusted him or not have had any means at all for shipping. As it is well known beside, he offered his service most frankly and willingly, and did take upon him and his bastard brother to attempt the bridge by such men as they had chosen, to whom I gave 30*l.* beforehand.” And in the same vein he says to Burghley, „I am grieved to think, much more to speak, of the loss of Sluys. God knoweth we have done for our parts as much as if a kingdom had stood upon it. But these men have strange designs in their heads, which will in the end breed their own ruin. . . . The dregs of their dealing will, I fear, remain a good while, for the practice and fashion continue. . . I must beg you to bear with me, for I scarce know what I write, what with grief for the loss of this town, and with anger for the vile lewd dealing of these men that have so naughtily carried themselves in this matter for Sluys. First, by letting me have no men of theirs, when I had but a few men furnished; then, their long deferring our men to be furnished; after, their lack of provisions of all sorts; lastly, vessels and barks to land our men. And these with such like hath brought this poor town to be lost.” . . He then makes an insinuation against the brave and true-hearted Welshman, who had been fighting night and day, from the beginning of the siege to the end. „And yet I cannot, for many respects, how well soever I think of Sir Roger Williams' valour and the other captains, give them countenance or access to me, before they do give some good reason for the delivery of the town without sending to me first.” Leicester to Burghley, <sup>27 July</sup> 6 Aug. (S. P. Office MS.)

1 „Your honour may see,” said Lloyd, „how Count Hohenlo's proceedings, and this late action, do concur as matters that have been hammered on one anvil and issued from one forge.” E. Lloyd to Walsingham, 27 July, 1587. (S. P. Office MS.)

2 Essex to Leicester, <sup>31 July</sup> 10 Aug., 1587. (S.

P. Office MS.) Walsingham to same. 2 Aug. 1587. (Brit. Mus. Galba, D. I. p. 234, MS.) „The ill success of Sluys causeth her to pick some quarrel towards your Lordship in that action, as by her letters you may perceive.”

3 „Corria la voz que cargava toda Inglaterra.” Parma to Philip. 6 Aug. 1587. (Arch. de Simancas, MS.)

4 Wilkes to the Lords 20th July, 1587. (S. P. Office MS.), explaining—what had been sufficiently explained before—why he left the Netherlands without greeting Leicester, „for that he was too terrified to come into

to believe that such an opportunity of personal vengeance would be turned to account by the Earl. Wilkes had already avowed his intention of making his escape without being dandled with leave-takings, and no doubt he was right. The Earl was indignant when he found that they had given him the slip, and denounced them with fresh acrimony to the Queen, imploring her to wreak full measure of wrath upon their heads; <sup>1</sup> and he well knew that his intreaties would meet with the royal attention.

Buckhurst had a parting interview with the governor-general, at which Killigrew and Beale, the new English counsellors who had replaced Wilkes and Clerk, were present. The conversation was marked by insolence on the part of Leicester, and by much bitterness on that of Buckhurst. The parting envoy refused to lay before the Earl a full statement of the grievances between the States-General and the governor, on the ground that Leicester had no right to be judge in his own cause. The matter, he said, should be laid before the Queen in council, and by her august decision he was willing to abide. On every other subject he was ready to give any information in his power. The interview lasted a whole forenoon and afternoon. Buckhurst, according to his own statement, answered freely all questions put to him by Leicester and his counsellors; while, if the report of those personages is to be trusted, he passionately refused to make any satisfactory communication. Under the circumstances, however, it may well be believed that no satisfactory communication was possible. <sup>2</sup>

his presence, knowing his animosity." He expresses the hope that "her Majesty, being the image of God on earth, will be like to Him in mercy, and not suffer more to be laid upon him than flesh and blood can bear."

<sup>1</sup> Leicester to Walsingham, 4 July, 1587. Same to Queen, 7 July, 1587. Same to Burghley, 13 July, 1587. (S. P. Office MSS.)

<sup>2</sup> Killigrew and Beale to Walsingham, 13th July, 1587. Buckhurst to Burghley,

On arriving in England, Sir John Norris was forbidden to come into her Majesty's presence, Wilkes was thrown into the Fleet Prison, and Buckhurst was confined in his own country-house. <sup>1</sup>

Norris had done absolutely nothing, which, even by implication, could be construed into a dereliction of duty; but it was sufficient that he was hated by Leicester, who had not scrupled, over and over again, to denounce this first general of England as a fool, a coward, a knave, and a liar.

As for Wilkes, his only crime was a most conscientious discharge of his duty, in the course of which he had found cause to modify his abstract opinions in regard to the origin of sovereignty, and had come reluctantly to the conviction that Leicester's unpopularity had made perhaps another governor-general desirable. But this admission had only been made privately and with extreme caution; while, on the other hand, he had constantly defended the absent Earl, with all the eloquence at his command. But the hatred of Leicester was sufficient to consign this able and painstaking public servant to a prison; and thus was a man of worth, honour, and talent, who had been placed in a position of grave responsibility and immense fatigue, and who had done his duty like an upright, straightforward Englishman, sacrificed to the wrath of a favourite. "Surely, Mr. Secretary," said the Earl, "there was never a falser creature, a more seditious wretch, than Wilkes. He is a villain, a devil, without faith or religion." <sup>2</sup>

23 July, 1587. A true Declaration of the Proceedings of Lord Buckhurst and Dr. Clerke, 24 July, 1587. (S. P. Office MSS.)

<sup>1</sup> Buckhurst to Walsingham, 24 July, 1587. Same to Burghley, 24 July, 1587. Same to same, 28 July, 1587. Walsingham to Leicester, 29 July, 1587. (S. P. Office MSS.)

<sup>2</sup> Leicester to Walsingham, 4 Aug. 1587. (S. P. Office MS.) Buckhurst was of a different opinion.

"Mr. Wilkes, having had so long experience in these parts," he wrote, "and being so careful and diligent for the good preser-

As for Buckhurst himself, it is unnecessary to say a word in his defence.

vation and furtherance of the cause, whereof in the late dangerous times and troubles here he made right good testimony, is able therein to do your Majesty most especial and notable service, being also otherwise so sufficiently practised in the estate of other countries and so well trained in your affairs at home, with such excellent gifts of *utterance, memory, wit, courage, and knowledge, and with so faithful and careful a heart to serve your Majesty, as it were a woeful case if such a worthy servant should for any respect be discomforted and disgraced by your Majesty's displeasure.*" Buckhurst to the Queen, 28 June, 1587. (Brit. Mus. Galba, C. xi. p. 61, MS.)

Yet such a eulogy from so illustrious a man, and fully borne out by the deeds and words of Wilkes himself, could not save the concillor from the gaol. He had loved Sir John Norris, which was enough to secure him the hatred of Leicester, and consequently the unmitigated wrath of the Queen.

But these pages have already illustrated the copiousness of the great Earl's vocabulary in vituperation. Mr. P. B., Sir John Norris, Hollock, Wilkes, Buckhurst himself, the States-General, the States-Provincial, and, in brief, any one who crossed his schemes, were sure to draw down the full tempest of wrath. He was now very angry with those who surrounded young Maurice, especially with the minister Villiers, whom he pronounced to be "a condemned man, not only among all honest and godly men, but also with all the churches through all the Provinces." Sainte Aldegonde, too, whom before and after this point of time, he seemed to appreciate and applaud, was now held up as an object of suspicion. "I have found cause of late," he says, "to fear Sainte Aldegonde to be an unsound and hollow man. There are great presumptions that he is dealing in secret with Parma. He is lately married. All men condemn him for it, and his best friends did greatly dissuade him from it, but it would not be. And now is he to return again for two or three months, being known to be greatly favoured on the other side, and can enjoy no penny but by that favour. I see he takes no course to please the church. The young Count is directed by both him and Villiers, albeit the one, Sainte Aldegonde, doth make less show than the other. Oh, God, what a world it is! Both these hot men heretofore are become less than lukewarm now, and wholly given to policy." Leicester to Walsingham, MS. above cited.

Yet before the end of the year Sainte Aldegonde was violently abused by others for opposite tendencies. "The Count of Hollock being drunk the other day," says Sir Robert Sidney, "took a quarrel to Monsieur de Sainte Aldegonde, saying he was wont to be a lover of the house of Nassau, but now he

The story of his mission has been completely detailed from the most authentic and secret documents, and there is not a single line written to the Queen, to her ministers, to the States, to any public body or to any private friend, in England or elsewhere, that does not reflect honour on his name. With sagacity, without passion, with unaffected sincerity, he had unravelled the complicated web of Netherland politics, and, with clear vision, had penetrated the designs of the mighty enemy whom England and Holland had to encounter in mortal combat. He had pointed out the errors of the Earl's administration—he had fearlessly, earnestly, but respectfully deplored the misplaced parsimony of the Queen—he had warned her against the delusions which had taken possession of her keen intellect—he had done his best to place the governor-general upon good terms with the States and with his sovereign; but it had been impossible for him to further his schemes for the acquisition of a virtual sovereignty over the Netherlands, or to extinguish the suspicions of the States that the Queen was secretly negotiating with the Spaniard, when he knew those suspicions to be just.

For deeds such as these, the able and high-minded ambassador, the accomplished statesman and poet, was forbidden to approach his sovereign's presence, and was ignominiously imprisoned in his own house until the

was grown altogether a Leicestrian, the which he repeated sundry times upon him before the Count Maurice and many other gentlemen. In truth, I think Sainte Aldegonde very well affected unto your Excellency. Surely he mislikes the proceedings here, and meddles nothing with them." Sidney to Leicester, 31 Dec. 1587. (Brit. Mus. Galba, D. II. p. 288.)

Nothing could be more unscrupulous than the denunciations of Leicester whenever he was offended. They would seem almost risible, were it not that the capricious wrath of the all-powerful favourite was often sufficient to blast the character, the career, the hopes, and even take away the lives, of honest men.



death of Leicester. After that event, Buckhurst emerged from confinement, received the Order of the Garter and the Earldom of Dorset, and on the death of Burghley succeeded that statesman in the office of Lord-Treasurer. Such was the substantial recognition of the merits of a man who was now disgraced for the conscientious discharge of the most important functions that had yet been confided to him.

It would be a thankless and superfluous task to give the details of the renewed attempt, during a few months, made by Leicester to govern the Provinces. His second administration consisted mainly of the same altercations with the States, on the subject of sovereignty, the same mutual recriminations and wranglings, that had characterized the period of his former rule. He rarely met the States in person, and almost never resided at the Hague, holding his court at Middelburg, Dort, or Utrecht, as his humour led him.

The one great feature of the autumn of 1587 was the private negotiation between Elizabeth and the Duke of Parma.

Before taking a glance at the nature of those secrets, however, it is necessary to make a passing allusion to an event which might have seemed likely to render all pacific communications with Spain, whether secret or open, superfluous.

For while so much time had been lost in England and Holland, by misunderstandings and jealousies, there was one Englishman who had not been losing time. In the winter and early spring of 1587, the Devonshire skipper had organized that expedition which he had come to the Netherlands the preceding autumn to discuss. He meant to aim a blow at the very heart of that project which Philip was shrouding with so much mystery, and which Elizabeth was attempting to counteract by so much diplomacy.

On the 2nd April, Francis Drake

sailed from Plymouth with four ships belonging to the Queen, and with twenty-four furnished by the merchants of London and other private individuals. It was a bold buccaneering expedition—combining chivalrous enterprise with the chance of enormous profit—which was most suited to the character of English adventures at that expanding epoch. For it was by England, not by Elizabeth, that the quarrel with Spain was felt to be a mortal one. It was England, not its sovereign, that was instinctively arming, at all points, to grapple with the great enemy of European liberty. It was the spirit of self-help, of self-reliance, which was prompting the English nation to take the great work of the age into its own hands. The mercantile instinct of the nation was flattered with the prospect of gain, the martial quality of its patrician and of its plebeian blood was eager to confront danger, the great Protestant mutiny against a decrepid superstition in combination with an aggressive tyranny, all impelled the best energies of the English people against Spain, as the embodiment of all which was odious and menacing to them, and with which they felt that the life and death struggle could not long be deferred.

And of these various tendencies, there were no more fitting representatives than Drake and Frobisher, Hawkins and Essex, Cavendish and Grenfell, and the other privateersmen of the sixteenth century. The same greed for danger, for gold, and for power, which, seven centuries before, had sent the Norman race forth to conquer all Christendom, was now sending its Anglo-Saxon and Anglo-Norman kindred to take possession of the old world and the new.

„The wind commands me away,” said Drake on the 2nd April, 1587; „our ship is under sail. God grant that we may so live in his fear, that the enemy may have cause to say that God doth

fight for her Majesty abroad as well as at home." 1

But he felt that he was not without enemies behind him, for the strong influence brought to bear against the bold policy which Walsingham favoured, was no secret to Drake. „If we deserve ill," said he, „let us be punished. If we discharge our duty, in doing our best, it is a hard measure to be reported ill by those who will either keep their fingers out of the fire, or who too well affect that alteration in our government which I hope in God they shall never live to see." 2 In latitude 40° he spoke two Zealand ships, homeward bound, and obtained information of great warlike stores accumulating in Cadiz and Lisbon. His mind was instantly made up. Fortunately, the pinnacle which the Queen despatched with orders to stay his hand 3 in the very act of smiting her great adversary, did not sail fast enough to overtake the swift corsair and his fleet. Sir Francis had too promptly obeyed the wind, when it „commanded him away," to receive the royal countermand. On the 19th April, the English ships entered the harbour of Cadiz, and destroyed ten thousand tons of shipping, with their contents, in the very face of a dozen great galleys, which the nimble English vessels soon drove under their forts for shelter. Two nights and a day, Sir Francis, that „hater of idleness," was steadily doing his work; unloading, rifling, scuttling, sinking, and burning those transport-ships which contained a portion of the preparations painfully made by Philip for his great enterprise. Pipestaves and spikes, horse-shoes and saddles, timber and cutlasses, wine, oil, figs, raisins, biscuits, and flour, a miscellaneous mass of ingredients long brewing for the trouble of England, were emptied into the harbour, and

before the second night, the blaze of a hundred and fifty burning vessels played merrily upon the grim walls of Philip's fortresses. Some of these ships were of the largest size then known. There was one belonging to Marquis Santa Cruz of 1500 tons, there was a Biscayan of 1200, there were several others of 1000, 800, and of nearly equal dimensions.

Thence sailing for Lisbon, Sir Francis captured and destroyed a hundred vessels more, appropriating what was portable of the cargoes, and annihilating the rest. At Lisbon, Marquis Santa Cruz, lord high admiral of Spain and generalissimo of the invasion, looked on mortified and amazed, but offering no combat, while the Plymouth privateersman swept the harbour of the great monarch of the world. After thoroughly accomplishing his work, Drake sent a message to Santa Cruz, proposing to exchange his prisoners for such Englishmen as might then be confined in Spain. But the Marquis denied all prisoners. Thereupon Sir Francis decided to sell his captives to the Moors, and to appropriate the proceeds of the sale towards the purchase of English slaves out of the same bondage. 1 Such was the fortune of war in the sixteenth century.

Having dealt these great blows, Drake set sail again from Lisbon, and, twenty leagues from St. Michaels, fell in with one of those famous Spanish East Indiamen, called carracks, then the great wonder of the seas. This vessel, San Felipe by name, with a cargo of extraordinary value, was easily captured, and Sir Francis now determined to return. He had done a good piece of work in a few weeks, but he was by no means of opinion that he had materially crippled the enemy. On the contrary, he gave the government warning as to the enormous power and vast preparations of Spain. „There would be forty thousand men under way ere long," he said, „well equipped and provisioned;" and

1 Drake to Walsingham in Barrow's, *Life of Drake* (Murray, 1843), p. 223. 2 Ibid.

3 Walsingham to Leicester, 17 April, 1587. Same to same, 11 April, 1587. (Brit. Mus. Galba, C. xi. p. 327-344. MSS.)

1 Barrow, 232, 233.

he stated, as the result of personal observation, that England could not be too energetic in its measures of resistance. He had done something with his little fleet, but he was no braggart, and had no disposition to underrate the enemy's power. „God make us all thankful again and again,” he observed, that we have, *although it be little, made a beginning upon the coast of Spain.*”<sup>1</sup> And modestly as he spoke of what he had accomplished, so with quiet self-reliance did he allude to the probable consequences. It was certain, he intimated, that the enemy would soon seek revenge with all his strength, and „with all the devices and traps he could devise.” This was a matter which could not be doubted. „But,” said Sir Francis. „I thank them much that they have staid so long, and when they come they shall be but the sons of mortal men.”<sup>2</sup>

Perhaps the most precious result of the expedition, was the lesson which the Englishmen had thus learned in handling the great galleys of Spain. It might soon stand them in stead. The little war-vessels which had come from Plymouth, had sailed round and round these vast unwieldy hulks, and had fairly driven them off the field, with very slight damage to themselves. Sir Francis had already taught the mariners of England, even if he had done nothing else by this famous Cadiz expedition, that an armada of Spain might not be so invincible as men imagined.

Yet when the conqueror returned from his great foray, he received no laurels. His sovereign met him, not with smiles, but with frowns and cold rebukes. He had done his duty, and helped to save her endangered throne, but Elizabeth was now the dear friend of Alexander Farnese, and in amicable correspondence with his royal master. This „little” beginning on the coast of

Spain might not seem to his Catholic Majesty a matter to be thankful for, nor be likely to further a pacification, and so Elizabeth hastened to disavow her Plymouth captain.<sup>1</sup>

1 „True it is, and I avow it on my faith, her Majesty did send a ship expressly before he went to Cadiz with a message by letters charging Sir Francis Drake *not to show any act of hostility*, which messenger by contrary winds could never come to the place where he was, but was constrained to come home, and *hearing of Sir F. Drake's actions*, her Majesty commanded the party that returned to have been punished, but that he acquitted himself by the oaths of himself and all his company. *And so unwilling yea unwilling to her Majesty* those actions were committed by Sir F. Drake, for the which her Majesty is as yet greatly offended with him.” Burghley to Andreas de Loo, 18 July, 1587. „Flanders Correspondence.” (S. P. Office MS.)

„There are letters written to Sir Francis Drake,” said Walsingham, „sent unto him by a pinnace sent forth especially for that purpose, to command him not to attempt anything by land, nor to enter into the ports to distress the ships. This resolution proceedeth altogether upon a hope of peace which I fear will draw a dangerous war upon her Majesty, by the alienation of the hearts of the well affected people in the Low Countries.” Walsingham to Leicester, 11 April 1587. (Brit. Mus. Galba, C. xi. p. 344. MS.)

And again, a week later—„As for Spain,” says the Secretary, „they are so far off from any intention to assail England, as they stand now upon their own guard for fear of Sir Francis Drake. There are letters written from certain of my lords, by her Majesty's effectual commandment, to inhibit him to attempt any thing by land, or within the ports of the kingdom of Spain. He is at liberty to take any of the King's fleets, either going out of Spain or returning into Spain. There is a bruit given out upon the despatch of these letters that there is order given for his revocation.” Same to same, 17 th April, 1587. (Brit. Mus. Galba, C. xi. p. 327, MS.)

It is somewhat amusing, on the other hand, to find Leicester claiming credit for her Majesty, for this demonstration against Spain, and using it in his communications with the States as a proof of her hostile intentions towards that power. „There is no such meaning in her Majesty to abuse you,” he observed, „as you might perceive both by the sending of Sir Francis Drake into Spain and by the return of myself hither, to have prosecuted the war if I had found any means here.” Leicester to the States, 6 Sept. 1587. (S. P. Office MS.)

<sup>1</sup> Barrow, 233.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid. Compare Camden, iii. 396. Meteren, xiv. 253, 254. Bor, II. xxi. 753-768, xxii. 981, xxiii. 77.



## CHAPTER XVII.

Secret Treating between Queen and Parma—Excitement and Alarm in the States—Religious Persecution in England—Queen's Sincerity towards Spain—Language and Letters of Parma—Negotiations of De Loo—English Commissioners appointed—Parma's affectionate Letter to the Queen—Philip at his Writing-Table—His Plots with Parma against England—Parma's Secret Letters to the King—Philip's Letters to Parma—Wonderful Duplicity of Philip—His sanguine Views as to England—He is reluctant to hear of the Obstacles—And imagines Parma in England—But Alexander's Difficulties are great—He denounces Philip's wild Schemes—Walsingham aware of the Spanish Plot—Which the States well understand—Leicester's great Unpopularity—The Queen warned against Treating—Leicester's Schemes against Barneveld—Leicesterian Conspiracy at Leyden—The Plot to seize the City discovered—Three Ringleaders sentenced to Death—Civil War in France—Victory gained by Navarre, and one by Guise—Queen recalls Leicester—Who retires on ill Terms with the States—Queen warned as to Spanish Designs—Results of Leicester's Administration.

THE course of Elizabeth towards the Provinces, in the matter of the peace, was certainly not ingenuous, but it was not absolutely deceitful. She concealed and denied the negotiations, when the Netherland statesmen were perfectly aware of their existence, if not of their tenor; but she was not prepared, as they suspected, to sacrifice their liberties and their religion, as the price of her own reconciliation with Spain. Her attitude towards the States was imperious, overbearing, and abusive. She had allowed the Earl of Leicester to return, she said, because of her love for the poor and oppressed people, but in many of her official, and in all her private communications, she denounced the men who governed that people as ungrateful wretches and impudent liars. 1

I E. g. „Nous avons renvoyé notre cousin de Leycestre—nonobstant que nous fussions un peu pres degoutés . . . vu les desordres et confusions depuis son parlement de là . . . les traverses ingrates de quelques uns mal affectés par de là, dont nous memes avons eu occasion de bien fort nous repentir. Toutefois la consideration que nous avons

These were the corrosives and vinegar which she thought suitable for the case; and the Earl was never weary in depicting the same statesmen as seditious, pestilent, self-seeking, mischief-making traitors. These secret, informal negotiations, had been carried on during most of the year 1587. It was the „controller's peace,” as Walsingham contemptuously designated the attempted treaty; for it will be recollected that Sir James Croft, a personage of very mediocre abilities, had always been more

eu de l'innocence d'un si bon peuple, et le desir qu'avons eu de leur bien jointe la prompte volonté de notre cousin, ont eu plus de force a nous retenir en notre premiere affection . . . et attendons que ce qu'est passé sera réparé à l'avenir . . .” Queen to State-Council, 20 June, 1587. (S. P. Office MS.) A letter to the States, of nearly the same date, is likewise filled with expressions of her disgust at the „étrange et ingrate maniere de vos deportemens envers notre cousin, votre ingratitude et traverses,” and of praise of the cousin, who, „nonobstant toutes ces discourtesies et ingrattitudes, ne voudra espargner pour le bien de vous tous de hasarder ni sa vie ni sa fortune,” &c. Queen to States, 22 June, 1587. (S. P. Office MS.)

And three months later—„How the town of Sluys was lost, we will spare to write that which thousands of your native people did affirm; how traitorously this town was lost, or rather betrayed, the world knoweth, and we do not think that yourselves can deny it, from want of supply from you and your chieftains, . . . and yet not without the honour and reputation of ours that defended it. . . . Our lieutenant (Leicester) could not have convenient time to deal with you (about the peace), for that he was so entangled with your overthwart dealing against him, with sundry false reports of us and himself, that we had agreed to a peace with the King of Spain, without regard to you. . . . That the Earl of Leicester was by us directed to surprise divers towns, to yield to the King, if you would not assent to peace, with many more such false and slanderous bruits spread—yea believed and maintained for some time by some of your own number, all which we affirm on the word of a prince, most false and maliciously devised with devilish minds, abhorring, as it seemeth, all liking of godly peace and quietness,” &c. Queen to the States, 20 Sept. 1587. (S. P. Office MS.)

busy than any other English politician in these transactions. He acted, however, on the inspiration of Burghley, who drew his own from the mountain-head.

But it was in vain for the Queen to affect concealment. The States knew everything which was passing, before Leicester knew. His own secret instructions reached the Netherlands before he did. His secretary, Junius, was thrown into prison, and his matter's letter taken from him, before there had been any time to act upon its treacherous suggestions. 1 When the Earl wrote letters with his own hand to his sovereign, of so secret a nature that he did not even retain a single copy for himself, for fear of discovery, he found, to his infinite disgust, that the States were at once provided with an authentic transcript of every line that he had written. 2 It was therefore useless, almost puerile, to deny facts which were quite as much within the knowledge of the Netherlands as of himself. The worst consequence of the concealment was, that a deeper treachery was thought possible

1 Meteren, xiv. 255: "This letter they have taken perforce from him, and committed first my man to prison, which I think was never durst to be attempted before, and puts me past my patience, I assure you" Leicester to Walsingham, 4 July, 1587. (S. P. Office MS.)

2 "I am credibly informed by an honest man," says Leicester, "who says he saw it, that the States have a copy of my last instrument, as also of the letter of her Majesty written lately privately to me, touching the dealing in the peace. Yea, further, that they are thoroughly and particularly made acquainted with a late letter of mine to her Majesty, written with my own hand, whereof I would have no copy taken, because I would have no man acquaint with it. In which letter I informed her Majesty at length of all things here, and gave her also, in some sort, my private advice. They have, by some means, got knowledge of the contents, thereof, and have intimated the same secretly to the Provinces, intending thereby to draw me into hatred and suspicion of the people, as though this dealing for peace were procured for me. But for this matter, I shall hope to deal well enough, for this treacherous usage of her Majesty's secrets," &c. Leicester to Walsingham, 28 Aug. 1587. (S. P. Office MS.)

than actually existed. „The fellow they call Barneveld," 1 as Leicester was in the habit of designating one of the first statesmen in Europe, was perhaps justified, knowing what he did, in suspecting more. Being furnished with a list of commissioners, already secretly agreed upon between the English and Spanish governments, to treat for peace, while at the same time the Earl was beating his breast, and flatly denying that there was any intention of treating with Parma at all, it was not unnatural that he should imagine a still wider and deeper scheme than really existed, against the best interests of his country. He may have expressed, in private conversation, some suspicions of this nature, but there is direct evidence that he never stated in public anything which was not afterwards proved to be matter of fact, or of legitimate inference from the secret documents which had come into his hands. The Queen exhausted herself in opprobrious language against those who dared to impute to her a design to obtain possession of the cities and strong places of the Netherlands, in order to secure a position in which to compel the Provinces into obedience to her policy. She urged, with much logic, that, as she had refused the sovereignty of the whole country when offered to her, she was not likely to form surreptitious schemes to make herself mistress of a portion of it. On the other hand, it was very obvious, that to accept the sovereignty of Philip's rebellious Provinces, was to declare war upon Philip; whereas, had she been pacifically inclined towards that sovereign, and treacherously disposed towards the Netherlands, it would be a decided advantage to her to have those strong places in her power. But the suspicions as to her good faith were exaggerated. As to the intentions of Leicester, the States were justified in their almost unlimited distrust. 1

1 Leicester to Burghley, 10-11 Sept. 1587 (S. P. Office MS.)

as very certain that both in 1586, and again, at this very moment, when Elizabeth was most vehement in denouncing such aspersions on her government, he had unequivocally declared to her his intention of getting possession, if possible, of several cities, and of the whole island of Walcheren, which, together with the cautionary towns already in his power, would enable the Queen to make good terms for herself with Spain, „if the worst came to the worst.”<sup>1</sup> It will also soon be shown that he did his best to carry these schemes into execution. There is no evidence, however, and no probability, that he had received the royal commands to perpetrate such a crime.

The States believed also, that in those secret negotiations with Parma the Queen was disposed to sacrifice the religious interests of the Netherlands. In this they were mistaken. But they had reason for their mistake, because the negotiator De Loo had expressly said, that, in

1 „I will go to Medenblik (the next town to Enkhuyzen), which is at your Majesty's devotion, as the governor thereof (Sonoy) is, and will do my best to recover Enkhuyzen ere I depart thence. Then, indeed, your Majesty, having Flushing, Brill, and Utrecht, as you have, and these, ye shall be able to bring the peace to better conditions, and bridle these States of Holland at your pleasure. . . . They are full of shifts, and yet, such as for this matter may ask toleration, for how hateful a matter peace hath been to the generality almost of all these countries, is well known to all persons, and how loathsome a thing it is to all but to such as for love and trust in your Majesty will conform themselves, I can sufficiently testify; and it is the only cause of the world for them to be careful in their dealing, for it doth confirm them and their posterity both in their lives and liberties, and therefore to be borne withal, if they take deliberation.” Leicester to the Queen, 9 Oct. 1587. (S. P. Office MS.) Yet the Earl, notwithstanding this admission, avows his determination of bridling the States by gaining possession of their cities.

And again, a month later: „I will not be idle to do all that in me shall lie to make this island of Walcheren assured, whatsoever shall fall out; which, if it may be, your Majesty shall the less fear to make a good bargain for yourself, when the worst shall come.” Leicester to the Queen, 5th Nov. 1587. (S. P. Office MS.)

her overtures to Farnese. she had abandoned that point altogether.<sup>1</sup> If this had been so, it would have simply been a consent on the part of Elizabeth, that the Catholic religion and the Inquisition should be re-established in the Provinces, to the exclusion of every other form of worship or polity. In truth, however, the position taken by her Majesty on the subject was as fair as could be reasonably expected. Certainly she was no advocate for religious liberty. She chose that her own subjects should be Protestants, because she had chosen to be a Protestant herself, and because it was an incident of her supremacy, to dictate uniformity of creed to all beneath her sceptre. No more than her father, who sent to the stake or gallows heretics to transubstantiation as well as believers in the Pope, had Elizabeth the faintest idea of religious freedom. Heretics to the English Church were persecuted, fined, imprisoned, mutilated, and murdered by sword, rope, and fire. In some respects, the practice towards those who dissented from Elizabeth was more immoral and illogical, even if less cruel, than that to which those were subjected who rebelled against Sixtus. The Act of Uniformity required Papists to assist at the Protestant worship, but wealthy Papists could obtain, immunity by an enormous fine. The Roman excuse to destroy bodies in order to save souls, could scarcely be alleged by a Church which might be bribed into connivance at heresy, and which derived a revenue from the very nonconformity for which humbler victims were sent to the gallows. It would,

1 „I have sent her Majesty another letter from De Loo, whereby it seemeth that now very lately her Majesty hath given him to understand that she will not insist upon the matter of religion further than shall be with the King's honour and conscience. Whereupon De Loo taketh no small hold, and if she keep that course, all will go to ruin, as I have written to her Majesty.” Buckhurst to Walsingham, 18 June, 1587. (S. P. Office MS.)



however, be unjust in the extreme to overlook the enormous difference in the amount of persecution, exercised respectively by the Protestant and the Roman Church. It is probable that not many more than two hundred Catholics<sup>1</sup> were executed, as such, in Elizabeth's reign, and this was ten score too many. But what was this against eight hundred heretics, burned, hanged, and drowned, in one Easter week, by Alva; against the eighteen thousand two hundred sent to stake and scaffold, as he boasted, during his administration; against the vast numbers of Protestants, whether they be counted by tens or by hundreds of thousands, who perished by the edicts of Charles V., in the Netherlands, or in the single Saint Bartholomew massacre in France? Moreover, it should never be forgotten—from undue anxiety for impartiality—that most of the Catholics who were executed in England, suffered as conspirators rather than as heretics. No foreign potentate, claiming to be vicegerent of Christ, had denounced Philip as a bastard and usurper, or had, by means of a blasphemous fiction, which then was a terrible reality, severed the bonds of allegiance by which his subjects were held,

1 „Dod reckons them at 191, Milner has raised the list to 204. Fifteen of these, according to him, suffered for denying the Queen's supremacy, 126 for exercising their ministry, and the rest for being reconciled to the Romish church. Many others died of hardship in prison, and many were deprived of their property. There seems, nevertheless, to be good reason for doubting whether any one who was executed might not have saved his life by explicitly denying the Pope's power to depose the Queen. This certainly furnishes a distinction between the persecution under Elizabeth (which, unjust as it was in its operation, yet, so far as it extended to capital inflections, had in view the security of the government) and that which the Protestants had sustained in her sister's reign, springing from mere bigotry and vindictive rancour.” (Hallam's 'Constitutional History,' fifth edition (Murray 1846), i. 168. Compare Lingard, viii. 356, 513, Strype, iii. iv., and see in particular chapters iii. and iv. of Hallam, in which the dealings of Elizabeth in religious matters are profoundly investigated.

cut him off from all communion with his fellow-creatures, and promised temporal rewards and a crown of glory in heaven to those who should succeed in depriving him of throne and life. Yet this was the position of Elizabeth. It was war to the knife between her and Rome, declared by Rome itself; nor was there any doubt whatever that the Seminary Priests—seedlings transplanted from foreign nurseries, which were as watered gardens for the growth of treason—were a perpetually organized band of conspirators and assassins, with whom it was hardly an act of excessive barbarity to deal in somewhat summary fashion. Doubtless it would have been a more lofty policy, and a far more intelligent one, to extend towards the Catholics of England, who as a body were loyal to their country, an ample toleration. But it could scarcely be expected that Elizabeth Tudor, as imperious and absolute by temperament as her father had ever been, would be capable of embodying that great principle.

When, in the preliminaries to the negotiations of 1587, therefore, it was urged on the part of Spain, that the Queen was demanding a concession of religious liberty from Philip to the Netherlands which she refused to English heretics, and that he only claimed the same right of dictating a creed to his subjects which she exercised in regard to her own, Lord Burghley replied that the statement was correct. The Queen permitted—it was true—no man to profess any religion but the one which she professed. At the same time it was declared to be unjust, that those persons in the Netherlands who had been for years in the habit of practising Protestant rites, should be *suddenly* compelled, *without instruction*, to abandon that form of worship. It was well known that many would rather die than submit to such oppression, and it was affirmed that the exercise of this cruelty would be resisted by her to the uttermost.

There was no hint of the propriety—on any logical basis—of leaving the question of creed as a matter between man and his Maker, with which any dictation on the part of crown or state was an act of odious tyranny. There was not even a suggestion the Protestant doctrines were true, and the Catholic doctrines false. The matter was merely taken up on the *uti possidetis* principle, that they who had acquired the fact of Protestant worship had a right to retain it, and could not justly be deprived of it, except by instruction and persuasion. It was also affirmed that it was not the English practice to inquire into men's consciences. It would have been difficult, however, to make that very clear to Philip's comprehension, because, if men, women, and children, were scourged with rods, imprisoned, and hanged, if they refused to conform publicly to a ceremony at which their consciences revolted—unless they had money enough to purchase nonconformity—it seemed to be the practice to inquire very effectively into their consciences. 1

1. „And when De Loo reporteth an objection made to him, that there is no more reason for the King to yield to any of his subjects liberty of religion contrary to the one he professeth no more than her Majesty doth to any of hers; indeed, at the first appearance, this objection seemeth of good moment to be allowed, and, until it be answered, ought to be taken by the Duke of Parma; but if the diversities of the comparison shall be marked, the case also will therein be changed. The Queen's Majesty *indeed never did permit*, either publicly or privately, that any persons for these seven years should use any exercise of religion contrary to that form received and established by public authority; so as none can challenge that they were by any liberty suffered to use any other, which is contrary to the Low Countries, for the space of about six years. But if her Majesty had so permitted, surely reason would move her not to constrain, otherwise than by instruction, any that by reason of her permission had governed their consciences to the contrary. And because it may be also further objected, as most falsely is divulged, to more offence against her Majesty from Catholic places, that she doth so severely punish them that are in conscience contrarily affected, it is to be avowed for a certain truth that her

But if there was a certain degree of disingenuousness on the part of Elizabeth towards the States, her attitude towards Parma was one of perfect sincerity. A perusal of the secret correspondence leaves no doubt whatever on that point. She was seriously and fervently desirous of peace with Spain. On the part of Farnese and his master, there was the most unscrupulous mendacity, while the confiding simplicity and truthfulness of the Queen in these negotiations was almost pathetic. Especially she declared her trust in the loyal and upright character of Parma, in which she was sure of never being disappointed. It is only doing justice to Alexander to say that he was as much deceived by her frankness as she by his falsehood. It never entered his head that a royal personage and the trusted counsellors of a great kingdom could be telling the truth in a secret international transaction, and he justified the industry with which his master and himself piled fiction upon fiction, by their utter disbelief in every word which came to them from England.

The private negotiations had been commenced, or rather had been renewed, very early in February of this year. During the whole critical period which preceded and followed the execution of

Majesty never did allow that any person was by inquisition urged to show his conscience in any matter of faith, nor ever was punished for professing only of his opinion in his conscience, but what any have beside their profession of their conscience, moved by others, by open acts to break the law, or have, under colour of encouraging others to change their form of religion, persuaded to them also to alter their obedience in all worldly duties, to practise rebellion in the realm, to solicit invasions, and flatly to deny the Queen's Majesty to be their lawful Queen. In those cases, her Majesty and all her ministers of justice had cause to withstand such violent courses under colours of religion; and otherwise than to withstand these most dangerous attempts, her Majesty did never allow any should lose their lives and shed their blood." (Rough draft of Burghley, 9 March, 1587. Br. Mus., Galba, C. ix. p. 122, MS.)

Mary, in the course of which the language of Elizabeth towards the States had been so shrewish, there had been the gentlest diplomatic cooing between Farnese and herself. It was—Dear Cousin, you know how truly I confide in your sincerity, how anxious I am that this most desirable peace should be arranged; and it was—Sacred Majesty, you know how much joy I feel in your desire for the repose of the world, and for a solid peace between your Highness and the King my master; how much I delight in concord—*how incapable I am by ambiguous words of spinning out these transactions, or of deceiving your Majesty*, and what a hatred I feel for steel, fire, and blood. 1

Four or five months rolled on, during which Leicester had been wasting time in England, Farnese wasting none before Sluys, and the States doing their best to counteract the schemes both of their enemy and of their ally. De Loo made a visit, in July, to the camp of the Duke of Parma, and received the warmest assurances of his pacific dispositions. „I am much pained,” said Alexander, „with this procrastination. „I am so full of sincerity myself, that it seems to me a very strange matter, this hostile descent by Drake upon the coasts of Spain. The result of such courses will be, that the King will end by being exasperated,

1 Parma to Queen Elizabeth, 18 Feb. 1587. Same to same, 5 April, 1587. Queen to Parma, 13 April, 1587. (Arch. de Simantas, MSS.) And even later still:—

„Such is the good opinion conceived of the Duke of Parma,” wrote Burghley, „for his own nature and worthiness in all places, that he is a prince of honour in keeping his promise, without respect of any gain or benefit. And, to tell you true, it is the only foundation which her Majesty maketh to proceed in this treaty, against the opinion of very many, in that she esteemeth the Duke to have great regard to his word and promise, and also an opinion that she hath, though he be a great man of war, that he is Christianly disposed rather to maintain peace than to raise war, whereof her Majesty looketh to make proof by this treaty,” &c. &c. Burghley to Andr. de Loo, 10 Oct. 1587. (S. P. Office MS.)

and I shall be touched in my honour—so great is the hopes I have held out of being able to secure a peace. I have ever been and I still am most anxious for concord, from the affection I bear to her sacred Majesty. I have been obliged, much against my will, to take the field again. I could wish now that our negotiations might terminate before the arrival of my fresh troops, namely, 9000 Spaniards and 9000 Italians, which, with Walloons, Germans, and Lorrainers, will give me an effective total of 30,000 soldiers. Of this I give you my word as a gentlemen. Go then, Andrew de Loo,” continued the Duke, „write to her sacred Majesty, that I desire to make peace, and to serve her faithfully; and that I shall not change my mind, even in case of any great success, for I like to proceed rather by the ways of love than of rigour and effusion of blood.” 1

„I can assure you, O most serene Duke,” replied Andrew, „that the most serene Queen is in the very same dispositions with yourself.”

„Excellent well then,” said the Duke, „we shall come to an agreement at once, and the sooner the deputies on both sides are appointed the better.”

A feeble proposition was then made, on the part of the peace-loving Andrew, that the hostile operations against Sluys should be at once terminated. But this did not seem so clear to the most serene Duke. He had gone to great expense in that business; and he had not built bridges, erected forts, and dug mines, only to abandon them for a few fine words. Fine words were plenty, but they raised no sieges. Meantime these pacific and gentle murmurings from Farnese's camp had lulled the Queen into forgetfulness of Roger Williams and Arnold Groenevelt and their men, fighting day and night in trench and mine during that critical midsummer. The wily tongue of the Duke had been more effective

1 De Loo to Burghley, 11 July, 1587. (S. P. Office MS.)



than his batteries in obtaining the much-coveted city. The Queen obstinately held back her men and money, confident of effecting a treaty whether Sluys fell or not. Was it strange, that the States should be distrustful of her intentions, and, in their turn, become neglectful of their duty? 1.

And thus summer wore into autumn, Sluys fell, the States and their governor-general were at daggers-drawn, the Netherlanders were full of distrust with regard to England, Alexander hinted doubts as to the Queen's sincerity; the secret negotiations, though fertile in suspicions, jealousies, delays, and such foul weeds, had produced no wholesome fruit, and the excellent De Loo became very much depressed. At last 26th Sept. a letter from Burghley relieved

1587.

his drooping spirits. From the most disturbed and melancholy man in the world, he protested, he had now become merry and quiet. 2 He straightway went off to the Duke of Parma, with the letter in his pocket, and translated it to him by candlelight, as he was careful to state as an important point in his narrative. And Farnese was fuller of fine phrases than ever.

„There is no cause whatever,” said he, in a most loving manner, „to doubt my sincerity. Yet the Lord-Treasurer intimates that the most serene Queen is disposed so to do. But if I had not the very best intentions and desires for peace, I should never have made the first overtures. If I did not wish a pacific conclusion, what in the world forced me to do what I have done? On the contrary, it is I that have reason to suspect the other parties with their long delays, by which they have made me lose the best part of the summer.” 3

1 Burghley to De Loo, 18 July, 1587. (S. P. Office MS.)

2 „Da turbato e melancolico m' ha del tutto quietato e fatto star allegro,” &c. e Loo to Burghley, 26 Sept. 1587. (S. P. Office MS.)

3 „Con dire amorevolmente lo che sigue —non e (disse), causa alcuna didubitare

He then commented on the strong expressions in the English letters, as to the continuance of her Majesty in her pious resolutions, observed that he was thoroughly advised of the disputes between the Earl of Leicester and the States; and added that it was very important for the deputies to arrive at the time indicated by the Queen.

„Whatever is to be done,” said he, in conclusion, „let it be done quickly;” and with that he said he would go and eat a bit of supper.

„And may I communicate Lord Burghley's letter to any one else?” asked De Loo.

„Yes, Yes, to the Seigneur de Champagne, and to my secretary Cosimo,” answered his Highness.

So the merchant-negotiator proceeded at once to the mansion of Champagne, in company with the secretary Cosimo. There was a long conference, in which De Loo was informed of many things which he thoroughly believed, and faithfully transmitted to the court of Elizabeth. Alexander had done his best, they said, to delay the arrival of his fresh troops. He had withdrawn from the field, on various pretexts, hoping, day after day, that the English commissioners would arrive, and that a firm and perpetual peace would succeed to the miseries of war. But as time wore away, and there came no commissioners, the Duke had come to the painful conclusion that he had been trifled with. 1

della mia sincera mente—si come sullo fine della 1<sup>a</sup> si fa menzione che la serma regina lo potrebbe fare—perche se non avessi havuto bonissima disposizione e desiderio della pace non sarei gia ito a farne la prima apertura mi medesimo, e condescendere alle cose che sapete (disse a me) se non si fosse stata intenzione di volerne venir a una conclusione (agionendo) che cosa mi forzava di farlo? Anzi piuttosto avrei occasione io di sospettar loro con tante sorte di dilazioni e haver mi fatto perdere la miglior parte de l'estate;” &c. (Ibid.)

1 „Ma a l' ultimo il Duca vedendo la continua dilazione, con giudicare che si burasse,” &c. (De Loo to Burghley, MS. last cited.)

His forces would now be sent into Holland to find something to eat; and this would ensure the total destruction of all that territory. He had also written to command all the officers of the coming troops to hasten their march, in order that he might avoid incurring still deeper censure. He was much ashamed, in truth, to have been wheedled into passing the wole fine season in idleness. 1 He had been sacrificing himself for her sacred Majesty, and to serve her best interests; and now he found himself the object of her mirth. 2 Those who ought to be well informed had assured him that the Queen was only waiting to see how the King of Navarre was getting on with the auxiliary force just going to him from Germany, that she had no intention whatever to make peace, and that, before long, he might expect all these German mercenaries upon his shoulders in the Netherlands. Nevertheless he was prepared to receive them with 40,000 good infantry, a splendid cavalry force, and plenty of money. 3

All this and more did the credulous Andrew greedily devour, and he lost no time in communicating the important intelligence to her Majesty and the Lord-Treasurer. He implored her, he said, upon his bare knees, prostrate on the ground, and from the most profound and veritable centre of his heart and with all his soul and all his strength, 4 to believe in the truth of the matters thus confided to him. He would pledge his immortal soul, which was of more value to him—as he correctly observed—than even the crown of Spain, that the King, the Duke, and his counsellors, were most sincerely desirous of peace, and actuated by the most loving and benevolent motives. Alexander Farnese

was „the antidote to the Duke of Alva,” kindly sent by heaven, *ut contraria contrariis curentur*, and if the entire security of the sacred Queen were not now obtained, together with a perfect re-integration of love between her Majesty and the King of Spain, and with the assured tranquillity and perpetual prosperity of the Netherlands, it would be the fault of England, not of Spain. 1

And no doubt the merchant believed all that was told him, and—what was worse—that he fully impressed his own convictions upon her Majesty and Lord Burghley, to say nothing of the comptroller, who, poor man, had great facility in believing anything that came from the court of the Most Catholic King. Yet it is painful to reflect, that in all these communications of Alexander and his agents, there was not one single word of truth. It was all false from beginning to end, as to the countermanding of the troops, as to the pacific intentions of the King and Duke, and as to the proposed campaign in Friesland, in case of rupture, and all the rest. But this will be conclusively proved a little later.

Meantime the conference had been most amicable and satisfactory. And when business was over, Champagny—not a whit the worse for the severe jilting which he had so recently sustained from the widow De Bours, now Mrs. Aristotle Patton—invited De Loo and Secretary Cosimo to supper. And the three made a night of it, sitting up late, and draining such huge bumpers to the health of the Queen of England, that—as the excellent Andrew subsequently informed Lord Burghley—his head ached most bravely next morning. 2

1 1 De Loo to Burghley, MS. last cited.

1 „Trovandosi vergogniato d'avere, lasciato scorrere sì bella stagione in ozio,” &c. (Ibid.) 2 Ibid. 3 Ibid.

4 „Flexis nudisque genibus humi prostratus, dal piu profondo e vero centro del mio cuore et ex corde et ex tota anima,” &c. (Ibid.)

2 „Con sommo contentamento del uno e l' altro, a tal segno, che tenendoci il Sr. de Champagny a cena, con far il ragione di buon cuore d'un gran brindisi che fece alla sanità di sua sacra Maesta, mi dolse (con licenza per dirlo come va) la mattina seguente bravamente la testa.” A. de Loo to Burghley, 26 Sept. 1587. (S. P. Office MS.)

And so, amid the din of hostile preparation not only in Cadiz and Lisbon, but in Ghent, and Sluys, and Antwerp, the import of which it seemed difficult to mistake, the comedy of negotiation was still rehearsing, and the principal actors were already familiar with their respective parts. There were the Earl of Derby, Knight of the Garter, and my Lord Cobham, and puzzling James Croft, and other Englishmen, actually believing that the farce was a solemn reality. There was Alexander of Parma thoroughly aware of the contrary. There was Andrew De Loo, more talkative, more credulous, more busy than ever, and more fully impressed with the importance of his mission; and there was the white-bearded Lord-Treasurer turning complicated paragraphs, shaking his head, and waving his wand across the water, as if, by such expedients, the storm about to burst over England could be dispersed.

The commissioners should come, if only the Duke of Parma would declare on his word of honour, that these hostile preparations, with which all Christendom was ringing, were not intended against England; or—if that really were the case—if he would request his master to abandon all such schemes, and if Philip in consequence would promise, on the honour of a prince, to make no hostile attempts against that country. 1

1 „If you can possibly, I require you to obtain of the Duke, in writing under his hand, an assurance either of his knowledge that these preparations are not nor shall be meant against any of her Majesty's dominions; or otherwise, if he be not able to assure the same, then, at the least, that he will, by his writing, assure her Majesty that he will, upon his honour, with all expedition, send to the King his advice to stay all hostile actions, or to have the King's answer, like a prince of honour, whether he intendeth or no to employ these forces against her Majesty, which, though in some construction may seem hard to require of a king intending hostility, yet, as the case is, when her Majesty yieldeth to a cessation of arms and to a treaty of peace with the king, is a request most reasonable to make, and honourable for the king to grant. . . Such are the frequent reports out of Spain of these

There would really seem an almost Arcadian simplicity in such demands, coming from so practised a statesman as the Lord-Treasurer, and from a woman of such brilliant intellect as Elizabeth unquestionably possessed. But we read the history of 1587, not only by the light of subsequent events, but by the almost microscopic revelations of sentiments and motives, which a full perusal of the secret documents in those ancient cabinets, affords. At that moment, it was not ignorance nor dullness which was leading England towards the pitfall so artfully dug by Spain. There was trust in the plighted word of a chivalrous soldier like Alexander Farnese, 1 of a most religious and anointed monarch like Philip II. English frankness, playing cards upon the table, was no match for Italian and Spanish leger-de-main,—a system according to which, to defraud the antagonist by every kind of falsehood and trickery was the legitimate end of diplomacy and statesmanship. It was well known that there were great preparations in Spain, Portugal, and the obedient Netherlands, by land and sea. But Sir Robert Sidney 2 was persuaded that the expedition was intended for

preparations, and yet her Majesty will stand to the Duke's answer, if the army shall not be known to be actually prepared against England—which if it shall be, no man will think it meet that her commissioners should come.” Burghley to A. De Loo, 10 Oct. 1587. (S. P. Office MS.)

1 As early as August, the Duke had proposed a cessation of arms, to grant which, as has been abundantly shown by his private correspondence, was never in his thoughts. „The Duke of Parma, to the end the treaty may proceed with better success, hath made offer unto us to yield to a cessation of arms, having put us also in hope that such forces as are now preparing in Italy, amounting to 15,000 footmen, at the least, shall be stayed.” Queen to Leicester, 9 Aug. 1587. (Br. Mus. Galba, D. I. 293, MS.)

2 „There came some out of Spain very lately, that say the preparations there are for a certain place in Africk, which greatly imports the passage of both the Indies. The admiral of the Turks was to leave it last year with sixty galleys.” Sir R. Sidney to Leicester, 31 Dec. 1587. (Br. Mus. Galba, D. II. p. 288, MS.)



Africa; even the Pope was completely mystified—to the intense delight of Philip—and Burghley, enlightened by the sagacious De Loo, was convinced, that even in case of a rupture, the whole strength of the Spanish arms was to be exerted in reducing Friesland and Overijssel. But Walsingham was never deceived; for he had learned from Demosthenes a lesson with which William the Silent, in his famous Apology, had made the world familiar, that *the only citadel against a tyrant and a conqueror was distrust.*

Alexander, much grieved that doubts should still be felt as to his sincerity, renewed the most exuberant expressions of that sentiment, together with gentle complaints against the dilatoriness which had proceeded from the doubt. Her Majesty had long been aware, he said, of his anxiety to bring about a perfect reconciliation; but he had waited, month after month, for her commissioners, and had waited in vain. His hopes had been dashed to the ground. The affair had been indefinitely spun out, and he could not resist the conviction that her Majesty had changed her mind. Nevertheless, as Andrew De Loo was again proceeding to England, the Duke seized the opportunity once more to kiss her hand, and—although he had well nigh resolved to think no more on the subject—to renew his declarations, that, if the much-coveted peace were not concluded, the blame could not be imputed to him, and that he should stand guiltless before God and the world. He had done, and was still ready to do, all which became a Christian and a man desirous of the public welfare and tranquillity. 1

1 „E così da canto mio haveva preparato gli affari di maniera, e messo il tutto in termine, che Vra Mata haveva potuto conoscere qual zelo ch' io abbracciara questa occasione, e quanto io desiderava di veder rivertire la buona e mutua intelligenza fra il Re mio signore et la Vra Mta. Ma vedendo che non ostante le tante speranze che m' eravano state date della venuta del commissarii di Vra Mta, la cosa si va tuttavia tirando al

When Burghley read these fine phrases he was much impressed; and they were pronounced at the English court to be „very princely and Christianly.” An elaborate comment too was drawn up by the comptroller on every line of the letter. „These be very good words,” said the comptroller. 1

But the Queen was even more pleased with the last proof of the Duke's sincerity; than even Burghley and Croft had been. Disregarding all the warnings of Walsingham, she renewed her expressions of boundless confidence in the wily Italian. „We do assure you,” wrote the Lords, „and so you shall do well to avow it to the Duke upon our honours, that her Majesty saith she thinketh both their minds to accord upon one good and Christian meaning, though their ministers may perchance sound upon a discord.” 2 And she repeated her resolution to send over her commissioners, so soon as the Duke had satisfied her as to the hostile preparations.

We have now seen the good faith of the English Queen towards the Spanish government. We have seen her boundless trust in the sincerity of Farnese and his master. We have heard the exuberant professions of an honest

luno, io non posso se non dubitare ch' ella habbia mutato d' opinione, e se ben io ero quasi risoluto di non ci pensar piu, tuttavia ritornandosene per di la il detto Andrea m' parse di scriver ancor questi pochi versi, tanto per non perder l' occasione di baciare humilte le mani a Vra Mata quanto per assigurarla che non restara per me, che la risoluzione presa, non passi avanti, e che succedendo altrimenti ne saro scuato inanzi a Dio et al mondo, e hvero almeno soddisfatto a me medesimo, d' haver fatto quello che l' obbligo Christiano, et di persona desiderosa del bene e riposo publico m' obligara.”

Parma to Queen Elizabeth, Oct. 30. 1587.  
Nov. 9.

(S. P. Office MS.)

1 The Lords to A. De Loo, 11 Nov. 1587.  
(S. P. Office MS.)

And if blunt Sir Roger Williams had been standing by when the remark was made, he might have exclaimed, with his countryman, honest Hugh Evans, „Good worts, good worts—good cabbage!” 2 Ibid.

intention to bring about a firm and lasting peace, which fell from the lips of Farnese and of his confidential agents. It is now necessary to glide for a moment into the secret cabinet of Philip, in order to satisfy ourselves as to the value of all those professions. The attention of the reader is solicited to these investigations, because the year 1587 was a most critical period in the history of English, Dutch, and European liberty. The coming year 1588 had been long spoken of in prophecy, as the year of doom, perhaps of the destruction of the world, but it was in 1587, the year of expectation and preparation, that the materials were slowly combining out of which that year's history was to be formed.

And there sat the patient letter-writer in his cabinet, busy with his schemes. His grey head was whitening fast. He was sixty years of age. His frame was slight, his figure stooping, his digestion very weak, his manner more glacial and sepulchral than ever; but if there were a hard-working man in Europe, that man was Philip II. And there he sat at his table, scrawling his apostilles. The fine innumerable threads which stretched across the surface of Christendom, and covered it as with a net, all converged in that silent cheerless cell. France was kept in a state of perpetual civil war; the Netherlands had been converted into a shambles; Ireland was maintained in a state of chronic rebellion; Scotland was torn with internal feuds, regularly organized and paid for by Philip; and its young monarch—„that lying King of Scots,” as Leicester called him—was kept in a leash ready to be slipped upon England when his master should give the word; and England herself was palpitating with the daily expectation of seeing a disciplined horde of brigands let loose upon her shores; and all this misery, past, present, and future, was almost wholly due to the exertions of that

gray-haired letter-writer at his peaceful library table.

At the very beginning of the year the King of Denmark had made an offer to Philip of mediation. The letter, entrusted to a young Count de Rantzau, had been intercepted by the States—the envoy not having availed himself, in time, of his diplomatic capacity, and having in consequence been treated, for a moment, like a prisoner of war. The States had immediately addressed earnest letters of protest to Queen Elizabeth, declaring that nothing which the enemy could do in war was half so horrible to them as the mere mention of peace. Life, honour, religion, liberty, their all, were at stake, they said, and would go down in one universal shipwreck, if peace should be concluded; and they implored her Majesty to avert the proposed intercession of the Danish King. 1 Wilkes wrote to Walsingham, 2 denouncing that monarch and his ministers as stipendiaries of Spain, while, on the other hand, the Duke of Parma, after courteously thanking the King for his offer of mediation, described him to Philip as such a dogged heretic, 3 that no good was to be derived from him, except by meeting his fraudulent offers with an equally fraudulent response. There will be nothing lost, said Alexander, by affecting to listen to his proposals, and meantime your Majesty must proceed with the preparations against England. 4 This was in the first week of the year 1587.

In February, and almost on the very day when Parma was writing those affectionate letters to Elizabeth, breathing nothing but peace, he was carefully conning Philip's directions in regard to the all-important business of the invasion. He was informed by his master,

1 Bor. ii. xxii. 945-948. Meteren, xii. 247.

2 Wilkes to Walsingham, 3 Dec. 1586. (S. P. Office MS.)

3 „Emperrado erege,” &c. Parma to Philip, 10 Jan. 1587. (Arch. de Simancas, MS.)

4 Ibid.

that one hundred vessels, forty of them of largest size, were quite ready, together with 12,000 Spanish infantry; including 3000 of the old legion, and that there were volunteers more than enough. 1 Philip had also taken note, he said, of Alexander's advice as to choosing the season when the crops in England had just been got in, as the harvest of so fertile a country would easily support an invading force; but he advised nevertheless that the army should be thoroughly victualled at starting. 2 Finding that Alexander did not quite approve of the Irish part of the plan, he would reconsider the point, and think more of the Isle of Wight; but perhaps still some other place might be discovered, a descent upon which might inspire that enemy with still greater terror and confusion. It would be difficult for him, he said, to grant the 6000 men asked for by the Scotch malcontents, without seriously weakening his armada; but there must be no positive refusal, for a concerted action with the Scotch lords and their adherents was indispensable. The secret, said the King, had been profoundly kept, and neither in Spain nor in Rome had anything been allowed to transpire. Alexander was warned therefore to do his best to maintain the mystery, for the enemy was trying very hard to penetrate their actions and their thoughts. 3

And certainly Alexander did his best. He replied to his master, by transmitting copies of the letters he had been writing with his own hand to the Queen, and of the pacific messages he had sent her through Champagny and De Loo. 4 She is just now somewhat confused, said he, and those of her counsellors who desire peace are more eager than ever for negotiation. She is very much afflicted with the loss of Deventer, and

is quarrelling with the French ambassador about the new conspiracy for her assassination. The opportunity is a good one, and if she writes an answer to my letter, said Alexander, we can keep the negotiation alive; while, if she does not, 'twill be a proof that she has contracted leagues with other parties. But, in any event, the Duke fervently, implored Philip not to pause in his preparations for the great enterprise which he had conceived in his royal breast. 1 So urgent for the invasion was the peace-loving general.

He alluded also to the supposition that the quarrel between her Majesty and the French envoy was a mere fetch, and only one of the results of Bellievre's mission. Whether that diplomatist had been sent to censure, or in reality to approve, in the name of his master, of the Scottish Queen's execution, Alexander would leave to be discussed by Don Bernardino de Mendoza, the Spanish ambassador in Paris; but he was of opinion that the anger of the Queen with France was a fiction, and her supposed league with France and Germany against Spain a fact. 2 Upon this point, as it appears from Secretary Walsingham's lamentations, the astute Farnese was mistaken. In truth he was frequently led into error by attributing to the English policy the same serpentine movement and venomous purpose which characterized his own; and we have already seen, that Elizabeth was ready, on the contrary, to quarrel with the States, with France, with all the world, if she could only secure the good-will of Philip.

The French matter, indissolubly connected in that monarch's schemes, with his designs upon England and Holland, was causing Alexander much anxiety. He foresaw great difficulty in maintaining that indispensable civil war in France, and thought that a peace might, some fine day, be declared between Henry III,

1 Philip II. to Parma, 28 Feb. 1587. (Arch. de Simancas, MS.) 2 Ibid.

3 Philip to Parma, MS. last cited.

4 Parma to Philip II. 22 March, 1587. (Arch. de Simancas, MS.)

1 Ibid.

2 Ibid.



and the Huguenots, when least expected. In consequence, the Duke of Guise was becoming very importunate for Philip's subsidies. „Mucio comes begging to me,” said Parma, „with the very greatest earnestness, and utters nothing but lamentations and cries of misery. 1 He asked for 25,000 of the 150,000 ducats promised him. I gave them. Soon afterwards he writes, with just as much anxiety, for 25,000 more. These I did not give; firstly, because I had them not” (which would seem a sufficient reason), „and secondly, because I wished to protract matters as much as possible. He is constantly reminding me of your Majesty's promise of 300,000 ducats in case he comes to a rupture with the King of France, and I always assure him that your Majesty will keep all promises.” 2

Philip, on his part, through the months of spring, continued to assure his generalissimo of his steady preparations by sea and land. He had ordered Mendoza to pay the Scotch lords the sum demanded by them, but not till after they had done the deed agreed upon; and as to the 6000 men, he felt obliged, he said, to defer that matter for the moment, and to leave the decision upon it to the Duke. 3 Farnese kept his sovereign minutely informed of the negotiations carried on through Champagny and De Loo, and expressed his constant opinion that the Queen was influenced by motives as hypocritical as his own. She was only seeking, he said, to deceive, to defraud, to put him to sleep, by those feigned negotiations, while she was making her combinations with France and Germany for the ruin of Spain. There was no virtue to be expected from her, except she was compelled thereto by pure necessity. 4 The English, he said, were

hated and abhorred by the natives of Holland and Zeeland, 1 and it behoved Philip to seize so favourable an opportunity for urging on his great plan with all the speed in the world. It might be that the Queen, seeing these mighty preparations, even although not suspecting that she herself was to be invaded, would tremble for her safety, if the Netherlands should be crushed. But if she succeeded in deceiving Spain, and putting Philip and Parma to sleep, she might well boast of having made fools of them all. 2 The negotiations for peace and the preparations for the invasion should go simultaneously forward, therefore, and the money would, in consequence, come more sparingly to the Provinces from the English coffers, and the disputes between England and the States would be multiplied. The Duke also begged to be informed whether any terms could be laid down, upon which the King really would conclude peace, in order that he might make no mistake for want of instructions or requisite powers. The condition of France was becoming more alarming every day, he said. In other words, there was an ever-growing chance of peace for that distracted country. The Queen of England was cementing a strong league between herself, the French King, and the Huguenots, and matters were looking very serious. The impending peace in France would never do, and Philip should prevent it in time by giving Mucio his money. Unless the French are entangled and at war among themselves, it is quite clear, said Alexander, that we can never think of carrying out our great scheme of invading England.” 3

sino fuesse forzada de la pura necesidad.” Parma to Philip, 12 April, 1587. (Arch. de Simancas, MS.)

1 „Odiados y aborrecidos de los naturales de Olanda y Zelanda.” (Parma to Philip, MS. last cited.)

2 „Se podria jactar de haber nos burlado.” (Parma to Philip, MS. last cited.)

3 „Sin quedar embarazados los franceses entre si es claro que no se podria pensar a

1 „Con grandissima instancia y declarandome lastimas y miserias” MS. Letter of Parma to Philip, last cited. 2 Ibid.

3 Philip to Parma, April 15, 1587. (Arch. de Simancas, MS.)

4 „No es aguardar de ella ninguna virtud,

The King thoroughly concurred in all that was said and done by his faithful governor and general. He had no intention of concluding a peace on any terms whatever, and therefore could name no conditions; but he quite approved of a continuance of the negotiations. The English, he was convinced, were utterly false on their part, and the King of Denmark's proposition to mediate was part and parcel of the same general fiction. He was quite sensible of the necessity of giving Mucio the money to prevent a pacification in France, and would send letters of exchange on Agostino Spinola for the 300,000 ducats. Meantime Farnese was to go on steadily with his preparations for the invasion. 1

The secretary of state, Don Juan de Idiaguez, also wrote most earnestly on the great subject to the Duke. „It is not to be exaggerated,” he said, „how set his Majesty is in the all-important business. If you wish to manifest towards him the most flattering obedience on earth, and to oblige him as much as you could wish, give him this great satisfaction *this year*. Since you have money, prepare everything out there, conquer all difficulties, and do the deed so soon as the forces of Spain and Italy arrive, according to the plan laid down by your Excellency last year. *Make use of the negotiations for peace for this one purpose, and no more*, and do the business like the man you are. Attribute the liberty of this advice to my desire to serve you more than any other, to my knowledge of how much you will thereby gratify his Majesty, and to my fear of his resentment towards you, in the contrary case.” 2

la efectuacion del negocio. Parma to Philip, 12 April, 1587. (Arch. de Simancas, MS.)

1 Philip to Parma, 15 April, 1587. (Arch. de Simancas, MS.)

2 No se puede encarecer quan puesto está su Magd en el negocio principal (the invasion of England.) Si Vra Exca le quiere hazar la mayor lisonja de la tierra, y obligarla a quanto quisiere, dé le este contenido este año, y pues tiene dinero prepare

And, on the same day, in order that there might be no doubt of the royal sentiments, Philip expressed himself at length on the whole subject. The dealings of Farnese with the English, and his feeding them with hopes of peace, would have given him more satisfaction, he observed, if it had caused their preparations to slacken; but, on the contrary, their boldness had increased. They had perpetrated the inhuman murder of the Queen of Scots, and moreover, not content with their piracies at sea and in the Indies, they had dared to invade the ports of Spain, as would appear in the narrative transmitted to Farnese of the late events at Cadiz. *And although that damage was small*, said Philip, there resulted a very great obligation to take them seriously in hand. 1 He *declined sending full powers* for treating; but in order to make use of the same arts employed by the English, he preferred that Alexander should not undeceive them, but desired him to express, as out of his own head, to the negotiators, his astonishment that while they were holding such language they should commit such actions. Even their want of prudence in thus provoking the King, when their strength was compared to his, should be spoken of by Farnese as wonderful, and he was to express the opinion that his Majesty would think him much wanting in circumspection, should he go on negotiating while they were playing such tricks.

todo lo de allá, y venca las dificultades y haga el efeto que a tiempo llegará lo de España y Italia, para el q Vra Exca dezia el año pasado, y sirva se de los tratos de paz para este mismo fin, no mas, y haga esto hecho tan de quien es, y atribuya Vra Exca la libertad desto aviso a lo q deseo servirle mas que nadie, y a lo que veo que obligara a su Magd con ello, y lo que temo que sentiria lo contrario.” Don Juan de Idiaguez to Parma, 13 May, 1587. (Arch. de Simancas, MS.)

1 Y aunque el daño fue poco es ya mucha la obligacion de yr les muy de veras a la mano.” Philip to Parma 13 May, 1587. (Arch. de Simancas, MS.)

„You must show yourself very sensitive about this event,” continued Philip, „and you must give them to understand that I am quite as angry as you. You must try to draw from them some offer of satisfaction—however false it will be in reality—such as a proposal to recall the fleet, or an assertion that the deeds of Drake in Cadiz were without the knowledge and contrary to the will of the Queen, and that she very much regrets them, or something of that sort.” 1

It has been already shown that Farnese was very successful in eliciting from the Queen, through the mouth of Lord Burghley, as ample a disavowal and repudiation of Sir Francis Drake as the King could possibly desire. Whether it would have the desired effect of allaying the wrath of Philip, might have been better foretold, could the letter, with which we are now occupied, have been laid upon the Greenwich council-board.

„When you have got such a disavowal,” continued his Majesty, „you are to act as if entirely taken in and imposed upon by them, and, pretending to believe everything they tell you, you must renew the negotiations, proceed to name commissioners, and propose a meeting upon neutral territory. 2 As for powers, say that you, as my governor-general, will entrust them to your deputies, in regard to the Netherlands. For all other matters, say that you have had full powers for many months, but that you cannot exhibit them until conditions worthy of my acceptance have been offered. Say this only for the sake of appearance. 3 This is the true way to take them in, and so the peace-commissioners may meet. But to you only do I declare that my *intention* is

*that this shall never lead to any result, whatever conditions may be offered by them.* On the contrary, all this is done—just as they do—to deceive them, and to cool them in their preparations for defence, by inducing them to believe that such preparations will be unnecessary. 1 *You are well aware that the reverse of all this is the truth,* and that on our part there is to be no slackness, but the greatest diligence in our efforts for the invasion of England, for which we have already made the most abundant provision in men, ships, and money, of which you are well aware.” 2

Is it strange that the Queen of England was deceived? Is it matter of surprise, censure, or shame, that no English statesman was astute enough or base enough to contend with such diplomacy, which seemed inspired only by the very father of lies?

„Although we thus enter into negotiations,” continued the King—unveiling himself, with a solemn indecency, not agreeable to contemplate—„without any intention of concluding them, you can always get out of them with great honour, by taking umbrage about the point of religion and about some other of the outrageous propositions which they are like to propose, and of which there are plenty in the letters of Andrew de Loo. 3 Your commissioners must be instructed to refer all important matters to your personal decision. The English will be asking for damages for money spent in assisting my rebels; your commissioners will contend that damages are rather due to me. Thus, and in other ways, time will be spent. Your own envoys are not

1 Philip to Parma, 13 May, 1587. (MS. last cited.)

2 „Y entonces hazar vos del engañado y que creyendo lo que os dñen de nuevo volváys a la plática,” &c. (MS. last cited.)

3 „Que es camino disimulado.” (MS. last cited.)

1 „Pero con vos solo me aciaro que mia intencion no es de que aquello llegué a efecto con ningunas condiciones, sino que todo esto se tome por medio, como lo hazen ellos, de entretenerlos y enfriarlos,” &c. (Ibid.)

2 Ibid.

3 „Con mucha honra, desconcertandovos sobre el punto de la religion o otro de los desaforados, que ellos han de proponer, que harto lo son los del papel de Andrea de Loo.” (MS. last cited.)



to know the secret any more than the English themselves. I tell it to you only. Thus you will proceed with the negotiations, now yielding on one point, and now insisting on another, but directing all to the same object—to gain time while proceeding with the preparation for the invasion, according to the plan already agreed upon.”<sup>1</sup>

Certainly the Most Catholic King seemed, in this remarkable letter, to have outdone himself; and Farnese that sincere Farnese, in whose loyal, truth-telling, chivalrous character, the Queen and her counsellors placed such implicit reliance—could thenceforward no longer be embarrassed as to the course he was to adopt. To lie daily, through thick and thin, and with every variety of circumstance and detail which a genius fertile in fiction could suggest, such was the simple rule prescribed by his sovereign. And the rule was implicitly obeyed, and the English sovereign thoroughly deceived. The secret confided only to the faithful breast of Alexander was religiously kept. Even the Pope was outwitted. His Holiness proposed to Philip the invasion of England, and offered a million to further the plan. He was most desirous to be informed if the project was resolved upon, and, if so, when it was to be accomplished. The King took the Pope’s million, but refused the desired information. He answered evasively. He had a very good will to invade the country, he said, but there were great difficulties in the way.<sup>2</sup> After a time, the Pope again tried to pry into the matter,<sup>3</sup> and again offered the million, which Philip had only accepted for the time when it might be wanted, giving him at the same time to understand that it was not necessary at

that time, because there were then great impediments. „Thus he is pledged to give me the subsidy, and I am not pledged for the time,” said Philip, „and I keep my secret, which is the most important of all.”<sup>1</sup>

Yet, after all, Farnese did not see his way clear towards the consummation of the plan. His army had wofully dwindled, and before he could seriously set about ulterior matters, it would be necessary to take the city of Sluys. This was to prove—as already seen—a most arduous enterprise. He complained to Philip<sup>2</sup> of his inadequate supplies both in men and money. The project conceived in the royal breast was worth spending millions for, he said; and although by zeal and devotion he could accomplish something, yet after all he was no more than a man, and without the necessary means the scheme could not succeed.<sup>3</sup> But Philip, on the contrary, was in the highest possible spirits. He had collected more money, he declared, than had ever been seen before in the world.<sup>4</sup> He had two million ducats in reserve, besides the Pope’s million, the French were in a most excellent state of division, and the invasion should be made this year without fail. The fleet would arrive in the English Channel by the end of the summer, which would be exactly in conformity with Alexander’s ideas. The invasion was to be threefold: from Scotland, under the Scotch earls and their followers, with the money and troops furnished by Philip; from the Netherlands, under Parma; and by the great Spanish armada

1 „Por tenerlo prendado en la ayuda, y de no prendarme yo en lo tiempo, y mas por el secreto que es la cosa principal.” (Ibid.)

2 Parma to Philip, 31 May, 1587. (Arch. de Simancas, MS.)

3 Ibid.

4 He had sent, he said, besides the regular remittances, 700,000 ducats, and there were then coming 2,300,000 ducats, additional—300,000 of which were for Mucio, in case of rupture with the French king. Otherwise not a penny was to be diverted from the great cause. Philip to Farnese, 5 June, 1587. (Arch. de Simancas, MS.)

1 „Podreys yr afloxando en unos puntos, y afirmando en otros, todo enderezado al mismo fin por ganar tiempo, preparando todo con diligencia segun la traza concebida,” &c. (MS. last cited.)

2 Philip to Parma, 5 June, 1587. (Arch. de Simancas, MS.)

3 „Se ha venido de rodear.” (Ibid.)

itself, upon the Isle of Wight. Alexander must recommend himself to God, in whose cause he was acting, and then do his duty, which lay very plain before him. If he ever wished to give his sovereign satisfaction in his life, he was to do the deed that year, whatever might betide. 1 Never could there be so fortunate a conjunction of circumstances again. France was in a state of revolution, the German levies were weak, the Turk was fully occupied in Persia, an enormous mass of money, over and above the Pope's million, had been got together, and although the season was somewhat advanced, it was certain that the Duke would conquer all impediments, and be the instrument by which his royal master might render to God that service which he was so anxious to perform. Enthusiastic, though gouty, Philip grasped the pen in order to scrawl a few words with his own royal hand. „This business is of such importance,” he said, „and it is so necessary that it should not be delayed, that I cannot refrain from urging it upon you as much as I can. I should do it even more amply, if this hand would allow me, which has been crippled with gout these several days, and my feet as well, and although it is unattended with pain, yet it is an impediment to writing.” 2

Struggling thus against his own difficulties, and triumphantly accomplishing a whole paragraph with disabled hand, it was natural that the King should expect Alexander, then deep in the siege of Sluys, to vanquish all his obstacles as successfully, and to effect the conquest of England so soon as the harvests of that kingdom should be garnered.

Sluys was surrendered at last, and

1 Philip to Parma, 5 June, 1587. (Arch. de Simancas, MS.)

2 „Importa tanto esse negocio, y que no se dilate, que no puedo dexar de encargarse todo quanto puedo y hiziera lo aun mas largamente si me diera lugar esta mano que he tenido con la gota estos dias y los pies, y aunque esta ya sin dolor, esta impedida para esto.” (MS. last cited.)

the great enterprise seemed ripening from hour to hour. During the months of autumn, upon the very days when those loving messages, mixed with gentle reproaches, were sent by Alexander to Elizabeth, and almost at the selfsame hours in which honest Andrew de Loo was getting such head-aches by drinking the Queen's health with Cosimo and Champagny, the Duke and Philip were interchanging detailed information as to the progress of the invasion. The King calculated that by the middle of September Alexander would have 30,000 men in the Netherlands ready for embarkation. Marquis Santa Cruz was announced as nearly ready to sail for the English Channel with 22,000 more, among whom were to be 16,000 seasoned Spanish infantry. The Marquis was then to extend the hand to Parma, and protect that passage to England which the Duke was at once to effect. The danger might be great for so large a fleet to navigate the seas at so late a season of the year; but Philip was sure that God, whose cause it was, would be pleased to give good weather. 1 The Duke was to send, with infinite precautions of secrecy, information which the Marquis would expect off Ushant, and be quite ready to act so soon as Santa Cruz should arrive. Most earnestly and anxiously did the King deprecate any thought of deferring the expedition to another year. If delayed, the obstacles of the following summer—a peace in France, a peace between the Turk and Persia, and other contingencies—would cause the whole project to fail, and Philip declared, with much iteration, that money, reputation, honour, his own character and that of Farnese, and God's service, were all at stake. 2 He was impatient at sug-

1 „Aunque no dexa de ver lo que se aventura en navegar con gruesa armada in invierno, y por esse canal, sin tener puerto cierto; y el tiempo plazera a Dios cuya es la causa darle bueno.” Philip to Parma, 4 Sept. 1587. (Arch. de Simancas, MS.)

2 Philip to Parma, 4 Sept. 1587. (MS. just cited.)

gestions of difficulties occasionally ventured by the Duke, who was reminded that he had been appointed chief of the great enterprise by the spontaneous choice of his master, and that all his plans had been minutely followed. „You are the author of the whole scheme,” said Philip, „and if it is all to vanish into space, what kind of a figure shall we cut the coming year?”<sup>1</sup> Again and again he referred to the immense sum collected—such as never before had been seen since the world was made—4,800,000 ducats with 2,000,000 in reserve, of which he was authorized to draw for 500,000 in advance, to say nothing of the Pope’s million.<sup>2</sup>

But Alexander, while straining every nerve to obey his master’s wishes about the invasion, and to blind the English by the fictitious negotiations, was not so sanguine as his sovereign. In truth, there was something puerile in the eagerness which Philip manifested. He had made up his mind that England was to be conquered that autumn, and had endeavoured—as well as he could—to comprehend the plans which his illustrious general had laid down for accomplishing that purpose. Of course, to any man of average intellect, or, in truth, to any man outside a madhouse, it would seem an essential part of the conquest that the Armada should arrive. Yet—wonderful to relate—Philip in his impatience, absolutely suggested that the Duke might take possession of England *without waiting for Santa Cruz and his Armada*. As the autumn had been wearing away, and there had been unavoidable delays about the shipping in Spanish ports, the King thought it best not to defer matters till the winter. „You are, doubtless, ready,” he said to Farnese. „If you think you can make the passage to England before the fleet

from Spain arrives, go at once. You may be sure that it will come ere long to support you. But if you prefer to wait, wait. The dangers of winter to the fleet and to your own person are to be regretted, but God, whose cause it is, will protect you.”<sup>1</sup>

It was easy to sit quite out of harm’s way, and to make such excellent arrangements for smooth weather in the wintry Channel, and for the conquest of a maritime and martial kingdom by a few flat bottoms. Philip had little difficulty on that score, but the affairs of France were not quite to his mind. The battle of Coutras, and the entrance of the German and Swiss mercenaries into that country, were somewhat perplexing. Either those auxiliaries of the Huguenots would be defeated, or they would be victorious, or both parties would come to an agreement. In the first event, the Duke, after sending a little assistance to Mucio, was to effect his passage to England *at once*. In the second case, those troops, even though successful, would doubtless be so much disorganized that it might be still safe for Farnese to go on. In the third contingency—that of an accord—it would be necessary for him to wait till the foreign troops had disbanded and left France. He was to maintain all his forces in perfect readiness, on pretext of the threatening aspect of French matters, and, so soon as the Swiss and Germans were dispersed, he was to proceed to business without delay.<sup>2</sup> The fleet would be ready in Spain in all November, but as sea-affairs were so doubtful, particularly in winter, and as the Armada could not reach the Channel till mid-winter, the Duke was not to wait for its arrival. „Whenever you see a favourable opportunity,” said Philip, „you must take care not to

1 „De que vos solo seys autor. Veed si hubiese de caer todo en vacío, que les que quedaríamos el año que viene,” &c. Philip to Parma, 14 Sept. 1587. (Arch. de Simancas, MS.)  
2 Ibid.

1 Philip to Parma, 4 Nov. 1587. (Arch. de Simancas, MS.)

2 Philip to Parma, 14 Nov. 1587. (MS. just cited.)



lose it, even if the fleet has not made its appearance. For you may be sure that it will soon come to give you assistance, in one way or another." 1

Farnese had also been strictly enjoined to deal gently with the English, after the conquest, so that they would have cause to love their new master. His troops were not to forget discipline after victory. There was to be no pillage or rapine. The Catholics were to be handsomely rewarded, and all the inhabitants were to be treated with so much indulgence that, instead of abhorring Parma and his soldiers, they would conceive a strong affection for them all, as the source of so many benefits. 2 Again the Duke was warmly commended for the skill with which he had handled the peace-negotiation. It was quite right to appoint commissioners, but it was never for an instant to be forgotten that the sole object of treating was to take the English unawares. „And therefore do you guide them to this end," said the King with piousunction, „which is what you owe to God, in whose service I have engaged in this enterprise, and to whom I have dedicated the whole." 3 The King of France, too—that unfortunate Henry III., against whose throne and life Philip maintained in constant pay an organized band of conspirators—was affectionately adjured, through the Spanish envoy in Paris, Mendoza, to reflect upon the advantages to France of a Catholic king and kingdom of England, in place of the heretics now in power, 4

But Philip, growing more and more

1 „Viendo buena ocasion procurays de de no perderla, aunque no aya liegado la armada—siendo cierto que luego llegará a hazar espaldas y ayudaros de una mano o otra." (Ibid.)

2 Philip to Parma, 25 Oct. 1587. (Arch. de Simancas, MS.)

3 „Por tomarlos desapercibidos. Assi lo guai a esta fin que es el que deve a Dios, por cuyo servicio hago lo principal, y se lo ofresco." (Philip to Parma, last cited.)

4 Philip to Don Bernardino de Mendoza, 4 Nov. 1587. (Arch. de Simancas, MS)

sanguine, as those visions of fresh crowns and conquered kingdoms rose before him in his solitary cell, had even persuaded himself that the deed was already done. In the early days of December, he expressed a doubt whether his 14th November letter had reached the Duke, who *by that time was probably in England.* 1 One would have thought the King addressing a tourist just starting on a little pleasure excursion. And this was precisely the moment when Alexander had been writing those affectionate phrases to the Queen which had been considered by the counsellors at Greenwich so „princely and Christianly," and which Croft had pronounced such „very good words."

If there had been no hostile fleet to prevent, it was to be hoped, said Philip, that, in the name of God, the passage had been made. „Once landed there," continued the King. „I am persuaded that you will give me a good account of yourself, and, with the help of our Lord, that you will do that service which I desire to render to Him, and that He will guide our cause, which is His own, and of such great importance to His church." 2 A part of the fleet would soon after arrive and bring six thousand Spaniards, the Pope's million, and other good things, which might prove useful to Parma, presupposing that they would find him established on the enemy's territory. 3

This conviction that the enterprise had been already accomplished grew stonger in the King's breast every day. He was only a little disturbed lest Farnese should have misunderstood that 14th November letter. Philip—as his wont was—had gone into so many petty and puzzling

1 Philip to Parma, 11 Dec. 1587. (Arch. de Simancas, MS.)

2 „Y aviendo passado estoy muy persuadido de vos que con ayuda de Nro Senor me dareys la buena cuenta que dezio que sareys cierto de hazerle el servicio que yo en esto pretendo—el lo guia como causa suya y tan importante a su yglesia." (Ibid.)

3 Philip to Parma, MS. last cited.

details, and had laid down rules of action suitable for various contingencies, so easy to put comfortably upon paper, but which might become perplexing in action, that it was no wonder he should be a little anxious. The third contingency suggested by him had really occurred. There had been a composition between the foreign mercenaries and the French King. Nevertheless they had also been once or twice defeated, and this was contingency number two. Now which of the events would the Duke consider as having really occurred. It was to be hoped that he would have not seen cause for delay, for in truth number three was not exactly the contingency which existed. France was still in a very satisfactory state of discord and rebellion. The civil war was by no means over. There was small fear of peace that winter. Give Mucio his pittance with frugal hand, and that dangerous personage would ensure tranquillity for Philip's project, and misery for Henry III. and his subjects for an indefinite period longer. The King thought it improbable that Farnese could have made any mistake. 1 He expressed therefore a little anxiety at having received no intelligence from him, but great confidence that, with the aid of the Lord and of his own courage he *had accomplished the great exploit*. Philip had only recommended delay in event of a general peace in France—Huguenots, Royalists, Leaguers, and all. This had not happened. „Therefore, I trust,” said the King, „that you—perceiving that this is not contingency number three which was to justify a pause—will have already executed the enterprise, and fulfilled my desire. I am confident that the deed is done, and that God has blessed it, and I am now expecting the news from hour to hour.” 2

1 Same to same, 24 Dec. 1587. (Arch. de Simancas, MS.)

2 „Y así creo, que conociendo que no es este el caso tercero, en que aviades de parar, avreys executado la empresa, y cumplido

But Alexander had not yet arrived in England. The preliminaries for the conquest caused him more perplexity than the whole enterprise occasioned to Philip. He was very short of funds. The five millions were not to be touched, except for the expenses of the invasion. But as England was to be subjugated, in order that rebellious Holland might be recovered, it was hardly reasonable to go away leaving such inadequate forces in the Netherlands as to ensure not only independence to the new republic, but to hold out temptation for revolt to the obedient Provinces. Yet this was the dilemma in which the Duke was placed. So much money had been set aside for the grand project that there was scarcely anything for the regular military business. The customary supplies had not been sent. Parma had leave to draw for six hundred thousand ducats, and he was able to get that draft discounted on the Antwerp Exchange by consenting to receive five hundred thousand, or sacrificing sixteen per cent. of the sum. 1 A good number of transports and scows had been collected, but there had been a deficiency of money for their proper equipment, as the five millions had been very slow in coming, and were still upon the road. The whole enterprise was on the point of being sacrificed, according to Farnese, for want of funds. The time for doing the deed had arrived, and he declared himself incapacitated by poverty. He expressed his disgust and resentment in language more energetic than courtly, and protested that he was not to blame. „I always thought,” said he, bitterly, „that your Majesty would provide all that was necessary even in superfluity, and not limit me beneath the ordinary. I did not suppose, when it was most important to have ready money, that

mio deseo . . . de que quedo aguardando el aviso de ora en ora.” (Philip to Parma, MS. last cited.)

1 Parma to Philip, 18 Sept. 1587. (Arch. de Simancas, MS.)

I should be kept short, and not allowed to draw certain sums by anticipation, which I should have done had you not forbidden." 1

This was through life a striking characteristic of Philip. Enormous schemes were laid out with utterly inadequate provision for their accomplishment, and a confident expectation entertained that wild visions were, in some indefinite way, to be converted into substantial realities, without fatigue or personal exertion on his part, and with a very trifling outlay of ready money.

Meantime the faithful Farnese did his best. He was indefatigable night and day in getting his boats together and providing his munitions of war. He dug a canal from Sas de Gand—which was one of his principal dépôts—all the way to Sluys, because the water communication between those two points was entirely in the hands of the Hollanders and Zeelanders. The rebel cruisers swarmed in the Scheldt, from Flushing almost to Antwerp, so that it was quite impossible for Parma's forces to venture forth at all; and it also seemed hopeless to hazard putting to sea from Sluys. 2 At the same time he had appointed his commissioners 3 to treat with the English envoys already named by the Queen. There had been much delay in the arrival of those deputies, on account of the noise raised by Barneveld and his followers; but Burghley was now sanguine that the exposure of what he called the Advocate's seditious, false, and perverse proceedings, would enable Leicester to procure the consent of the States to a universal peace.

And thus, with these parallel schemes of invasion and negotiation, spring, summer, and autumn, had worn away. Santa Cruz was still with his fleet in Lisbon, Cadiz, and the Azores; and Parma was in Brussels, when Philip fondly imagined him established in Greenwich Palace. When made aware of his master's preposterous expectations, Alexander would have been perhaps amused, had he not been half beside himself with indignation. Such folly seemed incredible. There was not the slightest appearance of a possibility of making a passage without the protection of the Spanish fleet, he observed. His vessels were mere transport-boats, without the least power of resisting an enemy. The Hollanders and Zeelanders, with one hundred and forty cruisers, had shut him up in all directions. He could neither get out from Antwerp nor from Sluys. There were large English ships, too, cruising in the Channel, and they were getting ready in the Netherlands and in England „most furiously." 1 The delays had been so great, that their secret had been poorly kept, and the enemy was on his guard. If Santa Cruz had come, Alexander declared that he should have already been in England. When he did come he should still be prepared to make the passage, but to talk of such an attempt without the Armada was senseless, and he denounced the madness of that proposition to his Majesty in vehement and unmeasured terms. 2 His army, by sickness and other causes, had been reduced to one-half the number considered necessary for the invasion, and the rebels had established regular squadrons in the Scheldt, in the very teeth of the forts at Lillo, Liefkenshoek, Saftingen, and other points close to Antwerp. There were so many of these war-vessels, and all in such excellent order, that they were a most notable

1 Parma to Philip, MS. last cited.

2 Parma to Philip, 21 Dec. 1587. (Arch. de Simancas, MS.) „Pues de razon Olandeses y Zelandeses solos estan siempre a la mira y asi como tienen medio de estorbarnos la junta y salida de nuestros baxeles lo ternan cada dia mayor para hazer lo mismo en el pasage."

3 Aremborg, Champagny, Richardot, Maas, Garnier. Parma to Philip, 18 Sept. 1587. (Arch. de Simancas, MS.)

1 Parma to Philip, 21 Dec. 1587. (Arch. de Simancas, MS.)

2 Ibid.



embarrassment to him, he observed, and his own flotilla would run great risk of being utterly destroyed. Alexander had been personally superintending matters at Sluys, Ghent, and Antwerp, and had strengthened with artillery the canal which he had constructed between Sas and Sluys. Meantime his fresh troops had been slowly arriving, but much sickness prevailed among them. The Italians were dying fast, almost all the Spaniards were in hospital, and the others were so crippled and worn out that it was most pitiable to behold them; yet it was absolutely necessary that those who were in health should accompany him to England, <sup>1</sup> since otherwise his Spanish force would be altogether too weak to do the service expected. He had got together a good number of transports. Not counting his Antwerp fleet—which could not stir from port, as he bitterly complained, nor be of any use, on account of the rebel blockade—he had between Dunkerke and Newport seventy-four vessels of various kinds fit for sea-service, one hundred and fifty flat-bottoms (*pleytas*), and seventy river-boys, all which were to be assembled at Sluys, whence they would—so soon as Santa Cruz should make his appearance—set forth for England. <sup>2</sup> This force of transports he pronounced sufficient, when properly protected by the Spanish Armada, to carry himself and his troops across the Channel. If, therefore, the matter did not become publicly known, and if the weather proved favourable, it was probable that his Majesty's desire would soon be fulfilled according to the plan proposed. The companies of light horse and of arquebus-men, with which he meant to make his entrance into London, had been clothed, armed, and mounted, he said, in a manner delightful to contemplate, and those soldiers at least might be trusted—if they could only

effect their passage—to do good service, and make matters quite secure. <sup>1</sup>

But craftily as the King and Duke had been dealing, it had been found impossible to keep such vast preparations entirely secret. Walsingham was in full possession of their plans down to the most minute details. The misfortune was that he was unable to persuade his sovereign, Lord Burghley, and others of the peace-party, as to the accuracy of his information. Not only was he thoroughly instructed in regard to the number of men, vessels, horses, mules, saddles, spurs, lances, barrels of beer and tons of biscuit, and other particulars of the contemplated invasion, but he had even received curious intelligence as to the gorgeous equipment of those very troops with which the Duke was just secretly announcing to the King his intention of making his triumphal entrance into the English capital. Sir Francis knew how many thousand yards of cramoisy velvet, how many hundredweight of gold and silver embroidery, how much satin and feathers, and what quantity of pearls and diamonds, Farnese had been providing himself withal. He knew the tailors, jewellers, silversmiths, and haberdashers, with whom the great Alexander—as he now began to be called—had been dealing, <sup>2</sup> but when he spoke at

<sup>1</sup> „Se han vestido, armado, y encabalgado, que es placer de verlas, y la soldadesca de ellas et tal que, si pueden pasar, haran a V. M. buen servizio y aseguraran mucho el servizio.” MS. letter last cited.

<sup>2</sup> „There is provided for lights a great number of torches, and so tempered that no water can put them out. A great number of little mills for grinding corn, great store of biscuit baked and oxen salted, great number of saddles and boots; also there is made 500 pair of velvet shoes—red, crimson velvet; and in every cloister throughout the country great quantity of roses made of silk, white and red, which are to be badges for divers of his gentlemen. By reason of these roses it is expected he is going for England. There is sold to the Prince by John Angel, pergamán, ten hundredweight of velvet, gold and silver to embroider his apparel withal. The covering to his mules is most gorgeously embroidered with gold and silver, which carry his baggages. There is also sold

<sup>1</sup> Parma to Philip, Dec. 21, 1587. (Arch. de Simancas, MS.)

<sup>2</sup> Ibid.

the council-board, it was to ears willfully deaf. Nor was much concealed from the Argus-eyed politicians in the republic. The States were more and more intractable. They knew nearly all the truth

to him by the Italian merchants at least 670 pieces of velvet to apparel him and his train. Every captain has received a gift from the Prince to make himself brave, and for Captain Corralini, an Italian, who hath one cornet of horse, I have seen with my eyes a saddle, with the trappings of his horse, his coat and rapier and dagger, which cost 3,500 French crowns. (!!) All their lances are painted of divers colours, blue and white, green and white, and most part blood red—so there is as great preparation for a triumph as for war. A great number of English priests come to Antwerp from all places. The commandment is given to all the churches to read the Litany daily for the prosperity of the Prince in his enterprise." John Giles to Walsingham, 4 Dec. 1587. (S. P. Office MS.)

The same letter conveyed also very detailed information concerning the naval preparations by the Duke, besides accurate intelligence in regard to the progress of the armada in Cadiz and Lisbon.

Sir William Russel wrote also from Flushing concerning these preparations in much the same strain; but it is worthy of note that he considered Farnese to be rather intending a movement against France.

"The Prince of Parma," he said, "is making great preparations for war, and with all expedition means to march a great army; and for a triumph, the coats and costly apparel for his own body doth exceed for embroidery, and beset with jewels; for all the *embroiderers and diamond-cutters work both night and day*, such haste is made. Five hundred velvet coats of one sort for lances, and a great number of brave new coats made for horsemen; 30,000 men are ready, and gather in Brabant and Flanders. It is said that there shall be in two days 10,000 to do some great exploit in these parts, and 20,000 to march with the Prince into France, and for certain it is not known what way or how they shall march, but all are ready at an hour's warning—4,000 saddles, 4,000 lances, 6,000 pairs of boots, 2,000 barrels of beer, biscuit sufficient for a camp of 20,000 men. &c. The Prince hath received a marvellous costly garland or crown from the Pope, and is chosen chief of the holy league, and now puts in his arms two cross keys. The King of France hath written for the Prince with expedition, and 'tis said he marches thither, and, on the way will besiege Cambray," &c. Occurrences, from the Governor of Flushing, Nov. 2, 1587. (S. P. Office MS.)

Thus Sir William seems to have been less accurately acquainted with the movements of Farnese than was John Giles, and the mysterious precautions of the King and his general have been far from fruitless.

with regard to the intercourse between the Queen's government and Farnese, and they suspected more than the truth. The list of English commissioners privately agreed upon between Burghley and De Loo was known to Barneveld, Maurice, and Hohenlo, before it came to the ears of Leicester. In June Buckhurst had been censured by Elizabeth for opening the peace matter to members of the States, according to her bidding, and in July Leicester was rebuked for exactly the opposite delinquency. She was very angry that he had delayed the communication of her policy so long, but she expressed her anger only when that policy had proved so transparent as to make concealment hopeless. Leicester, as well as Buckhurst, knew that it was idle to talk to the Netherlanders of peace, because of their profound distrust in every word that came from Spanish or Italian lips; but Leicester, less frank than Buckhurst, preferred to flatter his sovereign, rather than to tell her unwelcome truths. More fortunate than Buckhurst, he was rewarded for his flattery by boundless affection, and promotion to the very highest post in England when the hour of England's greatest peril had arrived, while the truth-telling counsellor was consigned to imprisonment and disgrace. When the Queen complained sharply that the States were mocking her, and that she was touched in honour at the prospect of not keeping her plighted word to Farnese, the Earl assured her that the Netherlanders were fast changing their views; that although the very name of peace had till then been odious and loathsome, 1 yet now, as coming from her Majesty, they would accept it with thankful hearts. 2 The States, or the leading members of that assembly, factious fellows, pestilent and seditious

1 Leicester to the Queen, 9 Oct. 1587. (S. P. Office MS.)

2 Same to same, 1 Oct. 1587. (S. P. Office MS.)

knaves, 1 were doing their utmost, and were singing sirens' songs 2 to enchant and delude the people, but they were fast losing their influence—so warmly did the country desire to conform to her Majesty's pleasure. He expatiated, however, upon the difficulties in his path. The knowledge possessed by the pestilent fellows as to the actual position of affairs was very mischievous. It was honey to Maurice and Hohenlo, 3 he said, that the Queen's secret practices with Farnese had thus been discovered. Nothing could be more marked than the jollity with which the ringleaders hailed these preparations for peace-making, 4 for they now felt certain that the government of their country had been fixed securely in their own hands. They were canonized, said the Earl, for their hostility to peace. 5

Should not this conviction, on the part of men who had so many means of feeling the popular pulse, have given the Queen's government pause. To serve his sovereign in truth, Leicester might have admitted a possibility at least of honesty on the part of men who were so ready to offer up their lives for their country. For in a very few weeks he was obliged to confess that the people were no longer so well disposed to acquiesce in her Majesty's policy. The great majority, both of the States and the people, were in favour, he agreed, of continuing the war. The inhabitants of the little Province of Holland alone, he said, had avowed their determination to maintain their rights—even if obliged to fight single-handed—and to shed the last drop in their veins, rather than to submit again to Spanish tyranny. 6 This seemed a heroic resolution,

worthy the sympathy of a brave Englishman, but the Earl's only comment upon it was, that it proved the ringleaders „either to be traitors, or else *the most blindest asses in the world.*” 1 He never scrupled, on repeated occasions, to insinuate that Barneveld, Hohenlo, Buys, Roorda, Sainte Aldegonde and the Nassaus, had organized a plot to sell their country to Spain. 2 Of this there was not the faintest evidence, but it was the only way in which he chose to account for their persistent opposition to the peace-negotiations, and to their reluctance to confer absolute power on himself. „Tis a crabbed, sullen, proud kind of people,” said he, and bent on establishing a popular government,” 3—a purpose which seemed somewhat inconsistent with the plot for selling their country to Spain, which he charged in the same breath on the same persons.

Early in August, by the Queen's command, he had sent a formal communication respecting the private negotiations to the States, but he could tell them no secret. The names of the commissioners, and even the supposed articles of a treaty already concluded, were flying from town to town, from mouth to mouth, so that the Earl pronounced it impossible for one not on the spot to imagine the excitement which existed.

He had sent a state-counsellor, one Bardesius, to the Hague, to open the matter; but that personage had only ventured to whisper a word to one or two members of the States, and was assured that the proposition, if made, would raise such a tumult of fury, that he might fear for his life. So poor Bardesius came back to Leicester, fell on his knees, and implored him at least

1 Same to same, 5 Nov. 1587. (S. P. Office MS.)

2 Same to Burghley, 30 Oct. 1587. (Brit. Mus. Galba, D. II. p. 57. MS.)

3 Leicester to Burghley, 17 Aug. 1587. (S. P. Office MS.)

4 Same to same, 30 Oct. 1587. (Brit. Mus. Galba, D. II. p. 57. MS.)

5 Leicester to Walsingham, 9 Oct. 1587. (S. P. Office MS.)

6 Leicester to Burghley, 30 Oct. 1587.

(Brit. Mus. Galba, D. II. 57. MS.) Same to the Queen, 11 Oct. 1587. (S. P. Office MS.)

1 Leicester to the Queen, 17 Nov. 1587. (S. P. Office MS.)

2 Leicester to the Queen, 5 Nov. 1587. (S. P. Office MS.) Same to Burghley, 6 Nov. 1587. (Brit. Mus. Galba, D. II. p. 176. MS.)

3 Leicester to the Queen, 11 Oct. 1587. (S. P. Office MS.)



to pause in these fatal proceedings. 1 After an interval he sent two eminent statesmen, Valk and Menin, to lay the subject before the assembly. They did so, and it was met by fierce denunciation. On their return, the Earl, finding that so much violence had been excited, pretended that they had misunderstood his meaning, and that he had never meant to propose peace-negotiations. But Valk and Menin were too old politicians to be caught in such a trap, and they produced a brief, drawn up in Italian—the foreign language best understood by the Earl—with his own corrections and interlineations, so that he was forced to admit that there had been no misconception. 2

Leicester at last could no longer doubt that he was universally odious in the Provinces. Hohenlo, Barneveldt, and the rest, who had „championed the country against the peace,” were carrying all before them. They had persuaded the people that the „Queen was but a tickle stay for them,” and had inflated young Maurice with vast ideas of his importance, telling him that he was „a natural patriot, the image of his noble father, whose memory was yet great among them, as good reason, dying in their cause, as he had done.” 3 The country was bent on a popular government, and on maintaining the war. There was no possibility, he confessed, that they would ever confer the authority on him which they had formerly bestowed. 4 The Queen had promised, when he left England the second time, that his absence

should be for but three months, 1 and he now most anxiously claimed permission to depart. Above all things; he deprecated being employed as a peace-commissioner. He was, of all men, the most unfit for such a post. At the same time he implored the statesmen at home to be wary in selecting the wisest persons for that arduous duty, in order that the peace might be made for Queen Elizabeth, as well as for King Philip. He strongly recommended, for that duty, Beale, the councillor, who with Killigrew had replaced the hated Wilkes and the pacific Bartholomew Clerk. „Mr. Beale, brother-in-law to Walsingham, is in my books a prince,” said the Earl. „He was *drowned* in England, but most useful in the Netherlands. Without him I am naked.” 2

And at last the governor told the Queen what Buckhurst and Walsingham had been perpetually telling her, that the Duke of Parma meant mischief; and he sent the same information as to hundreds of boats preparing, with 6000 shirts for camisados, 7000 pairs of wading boots, and saddles, stirrups, and spurs, enough for a choice band of 3000 men. 3 A shrewd troop, said the Earl, of the first soldiers in Christendom, to be landed some fine morning in England. And he too had heard of the jewelled suits of cramoisy velvet, and all the rest of the finery with which the triumphant Alexander was intending to astonish London. „Get horses enough and muskets enough in England,” exclaimed Leicester, „and then our people will not be beaten, I warrant you, if well led.” 4

And now, the governor—who, in order to soothe his sovereign and comply with her vehement wishes, had so long misrepresented the state of public feeling

1 Leicester to Burghley, 30 Sept. 1587. (Brit. Mus. Galba, D. II. p. 34. MS.)

2 Bor, iii. xxiii. 34. Hoofd Vervolg, 276. Wagenaar, viii. 236. Meteren, xiv. 260. Compare Reynd, vi. 109, who says however that Valk and Menin could produce no written instructions from Leicester, but that the characters of such well known statesmen carried conviction of the truth of their statements.

3 Leicester to the Lords, 21 Nov. 1587. (S. P. Office MS.)

4 Leicester to Walsingham, 13 Oct. 1587. (S. P. Office MS.)

1 Leicester to Burghley, 30 Sept. 1587. (S. P. Office MS.)

2 Leicester to Walsingham, 4 Aug. 1587. Same to same, 16 Sept. 1587. (S. P. Office MSS.)

3 Leicester to Burghley, 5 Nov. 1587. (S. P. Office MS.)

4 Ibid.

—not only confessed that Papists and Protestants, gentle and simple, the States and the people, throughout the republic, were all opposed to any negotiation with the enemy, but lifted up his own voice, and in earnest language expressed his opinion of the Queen's infatuation.

„Oh, my Lord, what a treaty is this for peace,” said he to Burghley, „that we must treat, altogether disarmed and weakened, and the King having made his forces stronger than ever he had known in these parts, besides what is coming out of Spain, and yet we will presume of good conditions! It grieveth me to the heart. But I fear you will all smart for it, and I pray God her Majesty feel it not, if it be His blessed will. She meaneth well and sincerely to have peace, but God knows that this is not the way. Well, God Almighty defend us and the realm, and especially her Majesty. But look for a sharp war, or a miserable peace, *to undo others and ourselves after.*” 1

1 Leicester to Burghley, 7 Nov. 1587. (S. P. Office MS.)

And to Walsingham he wrote most earnestly in the same vein. „Our enemies have dealt more like politic men than we have,” he said, „for it was always agreed heretofore among us that there was no way to make a good peace but by a strong war . . . Now is the difference put in experience, for we see the Prince of Parma did not weaken himself to trust upon peace, but hath increased his forces in the highest degree, whilst we talked of peace; that if we break off, he might either compel us to his peace or be beforehand with us by the readiness of his forces. *This was told and foretold, but yet no ear given nor care taken. . . Surely you shall find the Prince meaneth no peace. I see money doth undo all—the care to keep it, and not upon just cause to spend it. Her Majesty doth still blame me for the expense of her treasury here, which doth make me weary of my life; but her Majesty will rue the sparing counsel at such times.*”

He then sent information as to Parma's intentions, derived from an intercepted letter of a man in Sir William Stanley's regiment to a priest in England, „bidding his friend be sure they are shortly to be in England.” . . . „It were better to her Majesty,” added Leicester, „than a million pounds sterling, that she had done as the Duke of

Walsingham, too, was determined not to act as a commissioner. If his failing health did not serve as an excuse, he should be obliged to refuse, he said, and so forfeit her Majesty's favour, rather than be instrumental in bringing about her ruin, and that of his country. Never for an instant had the Secretary of State faltered in his opposition to the timid policy of Burghley. Again and again he had detected the intrigues of the Lord-Treasurer and Sir James Croft, and ridiculed the „comptroller's peace.” 1

And especially did Walsingham bewail the implicit confidence which the Queen placed in the sugary words of Alexander, and the fatal parsimony which caused her to neglect defending herself against Scotland; 2 for he was as well informed as was Farnese himself of Philip's arrangements with the Scotch lords, and of the subsidies in men and money by which their invasion of England was to be made part of the great scheme.

„No one thing,” sighed Walsingham, „doth more prognosticate an alteration of this estate, than that a prince of her Majesty's judgment should neglect, in respect of a little charges, the stopping of so dangerous a gap. . . . The manner of our cold and careless proceeding here, in this time of peril, maketh me to take no comfort of my recovery of health, for that I see, unless it shall please God in mercy and miraculously to preserve us, *we cannot long stand.*” 3

Parma hath done.” Leicester to Walsingham, 7 Nov. 1587. (S. P. Office MS.)

1 Walsingham to Leicester, 21 Sept. 1587. (Brit. Mus. Galba, D. II. p. 78. MS.)

2 Walsingham to Leicester, 12 Nov. 1587. (Brit. Mus. Galba, D. II. p. 178. MS.)

3 „A letter from the Duke of Parma,” says the Secretary, „bred in her Majesty such a dangerous security, as all advertisements of danger are neglected, and great expedition used in despatching of the commissioners. I was fully resolved in no sort to have accepted the charge, had not my sickness prevented, for that I would be loth to be engaged in a service that all men of judgment may see cannot but work her Majesty's

Leicester, finding himself unable to counteract the policy of Barneveld and his party, by expostulation or argument, conceived a very dangerous and criminal project before he left the country. The facts are somewhat veiled in mystery; but he was suspected, on weighty evidence, of a design to kidnap both Maurice and Barneveld, and carry them off to England. Of this intention, which was foiled at any rate before it could be carried into execution, there is perhaps not conclusive proof, but it has already been shown, from a deciphered letter, that the Queen had once given Buckhurst and Wilkes peremptory orders to seize the person of Hohenlo, and it is quite possible that similar orders may have been received at a later moment with regard to the young Count and the Advocate. At any rate, it is certain that late in the autumn some friends of Barneveld entered his bedroom, at the Hague, in the dead of night, and informed him that a plot was on foot to lay violent hands upon him, and that an armed force was already on its way to execute this purpose of Leicester before the dawn of day. The Advocate, without loss of time, took his departure for Delft, a step which was followed, shortly afterwards, by Maurice. 1

Nor was this the only daring stroke which the Earl had meditated. During the progress of the secret negotiations with Parma, he had not neglected those still more secret schemes to which he had occasionally made allusion. He had determined, if possible, to obtain possession of the most important cities in Holland and Zeeland. It was very plain to him that he could no longer hope, by fair means, for the great authority once conferred upon him by the free will of the States. It was his purpose, therefore, by force and stratagem to ruin. I pray God I and others of my opinion prove in this false prophets." (*Ibid.*)

1 Bor, iii. xxiii. 51. Hoofd, Vervolgh, 287. Wagenaar, viii. 240. Van Wyn op Wagenaar, viii. 68, 69.

recover his lost power. We have heard the violent terms in which both the Queen and the Earl denounced the men who accused the English government of any such intention. It had been formally denied by the States-General that Barneveld had ever used the language in that assembly with which he had been charged. He had only revealed to them the exact purport of the letter to Junius, and of the Queen's secret instructions to Leicester. 1 Whatever he may have said in private conversation, and whatever deductions he may have made among his intimate friends from the admitted facts in the case, could hardly be made matters of record. It does not appear that he, or the statesmen who acted with him, considered the Earl capable of a deliberate design to sell the cities, thus to be acquired, to Spain, as the price of peace for England. Certainly Elizabeth would have scorned such a crime, and was justly indignant at rumours prevalent to that effect, but the wrath of the Queen and of her favourite were perhaps somewhat simulated, in order to cover their real mortification at the discovery of designs on the part of the Earl which could not be denied. Not only had they been at last compelled to confess those negotiations, which for several months had been concealed and stubbornly denied, but the still graver plots of the Earl to regain his much-coveted authority had been, in a startling manner, revealed. The leaders of the States-General had a right to suspect the English Earl of a design to re-enact the part of the Duke of Anjou, and were justified in taking stringent measures to prevent a calamity, which, as they believed, was impending over their little commonwealth. The high-handed dealings of Leicester in the city of Utrecht have been already described. The most respectable and influential burghers of the place had been

1 Resol. Holl. 15, 16, 18 Sept. 1587, bl. 253, 254, 258, cited in Van Wyn, *ubi sup.*



imprisoned and banished, the municipal government wrested from the hands to which it legitimately belonged, and confided to adventurers who wore the cloak of Calvinism to conceal their designs, and a successful effort had been made, in the name of democracy, to eradicate from one ancient province the liberty on which it prided itself.

In the course of the autumn an attempt was made to play the same game at Amsterdam. A plot was discovered, before it was fairly matured, to seize the magistrates of that important city, to gain possession of the arsenals, and to place the government in the hands of well-known Leicestrians. A list of fourteen influential citizens, drawn up in the writing of Burggrave, the Earl's confidential secretary, was found, all of whom, it was asserted, had been doomed to the scaffold. 1

The plot to secure Amsterdam had failed, but, in North Holland, Medenblik was held firmly for Leicester by Diedrich Sonoy, in the very teeth of the States. 2 The important city of Enkhuizen, too, was very near being secured for the Earl, but a still more significant movement was made at Leyden. That heroic city, ever since the famous siege of 1574, in which the Spaniard had been so signally foiled, had distinguished itself by great liberality of sentiment in religious matters. The burghers were inspired by a love of

country, and a hatred of oppression, both civil and ecclesiastical; and Papists and Protestants, who had fought side by side against the common foe, were not disposed to tear each other to pieces, now that he had been excluded from their gates. Meanwhile, however, refugee Flemings and Brabantines had sought an asylum in the city, and being, as usual, of the strictest sect of the Calvinists, were shocked at the latitudinarianism which prevailed. To the honour of the city—as it seems to us now—but, to their horror, it was even found that one or two Papists had seats in the magistracy. 1 More than all this, there was a school in the town kept by a Catholic, and Adrian van der Werff himself—the renowned burgomaster, who had sustained the city during the dreadful leaguer of 1574, and who had told the famishing burghers that they might eat him if they liked, but that they should never surrender to the Spaniards while he remained alive—even Adrian van der Werff had sent his son to this very school. 2 To the clamour made by the refugees against this spirit of toleration, one of the favourite preachers in the town, of Arminian tendencies, had declared in the pulpit, that he would as lieve see the Spanish as the Calvinistic inquisition established over his country; using an expression, in regard to the church of Geneva, more energetic than decorous. 3

It was from Leyden that the chief opposition came to a synod, by which a great attempt was to be made towards subjecting the new commonwealth to a masked theocracy; a scheme which the States of Holland had resisted with might and main. The Calvinistic party, waxing stronger in Leyden, although still in a minority, at last resolved upon a strong effort to place the city in the hands of that great representative of Calvinism, the Earl

1 Hoofd, xxvi. 1199, 1260. Wagenaar, viii. 243-246.

Among them was the name of burgomaster Hoofd, father of the illustrious historian of the Netherlands. Much caution should be observed, however, in accepting, to their full extent, charges made in times of such violent party-spirit. Leicester would have hardly ventured to hang fourteen such men as Hoofd and his compeers, although he would willingly have brought Barneveld and Buys to the gibbet. He would have imprisoned and banished, no doubt, as many Amsterdam burghers of the States party as he could lay hands on.

2 Bor, iii. xxiii. 7; xxiv. 179-204, 208-233, 279-290. Reynd, vi. 101. Wagenaar, 209, 210, 270-278.

1 Bor, xxii. 93-105.

2 Ibid.

3 Ibid. „Liever de Spaense Inquisitie dan de Geneefse discipline, die pockige hoere,” p. 98.

of Leicester. Jacques Volmar, a deacon of the church; Cosma de Pescarengis, a Genoese captain of much experience in the service of the republic; Adolphus de Meetkerke, former president of Flanders, who had been, by the States, deprived of the seat in the great council to which the Earl had appointed him; Doctor Saravia, professor of theology in the university; with other deacons, preachers, and captains, went at different times from Leyden to Utrecht, and had secret interviews with Leicester.

A plan was at last agreed upon, according to which, about the middle of October, a revolution should be effected in Leyden. Captain Nicholas de Maulde, who had recently so much distinguished himself in the defence of Sluys, was stationed with two companies of States' troops in the city. He had been much disgusted—not without reason—at the culpable negligence through which the courageous efforts of the Sluys garrison had been set at nought, and the place sacrificed, when it might so easily have been relieved; and he ascribed the whole of the guilt to Maurice, Hohenlo, and the States, although it could hardly be denied that at least an equal portion belonged to Leicester and his party. The young Captain listened, therefore, to a scheme propounded to him by Colonel Cosmo and Deacon Volmar, in the name of Leicester. He agreed, on a certain day, to muster his company, to leave the city by the Delft gate—as if by command of superior authority—to effect junction with Captain Heraugiere, another of the distinguished malcontent defenders of Sluys who was stationed, with his command, at Delft, and then to re-enter Leyden, take possession of the town-hall, arrest all the magistrates, together with Adrian van der Werff, ex-burgomaster, and proclaim Lord Leicester, in the name of Queen Elizabeth, legitimate master of the city. <sup>1</sup> A list of

burghers who were to be executed was likewise agreed upon, at a final meeting of the conspirators, in a hostelry which bore the ominous name of „The Thunderbolt.” A desire had been signified by Leicester, in the preliminary interviews at Utrecht, that all bloodshed, if possible, should be spared; <sup>2</sup> but it was certainly an extravagant expectation, considering the temper, the political convictions, and the known courage of the Leyden burghers, that the city would submit, without a struggle, to this invasion of all their rights. It could hardly be doubted that the streets would run red with blood, as those of Antwerp had done, when a similar attempt, on the part of Anjou, had been foiled.

Unfortunately for the scheme, a day or two before the great stroke was to be hazarded, Cosmo de Pescarengis had been accidentally arrested for debt. A subordinate accomplice, taking alarm, had then gone before the magistrate and revealed the plot. Volmar and De Maulde fled at once, but were soon arrested in the neighbourhood. President de Meetkerke, Professor Saravia, the preacher Van der Wouw, and others most compromised, effected their escape. <sup>3</sup> The matter was instantly laid before the States of Holland by the magistracy of Leyden, and seemed of the gravest moment. In the beginning of the year the fatal treason of York and Stanley had implanted a deep suspicion of Leicester in the hearts of almost all the Netherlanders, which could not be eradicated. The painful rumours concerning the secret negotiations with Spain, and the design falsely attributed to the English Queen, of selling the chief cities of the republic to Philip as the price of peace, and of reimbursement for expenses incurred by her, increased the general excitement to fever. It was felt by the leaders of the States that as mortal a combat lay before them with the Earl

<sup>1</sup> Bor, *ubi sup.* Reyd, vii. 133, 134., Meteren, xiv. 261.

<sup>1</sup> Bor, Reyd, Meteren, *ubi sup.*

<sup>2</sup> Ibid.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid.

of Leicester as with the King of Spain, and that it was necessary to strike a severe blow, in order to vindicate their imperilled authority.

A commission was appointed by the high court of Holland, acting in conjunction with the States of the Provinces, to try the offenders. Among the commissioners were Adrian van der Werff, John van der Does, who had been military commandant of Leyden during the siege, Barneveld, and other distinguished personages, over whom Count Maurice presided. 1 The accused were subjected to an impartial trial. Without torture they confessed their guilt. 2 It is true, however, that Cosmo was placed within sight of the rack. He avowed that his object had been to place the city under the authority of Leicester, and to effect this purpose, if possible, without bloodshed. He declared that the attempt was to be made with the full knowledge and approbation of the Earl, who had promised him the command of a regiment of twelve companies, as a recompense for his services, if they proved successful. Leicester, said Cosmo, had also pledged himself, in case the men, thus executing his plans, should be discovered and endangered, to protect and rescue them, even at the sacrifice of all his fortune, and of the office he held. When asked if he had any written statement from his Excellency to that effect, Cosmo replied, no, nothing but his princely word, which he had voluntarily given. 3

1 Bor, Reynd, Meteren, *ubi sup.*

2 So say Bor and Meteren; but Reynd says that they were put to the torture, p. 153. „Nae pijnlijke ondervraeginge.”

3 Bor, Meteren, *ubi sup.* Reynd declares that Killigrew (who, with Beale, was member of the state-council as representative of the Queen) notified the commissioners that the attempt had been made with the knowledge and consent of Leicester, and warned them not to be precipitate in the trial: but that the Earl, who was then at Alkmar, denied all complicity in the affair. Cosmo, according to the same authority, called out, when upon the rack, „Oh, Excellence, a quoi employez vous les gens!” p. 134.

Volmar made a similar confession. He, too, declared that he had acted throughout the affair by express command of the Earl of Leicester. Being asked if he had any written evidence of the fact, he, likewise, replied in the negative. „Then his Excellency will unquestionably deny your assertion,” said the judges. „Alas! then am I a dead man,” replied Volmar, and the unfortunate deacon never spoke truer words. Captain de Maulde also confessed his crime. He did not pretend, however, to have had any personal communication with Leicester, but said that the affair had been confided to him by Colonel Cosmo, on the express authority of the Earl, and that he had believed himself to be acting in obedience to his Excellency's commands. 1

On the 26th October, after a thorough investigation, followed by a full confession on the culprits, the three were sentenced to death. 2 The decree was surely a most severe one. They had been guilty of no actual crime, and only in case of high treason could an intention to commit a crime be considered, by the laws of the state, an offence punishable with death. But it was exactly because it was important to make the crime high treason that the prisoners were condemned. The offence was considered as a crime not against Leyden, but as an attempt to levy war upon a city which was a member of the States of Holland and of the United States. If the States were sovereign, then this was a lesion of their sovereignty. Moreover, the offence had been aggravated by the employment of United States' troops against the commonwealth of the United States itself. To cut off the heads of these prisoners was a sharp practical answer to the claims of sovereignty by Leicester, as representing the people, and a terrible warning to all who might,

1 Bor, Meteren, Reynd, *ubi sup.*

2 Ibid. The sentences are given in full by Bor.



in future, be disposed to revive the theories of Deventer and Burgrave.

In the case of De Maulde the punishment seemed especially severe. His fate excited universal sympathy, and great efforts were made to obtain his pardon. He was a universal favourite; he was young; he was very handsome; his manners were attractive; he belonged to an ancient and honourable race. His father, the Seigneur de Mansart, had done great services in the war of independence, had been an intimate friend of the great Prince of Orange, and had even advanced large sums of money to assist his noble efforts to liberate the country. Two brothers of the young captain had fallen in the service of the republic. He, too, had distinguished himself at Ostend, and his gallantry during the recent siege of Sluys had been in every mouth, and had excited the warm applause of so good a judge of soldiery as the veteran Roger Williams. The scars of the wounds received in the desperate conflicts of that siege were fresh upon his breast. He had not intended to commit treason, but, convinced by the sophistry of older soldiers than himself, as well as by learned deacons and theologians, he had imagined himself doing his duty, while obeying the Earl of Leicester. If there were ever a time for mercy, this seemed one, and young Maurice of Nassau might have remembered, that, even in the case of the assassins who had attempted the life of his father, that great-hearted man had lifted up his voice—which seemed his dying one—in favour of those who had sought his life.

But the authorities were inexorable. There was no hope of a mitigation of punishment, but a last effort was made, under favour of a singular ancient custom, to save the life of De Maulde. A young lady of noble family in Leyden—Hytenbroek by name—claimed the right of rescuing the condemned malefactor from the axe, by appearing upon the

scaffold, and offering to take him for her husband. 1

Intelligence was brought to the prisoner in his dungeon, that the young lady had made the proposition, and he was told to be of good cheer. But he refused to be comforted. He was slightly acquainted with the gentlewoman, he observed, and doubted much whether her request would be granted. Moreover—if contemporary chronicle can be trusted—he even expressed a preference for the scaffold, as the milder fate of the two. 2 The lady, however, not being aware of those uncomplimentary sentiments, made her proposal to the magistrates, but was dismissed with harsh rebukes. She had need be ashamed, they said, of her willingness to take a condemned traitor for her husband. It was urged, in her behalf, that even in the cruel Alva's time the ancient custom had been respected, and that victims had been saved from the executioners, on a demand in marriage made even by women of abandoned character. 3 But all was of no avail. The prisoners were executed on the 26th October, Oct. 26th., the same day on which the 1587. sentence had been pronounced. The heads of Volmar and Cosmo were exposed on one of the turrets of the city. That of Maulde was interred with his body. 4

The Earl was indignant when he heard of the event. As there had been no written proof of his complicity in the conspiracy, the judges had thought it improper to mention his name in the sentences. He, of course, denied any knowledge of the plot, and its proof rested therefore only on the assertion of

1 Bor, 97. Vau Wyn op Wagen., viii. 72.

2 „Maer hy hoerende de selve noemen, en in haer geselschap wel geweest zijnde, hadde weynig moeds dat hy door haar verlost worden zoude, of ook de selve ten huwelijke niet begeernde, konde hem niet te vreden stellen.” &c. Bor, xxiii. (III.) 97.

3 Bor, *ubi sup.*

4 Bor, Meteren, Reyd, *ubi sup.* Le Petit, II. xiv. 551.

the prisoners themselves, which, however, was circumstantial, voluntary, and generally believed. 1

France, during the whole of this year of expectation, was ploughed throughout its whole surface by perpetual civil war. The fatal edict of June, 1585, had drowned the unhappy land in blood. Foreign armies, called in by the various contending factions, ravaged its fair territory, butchered its peasantry, and changed its fertile plains to a wilderness. The unhappy creature who wore the crown

1 Bor, Meteren, Reyd, *ubi sup.* Le Petit, II. xiv. 551.

The only passage bearing on the subject which I have found in Leicester's secret correspondence is this extract from a letter to the Queen: —, "The States have used great cruelty of late in Leyden against three persons that favoured your Majesty, whom they put to death, and banished twenty others, whereof their devoted head was one, old Count Meeterke another. This gentleman can inform you of it, and I will send it, shortly, at more length." Leicester to the Queen, 27 Oct. 1587. (S. P. Office MS.)

This very meagre allusion to so important an event is almost suspicious in itself, when coupled with the fact that the details were entrusted to a special messenger to communicate by word of mouth. The Earl knew very well that his most secret despatches were read by his antagonists, and he might not be unwilling to deceive them by the slighting tone of these allusions in his private letters.

Of course, it is unfair to place implicit reliance on the confessions of prisoners, anxious to save their lives by implicating the powerful governor. Yet it is difficult to know why they should expect his intercession if they knew themselves to be blasting his character by an impudent falsehood. Moreover, an elaborate pamphlet, published in defence of those persons who had effected their escape, was dedicated to the Earl himself, and contained a statement of the interview of the ringleaders with the Earl, although a strong attempt was made by the writer to deprive the plot of any criminal character. (Bor, iii. xxiii. 95, *seq.*, gives the document.) But the pamphlet was denounced and prohibited in Leyden, as an infamous libel and a tissue of falsehoods, and it is hardly just, therefore, to put it in as good evidence either for or against the Earl.

The secret intention of Leicester to obtain possession of certain cities, in order to bridle the States, and to make a good bargain for the Queen, should the worst come to the worst, has been already shown from his private letters.

of Charlemagne and of Hugh Capet was but the tool in the hands of the most profligate and designing of his own subjects, and of foreigners. Slowly and surely the net, spread by the hands of his own mother, of his own prime minister, 1 of the Duke of Guise, and obeying the command and receiving the stipend of Philip, seemed closing over him. He was without friends, without power to know his friends, if he had them. In his hatred to the Reformation, he had allowed himself to be made the enemy of the only man who could be his friend, or the friend of France. Allied with his mortal foe, whose armies were strengthened by contingents from Parma's forces, and paid for by Spanish gold, he was forced to a mock triumph over the foreign mercenaries who came to save his crown, and to submit to the defeat of the flower of his chivalry by the only man who could rescue France from ruin, and whom France could look up to with respect.

For, on the 20th October; Henry of Navarre had at last gained a victory. After twenty-seven years of perpetual defeat, during which they had been growing stronger and stronger, the Protestants had met the picked troops of Henry III., under the Duc de Joyeuse, near the burgh of Coutras. His cousins Condé and Soissons each commanded a wing in the army of the Béarnese. "You are both of my family," said Henry, before the engagement, "and the Lord so help me, but I will show you that I am the eldest born." 1 And during that bloody day the white plume was ever tossing where the battle was fiercest. "I choose to show myself. They *shall*

1 In October of this year, 1587, Epemon called Villeroy, in the king's presence, "un petit coquin," accused him of being a stipendiary of Philip II. and the League, and threatened to spur him as he would an obstinate horse. (L'Estoile, *Registre Journal de Henry III.* ed. 1587, p. 32.)

2 Péréfixe, 73.

see the Béarnese," was his reply to those who implored him to have a care for his personal safety. And at last, when the day was done, the victory gained, and more French nobles lay dead on the field, as Catharine de Medici bitterly declared, than had fallen in a battle for twenty years; when two thousand of the King's best troops had been slain, and when the bodies of Joyeuse and his brother had been laid out in the very room where the conqueror's supper, after the battle, was served, but where he refused, with a shudder, to eat, he was still as eager as before—had the wretched Valois been possessed of a spark of manhood, or of intelligence—to shield him and his kingdom from the common enemy. 1

For it could hardly be doubtful, even to Henry III., at that moment, that Philip II. and his jackal, the Duke of Guise, were pursuing him to the death, and that, in his breathless doublings to escape, he had been forced to turn upon his natural protector. And now Joyeuse was defeated and slain. „Had it been my brother's son," exclaimed Cardinal de Bourbon, weeping and wailing, „how much better it would have been." It was not easy to slay the champion of French Protestantism; yet, to one less buoyant, the game, even after the brilliant but fruitless victory of Coutras, might have seemed desperate. Beggared and outcast, with literally scarce a shirt to his back, without money to pay a corporal's guard, how was he to maintain an army?

But „Mucio" was more successful than Joyeuse had been, and the German and Swiss mercenaries, who had come across the border to assist the Béarnese, were adroitly handled by Philip's great stipendiary. Henry of Valois, whose troops had just been defeated at Coutras, was now compelled to participate in a more fatal series of triumphs. For, alas!

the victim had tied himself to the apron-string of „Madam League," and was paraded by her, in triumph, before the eyes of his own subjects and of the world. The passage of the Loire by the auxiliaries was resisted, a series of petty victories was gained by Guise, and, at last, after it was obvious that the leaders of the legions had been corrupted with Spanish ducats, Henry allowed them to depart, rather than give the Balafré opportunity for still further successes. 1

Then came the triumph in Paris—hosannahs in the churches, huzzas in the public places—not for the King, but for Guise. Paris, more madly in love with her champion than ever, prostrated herself at his feet. For him peans as to a deliverer. Without him the ark would have fallen into the hands of the Philistines. For the Valois, shouts of scorn from the populace, thunders from the pulpit, anathemas from monk and priest, elaborate invectives from all the pedants of the Sorbonne, distant mutterings of excommunication from Rome—not the toothless beldame of modern days, but the avenging divinity of priest-ridden monarchs. Such were the results of the edicts of June. Spain and the Pope had trampled upon France, and the populace in her capital clapped their hands and jumped for joy. „Miserable country, miserable King," sighed an illustrious patriot, „whom his own countrymen wish rather to survive, than to die to defend him! Let the name of Huguenot and of Papist be never heard of more. Let us think only of the counter-league. Is France to be saved by opening all its gates to Spain? Is France to be turned out of France, to make a lodging for the Lorrainer and the Spaniard?" Pregnant questions, which could not yet be answered, for the end was not yet. France was to become still more and more a wilderness. And well did that same brave and thoughtful lover of his country declare that he who

1 De Thou, X. L. lxxxvii Péréfixe, 75-78. L'Estoile, 232.

1 De Thou, *ubi sup.* L'Estoile, 232, 234.



should suddenly awake from a sleep of twenty-five years, and revisit that once beautiful land, would deem himself transplanted to a barbarous island of cannibals. 1

It had now become quite obvious that the game of Leicester was played out. His career—as it has now been fully exhibited—could have but one termination. He had made himself thoroughly odious to the nation whom he came to govern. He had lost for ever the authority once spontaneously bestowed, and he had attempted in vain, both by fair means and foul, to recover that power. There was nothing left him but retreat. Of this he was thoroughly convinced. 2 He was anxious to be gone, the republic most desirous to be rid of him, her Majesty impatient to have her favourite back again. The indulgent Queen, seeing nothing to blame in his conduct, while her indignation at the attitude maintained by the Provinces was boundless, permitted him, accordingly, to return; and in her letter to the States, announcing this decision, she took a fresh opportunity of emptying her wrath upon their heads.

She told them, that, notwithstanding her frequent messages to them, signifying her evil contentment with their unthankfulness for her exceeding great benefits, and with their gross violations of their contract with herself and with Leicester, whom they had, of their own accord, made absolute governor without her instigation; she had never received any good answer to move her to commit their sins to oblivion, nor had she remarked any amendment in their conduct. On the contrary, she complained that they daily increased their offences most notoriously in the sight of the world, and in so many points that she

lacked words to express them in one letter. She however thought it worth while to allude to some of their transgressions. She declared that their sinister or rather barbarous interpretation of her conduct had been notorious in perverting and falsifying her princely and Christian intentions, when she imparted to them the overtures that had been made to her for a treaty of peace for herself and for them with the King of Spain. Yet although she had required their allowance, before she would give her assent, she had been grieved that the world should see what impudent untruths had been forged upon her, not only by their sufferance, but by their social permission for her Christian good meaning towards them. She denounced the statements as to her having concluded a treaty, not only without their knowledge, but with the sacrifice of their liberty and religion, as utterly false, either for anything done in act, or intended in thought, by her. She complained that upon this most false ground had been heaped a number of like untruths and malicious slanders against her cousin Leicester, who had hazarded his life, spent his substance, left his native country, absented himself from her, and lost his time, only for their service. It had been falsely stated among them, she said, that the Earl had come over she last time, knowing that peace had been secretly concluded. It was false that he had intended to surprise divers of their towns, and deliver them to the King of Spain. All such untruths contained matter so improbable, that it was most strange that any person, having any sense, could imagine them correct. Having thus slightly animadverted upon their wilfulness, unthankfulness, and bad government, and having, in very plain English, given them the lie, eight distinct and separate times upon a single page, she proceeded to inform them that she had recalled her cousin Lei-

1 Duplessis Mornay, *Mem.* iv. 1-84.

2 „Tis time for me now to look after my own head—*sta tempo ch' io guardi la mia testa*,” he is said to have exclaimed when the Leyden plot was discovered. (*Reyd*, vii. 134.)

Leicester, having great cause to use his services in England, and not seeing how, by his tarrying there, he could either profit them or herself. Nevertheless she protested herself not void of compassion for their estate, and for the pitiful condition of the great multitude of kind and godly people, subject to the miseries which, by the States' government, were like to fall upon them, unless God should specially interpose; and she had therefore determined, for the time, to continue her subsidies, according to the covenant between them. If, meantime, she should conclude a peace with Spain, she promised to them the same care for their country as for her own. 1

Accordingly the Earl, after despatching an equally ill-tempered letter to the States, in which he alluded, at unmerciful length, to all the old grievances, blamed them for the loss of Sluys, for which place he protested that they had manifested no more interest than if it had been San Domingo in Hispaniola, took his departure for Flushing. 2 After remaining there, in a very moody frame of mind, for several days, expecting that the States would, at least, send a committee to wait upon him and receive his farewells, he took leave of them by letter. „God send me shortly a wind to blow me from them all,” 3 he exclaimed—a prayer which was soon granted—and before the end of the year he was safely landed in England. „These legs of mine,” said he, clapping his hands upon them as he sat in his chamber at Margate, „shall never go again into Holland. Let the States get others to serve their mercenary turn, for me they shall not have.” 4 Upon giving up the government, he caused a medal to be struck in his own honour. The device was a

flock of sheep watched by an English mastiff. Two mottoes—„Non gregem sed ingratos,” and „Invitus desero”—expressed his opinion of Dutch ingratitude and his own fidelity. The Hollanders, on their part, struck several medals to commemorate the same event, some of which were not destitute of invention. Upon one of them, for instance, was represented an ape smothering her young ones to death in her embrace, with the device, „Libertas ne ita chara ut simiae catuli;” while upon the reverse was a man avoiding smoke and falling into the fire, with the inscription, „Fugiens fumum, incidet in ignem.” 1

Leicester found the usual sunshine at Greenwich. All the efforts of Norris, Wilkes, and Buckhurst had been insufficient to raise even a doubt in Elizabeth's mind as to the wisdom and integrity by which his administration of the Provinces had been characterised from beginning to end. Those who had appealed from his hatred to the justice of their sovereign had met with disgrace and chastisement. But for the great Earl the Queen's favour was a rock of adamant. At a private interview he threw himself at her feet, and with tears and sobs implored her not to receive him in disgrace whom she had sent forth in honour. His blandishments prevailed, as they had always done. Instead, therefore, of appearing before the council, kneeling, to answer such inquiries as ought surely to have been instituted, he took his seat boldly among his colleagues, replying haughtily to all murmurs by a reference to her Majesty's secret instructions. 2

The unhappy English soldiers, who had gone forth under his banner in midsummer, had been returning, as they best might, in winter, starving, half-naked wretches, to beg a morsel of bread at the gates of Greenwich palace,

1 Queen to the States, 8 Nov. 1587. (S. T. Office MS.)

2 Bor, iii. xxiii. 141. Meteren, xiv. 262.

3 Leicester to Atye, 4 Dec. 1587. (S. P. Office MS.)

4 Stowe, 'Chronicle,' 713.

1 Bor, iii. xxiii. 153. Hoofd Vervolgh, 210. Meteren, xiii. 238.

2 Camden, iii. 400. Baker, 375.

and to be driven away as vagabonds, with threats of the stocks. 1 This was not the fault of the Earl, for he had fed them with his own generous hand in the Netherlands, week after week, when no money for their necessities could be obtained from the paymasters. Two thousand pounds had been sent by Elizabeth to her soldiers when sixty-four thousand pounds arrearage were due, 2 and no language could exaggerate the misery to which these outcasts, according to eye-witnesses of their own nation, were reduced.

Lord Willoughby was appointed to the command of what remained of these unfortunate troops, upon the Earl's departure. The sovereignty of the Netherlands remained undisputed with the States. Leicester resigned his commission by an instrument dated December, 17<sup>th</sup> which, however, never reached the Netherlands till April of the following year. 3 From that time forth the government of the republic maintained the same forms which the assembly had claimed for it in the long controversy with the governor-general, and which have been sufficiently described.

Meantime the negotiations for a treaty, no longer secret, continued. The Queen, infatuated as ever, still believed in the sincerity of Farnese, while that astute personage and his master were steadily maturing their schemes. A matrimonial alliance was secretly projected between the King of Scots and Philip's daughter, the Infanta Isabella, with the consent of the Pope and the whole college of

cardinals; and James, by the whole force of the Holy League, was to be placed upon the throne of Elizabeth. In case of his death without issue, Philip was to succeed quietly to the crowns of England, Scotland, and Ireland. 1 Nothing could be simpler or more rational, and accordingly these arrangements were the table-talk at Rome, and met with general approbation.

Communications to this effect, coming straight from the Colonna palace, were thought sufficiently circumstantial to be transmitted to the English government. Maurice of Nassau wrote with his own hand to Walsingham, professing a warm attachment to the cause in which Holland and England were united, and perfect personal devotion to the English Queen. 2 His language was not that of

1 Le Sieur to Walsingham, 3 Dec. 1587. Maurice de Nassau to same, 9 Dec. 1587. (S. P. Office MSS.)

2 „Je ne vous escrirai rien sur les propos d'Odo Colonna,” wrote Maurice, „car vous les entendrez bien par la lecture du sommaire que je vous envoie, mais bien je vous assure qu'il est un jeune homme d'esprit vif et prompt, qui parle bien et a été bien nourri. Toutefois monstrant par ses propos qu'il ne sçait gueres de choses hors la cour de Rome, de la connoissance des bonnes maisons, et a paru a aucuns des miens plus sages et expérimentés que moi, qu'il y avoit fondement en ce qu'il disoit, et que j'en devois advertir Sa M. tant pour la qualité de son dire, que pour faire connaître a Sa M. quand l'occasion se presentoit que j'en suis tres affectionné serviteur, ce qu'il convient par ma qualité et maison de monstrer par effet et non par paroles. Et en cette intention je me suis trouvé en ceste armée assemblée par ma diligence de tous les endroits de mes gouvernements, en intention, si Dieu m'en fait la grace, de combattre la puissance des plus grands ennemis de Sa Majesté, et de toute la Chretiente, ce sont le Roi d'Espagne et le Prince de Parme, lequel, de tout mon cœur, je désire trouver en personne où j'espère avec l'aide de Dieu faire connaître qu'il n'est pas si bon soldat ou il trouve resistance, que quand les hommes mal conseillés lui mettent les victoires en main de concevoir par leur lacheté de tant de prises de belles villes. Je vous supplie me tenir en la bonne grace de Sa M. de me continuer l'amitié que vous avez portée à monseigneur mon père, car j'espère que Dieu me fait grace de l'ensuivre promptement en constance et ferme resolution.

1 Memorial, in Burghley's own hand, Nov. 1587. (S. P. Office MS.)

2 „She would by no means yield to send over any greater sum than 2000*l.* though the Lord Treasurer, Sir Thomas Shirley, and myself, did let her understand that there was due unto the soldiers serving there the first of July last 44,000*l.*, and, before it could arrive there, at the least 64,000*l.*” Walsingham to Leicester, 14 Aug. 1587. (Br. Mus. Galba, d. i. p. 263, MS.)

3 Bor, iii. xxiii. 143 *seq.* Meteren, xiv. 262. Reynd, vii. 137, 138.



a youth who, according to Leicester's repeated insinuations, was leagued with the most distinguished soldiers and statesmen of the Netherlands to sell their country to Spain.

But Elizabeth was not to be convinced. She thought it extremely probable that the Provinces would be invaded, and doubtless felt some anxiety for England. It was unfortunate that the possession of Sluys had given Alexander such a point of vantage, and there was moreover a fear that he might take possession of Ostend. She had, therefore, already recommended that her own troops should be removed from that city, that its walls should be razed, its marine bulwarks destroyed, and that the ocean should be let in to swallow the devoted city for ever—the inhabitants having been previously allowed to take their departure. For it was assumed by her Majesty that to attempt resistance would be idle, and that Ostend could never stand a siege. <sup>1</sup>

The advice was not taken, and before the end of her reign Elizabeth was destined to see this indefensible city—only fit, in her judgment, to be abandoned to the waves—become memorable, throughout all time, for the longest and, in many respects, the most remarkable siege which modern history has recorded, the famous leaguer in which the first European captains of the coming age were to take their lessons, year after year, in the school of the great Dutch soldier, who was now but a „solemn, sly youth,” just turned of twenty.

The only military achievement which characterized the close of the year, to the great satisfaction of the Provinces and the annoyance of Parma, was the surprise of the city of Bonn. The indefatigable Martin Schenk—in fulfilment of his great contract with the States-

General, by which the war on the Rhine had been farmed out to him on such profitable terms—had led his mercenaries against this important town. He had found one of its gates somewhat insecurely guarded, placed a mortar under it at night, and occupied a neighbouring pig-stye with a number of his men, who, by chasing, maltreating, and slaughtering the swine, had raised an unearthly din, sufficient to drown the martial operations at the gate. In brief, the place was easily mastered, and taken possession of by Martin, in the name of the deposed elector, Gebhard Truchsess—the first stroke of good fortune which had for a long time befallen that melancholy prelate. <sup>1</sup>

The administration of Leicester has been so minutely pictured, that it would be superfluous to indulge in many concluding reflections. His acts and words have been made to speak for themselves. His career in the country has been described with much detail, because the period was a great epoch of transition. The republic of the Netherlands, during those years, acquired consistency and permanent form. It seemed possible, on the Earl's first advent, that the Provinces might become part and parcel of the English realm. Whether such a consummation would have been desirable or not, is a fruitless inquiry. But it is certain that the selection of such a man as Leicester made that result impossible. Doubtless there were many errors committed by all parties. The Queen was supposed by the Netherlands to be secretly desirous of accepting the sovereignty of the Provinces, provided she were made sure, by the Earl's experience, that they were competent to protect themselves.

<sup>1</sup> Bor, iii. xxii. 143. Meteren, xiv. 262. Wagenaar, viii. 266. Parma to Philip 11. 29 Dec. 1587. (Arch. de Simancas, MS.)

„According to this, Schenk is not dead yet, as reported” (segun esto no es muerto como habian dicho), was Philip's judicious marginal observation on the letter in which Parma communicated this clever exploit of Martin.

Jusqu'à je prierai Dieu, &c. Maurice de Naasau to Walsingham, 9 Dec. 1587. (S. P. Office MS.)

<sup>1</sup> Queen to Leicester, 8 Nov. 1587, in Burghley's hand. (S. P. Office MS.)

But this suspicion was unfounded. The result of every investigation showed the country so full of resources, of wealth, and of military and naval capabilities, that, united with England, it would have been a source of great revenue and power, not a burthen and an expense. Yet, when convinced of such facts by the statistics which were liberally laid before her by her confidential agents, she never manifested, either in public or private, any intention of accepting the sovereignty. This being her avowed determination, it was an error on the part of the States, before becoming thoroughly acquainted with the man's character, to confer upon Leicester the almost boundless authority which they granted on his first arrival. It was a still graver mistake, on the part of Elizabeth, to give way to such explosions of fury, both against the governor and the States, when informed of the offer and acceptance of that authority. The Earl, elevated by the adulation of others, and by his own vanity, into an almost sovereign attitude, saw himself chastised before the world, like an aspiring lackey, by her in whose favour he had felt most secure. He found himself, in an instant, humbled and ridiculous. Between himself and the Queen it was something of a lover's quarrel, and he soon found balsam in the hand that smote him. But though reinstated in authority, he was never again the object of reverence in the land he was attempting to rule. As he came to know the Netherlands better, he recognised the great capacity which their statesmen concealed under a plain and sometimes a plebeian exterior, and the splendid grandee hated, where at first he had only despised. The Netherlands, too, who had been used to look up almost with worship to a plain man of kindly manners, in felt hat and bargeman's woollen jacket, whom they called „Father William,” did not appreciate, as they ought, the magnificence of the stranger who had been sent to

govern them. The Earl was handsome, quick-witted, brave; but he was neither wise in council nor capable in the field. He was intolerably arrogant, passionate, and revengeful. He hated easily, and he hated for life. It was soon obvious that no cordiality of feeling or of action could exist between him and the plain, stubborn Hollanders. He had the fatal characteristic of loving only the persons who flattered him. With much perception of character, sense of humour, and appreciation of intellect, he recognised the power of the leading men in the nation and sought to gain them. So long as he hoped success, he was loud in their praises. They were all wise, substantial, well-languaged, big fellows, such as were not to be found in England or anywhere else. When they refused to be made his tools, they became tinkers, boors, devils, and atheists. He covered them with curses and devoted them to the gibbet. He began by warmly commending Buys and Barneveld, Hohenlo and Maurice, and endowing them with every virtue. Before he left the country he had accused them of every crime, and would cheerfully, if he could, have taken the life of every one of them. And it was quite the same with nearly every Englishman who served with or under him. Wilkes and Buckhurst, however much the objects of his previous esteem, so soon as they ventured to censure or even to criticise his proceedings, were at once devoted to perdition. Yet, after minute examination of the record, public and private, neither Wilkes nor Buckhurst can be found guilty of treachery or animosity towards him, but are proved to have been governed in all their conduct by a strong sense of duty to their sovereign, the Netherlands, and Leicester himself.

To Sir John Norris, it must be allowed, that he was never fickle, for he had always entertained for that distinguished general an honest, unswerving, and infinite hatred, which was not

susceptible of increase or diminution by any act or word. Pelham, too, whose days were numbered, and who was dying bankrupt and broken-hearted, at the close of the Earl's administration, had always been regarded by him with tenderness and affection. But Pelham had never thwarted him, had exposed his life for him, and was always proud of being his faithful, unquestioning, humble adherent. With perhaps this single exception, Leicester found himself, at the end of his second term in the Provinces, without a single friend and with few respectable partisans. Subordinate mischievous intriguers like Deventer, Junius, and Otheman, were his chief advisers and the instruments of his schemes.

With such qualifications it was hardly possible—even if the current of affairs had been flowing smoothly—that he should prove a successful governor of the new republic. But when the numerous errors and adventitious circumstances are considered—for some of which he was responsible, while of others he was the victim—it must be esteemed fortunate that no great catastrophe occurred. His immoderate elevation, his sudden degradation, his controversy in regard to the sovereignty, his abrupt departure for England, his protracted absence, his mistimed return, the secret instructions for his second administration, the obstinate parsimony and persistent ill-temper of the Queen—who, from the beginning to the end of the Earl's government, never addressed a kindly word to the Netherlands, but was ever censuring and browbeating them in public state-papers and private epistles—the treason of York and Stanley; above all, the disastrous and concealed negotiations with Parma, and the desperate attempts upon Amsterdam and Leyden—all placed him in a most un-

fortunate position from first to last. But he was not competent for his post under any circumstances. He was not the statesman to deal in policy with Buys, Barneveld, Ortel, Sainte Aldegonde; nor the soldier to measure himself against Alexander Farnese. His administration was a failure, and although he repeatedly hazarded his life, and poured out his wealth in their behalf with an almost unequalled liberality, he could never gain the hearts of the Netherlanders. English valour, English intelligence, English truthfulness, English generosity, were endearing England more and more to Holland. The statesmen of both countries were brought into closest union, and learned to appreciate and to respect each other, while they recognized that the fate of their respective commonwealths was indissolubly united. But it was to the efforts of Walsingham, Drake, Raleigh, Wilkes, Buckhurst, Norris, Willoughby, Williams, Vere, Russell, and the brave men who fought under their banners or their counsels, on every battle-field, and in every beleaguered town in the Netherlands, and to the universal spirit and sagacity of the English nation, in this grand crisis of its fate, that these fortunate results were owing; not to the Earl of Leicester, nor—during the term of his administration—to Queen Elizabeth herself.

In brief, the proper sphere of this remarkable personage, and the one in which he passed the greater portion of his existence, was that of a magnificent court-favourite, the spoiled darling, from youth to his deathbed, of the great English Queen; whether to the advantage or not of his country and the true interests of his sovereign, there can hardly be at this day any difference of opinion.



## CHAPTER XVIII.

Prophecies as to the Year 1588—Distracted Condition of the Dutch Republic—Willoughby reluctantly takes Command—English Commissioners come to Ostend—Secretary Garnier and Robert Cecil—Cecil accompanies Dale to Ghent—And finds the Desolation complete—Interview of Dale and Cecil with Parma—His fervent Expressions in favour of Peace—Cecil makes a Tour in Flanders—And sees much that is remarkable—Interviews of Dr. Rogers with Parma—Wonderful Harangues of the Envoy—Extraordinary Amenities of Alexander—With which Rogers is much touched—The Queen not pleased with her Envoy—Credulity of the English Commissioners—Ceremonious Meeting of all the Envoys—Consummate Art in wasting Time—Long Disputes about Commissions—The Spanish Commissions meant to deceive—Disputes about Cessation of Arms—Spanish Duplicity and Procrastination—Pedantry and Credulity of Dr. Dale—The Papal Bull and Dr. Allen's Pamphlet—Dale sent to ask Explanations—Parma denies all Knowledge of either—Croft believes to the last in Alexander—Dangerous Discord in North Holland—Leicester's Resignation arrives—Enmity of Willoughby and Maurice—Willoughby's dark Picture of Affairs—Hatred between States and Leicestrians—Maurice's Answer to the Queen's Charges—End of Sonoy's Rebellion—Philip fomented the Civil War in France—League's Threats and Plots against Henry—Mucio arrives in Paris—He is received with Enthusiasm—The King flies, and Spain triumphs in Paris—States expostulate with the Queen—English Statesmen still deceived—Deputies from Netherland Churches—Hold Conference with the Queen—And present long Memorials—More Conversations with the Queen—National Spirit of England and Holland—Dissatisfaction with Queen's Course—Bitter Complaints of Lord Howard—Want of Preparation in Army and Navy—Sanguine Statements of Leicester—Activity of Parma—The painful Suspense continues.

THE year 1588 had a last arrived—that fatal year concerning which the German astrologers—more than a century before—had prognosticated such dire events.<sup>1</sup> As the epoch approached it was firmly believed by many that the end of the world was at hand, while the least superstitious could not doubt that great calamities were impending over the nations. Portents observed during the

winter and in various parts of Europe came to increase the prevailing panic. It rained blood in Sweden, monstrous births occurred in France, and at Weimar it was gravely reported by eminent chroniclers that the sun had appeared at mid-day holding a drawn sword in his mouth—a warlike portent whose meaning could not be mistaken. 1

But, in truth, it needed no miracles nor prophecies to enforce the conviction that a long procession of disasters was steadily advancing. With France rent asunder by internal convulsions, with its imbecile king not even capable of commanding a petty faction among his own subjects, with Spain the dark cause of unnumbered evils, holding Italy in its grasp, firmly allied with the Pope, already having reduced and nearly absorbed France, and now, after long and patient preparation, about to hurl the concentrated vengeance and hatred of long years upon the little kingdom of England, and its only all—the just organized commonwealth of the Netherlands—it would have been strange indeed if the dullest intellect had not dreamed of tragical events. It was not encouraging that there should be distraction in the counsels of the two States so immediately threatened; that the Queen of England should be at variance with her wisest and most faithful statesmen as to their course of action, and that deadly quarrels should exist between the leading men of the Dutch republic and the English governor, who had assumed the responsibility of directing its energies against the common enemy.

The blackest night that ever descended upon the Netherlands—more disappointing because succeeding a period of comparative prosperity and triumph—was the winter of 1587-8, when Leicester had terminated his career by his abrupt

<sup>1</sup> De Thou, x. 218. Camden, III. 402. Strada, II. ix. 530. Pasquier, Oeuvres, II. 331.

1 Ibid, ubi sup.

departure for England, after his second brief attempt at administration. For it was exactly at this moment of anxious expectation, when dangers were rolling up from the south till not a ray of light or hope could pierce the universal darkness, that the little commonwealth was left without a chief. The English Earl departed, shaking the dust from his feet; but he did not resign. The supreme authority—so far as he could claim it—was again transferred, with his person, to England.

The consequences were immediate and disastrous. All the Leicestrians refused to obey the States-General. Utrecht, the stronghold of that party, announced its unequivocal intention to annex itself, without any conditions whatever, to the English crown; while, in Holland, young Maurice was solemnly installed stadholder, and captain-general of the Provinces, under the guidance of Hohenlo and Barneveld. But his authority was openly defied in many important cities within his jurisdiction by military chieftains who had taken the oaths of allegiance to Leicester as governor, and who refused to renounce fidelity to the man who had deserted their country, but who had not resigned his authority. Of these mutineers the most eminent was Diedrich Sonoy, governor of North Holland, a soldier of much experience, sagacity, and courage, who had rendered great services to the cause of liberty and Protestantism, and had defaced it by acts of barbarity which had made his name infamous. Against this refractory chieftain it was necessary for Hohenlo and Maurice to lead an armed force, and to besiege him in his stronghold—the important city of Medenblik—which he resolutely held for Leicester, although Leicester had definitely departed, and which he closed against Maurice, although Maurice was the only representative of order and authority within the distracted commonwealth. And thus civil war had broken out in

the little scarcely-organized republic, as if there were not dangers and bloodshed enough impending over it from abroad. And the civil war was the necessary consequence of the Earl's departure.

The English forces—reduced as they were by sickness, famine, and abject poverty—were but a remnant of the brave and well-seasoned bands which had faced the Spaniards with success on so many battle-fields.

The general who now assumed chief command over them—by direction of Leicester, subsequently confirmed by the Queen—was Lord Willoughby. A daring, splendid dragoon, an honest, chivalrous, and devoted servant of his Queen, a conscientious adherent of Leicester, and a firm believer in his capacity and character, he was, however, not a man of sufficient experience or subtlety to perform the various tasks imposed upon him by the necessities of such a situation. Quick-witted, even brilliant in intellect, and the bravest of the brave on the battle-field, he was neither a sagacious administrator nor a successful commander. And he honestly confessed his deficiencies, and disliked the post to which he had been elevated. He scorned baseness, intrigue, and petty quarrels, and he was impatient of control. Testy, cholerie, and quarrelsome, with a high sense of honour, and a keen perception of insult, very modest and very proud, he was not likely to feed with wholesome appetite upon the unsavoury annoyances which were the daily bread of a chief commander in the Netherlands. „I ambitiously affect not high titles, but round dealing,” he said; „desiring rather to be a private lance with indifferent reputation, than a colonel-general spotted or defamed with wants.”<sup>1</sup> He was not the politician to be matched against the unscrupulous and all-accomplished Farnese; and indeed no man better than Willoughby could illustrate

<sup>1</sup> Willoughby to Leicester, Sept. 1587. (Br. Mus., Galba, D. II., p. 141, MS.)

the enormous disadvantage under which Englishmen laboured at that epoch in their dealings with Italians and Spaniards. The profuse indulgence in falsehood which characterized southern statesmanship, was more than a match for English love of truth. English soldiers and negotiators went naked into a contest with enemies armed in a panoply of lies. It was an unequal match, as we have already seen, and as we are soon more clearly to see. How was an English soldier who valued his knightly word—how were English diplomatists—among whom one of the most famous—then a lad of twenty, secretary to Lord Essex in the Netherlands—had poetically avowed that „simple truth was highest skill,”—to deal with the thronging Spanish deceits sent northward by the great father of lies who sat in the Escorial?

„It were an ill lesson,” said Willoughby, „to teach soldiers the dissimulations of such as follow princes’ courts in Italy. For my own part, it is my only end to be loyal and dutiful to my sovereign, and plain to all others that I honour. I see the finest reynard loses his best coat as well as the poorest sheep.”<sup>1</sup> He was also a strong Leicestrian, and had imbibed much of the Earl’s resentment against the leading politicians of the States. Willoughby was sorely in need of counsel. That shrewd and honest Welshman—Roger Williams—was, for the moment, absent. Another of the same race and character commanded in Bergen-op-Zoom, but was not more gifted with administrative talent than the general himself.

„Sir Thomas Morgan is a very sufficient, gallant gentleman,” said Willoughby, „and in truth a very old soldier; but we both have need of one that can both give and keep counsel better than ourselves. For action he is undoubtedly very able, if there were

no other means to conquer but only to give blows.”<sup>1</sup>

In brief, the new commander of the English forces in the Netherlands was little satisfied with the States, with the enemy, or with himself; and was inclined to take but a dismal view of the disjointed commonwealth, which required so incompetent a person as he professed himself to be to set it right.

„’Tis a shame to show my wants,” he said, „but too great a fault of duty that the Queen’s reputation be frustrate. What is my slender experience! What an honourable person do I succeed! What an encumbered popular state is left! What withered sinews, which it passes my cunning to restore! What an enemy in head greater than heretofore! And wherewithal should I sustain this burthen? For the wars I am fitter to obey than to command. For the state, I am a man prejudicated in their opinion, and not the better liked of them that I have earnestly followed the general, and, being one that wants both opinion and experience with them I have to deal, and means to win more or to maintain that which is left, what good may be looked for?”<sup>2</sup>

The supreme authority—by the retirement of Leicester—was once more the subject of dispute. As on his first departure, so also on this his second and final one, he had left a commission to the state-council to act as an executive body during his absence. But, although he nominally still retained his office, in reality no man believed in his return; and the States-General were ill inclined to brook a species of guardianship over them, with which they believed themselves mature enough to dispense. Moreover the state-council, composed mainly of Leicestrians, would expire, by limitation of its commission, early in February of that year. The dispute

<sup>1</sup> Same to Burghley, 16 July, 1587. (Brit. Mus., Galba, D. J. p. 10, MS.)

<sup>2</sup> Willoughby to Burghley, 18 Nov. 1587. (Brit. Mus., Galba, D. II. 210 MS.)



for power would necessarily terminate, therefore, in favour of the States-General. 1

Meantime—while this internal revolution was taking place in the polity of the commonwealth—the gravest disturbances were its natural consequence. There were mutinies in the garrisons of Heusden, of Gertruydenberg, of Medenblik, as alarming, and threatening to become as chronic in their character, as those extensive military rebellions which often rendered the Spanish troops powerless at the most critical epochs. The cause of these mutinies was uniformly want of pay, the pretext, the oath to the Earl of Leicester, which was declared incompatible with the allegiance claimed by Maurice in the name of the States-General. The mutiny of Gertruydenberg was destined to be protracted; that of Medenblik, dividing, as it did, the little territory of Holland in its very heart, it was most important at once to suppress. Sonoy, however—who was so staunch a Leicestrian, that his Spanish contemporaries uniformly believed him to be an Englishman 2—held out for a long time, as will be seen, against the threats and even the armed demonstrations of Maurice and the States.

Meantime the English sovereign, persisting in her delusion, and despite the solemn warnings of her own wisest counsellors, and the passionate remonstrances of the States-General of the Netherlands, sent her peace-commissioners to the Duke of Parma.

The Earl of Derby, Lord Cobham, Sir James Croft, Valentine Dale, doctor of laws, and former ambassador at Vienna, and Dr. Rogers, envoys on the part of the Queen, arrived in the Netherlands in February. 3 The commissioners appointed on the part of Farnese

were Count Aremberg, Champagne, Richardot, Jacob Maas, and Secretary Garnier.

If history has ever furnished a lesson, how an unscrupulous tyrant, who has determined upon enlarging his own territories at the expense of his neighbours, upon suppressing human freedom wherever it dared to manifest itself, with fine phrases of religion and order for ever in his mouth, on deceiving his friends and enemies alike, as to his nefarious and almost incredible designs, by means of perpetual and colossal falsehoods; and if such lessons deserve to be pondered, as a source of instruction and guidance, for every age, then certainly the secret story of the negotiations by which the wise Queen of England was beguiled, and her kingdom brought to the verge of ruin, in the spring of 1588, is worthy of serious attention.

The English commissioners arrived at Ostend. With them came Robert Cecil, youngest son of Lord-Treasurer Burghley, then twenty-five years of age. He had no official capacity, but was sent by his father, that he might improve his diplomatic talents, and obtain some information as to the condition of the Netherlands. A slight, crooked, hump-backed young gentleman, dwarfish in stature, but with a face not irregular in feature, and thoughtful and subtle in expression, with reddish hair, a thin tawny beard, and large, pathetic, greenish-coloured eyes, with a mind and manners already trained to courts and cabinets, and with a disposition almost ingenuous, as compared to the massive dissimulation with which it was to be contrasted, and with what was, in after-times, to constitute a portion of his own character, Cecil, young as he was, could not be considered the least important of the envoys. The Queen, who gloved proper men, called him „her pigmy” and „although,” he observed with whimsical courtliness, „I may not find fault with

1 Compare Van der Kemp, „Maurits van Nassau,” I. 58, *seq.*

2 Herrera, III. 11, 84. Cornero, „Guerras de Flandes,” 224.

3 Camden, III. 407.

the sporting name she gives me, yet seem *I only not to dislike it, because she gives it.*" 1 The strongest man among them was Valentine Dale, who had much shrewdness, experience, and legal learning, but who valued himself, above all things, upon his Latinity. It was a consolation to him, while his adversaries were breaking Priscian's head as fast as the Duke, their master, was breaking his oaths, that his own syntax was as clear as his conscience. 2 The feeblest commissioner was James-a-Croft, who had already exhibited himself with very anile characteristics, and whose subsequent manifestations were to seem like dotage. Doctor Rogers, learned in the law, as he unquestionably was, had less skill in reading human character, or in deciphering the physiognomy of a Farnese, while Lord Derby, every inch a grandee, with Lord Cobham to assist him, was not the man to cope with the astute Richardot, the profound and experienced Champagny, or that most voluble and most rhetorical of doctors of law, Jacob Maas of Antwerp.

The commissioners, on their arrival, were welcomed by Secretary Garnier, who had been sent to Ostend to greet them. An adroit, pleasing, courteous gentleman, thirty-six years of age, small, handsome, and attired not quite as a soldier, nor exactly as one of the long robe, wearing a cloak furred to the knee, a cassock of black velvet, with plain gold buttons, and a gold chain about his neck, the secretary delivered handsomely the Duke of Parma's congratulations, recommended great expedition in the negotiations, and was then invited by the Earl of Derby to dine with the commissioners. 3 He was ac-

companied by a servant in plain livery, who—so soon as his master had made his bow to the English envoys—had set forth for a stroll through the town. The modest-looking valet, however, was a distinguished engineer in disguise, who had been sent by Alexander for the especial purpose of examining the fortifications of Ostend 1—that town being a point much coveted, and liable to immediate attack by the Spanish commander.

Meanwhile Secretary Garnier made himself very agreeable, showing wit, experience, and good education; and, after dinner, was accompanied to his lodgings by Dr. Rogers and other gentlemen, with whom—especially with Cecil—he held much conversation.

Knowing that this young gentleman „wanted not an honourable father,” the Secretary was very desirous that he should take this opportunity to make a tour through the Provinces, examine the cities, and especially „note the miserable ruins of the poor country and people.” He would then feelingly perceive how much they had to answer for, whose mad rebellion against their sovereign lord and master had caused so great an effusion of blood, and the wide desolation of such goodly towns and territories.

Cecil probably entertained a suspicion that the sovereign lord and master, who had been employed, twenty years long, in butchering his subjects and in ravaging their territory to feed his executioners and soldiers, might almost be justified in treating human beings as beasts and reptiles, if they had not at last rebelled. He simply and diplomatically answered, however, that he could not but concur with the Secretary in lamenting the misery of the Provinces and people so utterly despoiled and ruined, but, as it might be matter of dispute „from what head this fountain

1 R. Cecil to Burghley,  $\frac{16}{26}$  Feb. 1588. (S.

P. Office MS.)

2 Valentine Dale to Walsingham, 14 March, 1588. (S. P. Office MS.)

3 R. Cecil to Burghley,  $\frac{4}{14}$  March, 1588. (S. P. Office MS.)

1 Parma to Philip II., 20 March, 1588. (Arch. de Simancas, MS.)

of calamity was both fed and derived, he would not enter farther therein, it being a matter much too high for his capacity." He expressed also the hope that the King's heart might sympathize with that of her Majesty, in earnest compassion for all this suffering, and in determination to compound their differences. 1

On the following day there was some conversation with Garnier, on preliminary and formal matters, followed in the evening by a dinner at Lord Cobham's lodgings—a banquet which the forlorn condition of the country scarcely permitted to be luxurious. „We rather pray here for satiety," said Cecil, „than ever think of variety." 2

It was hoped by the Englishmen that the Secretary would take his departure after dinner; for the governor of Ostend, Sir John Conway, had an uneasy sensation, during his visit, that the unsatisfactory condition of the defences would attract his attention, and that a sudden attack by Farnese might be the result. Sir John was not aware, however, of the minute and scientific observations then making—at the very moment when Mr. Garnier was entertaining the commissioners with his witty and instructive conversation—by the unobtrusive menial who had accompanied the Secretary to Ostend. In order that those observations might be as thorough as possible, rather than with any view to ostensible business, the envoy of Parma now declared that—on account of the unfavourable state of the tide—he had resolved to pass another night at Ostend. „We could have spared his company," said Cecil, „but their Lordships considered it convenient that he should be used well." So Mr. Comptroller Croft gave the affable Secretary a dinner-invitation for the following day. 3

Here certainly was a masterly commencement on the part of the Spanish

diplomats. There was not one stroke of business during the visit of the Secretary. He had been sent simply to convey a formal greeting, and to take the names of the English commissioners—a matter which could have been done in an hour as well as in a week. But it must be remembered that, at that very moment, the Duke was daily expecting intelligence of the sailing of the Armada, and that Philip, on his part, supposed the Duke already in England, at the head of his army. Under these circumstances, therefore—when the whole object of the negotiation, so far as Parma and his master were concerned, was to amuse and to gain time—it was already ingenious in Garnier to have consumed several days in doing nothing, and to have obtained plans and descriptions of Ostend into the bargain.

Garnier—when his departure could no longer, on any pretext, be deferred—took his leave, once more warmly urging Robert Cecil to make a little tour in the obedient Netherlands, and to satisfy himself, by personal observation, of their miserable condition. As Dr. Dale purposed making a preliminary visit to the Duke of Parma at Ghent, it was determined accordingly that he should be accompanied by Cecil.

That young gentleman had already been much impressed by the forlorn aspect of the country about Ostend—for, although the town was itself in possession of the English, it was in the midst of the enemy's territory. Since the fall of Sluys the Spaniards were masters of all Flanders, save this one much-coveted point. And although the Queen had been disposed to abandon that city, and to suffer the ocean to overwhelm it, rather than that she should be at charges to defend it, yet its possession was of vital consequence to the English-Dutch cause, as time was ultimately to show. Meanwhile the position was already a very important one, for—according to the predatory system

1 Cecil to Burghley, MS. last cited.

2 *Ibid.*

3 *Ibid.*



of warfare of the day—it was an excellent starting-point for those marauding expeditions against persons and property, in which neither the Dutch nor English were less skilled than the Flemings or Spaniards. „The land all about here,” said Cecil, „is so devastated, that where the open country was wont to be covered with kine and sheep, it is now fuller of wild boars and wolves; whereof many come so nigh the town that the sentinels—three of whom watch every night upon a sand-hill outside the gates—have had them in a dark night upon them ere they were aware.”<sup>1</sup>

But the garrison of Ostend was quite as dangerous to the peasants and the country squires of Flanders, as were the wolves or wild boars; and many a pacific individual of retired habits, and with a remnant of property worth a ransom, was doomed to see himself whisked from his seclusion by Conway’s troopers, and made a compulsory guest at the city. Prisoners were brought in from a distance of sixty miles; and there was one old gentleman, „well languaged,” who „confessed merrily to Cecil, that when the soldiers fetched him out of his own mansion-house, sitting safe in his study, he was as little in fear of the garrison of Ostend as he was of the Turk or the devil.”<sup>2</sup>

Three days after the departure of Garnier, Dr. Dale and his attendants started upon their expedition from Ostend

<sup>1</sup> And Doctor Rogers held very similar language: „The most dolerous and heavy sights in this voyage to Ghent, by me weighed,” he said; „seeing the countries which, heretofore, by traffic of merchants, as much as any other I had seen flourish, now partly drowned, and except certain great cities, wholly burned, ruined, and desolate, possessed, I say, with wolves, wild boars, and foxes—a great testimony of the wrath of God,” &c., &c. Dr. Rogers to the Queen, <sup>1</sup>/<sub>11</sub> April, 1588. (S. P. Office MS.)

<sup>2</sup> Cecil to Burghley, <sup>4</sup>/<sub>14</sub> March, MS. already cited.

to Ghent—an hour’s journey <sup>7</sup>/<sub>17</sub> March, or so in these modern times. The English envoys, in the sixteenth century, found it a more formidable undertaking. They were many hours traversing the four miles to Oudenburg, their first halting-place; for the waters were out, there having been a great breach of the sea-dyke of Ostend, a disaster threatening destruction to town and country. <sup>1</sup> At Oudenburg, a „small and wretched hole,” as Garnier had described it to be, there was, however, a garrison of three thousand Spanish soldiers, under the Marquis de Renti. From these a convoy of fifty troopers was appointed to protect the English travellers to Bruges. Here they arrived at three o’clock, were met outside the gates by the famous General La Matte, and by him escorted to their lodgings in the „English house,” and afterwards handsomely entertained at supper in his own quarters.

The General’s wife, Madame de la Motte, was, according to Cecil, „a fair gentlewoman of discreet and modest behaviour, and yet not unwilling sometimes to hear herself speak;” <sup>2</sup> so that in her society, and in that of her sister—„a nun of the order of the Mounts, but who, like the rest of the sisterhood, wore an ordinary dress in the evening, and might leave the convent if asked in marriage”—the supper passed off very agreeably.

In the evening Cecil found that his father had formerly occupied the same bedroom of the English hotel in which Friday, he was then lodged; for he March 8, found that Lord Burghley 1588. had scrawled his name in the chimney-corner—a fact which was highly gratifying to the son. <sup>3</sup>

The next morning, at seven o’clock,

<sup>1</sup> Same to same, <sup>10</sup>/<sub>20</sub> March, 1588. (S. P. Office MS.)

<sup>2</sup> Cecil to Burghley. (MS. last cited.)

<sup>3</sup> Ibid.

the travellers set forth for Ghent. The journey was a miserable one. It was as cold any gloomy weather as even a Flemish month of March could furnish. A drizzling rain was falling all day long, the lanes were foul and miry, the frequent thickets which overhung their path were swarming with the freebooters of Zeeland, who were „ever at hand,” says Cecil, „to have picked our purses, but that they desried our convoy, and so saved themselves in the woods.” Sitting on horseback ten hours without alighting, under such circumstances as these, was not luxurious for a fragile little gentleman like Queen Elizabeth’s „pigmy;” especially as Dr. Dale and himself had only half a red herring between them for luncheon, and supped afterwards upon an orange. 1 The envoy protested that when they could get a couple of eggs a piece, while travelling in Flanders, „they thought they fared like princes.” 2

Nevertheless Cecil and himself fought it out manfully, and when they reached Ghent, at five in the evening, they were met by their acquaintance Garnier, and escorted to their lodgings. Here they were waited upon by President Richardot, „a tall gentleman,” on behalf of the Duke of Parma, and then left to their much-needed repose.

Nothing could be more forlorn than the country of the obedient Netherlands, through which their day’s journey had led them. Desolation had been the reward of obedience. „The misery of the inhabitants,” said Cecil, „is incredible, both without the town, where all things are wasted, houses spoiled, and grounds unlaboured, and also, even in these great cities, where they are for the most part poor beggars even in the fairest houses.” 3

And all this human wretchedness was the elaborate work of one man—one

dull, heartless bigot, living, far away, a life of laborious ease and solemn sensuality; and, in reality, almost as much removed from these fellow-creatures of his, whom he called his subjects, as if he had been the inhabitant of another planet. Has history many more instructive warnings against the horrors of arbitrary government—against the folly of mankind in ever tolerating the rule of a single irresponsible individual, than the lesson furnished by the life-work of that crowned criminal, Philip the Second?

The longing for peace on the part of these unfortunate obedient Flemings was intense. Incessant cries for peace reached the ears of the envoys on every side. Alas! it would have been better for these peace-wishers, had they stood side by side with their brethren, the noble Hollanders and Zeelanders, when they had been wresting, if not peace, yet independence and liberty, from Philip, with their own right hands. Now the obedient Flemings were but fuel for the vast flame which the monarch was kindling for the destruction of Christendom—if all Christendom were not willing to accept his absolute dominion.

The burgomasters of Ghent—of Ghent, once the powerful, the industrious, the opulent, the free, of all cities in the world now the most abject and forlorn—came in the morning to wait upon Elizabeth’s envoy, and to present him, according to ancient custom, with some flasks of wine. They came with tears streaming down their cheeks, earnestly expressing the desire of their hearts for peace, and their joy that at least it had now „begun to be thought on.” 1

„It is quite true,” replied Dr. Dale, „that her excellent Majesty the Queen—filled with compassion for your condition, and having been informed that the Duke of Parma is desirous of peace

1 Dale to Burghley,  $\frac{14}{24}$  March, 1588. (S. P. Office MS.) 2 Ibid. 3 Ibid.

1 Cecil to Burghley,  $\frac{10}{20}$  March, MS. already cited.

—has vouchsafed to make this overture. If it take not the desired effect, let not the blame rest upon her, but upon her adversaries." To these words the magistrates all said Amen, and invoked blessings on her Majesty. 1 And most certainly, Elizabeth was sincerely desirous of peace, even at greater sacrifices than the Duke could well have imagined; but there was something almost diabolic in the cold dissimulation by which her honest compassion was mocked, and the tears of a whole people in its agony made the laughing-stock of a despot and his tools.

On Saturday morning, Richardot and Garnier waited upon the envoy to escort him to the presence of the Duke. Cecil, who accompanied him, was not much impressed with the grandeur of Alexander's lodgings, and made unfavourable  
9 March, parisons between them and  
19 1588. the splendour of Elizabeth's

court. They passed through an ante-chamber into a dining-room, thence into an inner chamber, and next into the Duke's room. In the ante-chamber stood Sir William Stanley, the Deventer traitor, conversing with one Mockett, an Englishman, long resident in Flanders. Stanley was meanly dressed, in the Spanish fashion, and as young Cecil, passing through the chamber, looked him in the face, he abruptly turned from him, and pulled his hat over his eyes. „Twas well he did so," said that young gentleman, „for his taking it off would hardly have cost me mine." 2 Cecil was informed that Stanley was to have a commandery of Malta, and was in good favour with the Duke, who was, however quite weary of his mutinous and disorderly Irish regiment. 3

In the bed-chamber, Farnese—accompanied by the Marquis del Guasto, the Marquis of Renty, the Prince of Arem-

berg, President Richardot, and Secretary Cosimo—received the envoy and his companion. „Small and mean was the furniture of the chamber," said Cecil; „and although they attribute this to his love of privacy, yet it is a sign that peace is the mother of all honour and state, as may best be perceived by the court of England, which her Majesty's royal presence doth so adorn, as that it exceedeth this as far as the sun surpasseth in light the other stars of the firmament." 1

Here was a compliment to the Queen and her upholsterers drawn in by the ears. Certainly, if the first and best fruit of the much-longed-for peace were only to improve the furniture of royal and ducal apartments, in might be as well perhaps for the war to go on, while the Queen continued to outshine all the stars in the firmament. But the budding courtier and statesman knew that a personal compliment to Elizabeth could never be amiss or ill-timed.

The envoy delivered the greetings of her Majesty to the Duke, and was heard with great attention. Alexander attempted a reply in French, which was very imperfect, and, apologizing, exchanged that tongue for Italian. 2 He alluded with great fervour to the „honourable opinion concerning his sincerity and word," expressed to him by her Majesty, through the mouth of her envoy. „And indeed," said he, „I have always had especial care of keeping my word. My body and service are at the commandment of the King, my lord and master, but my honour is my own, and her Majesty may be assured that I shall always have especial regard of my word to so great and famous a Queen as her Majesty."

The visit was one of preliminaries and of ceremony. Nevertheless Farnese found opportunity to impress the envoy and his companions with his sincerity

1 Cecil to Burghley, 10 March. MS. already cited.  
20  
2 Ibid. 3 Ibid.

1 Cecil to Burghley, MS. last cited.  
2 Ibid.



of heart. He conversed much with Cecil, making particular and personal inquiries, and with appearance of deep interest, in regard to Queen Elizabeth.

„There is not a prince in the world” —he said, „reserving all question between her Majesty and my royal master—to whom I desire more to do service. So much have I heard of her perfections, that I wish earnestly that things might so fall out, as that it might be my fortune to look upon her face before my return to my own country. Yet I desire to behold her, not as a servant to him who is not able still to maintain war, or as one that feared any harm that might befall him; for in such matters my account was made long ago, to endure all which God may send. But, in truth, I am weary to behold the miserable estate of this people, fallen upon them through their own folly, and methinks that he who should do the best offices of peace would perform a *pium et sanctissimum opus*. Right glad am I that the Queen is not behind me in zeal for peace.” He then complimented Cecil in regard to his father, whom he understood to be the principal mover in these negotiations. 1

The young man expressed his thanks, and especially for the good affection which the Duke had manifested to the Queen and in the blessed cause of peace. He was well aware that her Majesty esteemed him a prince of great honour and virtue, and that for this good work, thus auspiciously begun, no man could possibly doubt that her Majesty, like himself, was most zealously affected to bring all things to a perfect peace.

The matters discussed in this first interview were only in regard to the place to be appointed for the coming conferences, and the exchange of powers. The Queen's commissioners had expected to treat at Ostend. Alexander, on the

contrary, was unable to listen to such a suggestion, as it would be utter dereliction of his master's dignity to send envoys to a city of his own, now in hostile occupation by her Majesty's forces. The place of conference, therefore, would be matter of future consideration. In respect to the exchange of powers, Alexander expressed the hope that no man would doubt as to the production on his commissioners' part of ample authority both from himself and from the King. 1

Yet it will be remembered, that, at this moment, the Duke had not only no powers from the King, but that Philip had most expressly refused to send a commission, and that he fully expected the negotiation to be superseded by the invasion, before the production of the powers should become indispensable.

And when Farnese was speaking thus fervently in favour of peace, and parading his word and his honour, the letters lay in his cabinet in the very room, in which Philip expressed his conviction that his general was already in London, that the whole realm of England was already at the mercy of a Spanish soldiery, and that the Queen, upon whose perfections Alexander had so long yearned to gaze, was a disrowned captive, entirely in her great enemy's power.

Thus ended the preliminary interview. On the following Monday, 11th March, Dr. Dale and his attendants 11 March, made the best of their way 1588.

back to Ostend, while young Cecil, with a safe conduct from Champagne, set forth on a little tour in Flanders.

The journey from Ghent to Antwerp was easy, and he was agreeably surprised by the apparent prosperity of the country. At intervals of every few miles, he was refreshed with the spectacle of a gibbet well garnished with dangling freebooters, and rejoiced, therefore, in comparative security. For it seemed that

1 Cecil to Burgley,  $\frac{10}{20}$  March, MS. already cited.

2 Ibid.

the energetic bailiff of Waasland had levied a contribution upon the proprietors of the country, to be expended mainly in hanging brigands; and so well had the funds been applied, that no predatory bands could make their appearance but they were instantly pursued by soldiers, and hanged forthwith, without judge or trial. Cecil counted twelve such places of execution on his road between Ghent and Antwerp. 1

On his journey he fell in with an Italian merchant, Lanfranchi by name, of a great commercial house in Antwerp, in the days when Antwerp had commerce, and by him, on his arrival the same evening in that town, he was made an honoured guest, both for his father's sake and his Queen's. „Tis the pleasantest city that ever I saw,” said Cecil, „for situation and building, but utterly left and abandoned now by those rich merchants that were wont to frequent the place.” 2

His host was much interested in the peace-negotiations, and, indeed, through his relations with Champagny and Andreas de Loo, had been one of the instruments by which it had been commenced. He inveighed bitterly against the Spanish captains and soldiers, to whose rapacity and ferocity he mainly ascribed the continuance of the war; and he was especially incensed with Stanley and other English renegades, who were thought fiercer haters of England than were the Spaniards themselves. Even in the desolate and abject condition of Antwerp and its neighbourhood, at that moment, the quick eye of Cecil detected the latent signs of a possible splendour. Should peace be restored, the territory once more be tilled, and the foreign merchants attracted thither again, he believed that the governor of the obedient Netherlands might live there in more magnificence than the King of Spain

himself, exhausted as were his revenues by the enormous expense of this protracted war. Eight hundred thousand dollars monthly, so Lanfranchi informed Cecil, were the cost of the forces on the footing then established. This, however, was probably an exaggeration, for the royal account-books showed a less formidable sum, 1 although a sufficiently large one to appal a less obstinate bigot than Philip. But what to him were the ruin of the Netherlands, the impoverishment of Spain, and the downfall of her ancient grandeur, compared to the glory of establishing the Inquisition in England and Holland?

While at dinner in Lanfranchi's house, Cecil was witness to another characteristic of the times, and one which afforded proof of even more formidable freebooters abroad than those for whom

1 „Relacion particular de lo que monta un mes de sueldo de toda la gente de este exercito asi infantra como cabaa y entretenidos de todos naciones, artilla armada, vituallas, y el numero de la gente que hay conforme a la ultima muestra de 29 April, 1588:—

Infanteria.	Hombres.	Vanderas.	Per Mes.
Espanola .....	8,718	89	62,239
Itala .....	5,339	52	35,226
Borgoga	3,278	29	20,591
Irlandesca			
Escocesa			
Wallona .....	17,825	144	79,341
Alema Alta ..	11,309	50	86,697
„ Baya ..	8,616	34	51,195

Caballeria ligera.

3,650 Alema estandartes ..... 38,631

Castillos.

Anversa.....	} 1,180 .....	Per Mes.
Gande .....		6,508
Charlemont		

Entretenidos.

668 .....	23,204
El Armada de Mar, gasto ordinario	} 26,400
per mes .....	
Artilleria .....	8,200
Vituallas, spedale, &c. ....	4,384

Sumario total.

59,915 hombres, per mes, escudos 380,427  
 Sua Alteza Alessandro Farnese, per mes,  
 3000 escudos d'oro.  
 Maesse del campo genl, per mes, 1000.  
 Monta el gasto ordino de cada mehasta aqui,  
 pesos 454,315 per mes = 370,000 escudos de  
 oro.” (Archivo de Simancas, MS.)

1 Cecil to Burghley,  $\frac{14}{24}$  March, 1588. (S.

P. Office MS.)

2 Ibid.

the bailiff of Waasland had erected his gibbets. A canal-boat had left Antwerp for Brussels that morning, and in the vicinity of the latter city had been set upon by a detachment from the English garrison of Bergen-op-Zoom, and captured, with twelve prisoners and a freight of 60,000 florins in money. „This struck the company at the dinner-table all in a dump,” said Cecil. And well it might; for the property mainly belonged to themselves, and they forthwith did their best to have the marauders waylaid on their return. But Cecil, notwithstanding his gratitude for the hospitality of Lanfranchi, sent word next day to the garrison of Bergen of the designs against them, and on his arrival at the place had the satisfaction of being informed by Lord Willoughby that the party had got safe home with their plunder. 1

„And well worthy they are of it,” said young Robert, „considering how far they go for it.”

The traveller, on leaving Antwerp, proceeded down the river to Bergen-op-Zoom, where he was hospitably entertained by that doughty old soldier Sir William Reade, and met Lord Willoughby, whom he accompanied to Brielle on a visit to the deposed elector Truchsess, then living in that neighbourhood. Cecil—who was not passion’s slave—had small sympathy with the man who could lose a sovereignty for the sake of Agnes Mansfeld. „’Tis a very goodly gentleman,” said he, „well fashioned, and of good speech, for which I must rather praise him than for loving a wife better than so great a fortune as he lost by her occasion.” 2 At Brielle he was handsomely entertained by the magistrates, who had agreeable recollections of his brother Thomas, late governor

of that city. Thence he proceeded by way of Delft—which, like all English travellers, he described as „the finest built town that ever he saw”—to the Hague, and thence to Flushing, and so back by sea to Ostend. He had made the most of his three weeks’ tour, had seen many important towns both in the republic and in the obedient Netherlands, and had conversed with many „tall gentlemen,” as he expressed himself, among the English commanders, having been especially impressed by the heroes of Sluys, Baskerville and that „proper gentleman Francis Vere.” 1

He was also presented by Lord Willoughby to Maurice of Nassau, and was perhaps not very benignantly received by the young prince. At that particular moment, when Leicester’s deferred resignation, the rebellion of Sonoy in North Holland, founded on a fictitious allegiance to the late governor-general, the perverse determination of the Queen to treat for peace against the advice of all the leading statesmen of the Netherlands, and the sharp rebukes perpetually administered by her, in consequence, to the young stadholder and all his supporters, had not tended to produce the most tender feelings upon their part towards the English government, it was not surprising that the handsome soldier should look askance at the crooked little courtier, whom even the great Queen smiled at while she petted him. Cecil was very angry with Maurice.

„In my life I never saw worse behaviour,” he said, „except it were in one lately come from school. There is neither outward appearance in him of any noble mind nor inward virtue.” 2

Although Cecil had consumed nearly the whole month of March in his tour,

1 Cecil to Burghley,  $\frac{14}{24}$  March. (S. P. Office MS.)

2 Cecil to Burghley,  $\frac{27 \text{ March}}{6 \text{ April}}$ , 1588. MS. last cited.

1 Cecil to Burghley,  $\frac{27 \text{ March}}{6 \text{ April}}$ , 1588. (S. P. Office MS.)

2 Cecil to Burghley,  $\frac{19}{29}$  March, 1588. MS. last cited.



he had been more profitably employed than were the royal commissioners during the same period at Ostend.

Never did statesmen know better how not to do that which they were ostensibly occupied in doing than Alexander Farnese and his agents, Champagny, Richardot, Jacob Maas, and Garnier. The first pretext by which much time was cleverly consumed was the dispute as to the place of meeting. Doctor Dale had already expressed his desire for Ostend as the place of colloquy. „'Tis a very slow old gentleman, I this Doctor Dale,” said Alexander; „he was here in the time of Madam my mother, and has also been ambassador at Vienna. I have received him and his attendants with great courtesy, and held out great hopes of peace. We had conversations about the place of meeting. He wishes Ostend: I object. The first conference will probably be at some point between that place and Newport.”<sup>2</sup>

The next opportunity for discussion and delay was afforded by the question of powers. And it must be ever borne in mind that Alexander was daily expecting the arrival of the invading fleets and armies of Spain, and was holding himself in readiness to place himself at their head for the conquest of England. This was, of course, so strenuously denied by himself and those under his influence, that Queen Elizabeth implicitly believed him, Burghley was lost in doubt, and even the astute Walsingham began to distrust his own senses. So much strength does a falsehood acquire in determined and skilful hands.

„As to the commissions, it will be absolutely necessary for your Majesty to send them,” wrote Alexander at the moment when he was receiving the English envoy at Ghent, „for—*unless the Armada arrive soon—it will be*

indispensable for me to have them, in order to keep the negotiation alive. Of course they will never broach the principal matters without exhibition of powers. Richardot is aware of the secret which your Majesty confided to me, namely, that the negotiations are only intended to deceive the Queen and to gain time for the fleet; but the powers must be set in order that we may be able to produce them, although your secret intentions will be obeyed.”<sup>1</sup>

The Duke commented, however, on the extreme difficulty of carrying out the plan, as originally proposed. „The conquest of England would have been difficult,” he said, „even although the country had been taken by surprise. Now they are strong and armed; we are comparatively weak. The danger and the doubt are great; and the English deputies, I think, are really desirous of peace. Nevertheless I am at your Majesty's disposition—life and all—and probably, *before the answer arrives to this letter*, the fleet will have arrived, and *I shall have undertaken the passage to England.*”<sup>2</sup>

After three weeks had thus adroitly been frittered away, the English commissioners became somewhat impatient, and despatched Doctor Rogers to the Duke at Ghent. This was extremely obliging upon their part, for if Valentine Dale were a „slow old gentleman,” he was keen, caustic, and rapid, as compared to Daniel Rogers. A formalist and a pedant, a man of red tape and routine, full of precedents and declamatory commonplaces which he mistook for eloquence, honest as daylight and tedious as a king, he was just the time-consumer for Alexander's purpose. The wily Italian listened with profound attention to the wise saws in which the excellent diplomatist revelled, and his fine

1 „Viejo y pesado.” Parma to Philip II., 20 March, 1588. (Arch. de Simancas, MS.)

2 Parma to Philip II., 20 March 1588. Arch. de Simancas MS.)

1 Parma to Philip II., 20 March, 1588. MS. last cited.

2 Ibid.

eyes often filled with tears at the Doctor's rhetoric.

Three interviews—each three mortal hours long—did the two indulge in at Ghent, and never was high commissioner better satisfied with himself than was Daniel Rogers upon those occasions. He carried every point; he convinced, he softened, he captivated the great Duke; he turned the great Duke round his finger. The great Duke smiled, or wept, or fell into his arms, by turns. Alexander's military exploits had rung through the world, his genius for diplomacy and statesmanship had never been disputed; but his talents as a light comedian were, in these interviews, for the first time fully revealed.

On the 26th March the learned Doctor made his first bow and performed his first flourish of compliments at Ghent.

26 March „I assure your Majesty,”  
5 April said he, „his Highness fol-  
1588. lowed my compliments of entertainment with so much honour, as that—his Highness or I, speaking of the Queen of England—he never did less than uncover his head, not covering the same unless I was covered also.” 1 And after these salutations had at last been got through with, thus spake the Doctor of Laws to the Duke of Parma:—

„Almighty God, the light of lights, be pleased to enlighten the understanding of your Alteza, and to direct the same to his glory, to the uniting of both their Majesties and the finishing of these most bloody wars, whereby these countries, being in the highest degree of misery desolate, lie as it were prostrate before the wrathful presence of the most mighty God, most lamentably beseeching his Divine Majesty to withdraw his scourge of war from them, and to move the hearts of princes to restore them unto peace, whereby they might attain unto their ancient flower

and dignity. Into the hands of your Alteza are now the lives of many thousands, the destruction of cities, towns, and countries, which to put to the fortune of war how perilous it were, I pray consider. Think ye, ye see the mothers *left alive* tendering their offspring in your presence, *nam matribus detestata bella*,” continued the orator. „Think also of others of all sexes, ages, and conditions, on their knees before your Alteza, most humbly praying and crying most dolorously to spare their lives, and save their property from the ensanguined scourge of the insane soldiers,” and so on, and so on. 1

Now Philip II. was slow in resolving, slower in action. The ponderous three-deckers of Biscay were notoriously the dullest sailers ever known, nor were the fettered slaves who rowed the great galleys of Portugal or of Andalusia very brisk in their movements; and yet the King might have found time to marshal his ideas and his squadrons, and the Armada had leisure to circumnavigate the globe and invade England afterwards, if a succession of Daniel Rogerses could have entertained his Highness with compliments while the preparations were making.

But Alexander—at the very outset of the Doctor's eloquence—found it difficult to suppress his feelings. „I can assure your Majesty,” said Rogers, „that his eyes—he has a very large eye—were moistened. Sometimes they were thrown upward to heaven, sometimes they were fixed full upon me, sometimes they were cast downward, well declaring how his heart was affected.” 2

Honest Daniel even thought it necessary to mitigate the effect of his rhetoric, and to assure his Highness that it was, after all, only he, Doctor Rogers, and not the minister plenipotentiary of the Queen's most serene Majesty, who was exciting all this emotion.

1 Daniel Roger to the Queen,  $\frac{1}{11}$ , April, 1588. (S. P. Office MS.)

1 Daniel Rogers to the Queen, MS. last cited.  
2 Ibid.

„At this part of my speech,” said he, „I prayed his Highness not to be troubled, 1 for that the same *only proceeded from Doctor Rogers*, who, it might please him to know, was so much moved with the pitiful case of these countries, as also that which of war was sure to ensue, that I wished, if my body were full of rivers of blood, the same to be poured forth to satisfy any that were blood-thirsty, so there might an assured peace follow.” 2

His Highness, at any rate, manifesting no wish to drink of such sanguinary streams—even had the Doctor’s body contained them—Rogers became calmer. He then descended from rhetoric to jurisprudence and casuistry, and argued at intolerable length the propriety of commencing the conferences at Ostend, and of exhibiting mutually the commissions.

It it quite unnecessary to follow him as closely as did Farnese. When he had finished the first part of his oration, however, and was „addressing himself to the second point,” Alexander at last interrupted the torrent of his eloquence.

„He said that my divisions and subdivisions,” wrote the Doctor, „were perfectly in his remembrance, and that he would first answer the first point, and afterwards give audience to the second, and answer the same accordingly.”

Accordingly Alexander put on his hat, and begged the envoy also to be covered. Then, „with great gravity, as one inwardly much moved,” the Duke took up his part in the dialogue.

„Signor Ruggieri,” said he, „you have propounded unto me speeches of two sorts: the one proceeds from Doctor Ruggieri, the other from the lord ambassador of the most serene Queen of England. Touching the first, I do give you my hearty thanks for your godly speeches, assuring you that though, by

reason I have always followed the wars, I cannot be ignorant of the calamities by you alleged, yet you have so truly represented the same before mine eyes as to effectuate in me, at this instant, not only the confirmation of mine own disposition to have peace, but also an assurance that this treaty shall take good and speedy end, seeing that it hath pleased God to raise up such a good instrument as you are.” 1

„Many are the causes,” continued the Duke, „which, besides my disposition, move me to peace. My father and mother are dead, my son is a young prince, my house has truly need of my presence. I am not ignorant how ticklish a thing is the fortune of war, which—how victorious soever I have been—may in one moment not only deface the same, but also deprive me of my life. The King, my master, is now stricken in years, his children are young, his dominions in trouble. His desire is to live, and to leave his posterity, in quietness. The glory of God, the honour of both their Majesties, and the good of these countries, with the stay of the effusion of Christian blood, and divers other like reasons, *force him to peace.*” 2

Thus spoke Alexander, like an honest Christian gentleman, avowing the most equitable and pacific dispositions on the part of his master and himself. Yet at that moment he knew that the Armada was about to sail, that his own nights and days were passed in active preparations for war, and that no earthly power could move Philip by one hair’s-breadth from his purpose to conquer England that summer. 3

It would be superfluous to follow

1 Ibid.

2 Ibid.

3 We have sufficiently proved the good faith of the Queen on entering upon these negotiations. Alexander himself felt as sure of her sincerity as he did of his master’s duplicity. „I believe that she desires peace earnestly,” said he to Philip, „on account of her fear of expense.” Parma to Philip II. 31 Jan. 1588. (Arch. de Simancas. MS.)

1 „Scontentarsi,” MS. last cited.

2 Rogers to the Queen, MS. before cited.



the Duke or the Doctor through their long dialogue on the place of conference, and the commissions. Alexander considered it „infamy” on his name if he should send envoys to a place of his master’s held by the enemy. He was also of opinion that it was unheard of to exhibit commissions previous to a preliminary colloquy.

Both propositions were strenuously contested by Rogers. In regard to the second point in particular, he showed triumphantly, by citations from the „Polonians, Prussians, and Lithuanians,” that commissions ought to be previously exhibited.<sup>1</sup> But it was not probable that even the Doctor’s learning and logic would persuade Alexander to produce his commission, because, unfortunately, he had no commission to produce. A comfortable argument on the subject, however, would, none the less, consume time.

Three hours of this work brought them, exhausted and hungry, to the hour of noon and of dinner. Alexander, with profuse and smiling thanks for the envoy’s plain dealing and eloquence, assured him that there would have been peace long ago „had Doctor Rogers always been the instrument,” and regretted that he was himself not learned enough to deal creditably with him. He would, however, send Richardot to bear him company at table, and chop logic with him afterwards.

Next day, at the same hour, the Duke and Doctor had another-encounter. So soon as the envoy made his appearance, he found himself „embraced most cheerfully and familiarly by his Alteza,” who, then entering at once into business, asked as to the Doctor’s second point.<sup>2</sup>

The Doctor answered with great alacrity

„Certain expressions have been reported to her Majesty,” said he, „as

coming both from your Highness and from Richardot, hinting at a possible attempt by the King of Spain’s forces against the Queen. Her Majesty, gathering that you are going about belike to terrify her, commands me to inform you very clearly and very expressly that she does not deal so weakly in her government, nor so improvidently, but that she is provided for anything that might be attempted against her by the King, and as able to offend him as he her Majesty.”<sup>1</sup>

Alexander—with a sad countenance, as much offended, his eyes declaring miscontentment—asked who had made such a report.

„Upon the honour of a gentleman,” said he, „whoever has said this has much abused me, and evil acquitted himself. They who know me best are aware that it is not my manner to let any word pass my lips that might offend any prince.” Then, speaking most solemnly, he added, „I declare *really* and *truly* (which two words he said in Spanish), that *I know not of any intention of the King of Spain against her Majesty or her realms.*”<sup>2</sup>

At that moment the earth did not open—year of portents though it was—and the Doctor, „singularly rejoicing” at this authentic information from the highest source, proceeded cheerfully with the conversation.

„I hold myself,” he exclaimed, „the man most satisfied in the world, because I may now write to her Majesty that I have heard your Highness upon your honour use these words.”

„Upon my honour, it is true,” repeated the Duke; „for so honourably do I think of her Majesty, as that, after the King, my master, I would honour and serve her before any prince in Christendom.” He added many earnest asseverations of similar import.

<sup>1</sup> Ibid.

<sup>2</sup> „Realmente y verdaderamente.” (Rogers to the Queen, MS. last cited.)

<sup>1</sup> Rogers to the Queen, MS. already cited.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid.

„I do not deny, however,” continued Alexander, „that I have heard of certain ships having been armed by the King against that Draak”—he pronounced the „a” in Drake’s name very broadly, or *Doricè*—„who has committed so many outrages; but I repeat that I *have never heard of any design* against her Majesty or against England.”<sup>1</sup>

The Duke then manifested much anxiety to know by whom he had been so misrepresented. „There has been no one with me but Dr. Dale,” said he, „and I marvel that he should thus wantonly have injured me.”

„Dr. Dale,” replied Rogers, „is a man of honour, of good years, learned, and well experienced; but perhaps he unfortunately misapprehended some of your Alteza’s words, and thought himself bound by his allegiance strictly to report them to her Majesty.”

„I grieve that I should be misrepresented and injured,” answered Farnese, „in a manner so important to my honour. Nevertheless, knowing the virtues with which her Majesty is endued, I assure myself that the protestations I am now making will entirely satisfy her.”

He then expressed the fervent hope that the holy work of negotiation now commencing would result in a renewal of the ancient friendship between the Houses of Burgundy and of England, asserting that „there had never been so favourable a time as the present.”

Under former governments of the Netherlands there had been many mistakes and misunderstandings.

„The Duke of Alva,” said he, „has learned by this time, before the judgment-seat of God, how he discharged his functions, succeeding as he did my mother, the Duchess of Parma, who left the Provinces in so flourishing a condition. Of this, however, I will say no more, because of a feud between the Houses of Farnese and of Alva. As for

Requesens, he was a good fellow, but didn’t understand his business. Don John of Austria again, whose soul I doubt not is in heaven, was young and poor, and disappointed in all his designs; but God has never offered so great a hope of assured peace as might now be accomplished by her Majesty.”<sup>1</sup>

Finding the Duke in so fervent and favourable a state of mind, the envoy renewed his demand that at least the *first* meeting of the commissioners might be held at Ostend.

„Her Majesty finds herself so touched in honour upon this point, that if it be not conceded—as I doubt not it will be, seeing the singular forwardness of your Highness”—said the artful Doctor with a smile,<sup>2</sup> „we are no less than commanded to return to her Majesty’s presence.”

„I sent Richardot to you yesterday, said Alexander; „did he not content you?”

„Your Highness, no,” replied Rogers. „Moreover, her Majesty sent me to your Alteza, and not to Richardot. And the matter is of such importance that I pray you to add to all your graces and favours heaped upon me, this one of sending your commissioners to Ostend.”

His Highness could hold out no longer; but suddenly catching the Doctor in his arms, and hugging him „in most honourable and amiable manner,” he cried—3

„Be contented, be cheerful, my lord ambassador. You shall be satisfied upon this point also.”

„And never did envoy depart,” cried the lord ambassador, when he could get his breath, „more bound to you, and more resolute to speak honour of your Highness than I do.”

„To-morrow we will ride together towards Bruges,” said the Duke, in conclusion. „Till then farewell.”

<sup>1</sup> Ibid.

<sup>2</sup> „I spake it souriant,” &c. Ibid.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid.

<sup>1</sup> Rogers to the Queen, MS. last cited.

Upon this he again heartily embraced the envoy, and the friends parted for the day.

Next morning, 28th March, the Duke, who was on his way to Bruges and Sluys to look after his <sup>28 March</sup> gunboats, and other naval <sup>7 April</sup> and military preparations, set <sup>1588.</sup> forth on horseback, accompanied by the Marquis del Vasto, and, for part of the way, by Rogers.

They conversed on the general topics of the approaching negotiations; the Duke expressing the opinion that the treaty of peace would be made short work with, for it only needed to renew the old ones between the Houses of England and Burgundy. As for the Hollanders and Zeelanders, and their accomplices, he thought there would be no cause of stay on their account; and, in regard to the cautionary towns, he felt sure that her Majesty had never had any intention of appropriating them to herself, and would willingly surrender them to the King.

Rogers thought it a good opportunity to put in a word for the Dutchmen, who certainly would not have thanked him for his assistance at that moment.

„Not to give offence to your Highness,” he said, „if the Hollanders and Zeelanders, with their confederates, like to come into this treaty, surely your Highness would not object?”

Alexander, who had been riding along quietly during this conversation, with his right hand on his hip, now threw out his arm energetically.

„Let them come into it, let them treat, let them conclude” 1 he exclaimed, „in the name of Almighty God! I have always been well disposed to peace, and am now more so than ever. I could even, with the loss of my life, be content to have peace made at this time.”

Nothing more, worthy of commemoration, occurred during this concluding

interview, and the envoy took his leave at Bruges, and returned to Ostend. 1

I have furnished the reader with a minute account of these conversations, drawn entirely from the original records, not so much because the interviews were in themselves of vital importance, but because they afford a living and breathing example—better than a thousand homilies—of the easy victory which diplomatic or royal mendacity may always obtain over innocence and credulity.

Certainly never was envoy more thoroughly beguiled than the excellent Daniel upon this occasion. Wiser than a serpent, as he imagined himself to be, more harmless than a dove, as Alexander found him, he could not sufficiently congratulate himself upon the triumphs of his eloquence and his adroitness; and despatched most glowing accounts of his proceedings to the Queen.

His ardour was somewhat damped, however, at receiving a message from her Majesty in reply, which was anything but benignant. His eloquence was not commended; and even his preamble, with its touching allusion to the live mothers tendering their offspring—the passage which had brought the tears into the large eyes of Alexander—was coldly and cruelly censured.

„Her Majesty can in no sort like such speeches”—so ran the return-despatch—„in which she is made to beg for peace. The King of Spain standeth in as great need of peace as herself; and she doth greatly mislike the preamble of Dr. Rogers in his address to the Duke at Ghent, *finding it, in very truth, quite fond and vain*. I am commanded by a particular letter to let him understand how much her Majesty is offended with him.” 2

1 Rogers to the Queen, MS. last cited.

2 Lords of Council to Earl of Derby and Lord Cobham, <sup>11</sup>/<sub>21</sub> April, 1588. (S. P. Office MS.)

1 „Entrino, trattino, concludino.” Rogers to the Queen, MS. last cited.



Alexander, on his part, informed his royal master of these interviews, in which there had been so much effusion of sentiment, in very brief fashion.

„Dr. Rogers, one of the Queen's commissioners, has been here,” he said, „urging me with all his might to let all your Majesty's deputies go, if only for one hour, to Ostend. I refused, saying I would rather they should go to England than into a city of your Majesty held by English troops. I told him it ought to be satisfactory that I had offered the Queen, as a lady, her choice of any place in the Provinces, or on neutral ground. Rogers expressed regret for all the bloodshed and other consequences if the negotiations should fall through for so trifling a cause; the more so as in return for this little compliment to the Queen she would not only restore to your Majesty everything that she holds in the Netherlands, but would assist you to recover the part which remains obstinate. 1 To quiet him and to consume time, I have promised that President Richardot shall go and try to satisfy them. *Thus two or three weeks more will be wasted.* But at last the time will come for exhibiting the powers. They are very anxious to see mine; and when at last they find I have none, I fear that they will break off the negotiations.” 2

Could the Queen have been informed of this voluntary offer on the part of her envoy to give up the cautionary towns, and to assist in reducing the rebellion, she might have used stronger language of rebuke. It is quite possible, however, that Farnese—not so attentively following the Doctor's eloquence as he had appeared to do—had somewhat inaccurately reported the conversations, which, after all, he knew to be

of no consequence whatever, except as time-consumers. For Elizabeth, desirous of peace as she was, and trusting to Farnese's sincerity as she was disposed to do, was more sensitive than ever as to her dignity.

„We charge you all,” she wrote with her own hand to the commissioners, „that no word be overslipped by them, that may touch our honour and greatness, that be not answered with good sharp words. I am a king that will be ever known not to fear any but God.” 1

It would have been better, however, had the Queen more thoroughly understood that the day for scolding had quite gone by, and that something sharper than the sharpest words would soon be wanted to protect England and herself from impending doom. For there was something almost gigantic in the frivolities with which weeks and months of such precious time were now squandered. Plenary powers—„commission bastantissima”—from his sovereign had been announced by Alexander as in his possession; although the reader has seen that he had no such power at all. The mission of Rogers had quitted the envoys at Ostend for a time, and they waited quietly for the visit of Richardot to Ostend, into which the promised meeting of all the Spanish commissioners in that city had dwindled. Meantime there was an exchange of the most friendly amenities between the English and their mortal enemies. Hardly a day passed that La Motte, or Renty, or Aremburg, did not send Lord Derby, or Cobham, or Robert Cecil, a hare or a pheasant, or a cast of hawks, 2 and they in return sent barrel upon barrel of Ostend oysters, five or six hundred at a time. 3 The Englishmen, too, had it in their

1 „Por esta poca honra que se hara á la Reyna ella non solo restituyre á V. Magd todo lo que tiene destos estados mas ayudara á cobrar la parte que quedara obstinada.” Parma to Philip II, 16 April, 1588. (Archivio de Simancas MS.) 2 Ibid.

1 Queen to the Commissioners,  $\frac{8}{18}$  April, 1588. (S. P. Office MS.)

2 Cecil to Burghley,  $\frac{5}{15}$  April, 1588. (S. P. Office MS.) 3 Ibid.

power to gratify Alexander himself with English greyhounds, for which he had a special liking. „You would wonder,” wrote Cecil to his father, „how fond he is of English dogs.”<sup>1</sup> There was also much good preaching, among other occupations, at Ostend. „My Lord of Derby’s two chaplains,” said Cecil, „have seasoned this town better with sermons than it had been before for a year’s space.”<sup>2</sup> But all this did not expedite the negotiations, nor did the Duke manifest so much anxiety for colloquies as for greyhounds. So, in an unlucky hour for himself, another „fond and vain” old gentleman—James Croft, the comptroller, who had already figured, not much to his credit, in the secret negotiations between the Brussels and English courts—betook himself, unauthorized and alone, to the Duke at Bruges. Here he had an interview very similar in character to that in which Daniel Rogers had been indulged, declared to Farnese that the Queen was most anxious for peace, and invited him to send a secret envoy to England, who would instantly have ocular demonstration of the fact. Croft returned as triumphantly as the excellent Doctor had done, averring that there was no doubt as to the immediate conclusion of a treaty. His grounds of belief were very similar to those upon which Rogers had founded his faith. „’Tis a weak old man of seventy,” said Parma, „with very little sagacity. I am inclined to think that his colleagues are taking him in, that they may the better deceive us.”<sup>3</sup> I will see that they do nothing of the kind.” But the movement was purely one of the comptroller’s own inspiration; for Sir James had a singular facility for getting himself into trouble, and for making confusion. Already, when he had been scarcely a day in Ostend, he

had insulted the governor of the place, Sir John Conway, had given him the lie in the hearing of many of his own soldiers, had gone about telling all the world that he had express authority from her Majesty to send him home in disgrace, and that the Queen had called him a fool, and quite unfit for his post.<sup>1</sup> And as if this had not been mischief-making enough, in addition to the absurd De Loo and Bodman negotiations of the previous year, in which he had been the principal actor, he had crowned his absurdities by this secret and officious visit to Ghent. The Queen, naturally very indignant at this conduct, reprehended him severely, and ordered him back to England.<sup>2</sup> The comptroller was wretched. He expressed his readiness to obey her commands, but nevertheless implored his dread sovereign to take merciful consideration of the manifold misfortunes, ruin, and utter undoing, which thereby should fall upon him and his unfortunate family. All this he protested he would nothing esteem if it tended to her Majesty’s pleasure or service, „but seeing it should effectuate nothing but to bring the aged carcase of her poor vassal to present decay, he implored compassion upon his hoary hairs, and promised to repair the error of his former proceedings. He avowed that he would not have ventured to disobey for a moment her orders to return, but „that his aged and feeble limbs did not retain sufficient force, without present death, to comply with her commandment.”<sup>3</sup> And with that he took to his bed, and remained there until the Queen was graciously pleased to grant him her pardon.

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1 Queen to Derby and Cobham, <sup>17</sup>/<sub>27</sub> April,

1588. (S. P. Office MS.)

2 Queen to the Commissioners for the reprehension of Sir James Croft, in Lord Burghley’s handwriting, <sup>8</sup>/<sub>18</sub> May, 1588. MS.

last cited.

3 Croft to the Queen, 28 May, 1588. Ibid.

1 Ibid.      2 Ibid.

3 „Como muestra poca sagacidad dexa de dar recelo de que le engañan á el para mas engañar,” &c. Parma to Philip II., 13 May, 1588. (Arch. de Simancas MS.)

At last, early in May, instead of the visit of Richardot, there was a preliminary meeting of all the commissioners in tents on the sands, within a cannon-shot of Ostend, and between that place and Newport. It was a showy and ceremonious interview, in which no business was transacted. The commissioners of Philip were attended by a body of one hundred and fifty light horse, and by three hundred private gentlemen in magnificent costume. La Motte also came from Newport with one thousand Walloon cavalry, while the English commissioners on their part were escorted from Ostend by an imposing array of English and Dutch troops. 1 As the territory was Spanish, the dignity of the King was supposed to be preserved; and Alexander, who had promised Dr. Rogers that the first interview should take place within Ostend itself, thought it necessary to apologize to his sovereign for so nearly keeping his word as to send the envoys within cannon-shot of the town. „The English commissioners,” said he, „begged with so much submission for this concession, that I thought it as well to grant it.” 2

The Spanish envoys were despatched by the Duke of Parma, well provided with full powers for himself, which were not desired by the English government, but unfurnished with a commission from Philip, which had been pronounced indispensable. 3 There was therefore much prancing of cavalry, flourishing of trumpets, and eating of oysters, at the first conference, but not one stroke of business. As the English envoys had now been three whole months in Ostend, and as this was the first occasion on which they had been brought face to face with the Spanish commissioners, it must be confessed that the tactics of

Farnese had been masterly. Had the haste in the dock-yards of Lisbon and Cadiz been at all equal to the magnificent procrastination in the council-chambers of Bruges and Ghent, Medina Sidonia might already have been in the Thames.

But although little ostensible business was performed, there was one man who had always an eye to his work. The same servant in plain livery, who had accompanied Secretary Garnier on his first visit to the English commissioners at Ostend, had now come thither again, accompanied by a fellow-lackey. While the complimentary dinner, offered in the name of the absent Farnese to the Queen's representatives, was going forward, the two menials strayed off together to the downs for the purpose of rabbit-shooting. 1 The one of them was the same engineer who had already, on the former occasion, taken a complete survey of the fortifications of Ostend; the other was no less a personage than the Duke of Parma himself. The pair now made a thorough examination of the town and its neighbourhood, and, having finished their reconnoitring, made the best of their way back to Bruges. 2 As it was then one of Alexander's favourite objects to reduce the city of Ostend at the earliest possible moment, it must be allowed that this preliminary conference was not so barren to himself as it was to the commissioners. Philip, when informed of this manœuvre, was naturally gratified at such masterly duplicity, while he gently rebuked his nephew for exposing his valuable life; and certainly it would have been an inglorious termination to the Duke's splendid career had he been hanged as a spy within the trenches of Ostend. With the other details of this first diplomatic colloquy Philip was delighted. „I see you understand me

1 Parma to Philip II. 13 May, 1588. (Arch. de Simancas, MS.)

2 „Suplicado con grande submicion que se diese esta satisfaccion á la Reyna,” &c. Parma to Philip II. (MS. last cited.)

3 Ibid.

1 Ibid.

2 Parma to Philip II., 13 May, 1588. (Arch. de Simancas, MS.)



thoroughly," he said. „Keep the negotiation alive till my Armade appears, and then carry out my determination, and replant the Catholic religion on the soil of England." 1

The Queen was not in such high spirits. She was losing her temper very fast, as she became more and more convinced that she had been trifled with. No powers had been yet exhibited, no permanent place of conference fixed upon, and the cessation of arms demanded by her commissioners for England, Spain, and all the Netherlands, was absolutely refused. 2 She desired her commissioners to inform the Duke of Parma that it greatly touched his honour—as both before their coming and afterwards he had assured her that he had *comision bastantissima* from his sovereign—to clear himself at once from the imputation of insincerity. „Let not the Duke think," she wrote with her own hand, „that we would so long time endure these many frivolous and unkindly dealings, but that we desire all the world to know our desire of a kingly peace, and that we will endure no more the like, nor any, but will return you from your charge." 3

Accordingly—by her Majesty's special command—Dr. Dale made another visit to Bruges, to discover, once for all, whether there was a commission from Philip or not, and, if so, to see it with his own eyes. On the 7th May he had an interview with the Duke. After thanking his Highness for the

honourable and stately manner in which the conferences 1588. had been inaugurated near Ostend. Dale laid very plainly before him her Majesty's complaints of the ergiversations and equivocations con-

cerning the 'commission, which had now lasted three months long. 1

In answer, Alexander made a complimentary harangue, confining himself entirely to the first part of the envoy's address, and assuring him in redundant phraseology, that he should hold himself very guilty before the world, if he had not surrounded the first colloquy between the plenipotentiaries of two such mighty princes, with as much pomp as the circumstances of time and place would allow. After this superfluous rhetoric had been poured forth, he calmly dismissed the topic which Dr. Dale had come all the way from Ostend to discuss, by carelessly observing that President Richardot would confer with him on the subject of the commission. 2

„But," said the envoy, „'tis no matter of conference or dispute. I desire simply to see the commission."

„Richardot and Champagny shall deal with you in the afternoon," repeated Alexander; and, with this reply, the Doctor was fain to be contented.

Dale then alluded to the point of cessation of arms.

„Although," said he, „the Queen might justly require that the cessation should be general for all the King's dominion, yet in order not to stand on precise points, she is content that it should extend no further than to the towns of Flushing, Brill, Ostend, and Bergen-op-Zoom."

„To this he said nothing," wrote the envoy, and so I went no further."

In the afternoon Dale had conference with Champagny and Richardot. As usual, Champagny was bound hand and foot by the gout, but was as quick-witted and disputatious as ever. Again Dale made an earnest harangue, proving satisfactorily—as if any proof were necessary on such a point—that a commission from Philip ought to be pro-

1 Philip II. to Parma, 21 June, 1588. (Arch. le Simancoas, MS.)

2 Parma to Philip II. 13 May, 1588. (Arch. le Simancoas, MS.)

3 Queen to the Commissioners, 30 April 1588. (S. P. Office MS.)

1 Dale to the Queen, 9 May, 1588. (S. P. Office MS.)

2 Ibid.

duced, and that a commission had been promised, over and over again. 1

After a pause, both the representatives of Parma began to wrangle with the envoy in very insolent fashion. „Richardot is always their mouthpiece,” said Dale; „only Champagne choppeth in at every word, and would do so likewise in ours if we would suffer it.” 2

„We shall never have done with these impertinent demands,” said the President. „You ought to be satisfied with the Duke’s promise of ratification contained in his commission. We confess what you say concerning the former requisitions and promises to be true, but when will you have done? Have we not showed it to Mr. Croft, one of your own colleagues? And if we show it you now, another may come to-morrow, and so we shall never have an end.”

„The delays come from yourselves,” roundly replied the Englishman, „for you refuse to do what in reason and law you are bound to do. And the more demands the more *mora aut potius culpa* in you. You, of all men, have least cause to hold such language, who so confidently and even disdainfully answered our demand for the commission, in Mr. Cecil’s presence, and promised to show a perfect one at the very first meeting. As for Mr. Comptroller Croft, he came hither without the command of her Majesty and without the knowledge of his colleagues.”

Richardot then began to insinuate that, as Croft had come without authority, so—for aught they could tell—might Dale also. But Champagne here interrupted, protested that the president was going too far, and begged him to show the commission without further argument. 3

Upon this Richardot pulled out the

1 Dale to the Queen, MS. last cited.

2 Commissioners to Privy Council, 7 June, 1588. (S. P. Office MS.)

3 Dale to the Queen, <sup>9</sup>/<sub>19</sub> May, 1588. (S. P. Office MS.)

commission from under his gown, and placed it in Dr. Dale’s hands! 1

It was dated 17th April, 1588, signed and sealed by the King, and written in French, and was to the effect, that as there had been differences between her Majesty and himself, as her Majesty had sent ambassadors into the Netherlands, as the Duke of Parma had entered into treaty with her Majesty, therefore the King authorised the Duke to appoint commissioners to treat, conclude, and determine all controversies and misunderstandings, confirmed any such appointment already made, and promised to ratify all that might be done by them in the premises. 2

Dr. Dale expressed his satisfaction with the tenor of this document, and begged to be furnished with a copy of it, but this was peremptorily refused. 3 There was then a long conversation—ending, as usual, in nothing—on the two other points, the place for the conferences, namely, and the cessation of arms.

Next morning Dale, in taking leave of the Duke of Parma, expressed the gratification which he felt, and which her Majesty was sure to feel at the production of the commission. It was now proved, said the envoy, that the King was as earnestly in favour of peace as the Duke was himself.

Dale then returned, well satisfied to Ostend.

In truth the commission had arrived just in time. „Had I not received it soon enough to produce it then,” said Alexander, „the Queen would have broken off the negotiations. So I ordered Richardot, who is quite aware of your Majesty’s secret intentions, from which we shall not swerve one jot, to show it privately to Croft, and afterwards to Dr. Dale, but without allowing a copy of it to be taken.” 4

1 Ibid.

2 Ibid.

3 Ibid.

4 Parma to Philip II. 8 June, 1588. (Arch de Sim. MS.)

„You have done very well,” replied Philip, „but that commission is, on no account, to be used, except for show. You know my mind thoroughly.”<sup>1</sup>

Thus three months had been consumed, and at last one indispensable preliminary to any negotiation had, in appearance, been performed. Full powers on both sides had been exhibited. When the Queen of England gave the Earl of Derby and his colleagues commission to treat with the King's envoys, and pledged herself beforehand to ratify all their proceedings, she meant to perform the promise to which she had affixed her royal name and seal. She could not know that the Spanish monarch was deliberately putting *his* name to a lie, and chuckling in secret over the credulity of his English sister, who was willing to take his word and his bond. Of a certainty the English were no match for southern diplomacy.

<sup>1</sup> Philip to Parma, 21 June, 1588. (Arch. de Sim. MS.)

The King, when he at last sent the power on the 13th May, 1588, had observed to Parnese—„I don't think that there will be any trouble on account of your having no commission from me. Nevertheless, in order to dispel their doubts and to remove all suspicion, I have ordered for the nonce one to be sent in French. This, as I have already stated, is not to be used for the purpose of concluding or agreeing to anything, in any case whatever, but only for the sake of keeping the negotiation alive, in order to enable us the better to execute our armed enterprise; and so I again charge it upon you, with a renewed prohibition of anything to a contrary sense, referring you always to my letter of 24th April, and to my orders so often given, which you are to fulfil exactly without departing one jot therefrom. Para sacarlos de duda, y quitarlos toda sospecha, he mandado un poder por la via de las francesas, del qual, como entonces, os lo adverti y declare, no se ha de usar para consentir ni concluir por ningun caso, cosa alguna, sino solo que acude la platica para poder executar mejor lo de las armas y empresa, y asi os lo torno a encargar con nueva prohibicion de lo contrario, remittien-dome a la carta que en esta materia se os escribio por esta via a lo 24 April, que es a orden que aveys de cumplir puntualmente sin apartaros della,” &c. Philip II. to Parma, 3 May, 1588. (Archivo de Simancas, MS.)

But Elizabeth was now more impatient than ever that the other two preliminaries should be settled—the place of conferences, and the armistice.

„Be plain with the Duke,” she wrote to her envoys, „that we have tolerated so many weeks in tarrying a commission, that I will never endure more delays. Let him know he deals with a prince who prizes her honour more than her life. Make yourselves such as stand off your reputations.”<sup>1</sup>

Sharp words, but not sharp enough to prevent a further delay of a month; for it was not till the 6th June that the commissioners at last came 6 June, together at Bourbourg, 2 1588. that „miserable little hole,” on the coast between Ostend and Newport, against which Garnier had warned them. And now there was ample opportunity to wrangle at full length on the next preliminary, the cessation of arms. It would be superfluous to follow the altercation step by step—for negotiations there were none—and it is only for the sake of exhibiting at full length the infamy of diplomacy, when diplomacy is unaccompanied by honesty, that we are hanging up this series of pictures at all. Those bloodless encounters between credulity and vanity upon one side, and gigantic fraud on the other, near those very sands of Newport, and in sight of the Northern Ocean, where, before long, the most terrible battles, both by land and sea, which the age had yet witnessed, were to occur, are quite as full of instruction and moral as the most sanguinary combats ever waged.

At last the commissioners exchanged

<sup>1</sup> Queen's Minute to the Commissioners, 13 May, 1588. (S. P. Office MS.)

<sup>2</sup> Parma to Philip, 8 June, 1588. (Arch. de Simancas, MS.) Dale to Walsingham, 29 May, 1588. (S. P. Office MS.) Commissioners to the Queen. (Ibid.)



copies of their respective powers. After four months of waiting and wrangling, 27 May so much had been achieved 6 June' —a show of commissions and 1588. a selection of the place for conference. And now began the long debate about the cessation of arms. The English claimed an armistice for the whole dominion of Philip and Elizabeth respectively, during the term of negotiation, and for twenty days after. The Spanish would grant only a temporary truce, terminable at six days' notice, and that only for the four cautionary towns of Holland held by the Queen. Thus Philip would be free to invade England at his leisure out of the obedient Netherlands or Spain. This was inadmissible, of course, but a week was spent at the outset in reducing the terms to writing; and when the Duke's propositions were at last produced in the French tongue, they were refused by the Queen's commissioners, who required that the documents should be in Latin. Great was the triumph of Dr. Dale, when, after another interval, he found their Latin full of barbarisms and blunders, at which a schoolboy would have blushed. 1 The King's commissioners, however, while halting in their syntax, had kept steadily to their point.

„You promised a general cessation of arms at our coming,” said Dale, at a conference on the  $\frac{2}{12}$  June, „and now ye have lingered five times twenty days, and nothing done at all. The world may see the delays come of you and not of us, and that ye are not so desirous of peace as ye pretend.” 2

„But as for your invasion of England,” stoutly observed the Earl of Derby, „ye shall find it hot coming thither. England was never so ready in any former

age, neither by sea nor by land; but we would show your unreasonableness in proposing a cessation of arms by which ye would bind her Majesty to forbear touching all the Low Countries, and yet leave yourselves at liberty to invade England.” 1

While they were thus disputing Secretary Garnier rushed into the room, looking very much frightened, and announced that Lord Henry Seymour's fleet of thirty-two ships of war was riding off Gravelines, and that he had sent two men on shore who were now waiting in the antechamber.

The men being accordingly admitted handed letters to the English commissioners from Lord Henry, in which he begged to be informed in what terms they were standing, and whether they needed his assistance or countenance in the cause in which they were engaged. The envoys found his presence very „comfortable,” as it showed the Spanish commissioners that her Majesty was so well provided as to make a cessation of arms less necessary to her than it was to the King. They therefore sent their thanks to the Lord Admiral, begging him to cruise for a time off Dunkirk and its neighbourhood, that both their enemies and their friends might have a sight of the English ships. 2

Great was the panic all along the coast at this unexpected demonstration. The King's commissioners got into their coaches, and drove down to the coast to look at the fleet, and—so soon as they appeared—were received with such a thundering cannonade an hour long, by way of salute, as to convince them, in the opinion of the English envoys, that the Queen had no cause to be afraid of any enemies afloat or ashore. 3

But these noisy arguments were not much more effective than the interchange

1 Dale to Walsingham, 21 June, 1588. (S. P. Office MS.)

2 Commissioners to Privy Council, 3 June, 1588. (S. P. Office MS.)

1 Ibid.

2 Ibid.

3 Commissioners to Privy Council, 7 June, 1588. (S. P. Office MS.)

of diplomatic broadsides which they had for a moment superseded. The day had gone by for blank cartridges and empty protocols. Nevertheless Lord Henry's harmless thunder was answered, the next day, by a „Quintuplication” in worse Latin than ever, presented to Dr. Dale and his colleagues by Richardot and Champagny, on the subject of the armistice. And then there was a return quintuplication, in choice Latin, by the classic Dale, and then there was a colloque on the quintuplication, and everything that had been charged, and truly charged, by the English, was now denied by the King's commissioners; and Champagny—more gouty and more irascible than ever—„chopped in” at every word spoken by King's envoys or Queen's, contradicted everybody, repudiated everything said or done by Andrew de Loo, or any of the other secret negotiators during the past year, declared that there never had been a general cessation of arms promised, and that, at any rate, times were now changed, and such an armistice was inadmissible.<sup>1</sup> Then the English answered with equal impatience, and reproached the King's representatives with duplicity and want of faith, and censured them for their unseemly language, and begged to inform Champagny and Richardot that they had not then to deal with such persons as they might formerly have been in the habit of treating withal, but with a „great prince who did justify the honour of her actions,” and they confuted the positions now assumed by their opponents with official documents and former statements from those very opponents' lips. And then, after all this diplomatic and rhetorical splutter, the high commissioners recovered their temper and grew more polite, and the King's „envoys excused themselves in a mild, merry manner,” for the rudeness of

their speeches, and the Queen's envoys accepted their apologies with majestic urbanity, and so they separated for the day in a more friendly manner than they had done the day before.<sup>1</sup>

„You see to what a scholar's shift we have been driven for want of resolution,” said Valentine Dale. „If we should linger, here until there should be broken heads, in what case we should be God knoweth. For I can trust Champagny and Richardot no farther than I can see them.”<sup>2</sup>

And so the whole month of June passed by; the English commissioners „leaving no stone unturned to get a quiet cessation of arms in general terms,”<sup>3</sup> and being constantly foiled, yet perpetually kept in hope that the point would soon be carried.<sup>4</sup> At the same time the signs of the approaching invasion seemed to thicken. „In my opinion,” said Dale, „as Phormio spake in matters of wars, it were very requisite that my Lord Harry should be always on this coast, for they will steal out from hence as they can, either to join with the Spanish navy or to land, and they may be very easily scattered, by God's grace.” And, with the honest pride of a protocol-maker, he added, „our postulates do trouble the King's commissioners very much, and do bring them to despair.”<sup>5</sup>

The excellent Doctor had not even yet discovered that the King's commissioners were delighted with his postu-

<sup>1</sup> Commissioners to Privy Council, <sup>21</sup>/<sub>31</sub>

June, 1588. (S. P. Office MS.)

<sup>2</sup> Dale to Walsingham, <sup>4</sup>/<sub>14</sub> June, 1588. (S

P. Office MS.)

„And if her Majesty list to break, she may now do it upon their present denial of the cessation of arms, which Richardot did in open council promise to Norris and Andrea de Loo should be accorded at the coming of her Majesty's commissioners, and which is now denied as ever spoken, or to be performed if promised.” (Ibid.)

<sup>3</sup> Dale to Burghley, <sup>17</sup>/<sub>27</sub> June, 1588. (S P.

Office MS.) <sup>4</sup> Ibid. <sup>5</sup> Ibid.

<sup>1</sup> Commissioners to Privy Council. (MS. not cited.)

lates; and that to have kept them postulating thus five months in succession, while naval and military preparations were slowly bringing forth a great event—which was soon to strike them with as much amazement as if the moon had fallen out of heaven—was one of the most decisive triumphs ever achieved by Spanish diplomacy. But the Doctor thought that his logic had driven the King of Spain to despair.

At the same time he was not insensible to the merits of another and more peremptory style of rhetoric. „I pray you,” said he to Walsingham, „let us hear some arguments from my Lord Harry out of her Majesty’s navy now and then. I think they will do more good than any bolt that we can shoot here. If they be met with at their going out, there is no possibility for them to make any resistance, having so few men that can abide the sea; for the rest, as you know, must be sea-sick at first.” 1

But the envoys were completely puzzled. Even at the beginning of July, Sir James Croft was quite convinced of the innocence of the King and the Duke, 2 but Croft was in his dotage.

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1 Dale to Burghley, <sup>17</sup>/<sub>27</sub> June, 1588. (S. P. Office MS.)

2 „I may be esteemed more credulous than cause requireth, yet I assure your Lordship I never embraced any opinion thereof other than such as by some conjectural argument was made very probable unto me, like as I thought good at this time to inform your Lordship, that yesterday by chance I had conference with one of the commissioners on the other side, and was by him in sort assured that the matter of this treaty will fall out—so far as in that side lieth—to as good purpose as her Majesty will require it; he not doubting that the two years for the toleration of religion, and the point of her Majesty’s security, and all other things necessary in this treaty, will be easily assented unto, to which purpose he wished me to deal with Dr. Dale to be willing to urge that which he underhand would advise us unto, requiring for their better justification to be pressed to that which themselves much desire” (!) &c. Croft to Burghley, <sup>29</sup>/<sub>2</sub> June, 1588. (S. P. Office MS.)

As for Dale, he occasionally opened his eyes and his ears, but more commonly kept them well closed to the significance of passing events, and consoled himself with his protocols and his classics, and the purity of his own Latin.

„’Tis a very wise saying of Terence,” said he, „*omnibus nobis, ut res dant sese, ita magni aut humiles sumus*. When the King’s commissioners hear of the King’s navy from Spain, they are in such jollity that they talk loud.... In the mean time—as the wife of Bath saith in Chaucer by her husband, we owe them not a word. If we should die to-morrow, I hope her Majesty will find by our writings that the honour of the cause, in the opinion of the world, must be with her Majesty, and that her commissioners are neither of such imperfection in their reasons or so barbarous in language, as they who fail not, almost in every line, of some barbarism tot to be borne in a grammar-school, although in subtleness and impudent affirming of untruths and denying of truths, her commissioners are not in any respect to match with Champagny and Richardot, who are doctors in that faculty.” 1

It might perhaps prove a matter of indifference to Elizabeth and to England, when the Queen should be a state-prisoner in Spain, and the Inquisition quietly established in her kingdom, whether the world should admit or not, in case of his decease, the superiority of Dr. Dale’s logic and Latin to those of his antagonists. And even if mankind conceded the best of the argument to the English diplomatists, that diplomacy might seem worthless which could be blind to the colossal falsehoods growing daily before its eyes. Had the commissioners been able to read the secret correspondence between Parma and his

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1 Dale to Burghley, <sup>21</sup>/<sub>31</sub> June, 1588. (S. P. Office MS.)



master—as we have had the opportunity of doing—they would certainly not have left their homes in February, to be made fools of until July, but would, on their knees, have implored their royal mistress to awake from her fatal delusion before it should be too late. Even without that advantage, it seems incredible that they should have been unable to pierce through the atmosphere of duplicity which surrounded them, and to obtain one clear glimpse of the destruction so steadily advancing upon England.

For the famous bull of Sixtus V. had now been fulminated. Elizabeth had been again denounced as a bastard and usurper, and her kingdom had been solemnly conferred upon Philip, with title of defender of the Christian faith, to have and to hold as tributary and feudatory of Rome. The so-called Queen had usurped the crown contrary to the ancient treaties between the apostolic stool and the kingdom of England, which country, on its reconciliation with the head of the church after the death of St. Thomas of Canterbury, had recognised the necessity of the Pope's consent in the succession to its throne; she had deserved chastisement for the terrible tortures inflicted by her upon English Catholics and God's own saints; and it was declared an act of virtue, to be repaid with plenary indulgence and forgiveness of all sins, to lay violent hands on the usurper, and deliver her into the hands of the Catholic party. And of the holy league against the usurper, Philip was appointed the head, and Alexander of Parma chief commander. This document was published in large numbers in Antwerp in the English tongue. 1.

The pamphlet of Dr. Allen, just named Cardinal, was also translated in the same city, under the direction of the Duke of Parma, in order to be distributed throughout England on the arrival in that kingdom of the Catholic

troops. 1 The well-known 'Admonition to the Nobility and People of England and Ireland' accused the Queen of every crime and vice which can pollute humanity, and was filled with foul details unfit for the public eye in these more decent days. 2

So soon as the intelligence of these publications reached England, the Queen ordered her commissioners at Bourbourg to take instant cognizance of them, and to obtain a categorical explanation on the subject from Alexander himself; as if an explanation were possible, as if the designs of Sixtus, Philip, and Alexander could any longer be doubted, and as if the Duke were more likely now than before to make a succinct statement of them for the benefit of her Majesty.

„Having discovered,” wrote Elizabeth on the 9th July (N.S.), „that this treaty of peace is entertained only to abuse us, and being many ways given to understand that the preparations which have so long been making and which now are consummated, both in Spain and the Low Countries, are purposely to be employed against us and our country; finding that, for the furtherance of these exploits, there is ready to be published a vile, slanderous, and blasphemous book, containing as many lies as lines, entitled 'An Admonition,' &c., and contrived by a lewd-born subject of ours, now become an arrant traitor, named Dr. Allen, lately made a cardinal at Rome, as also a bull of the Pope, whereof we send you a copy, both very lately brought into those Low Countries, the one whereof is already printed at Antwerp in a great multitude, in the English tongue, and the other ordered to be printed, only to stir up our subjects, contrary of the laws of God and their allegiance, to join with such foreign purposes as are prepared against us and our realm, to come out

1 Parma to Philip II. 21 June, 1588. (Arch. de Sim. MS.)

2 Lingard, vii. 442 seq.

1 Meteren, xv. 270 seq.

of those Low Countries and out of Spain; and as it appears by the said bull that the Duke of Parma is expressly named and chosen by the Pope and the King of Spain to be principal executioner of these intended enterprises, we cannot think it honourable for us to continue longer the treaty of peace with them that, under colour of treaty, arm themselves with all the power they can to a bloody war." 1

Accordingly the Queen commanded Dr. Dale, as one of the commissioners, to proceed forthwith to the Duke, in order to obtain explanations as to his contemplated conquest of her realm, and as to his share in the publication of the bull and pamphlet, and to „require him, as he would be accounted a prince of honour, to let her plainly understand what she might think thereof." The envoy was to assure him that the Queen would trust implicitly to his statement, to adjure him to declare the truth, and, in case he avowed the publications and the belligerent intentions suspected, to demand instant safe-conduct to England for her commissioners, who would, of course, instantly leave the Netherlands. On the other hand, if the Duke disavowed those infamous documents, he was to be requested to punish the printers, and have the books burned by the hangman. 2

Dr. Dale, although suffering from cholic, was obliged to set forth at once upon what he felt would be a bootless journey. At his return—which was upon the 22nd of July (N.S.)—the shrewd old gentleman had nearly arrived at the opinion that her Majesty might as well break off the negotiations. He had a „comfortless voyage and a ticklish message;" 3 found all along the road signs

of an approaching enterprise, difficult to be mistaken; reported 10,000 veteran Spaniards, to which force Stanley's regiment was united; 6000 Italians, 3000 Germans, all with pikes, corselets, and slash swords complete; besides 10,000 Walloons. The transports for the cavalry at Gravelingen he did not see, nor was he much impressed with what he heard as to the magnitude of the naval preparations at Newport. He was informed that the Duke was about making a foot-pilgrimage from Brussels to Our Lady of Halle, to implore victory for his banners, and had daily evidence of the soldiers' expectation to invade and to „devour England." 1 All this had not tended to cure him of the low spirits with which he began the journey. Nevertheless, although he was unable—as will be seen—to report an entirely satisfactory answer from Farnese to the Queen upon the momentous questions entrusted to him, he, at least, thought of a choice passage in *The Æneid*, so very apt to the circumstances, as almost to console him for the pangs of his cholic" and the terrors of the approaching invasion.

„I have written two or three verses out of Virgil for the Queen to read," said he, which I pray your Lordship to present under her. *God grant her to weigh them.* If your Lordship do read the whole discourse of Virgil in that place, *it will make your heart melt.* Observe the report of the ambassadors that were sent to Diomedes to make war against the Trojans, for the old hatred that he, being a Grecian, did bear unto them; and note the answer of Diomedes dissuading them from entering into war with the Trojans, the perplexity of the king, the miseries of the country, the reasons of Drances that spake against them which would have war, the violent persuasions of Turnus to war; and note, I pray you, one

1 Queen to Commissioners, <sup>29 June</sup>/<sub>9 July</sub>, 1588.

S. P. Office MS.)

2 Ibid.

3 Dale to Burghley, <sup>12</sup>/<sub>22</sub> July, 1588. (S. P. Office MS.)

1 Dale to Walsingham, date last cited. (S. P. Office MS.)

word, *„nec te ullius violentia frangat.* 1 What a lecture could I make with Mr. Cecil upon that passage in Virgil!" 2

The most important point for the reader to remark is the date of this letter. It was received in the very *last days of the month of July*. Let him observe—as he will soon have occasion to do—the events which were occurring on land and sea exactly at the moment when this classic despatch reached its destination, and judge whether the hearts of the Queen and Lord Burghley would be then quite at leisure to melt at the sorrows of the Trojan war. Perhaps the doings of Drake and Howard, Medina Sidonia, and Ricalde, would be pressing as much on their attention as the eloquence of Diomede or the wrath of Turnus. Yet it may be doubted whether the reports of these Grecian envoys might not, in truth, be almost as much to the purpose as the despatches of the diplomatic pedant, with his Virgil and his cholic, into whose hands grave matters of peace and war were entrusted in what seemed the day of England's doom.

What a lecture I could make with Mr. Cecil on the subject!" An English ambassador, at the court of Philip II.'s viceroy, could indulge himself in imaginary prelections on the *Æneid*, in the last days of July of the year of our Lord 1588!

The Doctor, however—to do him justice—had put the questions categorically to his Highness, as he had been instructed to do. He went to <sup>8</sup> Bruges so mysteriously, that <sup>18</sup> July, no living man that side the <sup>1588.</sup> sea, save Lord Derby and Lord Cobham,

knew the cause of his journey. 1 Poor puzzling James Croft, in particular, was moved almost to tears, by being kept out of the secret. 2 On the <sup>8</sup> <sub>18</sub> July, Dale had audience of the Duke at Bruges. After a few commonplaces, he was invited by the Duke to state what special purpose had brought him to Bruges.

„There is a book printed at Antwerp," said Dale, „and set forth by a fugitive from England, who calleth himself a cardinal." 3

Upon this the Duke began diligently to listen.

„This book," resumed Dale, „is an Admonition to the nobility and people of England and Ireland touching the execution of the sentence of the Pope against the Queen, which the King Catholic hath entrusted to your Highness as chief of the enterprise. There is also a bull of the Pope declaring my sovereign mistress illegitimate and an usurper, with other matters too odious for any prince or gentleman to name or hear. In this bull the Pope saith that he hath dealt with the Most Catholic King to employ all the means in his power to the deprivation and deposition of my sovereign, and doth charge her subjects to assist the army appointed by the King Catholic for that purpose, under the conduct of your Highness. Therefore Her Majesty would be satisfied from your Highness in that point, and will take satisfaction of none other; not doubting but that as you are a prince of word and credit, you will deal plainly with her Majesty. Whatsoever it may be, her Majesty will not take it amiss against your Highness, so she may only be informed by you of the truth. Wherefore I do require you to satisfy the Queen." 4

„I am glad," replied the Duke, „that her Majesty and her commission-

1 The reader who will take the trouble to refer to the *Æneid*, lib. xi., may amuse himself by observing that the aptness of the analogy was by no means so wonderful as it seemed to Dr. Dale, *„nec te ullius violentia vincat (frangat),"* &c. 354.

2 Dale to Burghley, <sup>12</sup> July, 1583. (S. P. Office MS.)

1 Dale to Burghley, MS. last cited.

2 Ibid.

3 Ibid.

4 Ibid.



ers do take in good part my goodwill towards them. I am especially touched by the good opinion her Majesty hath of my sincerity, which I should be glad always to maintain. As to the book to which you refer, I have never read it nor seen it, nor do I take heed of it. It may well be that her Majesty, whom it concerneth, should take notice of it; but for my part I have nought to do with it, nor can I prevent men from writing or printing at their pleasure. I am at the commandment of my master only." 1

As Alexander made no reference to the Pope's bull, Dr. Dale observed, that if a war had been, of purpose, undertaken at the instance of the Pope, all this negotiation had been in vain, and her Majesty would be obliged to withdraw her commissioners, not doubting that they would receive safe-conduct, as occasion should require.

"Yea, God forbid else," replied Alexander; "and further, *I know nothing* of any bull of the Pope, nor do I care for any, nor do I undertake anything for him. But as for any misunderstanding (*mal entendu*) between my master and her Majesty, I must, as a soldier, act at the command of my sovereign. For my part, I have always had such respect for her Majesty, being so noble a Queen, as that I would never hearken to anything that might be reproachful to her. After my master, I would do most to serve your Queen, and I hope she will take my word for her satisfaction on that point. And for avoiding of bloodshed and the burning of houses and such other calamities as do follow the wars, I have been a petitioner to my sovereign that all things might be ended quietly by a peace. That is a thing, however," added the Duke, "which you have more cause to desire than we, for if the King, my master, should lose a battle, he would be able to recover it well enough, without harm

to himself, being far enough off in Spain, while, if the battle be lost on your side, you may lose kingdom and all." 1

"By God's sufferance," rejoined the Doctor, "her Majesty is not without means to defend her crown, that hath descended to her from so long a succession of ancestors. Moreover your Highness knows very well that one battle cannot conquer a kingdom in another country."

"Well," said the Duke, "that is in God's hand."

"So it is," said the Doctor.

"But make an end of it," continued Alexander quietly; "and if you have anything to put into writing, you will do me a pleasure by sending it to me." 2

Dr. Valentine Dale was not the man to resist the temptation to make a protocol, and promised one for the next day.

"I am charged only to give your Highness satisfaction," he said, "as to her Majesty's sincere intentions, which have already been published to the world in English, French, and Italian, in the hope that you may also satisfy the Queen upon this other point. I am but one of her commissioners, and could not deal without my colleagues. I crave leave to depart to-morrow morning, and with safe-convoy, as I had in coming."

After the envoy had taken leave, the Duke summoned Andrea de Loo, and related to him the conversation which had taken place. He then, in the presence of that personage, again declared, upon his honour and with very constant affirmations, that he had never *seen nor heard of the book*—the 'Admonition' by Cardinal Allen—and that he knew nothing of any bull, and had no regard to it. 3

The plausible Andrew accompanied the Doctor to his lodgings, protesting all the way of his own and his master's sincerity, and of their unequivocal intentions to conclude a peace. The next day

1 Dale to Burghley, MS. last cited.

1 Ibid.

2 Ibid.

3 Ibid.

the Doctor, by agreement, brought a most able protocol of demands in the name of all commissioners of her Majesty; 1 which able protocol the Duke did not at that moment read, which he assuredly never read subsequently, and which no human soul ever read afterwards. Let the dust lie upon it, and upon all the vast heap of protocols raised mountains high during the spring and summer of 1588.

„Dr. Dale has been with me two or three times,” said Parma, in giving his account of these interviews to Philip. „I don't know why he came, but I think he wished to make it appear, by coming to Bruges, that the rupture, when it occurs, was caused by us, not by the English. He has been complaining of Cardinal Allen's book, and I told him that I didn't understand a word of English, and knew nothing whatever of the matter.” 2

It has been already seen that the Duke had declared, on his word of honour, that he had never heard of the famous pamphlet. Yet at that very moment letters were lying in his cabinet, received more than a fortnight before from Philip, in which that monarch *thanked Alexander for having had the Cardinal's book translated at Antwerp!* 3 Certainly few English diplomatists could be a match for a Highness so liberal of his word of honour.

But even Dr. Dale had at last convinced himself—even although the Duke knew nothing of bull or pamphlet—that mischief was brewing against England. The sagacious man, having seen large bodies of Spaniards and Walloons making such demonstrations of eagerness to be led against his country, and „professing it as openly as if they were going to a fair or market,” while even Alexander himself could „no more hide it than

did Henry VIII. when he went to Boulogne,” 1 could not help suspecting something amiss.

His colleague, however, Comptroller Croft, was more judicious, for he valued himself on taking a sound, temperate, and conciliatory view of affairs. He was not the man to offend a magnanimous neighbour—who meant nothing unfriendly—by regarding his manœuvres with superfluous suspicion. So this envoy wrote to Lord Burghley on the 2nd August (N.S.)—let the reader mark the date—that, „although a great doubt had been conceived as to the King's sincerity, . . . yet that *discretion and experience* induced him—the envoy—to think, that besides *the reverent opinion to be had of princes' oaths*, and the general incommmodity which will come by the contrary, God had so balanced princes' powers in that age, as they rather *desire to assure themselves at home*, than with danger to *invade their neighbours.*” 2

Perhaps the mariners of England—at that very instant exchanging broadsides off the coast of Devon and Dorset with the Spanish Armada, and doing their best to protect their native land from the most horrible calamity which had ever impended over it—had arrived at a less reverent opinion of princes' oaths; and it was well for England in that supreme hour that there were such men as Howard and Drake, and Winter and Frobisher, and a whole people with hearts of oak to defend her, while bungling diplomatists and credulous dotards were doing their best to imperil her existence.

But it is necessary—in order to obtain a complete picture of that famous year 1588, and to understand the causes from which such great events were

1 Dale to Burghley, 12 July, 1588. (S. P. 22

Office MS.)

2 Croft to Burghley, 23 July, 1588. (MS. 2 Aug.

last cited.

1 Dale to Burghly, MS. last cited.

2 Parma to Philip, 21 July, 1588. (Arch. de Simancas, MS.)

3 Philip 11. to Parma, 21 June, 1588. (MS last cited)

springing—to cast a glance at the internal politics of the States most involved in Philip's meshes.

Certainly, if there had ever been a time when the new commonwealth of the Netherlands should be both united in itself and on thoroughly friendly terms with England, it was exactly that epoch of which we are treating. There could be no reasonable doubt that the designs of Spain against England were hostile, and against Holland revengeful. It was at least possible that Philip meant to undertake the conquest of England, and to undertake it as a stepping-stone to the conquest of Holland. Both the kingdom and the republic should have been alert, armed, full of suspicion towards the common foe, full of confidence in each other. What decisive blows might have been struck against Parma in the Netherlands, when his troops were starving, sickly, and mutinous, if the Hollanders and Englishmen had been united under one chieftain, and thoroughly convinced of the impossibility of peace! Could the English and Dutch statesmen of that day have read all the secrets of their great enemy's heart, as it is our privilege at this hour to do, they would have known that in sudden and deadly strokes lay their best chance of salvation. But, without that advantage, there were men whose sagacity told them that it was the hour for deeds and not for dreams. For to Leicester and Walsingham, as well as to Paul Buys and Barneveld, peace with Spain seemed an idle vision. It was unfortunate that they were overruled by Queen Elizabeth and Burghley, who still clung to that delusion; it was still more disastrous that the intrigues of Leicester had done so much to paralyze the republic; it was almost fatal that his departure, without laying down his authority, had given the signal for civil war.

During the winter, spring, and summer of 1588, while the Duke—in the

face of mighty obstacles—was slowly proceeding with his preparations in Flanders, to cooperate with the armaments from Spain, it would have been possible by a combined movement to destroy his whole plan, to liberate all the Netherlands, and to avert, by one great effort, the ruin impending over England. Instead of such vigorous action, it was thought wiser to send commissioners, to make protocols, to ask for armistices, to give profusely to the enemy that which he was most in need of—time. Meanwhile the Hollanders and English could quarrel comfortably among themselves, and the little republic, for want of a legal head, could come as near as possible to its dissolution.

Young Maurice—deep thinker for his years and peremptory in action—was not the man to see his great father's life-work annihilated before his eyes, so long as he had an arm and brain of his own. He accepted his position at the head of the government of Holland and Zeeland, and as chief of the war-party. The council of state, mainly composed of Leicester's creatures, whose commissions would soon expire by their own limitation, could offer but a feeble resistance to such determined individuals as Maurice, Buys, and Barneveld. The party made rapid progress. On the other hand, the English Leicestrians did their best to foment discord in the Provinces. Sonoy was sustained in his rebellion in North Holland, not only by the Earl's partizans, but by Elizabeth herself. Her rebukes to Maurice, when Maurice was pursuing the only course which seemed to him consistent with honour and sound policy, were sharper than a sword. Well might Duplessis Mornay observe, that the commonwealth had been rather strangled than embraced by the English Queen. Sonoy, in the name of Leicester, took arms against Maurice and the States; Maurice marched against him; and Lord Willoughby, commander-in-



chief of the English forces, was anxious to march against Maurice. It was a spectacle to make angels weep, that of Englishmen and Hollanders preparing to cut each other's throats, at the moment when Philip and Parma were bending all their energies to crush England and Holland at once.

Indeed, the interregnum between the departure of Leicester and his abdication was diligently employed by his more reckless partizans to defeat and destroy the authority of the States. By prolonging the interval, it was hoped that no government would be possible except the arbitrary rule of the Earl, or of a successor with similar views: for a republic—a free commonwealth—was thought an absurdity. To entrust supreme power to advocates, merchants, and mechanics, seemed as hopeless as it was vulgar. Willoughby, much devoted to Leicester and much detesting Barneveld, had small scruple in fanning the flames of discord.

There was open mutiny against the States by the garrison of Gertruydenberg, and Willoughby's brother-in-law, Captain Wingfield, commanded in Gertruydenberg. There were rebellious demonstrations in Naarden, and Willoughby went to Naarden. The garrison was troublesome, but most of the magistrates were firm. So Willoughby supped with the burgomasters, and found that Paul Buys had been setting the people against Queen Elizabeth, Leicester, and the whole English nation, making them all odious. Colonel Dorp said openly that it was a shame for the country to refuse their own natural-born Count for strangers. He swore that he would sing his song whose bread he had eaten. 1 A „fat militia captain” of the place, one Soyssons, on the other hand, privately informed Willoughby that Maurice and Barneveld were treating

underhand with Spain. Willoughby was inclined to believe the calumny, but feared that his corpulent friend would lose his head for reporting it. Meantime the English commander did his best to strengthen the English party in their rebellion against the States.

„But how if they make war upon us?” asked the Leicestrians.

„It is very likely,” replied Willoughby, „that if they use violence you will have her Majesty's assistance, and then you who continue constant to the end will be rewarded accordingly. Moreover, who would not rather be a horse-keeper to her Majesty than a captain to Barneveld or Buys?” 1

When at last the resignation of Leicester—presented to the States by Killigrew on the 31st March 2—seemed to promise comparative repose to the republic, the vexation of the Leicestrians was intense. Their efforts to effect a dissolution of the government had been rendered unsuccessful, when success seemed within their grasp. „Albeit what is once executed cannot be prevented,”

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1 Willoughby to —, <sup>18</sup>/<sub>28</sub> Feb. 1588. (S. P.

Office MS.) „It was likewise said openly to Count Maurice at his table, „Sir, if the Prince your father had been offered the third part by the enemy which you have been, he would have accepted it: and is it not a good occasion that you may article what you will, and have whatever you may demand. Soyssons, a fat captain of Naarden, fed for their tooth, confessed to me that they had practised with the enemy. Thus you may see their dispositions; much ado had I to persuade the burgomasters of the honourable course her Majesty would hold, and no less to assure the unfortunate captain, whose head I fear will pay for all. Further, I said it was sure that the States-General, the council of state, which I was somewhat acquainted with, nor the two counts who had feasted us and drunk the health of his Excellency, meant but all well to us.’ „Well,” said the old Burgomaster, „but that I hear you say so, I would scarcely believe it, for mine ears have often borne witness to the contrary,” &c. Willoughby to —, <sup>20</sup>/<sub>2</sub> Feb. 1588. (S. P. Office MS.)

2 Bor, iii. 224. Wagenaar, viii. 265.

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1 Willoughby to —, <sup>18</sup>/<sub>28</sub> Feb. 1588. (S. P. Office MS.)

said Captain Champernoun, „yet 'tis thought certain that, if the resignation of Lord Leicester's commission had been deferred yet some little time, the whole country and towns would have so revolted and mutinied against the government and authority of the States, as that they should have had no more credit given them by the people than pleased her Majesty. Most part of the people could see—in consequence of the troubles, discontent, mutiny of garrisons, and the like, that it was most necessary for the good success of their affairs that the power of the States should be abolished, and the whole government of his Excellency erected. As these matters *were busily working into the likelihood of some good effect, came the resignation* of his Excellency's commission and authority, which so dashed the proceedings of it, as that all people and commanders well affected unto her Majesty and my Lord of Leicester are utterly discouraged. The States, with their adherents, before they had my Lord's resignation, were much perplexed what course to take, but now begin to hoist their heads.” The excellent Leicestrian entertained hopes, however, that mutiny and intrigue might still carry the day. He had seen the fat militiaman of Naarden and other captains, and hoped much mischief from their schemes. „The chief mutineers of Gertruydenberg, „he said, „may be wrought to send unto the States, that, if they do not procure them some English governor, they will compound with the enemy, *whereon the States shall be driven* to request her Majesty to accept the place, themselves entertaining the garrison. I know certain captains discontented with the States for arrears of pay, *who will contrive to get into Naarden* with their companies, with the States' consent, who, once entered, will keep the place for their satisfaction, pay their soldiers out of the contributions of the country, and yet

secretly hold the place at her Majesty's command.” 1

This is not an agreeable picture; yet it is but one out of many examples of the intrigues by which Leicester and his party were doing their best to destroy the commonwealth of the Netherlands at a moment when its existence was most important to that of England.

To foment mutiny in order to subvert the authority of Maurice, was not a friendly or honourable course of action either towards Holland or England; and it was to play into the hands of Philip as adroitly as his own stipendiaries could have done. 2

With mischief-makers like Champernoun in every city, and with such diplomatists at Ostend as Croft and Rogers and Valentine Dale, was it wonderful that the King and the Duke of Parma found time to mature their plans for the destruction of both countries?

Lord Willoughby, too, was extremely dissatisfied with his own position. He received no commission from the Queen for several months. When it at last reached him, it seemed inadequate, and he became more sullen than ever. He declared that he would rather serve the Queen as a private soldier, at his own expense—„lean as his purse was”—than accept the limited authority conferred on him. He preferred to show his devotion „in a beggarly state, than in a formal show.” He considered it beneath her Majesty's dignity that he should act in the field under the States, but his instructions forbade his acceptance of any office from that body but that of general in their service. He was very discontented, and more anxious than ever to be rid of

1 Arthur Champernoun to Walsingham,

2 April, 1588. (S. P. Office MS.) He commanded an English company at Utrecht.

2 „I congratulate you,” wrote Philip to Farnese, „upon the Disputes between the rebels and the English, and among themselves. I trust you will get good fruit from their quarrels.” Philip to Parma, 13 May, 1588. (Arch. de Sim. MS.)

his functions. Without being extremely ambitious, he was impatient of control. He desired not „a larger-shaped coat,” but one that fitted him better. „I wish to shape my garment homely, after my cloth,” he said, „that the better of my parish may not be misled by my sumptuousness. I would live quietly, without great noise, my poor roof low and near the ground, not subject to be overblown with unlooked-for storms, while the sun seems most shining.”<sup>1</sup>

Being the deadly enemy of the States and their leaders, it was matter of course that he should be bitter against Maurice. That young Prince, bold, enterprising, and determined as he was, did not ostensibly meddle with political affairs more than became his years; but he accepted the counsels of the able statesmen in whom his father had trusted. Riding, hunting, and hawking seemed to be his chief delight at the Hague, in the intervals of military occupations. He rarely made his appearance in the state-council during the winter, and referred public matters to the States-General, to the States of Holland, to Barneveld, Buys, and Hohenlo. <sup>2</sup> Superficial observers like George Gilpin regarded him as a cipher; others, like Robert Cecil, thought him an unmannerly schoolboy; but Willoughby, although considering him insolent and conceited, could not deny his ability. The peace-partisans among the burghers—a very small faction—were furious against him, for they knew that Maurice of Nassau represented war. They accused of deep designs against the liberties of their country the youth who was ever ready to risk his life in their defence. A burgomaster from Friesland, who had come across the Zuyder Zee to intrigue against the States party, was full of spleen at being obliged to dance attendance for a

long time at the Hague. He complained that Count Maurice, green of years, and seconded by greener counsellors, was meditating the dissolution of the state-council, the appointment of a new board from his own creatures, the overthrow of all other authority, and the assumption of the sovereignty of Holland and Zeeland, with absolute power. „And when this is done,” said the rueful burgomaster, „he and his turbulent fellows may make what terms they like with Spain, to the disadvantage of the Queen and of us poor wretches.”<sup>1</sup>

But there was nothing farther from the thoughts of the turbulent fellows than any negotiations with Spain. Maurice was ambitious enough, perhaps, but his ambition ran in no such direction. Willoughby knew better, and thought that by humouring the petulant young man it might be possible to manage him.

„Maurice is young,” he said, „hot-headed; coveting honour. If we do but look at him through our fingers, without much words, but with providence enough, baiting his hook a little to his appetite, there is no doubt but he might be caught and kept in a fish-pool, while in his imagination he may judge it a sea. If not, 'tis likely he will make us fish in troubled waters.”<sup>2</sup>

Maurice was hardly the fish for a mill-pond even at that epoch, and it might one day be seen whether or not he could float in the great ocean of events. Meanwhile, he swam his course without superfluous gambols or spoutings.

The commander of her Majesty's forces was not satisfied with the States, nor their generals, nor their politicians. „Affairs are going *a malo in pejus*,” he said. „They embrace their liberty as apes their young. To this end are Counts Hollock and Maurice set upon the stage to entertain the popular sort.

<sup>1</sup> Willoughby to Burghley,  $\frac{23 \text{ Jan.}}{2 \text{ Feb.}}$ , 1588.

(S. P. Office MS.)

<sup>2</sup> Gilpin to Walsingham,  $\frac{4 \text{ Feb.}}{14}$ , 1588. MS.

last cited.

<sup>1</sup> Willoughby to Burghley,  $\frac{12}{22} \text{ Jan. 1588.}$

(S. P. Office MS.)

<sup>2</sup> Ibid.



Her Majesty and my Lord of Leicester are not forgotten. The Counts are in Holland, especially Hollock, for the other is but the cipher. And yet I can assure you *Maurice hath wit and spirit too much for his time.*" 1

As the troubles of the interregnum increased Willoughby was more dissatisfied than ever with the miserable condition of the Provinces, but chose to ascribe it to the machinations of the States' party, rather than to the ambiguous conduct of Leicester. „These evils," he said, „are especially derived from the childish ambition of the young Count Maurice, from the covetous and furious counsels of the proud Hollanders, now chief of the States-General, and, if with pardon it may be said, from our slackness to entertain our friends. The provident and wiser sort—weighing what a slender ground the appetite of a young man is, unfurnished with the sinews of war to manage so great a cause—for a good space after my Lord of Leicester's departure, gave him far looking on, to see him play his part on the stage." 2

Willoughby's spleen caused him to mix his metaphors more recklessly than strict taste would warrant, but his violent expressions painted the relative situation of parties more vividly than could be done by a calm disquisition. Maurice thus playing his part upon the stage—as the general proceeded to observe—„was a skittish horse, becoming by little and little assured of what he had feared, and perceiving the harmlessness thereof; while his companions, finding no safety of neutrality in so great practices, and no overturning nor barricado to stop his rash wilded chariot, followed without fear; and when some of the

first had passed the bog, the rest, as the fashion is, never started after. The variable democracy, embracing novelty, began to applaud their prosperity; the base and lewdest sorts of men, to whom there is, nothing more agreeable than change of estates, as a better monture to degrees than their merit, took present hold thereof. Hereby Paul Buys, Barneveld, and divers others, who were before mantled with a tolerable affection, though seasoned with a poisoned intention, caught the occasion, and made themselves the Beelzebubs of all these mischiefs, and, for want of better angels, spared not to let fly our golden-winged ones in the name of guilders, to prepare the hearts and hands that hold money more dearer than honesty, of which sort, the country troubles and the Spanish practices having suckled up many, they found enough to serve their purpose. As the breach is safely saltable where no defence is made, so they, finding no head, but those, scattered arms that were disavowed, drew the sword with Peter; and gave pardon with the Pope, as you shall plainly perceive by the proceedings at Horn. Thus their force, fair words, or corruption, prevailing everywhere, it grew to this conclusion—that the worst were encouraged with their good success, and the best sort assured of no fortune or favour." 1

Out of all this hubbub of stage-actors, skittish horses, rash wilded chariots, bogs, Beelzebubs, and golden-winged angels, one truth was distinctly audible; that Beelzebub, in the shape of Barneveld, had been getting the upper hand in the Netherlands, and that the Leicestrians were at a disadvantage. In truth those partisans were becoming extremely impatient. Finding themselves deserted by their great protector, they naturally turned their eyes towards Spain, and were now threatening to sell

1 Same to same, 16 Jan. 1589. MS. last cited.

2 Willoughby to Walsingham, 19 Feb. 1588. (S. P. Office MS.)

1 Willoughby to Walsingham, MS. last cited.

themselves to Philip. The Earl, at his departure, had given them privately much encouragement. But month after month had passed by while they were waiting in vain for comfort. At last the „best”—that is to say, the unhappy Leicestrians—came to Willoughby, asking his advice in their „declining and desperate cause.”

„Well nigh a month longer,” said that general, „I nourished them with compliments, and assured them that my Lord of Leicester would take care of them.”<sup>1</sup> The diet was not fattening. So they began to grumble more loudly than ever, and complained with great bitterness of the miserable condition in which they had been left by the Earl, and expressed their fears lest the Queen likewise meant to abandon them. They protested that their poverty, their powerful foes, and their slow friends, would compel them either to make their peace with the States’ party, or „compound with the enemy.”

It would have seemed that real patriots, under such circumstances, would hardly hesitate in their choice, and would sooner accept the dominion of „Beelzebub,” or even Paul Buys, than that of Philip II. But the Leicestrians of Utrecht and Friesland—patriots as they were—hated Holland worse than they hated the Inquisition. Willoughby encouraged them in that hatred. He assured them of her Majesty’s affection for them, complained of the factious proceeding of the States, and alluded to the unfavourable state of the weather, as a reason why—near four months long—they had not received the comfort out of England which they had a right to expect. He assured them that neither the Queen nor Leicester, would conclude this honourable action, wherein much had been hazarded, „so rawly and tragically” as they seemed to fear, and warned them, that, „if they did join

with Holland, it would neither ease nor help them, but draw them into a more dishonourable loss of their liberties; and that, after having wound them in, the Hollanders would make their own peace with the enemy.”<sup>1</sup>

It seemed somewhat unfair—while the Queen’s government was straining every nerve to obtain a peace from Philip, and while the Hollanders were obstinately deaf to any propositions for treating—that Willoughby should accuse them of secret intentions to negotiate. But it must be confessed that faction has rarely worn a more mischievous aspect than was presented by the politics of Holland and England in the winter and spring of 1588.

Young Maurice was placed in a very painful position. He liked not to be „strangled in the great Queen’s embrace;” but he felt most keenly the necessity of her friendship, and the importance to both countries of a close alliance. It was impossible for him, however, to tolerate the rebellion of Sonoy, although Sonoy was encouraged by Elizabeth, or to fly in the face of Barneveld, although Barneveld was detested by Leicester. So with much firmness and courtesy, notwithstanding the extravagant pictures painted by Willoughby, he suppressed mutiny in Holland, while avowing the most chivalrous attachment to the sovereign of England.

Her Majesty expressed her surprise and her discontent, that, notwithstanding his expressions of devotion to herself, he should thus deal with Sonoy, whose only crime was an equal devotion. „If you do not behave with more moderation in future,” she said, „you may believe that we are not a princess of so little courage as not to know how to lend a helping hand to those who are unjustly oppressed. We should be sorry if we had cause to be disgusted with your actions, and if we were

<sup>1</sup> Willoughby to Walsingham. MS. last cited.

<sup>1</sup> Ibid.

compelled to make you a stranger to the ancient good affection which we bore to your late father, and have continued towards yourself." <sup>1</sup>

But Maurice maintained a dignified attitude, worthy of his great father's name. He was not the man to crouch like Leicester, when he could no longer refresh himself in the „shadow of the Queen's golden beams," important as he knew her friendship to be to himself and his country. So he defended himself in a manly letter to the privy council against the censures of Elizabeth. <sup>2</sup> He avowed his displeasure, that, within his own jurisdiction, Sonoy should give a special oath of obedience to Leicester; a thing never done before in the country, and entirely illegal. It would not even be tolerated in England, he said, if a private gentleman should receive a military appointment in Warwickshire of Norfolk without the knowledge of the lord-lieutenant of the shire. He had treated the costumacious Sonoy with mildness during a long period, but without effect. He had abstained from violence towards him, out of reverence to the Queen, under whose sacred name he sheltered himself. Sonoy had not desisted, but had established himself in organized rebellion at Medemblik, declaring that he would drown the whole country, and levy black-mail upon its whole property, if he were not paid one hundred thousand crowns. He had declared that he would crush Holland like a glass beneath his feet. Having nothing but religion in his mouth, and protecting himself with the Queen's name, he had been exciting all the cities of North Holland to rebellion, and bringing the poor people to destruction. He had been offered money enough to

satisfy the most avaricious soldier in the world, but he stood out for six years' full pay for his soldiers, a demand with which it was impossible to comply. It was necessary to prevent him from inundating the land and destroying the estates of the country gentlemen and the peasants. „This, gentlemen," said Maurice, „is the plain truth; nor do I believe that you will sustain against me a man who was under such vast obligations to my late father, and who requites his debt by daring to speak of myself as a rascal; or that you will countenance his rebellion against a country to which he brought only his cloak and sword, and whence he has filched one hundred thousand crowns. You will not, I am sure, permit a simple captain, by his insubordination, to cause so much mischief, and to set on fire this and other Provinces.

„If, by your advice," continued the Count, „the Queen should appoint fitting personages to office here—men who know what honour is, born of illustrious and noble race, or who by their great virtue have been elevated to the honours of the kingdom—to them I will render an account of my actions. And it shall appear that I have more ability and more desire to do my duty to her Majesty than those who render her lip-service only, and only make use of her sacred name to fill their purses, while I and mine have been ever ready to employ our lives, and what remains of our fortunes, in the cause of God, her Majesty, and our country." <sup>1</sup>

Certainly no man had a better right to speak with consciousness of the worth of race than the son of William the Silent, the nephew of Lewis, Adolphus, and Henry of Nassau, who had all laid down their lives for the liberty of their country. But Elizabeth continued to threaten the States-General, through the mouth of Willoughby, with the loss of

<sup>1</sup> Queen to Maurice of Nassau, <sup>13</sup> Feb. 1588. (S. P. Office MS.)

<sup>2</sup> Maurice of Nassau to Privy Council,

<sup>5</sup> March, 1588. (S. P. Office MS.)

<sup>1</sup> Maurice of Nassau to Privy Council, (S. P. Office MS.)



her protection, if they should continue thus to requite her favours with ingratitude and insubordination: 1 and Maurice once more respectfully but firmly replied that Sonoy's rebellion could not and would not be tolerated; appealing boldly to her sense of justice, which was the noblest attribute of kings. 2

At last the Queen informed Willoughby, that—as the cause of Sonoy's course seemed to be his oath of obedience to Leicester, whose resignation of office had not yet been received in the Netherlands—she had now ordered Councillor Killigrew to communicate the fact of that resignation. She also wrote to Sonoy, requiring him to obey the States and Count Maurice, and to accept a fresh commission from them, or at least to surrender Medenblik, and to fulfil all their orders with zeal and docility. 3

This act of abdication by Leicester, which had been received on the 22nd of January by the English envoy, Herbert, at the moment of his departure from the Netherlands, had been carried back by him to England, on the ground that its communication to the States at that moment would cause him inconveniently to *postpone his journey*. It never officially reached the States-General until the 31st of March, so that this most dangerous crisis was protracted nearly five months long—certainly without necessity or excuse—and whether through design, malice, wantonness, or incomprehensible carelessness, it is difficult to say. 4

So soon as the news reached Sonoy, that contumacious chieftain found his position untenable, and he allowed the States' troops to take possession of Medenblik, and with it the important territory of North Holland, of which province Maurice now saw himself undisputed governor. Sonoy was in the course of the summer deprived of all office, and betook himself to England. Here he was kindly received by the Queen, who bestowed upon him a ruined tower, and a swamp among the fens of Lincolnshire. He brought over some of his countrymen well-skilled in such operations, set himself to draining and dyking, and hoped to find himself at home and comfortable in his ruined tower. But unfortunately, neither he nor his wife, notwithstanding their English proclivities, could speak a word of the language, they found their social enjoyments very limited. Moreover, as his workpeople were equally without the power of making their wants understood, the dyking operations made but little progress. So the unlucky colonel soon abandoned his swamp, and retired to East Friesland, where he lived a morose and melancholy life on a pension of one thousand florins, granted him by the States of Holland, until the year 1597, when he lost his mind, fell into the fire, and thus perished. 1

And thus, in the Netherlands, through hollow negotiations between enemies and ill-timed bickerings among friends, the path of Philip and Parma had been made comparatively smooth during the spring and early summer of 1588. What was the aspect of affairs in Germany and France?

The adroit capture of Bonn by Martin Schenk had given much trouble. Parma was obliged to detach a strong force,

and chronicles of the day. It has been here reduced to the smallest compass consistent with a purpose of presenting an intelligible account of the politics of Leicester's administration and its consequences.

1 Bor, iii. 290.

1 Queen to Willoughby,  $\frac{5}{15}$  March, 1588.

MS. last cited.

2 Maurice of Nassau to Queen Elizabeth, 15 March, 1588. (S. P. Office, MS.)

3 Queen to Willoughby,  $\frac{17}{27}$  March, 1588.

Queen to Sonoy,  $\frac{5}{15}$  April, 1588. (S. P. Office MSS.)

4 Bor, iii. xxiv. 179 *seq.* 233 *seq.* Van der Kemp, i. 62. Wagenaar, viii. 270. Resol. Holl. 1 April, 1588.

This business of Col. Diedrich Sonoy occupies an enormous space in the archives

under Prince Chimay, 1 to attempt the recovery of that important place, which—so long as it remained in the power of the States—rendered the whole electorate insecure and a source of danger to the Spanish party. Farnese endeavoured in vain to win back the famous partizan by most liberal offers, for he felt bitterly the mistake he had made in alienating so formidable a freebooter. But the truculent Martin remained obdurate and irascible. Philip, much offended that the news of his decease had proved false, ordered rather than requested the Emperor Rudolph to have a care that nothing was done in Germany to interfere with the great design upon England. 2 The King gave warning that he would suffer no disturbance from that quarter, but certainly the lethargic condition of Germany rendered such threats superfluous. There were riders enough, and musketeers enough, to be sold to the highest bidder. German food for powder was offered largely in the market to any foreign consumer, for the trade in their subjects' lives was ever a prolific source of revenue to the petty sovereigns—numerous as the days of the year—who owned Germany and the Germans.

The mercenaries who had so recently been making their inglorious campaign in France had been excluded from that country at the close of 1587, and furious were the denunciations of the pulpits and the populace of Paris that the foreign brigands who had been devastating the soil of France, and attempting to oppose the decrees of the Holy Father of Rome, should have made their escape so easily. Rabid Lincestre and other priests and monks foamed with rage, as they execrated and anathematized the devil-worshipper Henry of Valois, in all the churches of that monarch's capital.

The Spanish ducats were flying about, more profusely than ever, among the butchers and porters, and fishwomen, of the great city; and Madam League paraded herself in the daylight with still increasing insolence. There was scarcely a pretence at recognition of any authority, save that of Philip and Sixtus. France had become a wilderness—an uncultivated, barbarous province of Spain. Mucio-Guise had been secretly to Rome, had held interviews with the Pope and cardinals, and had come back with a sword presented by his Holiness, its hilt adorned with jewels, and its blade engraved with tongues of fire. 1 And with this flaming sword the avenging messenger of the Holy Father was to smite the wicked, and to drive them into outer darkness.

And there had been fresh conferences among the chiefs of the sacred League within the Lorraine territory, and it was resolved to require of the Valois an immediate extermination of heresy and heretics throughout the kingdom, the publication of the Council of Trent, and the formal establishment of the Holy Inquisition in every province of France. Thus, while doing his Spanish master's bidding, the great lieutenant of the League might, if he was adroit enough to outwit Philip, ultimately carve out a throne for himself.

Yet Philip felt occasional pangs of uneasiness lest there should, after all, be peace in France, and lest his schemes against Holland and England might be interfered with from that quarter. Even Farnese, nearer the scene, could not feel completely secure that a sudden reconciliation among contending factions might not give rise to a dangerous inroad across the Flemish border. So Guise was plied more vigorously than ever by the Duke with advice and encouragement, and assisted with such Walloon carabineers as could be

1 Parma to Philip II. 31 Jan. 1588. (Arch. de Sim. MS.)

2 Philip II. to Parma, 24 April, 1588. (MS. last cited.)

1 L'Estoile, 286.

spared, 1 while large subsidies and larger promises came from Philip, 2 whose prudent policy was never to pay excessive sums, until the work contracted for was done. „Mucio must do the job long since agreed upon,” said Philip to Farnese, „and you and Mendoza must see that he prevents the King of France from troubling me in my enterprise against England.” 3 If the unlucky Henry III. had retained one spark of intelligence, he would have seen that his only chance of rescue lay in the arm of the Béarnese, and in an honest alliance with England. Yet so strong was his love for the monks, who were daily raving against him, that he was willing to commit any baseness in order to win back their affection. He was ready to exterminate heresy and to establish the Inquisition, but he was incapable of taking energetic measures of any kind, even when throne and life were in imminent peril. Moreover, he clung to Epemon and the „*politiques*,” in whose swords he alone found pro-

tection, and he knew that Epemon and the *politiques* were the objects of horror to Paris and to the League. At the same time he looked imploringly towards England and towards the great Huguenot chieftain, Elizabeth's knight-errant. He had a secret interview with Sir Edward Stafford, in the garden of the Bernardine convent, and importuned that envoy to implore the Queen to break off her negotiations with Philip, and even dared to offer the English ambassador a large reward, if such a result could be obtained. Stafford was also earnestly requested to beseech the Queen's influence with Henry of Navarre, that he should convert himself to Catholicism, and thus destroy the League.

On the other hand, the magniloquent Mendoza, who was fond of describing himself as „so violent and terrible to the French that they wished to be rid of him,” 1 had—as usual—been frightening the poor King, who, after a futile attempt at dignity, had shrunk before the blusterings of the ambassador. „This King,” said Don Bernardino, „thought that he could impose upon me and silence me, by talking loud, but, as I didn't talk softly to him, he has undeceived himself. . . . I have had another interview with him, and found him softer than silk, and he made me many caresses, and after I went out he said that I was a very skilful minister.” 2

It was the purpose of the League to

1 „El serlo yo tan terrible, violento, y sedicioso, que impido no se estreche este rey muy de veras con V. Majd lo qual se heria si faltase yo deste puesto.” Mendoza to Philip II.. 30 Jan. 1588. (Arch. de Sim. [Paris], MS.)

2 „Este rey creyo que me espantara hiziera callar con hallar me alto, y con el no respondalle yo baxo, se ha desengañado. Ha tenido despues audiencia, y halle lo mas blando que una seda, y me hizo muchas caricias que yo le reconocí con las palabras devidas, y despues del salir de hablalle, entiendo que dixo que yo era un ministro bien avisé,” &c. Don B. de Mendoza to Don Juan de Idiaquez, 5 April, 1588. (Arch. de Sim. [Paris], MS.)

1 Herrera, III. iii. 72. 2000 infantry and 1000 horse.

2 Philip to Parma, 27 Nov. 1587. Same to same, 29 Jan. 1588. (Arch. de Sim. MSS.)

3 Philip to Parma, 24 April, 1588. (Arch. de Sim. MS.) Philip II. to Mendoza, 16 Feb. 1588. (Arch. de Sim. [Paris], MS.)

„A Mucio animad y aconsejad como soleys, lo que se cumple . . . y le procurad hazar tiro.” Philip II. to Mendoza, 2 June, 1588. (Arch. de Sim. [Paris], MS.)

The King was, however, perpetually warning Guise not to allow himself or his confederates „to brag openly of the assistance which they were receiving from Spain, lest the ministers of Henry should think Philip partial; but in reality not to waver a hair's breadth in his determination, relying upon the Spanish King and on the Duke of Parma,” &c. Philip II. to Mendoza, 16 July, 1588. (Arch. de Sim. [Paris], MS.)

„The public report that we are assisting Guise,” said the King a year before, „is very inconvenient, and must be suppressed. . . . My nephew, the Duke of Parma, has assured Guise that he will assist him, and Guise ought to be grateful. At the same time Anglée has been telling me that his King desired to join me against England. All this was to deceive, and I have answered all with equal deception,” &c. Philip II. to Mendoza, July, 1587. MS.



obtain possession of the King's person, and, if necessary, to dispose of the *politiques* by a general massacre, such as sixteen years before had been so successful in the case of Coligny and the Huguenots. So the populace—more rabid than ever—were impatient that their adored Balafré should come to Paris and begin the holy work.

He came as far as Gonesse to do the job he had promised to Philip, but having heard that Henry had reinforced himself with four thousand Swiss from the garrison of Lagny, he fell back to Soissons. The King sent him a most abject message, imploring him not to expose his sovereign to so much danger, by setting his foot at that moment in the capital. The Balafré hesitated, but the populace raved and roared for its darling. The Queen-Mother urged her unhappy son to yield his consent, and the Montpensier—fatal sister of Guise, with the famous scissors ever at her girdle—insisted that her brother had as good a right as any man to come to the city. Meantime the great chief of the *politiques*, the hated and insolent Epernon, had been appointed governor of Normandy, and Henry had accompanied his beloved minion a part of the way towards Rouen. A plot contrived by the Montpensier to waylay the monarch on his return, and to take him into the safe-keeping of the League, miscarried, for the King re-entered the city before the scheme was ripe. On the other hand, Nicholas Poulain, bought for twenty thousand crowns by the *politiques*, gave the King and his advisers full information of all these intrigues, and, standing in Henry's cabinet, offered, at peril of his life, if he might be confronted with the conspirators—the leaders of the League within the city—to prove the truth of the charges which he had made. 2

1 L'Etoile, 244.

2 De Thou, x. l. 89, p. 251 *seq.* Herrera, ii. 118 *seq.* 'Procès verbal' de Nicolas Poulin,

For the whole city was now thoroughly organized. The number of its districts had been reduced from sixteen to five, the better to bring it under the control of the Leaguers; and, while it could not be denied that Mucio had been doing his master's work very thoroughly, yet it was still in the power of the King—through the treachery of Poulain—to strike a blow for life and freedom, before he was quite taken in the trap. But he stood helpless, paralyzed, gazing in dreamy stupor—like one fascinated—at the destruction awaiting him.

At last, one memorable May morning, a traveller alighted outside the gate of Saint Martin, and proceeded on foot 10th May, through the streets of Paris. 1588. He was wrapped in a large cloak, which he held carefully over his face. When he had got as far as the street of Saint Denis, a young gentleman among the passers-by, a good Leaguer, accosted the stranger, and with coarse pleasantry, plucked the cloak from his face, and the hat from his head. Looking at the handsome, swarthy features, marked with a deep scar, and the dark, dangerous eyes which were then revealed, the practical jester at once recognized in the simple traveller the terrible Balafré, and kissed the hem of his garments with submissive rapture. Shouts of „Vive Guise!” rent the air from all the bystanders, as the Duke, no longer affecting concealment, proceeded with slow and stately step toward the residence of Catharine de' Medici. 1 That queen of compromises and of magic had been holding many a conference with the leaders of both parties: had been increasing her son's stupefaction by her enigmatical counsels. had been anxiously consulting her talis-

&c., 320-332. Apud L'Etoile, *Registre Journal de Henry III.*

1 L'Etoile, 250. De Thou, *ubi sup.* 'Recit du Bourgeois de Paris,' MS. Dupuys, cited by Capeigne, 'Hist. de la Réforme,' &c. iv. 378.

man of goat's and human blood, mixed with metals melted under the influence of the star of her nativity, and had been daily visiting the wizard Ruggieri, in whose magic circle—peopled with a thousand fantastic heads—she had held high converse with the world of spirits, and derived much sound advice as to the true course of action to be pursued between her son and Philip, and between the politicians and the League. But, in spite of these various sources of instruction, Catharine was somewhat perplexed, now that decisive action seemed necessary—a dethronement and a new massacre impending, and judicious compromise difficult. So, after a hurried conversation with Mucio, who insisted on an interview with the King, she set forth for the Louvre, the Duke lounging calmly by the side of her sedan-chair, on foot, receiving the homage of the populace, as men, women, and children together, they swarmed around him as he walked, kissing his garments, and rending the air with their shouts. 1 For that wolfish mob of Paris, which had once lapped the blood of ten thousand Huguenots in a single night, and was again rabid with thirst, was most docile and fawning to the great Balafré. It grovelled before him, it hung upon his look, it licked his hand, and, at the lifting of his finger, or the glance of his eye, would have sprung at the throat of King or Queen-Mother, minister, or minion, and devoured them all before his eyes. It was longing for the sign; for much as Paris adored and was besotted with Guise and the League, even more, if possible, did it hate those goldless politicians, who had grown fat on extortions from the poor, and who had converted their substance into the daily bread of luxury.

Nevertheless the city was full of armed men, Swiss and German mercenaries, and burgher guards, sworn to fidelity to the throne. The place might have

been swept clean, at that moment, of rebels who were not yet armed or fortified in their positions. The Lord had delivered Guise into Henry's hands. „Oh, the madman!” cried Sixtus V., when he heard that the Duke had gone to Paris, „thus to put himself into the clutches of the King whom he had so deeply offended!” And, „Oh, the wretched coward, the imbecile!” he added, when he heard how the King had dealt with his great enemy. 1

For the monarch was in his cabinet that May morning, irresolutely awaiting the announced visit of the Duke. By his side stood Alphonse Gorse, attached as a mastiff to his master, and fearing not Guise nor Leaguer, man nor devil.

„Sire, is the Duke of Guise your friend or enemy?” said Alphonse. The King answered by an expressive shrug.

„Say the word, Sire,” continued Alphonse, „and I pledge myself to bring his head this instant, and lay it at your feet.” 2

And he would have done it. Even at the side of Catharine's sedan-chair, and in the very teeth of the worshipping mob, the Corsican would have had the Balafré's life, even though he laid down his own.

But Henry—irresolute and fascinated—said it was not yet time for such a blow. 3

Soon afterward, the Duke was announced. The chief of the League and the last of the Valois met, face to face, but not for the last time. The interview was coldly respectful on the part of Mucio, anxious and embarrassed on that of the King. When the visit, which was merely one of ceremony, was over, the Duke departed as he came receiving the renewed homage of the populace as he walked to his hotel.

That night precautions were taken. All the guards were doubled around the palace and through the streets. The

1 De Thou, *L'Estoile*, *ubi sup.*

1 De Thou, x. 266.

2 L'Estoile, 248.

3 Ibid.

Hôtel de Ville and the Place de la Grève were made secure, and the whole city was filled with troops. But the Place

11th May, Maubert was left unguarded, 1588. and a rabble rout—all night

long—was collecting in that distant spot. Four companies of burgher-guards went over to the League at three o'clock in the morning. The rest stood firm in the cemetery of the Innocents, awaiting the orders of the King. At daybreak on the 11th the town was still quiet. There was an awful pause of expectation. The shops remained closed all the morning, the royal troops were drawn up in battle-array, upon the Grève and around the Hôtel de Ville, but they stood motionless as statues, until the populace began taunting them with cowardice, and then laughing them to scorn. For their sovereign lord and master still sat paralyzed in his palace.

The mob had been surging through all the streets and lanes, until, as by a single impulse, chains were stretched across the streets, and barricades thrown up in all the principal thoroughfares. About noon the Duke of Guise, who had been sitting quietly in his hotel, with a very few armed followers, came out into the street of the Hôtel Montmorency, and walked calmly up and down, arm-in-arm with the Archbishop of Lyons, between a double hedge-row of spectators and admirers, three or four ranks thick. He was dressed in a white slashed doublet and hose, and wore a very large hat. 1 Shouts of triumph resounded from a thousand brazen throats, as he moved calmly about, receiving, at every instant, expresses from the great gathering in the Place Maubert.

„Enough, too much, my good friends,” he said, taking off the great hat—(„I don't know whether he was laughing in it,” observed one who was looking on that day)—„Enough of „Long live Guise!” Cry „Long live the King!”” 2

1 L'Estoile, 250.

2 Ibid.

There was no response, as might be expected, and the people shouted more hoarsely than ever for Madam League and the Balafré. The Duke's face was full of gaiety; there was not a shadow of anxiety upon it in that perilous and eventful moment. He saw that the day was his own.

For now, the people, ripe, ready, mustered, armed, barricaded, awaited but a signal to assault the King's mercenaries, before rushing to the palace. On every house-top missiles were provided to hurl upon their heads. There seemed no escape for Henry or his Germans from impending doom, when Guise, thoroughly triumphant, vouchsafed them their lives.

„You must give me these soldiers as a present, my friends,” said he to the populace.

And so the armed Swiss, French, and German troopers and infantry, submitted to be led out of Paris, following with docility the aide-de-camp of Guise, Captain St. Paul, who walked quietly before them, with his sword in its scabbard, and directing their movements with a cane. Sixty of them were slain by the mob, who could not, even at the command of their beloved chieftain, quite forego their expected banquet. But this was all the blood shed on the memorable day of Barricades, when another Batholomew Massacre had been expected. 1

Meantime, while Guise was making his promenade through the city, exchanging embraces with the rabble, and listening to the coarse congratulations and obscene jests of the porters and fishwomen, the poor King sat crying all day long in the Louvre. The Queen-Mother was with him, reproaching him bitterly with his irresolution and want of confidence in her, and scolding him for his tears. But the unlucky Henry only wept the more as he cowered in a corner.

1 L'Estoile. De Thou, 257-261. Herrera, *ubi sup.*



„These are idle tears,” said Catharine. „This is no time for crying. And for myself, though women weep so easily, I feel my heart too deeply wrung for tears. If they came to my eyes they would be tears of blood” 1

Next day the last Valois walked out of the Louvre, as if for a promenade in the Tuileries, and proceeded straightway to the stalls, where his horse stood saddled. Du Halde, his equerry, buckled his master's spurs on, upside down. „No matter,” said Henry, „I am not riding to see my mistress. I have a longer journey before me.” 2

And so—followed by a rabble rout of courtiers, without boots or cloaks, and mounted on sorry hacks—the King of France rode forth from his capital post-haste, and, turning as he left the gates, hurled back impotent imprecations upon Paris and its mob. 3 Thenceforth, for a long interval, there was no king in that country. Mucio had done his work, and earned his wages, and Philip II. reigned in Paris. The commands of the League were now complied with. Heretics were doomed to extermination. The edict 19th July, of 19th July, 1588, was 1588. published with the most exclusive and stringent provisions that the most bitter Romanist could imagine, 4 and, as a

fair beginning, two young girls, daughters of Jacques Forcade, once „procureur au parlement,” were burned in Paris, for the crime of Protestantism. 1

The Duke of Guise was named Generalissimo of the Kingdom (26th August, 1588). Henry gave in his submission to the Council of Trent, the edicts, the Inquisition, and the rest of the League's infernal machinery, and was formally reconciled to Guise, with how much sincerity time was soon to show. 2

Meantime Philip, for whom and at whose expense all this work had been done by the hands of the faithful Mucio, was constantly assuring his royal brother of France, through envoy Longlée, at Madrid, of his most affectionate friendship, and utterly repudiating all knowledge of these troublesome and dangerous plots. Yet they had been especially organized—as we have seen—by himself and the Balafre, in order that France might be kept a prey to civil war, and thus rendered incapable of offering any obstruction to his great enterprise against England. Any complicity of Mendoza, the Spanish ambassador in Paris, or of the Duke of Parma, who were important agents in all these proceedings, with the Duke of Guise, was strenuously and circumstantially denied; and the Balafre, on the day of the barricades, sent Brissac to Elizabeth's envoy, Sir Edward Stafford, to assure him as to his personal safety, and as to the deep affection with which England and its Queen were regarded by himself and all his friends. Stafford

1 „La Reyna Madre dizo al Rey quan mal avisado havia sido quexandosele de la poca confianza que tenia de ella, y que nunca la haria descubierta sus secretos, ni procurado su daño para executar semejante resolucion sin su parescer y esto con palabras de tanto sentimiento que el Rey se enternecio llorando, y ella le dizo ser lagrunas perdidas aquellas, por no ser tiempo de llorar; que si bien las mugeres lo hazian tan facilmente, que ella tenia tan zerrado el pecho que no podria llorar, y que si la viniessen a los ojos lagrimas, serian de sangre.” Relacion de lo subcedido a Paris desde los 9 hasta 13 de Mayo, 1588. (Arch. de Sim. [Paris], MS.)

2 L'Estoile, 252.

3 L'Estoile, De Thou, Herrera, *ubi sup.* Pasquier, vol. ii., lettre iv., 331-334 (ed. 1723.)

4 The King bound himself by oath to extirpate heresy, to remove all persons suspected of that crime from office, and never

to lay down arms so long as a single heretic remained. By secret articles, two armies against the Huguenots were agreed upon, one under the Duke of Mayenne, the other under some general to be appointed by the King. The Council of Trent was forthwith to be proclaimed, and by a refinement of malice the League stipulated that all officers appointed in Paris by the Duke of Guise on the day after the barricades should resign their powers, and be immediately re-appointed by the King himself. De Thou, x. i. 86, pp. 324, 325.

1 Duplessis Mornay, iv. 246, L'Estoile, 258.

2 De Thou, *ubi sup.*

had also been advised to accept a guard for his house of embassy. His reply was noble.

„I represent the majesty of England,” he said, „and can take no safeguard from a subject of the sovereign to whom I am accredited.”

To the threat of being invaded, and to the advice to close his gates, he answered, „Do you see these two doors? Know then, if I am attacked, I am determined to defend myself to the last drop of my blood, to serve as an example to the universe of the law of nations, violated in my person. Do not imagine that I shall follow your advice. The gates of an ambassador shall be open to all the world.”

Brissac returned with this answer to Guise, who saw that it was hopeless to attempt making a display in the eyes of Queen Elizabeth, but gave private orders that the ambassador should not be molested. <sup>1</sup>

Such were the consequences of the day of the barricades—and thus the path of Philip was cleared of all obstructions on the part of France. His Mucio was now generalissimo. Henry was virtually deposed. Henry of Navarre, poor and good-humoured as ever, was scarcely so formidable at that moment as he might one day become. When the news of the day of barricades was brought at night to that cheerful monarch, he started from his couch. „Ha,” he exclaimed with a laugh, „but they haven't yet caught the Béarnese!” <sup>2</sup>

And it might be long before the League would catch the Béarnese; but, meantime, he could render slight assistance to Queen Elizabeth.

In England there had been much fruitless negotiation between the government of that country and the commissioners from the States-General. There

was perpetual altercation on the subject of Utrecht, Leyden, Sonoy, and the other causes of contention; the Queen—as usual—being imperious and choleric, and the envoys, in her opinion, very insolent. But the principal topic of discussion was the peace negotiations which the States-General, both a home and through their delegation in England, had been doing their best to prevent; steadily refusing her Majesty's demand that commissioners, on their part, should be appointed to participate in the conferences at Ostend. Elizabeth promised that there should be as strict regard paid to the interests of Holland as to those of England, in case of a pacification, and that she would never forget her duty to them, to herself, and to the world, as the protectress of the reformed religion. The deputies, on the other hand, warned her that peace with Spain was impossible; that the intention of the Spanish court was to deceive her, while preparing her destruction and theirs; that it was hopeless to attempt the concession of any freedom of conscience from Philip II.; and that any stipulations which might be made upon that, or any other subject, by the Spanish commissioners, would be tossed to the wind. In reply to the Queen's loud complaints that the States had been trifling with her, and undutiful to her, and that they had kept her waiting seven months long for an answer to her summons to participate in the negotiations, they replied, that up to the 15th October of the previous year, although there had been flying rumours of an intention on the part of her Majesty's government to open those communications with the enemy, it had, „nevertheless been earnestly and expressly, and with high words and oaths, denied that there was any truth in those rumours.” Since that time the States had not once only, but many times, in private letters, in public documents, and in conversations, with Lord Lei-

<sup>1</sup> De Thou, x. 264-266.

<sup>2</sup> „Etant couché surs son lit vert, il se leva, et tout gaiment dit ces mots; Ils ne tiennent encore le Béarnois” L'Estoile, 252.

cester and other eminent personages, deprecated any communications whatever with Spain, asserting uniformly their conviction that such proceedings would bring ruin on their country, and imploring her Majesty not to give ear to any propositions whatever. 1

And not only were the envoys, regularly appointed by the States-General, most active in England in their attempts to prevent the negotiations, but delegates from the Netherland churches were also sent to the Queen, to reason with her on the subject, and to utter solemn warnings that the cause of the reformed religion would be lost for ever, in case of a treaty on her part with Spain. When these clerical envoys reached England the Queen was already beginning to wake from her delusion; although her commissioners were still—as we have seen—hard at work, pouring sand through their sieves at Ostend, and although the steady protestations of the Duke of Parma, and the industrious circulation of falsehoods by Spanish emissaries, had even caused her wisest statesmen, for a time, to participate in that delusion.

For it is not so great an impeachment on the sagacity of the great Queen of England, as it would now appear to those who judge by the light of subsequent facts, that she still doubted whether the armaments, notoriously preparing in Spain and Flanders, were intended against herself; and that—even if such were the case—she still believed in the possibility of averting the danger by negotiation.

So late as the beginning of May, even the far-seeing and anxious Walsingham could say that in England „they were doing nothing but honouring St. George, of whom the Spanish Armada seemed to be afraid. We hear,” he added, „that they will not be ready to set forward before the midst of May,

but I trust that it will be May come twelvemonths. The King of Spain is too old and too sickly to fall to conquer kingdoms. If he be well counselled, his best course will be to settle his own kingdoms in his own hands.” 1

And even much later, in the middle of July—when the mask was hardly maintained—even then there was no certainty as to the movements of the Armada; and Walsingham believed, just ten days before the famous fleet was to appear off Plymouth, that it had dispersed and returned to Spain, never to re-appear. 2 As to Parma's intentions, they were thought to lie rather in the direction of Ostend than of England; and Elizabeth, on the 20th July, was more anxious for that city than for her own kingdom. „Mr Ned, I am persuaded,” she wrote to Norris, „that if the Spanish fleet break, the Prince of Parma's enterprise for England will fall to the ground, and then are you to look to Ostend. Haste your works.” 3

All through the spring and early summer, Stafford, in Paris, was kept in a state of much perplexity as to the designs of Spain—so contradictory were the stories circulated, and so bewildering the actions of men known to be hostile to England. In the last days of April he intimated it as a common opinion in Paris,

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1 Walsingham to Sir Ed. Norris, 22 April  
2 May,  
(S. P. Office MS.)

„By the middle of July,” says Stowe, „it was said by some of honourable rank and great judgment, that the whole fleet of the invasion was a Popish brag and a French tale.” 750.

2 Walsingham to E. Norris,  $\frac{9}{19}$  July, 1588.  
(S. P. Office MS.)

„And for the navy of Spain, we have lately received advertisements that by reason of their great wants, as well of mariners as of necessary provision, but especially through the infection fallen among their men, they are forced to return, and have dispersed themselves.” (11).

3 Leicester to E. Norris. P. S. by Queen Elizabeth (?),  $\frac{10}{20}$  July, 1588. (S. P. Office MS.)



that these naval preparations of Philip were an elaborate farce; „that the great elephant would bring forth but a mouse; that the great processions, prayers, and pardons at Rome, for the prosperous success of the Armada against England, would be of no effect; that the King of Spain was laughing in his sleeve at the Pope, that he could make such a fool of him; and that such an enterprise was a thing the King never durst think of in deed, but only in show to feed the world.” 1

Thus, although furnished with minute details as to these armaments, and as to the exact designs of Spain against his country, by the ostentatious statements of the Spanish ambassador in Paris himself, the English envoy was still inclined to believe that these statements were a figment, expressly intended to deceive. Yet he was aware that Lord Westmoreland, Lord Paget, Sir Charles Paget, Morgan, and other English refugees, were constantly meeting with Mendoza, that they were told to get themselves in readiness, and to go down—as well appointed as might be—to the Duke of Parma; that they had been „sending for their tailor to make them apparel, and to put themselves in equipage;” that, in particular, Westmoreland had been assured of being restored by Philip to his native country in better condition than before. The Catholic and Spanish party in Paris were, however, much dissatisfied with the news from Scotland, and were getting more and more afraid that King James would object to the Spaniards getting a foot-hold in his country, and that „the Scots would soon be playing them a Scottish trick.” 2

Stafford was plunged still more inextricably into doubt by the accounts

from Longlée in Madrid. 1 That diplomatist, who had been completely convinced by Philip as to his innocence of any participation in the criminal enterprises of Guise against Henri III., was now almost staggered by the unscrupulous mendacity of that monarch with regard to any supposed designs against England. Although the Armada was to be ready by the 15th May, Longlée was of opinion—nowithstanding many bold announcements of an attack upon Elizabeth—that the real object of the expedition was America. There had recently been discovered, it was said, „a new country, more rich in gold and silver than any yet found, but so full of stout people that they could not master them.” 2 To reduce these stout people beyond the Atlantic, therefore, and to get possession of new gold mines, was the real object at which Philip was driving and Longlée and Stafford were both very doubtful whether it were worth the Queen’s while to exhaust her finances in order to protect herself against an imaginary invasion. Even so late as *the middle of July*, six to one was offered on the Paris Exchange that the Spanish fleet would never be seen in the English seas, and those that offered the bets were known to be well-wishers to the Spanish party. 3

Thus sharp diplomatists and statesmen like Longlée, Stafford, and Walsingham were beginning to lose their fear of the great bugbear by which England had so long been haunted. It was therefore no deep stain on the Queen’s sagacity that she, too, was willing to place credence in the plighted honour of Alexander Farnese, the great prince who prided

1 Dépêches de Longlée envoyé de Henri III. en Espagne, Mars, Avril, Mai, 1588. Fonds St. Germain. (Bib. Imp. de France, MS.)

2 Stafford to Walsingham,  $\frac{24 \text{ April}}{4 \text{ May}}$ , 1588.

(S. P. Office MS.)

3 Stafford to Walsingham,  $\frac{3}{13}$  July, 1588.

(S. P. Office MS.)

1 Sir E. Stafford to Walsingham,  $\frac{12}{22}$  April, 1588. (S. P. Office MS.)

2 Stafford to Walsingham,  $\frac{24 \text{ April}}{4 \text{ May}}$ , 1588. (S. P. Office MS.)

himself on his sincerity, and who, next to the King his master, adored the virgin Queen of England.

The deputies of the *Netherland churches* had come, with the permission of Count Maurice and of the States-General, but they represented more strongly than any other envoys could do the English and the monarchical party. They were instructed especially to implore the Queen to accept the sovereignty of their country; to assure her that the restoration of Philip—who had been a wolf instead of a shepherd to his flock—was an impossibility, that he had been solemnly and for ever deposed; that under her sceptre only could the Provinces ever recover their ancient prosperity; that ancient and modern history alike made it manifest that a free republic could never maintain itself, but that it must, of necessity, run its course through sedition, bloodshed, and anarchy, until liberty was at last crushed by an absolute despotism; that equality of condition, the basis of democratic institutions, could never be made firm; and that a fortunate exception, like that of Switzerland, whose historical and political circumstances were peculiar, could never serve as a model to the *Netherlands*, accustomed as those Provinces had ever been to a monarchical form of government; and that the antagonism of aristocratic and democratic elements in the States had already produced discord, and was threatening destruction to the whole country. To avert such dangers the splendour of royal authority was necessary, according to the venerable commands of Holy Writ, and therefore the *Netherland churches* acknowledged themselves the foster children of England, and begged that in political matters also the inhabitants of the Provinces might be accepted as the subjects of her Majesty. They also implored the Queen to break off these accursed negotiations with Spain, and to provide that henceforth in the *Netherlands* the

reformed religion might be freely exercised, *to the exclusion of any other.*"<sup>1</sup>

Thus it was very evident that these clerical envoys, although they were sent by permission of the States, did not come as the representatives of the dominant party. For that „Beelzebub, Barneveld, had different notions from theirs as to the possibility of a republic, and as to the propriety of tolerating other forms of worship than his own. But it was for such pernicious doctrines, on religious matters in particular, that he was called Beelzebub, Pope John, a papist in disguise, and an atheist; and denounced, as leading young Maurice and the whole country to destruction.

On the basis of these instructions, the deputies drew up a memorial of pitiless length, filled with astounding parallels

12 July, between their own position 1588, and that of the Hebrews, Assyrians, and other distinguished nations of antiquity. They brought it to Walsingham on the 12th July, 1588, and the much-enduring man heard it read from beginning to end. He expressed his approbation of its sentiments, but said it was too long. It must be put on one sheet of paper, he said, if her Majesty was expected to read it.

„Moreover," said the Secretary of State, „although your arguments are full of piety, and your examples from Holy Writ very apt, I must tell you the plain truth. Great princes are not always so zealous in religious matters as they might be. Political transactions move them more deeply, and they depend too much on worldly things. However, there is no longer much danger, for our envoys will return from Flanders in a few days;"<sup>2</sup>

„But," asked a deputy, „if the Spanish fleet does not succeed in its enterprise, will the peace-negotiations be renewed?"

<sup>1</sup> Instructions from the Churches of the *Netherlands* for the Deputies to the Queen of England, apud Bor, iii. 255-259.

<sup>2</sup> Report of the Deputies, in Bor, iii. 259.

„By no means,” said Walsingham; „the Queen can never do that, consistently with her honour. They have scattered infamous libels against her—so scandalous, that you would be astounded should you read them. Arguments drawn from honour are more valid with princes than any other.”

He alluded to the point in their memorial touching the free exercise of the reformed religion in the Provinces.

„Tis well and piously said,” he observed; „but princes and great lords are not always very earnest in such matters. I think that her Majesty’s envoys will not press for the free exercise of the religion so very much; not more than for two or three years. By that time—should our negotiations succeed—the foreign troops will have evacuated the Netherlands on condition that the States-General shall settle the religious question.”<sup>1</sup>

„But,” said Daniel de Dieu, one of the deputies, „the majority of the States is *Popish*.”

„Be it so,” replied Sir Francis; „nevertheless they will sooner permit the exercise of the reformed religion than take up arms and begin the war anew.”

He then alluded to the proposition of the deputies to exclude all religious worship but that of the reformed church—all false religion—as they expressed themselves.

„Her Majesty,” said he, „is well disposed to permit some exercise of their religion to the Papists. So far as regards my own feelings, if we were now in the beginning of the reformation, and the papacy were still entire, I should willingly concede such exercise; but now that the papacy has been overthrown, I think it would not be safe to give such permission. When we were disputing, at the time of the pacification of Ghent, whether the Popish religion should be partially permitted, the Prince

of Orange was of the affirmative opinion; but I, who was then at Antwerp, entertained the contrary conviction.”

„But,” said one of the deputies—pleased to find that Walsingham was more of their way of thinking on religious toleration than the great Prince of Orange had been, or than Maurice and Barneveld then were—„but her Majesty will, we hope, follow the advice of her good and faithful counsellors.”

„To tell you the truth, answered Sir Francis, „great princes are not always inspired with a sincere and upright zeal;”—it was the third time he had made this observation—„although, so far as regards the maintenance of the religion in the Netherlands, that is a matter of necessity. Of that there is no fear, since otherwise all the pious would depart, and none would remain but Papists, and, what is more, enemies of England. Therefore the Queen is aware that the religion must be maintained.”<sup>1</sup>

He then advised the deputies to hand in the memorial to her Majesty, without any long speeches, for which there was then no time or opportunity; and it was subsequently arranged that they should be presented to the Queen as she would be mounting her horse at St. James’s to ride to Richmond.

Accordingly on the 15th July, as her Majesty came forth at the gate, with a throng of nobles and ladies—some July 15, about to accompany her and 1588. some bidding her adieu—the deputies fell on their knees before her. Notwithstanding the advice of Walsingham, Daniel de Dieu was bent upon an oration.

„Oh illustrious Queen!” he began, „the churches of the United Netherlands—”

He had got no further, when the Queen, interrupting, exclaimed, „Oh! I beg you—at another time—I cannot now listen to a speech. Let me see the memorial.”

Daniel de Dieu then humbly presented

<sup>1</sup> Report of the Deputies, in Bor, last cited.

<sup>1</sup> Ibid.



that document, which her Majesty graciously received, and then, getting on horseback rode off to Richmond. 1

The memorial was in the nature of an exhortation to sustain the religion, and to keep clear of all negotiations with idolaters and unbelievers, and the memorialists supported themselves by copious references to Deuteronomy, Proverbs, Isaiah, Timothy, and Psalms, relying mainly on the case of Jehosaphat, who came to disgrace and disaster through his treaty with the idolatrous King Ahab. With regard to any composition with Spain, they observed, in homely language, that a burnt cat fears the fire; and they assured the Queen that, by following their advice, she would gain a glorious and immortal name, like those of David, Ezekiel, Josiah, and others, whose fragrant memory, even as precious incense from the apothecary's, endureth to the end of the world. 2

It was not surprising that Elizabeth, getting on horseback on the 15th July, 1588, with her head full of Tillbury Fort and Medina Sidonia, should have as little relish for the affairs of Ahab and Jehosaphat, as for those melting speeches of Diomedes and of Turnus to which Dr. Valentine Dale on his part was at that moment invoking her attention.

On the 20th July the deputies were informed by Leicester that her Majesty would grant them an interview, and that they must come into his quarter July 20, of the palace and await her arrival. 1588.

Between six and seven in the evening she came into the throne-room, and the deputies again fell on their knees before her. 3

She then seated herself—the deputies remaining on their knees on her right side and the Earl of Leicester standing at her left—and proceeded to make many re-

marks touching her earnestness in the pending negotiations to provide for their religious freedom. It seemed that she must have received a hint from Walsingham on the subject.

„I shall provide,” she said, „for the maintenance of the reformed worship.”

De Dieu.—„The enemy will never concede it.”

The Queen.—„I think differently.”

De Dieu.—„There is no place within his dominions where he has permitted the exercise of the pure religion. He has never done so.”

The Queen.—„He conceded it in the pacification of Ghent.”

De Dieu.—„But he did not keep his agreement. Don John had concluded with the States, but said he was not held to his promise; in case he should repent; and the King wrote afterwards to our States, and said that he was no longer bound to his pledge.”

The Queen.—„That is quite another thing.”

De Dieu.—„He has very often broken his faith.”

The Queen.—„He shall no longer be allowed to do so. If he does not keep his word, that is my affair, not yours. It is my business to find the remedy. Men would say, See in what a desolation the Queen of England has brought this poor people. As to the freedom of worship, I should have proposed three or four years' interval—leaving it afterwards to the decision of the States.”

De Dieu.—„But the majority of the States is Popish.”

The Queen.—„I mean the States-General, not the States of any particular Province”

De Dieu.—„The greater part of the States-General is Popish.”

The Queen.—„I mean the three estates—the clergy, the nobles, and the cities,” The Queen—as the deputies observed—here fell into an error. She thought that prelates of the reformed church, as in England, had seats in the States-General.

1, Report of the Deputies, 259, 260-262.  
2, Memorial from the United Churches, &c., apud Bor, iii. 260-262 *seq.*

3 Bor, iii. 262, 263.

Daniel de Dieu explained that they had no such position.

The Queen.—„Then how were you sent hither?”

De Dieu.—„We came with the consent of Count Maurice of Nassau.”

The Queen.—„And of the States?”

De Dieu.—„We came with their knowledge.”

The Queen.—„Are you sent only from Holland and Zeeland? Is there no envoy from Utrecht and the other Provinces?”

Helmichius.—„We two,” pointing to his colleague Sossingius, „are from Utrecht.”

The Queen.—„What? Is this young man also a minister?” She meant Helmichius, who had a very little beard, and looked young.

Sossingius.—„He is not so young as he looks.”

The Queen.—„Youths are sometimes as able as old men.”

De Dieu.—„I have heard our brother preach in France more than fourteen years ago.”

The Queen.—„He must have begun young. How old were you when you first became a preacher?”

Helmichius.—„Twenty-three or twenty-four years of age.”

The Queen.—„It was with us, at first, considered a scandal that a man so young as that should be admitted to the pulpit. Our antagonists reproached us with it in a book called *Scandale de l'Angleterre*, saying that we had none but schoolboys for ministers. I understand that you pray for me as warmly as if I were your sovereign princess. I think I have done as much for the religion as if I were your Queen.”

Helmichius.—„We are far from thinking otherwise. We acknowledge willingly your Majesty's benefits to our churches.”

The Queen.—„It would else be ingratitude on your part.”

Helmichius.—„But the King of Spain will never keep any promise about the religion.”

The Queen.—„He will never come so far: he does nothing but make a noise on all sides. Item, I don't think he has much confidence in himself.”

De Dieu.—„Your Majesty has many enemies. The Lord hath hitherto supported you, and we pray that He may continue to uphold your Majesty.”

The Queen.—„I have indeed many enemies; but I make no great account of them. Is there anything else you seek?”

De Dieu.—„There is a special point: it concerns our, or rather your Majesty's, city of Flushing. We hope that Russelius—(so he called Sir William Russell)—may be continued in its government, although he wishes his discharge.”

„Aha!” said the Queen, laughing and rising from her seat, „I shall not answer you; I shall call some one else to answer you.”

She then summoned Russell's sister, Lady Warwick.

„If you could speak French,” said the Queen to that gentlewoman, „I should bid you reply to these gentlemen, who beg that your brother may remain in Flushing, so very agreeable has he made himself to them.”

The Queen was pleased to hear this good opinion of Sir William, and this request that he might continue to be governor of Flushing, because he had uniformly supported the Leicester party, and was at that moment in high quarrel with Count Maurice and the leading members of the States.

As the deputies took their leave, they requested an answer to their memorial, which was graciously promised. 1

Three days afterwards, 23rd July, Walsingham gave them a written answer to their memorial—conceived in the same sense as had been the expressions of her Majesty and her counsellors. 28 July, Support to the Netherlands 1588. and stipulations for the free exercise

1 Report of the Deputies of the Netherland Churches, in Bor. iii. 262 seq.

of their religion were promised; but it was impossible for these deputies of the churches to obtain a guarantee from England that the Popish religion should be excluded from the Provinces, in case of a successful issue to the Queen's negotiation with Spain. 1

And thus during all those eventful days—the last weeks of July and the first weeks of August—the clerical deputation remained in England, indulging in voluminous protocols and lengthened conversations with the Queen and the principal members of her government. It is astonishing, in that breathless interval of history, that so much time could be found for quill-driving and oratory.

Nevertheless, both in Holland and England, there had been other work than protocolling. One throb of patriotism moved the breast of both nations. A longing to grapple, once for all, with the great enemy of civil and religious liberty inspired both. In Holland, the States-General and all the men to whom the people looked for guidance, had been long deprecating the peace-negotiations. Extraordinary supplies—more than had ever been granted before—were voted for the expenses of the campaign; and Maurice of Nassau, fitly embodying the warlike tendencies of his country and race, had been most importunate with Queen Elizabeth that she would accept his services and his advice. 2 Armed vessels of every size, from the gun-boat to the galleon of 1200 tons—then the most imposing ship in those waters—swarmed in all the estuaries and rivers, and along the Dutch and Flemish coast, bidding defiance to Parma and his armaments; and offers of a large contingent from the fleets of Joost de Moor and Justinus de Nassau, to serve under Seymour and Howard, were freely made by the States-General.

It was decided early in July, by the board of admiralty, presided over by

Prince Maurice, that the largest square-rigged vessels of Holland and Zeeland should cruise between England and the Flemish coast, outside the banks; that a squadron of lesser ships should be stationed within the banks; and that a fleet of sloops and fly-boats should hover close in shore, about Flushing and Rammekens. All the war-vessels of the little republic were thus fully employed. But, besides this arrangement, Maurice was empowered to lay an embargo—under what penalty he chose and during his pleasure—on all square-rigged vessels over 300 tons, in order that there might be an additional supply in case of need. Ninety ships of war under Warmond, admiral, and Van der Does, vice-admiral of Holland; and Justinus de Nassau, admiral, and Joost de Moor, vice-admiral of Zeeland; together with fifty merchant-vessels of the best and strongest, equipped and armed for active service, composed a formidable fleet. 1

The States-General, a month before, had sent twenty-five or thirty good ships, under Admiral Rosendael, to join Lord Henry Seymour, then cruising between Dover and Calais. A tempest drove them back, and their absence from Lord Henry's fleet being misinterpreted by the English, the States were censured for ingratitude and want of good faith. But the injustice of the accusation was soon made

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1 So soon as the Sonoy difficulty, by which so much mischief had been created, should be terminated, Maurice announced his intention to the Queen. „à combattre l'ennemi par mer et par terre, pour l'empêcher qu'il ne prenne terre.” „Je supplie V. M.” he continued, „de commander à M. l'admiral Howard de tenir correspondance avec moi, comme aussi je ferai avec Sa Seignie.” Maurice de Nassau to the Queen, 20 April, 1588. (S. P. Office MS.)

30 „Ne pouvant, pour mon devoir vous celer qu'un des plus grands empêchements que je trouve en nos affaires de pardeça est cette negotiation de paix qui engendre de telles confusions que les forces ne peuvent être employées par mer et par terre si tôt et si bien que je desirerai. Je ferai toute fois toute diligence d'être prest assez à temps pour rompre les desseins du Duc de Parma &c. Same to same, same date.

1 Report, &c. *ubi sup.*

2 Bor. iii. 318, 319.



manifest, for these vessels, reinforcing the great Dutch fleet outside the banks, did better service than they could have done in the straits. A squadron of strong well-armed vessels, having on board, in addition to their regular equipment, a picked force of twelve hundred musketeers, long accustomed to this peculiar kind of naval warfare, with crews of grim Zeelanders, who had faced Alva and Valdez in their day, now kept close watch over Farnese, determined that he should never thrust his face out of any haven or nook on the coast so long as they should be in existence to prevent him. 1

And in England the protracted diplomacy at Ostend, ill-timed though it was, had not paralyzed the arm or chilled the heart of the nation. When the great Queen, arousing herself from the delusion in which the falsehoods of Farnese and of Philip had lulled her, should once more represent—as no man or woman better than Elizabeth Tudor could represent—the defiance of England to foreign insolence; the resolve of a whole people to die rather than yield; there was a thrill of joy through the national heart. When the enforced restraint was at last taken off, there was one bound towards the enemy. Few more magnificent spectacles have been seen in history than the enthusiasm which pervaded the country as the great danger, so long deferred, was felt at last to be closely approaching. The little nation of four millions, the merry England of the sixteenth century, went forward to the death-grapple with its gigantic antagonist as cheerfully as to a long-expected holiday. Spain was a vast empire, overshadowing the world; England, in comparison, but a province; yet nothing could surpass the steadiness with which the conflict was awaited.

For, during all the months of suspense, the soldiers and sailors, and many statesmen of England, had deprecated, even as the Hollanders had been doing, the dan-

gerous delays of Ostend. Elizabeth was not embodying the national instinct, when she talked of peace, and shrank penuriously from the expenses of war. There was much disappointment, even indignation, at the slothfulness with which the preparations for defence went on, during the period when there was yet time to make them. It was feared with justice that England, utterly unfortified as were its cities, and defended only by its little navy without, and by untaught enthusiasm within, might, after all, prove an easier conquest than Holland and Zealand, every town in whose territory bristled with fortifications. If the English ships—well-trained and swift sailers as they were—were unprovided with spars and cordage, beef and biscuit, powder and shot, and the militia-men, however enthusiastic, were neither drilled nor armed, was it so very certain, after all, that successful resistance would be made to the great Armada, and to the veteran pikemen and musketeers of Farnese, seasoned on a hundred battle-fields, and equipped as for a tournament? There was generous confidence and chivalrous loyalty on the part of Elizabeth's naval and military commanders; but there had been deep regret and disappointment at her course.

Hawkins was anxious, all through the winter and spring, to cruise with a small squadron off the coast of Spain. With a dozen vessels he undertook to „distress anything that went through the seas.” The cost of such a squadron, with eighteen hundred men, to be relieved every four months, he estimated at two thousand seven hundred pounds sterling the month, or a shilling a day for each man; and it would be a very unlucky month, he said, in which they did not make captures to three times that amount; for they would see nothing that would not be presently their own. „We might have peace, but not with God,” said the pious old slave-trader; „but rather than serve Baal, let us die a thousand deaths. Let us have open war with these Jesuits, and every man will

contribute, fight, devise, or do, for the liberty of our country." 1

And it was open war with the Jesuits for which those stout-hearted sailors longed. All were afraid of secret mischief. The diplomats—who were known to be flitting about France, Flanders, Scotland, and England—were birds of ill omen. King James was beset by a thousand bribes and expostulations to avenge his mother's death; and although that mother had murdered his father, and done her best to disinherit himself, yet it was feared that Spanish ducats might induce him to be true to his mother's revenge, and false to the reformed religion. 2 Nothing of good was hoped for from France. „For my part," said Lord Admiral Howard, „I have made of the French King, the Scottish King, and the King of Spain, a trinity that I mean never to trust to be saved by, and I would that others were of my opinion." 3

The noble sailor, on whom so much responsibility rested, yet who was so trammelled and thwarted by the timid and parsimonious policy of Elizabeth and of Burghley, chafed and shook his chains like a captive. „Since England was England," he exclaimed, „there was never such a stratagem and mask to deceive her as this treaty of peace. I pray God that we do not curse for this a long grey beard with a white head witless, that will make all

1 Hawkins to Walsingham,  $\frac{1}{11}$  Feb. 1588.

(S. P. Office MS.)

2 „En hora buena ayen ilegado el Conde de Morton y Coronel Semple," says Philip, speaking of one of the hundred attempts of the Scotch Catholics employed by him to bring about a co-operation on the part of James with the Spanish designs upon England, „aunque segun los avisos que embiastes de Inglaterra menos frutos haran que se prometian, pues tienen hereses al Rey tan de su mano. Pero bien es que hagaos las diligencias que se pueden, tentando si la sangre de su madre le estimola a la vengança," &c. Philip II. to Mendoza, 21 June, 1588. (Arch. de Simancas [in the Arch. de l'Empire, at Paris], MS.)

3 Howard to Walsingham,  $\frac{27 \text{ Jan.}}{6 \text{ Feb.}}$  1588.

(S. P. Office MS.)

the world think us heartless. You know whom I mean." 1 And it certainly was not difficult to understand the allusion to the pondering Lord-Treasurer.—„*Opus est aliquo Dædalo*, to direct us out of the maze," 2 said that much puzzled statesman, but he hardly seemed to be making himself wings with which to lift England and himself out of the labyrinth. The ships were good ships, but there was intolerable delay in getting a sufficient number of them as ready for action as was the spirit of their commanders.

„Our ships do show like gallants here," said Winter; „it would do a man's heart good to behold them. Would to God the Prince of Parma were on the seas with all his forces, and we in sight of them! You should hear that we would make his enterprise very unpleasant to him." 3

And Howard, too, was delighted not only with his own little flag-ship the *Ark-Royal*—„the odd ship of the world for all conditions,"—but with all of his fleet that could be mustered. Although wonders were reported, by every arrival from the south, of the coming Armada, the Lord-Admiral was not appalled. He was perhaps rather imprudent in the defiance he flung to the enemy. „Let me have the four great ships and twenty hoys, with but twenty men a-piece, and each with but two iron pieces, and her Majesty shall have a good account of the Spanish forces; and I will make the King wish his galleys home again. Few as we are, if his forces be not hundreds, we will make good sport with them." 4

But those four great ships of her Majesty, so much longed for by Howard, were not forthcoming. He complained

1 Howard to Walsingham, MS. last cited.

2 Burghley to Willoughby,  $\frac{6}{16}$  Feb. 1588.

(S. P. Office MS.)

3 Sir Will. Winter to Hawkins,  $\frac{28 \text{ Feb.}}{9 \text{ Mar.}}$ , 1588. (S. P. Office MS.)

4 Howard to Burghley,  $\frac{29 \text{ Feb.}}{10 \text{ Mar.}}$ , 1588.

(S. P. Office MS.)

that the Queen was „keeping them to protect Chatham Church withal, when they should be serving their turn abroad.”<sup>1</sup> The Spanish fleet was already reported as numbering from 210 sail, with 36,000 men, 2 to 400 or 500 ships, and 80,000 soldiers and mariners; 3 and yet Drake was not ready with his squadron. „The fault is not in him,” said Howard, but I pray God her Majesty do not repent her slack dealing. We must all lie together, for we shall be stirred very shortly with heave ho! I fear ere long her Majesty will be sorry she hath believed some so much as she hath done.”<sup>4</sup>

Howard had got to sea, and was cruising all the stormy month of March in the Channel with his little unprepared squadron, expecting at any moment—such was the profound darkness which enveloped the world at that day—that the sails of the Armada might appear in the offing. He made a visit to the Dutch coast, and was delighted with the enthusiasm with which he was received. Five thousand people a day came on board his ships, full of congratulation and delight; and he informed the Queen that she was not more assured of the Isle of Sheppey than of Walcheren.<sup>5</sup>

Nevertheless time wore on, and both the army and navy of England were quite unprepared, and the Queen was more reluctant than ever to incur the expense necessary to the defence of her kingdom. At least one of those galleys, which, as Howard bitterly complained, seemed destined to defend Chatham Church, was importunately demanded; but it was already Easter-day (17th April), and she

was demanded in vain. „Lord! when should she serve,” said the Admiral, „if not at such a time as this? Either she is fit now to serve, or fit for the fire. I hope never in my time to see so so great a cause for her to be used. I dare say her Majesty will look that men should fight for her, and I know they will at this time. The King of Spain doth not keep any ship at home, either of his own or any other, that he can get for money. Well, well, I must pray heartily for peace, said Howard with increasing spleen, „for I see the support of an honourable war will never appear. Sparing and war have no affinity together.”<sup>1</sup>

In truth Elizabeth’s most faithful subjects were appalled at the ruin which she seemed by her mistaken policy to be rendering inevitable. „I am sorry,” said the Admiral, „that her Majesty is so careless of this most dangerous time, I fear me much, and with grief I think it, that she relieth on a hope that will deceive her, and greatly endanger her, and then it will not be her money nor her jewels that will help; for as they will do good in time, so they will help nothing for the redeeming of time.”<sup>2</sup>

The preparations on shore were even more dilatory than those on the sea. We have seen that the Duke of Parma, once landed, expected to march directly upon London; and it was notorious that there were no fortresses to oppose a march of the first general in Europe and his veterans upon that unprotected and wealthy metropolis. An army had been enrolled—a force of 86,016 foot, and 13,831 cavalry; but it was an army on paper merely. Even of the 86,000, only 48,000 were set down as trained; and it is certain that the training had been of the most meagre and unsatisfactory description.<sup>3</sup> Leicester was to

<sup>1</sup> Howard to Walsingham,  $\frac{11}{21}$  March, 1588.

(S. P. Office MS.) <sup>2</sup> Ibid.

<sup>3</sup> Drake to the Queen,  $\frac{26}{8}$  April, 1588. (S. P. Office MS.)

<sup>4</sup> Howard to Walsingham,  $\frac{11}{21}$  March, 1588. MS.

<sup>5</sup> Same to same,  $\frac{9}{19}$  March, 1588. (S. P. Office MS.)

<sup>1</sup> Howard to Walsingham,  $\frac{7}{17}$  April, 1588.

(S. P. Office MS.)

<sup>2</sup> Same to same, MS. last cited.

<sup>3</sup> Murden, 608-613. „Hardwicke Papers”.



be commander-in-chief; but we have already seen that nobleman measuring himself, not much to his advantage, with Alexander Farnese, in the Isle of Bommel, on the sands of Blankenburg, and at the gates of Sluys. His army was to consist of 27,000 infantry and 2000 horse; yet at midsummer it had not reached half that number. Lord Chamberlain Hunsdon was to protect the Queen's person with another army of 36,000; but this force was purely an imaginary one; and the lord-lieutenant of each county was to do his best with the militia. But men were perpetually escaping out of the general service, in order to make themselves retainers for private noblemen, and be kept at their expense. „You shall hardly believe, said Leicester, „how many new liveries be gotten within these six weeks, and no man fears the penalty. It would be better that every nobleman did as Lord Dacres, than to take away from the principal service such as are set down to serve.”<sup>1</sup>

Of enthusiasm and courage, then, there was enough, while of drill and discipline, of powder and shot, there was a deficiency. No braver or more competent soldier could be found than Sir Edward Stanley—the man whom we have seen in his yellow jerkin, helping himself into Fort Zutphen with the Spanish soldier's pike—and yet Sir Edward Stanley gave but a sorry account of the choicest soldiers of Chester and Lancashire, whom he had been sent to inspect. „I find them not,” he said, „according to your expectation, nor mine own liking. They were appointed two years past to have been trained six days by the year or more, at the discretion of the muster-master, but, as yet, they *have not been trained any day*, so that they have benefited nothing, nor yet know their leaders. There is now promise of amendment, which, I

doubt, will be very slow, in respect to my Lord Derby's absence.”<sup>1</sup>

My Lord Derby was at that moment, and for many months afterwards, assisting Valentine Dale in his classical pro-lusions on the sands of Bourbourg. He had better have been mustering the train-bands of Lancashire. There was a general indisposition in the rural districts to expend money and time in military business, until the necessity should become imperative. Professional soldiers complained bitterly of the canker of a long peace. „For our long quietness, which it hath pleased God to send us,” said Stanley, „they think their money very ill bestowed which they expend on armour or weapon, for that they be in hope they shall never have occasion to use it, so they may pass muster, as they have done heretofore. I want greatly powder, for there is little or none at all.”<sup>2</sup>

The day was fast approaching when all the powder in England would be

1 Edward Stanley to the Privy Council  
28 Feb. 1588. (S. P. Office MS.) 2 Ibid.  
9 March

All the spring, Sir John Norris was doing what he could to exercise the soldiers in London. The captains of the Artillery-Garden had been tolerably well drilled for several years, but the rank and file were ignorant enough of the art of war. „There has been a general muster of men fit to bear arms here,” said a resident of London in April, „and there have not been found ten thousand sufficient men. This will seem strange to you, but it is as true as the Gospel of St. John. There is a great want of powder, and no hope of supply, except that which can be manufactured in England.” Avis de Londres, Avril, 1588. (Arch. de Simancas, MS.)

The encouragement given to the peace-party in the metropolis by the Ostend negotiations was acting like a poison. „The people here are anxious for peace,” wrote a secret correspondent of the Spanish government; „and if the Duke of Parma gives the least hope in the world of it, they will all throw down their arms.” Much encouragement, too, was given to Philip by the alleged disloyalty of many inhabitants of London. „There is an infinity of fellows here,” said the writer, „who desire the sacking of London not less than the Spaniards themselves do, and are doing all they can to advance the Catholic cause.” Avisos de Londres, 21-25-28 Mayo, 1588. (Arch. de Simancas [Paris], MS.)

i. 576 Lingard, viii. 273. Camden, iii. 405. Stowe, 750.

1 Leicester to Walsingham, 24 July, 1585. S. P. Office MS.) 5 Aug.

too little for the demand. But matters had not very much mended even at mid-summer. It is true that Leicester, who was apt to be sanguine—particularly in matters under his immediate control—spoke of the handful of recruits assembled at his camp in Essex, as „soldiers of a year’s experience, rather than a month’s camping;” but in this opinion he differed from many competent authorities, and was somewhat in contradiction to himself. Nevertheless he was glad that the Queen had determined to visit him, and encourage his soldiers.

„I have received in secret,” he said, „those news that please me, that your Majesty doth intend to behold the poor and bare company that lie here in the field, most willingly to serve you, yea, most ready to die for you. You shall, dear Lady, behold as goodly, loyal, and as able men as any prince Christian can show you, and yet but a handful of your own, in comparison of the rest you have. What comfort not only these shall receive who shall be the happiest to behold yourself I cannot express; but assuredly it will give no small comfort to the rest, that shall be overshadowed with the beams of so gracious and princely a party, for what your royal Majesty shall do to these will be accepted as done to all. Good sweet Queen, alter not your purpose, if God give you health. It will be your pain for the time, but your pleasure to behold such people. And surely the place must content you, being as fair a soil and as goodly a prospect as may be seen or found, as this extreme weather hath made trial, which doth us little annoyance, it is so firm and dry a ground. Your usher also liketh your lodging—a proper, secret, cleanly house. Your camp is a little mile off, and your person will be as sure as at St. James’s, for my life.” 1

1 Leicester to the Queen,  $\frac{5}{15}$  July, 1588.  
(S. P. Office MS.)

But notwithstanding this cheerful view of the position expressed by the commander-in-chief, the month of July had passed, and the *early days of August* had already arrived; and yet the camp was not formed, nor anything more than that mere handful of troops mustered about Tilbury, to defend the road from Dover to London. The army at Tilbury never exceeded sixteen or seventeen thousand men. 1

The whole royal navy—numbering about thirty-four vessels in all—of different sizes, ranging from 1100 and 1000 tons to 30, had at last been got ready for sea. Its aggregate tonnage was 11,820; 2 not half so much as at the present moment—in the case of one marvellous merchant steamer—*floats upon a single keel*.

These vessels carried 837 guns and 6279 men. But the navy was reinforced by the patriotism and liberality of English merchants and private gentlemen. The city of London, having been requested to furnish 15 ships of war and 5000 men, asked two days for deliberation, and then gave 30 ships and 10,000 men, 3 of which number 2710 were seamen. Other cities, particularly Plymouth, came forward with proportionate liberality, and private individuals, nobles, merchants, and men of humblest rank, were enthusiastic in volunteering into the naval service, to risk property and life in defence of the country. By mid-summer there had been a total force of 197 vessels manned, and partially equipped, with an aggregate of 29,744 tons, and 15,785 seamen. Of this fleet a very large number were mere coasters of less than 100 tons each; scarcely ten ships were above 500, and but one above 1000 tons—the *Triumph*, Captain Frobisher, of 1100 tons, 42 guns, and 500 sailors. 4

Lord Howard of Effingham, Lord

1 Stowe, 750. 2 Barrow, 266, 267.  
3 Stowe, 743. Compare estimates in Barrow, 268. 4 Ibid.

High-Admiral of England, distinguished for his martial character, public spirit, and admirable temper, rather than for experience or skill as a seaman, took command of the whole fleet, in his „little odd ship for all conditions,” the *Ark Royal*, of 800 tons, 425 sailors, and 55 guns.

Next in rank was Vice-Admiral Drake, in the *Revenge*, of 500 tons, 250 men and 40 guns. Lord Henry Seymour, in the *Rainbow*, of precisely the same size and strength, commanded the inner squadron, which cruised in the neighbourhood of the French and Flemish coast.

The Hollanders and Zeelanders had undertaken to blockade the Duke of Parma still more closely, and pledged themselves that he should never venture to show himself upon the open sea at all. The mouth of the Scheldt, and the dangerous shallows off the coast of Newport and Dunkirk, swarmed with their determined and well-seasoned craft, from the flybooter or filibuster of the rivers, to the larger armed vessels, built to confront every danger, and to deal with any adversary.

Farnese, on his part, within that well-guarded territory, had, for months long, scarcely, slackened in his preparations, day or night. Whole forests had been felled in the land of Waas to furnish him with transports and gunboats, and with such rapidity, that—according to his enthusiastic historiographer—each tree seemed by magic to metamorphose itself into a vessel at the word of command. 1 Shipbuilders, pilots, and seamen were brought from the Baltic, from Hamburg, from Genoa. The whole surface of the obedient Netherlands, whence wholesome industry had long been banished, was now the scene of a prodigious baleful activity. Portable bridges for fording the rivers of England, stockades for entrenchments, rafts and bars, were provided in vast numbers,

and Alexander dug canals and widened natural streams to facilitate his operations. 1 These wretched Provinces, crippled, impoverished, languishing for peace, were forced to contribute out of their poverty, and to find strength even in their exhaustion, to furnish the machinery for destroying their own countrymen, and for hurling to perdition their most healthful neighbour.

And this approaching destruction of England—now generally believed in—was like the sound of a trumpet throughout Catholic Europe. Scions of royal houses, grandees of azure blood, the bastard of Philip II., the bastard of Savoy, the bastard of Medici, the Margrave of Burghaut, the Archduke Charles, nephew of the Emperor, the Princes of Ascoli and of Melfi, the Prince of Morocco, and others of illustrious name, with many a noble English traitor, like Paget, and Westmoreland, and Stanley, all hurried to the camp of Farnese, as to some famous tournament, in which it was a disgrace to chivalry if their names were not enrolled. The roads were trampled with levies of fresh troops from Spain, Naples, Corsica, the States of the Church, the Milanese, Germany, Burgundy.

Blas Capizucca was sent in person to conduct reinforcements from the north of Italy. The famous Terzio of Naples, under Carlos Pinelo, arrived 3500 strong—the most splendid regiment ever known in the history of war. Every man had an engraved corslet and musket-barrel, and there were many who wore gilded armour, while their waving plumes and festive caparisons made them look like holiday-makers, rather than real campaigners, in the eyes of the inhabitants of the various cities through which their road led them to Flanders. 2 By the end of April the Duke of Parma saw him-

1 Strada, *ubi sup.* Parma to Philip, 21 Dec. 1587. (Arch. de Simancas, MS.) Meteren, xv. 270.

2 Carnero, 'Guerras de Flandes' (1625), p. 222.

1 Strada, ii. ix. 542.



self at the head of 60,000 men, at a monthly expense of 454,315 crowns or dollars. 1 Yet so rapid was the progress of disease—incident to northern climates—among those southern soldiers, that we shall find the number woefully diminished before they were likely to set foot upon the English shore.

Thus great preparations, simultaneously with pompous negotiations, had been going forward month after month, in England, Holland, Flanders. Nevertheless, winter, spring, two-thirds of

1 'Relacion Particular,' &c. 29 April, 1588. (Arch. de Simancas, MS.) Compare Strada II. ix. 540.

summer, had passed away, and on the 29th July, 1588 there remained the same sickening uncertainty, which was the atmosphere in which the nations had existed for a twelvemonth.

Howard had cruised for a few weeks between England and Spain, without any results, and, on his return, had found it necessary to implore her Majesty, as late as July, to „trust no more to Judas' kisses, but to her sword, not her enemy's word." 1

1 Howard to Walsingham, <sup>28 June</sup>/<sub>3 July</sub>, 1588. in Barrow, 284.

## CHAPTER XIX.

Philip Second in his Cabinet—His System of Work and Deception—His vast but vague Schemes of Conquest—The Armada sails—Description of the Fleet—The Junction with Parma unprovided for—The Gale off Finisterre—Exploits of David Gwynn—First Engagements in the English Channel—Considerable Losses of the Spaniards—General Engagement near Portland—Superior Seamanship of the English—Both Fleets off Calais—A Night of Anxiety—Project of Howard and Winter—Impatience of the Spaniards—Fire-Ships sent against the Armada—A great Galeasse disabled—Attacked and captured by English Boats—General Engagement of both Fleets—Loss of several Spanish Ships—Armada flies, followed by the English—English insufficiently provided—Are obliged to relinquish the Chase—A great Storm disperses the Armada—Great Energy of Parma—Made fruitless by Philip's Dulness—England readier at Sea than on Shore—The Lieutenant-General's Complaints—His Quarrels with Norris and Williams—Harsh Statements as to the English Troops—Want of Organization in England—Royal Parsimony and Delay—Quarrels of English Admirals—England's narrow Escape from great Peril—Various Rumours as to the Armada's Fate—Philip for a long Time in Doubt—He believes himself victorious—Is tranquil when undeceived.

It is now time to look in upon the elderly letter-writer in the Escorial, and see how he was playing his part in the drama.

His counsellors were very few. His chief advisers were rather like private

secretaries than cabinet ministers; for Philip had been withdrawing more and more into seclusion and mystery as the webwork of his schemes multiplied and widened. He liked to do his work, assisted by a very few confidential servants. The Prince of Eboli, the famous Ruy Gomez, was dead. So was Cardinal Granvelle. So were Erasso and Delgado. His midnight council—*junta de noche*—for thus, from its original hour of assembling, and the air of secrecy in which it was enwrapped, it was habitually called—was a triumvirate. Don Juan de Idiaquez was chief secretary of state and of war; the Count de Chinchon was minister for the household, for Italian affairs, and for the kingdom of Aragon; Don Cristoval de Moura, the monarch's chief favourite, was at the head of the finance department, and administered the affairs of Portugal and Castile. 1

The president of the council of Italy, after Granvelle's death, was Quiroga, cardinal of Toledo, and inquisitor-general. 2 Enormously long letters, in the King's name, were prepared chiefly by

1 Herrarâ, III. ii. 43-45, and 188.

2 Herrera, *ubi sup.*

the two secretaries, Idiaquez and Moura. In their hands was the vast correspondence with Mendoza and Parma, and Olivarez at Rome, and with Mucio, in which all the stratagems for the subjugation of Protestant Europe were slowly and artistically contrived. Of the great conspiracy against human liberty, of which the Pope and Philip were the double head, this midnight triumvirate was the chief executive committee.

These innumerable despatches, signed by Philip, were not the emanations of his own mind. The King had a fixed purpose to subdue Protestantism and to conquer the world; but the plans for carrying the purpose into effect were developed by subtler and more comprehensive minds than his own. It was enough for him to ponder wearily over schemes which he was supposed to dictate, and to give himself the appearance of supervising what he scarcely comprehended. And his work of supervision was often confined to pettiest details. The handwriting of Spain and Italy at that day was beautiful, and in our modern eyes seems neither antiquated nor ungraceful. But Philip's scrawl was like that of a clown just admitted to a writing-school, and the whole margin of a fairly penned despatch, perhaps fifty pages long, laid before him for comment and signature by Idiaquez or Moura, would be sometimes covered with a few awkward sentences, which it was almost impossible to read, and which, when deciphered, were apt to reveal suggestions of astounding triviality. 1

Thus a most important despatch—in

1 No man who has had personal experience in the Archives of Simancas, or who has studied with his own eyes the great collection of documents originally belonging to that depository, and now preserved in the Archives of the Empire at Paris, will assert that the description in the text is exaggerated. The paragraphs written in the King's own hand are almost illegible, and evidently written with great difficulty. When deciphered, they are found to be always awkward, generally ungrammatical, and very often puerile.

which the King, with his own hand, was supposed to be conveying secret intelligence to Mendoza concerning the Armada, together with minute directions for the regulations of Guise's conduct at the memorable epoch of the barricades—contained but a single comment from the monarch's own pen. „The Armada has been in Lisbon about a month—*quassi un mes*”—wrote the secretary. „There is but ons *s* in *quasi*,” said Philip. 1

Again, a despatch of Mendoza to the King contained the intelligence that Queen Elizabeth was, at the date of the letter, residing at St. James's. Philip, who had no objection to display his knowledge of English affairs—as became the man who had already been almost sovereign of England, and meant to be entirely so—supplied a piece of information in an apostille to this despatch. „St. James is a house of recreation,” he said, „which was once a monastery. There is a park between it, and the palace which is called Huytal; but *why it is called Huytal*, I am sure I don't know.” 2 His researches in the English language had not enabled him to recognize the adjective and substantive out of which the abstruse compound White-Hall (*Huyt-al*), was formed.

On another occasion, a letter from England containing important intelligence concerning the number of soldiers enrolled

1 Philip II. to Mendoza, 2 June, 1588. A 56, 152. (Arch. de Simancas [Paris], MS.) „Ha un *S* in *quasi*.”

2 „La reyna se avia retirado a San Gemes, que es a las espaldas de Huytal, la cassa de Londres, y para guarda de su persona decian haver señalada 4 mil hombres, y mil cavaleros que estuviessen siempre con ella, y a causa da estar tan medrosos los de Londres, llevaron a Don Pedro de Valdez y a todos los de mas que se tomaron en carros a Londres para que viesse el pueblo que arian tomado presos españoles con voz de ser deshecha toda la armada de V. Md.” &c.

Note in Philip's hand: „Casa de plazet que fue monasterio—es un parque entre ella y el palacio que se llama Huytal, y no sé porque yo.” Mendoza to Philip II. 20 Aug. 1588. (Arch. de Simancas [Paris], MS.)

in that country to resist the Spanish invasion, the quantity of gunpowder and various munitions collected, with other details of like nature, furnished besides a bit of information of less vital interest. „In the windows of the Queen's presence-chamber they have discovered a *great quantity of lice*, all clustered together," said the writer.

Such a minute piece of statistics could not escape the microscopic eye of Philip. So, disregarding the soldiers and the gunpowder, he commented *only* on this last-mentioned clause of the letter; and he did it cautiously too, as a King surnamed the Prudent should:—

„But perhaps they were fleas," wrote Philip. 1

Such examples—and many more might be given—sufficiently indicate the nature of the man on whom such enormous responsibilities rested, and who had been, by the adulation of his fellow-creatures, elevated into a god. And we may cast a glance upon him as he sits in his cabinet—buried among those piles of despatches—and receiving methodically, at stated hours, Idiaquez, or Moura, or Chincon, to settle the affairs of so many millions of the human race; and we may watch exactly the progress of that scheme, concerning which so many contradictory rumours were circulating in Europe. In the month of April a Walsingham could doubt, even in August an ingenuous comptroller could disbelieve, the reality of the great project, and the Pope himself, even while pledging himself to assistance, had been systematically deceived. He had supposed the whole scheme rendered futile by the exploit of Drake at Cadiz, and had declared that „the Queen of England's

1 „En les fenestres de la chambre de presence en la cour de la Reyne on a trouvé fort grand nombre de poux qui se sont coulés ensemble." There is a Spanish translation appended to this document, and on the margin, in Philip's hand, is written: „Gran numero de piojos o quiza pulgos." Avisos de Londres, 1 April, 1586. (Arch. de Simancas [Paris], MS.)

distaff was worth more than Philip's sword, that the King was a poor creature, that he would never be able to come to a resolution, and that even if he should do so, it would be too late;" 1 and he had subsequently been doing his best, through his nuncio in France, to persuade the Queen to embrace the Catholic religion, and thus save herself from the impending danger. Henry III. had even been urged by the Pope to send a special ambassador to her for this purpose—as if the persuasions of the wretched Valois were likely to be effective with Elizabeth Tudor—and Burghley had, by means of spies in Rome, who pretended to be Catholics, given out intimations that the Queen was seriously contemplating such a step. 2 Thus the Pope, notwithstanding Cardinal Allan, the famous million, and the bull, was thought by Mendoza to be growing lukewarm in the Spanish cause, and to be urging upon the „Englishwoman" the propriety of converting herself, even at the late hour of May, 1588. 3

1 Un Vandini, gran vanquero de Roma, que tiene correspondencia con este Rey Xmo y intelligencia con muchos Cateos le ha escrito haver dicho el Papa quando supo lo que Draques avia hecho en Cales, que Sa Magd (Philip II.) era persona de poco, que nunca se acabava de resolver, y quando lo hiziesse no seria en tiempo—han aqui no solo solemnizado pero publicado añadiendo que valla mas la rueca de la Reyna de Inglaterra que la espada del Rey de España &c. &c. Mendoza to Idiaquez, 16 July, 1587. (Arch. de Simancas [Paris], MS.)

2 „Me he visto con el nuncio, y me ha dicho que Su Santid, avia meses, que pidio a este Rey embiasse a la de Inglaterra lo bien que le estaria hazerse Catolica, y esto por tener Su Sd avisos poder venir en ello con semejantes persuasiones que este Rey escrivio a su embaxe que tiene en Inglaterra le avisasse si estava en esta disposicion la Reyna, el qual respondió el Tesorero Cecil por medio de espiones que tenia en Roma fingiendo ser Catolicos avia hecho llegar esta voz a Su Sd para ganar tiempo y entibiar le en persuadir la empresa a V. Magd. y que agora de nuevo Su Sd avia significado al Cardi de Joyosa que seria muy bien que este Rey embiasse un embaxe extrado, para hazar este officio con la Ynglesa, &c. &c. Mendoza to Philip II., 8 May, 1588. (Arch. de Simancas [Paris], MS.) 3 Ibid.



But Philip, for years, had been maturing his scheme, while reposing entire confidence—beyond his own cabinet doors—upon none but Alexander Farnese; and the Duke—alone of all men—was perfectly certain that the invasion, this year, be attempted.

The captain-general of the expedition was the Marquies of Santa Cruz, a man of considerable naval experience, and of constant good fortune, who; in thirty years, had never sustained a defeat. 1 He had however shown no desire to risk one, when Drake had offered him the memorable challenge in the year 1587, and perhaps his reputation of the invincible captain had been obtained by the same adroitness on previous occasions. He was no friend to Alexander Farnese, and was much disgusted when informed of the share allotted to the Duke in the great undertaking. 2 A course of reproach and perpetual reprimand was the treatment to which he was, in consequence, subjected, which was not more conducive to the advancement of the expedition than it was to the health of the captain-general. Early in January the Cardinal Archduke was sent to Lisbon to lecture him, with instructions to turn a deaf ear to all his remonstrances, to deal with him peremptorily, to forbid his writing letters on the subject to his Majesty, and to order him to accept his post or to decline it without conditions, in wick latter contingency he was to be informed that his successor was already decided upon. 3

This was not the most eligible way perhaps for bringing the captain-general into a cheerful mood; particularly as he was expected to be ready in *January* to sail to the Flemish coast. 4 Nevertheless the Marquis expressed a hope to

accomplish his sovereign's wishes; and great had been the bustle in all the dockyards of Naples, Sicily, and Spain; particularly in the provinces of Guipuzcoa, Biscay, and Andalusia, and in the four great cities of the coast. War-ships of all dimensions, tenders, transports, soldiers, sutlers, munitions of war, provisions, were all rapidly concentrating in Lisbon as the great place of rendezvous; and Philip confidently believed, and as confidently informed the Duke of Parma, that he might be expecting the Armada at any time after the end of January. 1

Perhaps in the history of mankind there has never been a vast project of conquest conceived and matured in so protracted and yet so desultory a manner, as was this famous Spanish invasion. There was something almost puerile in the whims rather than schemes of Philip for carrying out his purpose. It was probable that some resistance would be offered, at least by the navy of England, to the subjugation of that country, and the King had enjoyed an opportunity, the preceding summer, of seeing the way in which English sailors did their work. He had also appeared to understand the necessity of covering the passage of Farnese from the Flemish ports into the Thames, by means of the great Spanish fleet from Lisbon. Nevertheless he never seemed to be aware that Farnese could not invade England quite by himself, and was perpetually expecting to hear that he had done so.

„Holland and Zeeland,” wrote Alexander to Philip, „have been arming with their accustomed promptness; England has made great preparations. I have done my best to make the impossible possible; but your letter told me to wait for Santa Cruz, and to expect him very shortly. If, on the contrary, you had told me to make the passage without him, I would have made the attempt, although we had every one of us perished. Four ships of war could sink every one of my

1 Herrera, III. iti. 70.

2 Las Advertencias de Su Magd para el Marquies de Santa Cruz, 1588. (Arch. de Simancas, MS.)

3 MS. last cited.

4 Orden de Su Magd que se embio al Sor Cardí Archiduque. Enero, 1588. (Arch. de Simancas MS.)

1 Herrera, III. iii. 90, 91.

boats. Nevertheless I beg to be informed of your Majesty's final order. If I am seriously expected to make the passage without Santa Cruz, I am ready to do it, although I should go all alone in a cock-boat." 1

But Santa Cruz at least was not destined to assist in the conquest of England; for, worn out with fatigue and vexation, goaded by the reproaches and insults of Philip, Santa Cruz was dead. 2 He was replaced in the chief command of the fleet by the Duke of Medina Sidonia, a grandee of vast wealth, but with little capacity and less experience. To the iron marquis it was said that a golden duke 3 had succeeded; but the duke of gold did not find it easier to accomplish impossibilities than his predecessor had done. Day after day, throughout the months of winter and spring, the King had been writing that the fleet was just on the point of sailing, and as frequently he had been renewing to Alexander Farnese the intimation that perhaps, after all, he might find an opportunity of crossing to England, without waiting for its arrival. 4 And Alexander, with the same regularity, had been informing his master that the troops in the the Netherlands had been daily dwindling from sickness and other causes, till at last, instead of the 30,000 effective infantry, with which it had been originally intended to make the enterprise, he had not more than 17,000, in the month of April. 5 The 6000 Spaniards, whom he was to receive from the fleet of Medina Sidonia, would therefore be the very mainspring of his army. 6 After leaving no more soldiers in the Nether-

lands than were absolutely necessary for the defence of the obedient Provinces against the rebels, he could only take with him to England 23,000 men, even after the reinforcements from Medina. „When we talked of taking England by surprise," said Alexander, „we never thought of less than 30,000. Now that she is alert and ready for us, and that it is certain we must fight by sea and by land, 50,000 would be few." 1 He almost ridiculed the King's suggestion that a feint might be made by way of besieging some few places in Holland or Zeeland. The whole matter in hand, he said, had become as public as possible, and the only efficient blind was the peace-negotiation; for many believed, as the English deputies were now treating at Ostend, that peace would follow. 2

At last, on the 28th, 29th, and 30th May, 1588, the fleet, which had been waiting at Lisbon more than a month for favourable weather, set sail from that port, after having been duly blessed by the Cardinal Archduke Albert, viceroy of Portugal. 3

There were rather more than one hundred and thirty ships in all, divided into ten squadrons. 4 There was the squadron of Portugal, consisting of ten galleons, and commanded by the captain-general, Medina Sidonia. In the squadron of Castile were fourteen ships of various sizes, under General Diego Flores de Valdez. This officer was one of the most experienced naval officers in the Spanish service, and was subsequently ordered, in consequence, to sail with the gene-

1 Parma to Philip, 31 Jan. 1588. (Arch. de Simancas, MS.)

2 Parma to Philip, 20 March, 1588. (Arch. de Simancas, MS.)

3 Philip II. to Mendoza, 24 April, 1588, and 2 June, 1588. (Arch. de Simancas [Paris], MSS.) Bor, iii. 321, 322.

4 Herrera, III. iii. 93, *seq.* Philip II, to Parma, 13 May, 1588, says 150, but there were many small vessels and transports equipped, which never left Spain. The number of effective ships of all kinds was probably less than 140.

1 „Aunque huviesse de passar solo en una zabra." Parma to Philip, 21 Dec. 1587. (Arch. de Simancas, MS.)

2 Strada, II. ix. 549. Philip to Parma, 18 Feb. 1588. (Arch. de Simancas, MS.)

3 Strada, *ubi sup.*

4 Philip to Parma, 6 March, 1588. (Arch. de Simancas, MS.)

5 Parma to Philip, 20 March, 1588. (Arch. de Simancas, MS.)

6 „El niervo principal." (Ibid.)

ralissimo in his flag-ship. 1 In the squadron of Andalusia were ten galleons and other vessels, under General Pedro de Valdez. In the squadron of Biscay were ten galleons and lesser ships, under General Juan Martinez de Recalde, upper admiral of the fleet. In the squadron of Guipuzcoa were ten galleons, under General Miguel de Oquendo. In the squadron of Italy were ten ships, under General Martin de Bertendona. In the squadron of Urcas, or store-ships, were twenty-three sail, under General Juan Gomez de Medina. The squadron of tenders, caravels, and other vessels, numbered twenty-two sail, under General Antonio Hurtado de Mendoza. The squadron of four galeasses was commanded by Don Hugo de Moncada. The squadron of four galeras, or galleys, was in charge of Captain Diego de Medrado.

Next in command to Medina Sidonia was Don Alonzo de Leyva, captain-general of the light horse of Milan. Don Francisco de Bobadilla was marshal-general of the camp. Don Diego de Pimentel was marshal of the camp to the famous Terzio or legion of Sicily. 2

The total tonnage of the fleet was 59,120; the number of guns was 3165. Of Spanish troops there were 19,295 on board; there were 8252 sailors and 2088 galley-slaves. Besides these, there was a force of noble volunteers, belonging to the most illustrious houses of Spain, with their attendants, amounting to nearly 2000 in all. There was also Don Martin Alacon, administrator and vicar-general of the Holy Inquisition, at the head of some 290 monks of the mendicant orders, priests and familiars. 3 The grand total of those embarked was about 30,000. The expense of the fleet was estimated by Don

Diego de Pimentel at 12,000 ducats a-day, and the daily cost of the combined naval and military force under Farnese and Medina Sidonia was states at 30,000 ducats. 1

The size of the ships ranged from 1200 tons to 300. The galleons, of which there were about sixty, were huge round-stemmed clumsy vessels, with bulwarks three or four feet thick, and built up at stem and stern, like castles. The galeasses—of which there were four—were a third larger than the ordinary galley, and were rowed each by three hundred galley-slaves. They consisted of an enormous towering fortress at the stern, a castellated structure almost equally massive in front, with seats for the rowers a-midships. At stem and stern and between each of the slaves' benches were heavy cannon. These galeasses were floating edifices, very wonderful to contemplate. They were gorgeously decorated. There were splendid state-apartments, cabins, chapels, and pulpits in each, and they were amply provided with awnings, cushions, streamers, standards, gilded saints, and bands of music. 2 To take part in an ostentatious pageant, nothing could be better devised. To fulfil the great objects of a war-vessel—to sail and to fight—they were the worst machines ever launched upon the ocean. The four galleys were similar to the galeasses in every respect except that of size, in which they were by one-third inferior.

All the ships of the fleet—galeasses, galleys, galleons, and hulks—were so encumbered with top-hamper, so over-weighted in proportion to their draught of water, that they could bear but little canvas, even with smooth seas and light and favourable winds. In violent tempests therefore, they seemed likely to suffer. To the eyes of the 16th century

1 Herrera, *ubi sup.*

2 Herrera, *ubi sup.* Compare Strada, II. ix. 546, *seq.* Bor, III. xxv. 317, *seq.* Meteren, xv. 270. Camden, iii. 410, *seq.* Carnero, 226. Coloma, f. 5, *seq.* Barrow 226-270.

3 Meteren, *ubi sup.*

1 Examination of Don Diego de Pimentel before the council of Holland; apud Bor, iii. 325 *seq.*

2 Strada II. ix. 546. Meteren, xv. 270.



these vessels seemed enormous. A ship of 1300 tons was then a monster rarely seen, and a fleet, numbering from 130 to 150 sail, with an aggregate tonnage of 60,000, seemed sufficient to conquer the world, and to justify the arrogant title, by which it had baptised itself, of the *Invincible*.

Such was the machinery which Philip had at last set afloat, for the purpose of dethroning Elizabeth and establishing the Inquisition in England. One hundred and forty ships, eleven thousand Spanish veterans, as many more recruits, partly Spanish, partly Portuguese, two thousand *grandees*, as many galley-slaves, and three hundred barefooted friars and inquisitors.

The plan was simple. Medina Sidonia was to proceed straight from Lisbon to Calais roads: there he was to wait for the Duke of Parma, who was to come forth from Newport, Sluys, and Dunkirk, bringing with him his 17,000 veterans, and to assume the chief command of the whole expedition. They were then to cross the channel to Dover, land the army of Parma, reinforced with 6000 Spaniards from the fleet, and with these 23,000 men Alexander was to march at once upon London. Medina Sidonia was to seize and fortify the Isle of Wight, guard the entrance of the harbours against any interference from the Dutch and English fleets, and—so soon as the conquest of England had been effected—he was to proceed to Ireland.<sup>1</sup> It had been the wish of Sir William Stanley that Ireland should be subjugated first, as a basis of operations against England; but this had been overruled. The intrigues of Mendoza and Farnese, too, with the Catholic nobles of Scotland, had proved, after all, unsuccessful. King James had yielded to superior offers of money and advancement held out to him by Elizabeth,

and was now, in Alexander's words, a confirmed heretic.<sup>1</sup>

There was no course left, therefore, but to conquer England at once. A strange omission had, however, been made in the plan from first to last. The commander of the whole expedition was the Duke of Parma: on his head was the whole responsibility. Not a gun was to be fired—if it could be avoided—until he had come forth with his veterans to make his junction with the *Invincible Armada* off Calais. Yet there was no arrangement whatever to enable him to come forth—not the slightest provision to effect that junction. It would almost seem that the letter-writer of the Escorial had been quite ignorant of the existence of the Dutch fleets off Dunkirk, Newport and Flushing, although he had certainly received information enough of this formidable obstacle to his plan.

„Most joyful I shall be,” said Farnese—writing on one of the days when he had seemed most convinced by Valentine Dale's arguments, and driven to despair by his postulates—„to see myself with these soldiers on English ground, where, with God's help, I hope to accomplish your Majesty's demands.”<sup>2</sup> He was much troubled, however, to find doubts entertained at the last moment as to his 6000 Spaniards; and certainly it hardly needed an argument to prove that the invasion of England with but 17,000 soldiers was a somewhat hazardous scheme. Yet the pilot Moresini had brought him letters from Medina Sidonia, in which the Duke expressed hesitation about parting with those 6000 veterans, unless the English fleet should have been previously destroyed, and had also again expressed his hope that Parma would be punctual to the rendezvous.<sup>3</sup> Alexander immediately combated these

<sup>1</sup> Letters of Philip and of Parma already cited. (Arch. de Sim. MS.)

<sup>1</sup> Parma to Philip II. 8 June, 1588. (Arch. de Sim. MS.)

<sup>2</sup> Parma to Philip, 22 June, 1588. (Arch. de Sim. MS.)

<sup>3</sup> Ibid.

views in letters to Medina and to the King. He avowed that he would not depart one tittle from the plan originally laid down. The 6000 men, and more if possible, were to be furnished him, and the Spanish Armada was to protect his own flotilla, and to keep the channel clear of enemies. No other scheme was possible, he had, for it was clear that his collection of small flat-bottomed river-boats and hoys could not even make the passage, except in smooth weather. They could not contend with a storm, much less with the enemy's ships, which would destroy them utterly in case of a meeting, without his being able to avail himself of his soldiers—who would be so closely packed as to be hardly moveable—or of any human help. The preposterous nation that he should come out with his flotilla to make a junction with Medina off Calais, was over and over again denounced by Alexander with vehemence and bitterness, and most boding expressions were used by him as to the probable result, were such a delusion persisted in. 1

Every possible precaution, therefore, but one had been taken. The King of France—almost at the same instant in which Guise had been receiving his latest instructions from the Escorial for dethroning and destroying that monarch—had been assured by Philip of his inalienable affection; had been informed of the object of this great naval expedition—which was not by any means, as Mendoza had stated to Henry, an enterprise against France or England, but only a determined attempt to clear the sea, once for all, of those English pirates who had done so much damage for years past on the high seas—and had been requested, in case any Spanish ship should be driven by stress of weather into French ports, to afford them that comfort and protection to which the

vessels of so close and friendly an ally were entitled. 1

Thus there was bread, beef, and powder enough—there were monks and priests enough—standards, galley-slaves, and inquisitors enough; but there were no light vessels in the Armada, and no heavy vessels in Parma's fleet. Medina could not go to Farnese, nor could Farnese come to Medina. The junction was likely to be difficult, and yet it had never once entered the heads of Philip or his counsellors to provide for that difficulty. The King never seemed to imagine that Farnese, with 40,000 or 50,000 soldiers in the Netherlands, a fleet of 300 transports, and power to dispose of very large funds for one great purpose, could be kept in prison by a fleet of Dutch skippers and corsairs.

With as much sluggishness as might have been expected from their clumsy architecture, the ships of the Armada consumed nearly three weeks in sailing from Lisbon to the neighbourhood of Cape Finisterre. Here they were overtaken by a tempest, and were scattered hither and thither, almost at the mercy

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1 "Hableys antes al Rey de mi parte, y conviniendo hablarle, le direys que el atrevimiento de los corsarios ingleses me ha obligado a dessear limpiar dellos la mar, este verano, y que assi he mandado hazer una armada para este effecto, en la qual avra cuydado de hazar todo el buen tratamiento que es razon a sus buenos subditos que toparen, de que le he querido dar parte y pedir le come tambien lo hareys en mi nombre, y si algunos baxeles de mi armada aportaran con temporal a sus puertos ordene, que sean tratados conforme a la buena paz y hermandad que entre nosotros hay, quitandole por aqui la sospecha destas fuerzas, y grangeandole para lo que se pretende, y este oficio bastara por agora, sin llegar a mas particularidades," &c. Philip II. to Mendoza, 24 April, 1588. (Arch. de Sim. [Paris], A. 56, 148 MS.)

This letter reached Mendoza in Paris just before that envoy, according to his master's instructions, was assisting Guise to make his memorable stroke of the 'barricades.'

There is another letter of the same purport nearly three months later. Philip II. to Mendoza, 18 July, 1588. (Arch. de Sim. [Paris], A. 56, 159, MS.)

1 Parma to Philip, 22 June, 1588. (Arch. de Sim. MS.)

of the winds and waves: 1 for those unwieldy hulks were ill adapted to a tempest in the Bay of Biscay. There were those in the Armada, however, to whom the storm was a blessing. David Gwynn, a Welsh mariner, had sat in the Spanish hulks a wretched galley-slave—as prisoner of war—for more than eleven years, hoping, year after year, for a chance of escape from bondage. 2 He sat now among the rowers of the great galley, the *Vasana*, one of the humblest instruments by which the subjugation of his native land to Spain and Rome was to be effected.

Very naturally, among the ships which suffered most in the gale were the four huge unwieldy galleys—a squadron of four under Don Diego de Medrado—with their enormous turrets at stem and stern, and their low and open waists. The chapels, pulpits, and gilded Madonnas proved of little avail in a hurricane. The *Diana*, largest of the four, went down with all hands; the *Princess* was labouring severely in the trough of the sea, and the *Vasana* was likewise in imminent danger. So the master of this galley asked the Welsh slave, who had far more experience and seamanship than he possessed himself, if it were possible to save the vessel. Gwynn saw an opportunity for which he had been waiting eleven years. He was ready to improve it. He pointed out to the captain the hopelessness of attempting to overtake the Armada. They should go down, he said, as the *Diana* had already done, and as the *Princess* was like at any moment to do, unless they took in every rag of sail, and did their best with their oars to gain the nearest port. But in order that the rowers might exert themselves to the utmost, it was necessary that the soldiers, who were a useless incumbrance on deck, should go below. Thus only could the ship be

properly handled. The captain, anxious to save his ship and his life, consented. Most of the soldiers were sent beneath the hatches: a few were ordered to sit on the benches among the slaves. Now there had been a secret understanding for many days among these unfortunate men, nor were they wholly without weapons. They had been accustomed to make toothpicks and other trifling articles for sale out of broken sword-blades and other refuse bits of steel. There was not a man among them who had not thus provided himself with a secret stiletto. 1

At first Gwynn occupied himself with arrangements for weathering the gale. So soon, however, as the ship had been made comparatively easy, he looked around him, suddenly threw down his cap, and raised his hand to the rigging. It was a preconcerted signal. The next instant he stabbed the captain to the heart, while each one of the galley-slaves killed the soldier nearest him; then, rushing below, they surprised and overpowered the rest of the troops, and put them all to death. 2

Coming again upon deck, David Gwynn descried the fourth galley of the squadron, called the *Royal*, commanded by Commodore Medrado in person, bearing down upon them, before the wind. It was obvious that the *Vasana* was already an object of suspicion.

„Comrades,” said Gwynn, „God has given us liberty, and by our courage we must prove ourselves worthy of the boon.” 3

As he spoke there came a broadside from the galley *Royal* which killed nine of his crew. David, nothing daunted, laid his ship close alongside of the *Royal*, with such a shock that the timbers quivered again. Then, at the head of his liberated slaves, now thoroughly armed, he dashed on board the galley, and, after a furious conflict, in which he was assisted by the slaves of the

1 Herrera, Strada, Bor, Meteren, Camder, Carnero Coloma, Barrow, *ubi sup.*

2 Bor, iii. 332 seq.

1 Ibid.

2 Ibid.

3 Ibid.



*Royal*, succeeded in mastering the vessel, and putting all the Spanish soldiers to death. This done, the combined rowers, welcoming Gwynn as their deliverer from an abject slavery which seemed their lot for life, willingly accepted his orders. The gale had meantime abated, and the two galleys, well conducted by the experienced and intrepid Welshman, made their way to the coast of France, and landed at Bayonne on the 31st, dividing among them the property found on board the two galleys. Thence, by land, the fugitives, four hundred and sixty-six in number—Frenchmen, Spaniards, Englishmen, Turks, and Moors—made their way to Rochelle. Gwynn had an interview with Henry of Navarre, and received from that chivalrous king a handsome present. Afterwards he found his way to England, and was well commended by the Queen. The rest of the liberated slaves dispersed in various directions. 1

This was the first adventure of the invincible Armada. Of the squadron of galleys, one was already sunk in the sea, and two of the others had been conquered by their own slaves. The fourth rode out the gale with difficulty, and joined the rest of the fleet, which ultimately reassembled at Coruña; the ships having, in distress, put in a first at Vivera, Ribadeo, Gijon, and other northern ports of Spain. 2 At the Groyne—as the English of that day were accustomed to call Coruña—they remained a month, repairing damages and recruiting; and on the 22nd of July 3 (N.S.) the

Armada set sail. Six days later, the Spaniards took soundings, thirty leagues from the Scilly Islands, and on Friday, the 29th of July, off the Lizard, 1 they had their first glimpse of the land of promise presented them by Sixtus V., of which they had at last come to take possession.

On the same day and night the blaze and smoke of ten thousand beacon-fires from the Land's End to Margate, and from the Isle of Wight to Cumberland, gave warning to every Englishman that the enemy was at last upon them. Almost at that very instant intelligence had been brought from the court to the Lord-Admiral at Plymouth, that the Armada, dispersed and shattered by the gales of June, was not likely to make its appearance that year; and orders had consequently been given to disarm the four largest ships, and send them into dock. 2 Even Walsingham, as already stated, had participated in this strange delusion. 3

Before Howard had time to act upon this ill-timed suggestion—even had he been disposed to do so—he received authentic intelligence that the great fleet was off the Lizard. Neither he nor Francis Drake were the men to lose time in such an emergency, and before that Friday night was spent, sixty of the best English ships had been warped out of Plymouth harbour. 4

On Saturday, 30th July, the wind was very light at south-west, with a mist and drizzling rain, 5 but by three in the afternoon the two fleets could

1 Bor, Meteren, xv. 272. Compare Camden iv. 410, who had heard, however, nothing but the name of Gwynn, and who speaks of the "*treachery of the Turkish rowers.*" (1)

2 Herrera, III. iii. 94.

3 Medina Sidonia from his galleon *San Martin* to Parma, 25 July, 1588. (Arch. de Simancas, MS.)

The dates in the narrative will be always given according to the New Style, then already adopted by Spain, Holland, and France, although not by England. The dates thus given are, of course, ten days later, than they appear in contemporary English records.

1 Herrera, *ubi sup.*

2 Meteren, xv. 272. Camden, iii. 410. Murdin, 615-621. The ships were the *Triumph*, *White Bear*, *Elizabeth*, *Jonas*, and *Victory*. *Lingard*, viii. 280.

3 Walsingham to Sir Ed. Norris, 9

July, 1588. (S. P. Office MS.)

4 Herrera, *ubi sup.* Howard to Walsingham,

21 July, 1588, in Barrow, 288.

31

5 Herrera, 101.

descri and count each other through the haze. 1

By nine o'clock, 31st July, about two miles from Loos, 2 on the Cornish coast, the fleets had their meeting. There were 136 sail of the Spaniards, of which ninety were large ships, and sixty-seven of the English. 3 It was a solemn moment. The long-expected Armada presented a pompous, almost a theatrical appearance. The ships seemed arranged for a pageant in honour of a victory already won. Disposed in form of a crescent, the horns of which were seven miles asunder, those gilded, towered, floating castles, with their gaudy standards and their martial music, moved slowly along the channel, with an air of indolent pomp. Their captain-general, the Golden Duke, stood in his private shot-proof fortress, 4 on the deck of his great galleon the *Saint Martin*, surrounded by generals of infantry and colonels of cavalry, who knew as little as he did himself of naval matters. The English vessels, on the other hand—with a few exceptions, light, swift, and easily handled—could sail round and round those unwieldy galleons, hulks, and galleys rowed by fettered slave-gangs. The superior seamanship of free Englishmen, commanded by such experienced captains as Drake, Frobisher, and Hawkins—from infancy at home on blue water—was manifest in the very first encounter. They obtained the weather-gage at once, and cannonaded the enemy at intervals with considerable effect, easily escaping at will out of range of the sluggish Armada, which was incapable of bearing sail in pursuit, although provided with an armament which could sink all its enemies at close quarters. „We had some small

fight with them that Sunday afternoon,” said Hawkins. 1

Medina Sidonia hoisted the royal standard at the fore, and the whole fleet did its utmost, which was little, to offer general battle. It was in vain. The English, following at the heels of the enemy, refused all such invitations, and attacked only the rear-guard of the Armada, where Recalde commanded. That admiral, steadily maintaining his post, faced his nimble antagonists, who continued to tease, to maltreat, and to elude him, while the rest of the fleet proceeded slowly up the Channel, closely followed by the enemy. And thus the running fight continued along the coast, in full view of Plymouth, whence boats with reinforcements and volunteers were perpetually arriving to the English ships, until the battle had drifted quite out of reach of the town.

Already in this first „small fight” the Spaniards had learned a lesson, and might even entertain a doubt of their invincibility. But before the sun set there were more serious disasters. Much powder and shot had been expended by the Spaniards to very little purpose, and so a master-gunner on board Admiral Oquendo's flagship was reprimanded for careless ball-practice. The gunner, who was a Fleming, enraged with his captain, laid a train to the powder-magazine, fired it, and threw himself into the sea. 2 The two decks blew up. The great castle at the stern rose into the clouds, carrying with it the paymaster-general of the fleet, a large portion of treasure, and nearly two hundred men. 3 The ship was a wreck, but it was possible to save the rest of the crew. So Medina Sidonia sent light vessels to remove them, and wore with his flag-

1 Herrera 101. Howard to Walsingham, *ubi sup.*

2 R. Tomson to —, 30 July, 1588. (S. P. 9 Aug.)

3 Office MS.) 3 Ibid.

4 Meteren, xv. 274.

1 Hawkins to Walsingham, 31 July, 1588. 9 Aug.

(S. P. Office MS.)

2 Report of certain Mariners, Aug. 1588. (S. P. Office MS.)

3 Herrera, III. iii. 100-102. Camden, iii. 412. Bor, iii. 323.

ship, to defend Oquendo, who had already been fastened upon by his English pursuers. But the Spaniards, not being so light in hand as their enemies, involved themselves in much embarrassment by this manœuvre; and there was much falling foul of each other, entanglement of rigging, and carrying away of yards. Oquendo's men, however, were ultimately saved, and taken to other ships. 1

Meantime Don Pedro de Valdez, commander of the Andalusian squadron, having got his galleon into collision with two or three Spanish ships successively, had at last carried away his fore-mast close to the deck, and the wreck had fallen against his main-mast. He lay crippled and helpless, the Armada was slowly deserting him, night was coming on, the sea was running high, and the English, ever hovering near, were ready to grapple with him. In vain did Don Pedro fire signals of distress. The captain-general—even as though the unlucky galleon had not been connected with the Catholic fleet—calmly fired a gun to collect his scattered ships, and abandoned Valdez to his fate. „He left me comfortless in sight of the whole fleet,” said poor Pedro, „and greater inhumanity and unthankfulness I think was never heard of among men. 2

Yet the Spaniard comported himself most gallantly. Frobisher, in the largest ship of the English fleet, the *Triumph*, of 1100 tons, and Hawkins in the *Vic-tory*, of 800, cannonaded him at a distance, but, night coming on, he was able to resist; and it was not till the following morning that he surrendered to the *Revenge*. 3

Drake then received the gallant prisoner on board his flagship—much to the disgust and indignation of Frobisher and Hawkins, thus disappointed to their prize and ransom-money 1—treated him with much courtesy, and gave his word of honour that he and his men should be treated fairly, like good prisoners of war. This pledge was redeemed, for it was not the English, as it was the Spanish custom, to convert captives into slaves, but only to hold them for ransom. Valdez responded to Drake's politeness by kissing his hand, embracing him, and overpowering him with magnificent compliments. 2 He was then sent on board the Lord-Admiral, who received him with similar urbanity, and expressed his regret that so distinguished a personage should have been so coolly deserted by the Duke of Medina. Don Pedro then returned to the *Revenge*, where, as the guest of Drake, he was a witness to all subsequent events up to the 10th of August, on which day he was sent to London with some other officers, 3 Sir Francis claiming his ransom as his lawful due. 4

Here certainly was no very triumphant beginning for the Invincible Armada. On the very first day of their being in presence of the English fleet—then but sixty-seven in number, and vastly their inferior in size and weight of metal—they had lost the flagships of the Guipuzcoan and of the Andalusian squadrons, with a general-admiral, 450 officers and men,

lish naval commanders, Frobesquerio and Avenisio.

Many English names look almost as strangely in their Spanish dress as these two familiar ones of Frobisher and Hawkins. Thus Dr. Bartholomew Clerk is called, for some mysterious reason, Dr. Quiberich; Col. Patton becomes Col. Reyton; while Lord High Admiral Howard of Effingham figures in the chronicles as Carlos Haurat, Count of Contuberland. Herrera, iii. p. 49.

1 See page 498, note.

2 Meteren, Bor, *ubi sup.*

3 Drake to Walsingham, 31 July, 1588.  
10 Aug.  
4 Ibid.

1 Herrera, III. 100-102. Camden, iii. 412. Bor, iii. 323.

2 Valdez to Philip II. („Englished”), 31 Aug. 1588. (S. P. Office MS.) Compare Herrera, Bor, Camden, *ubi sup.*

3 MS. letter of Valdez before cited. Bor, Camden, *ubi sup.* Meteren, xv. 272. Herrera, III. iii. 400-102, who draws entirely from the journal of a Spanish officer in the Armada, and who calls the two famous Eng-



and some 100,000 ducats of treasure. They had been out-manceuvred, out-sailed, and thoroughly maltreated by their antagonists, and they had been unable to inflict a single blow in return. Thus the „small fight” had been a cheerful one for the opponents of the Inquisition, and the English were proportionably encouraged.

On Monday, 1st of August, Medina Sidonia placed the rear-guard—consisting of the galleasses, the galleons, *St. Matthew*, *St. Luke*, *St. James*, and the *Florence*, and other ships, forty-three in all—under command of Don Antonio de Leyva. He was instructed to entertain the enemy—so constantly hanging on the rear—to accept every chance of battle, and to come to close quarters whenever it should be possible. The Spaniards felt confident of sinking every ship in the English navy, if they could but once come to grappling; but it was growing more obvious every hour that the giving or withholding battle was entirely in the hands of their foes. Meantime—while the rear was thus protected by Leyva's division—the vanguard and main body of the Armada, led by the captain-general, would steadily pursue its way, according to the royal instructions, until it arrived at its appointed meeting-place with the Duke of Parma. Moreover, the Duke of Medina, dissatisfied with the want of discipline and of good seamanship hitherto displayed in his fleet, now took occasion to send a serjeant-major, with written sailing directions, on board each ship in the Armada, with express orders to hang every captain, without appeal or consultation, who should leave the position assigned him; and the hangmen were sent with the serjeant-majors to ensure immediate attention to these arrangements. 1 Juan Gil was at the same time sent off in a sloop to the Duke of Parma, to carry the news of the movements of the Armada, to request in-

formation as to the exact spot and moment of the junction, and to beg for pilots acquainted with the French and Flemish coasts. „In case of the slightest gale in the world,” said Medina, „I don't know how or where to shelter such large ships as ours.” 1

Disposed in this manner, the Spaniards sailed leisurely along the English coast with light westerly breezes, watched closely by the Queen's fleet, which hovered at a moderate distance to windward, without offering, that day, any obstruction to their course.

By five o'clock on Tuesday morning, 2nd of August, the Armada lay between Portland Bill and St. Alban's Head, Tues., 2 Aug. when the wind shifted to the 1588. north-east, and gave the Spaniards the weather-gage. 2 The English did their best to get to windward, but the Duke, standing close into the land with the whole Armada, maintained his advantage. The English then went about, making a tack seaward, and were soon afterwards assaulted by the Spaniards. A long and spirited action ensued. Howard in his little *Ark Royal*—„the odd ship of the world for all conditions”—was engaged at different times with Bertendona, of the Italian squadron, with Alonzo de Leyva in the *Ratta*, and with other large vessels. He was hard pressed for a time, but was gallantly supported by the *Nonpareil*, Captain Tanner; and after a long and confused combat, in which the *St. Mark*, the *St. Luke*, the *St. Matthew*, the *St. Philip*, the *St. John*, the *St. James*, the *St. John Baptist*, the *St. Martin*, and many other great galleons, with saintly and apostolic names, fought pell-mell with the *Lion*, the *Bear*, the *Bull*, the *Tiger*, the

1 „Con el menor temporal del mundo non se sabe donde se pueden abrigar naos tan grandes.” Medina Sidonia to Parma, 2 Aug. 1588. (Arch. de Sim. MS.)

2 Declaration of the Proceedings of the two Fleets, July 19-31 (O.S.), 1588. (S. P. Office MS.) Herrera, III. iii. 106.

1 Herrera, III. iii. 105. „Sin replica ni consulta,” &c.

*Dreadnought*, the *Revenge*, the *Victory*, the *Triumph*, and other of the more profanely-baptized English ships, the Spaniards were again baffled in all their attempts to close with, and to board, their ever-attacking, ever-flying adversaries. The cannonading was incessant. „We had a sharp and a long fight, said Hawkins. 1 Boat-loads of men and munitions were perpetually arriving to the English, and many high-born volunteers—like Cumberland, Oxford, North-umberland, Raleigh, Brooke, Dudley, Willoughby, Noel, William Hatton, Thomas Cecil, and others—could no longer restrain their impatience, as the roar of battle sounded along the coasts of Dorset, but flocked merrily on board the ships of Drake, Hawkins, Howard, and Frobisher, or came in small vessels which they had chartered for themselves, in order to have their share in the delights of the long expected struggle. 2

The action, irregular, desultory, but lively, continued nearly all day, and until the English had fired away most of their powder and shot. 3 The Spaniards, too, notwithstanding their years of preparation, were already short of light metal, and Medina Sidonia had been daily sending to Parma for a supply of four, six, and ten pound balls. 4 So much lead and gunpowder had never before been wasted in a single day; for there was no great damage inflicted on either side. The artillery practice was certainly not much to the credit of either nation.

„If her Majesty's ships had been manned with a full supply of good gunners," said honest William Thomas, an old artilleryman, „it would have

been the woofullest time ever the Spaniard took in hand, and the most noble victory ever heard of would have been her Majesty's. But our sins were the cause that so much powder and shot were spent, so long time in fight, and in comparison so little harm done. It were greatly to be wished that her Majesty were no longer deceived in this way." 1

Yet the English, at any rate, had succeeded in displaying their seamanship, if not their gunnery, to advantage. In vain the unwieldy hulks and galleons had attempted to grapple with their light-winged foes, who pelted them, braved them, damaged their sails and gearing, and then danced lightly off into the distance; until at last, as night fell, the wind came out from the west again, and the English regained and kept the weatherage.

The Queen's fleet, now divided into four squadrons, under Howard, Drake, Hawkins, and Frobisher, amounted to near one hundred sail, exclusive of Lord Henry Seymour's devision, which was cruising in the Straits of Dover. But few of all this number were ships of war, however, and the merchant vessels, although zealous and active enough, were not thought very effective. „If you had seen the simple service done by the merchants and coast ships," said Winter, „you would have said we had been little holpen by them, otherwise than that they did make a show." 2

All night the Spaniards, holding their course towards Calais, after the long but indecisive conflict had terminated, were closely pursued by their wary

1 William Thomas, master-gunner of Flushing (who much complained that the loss of its charter by the worshipful corporation of gunners, founded by Henry VII, had caused its decay, and much mischief in consequence), to Burghley, <sup>30 Sept.</sup> <sub>10 Oct.</sub> 1588. (S. P. Office MS.)

2 Sir W. Winter to Walsingham, <sup>1</sup> <sub>11</sub> Aug. 1588. (S. P. Office MS.)

1 Hawkins to Walsingham, <sup>31 July</sup> <sub>10 Aug.</sub> 1588.

(S. P. Office MS.) Herrera, III. iii. 106-108, Bor, iii. 323. Meteren, xv. 273. Camden, iii. 412, 413.

2 Herrera, Bor, Meteren, Camden, *ubi sup.*

3 MS. Letter of Hawkins last cited.

4 Medina Sidonia to Parma, 2 Aug. 1588.

(Arch. de Sim. MS.) Herrera, III. iii. 108.

3 Aug., Wed. antagonists. On Wednes-  
 4 Aug., Thurs day, 3rd of August, there  
 1588. was some slight cannon-  
 ading, with but slender results; and on  
 Thursday, the 4th, both fleets were off  
 Dunnose, on the Isle of Wight. The great  
 hulk *Santaña* and a galleon of Portugal,  
 having been somewhat damaged the  
 previous day, were lagging behind the  
 rest of the Armada, and were vigorously  
 attacked by the *Triumph* and a few  
 other vessels. Don Antonio de Leyva,  
 with some of the galleasses and large  
 galleons, came to the rescue, and Fro-  
 bisher, although in much peril, main-  
 tained an unequal conflict, within close  
 range, with great spirit. 1

Seeing his danger, the Lord Admiral  
 in the *Ark Royal*, accompanied by the  
*Golden Lion*, the *White Bear*, the *Eliz-  
 abeth*, the *Victory*, and the *Leicester*,  
 bore boldly down into the very midst  
 of the Spanish fleet, and laid himself  
 within three or four hundred yards of  
 Medina's flagship, the *St. Martin*, while  
 his comrades were at equally close quar-  
 ters with Vice-Admiral Recalde and the  
 galleons of Oquendo, Mexia, and Al-  
 manza. It was the hottest conflict which  
 had yet taken place. 2 Here at last was  
 thorough English work. The two great  
 fleets, which were there to subjugate  
 and to defend the realm of Elizabeth,  
 were nearly yard-arm and yard-arm  
 together—all England on the lee. Broad-  
 side after broadside of great guns, volley  
 after volley of arquebusry from maintop  
 and rigging, were warmly exchanged,  
 and much damage was inflicted on the  
 Spaniards, whose gigantic ships were so  
 easy a mark to aim at, while from their  
 turreted heights they themselves fired  
 for the most part harmlessly over the  
 heads of their adversaries. The leaders  
 of the Armada, however, were encour-  
 aged, for they expected at last to come  
 to even closer quarters, and there were

some among the English who were mad  
 enough to wish to board.

But so soon as Frobisher, who was  
 the hero of the day, had extricated him-  
 self from his difficulty, the Lord-Admiral  
 —having no intention of risking the  
 existence of his fleet, and with it perhaps  
 of the English crown, upon the hazard  
 of a single battle, and having been  
 himself somewhat damaged in the fight  
 —gave the signal for retreat, and caused  
 the *Ark Royal* to be towed out of action.  
 Thus the Spaniards were frustrated of  
 their hopes, and the English, having  
 inflicted much punishment at compara-  
 tively small loss to themselves, again  
 stood off to windward, and the Armada  
 continued its indolent course along the  
 cliffs of Freshwater and Blackgang. 1

On Friday, 5th August, the English,  
 having received men and munitions from  
 shore, pursued their antagonists at a  
 Fri., 5 Aug. moderate distance; and the  
 1588. Lord-Admiral, profiting by  
 the pause—for it was almost a flat calm  
 —sent for Martin Frobisher, John Haw-  
 kins, Roger Townsend, Lord Thomas  
 Howard, son of the Duke of Norfolk,  
 and Lord Edmund Sheffield, and on the  
 deck of the *Royal Ark* conferred the  
 honour of knighthood on each for his  
 gallantry in the action of the previous  
 day. 2 Medina Sidonia, on his part,  
 was again despatching messenger after  
 messenger to the Duke of Parma, asking  
 for small shot, pilots, and forty fly-  
 boats, with which to pursue the teasing  
 English clippers. 3 The Catholic Armada,  
 he said, being so large and heavy, was  
 quite in the power of its adversaries,  
 who could assault, retreat, fight, or  
 leave off fighting, while he had nothing  
 for it but to proceed, as expeditiously  
 as might be, to his rendezvous in Ca-  
 lais roads.

And in Calais roads the great fleet—

1 Ibid.

2 Camden, iii. 414. Bor, iii. 323, 324.

3 Medina Sidonia to Parma, 4 Aug. 1588.  
 (Arch. de Sim. MS.)

1 Declaration of the Proceedings, &c. (MS.  
 before cited.) Bor, Herrera, Meteren, Cam-  
 den, *ubi sup.* 2 Ibid.



sailing slowly all next day in company Sat., 6 Aug. with the English, without a 1588. shot being fired on either side—at last dropped anchor on Saturday afternoon, August 6th.

Here, then, the Invincible Armada had arrived at its appointed resting-place. Here the great junction of Medina Sidonia with the Duke of Parma was to be effected, and now at last the curtain was to rise upon the last act of the great drama so slowly and elaborately prepared.

That Saturday afternoon, Lord Henry Seymour and his squadron of sixteen lay between Dungeness and Folkestone, waiting the approach of the two fleets. He spoke several coasting-vessels coming from the west; but they could give him no information—strange to say—either of the Spaniards or of his own countrymen. 1 Seymour, having hardly three days' provision in his fleet, thought that there might be time to take in supplies, and so bore into the Downs. Hardly had he been there half an hour, when a pinnace arrived from the Lord-Admiral, with orders for Lord Henry's squadron to hold itself in readiness. There was no longer time for victualling, and very soon afterwards the order was given to make sail and bear for the French coast. The wind was, however, so light that the whole day was spent before Seymour with his ships could cross the Channel. At last, towards seven in the evening, he saw the great Spanish Armada drawn up in a half-moon, and riding at anchor—the ships very near each other—a little to the eastward of Calais, and very near the shore. 1 The English, under Howard, Drake, Frobisher, and Hawkins, were slowly following, and—so soon as Lord Henay, arriving from the opposite shore, had made his junction with them—the whole combined fleet

dropped anchor likewise very near Calais, and within one mile and a half of the Spaniards. That invincible force had at last almost reached its destination. It was now to receive the co-operation of the great Farnese, at the head of an army of veterans, disciplined on a hundred battle-fields, confident from countless victories, and arrayed, as they had been with ostentatious splendour, to follow the most brilliant general in Christendom on his triumphal march into the capital of England. The long-threatened invasion was no longer an idle figment of politicians, maliciously spread abroad to poison men's minds as to the intentions of a long-enduring but magnanimous, and on the whole friendly sovereign. The mask had been at last thrown down, and the mild accents of Philip's dupes, interchanging protocols so decorously month after month on the sands of Bourbourg, had been drowned by the peremptory voice of English and Spanish artillery, suddenly breaking in upon their placid conferences. It had now become supererogatory to ask for Alexander's word of honour whether he had ever heard of Cardinal Allan's pamphlet, or whether his master contemplated hostilities against Queen Elizabeth.

Never, since England was England, had such a sight been seen as now revealed itself in those narrow straits between Dover and Calais. Along that long, low, sandy shore, and quite within the range of the Calais fortifications, one hundred and thirty Spanish ships—the greater number of them the largest and most heavily armed in the world—lay face to face, and scarcely out of cannonshot, with one hundred and fifty English sloops and frigates, the strongest and swiftest that the island could furnish, and commanded by men whose exploits had rung through the world.

Farther along the coast, invisible, but known to be performing a most perilous and vital service, was a squadron

1 Sir W. Winter to Walsingham, <sup>1</sup>/<sub>11</sub> Aug.

1588. (S. P. Office MS.)

2 Sir W. Winter to Walsingham, just cited.

of Dutch vessels of all sizes, lining both the inner and outer edges of the sandbanks off the Flemish coasts, and swarming in all the estuaries and inlets of that intricate and dangerous cruising-ground between Dunkirk and Walcheren. Those fleets of Holland and Zeeland, numbering some one hundred and fifty galleons, sloops, and fly-boats, under Warmond, Nassau, Van der Does, de Moor, and Rosendaal, lay patiently blockading every possible egress from Newport, or Gravelines, or Sluys, or Flushing, or Dunkirk, and longing to grapple with the Duke of Parma, <sup>1</sup> so soon as his fleet of gunboats and hoys, packed with his Spanish and Italian veterans, should venture to set forth upon the sea for their long-prepared exploit.

It was a pompous spectacle, that midsummer night, upon those narrow seas. The moon, which was at the full, was rising calmly upon a scene of anxious expectation. Would she not be looking, by the morrow's night, upon a subjugated England, a re-enslaved Holland—upon the downfall of civil and religious liberty? Those ships of Spain, which lay there with their banners waving in the moonlight, discharging salvos of anticipated triumph and filling the air with strains of insolent music, would they not, by daybreak, be moving straight to their purpose, bearing the conquerors of the world to the scene of their cherished hopes?

That English fleet, too, which rode there at anchor, so anxiously on the watch—would that swarm of nimble, lightly-handled, but slender vessels, which had held their own hitherto in hurried and desultory skirmishes—be able to cope with their great antagonist, now that the moment had arrived for the death grapple? Would not Howard, Drake, Frobisher, Seymour, Winter, and Hawkins, be swept out of the straits at last, yielding an open passage to

Medina, Oquendo, Recalde, and Farnese? Would those Hollanders and Zeelanders, cruising so vigilantly among their treacherous shallows, dare to maintain their post, now that the terrible „Holofernese,” with his invincible legions, was resolved to come forth?

So soon as he had cast anchor, Howard despatched a pinnace to the *Vanguard*, with a message to Winter to come on board the flagship. <sup>1</sup> When Sir William reached the *Ark*, it was already nine in the evening. He was anxiously consulted by the Lord-Admiral as to the course now to be taken. Hitherto the English had been teasing and perplexing an enemy, on the retreat, as it were, by the nature of his instructions. Although anxious to give battle, the Spaniard was forbidden to descend upon the coast until after his junction with Parma. So the English had played a comparatively easy game, hanging upon their enemy's skirts, maltreating him as they doubled about him, cannonading him from a distance, and slipping out of his reach at their pleasure. But he was now to be met face to face, and the fate of the two free commonwealths of the world was upon the issue of the struggle, which could no longer be deferred.

Winter, standing side by side with the Lord-Admiral on the deck of the little *Ark Royal*, gazed for the first time on those enormous galleons and galleys with which his companion was already sufficiently familiar.

„Considering their hugeness,” said he, „’twill not be possible to remove them but by a device.” <sup>2</sup>

Then remembering, in a lucky moment, something that he had heard four years before of the fire-ships sent by the Antwerpens against Parma's bridge—the inventor of which, the Italian Gianibelli, was at that very moment constructing fortifications on the

<sup>1</sup> Bor, iii. 321 *seq.* Meteren, xv. 272, 273.

<sup>1</sup> Winter to Walsingham, MS. already cited.  
<sup>2</sup> Ibid.

Thames 1 to assist the English against his old enemy Farnese—Winter suggested that some stratagem of the same kind should be attempted against the Invincible Armada. 2 There was no time nor opportunity to prepare such submarine volcanoes as had been employed on that memorable occasion, but burning ships at least might be sent among the fleet. Some damage would doubtless be thus inflicted by the fire, and perhaps a panic, suggested by memories of Antwerp and by the knowledge that the famous Mantuan wizard was then a resident of England, would be still more effective. In Winter's opinion, the Armada might at least be compelled to slip its cables, and be thrown into some confusion if the project were fairly carried out.

Howard approved of the device, and determined to hold, next morning, a council of war for arranging the details of its execution. 3

While the two sat in the cabin, conversing thus earnestly, there had well nigh been a serious misfortune. The ship *White Bear*, of 1000 tons burthen, and three others of the English fleet, all tangled together, came drifting with the tide against the *Ark*. There were many yards carried away, much tackle spoiled, and for a time there was great danger, in the opinion of Winter, that some of the very best ships in the fleet would be crippled and quite destroyed

1 Meteren, xv. 272.

2 Thus distinctly stated by Sir Wm. Winter, in his admirable letter of  $\frac{1}{14}$  Aug.

(MS. already cited.)

3 Winter's Letter, MS.

It has been stated by many writers—Camden, iii. 415, Meteren, xv. 273, and others—that this project of the fire-ships was directly commanded by the Queen. Others attribute the device to the Lord-Admiral (Bor, iii. 321), or to Drake (Strada, ix. 559), while Coloma (i. 7) prefers to regard the whole matter as quite a trifling accident, „harto pequeno accidente;” but there is no doubt that the merit of the original suggestion belongs exclusively to Winter. To give the glory of the achievement to her Majesty, who knew nothing of it whatever, was a most gratuitous exhibition of loyalty.

on the eve of a general engagement. By alacrity and good handling, however, the ships were separated, and the ill consequences of an accident—such as had already proved fatal to several Spanish vessels—were fortunately averted. 1

Next day, Sunday, 7th August, the two great fleets were still lying but a mile and a half apart, calmly gazing Sun., 7 Aug. at each other, and rising and falling at their anchors as idly as if some vast summer regatta were the only purpose of that great assemblage of shipping. Nothing as yet was heard of Farnese. Thus far, at least, the Hollanders had held him at bay, and there was still breathing-time before the catastrophe. So Howard hung out his signal for council early in the morning, and very soon after Drake and Hawkins, Seymour, Winter, and the rest, were gravely consulting in his cabin. 2

It was decided that Winter's suggestion should be acted upon, and Sir Henry Palmer was immediately despatched in a pinnace to Dover, to bring off a number of old vessels fit to be fired, together with a supply of light wood, tar, rosin, sulphur, and other combustibles most adapted to the purpose. 3 But as time wore away, it became obviously impossible for Palmer to return that night, and it was determined to make the most of what could be collected in the fleet itself. 4 Otherwise it was to be feared that the opportunity might be for ever lost. Parma, crushing all opposition, might suddenly appear at any moment upon the Channel; and the whole Spanish Armada, placing itself between him and his enemies, would engage the English and Dutch fleets, and cover his passage to Dover. It would then be too late to think of the burning ships.

On the other hand, upon the decks of the Armada, there was an impatience

1 Winter's letter, MS.

3 Ibid.

2 Ibid.

4 Ibid.



that night which increased every hour. The governor of Calais, M. de Gourdon, had sent his nephew on board the flagship of Medina Sidonia, with courteous salutations, professions of friendship, and bountiful refreshments. There was no fear—now that Mucio was for the time in the ascendancy—that the schemes of Philip would be interfered with by France. The governor had, however, sent serious warning of the dangerous position in which the Armada had placed itself. He was quite right. Calais roads were no safe anchorage for huge vessels like those of Spain and Portugal; for the tides and cross-currents to which they were exposed were most treacherous. 1 It was calm enough at the moment, but a westerly gale might, in a few hours, drive the whole fleet hopelessly among the sand-banks of the dangerous Flemish coast. Moreover, the Duke, although tolerably well furnished with charts and pilots for the English coast, was comparatively unprovided against the dangers which might beset him off Dunkirk, Newport, and Flushing. He had sent messengers, day after day, to Farnese, begging for assistance of various kinds, but, above all, imploring his instant presence on the field of action. 2 It was the time and place for Alexander to assume the chief command. The Armada was ready to make front against the English fleet on the left, while on the right, the Duke, thus protected, might proceed across the Channel and take possession of England.

And the impatience of the soldiers and sailors on board the fleet was equal to that of their commanders. There was London almost before their eyes—a huge mass of treasure, richer and more accessible than those mines beyond the Atlantic which had so often rewarded

Spanish chivalry with fabulous wealth. And there were men in those galleons who remembered the sack of Antwerp, eleven years before—men who could tell, from personal experience, how helpless was a great commercial city, when once in the clutch of disciplined brigands—men who, in that dread „fury of Antwerp,” had enriched themselves in an hour with the accumulations of a merchant’s life-time, and who had slain fathers and mothers, sons and daughters, brides and bridegrooms, before each other’s eyes, until the number of inhabitants butchered in the blazing streets rose to many thousands; and the plunder from palaces and warehouses was counted by millions, before the sun had set on the „great fury.” Those Spaniards, and Italians, and Walloons, were now thirsting for more gold, for more blood; and as the capital of England was even more wealthy and far more defenceless than the commercial metropolis of the Netherlands had been, so it was resolved that the London „fury” should be more thorough and more productive than the „fury” of Antwerp, at the memory of which the world still shuddered. And these professional soldiers had been taught to consider the English as a pacific, delicate, effeminate race, dependent on good living, without experience of war, quickly fatigued and discouraged, 1 and even more easily to be plundered and butchered than were the excellent burghers of Antwerp.

And so these southern conquerors looked down from their great galleons and galleasses upon the English vessels. More than three-quarters of them were merchantmen. There was no comparison whatever between the relative strength of the fleets. In number they were about equal—being each from one hundred and thirty to one hundred and fifty strong,—but the Spaniards had twice the tonnage of the English, four times

1 Herrera, III. iii. 108.

2 Medina Sidonia to Parma, 2 Aug. 1588, 4 Aug. 1588, 5 Aug. 1588. Parma to Philip II., 7 Aug. 1588, 8 Aug. 1588. (Arch. de Simancas, MSS.)

1 Examination of Don Diego de Pimentel, in Bor, iii. 325, 326.

the artillery, and nearly three times the number of men.

Where was Farnese? Most impatiently the Golden Duke paced the deck of the *Saint Martin*. Most eagerly were thousands of eyes strained towards the eastern horizon to catch the first glimpse of Parma's flotilla. But the day wore on to its close, and still the same inexplicable and mysterious silence prevailed. There was utter solitude on the waters in the direction of Gravelines and Dunkirk—not a sail upon the sea in the quarter where bustle and activity had been most expected. The mystery was profound, for it had never entered the head of any man in the Armada that Alexander could not come out when he chose. 1

And now to impatience succeeded suspicion and indignation; and there were curses upon sluggishness and upon treachery. For, in the horrible atmosphere of duplicity in which all Spaniards and Italians of that epoch lived, every man suspected his brother, and already Medina Sidonia suspected Farnese of playing him false. There were whispers of collision between the Duke and the English commissioners at Bourbourg. There were hints that Alexander was playing his own game, that he meant to divide the sovereignty of the Netherlands with the heretic Elizabeth, to desert his great trust, and to effect, if possible, the destruction of his master's Armada, and the downfall of his master's sovereignty in the north. Men told each other, too, of a vague rumour, concerning which Alexander might have received information, and in which many believed, that Medina Sidonia was the bearer of secret orders to throw Farnese into bondage, so soon as he should appear, to send him a disgraced captive back to Spain for punishment, and to place the baton of command in the hand of the Duke of Pastrana, Philip's bastard by the Eboli. 2 Thus, in the absence

of Alexander, all was suspense and suspicion. It seemed possible that disaster instead of triumph was in store for them through the treachery of the commander-in-chief. Four and twenty hours, and more, they had been lying in that dangerous roadstead, and although the weather had been calm and the sea tranquil, there seemed something brooding in the atmosphere.

As the twilight deepened, the moon became totally obscured, dark cloud-masses spread over the heavens, the sea grew black, distant thunder rolled, and the sob of an approaching tempest became distinctly audible. 1 Such indications of a westerly gale were not encouraging to those cumbrous vessels, with the treacherous quicksands of Flanders under their lee.

At an hour past midnight, it was so dark that it was difficult for the most practised eye to pierce far into the gloom. But a faint drip of oars now struck the ears of the Spaniards as they watched from the decks. A few moments afterwards the sea became suddenly luminous, and six flaming vessels appeared at a slight distance, bearing steadily down upon them before the wind and tide. 2

There were men in the Armada who had been at the siege of Antwerp only three years before. They remembered with horror the devil-ships of Gianibelli, those floating volcanoes, which had seemed to rend earth and ocean, whose explosion had laid so many thousands of soldiers dead at a blow, and which had shattered the bridge and floating forts of Farnese, as though they had been toys of glass. They knew, too, that the famous engineer was at that moment in England.

In a moment one of those horrible panics, which spread with such contagious rapidity among large bodies of

1 Strada, II. x. 560.

2 Winter's Letter, MS. already cited. Compare Herrera, III, iii. 108. Meteren, xv. 273. Bor, iii. 324 *seq.* Strada, II. x. 560, 561. Camden, iii. 415.

1 Examination, &c., last cited.

2 Strada, II. x. 567, 568

men, seized upon the Spaniards. There was a yell throughout the fleet—„The fire-ships of Antwerp, the fire-ships of Antwerp!” and in an instant every cable was cut, and frantic attempts were made by each galleon and galeasse to escape what seemed imminent destruction. The confusion was beyond description. Four or five of the largest ships became entangled with each other. Two others 1 were set on fire by the flaming vessels, and were consumed. Medina Sidonia, who had been warned, even before his departure from Spain, 2 that some such artifice would probably be attempted, and who had even, early that morning, sent out a party of sailors in a pinnace 3 to search for indications of the scheme, was not surprised or dismayed. He gave orders—as well as might be—that every ship, after the danger should be passed, was to return to its post, and await his further orders. 4 But it was useless, in that moment of unreasonable panic, to issue commands. The despised Mantuan, who had met with so many rebuffs at Philip’s court, and who—owing to official incredulity—had been but partially successful in his magnificent enterprise at Antwerp, had now, by the mere terror of his name, inflicted more damage on Philip’s Armada than had hitherto been accomplished by Howard and Drake, Hawkins and Frobisher, combined.

So long as night and darkness lasted, the confusion and uproar continued. When the Monday morning dawned, several of the Spanish vessels Monday, lay disabled, while the rest Aug. 8, of the fleet was seen at a 1588.

1 This fact, mentioned by no historian, distinctly appears from Winter’s letter, so often cited. „We perceived that there were two great fires more than ours (previously stated by him as six in number), and far greater and huger than any our fired vessels could make.”

2 „Advertido va el dunque del intento de Drake quanto al quemar los navios.” Philip II. to Mendoza, 21st June, 1588, (Archives de Simancas [Paris], MS.)

3 Herrera, III. iii. 108.

4 Ibid.

distance of two leagues from Calais, driving towards the Flemish coast. The threatened gale had not yet begun to blow, but there were fresh squalls from the w.s.w., which, to such awkward sailers as the Spanish vessels, were difficult to contend with. On the other hand, the English fleet was all astir, and ready to pursue the Spaniards, now rapidly drifting into the North Sea. In the immediate neighbourhood of Calais, the flagship of the squadron of galeasses, commanded by Don Hugo de Moncada, was discovered using her foresail and oars, and endeavouring to enter the harbour. She had been damaged by collision with the *St. John of Sicily* and other ships, during the night’s panic, and had her rudder quite torn away. 1 She was the largest and most splendid vessel in the Armada—the show-ship of the fleet, „the very glory and stay of the Spanish navy;” 2 and during the previous two days she had been visited and admired by great numbers of Frenchmen from the shore.

Lord Admiral Howard bore down upon her at once, but as she was already in shallow water, and was rowing steadily towards the town, he saw that the *Ark* could not follow with safety. So he sent his long-boat to cut her out, manned with fifty or sixty volunteers, most of them „as valiant in courage as gentle in birth” 3—as a partaker in the adventure declared. The *Margaret and Joan* of London, also following in pursuit, ran herself a-ground, but the master despatched his pinnace with a body of musketeers, to aid in the capture of the galeasse.” 4

That huge vessel failed to enter the harbour, and stuck fast upon the bar. There was much dismay on board, but Don Hugo prepared resolutely to defend

1 „Declaration of the Proceedings of the two fleets.” (MS. already cited.)

2 R. Tomson to —, 30 July 1588. (S. P. Office MS.)

3 Tomson’s Letter, MS. just cited. 4 Ibid.



himself. The quays of Calais and the line of the French shore were lined with thousands of eager spectators, as the two boats—rowing steadily towards a galeasse, which carried forty brass pieces of artillery, and was manned with three hundred soldiers and four hundred and fifty slaves—seemed rushing upon their own destruction. Of these daring Englishmen, patricians and plebeians together, in two open pinnaces, there were not more than one hundred in number, all told. They soon laid themselves close to the *Capitana*, far below her lofty sides, and called on Don Hugo to surrender. The answer was a smile of derision from the haughty Spaniard, as he looked down upon them from what seemed an inaccessible height. Then one Wilton, coxswain of the *Delight*, of Winter's squadron, clambered up to the enemy's deck and fell dead the same instant. 1 Then the English volunteers opened a volley upon the Spaniards. „They seemed safely ensconced in their ships,” said bold Dick Tomson, of the *Margaret and Joan*, „while we in our open pinnaces, and far under them, had nothing to shroud and cover us.” Moreover the numbers were seven hundred and fifty to one hundred. But the Spaniards, still quite disconcerted by the events of the preceding night, seemed under a spell. Otherwise it would have been an easy matter for the great galeasse to annihilate such puny antagonists in a very short space of time. 2

The English pelted the Spaniards quite cheerfully, however, with arquebus-shot, whenever they showed themselves above the bulwarks, picked off a considerable number, and sustained a rather severe loss themselves, Lieutenant Preston, of the *Ark Royal*, among others, being dangerously wounded. „We had a pretty skirmish for half an hour,”

said Tomson. At last Don Hugo de Moncada, furious at the inefficiency of his men, and leading them forward in person, fell back on his deck with a bullet through both eyes. 1 The panic was instantaneous, for, meantime, several other English boats—some with eight, ten, or twelve men on board—were seen pulling towards the galeasse; while the dismayed soldiers at once leaped overboard on the land side, and attempted to escape by swimming and wading to the shore. Some of them succeeded, but the greater number were drowned. The few who remained—not more than twenty in all 2—hoisted two handkerchiefs upon two rapiers as a signal of truce. 3 The English, accepting it as a symbol of defeat, scrambled with great difficulty up the lofty sides of the *Capitana*, and, for an hour and a half, occupied themselves most agreeably in plundering the ship and in liberating the slaves. 4

It was their intention, with the flood-tide, to get the vessel off, as she was but slightly damaged, and of very great value. But a serious obstacle arose to this arrangement. For presently a boat came alongside, with young M. de Gourdon and another French captain, and hailed the galeasse. There was nobody on board who could speak French but Richard Tomson. So Richard returned the hail, and asked their business. 5 They said they came from the governor.

„And what is the governor's pleasure?” asked Tomson, when they had come up the side.

„The governor has stood and beheld your fight, and rejoiced in your victory,” was the reply; „and he says that for your prowess and manhood you well deserve the pillage of the galeasse. He requires and commands you, however, not to attempt carrying off either the

1 Winter to Walsingham, MS. before cited.

2 Tomson's Letter, MS. Compare Herrera, III. iii. 108. Bor, iii. 324, 325. Meteren, xv. 278. Camden, iii. 415. Strada, II. ix. 561. Coloma, i. 7, 8.

1 Ibid.

2 Coloma, *ubi sup.*

3 Tomson's Letter, MS. before cited.

4 Bor, iii. 325.

5 Tomson's Letter, MS. before cited.

ship or its ordnance; for she lies aground under the battery of his castle, and within his jurisdiction, and does of right appertain to him."

This seemed hard upon the hundred volunteers, who, in their two open boats, had so manfully carried a ship of 1200 tons, 40 guns, and 750 men; but Richard answered diplomatically.

"We thank M. de Gourdon," said he, "for granting the pillage to mariners and soldiers who had fought for it, and we acknowledge that without his goodwill we cannot carry away anything we have got, for the ship lies on ground directly under his batteries and bulwarks. Concerning the ship and ordnance, we pray that he would send a pinnace to my Lord Admiral Howard, who is here in person hard by, from whom he will have an honourable and friendly answer, which we shall all obey."

With this the French officers, being apparently content, were about to depart; and it is not impossible that the soft answer might have obtained the galleasse and the ordnance, notwithstanding the arrangement which Philip II. had made with his excellent friend Henry III. for aid and comfort to Spanish vessels in French ports. Unluckily, however, the inclination for plunder being rife that morning, some of the Englishmen hustled their French visitors, plundered them of their rings and jewels, as if they had been enemies, and then permitted them to depart. They rowed off to the shore, vowing vengeance, and within a few minutes after their return the battery of the fort was opened upon the English, and they were compelled to make their escape as they could with the plunder already secured, leaving the galleasse in the possession of M. de Gourdon. 1

This adventure being terminated, and the pinnaces having returned to the fleet,

1 Tomson's Letter, MS. before cited. Compare Herrera, Bor, Meteren, Camden, Strada, Coloma, *ubi sup.*

the Lord-Admiral, who had been lying off and on, I now bore away with all his force in pursuit of the Spaniards. The Invincible Armada, already sorely crippled, was standing N.N.E. directly before a fresh topsail breeze from the S.S.W. The English came up with them soon after nine o'clock A.M. off Gravelines, and found them sailing in a half-moon, the admiral and vice-admiral in the centre, and the flanks protected by the three remaining galleasses and by the great galleons of Portugal. 2

Seeing the enemy approaching. Medina Sidonia ordered his whole fleet to luff to the wind, and prepare for action. 3 The wind, shifting a few points, was now at W.N.W., so that the English had both the weather-gage and the tide in their favour. A general combat began at about ten, and it was soon obvious to the Spaniards that their adversaries were intending warm work. Sir Francis Drake in the *Revenge*, followed by Frobisher in the *Triumph*, Hawkins in the *Victory* and some smaller vessels, made the first attack upon the Spanish flagships. Lord Henry in the *Rainbow*, Sir Henry Palmer in the *Antelope*, and others, engaged with three of the largest galleons of the Armada, while Sir William Winter in the *Vanguard*, supported by most of his squadron, charged the starboard wing. 4

The portion of the fleet thus assaulted fell back into the main body. Four of the ships ran foul of each other, 5 and Winter, driving into their centre, found himself within musket-shot of many of their most formidable ships.

"I tell you, on the credit of a poor gentleman," he said, "that were five hundred discharges of demi-cannon, culverin, and demi-culverin, from the

1 Winter's Letter, MS. before cited.

2 *Ibid.*

3 Herrera, III. iii. 110

4 Herrera, last cited. Winter's Letter, MS. Lord H. Seymour to the Queen, in Barrow, 305.

5 Winter's Letter, MS.

*Vanguard*; and when I was farthest off in firing my pieces, I was not out of shot of theirarquebus, and most time within speech, one of another." 1

The battle lasted six hours long, hot and furious; for now there was no excuse for retreat on the part of the Spaniards, but, on the contrary, it was the intention of the Captain-General to return to his station off Calais, if it were within his power. Nevertheless the English still partially maintained the tactics which had proved so successful, and resolutely refused the fierce attempts of the Spaniards to lay themselves alongside. Keeping within musket-range, the well-disciplined English mariners poured broadside after broadside against the towering ships of the Armada, which afforded so easy a mark; while the Spaniards, on their part, found it impossible, while wasting incredible quantities of powder and shot, to inflict any severe damage on their enemies. Throughout the action, not an English ship was destroyed, and not a hundred men were killed. 2 On the other hand, all the best ships of the Spaniards were riddled through and through, and with masts and yards shattered, sails and rigging torn to shreds, and a northwest wind still drifting them towards the fatal sandbanks of Holland, they laboured heavily in a chopping sea, firing wildly, and receiving tremendous punishment at the hands of Howard, Drake, Seymour, Winter, and their followers. Not even master-gunner Thomas could complain that day of „blind exercise” on the part of the English, with „little harm done, to the enemy. There was scarcely a ship in the Armada that did not suffer severely; 3 for nearly all were engaged in

that memorable action off the sands of Graveliness. The Captain-General himself, Admiral Recalde, Alonzo de Leyva, Oquendo, Diego Flores de Valdes, Bertendona, Don Francisco de Toledo, Don Diego de Pimentel, Telles Enriquez, Alonzo de Luzon, Garibay, with most of the great galleons and galeasses, were in the thickest of the fight, and one after the other each of those huge ships was disabled. Three sank before the fight was over, many others were soon drifting helpless wrecks towards a hostile shore, and, before five o'clock in the afternoon, at least sixteen of their best ships had been sacrificed, and from four to five thousand soldiers killed. 1

Nearly all the largest vessels of the Armada, therefore, having been disabled or damaged—according to a Spanish eye-witness—and all their small shot exhausted, Medina Sidonia reluctantly gave orders to retreat. The Captain-General was a bad sailor, but he was a chivalrous Spaniard of ancient Gothic blood, and he felt deep mortification at the plight of his invincible fleet, together with undisguised resentment against Alexander Farnese, through whose treachery and incapacity he considered the great Catholic cause to have been so foully sacrificed. Crippled, maltreated, and diminished in number, as were his ships, he would have still faced the enemy, but the winds and currents were fast driving him on a lee-shore, and the pilots, one and all, assured him that it would be inevitable destruction to remain. After a slight and very ineffectual attempt to rescue Don Diego de Pimentel in the *St. Matthew*—who refused to leave his disabled ship—and

tain J. Fenner to Walsingham, <sup>4</sup>/<sub>14</sub> Aug. 1588.

(S. P. Office MS.)

1 Bor, iii. 327. Herrera, *ubi sup.*, 'Declaration of the Proceedings,' MS. Howard to Walsingham, <sup>7</sup>/<sub>17</sub> Aug. 1586. Drake to the

Queen, <sup>8</sup>/<sub>18</sub> Aug. 1586; in Barrow, 306-310.

1 Winter's Letter, MS.

2 Herrera, III. iii. 110.

3 „God hath mightily preserved her Majesty's forces with the least losses that ever hath been heard of, being within the compass of so great volleys of shot, both small and great. I verily believe there is not three-score men lost of her Majesty's forces.” Cap-



Don Francisco de Toledo, whose great galleon, the *St. Philip*, was fast driving, a helpless wreck, towards Zeeland, the Armada bore away N.N.E. into the open sea, leaving those who could not follow to their fate. 1

The *St. Matthew*, in a sinking condition, hailed a Dutch fisherman, who was offered a gold chain to pilot her into Newport. But the fisherman, being a patriot, steered her close to the Holland fleet, where she was immediately assaulted by Admiral Van der Does, to whom, after a two hours' bloody fight, she struck her flag. 2 Don Diego, marshal of the camp to the famous legion of Sicily, brother of the Marquis of Tavera, nephew of the Viceroy of Sicily, uncle to the Viceroy of Naples, and numbering as many titles, dignities, and high affinities, as could be expected of a grandee of the first class, was taken, with his officers, to the Hague. 3 „I was the means,” said Captain Borlase, „that the best sort were saved, and the rest were cast overboard and slain at our entry. He fought with us two hours, and hurt divers of our men, but at last yielded.” 4

John Van der Does, his captor, presented the banner of the *St. Matthew* to the great church of Leyden, where—such was its prodigious length—it hung from ceiling to floor without being entirely unrolled; 5 and there it hung, from generation to generation, a worthy companion to the Spanish flags which had been left behind when Valdez abandoned the siege of that heroic city fifteen years before.

The galleon *St. Philip*, one of the four largest ships in the Armada, dismantled and foundering, drifted towards Newport, where camp-marshal Don Fran-

cisco de Toledo hoped in vain for succour. La Motte made a feeble attempt at rescue, but some vessels from the Holland fleet, being much more active, seized the unfortunate galleon, and carried her into Flushing. The captors found forty-eight brass cannon and other things of value on board, but there were some casks of Ribadavia wine which was more fatal to her enemies than those pieces of artillery had proved. For while the rebels were refreshing themselves, after the fatigues of the capture, with large draughts of that famous vintage, the *St. Philip*, which had been bored through and through with English shot, and had been rapidly filling with water, gave a sudden lurch, and went down in a moment, carrying with her to the bottom three hundred of those convivial Hollanders.” 1

A large Biscay galleon, too, of Recalde's squadron, much disabled in action, and now, like many others, unable to follow the Armada, was summoned by Captain Cross, of the *Hope*, 48 guns, to surrender. Although foundering, she resisted, and refused to strike her flag. One of her officers attempted to haul down her colours, and was run through the body by the captain, who, in his turn, was struck dead by a brother of the officer thus slain. In the midst of this quarrel the ship went down with all her crew. 2

Six hours and more, from ten till nearly five, the fight had lasted—a most cruel battle, as the Spaniards declared. There were men in the Armada who had served in the action of Lepanto, 3 and who declared that famous

1 Coloma, i. 870. Compare Meteren, Bor, *ubi sup.* et al.

2 Meteren, xv. 273<sup>vo</sup>, who relates the anecdote on the authority of some sailors who made their escape by jumping overboard, and who were picked up just before she sank, „Declaration of the Proceedings,” &c. MS.

3 Howard to Walsingham, 8 Aug. 1588.

(S. P. Office MS.)

5 Bor, Meteren, *ubi sup.*

1 Herrera, III. iii. 109. Meteren, xv. 273, 274. Bor, iii. 325. Camden, iii. 415, 416.

2 Bor, *ubi sup.*

3 Ibid.

4 Borlase to Walsingham, 8 Aug. 1588.

13

(S. P. Office MS.) „Some make little account,” says the Lord-Admiral, „of the Spanish for

encounter to have been far surpassed in severity and spirit by this fight off Gravelines. „Surely every man in our fleet did well,” said Winter, „and the slaughter the enemy received was great.”<sup>1</sup> Nor would the Spaniards have escaped even worse punishment, had not, most unfortunately, the penurious policy of the Queen’s government rendered her ships useless at last, even in this supreme moment. They never ceased cannonading the discomfited enemy until the ammunition was exhausted. „When the cartridges were all spent,” said Winter, „and the munitions in some vessels gone altogether, we ceased fighting, but followed the enemy, who still kept away.”<sup>2</sup> And the enemy—although still numerous, and seeming strong enough, if properly handled, to destroy the whole English fleet—fled before them. There remained more than fifty Spanish vessels, above six hundred tons in size, besides sixty hulks and other vessels of less account; while in the whole English navy were but thirteen ships of or above that burthen. „Their force is wonderful great and strong,” said Howard, „but we pluck their feathers by little and little.”<sup>3</sup>

For Medina Sidonia had now satisfied himself that he should never succeed in boarding those hard-fighting and swift-sailing craft, while, meantime, the horrible panic of Sunday night and the

cess by sea, but I do warrant you, all the world never saw such a force as theirs was. And some Spanish there we have taken that were in the fight of Lepanto do say, that the worst of our four fights that we have had with them did exceed far the fight they had there; and they say that at some of our fights we had twenty times as much great shot there played than they had there.”

„It was a most cruel battle” (*credelissima batalla*), says Herrera, from the journal of a Spaniard present (iii. 108).

<sup>1</sup> Winter’s Letter, <sup>1</sup>/<sub>11</sub> Aug. 1588. (MS. before cited.)

<sup>2</sup> Winter’s Letter, MS. last cited.

<sup>3</sup> Howard to Walsingham, <sup>29</sup>/<sub>8</sub> July, 1588.

(S. P. Office MS.)

succession of fights throughout the following day, had completely disorganised his followers. Crippled, riddled, shorn, but still numerous, and by no means entirely vanquished, the Armada was flying with a gentle breeze before an enemy who, to save his existence, could not have fired a broadside.

„Though our powder and shot was well nigh spent,” said the Lord-Admiral, „we put on a brag countenance and gave them chase, as though we had wanted nothing.”<sup>1</sup> And the brag countenance was successful, for that „one day’s service had much appalled the enemy,”<sup>2</sup> as Drake observed; and still the Spaniards fled with a freshening gale

<sup>8</sup> Aug. all through the Monday night.

<sup>1588.</sup> „A thing greatly to be regarded,” said Fenner, of the *Nonpareil*, „is that that the Almighty hath stricken them with a wonderful fear. I have hardly seen any of their companies succoured of the extremities which befell them after their fights, but they have been left at utter ruin, while they bear as much sail as ever they possibly can.”<sup>3</sup>

On Tuesday morning, 9<sup>th</sup> August, the English ships were off the Isle of Walcheren, at a safe distance from the Tues., Aug. 9, shore. „The wind is hanging westerly,” said Rich-

<sup>1588.</sup> ard Tomson, of the *Margaret and Joan*, „and we drive our enemies apace, much marvelling in what port they will direct themselves. Those that are left alive are so weak and heartless that they could be well content to lose all charges and to be at home, both rich and poor.”<sup>4</sup>

„In my conscience,” said Sir William Winter, „I think the Duke would give his dukedom to be in Spain again.”<sup>5</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Same to same, <sup>7</sup>/<sub>17</sub> Aug. 1588, in Barrow, 306, 307.

<sup>2</sup> Drake to Walsingham, in Barrow, 301.

<sup>3</sup> Fenner to Walsingham, <sup>4</sup>/<sub>14</sub> Aug. 1588.

(S. P. Office MS.)

<sup>4</sup> Tomson’s Letter, MS. before cited.

<sup>5</sup> Winter’s Letter, MS. before cited.

The English ships, one hundred and four in number, 1 being that morning half a league to windward, the Duke gave orders for the whole Armada to lay to and await their approach. But the English had no disposition to engage, for at that moment the instantaneous destruction of their enemies seemed inevitable. Ill-managed, panick-struck, staggering before their foes, the Spanish fleet was now close upon the fatal sands of Zeeland. Already there were but six and a half fathoms of water, rapidly shoaling under their keels, and the pilots told Medina that all were irretrievably lost, for the freshening northwester was driving them steadily upon the banks. The English, easily escaping the danger, hauled their wind, and paused to see the ruin of the proud Armada accomplished before their eyes. Nothing but a change of wind at the instant could save them from perdition. There was a breathless shudder of suspense, and then there came the change. Just as the foremost ships, were about to ground on the Ooster Zand, the wind suddenly veered to the south-west, and the Spanish ships quickly squarring their sails to the new impulse, stood out once more into the open sea. 2

All that day the galleons and galleasses, under all the canvas which they dared to spread, continued their flight before the south-westerly breeze, and still the Lord-Admiral, maintaining the brag countenance, followed, at an easy distance, the retreating foe. At 4 p.m., Howard fired a signal gun, and ran up a flag of council. Winter could not go, for he had been wounded in action, but Seymour and Drake, Hawkins, Frobisher, and the rest were present, and it was decided that Lord Henry should return, accompanied by Winter and the rest of the inner squadron, to guard the Thames-mouth against any attempt of the Duke of Parma, while

the Lord-Admiral and the rest of the navy should continue the pursuit of the Armada. 1

Very wroth was Lord Henry at being deprived of his share in the chase. „The Lord-Admiral was altogether desirous to have me strengthen him, said he, „and having done so to the uttermost of my goodwill and the venture of my life, and to the distressing of the Spaniards, which was thoroughly done on the Monday last, I now find his Lordship jealous and loath to take part of the honour which is to come. So he has used his authority to command me to look to our English coast, threatened by the Duke of Parma. I pray God my Lord-Admiral do not find the lack of the *Rainbow* and her companions, for I protest before God I vowed I would be as near or nearer with my little ship to encounter our enemies as any of the greatest ships in both armies.” 2

There was no insubordination, however, and Seymour's squadron, at twilight of Tuesday evening. August 9th—according to orders, so that the enemy might not see their departure—bore away for Margate. 3 But although Winter and Seymour were much disappointed at their enforced return, there was less enthusiasm among the sailors of the fleet. Pursuing the Spaniards without powder to fire, and without beef and bread to eat, was not thought amusing by the English crews. Howard had not three days' supply of food in his lockers, and Seymour and his squadron had not food for one day. Accordingly, when Seymour and Winter took their departure, „they had much ado,” so Winter said, „with the staying of many ships that would have returned with them, besides their own company.” 4 Had the Spaniards, instead of being panick-struck, but turned

1 Winter's Letter, MS.

2 Lord H. Seymour to Walsingham, <sup>1</sup>/<sub>11</sub>

Aug. 1588. (S. P. Office MS.)

3 Winter's Letter, MS.

4 Ibid.

1 Herrera, 110.

2 Herrera, 110. Camden, iii. 416.



on their pursuers, what might have been the result of a conflict with starving and unarmed men? 1

Howard, Drake, and Frobisher, with the rest of the fleet, followed the Armada through the North Sea from Tuesday night (9th August) till Friday (the 12th), and still, the strong south-wester swept the Spaniards before them, uncertain whether to seek refuge, food, water, and room to repair damages, in the realms of the treacherous King of Scots, or on the iron-bound coasts of Norway. Medina Sidonia had, however, quite abandoned his intention of returning to England, and was only anxious for a safe return to Spain. So much did he dread that northern passage, unpiloted, around the grim Hebrides, that he would probably have surrendered, had the English overtaken him and once more offered battle. He was on the point of hanging out a white flag—as they approached him for the last time—but yielded to the expostulations of the ecclesiastics on board the *Saint Martin*, who thought, no doubt, that they had more to fear from England than from the sea, should they be carried captive to that country, and who persuaded him that it would be a sin and a disgrace to surrender before they had been once more attacked. 2

On the other hand, the Devonshire skipper, Vice-Admiral Drake, now thoroughly in his element, could not restrain his hilarity, as he saw the Invincible Armada of the man whose beard he had so often singed, rolling through the German Ocean, in full flight from the country which was to have been made,

1 „Had the English been well furnished with victuals and munition,” says Stowe, „they would in the pursuit have brought the Spaniards to their mercy. On the other hand, had the Spaniards but two days longer continued fight, they must have driven the English to retreat, for want of shot and powder, leaving the Spaniards masters of the field,” 719.

2 Meteren, xv. 274, on the authority of certain Dutch fishermen, who had been impressed on board the *San Martin* Rey, viii. 147.

that week, a Spanish province. Unprovided as were his ships, he was for risking another battle, and it is quite possible that the brag countenance might have proved even more successful than Howard thought.

„We have the army of Spain before us,” wrote Drake, from the *Revenge*, „and hope with the grace of God to wrestle a pull with him. There never was any thing pleased me better than seeing the enemy flying with a southerly wind to the northward. God grant you have a good eye to the Duke of Parma, for with the grace of God, if we live, I doubt not so to handle the matter with the Duke of Sidonia as he shall wish himself at St. Mary’s Port among his orange-trees.” 1

But Howard decided to wrestle no further pull. Having followed the Spaniards till Friday, 12th of August, as far as the latitude of 56° 17', Friday, the Lord Admiral called a 12 August, council. It was then decided, 1588, in order to save English lives and ships, to put into the Frith of Forth for water and provisions, leaving two „pinnaces to dog the fleet until it should be past the Isles of Scotland.” 2 But the next day, as the wind shifted to the north-west, another council decided to take advantage of the change, and bear away for the North Foreland, in order to obtain a supply of powder, shot, and provisions. 3

Up to this period, the weather, though occasionally threatening, had been moderate. During the week which succeeded the eventful night off Calais, neither the Armada nor the English ships had been much impeded in their manœuvres

1 Drake to Walsingham,  $\frac{30 \text{ July}}{10 \text{ Aug.}}$ , 1588, in Barrow, 304.

2 Fenner to Walsingham,  $\frac{4}{14}$  Aug. 1588.

(S. P. Office MS.) Howard to Walsingham,  $\frac{7}{17}$  Aug. 1586, in Barrow, 306.

3 Fenner’s Letter, MS. last cited.

by storms or heavy seas. But on the following Sunday, 14th of August, there was a change. The wind shifted again to the south-west, and, during the whole of that day and the Monday, blew a tremendous gale. 1 „'Twas a more violent storm,” said Howard, „than was ever seen before at this time of the year.” 2 The retreating English fleet was scattered, many ships were in peril, „among the ill-favoured sands of Norfolk,” but within four or five days all arrived safely in Margate roads. 3

Far different was the fate of the Spaniards. Over their Invincible Armada, last seen by the departing English midway between the coasts of Scotland and Denmark, the blackness of night seemed suddenly to descend. A mystery hung for a long time over their fate. Damaged, leaking, without pilots, without a competent commander, the great fleet entered that furious storm, and was whirled along the iron crags of Norway and between the savage rocks of Faroe and the Hebrides. In those regions of tempest the insulted North wreaked its full vengeance on the insolent Spaniards. Disaster after disaster marked their perilous track; gale after gale swept them hither and thither, tossing them on sand-banks or shattering them against granite cliffs. The coasts of Norway, Scotland, Ireland, were strewn with the wrecks of that pompous fleet which claimed the dominion of the seas; with the bones of those invincible legions which were to have sacked London and made England a Spanish viceroyalty.

Through the remainder of the month of August there was a succession of storms. On the 2nd September a fierce south-wester drove Admiral Oquendo in his galleon, together with one of the great galleasses, two large Venetian ships, the *Ratta* and the *Balauzara*, and

thirty-six other vessels, upon the Irish coast, where nearly every soul on board perished, while the few who escaped to the shore—notwithstanding their religious affinity with the inhabitants—were either butchered in cold blood, or sent coupled in halters from village to village, in order to be shipped to England. 1 A few ships were driven on the English coast; others went ashore near Rochelle.

Of the four galleasses and four galleys, one of each returned to Spain. Of the ninety-one great galleons and hulks, fifty-eight were lost and thirty-three returned. 2 Of the tenders and zabras, seventeen were lost and eighteen returned. Of one hundred and thirty-four vessels, which sailed from Coruna in July, but fifty-three, 3 great and small, made their escape to Spain, and these were so damaged as to be utterly worthless. The Invincible Armada had not only been vanquished but annihilated.

Of the 30,000 men who sailed in the fleet, it is probable that not more than 10,000 ever saw their native land again. Most of the leaders of the expedition lost their lives. Medina Sidonia reached Santander in October, and, as Philip for a moment believed, „with the greater part of the Armada,” although the King soon discovered his mistake. 4 Recalde, Diego Flores de Valdez, Oquendo, Maldonado, Bobadilla, Manriquez, either perished at sea or died of exhaustion immediately after their return. Pedro de Valdez, Vasco de Silva,

1 Drake, in Stowe, 750 seq. Barrow, 319. Meteren, xv. 274. Bor, iii. 326, 327.

2 Meteren and Bor, *ubi sup.*

3 Meteren and Bor, *ubi sup.* Compare Strada, ii. ix. 563, who sets before his readers the „absurd discrepancy” between the English-Dutch and the Spanish accounts of these losses. According to the Spaniards, thirty-three vessels were lost or captured, and 10,000 men were missing. According to their enemies, only 10,000 men and about sixty ships escaped. Meteren's account, xv. 274, is minute, and seems truthful, and is followed in the text.

4 Philip II. to Parma, 10 Oct. 1588. (Arch. de Simancas, MS.)

1 Fenner's Letter, MS. last cited.

2 Howard to Walsingham,  $\frac{8}{18}$  Aug 1588.

(S. P. Office MS.) 3 Ibid.

Alonzo de Sayas, Pimentel, Toledo, with many other nobles, were prisoners in England and Holland. There was hardly a distinguished family in Spain not placed in mourning, so that, to relieve the universal gloom, an edict was published forbidding the wearing of mourning at all. On the other hand, a merchant of Lisbon, not yet reconciled to the Spanish conquest of his country, permitted himself some tokens of hilarity at the defeat of the Armada, and was immediately hanged by express command of Philip. Thus—as men said—one could neither cry nor laugh within the Spanish dominions. 1

This was the result of the invasion, so many years preparing, and at an expense almost incalculable. In the year 1588 alone, the cost of Philip's armaments for the subjugation of England could not have been less than six millions of ducats, and there was at least as large a sum on board the Armada itself, although the Pope refused to pay his promised million. 2 And with all this outlay, and with the sacrifice of so many thousand lives, nothing had been accomplished, and Spain, in a moment, instead of seeming terrible to all the world, had become ridiculous. 3

„Beaten and shuffled together from the Lizard to Calais, from Calais driven with squibs from their anchors, and chased out of sight of England about Scotland and Ireland,” as the Devonshire skipper expressed himself, it must be confessed that the Spaniards presented a sorry sight. „Their invincible and dreadful navy,” said Drake, „with all its great and terrible ostentation, did not in all their sailing about England

so much as sink or take one ship, bark, pinnace, or cock-boat of ours, or even burn so much as one sheep-cote on this land.” 1

Meanwhile Farnese sat chafing under the unjust reproaches heaped upon him, as if he, and not his master, had been responsible for the gigantic blunders of the invasion. 2

„As for the Prince of Parma,” said Drake, „I take him to be as a bear robbed of her whelps.” 3 The Admiral was quite right. Alexander was beside himself with rage. Day after day, he had been repeating to Medina Sidonia and to Philip that his flotilla and transports could scarcely live in any but the smoothest sea, while the supposition that they could serve a warlike purpose he pronounced absolutely ludicrous. He had always counselled the seizing of a place like Flushing, as a basis of operations against England, but had been overruled; and he had at least reckoned upon the Invincible Armada to clear the way for him, before he should be expected to take the sea. 4

With prodigious energy, and at great expense, he had constructed or improved internal water-communications from Ghent to Sluys, Newport, and Dunkerk. He had thus transported all his hoys, barges, and munitions for the invasion, from all points of the obedient Netherlands to the sea-coast, without coming within reach of the Hollanders and Zealanders, who were keeping close watch on the outside. But those Hollanders

1 Drake, in Stowe, before cited.

2 „It seems the Duke of Parma is in a great chafe,” said Seymour, „to see his ships in durance at Dunkirk, also to find such discomforture of the Spanish fleet hard by his nose. I can say no more, but God doth show his mighty hand for protecting this little island.” Seymour to Walsingham, Aug. 7 1588. (S. P. Office MS.)

3 Drake to Walsingham,  $\frac{10}{20}$  Aug. 1588, in Barrow, 310.

4 Parma's Letters to Philip, before cited, *passim*. (Arch. de Simancas, MS.)

1 Reyd, viii. 148.

2 Philip II. to Parma (MS. just cited.)

3 The wits of Rome were very severe upon Philip. „S'il y a aucun,” said a Pasquill stuck up in that city, „qui sache des nouvelles de l'armée d'Espagne, perdue en mer depuis trois semaines ou environ, et qui puisse apprendre ce qu'elle est devenue, qu'il en donne une revelation, et s'adresse au palais de St. Pierre, ou le St. Père lui fera donner un vin.” L'Etoile, 263.



and Zeelanders, guarding every outlet to the ocean, occupying every hole and cranny of the coast, laughed the invaders of England to scorn, braving them, jeering them, daring them to come forth, while the Walloons and Spaniards shrank before such amphibious assailants, to whom a combat on the water was as natural as upon dry land. Alexander, upon one occasion, transported with rage, selected a band of one thousand musketeers, partly Spanish, partly Irish, and ordered an assault upon those insolent boatmen. With his own hand—so it was related—he struck dead more than one of his own officers who remonstrated against these commands; and then the attack was made by his thousand musketeers upon the Hollanders, and every man of the thousand was slain. 1

He had been reproached for not being ready, for not having embarked his men; but he had been ready for a month, and his men could be embarked in a single day. „But it was impossible,” he said, „to keep them long packed up on board vessels so small that there was no room to turn about in: the people would sicken, would rot, would die.” 2 So soon as he had received information of the arrival of the fleet before Calais—which was on the 8th August—he had proceeded the same night to Newport, and embarked 16,000 men, and before dawn he was at Dunkerk, where the troops stationed in that port were as rapidly placed on board the transports. 3 Sir William Stanley, with his 700 Irish kerns, were among the first, shipped for the enterprise. 4 Two days long these regiments lay heaped together, like sacks of corn, in the boats—as one of their

officers described it 1—and they lay cheerfully, hoping that the Dutch fleet would be swept out of the sea by the Invincible Armada, and patiently expecting the signal for setting sail to England. Then came the Prince of Ascoli, who had gone ashore from the Spanish fleet of Calais, accompanied by sergeant-major Gallinato and other messengers from Medina Sidonia, bringing the news of the fire-ships and the dispersion and flight of the Armada. 2

„God knows,” said Alexander, „the distress in which this event has plunged me, at the very moment when I expected to be sending your Majesty my congratulations on the success of the great undertaking. But these are the works of the Lord, who can recompense your Majesty by giving you many victories, and the fulfilment of your Majesty’s desires, when He thinks the proper time arrived. Meantime let Him be praised for all, and let your Majesty take great care of your health, which is the most important thing of all.” 3

Evidently the Lord did not think the proper time yet arrived for fulfilling his Majesty’s desires for the subjugation of England, and meanwhile the King might find what comfort he could in pious commonplaces and in attention to his health.

But is very certain that, of all the high parties concerned, Alexander Farnese was the least reprehensible for the overthrow of Philip’s hopes. No man could have been more judicious—as it has been sufficiently made evident in the course of this narrative—in arranging all the details of the great enterprise, in pointing out all the obstacles, in providing for all emergencies. No man could have been more minutely faithful to his master, more treacherous to all the world beside. Energetic, inventive, patient, courageous, and stupendously

1 Bor, iii. 323, 324. Strada, II. ix. 562. Reyd, viii. 147.

2 „Porque los baxeles son tan pequeños que no hay plaza para revolverse. La gente se enfermaria, pudriera, y perderia.” Parma to Philip, 8 Aug. 1588. (Arch. de Sim. MS.)

3 Parma to Philip, 10 Aug. 1588. (Arch. de Sim. MS.)

4 Meteren, xv. 273, 274.

1 Strada, II. x. 559, 562.

2 Parma to Philip, 10 Aug. (MS. last cited.)

3 Ibid.

false, he had covered Flanders with canals and bridges, had constructed flotillas, and equipped a splendid army, as thoroughly as he had puzzled Comptroller Croft. And not only had that diplomatist and his wiser colleagues been hoodwinked, but Elizabeth and Burghley, and, for a moment, even Walsingham, were in the dark; while Henry III. had been his passive victim, and the magnificent Balafra a blind instrument in his hands. Nothing could equal Alexander's fidelity but his perfidy. Nothing could surpass his ability to command but his obedience. And it is very possible that, had Philip followed his nephew's large designs, instead of imposing upon him his own most puerile schemes, the result for England, Holland, and all Christendom, might have been very different from the actual one. The blunder against which Farnese had in vain warned his master was the stolid ignorance in which the King and all his counsellors chose to remain of the Holland and Zeeland fleet. For them, Warmond and Nassau, and Van der Does and Joost de Moor, did not exist, and it was precisely these gallant sailors, with their intrepid crews, who held the key to the whole situation.

To the Queen's glorious naval commanders, to the dauntless mariners of England, with their well-handled vessels, their admirable seamanship, their tact and their courage, belonged the joys of the contest, the triumph, and the glorious pursuit; but to the patient Hollanders and Zeelanders, who, with their hundred vessels, held Farnese, the chief of the great enterprise, at bay, a close prisoner with his whole army in his own ports, daring him to the issue, and ready—to the last plank of their fleet, and to the last drop of their blood—to confront both him and the Duke of Medina Sidonia, an equal share of honour is due. The safety of the two free commonwealths of the world in that terrible contest was achieved

by the people and the mariners of the two states combined.

Great was the enthusiasm, certainly, of the English people as the volunteers marched through London to the place of rendez-vous, and tremendous were the cheers when the brave Queen rode on horseback along the lines of Tilbury. Glowing pictures are revealed to us of merry little England, arising in its strength, and dancing forth to encounter the Spaniards, as if to a great holiday. „It was a pleasant sight,” says that enthusiastic merchant-tailor John Stowe, „to behold the cheerful countenances, courageous words, and gestures of the soldiers, as they marched to Tilbury, dancing, leaping wherever they came, as joyful at the news of the foe's approach as if lusty giants were to run a race. And Bellona-like did the Queen infuse a second spirit of loyalty, love, and resolution into every soldier of her army, who, ravished with their sovereign's sight, prayed heartily that the Spaniards might land quickly, and, when they heard they were fled, began to lament.”<sup>1</sup>

But if the Spaniards had not fled, if there had been no English navy in the Channel, no squibs at Calais, no Dutchmen off Dunkerk, there might have been a different picture to paint. No man who has studied the history of those times can doubt the universal and enthusiastic determination of the English nation to repel the invaders. Catholics and Protestants felt alike on the great subject. Philip did not flatter himself with assistance from any English Papists, save exiles and renegades like Westmoreland, Paget, Throgmorton, Morgan, Stanley, and the rest. The bulk of the Catholics, who may have constituted half the population of England, although malcontent, were not rebellious; and, notwithstanding the precautionary measures taken by government against them,

<sup>1</sup> Stowe, 749.

Elizabeth proudly acknowledged their loyalty. 1

But loyalty, courage, and enthusiasm might not have sufficed to supply the want of numbers and discipline. According to the generally accepted statement of contemporary chroniclers, there were some 75,000 men under arms; 20,000 along the southern coast, 23,000 under Leicester, and 33,000 under Lord Chamberlain Hundson, for the special defence of the Queen's person. 2

But it would have been very difficult, in the moment of danger, to bring anything like these numbers into the field. A drilled and disciplined army—whether of regulars or of militia-men—had no existence whatever. If the merchant-vessels, which had been joined to the royal fleet, were thought by old naval commanders to be only good to make a show, the volunteers on land were likely to be even less effective than the marine militia, so much more accustomed than they to hard work. Magnificent was the spirit of the great feudal lords as they rallied round their Queen. The Earl of Pembroke offered to serve

1 „Said it was their intention to occupy the whole kingdom of England—to keep the English Queen a prisoner, but to treat her as a Queen, until the King should otherwise ordain. Said that they had understood there were many Catholics in England, but that they made not much account of them, knowing that the Queen had taken care that they should not give any assistance, and believing that most of them would have fought for their native land,” &c. &c. Answers of Don Diego de Pimentel to Interrogations before Adrian van der Myle, John van Olden-Barneveld, Admiral Villers, and Famars, in Bor, III. xxiii. 325, 326.

„This invasion, tending to the reducing of this realm to the subjection of a stranger—a matter so greatly disliked generally by the subjects of this realm of all sorts and of all religions, yea, by no small number of them that are known to be addicted to the Romish religion—who are resolutely bent to withstand the same with the employment of their goods and hazard of their lives,” &c. Queen to the Commissioners at Bourbourg (signed, but stayed by her Majesty's order), July <sup>17</sup>/<sub>27</sub>, 1588. (S. P. Office MS.)

2 Camden, iii. 405.

at the head of three hundred horse and five hundred footmen, armed at his own cost, and all ready to „hazard the blood of their hearts” in defence of her person. „Accept hereof, most excellent sovereign,” said the Earl, „from a person desirous to live no longer than he may see your Highness enjoy your blessed estate, maugre the beards of all confederated leaguers.” 1

The Earl of Shrewsbury, too, was ready to serve at the head of his retainers, to the last drop of his blood. „Though I be old,” he said, „yet shall your quarrel make me young again. Though lame in body, yet lusty in heart to lend your greatest enemy one blow, and to stand near your defence, every way wherein your Highness shall employ me.” 2

But there was perhaps too much of this feudal spirit. The lieutenant-general complained bitterly that there was a most mischievous tendency among all the militiamen to escape from the Queen's colours, in order to enrol themselves as retainers to the great lords. 3 This spirit was not favourable to efficient organization of a national army. Even had the commander-in-chief been a man of genius and experience, it would have been difficult for him, under such circumstances, to resist a splendid army, once landed and led by Alexander Farnese; but even Leicester's most determined flatterers hardly ventured to compare him in military ability with that first general of his age. The best soldier in England was unquestionably Sir John Norris, and Sir John was now marshal of the camp to Leicester. The ancient quarrel between the two had been

1 Pembroke to the Queen, <sup>29 July</sup>/<sub>7 Aug.</sub>, 1588.

(S. P. Office MS.)

2 Shrewsbury to the Queen, <sup>9</sup>/<sub>19</sub> Aug. 1588. (S. P. Office MS.)

3 Leicester to Walsingham, <sup>24 July</sup>/<sub>3 Aug.</sub>, 1588. (S. P. Office MS.)



smoothed over, and—as might be expected—the earl hated Norris more bitterly than before, and was perpetually vituperating him, as he had so often done in the Netherlands. Roger Williams, too, was entrusted with the important duties of master of the horse, under the lieutenant-general, and Leicester continued to bear the grudge towards that honest Welshman which had begun in Holland. These were not promising conditions in a camp, when an invading army was every day expected; nor was the completeness or readiness of the forces sufficient to render harmless the quarrels of the commanders.

The Armada had arrived in Calais roads on Saturday afternoon, the 6th August. If it had been joined on that day, or the next—as Philip and Medina Sidonia fully expected—by the Duke of Parma's flotilla, the invasion would have been made at once. If a Spanish army had ever landed in England at all, that event would have occurred on the 7th August. The weather was not unfavourable, the sea was smooth, and the circumstances under which the catastrophe of the great drama was that night accomplished were a profound mystery to every soul in England. For aught that Leicester, or Burghley, or Queen Elizabeth knew at the time, the army of Farnese might, on Monday, have been marching upon London. Now, on that Monday morning, the army of Lord Hundson was not assembled at all, and Leicester, with but four thousand men under his command, was just commencing his camp at Tilbury. 1 The „Bellona-like” appearance of the Queen

1 „I have a most apt place to begin our camp in, not far from the fort, at a place called West Tilbury.” Leicester to Privy Council, 24 July, 1588. (S. P. Office MS.)  
3 Aug.

„I did peruse and make choice of the ground for the encamping of the soldiers. Yesterday went to Chelmsford to order all the soldiers hither this day.” Same to Walsingham, 25 July 1588. (S. P. Office MS.)  
4 Aug.

on her white palfry, with truncheon in hand, addressing her troops in that magnificent burst of eloquence which has so often been repeated, was not till eleven days afterwards, August <sup>9</sup>/<sub>19</sub>; 1 not till the great Armada, shattered and tempest-tossed, had been, a week long, dashing itself against the cliffs of Norway and the Faröes, on its forlorn retreat to Spain.

Leicester, courageous, self-confident, and sanguine as ever, could not restrain his indignation at the parsimony with which his own impatient spirit had to contend. „Be you assured,” said he, *on the 3rd August, when the Armada was off the Isle of Wight*, „if the Spanish fleet arrive safely in the narrow seas, the Duke of Parma will join presently with all his forces, and lose no time in invading this realm. Therefore I beseech you, my good Lords, let no man, by hope or other abuse, prevent your speedy providing defence against this mighty enemy now knocking at our gate.” 2

For even at this supreme moment doubts were entertained at court as to the intentions of the Spaniards.

Next day he informed Walsingham that his four thousand men had arrived. „They be as forward men and willing to meet the enemy as I ever saw,” said he. 3 He could not 4 Aug. 1588. say as much in praise of the commissariat. „Some want the captains showed,” he observed, „for these men arrived without one meal of victuals, so that, on their arrival, they had not one barrel of beer nor loaf of bread—enough after twenty miles' march to have discouraged them, and brought them to mutiny. I see many causes to increase my former

1 Lingard, viii. 285.

2 Leicester to Privy Council, 24 July,  
3 Aug., 1588. (S. P. Office MS.)

3 Same to Walsingham, 25 July, 1588.  
4 Aug. (S. P. Office MS.)

opinion of the dilatory wants you shall find upon all sudden hurley-burleys. In no former time was ever so great a cause; and albeit her Majesty hath appointed an army to resist her enemies if they land, yet how hard a matter it will be to gather men together, I find it now. If it will be five days to gather these countrymen, judge what it will be to look in short space for those that dwell forty, fifty, sixty miles off." 1

He had immense difficulty in feeding even this slender force. „I made proclamation," said he, „two days ago, in all market towns, that victuallers should come to the camp and receive money for their provisions, but there is not one victualler come in to this hour. I have sent to all the justices of peace about it from place to place. I speak it that timely consideration be had of these things, and that they be not deferred till the worst come. Let her Majesty *not defer the time*, upon any supposed hope, *to assemble a convenient force of horse and foot about her*. Her Majesty cannot be strong enough too soon; and if her navy had not been strong and abroad as it is, what care had herself and her whole realm been in by this time! And what care she will be in if her forces be not only assembled, but an army presently dressed to withstand the mighty enemy that is to approach her gates!

„God doth know, I speak it not to bring her to charges. I would she had less cause to spend than ever she had, and her coffers fuller than ever they were; but I will prefer her life and safety, and the defence of the realm, before all sparing of charges in the present danger." 2

Thus, on the 5th August, no army had been assembled—not even the body-

1 Leicester to Walsingham, <sup>26 July</sup>/<sub>5 Aug.</sub>, 1588.

(S. P. Office MS.)

Leicester to Walsingham, <sup>26 July</sup>/<sub>5 Aug.</sub>, 1588.

(S. already cited.)

guard of the Queen,—and Leicester, with four thousand men, unprovided with a barrel of beer or a loaf of bread, was about commencing his entrenched camp at Tilbury. On the 6th August the Armada was in Calais roads, expecting Alexander Farnese to lead his troops upon London!

Norris and Williams, on the news of Medina Sidonia's approach, had rushed to Dover, much to the indignation of Leicester, just as the Earl was beginning his entrenchments at Tilbury. „I assure you I am angry with Sir John Norris and Sir Roger Williams," he said, I am here cook, caterer, and huntsman. I am left with no one to supply Sir John's place as marshal, but, for a day or two, am willing to work the harder myself. I ordered them both to return this day early, which they faithfully promised. Yet, on arriving this morning, I hear nothing of either, and have nobody to marshal the camp either for horse or foot. This manner of dealing doth much mislike me in them both. I am ill-used. 'Tis now four o'clock, but here's not one of them. If they come not this night, I assure you I will not receive them into office, nor bear such loose, careless dealing at their hands. If you saw how weakly I am assisted you would be sorry to think that we here should be the front against the enemy that is so mighty, if he should land here. And seeing her Majesty hath appointed me her lieutenant-general, I look that respect be used towards me, such as is due to my place." 1

Thus the ancient grudge between Leicester and the Earl of Sussex's son was ever breaking forth, and was not likely to prove beneficial at this eventful season.

Next day the Welshman arrived, and Sir John promised to come back in the evening. Sir Roger brought word from the coast that Lord Henry Seymour's

1 Same to same, <sup>26 July</sup>/<sub>4 Aug.</sub>, (MS. already cited.)

fleet was in want both of men and powder. „Good Lord!” exclaimed Leicester, „how is this come to pass, that both he and my Lord-Admiral are so weakened of men? I hear they be running away. I beseech you, assemble your forces, and play not away this kingdom by delays. Hasten our horsemen hither and footmen. . . . 5 Aug. If the Spanish fleet come to 1588. the narrow seas, the Prince of Parma will play another part than is looked for.”<sup>1</sup>

As the Armada approached Calais, Leicester was informed that the soldiers at Dover began to leave the coast. It seemed that they were dissatisfied with the penuriousness of the government. „Our soldiers do break away at Dover, or are not pleased. I assure you, without wages, the people will not tarry, and contributions go hard with them. Surely I find that her Majesty must needs deal liberally, and be at charges to entertain her subjects that have chargeably and liberally used themselves to serve her.”<sup>2</sup> The lieutenant-general even thought it might be necessary for him to proceed to Dover in person, in order to remonstrate with these discontented troops; for it was possible that those ill-paid, undisciplined, and very meagre forces would find much difficulty in opposing Alexander’s march to London, if he should once succeed in landing. Leicester had a very indifferent opinion too of the train-bands of the metropolis. „For your Londoners,” he said, „I see their *service will be little*, except they have their own captains, and, having them, *I look for none at all by them*, when we shall meet the enemy.”<sup>3</sup> This was not complimentary, certainly, to the training

of the famous Artillery Garden, and furnished a still stronger motive for defending the road over which the capital was to be approached. But there was much jealousy, both among citizens and nobles, of any authority entrusted to professional soldiers. „I know what burghers be, well enough,” said the Earl; „as brave and well-entertained as ever the Londoners were. If they should go forth from the city they should have good leaders. You know the imperfections of the time, how few leaders you have, and the gentlemen of the counties are very loth to have any captains placed with them. So that the beating out of our best captains is like to be cause of great danger.”<sup>1</sup>

Sir John Smith, a soldier of experience, employed to drill and organize some of the levies, expressed still more disparaging opinions than those of Leicester concerning the probable efficiency in the field of these English armies.<sup>2</sup> The Earl was very angry with the knight, however, and considered him incompetent, insolent, and ridiculous. Sir John seemed, indeed, more disposed to keep himself out of harm’s way than to render service to the Queen by leading awkward recruits against Alexander Farnese. He thought it better to nurse himself.

„You would laugh to see how Sir John Smith has dealt since my coming,” said Leicester. „He came to me, and told me that his disease so grew upon him as he must needs go to the baths. I told him I would not be against his health, but he saw what the time was, and what pains he had taken with his countrymen, and that I had provided a good place for him. Next day he came again, saying little to my offer then, and seemed desirous, for his

<sup>1</sup> Same to same, <sup>26 July</sup>/<sub>5 Aug.</sub>, 1588. already cited.)

<sup>2</sup> Same to same, <sup>28 July</sup>/<sub>7 Aug.</sub> (S. P. Office MS.)

<sup>3</sup> Ibid.

<sup>1</sup> Leicester to Walsingham, <sup>26 July</sup>/<sub>7 Aug.</sub>, 1588.

(S. P. Office MS.)

<sup>2</sup> Hardwicke Papers, i. 575. Strype, iv. 47 Lingard, viii. 273.



health, to be gone. I told him what place I did appoint, which was a regiment of a great part of his countrymen. He said his health was dear to him, and he desired to take leave of me, which I yielded unto. Yesterday, being our muster-day, he came again to me to dinner; but such foolish and vain-glorious paradoxes he burst withal, without any cause offered, as made all that knew anything smile and answer little, but in sort rather to satisfy men present than to argue with him." 1

And the knight went that day to review Leicester's choice troops—the four thousand men of Essex—but was not much more deeply impressed with their proficiency than he had been with that of his own regiment. He became very censorious.

„After the muster," said the lieutenant-general, „he entered again into such strange cries for ordering of men, and for the fight with the weapon, as made me think he was not well. God forbid he should have charge of men that knoweth so little, as I dare pronounce that he doth!" 2

Yet the critical knight was a professional campaigner, whose opinions were entitled to respect; and the more so, it would seem, because they did not materially vary from those which Leicester himself was in the habit of expressing. And these interior scenes of discord, tumult, parsimony, want of organization, and unsatisfactory mustering of troops, were occurring on the very Saturday and Sunday when the Armada lay in sight of Dover cliffs, and when the approach of the Spaniards on the Dover-road might at any moment be expected.

Leicester's jealous and overbearing temper itself was also proving a formidable obstacle to a wholesome system of defence. He was already displeased with

the amount of authority entrusted to Lord Hunsdon, disposed to think his own rights invaded, and desirous that the Lord Chamberlain should accept office under himself. He wished saving clauses as to his own authority inserted in Hunsdon's patent. „Either it must be so, or I shall have wrong," said he, „if he absolutely command where my patent doth give me power. You may easily conceive what absurd dealings are likely to fall out, if you allow two absolute commanders." 1

Looking at these pictures of commander-in-chief, officers, and rank and file—as painted by themselves—we feel an inexpressible satisfaction that in this great crisis of England's destiny there were such men as Howard, Drake, Frobisher, Hawkins, Seymour, Winter, Fenner, and their gallant brethren, cruising that week in the Channel, and that Nassau and Warmond, De Moor and Van der Does, were blockading the Flemish coast.

There was but little preparation to resist the enemy once landed. There were no fortresses, no regular army, no population trained to any weapon. There were patriotism, loyalty, courage, and enthusiasm, in abundance; but the commander-in-chief was a queen's favourite, odious to the people, with very moderate abilities, and eternally quarrelling with officers more competent than himself; and all the arrangements were so hopelessly behindhand that, although great disasters might have been avenged, they could scarcely have been avoided.

Remembering that the Invincible Armada was lying in Calais roads on the 6th of August, hoping to cross to Dover the next morning, let us ponder the words addressed on that very day to Queen Elizabeth by the Lieutenant-General of England.

„My most dear and gracious Lady," said the Earl, „it is most true that those enemies that approach your king-

1 Leicester to Walsingham, 28 July, 1588.  
7 Aug.  
(MS. already cited.) 2 Ibid.

1 Ibid.

dom and person are your undeserved foes, and being so, and hating you for a righteous cause, there is the less fear to be had of their malice or their forces; for there is a most just God that be-holdeth the innocence of that heart. The cause you are assailed for is His and His Church's, and He never failed any that faithfully do put their chief trust in His goodness. He hath, to comfort you withal, given you great and mighty means to defend yourself, which means I doubt not but your Majesty will timely and princely use them, and your good God that ruleth all will assist you and bless you with victory." 1

He then proceeded to give his opinion on two points concerning which the Queen had just consulted him—the propriety of assembling her army, and her desire to place herself at the head of it in person.

On the first point one would have thought discussion superfluous on the 6th of August. „For your army, *it is more than time it were gathered and about you,*” said Leicester, „or so near you as you may have the use of it at a few hours’ warning. The reason is that your mighty enemies are at hand, and, if God suffers them to pass by your fleet, you are sure they will attempt their purpose of landing with all expedition. And albeit your navy be very strong, but, as we have always heard, the other is not only far greater, but their forces of men much beyond yours. No doubt, if the Prince of Parma come forth, their forces by sea shall not only be greatly augmented, but his power to land shall the easier take effect whensoever he shall attempt it. Therefore it is most requisite that your Majesty at all events have as great a force every way as you can devise; for there is no dalliance at such a time nor with such an enemy. You shall

otherwise hazard your own honour, besides your person and country, and must offend your gracious God that gave you these forces and power, *though you will not use them when you should.*” 1

It seems strange enough that such phrases should be necessary when the enemy was knocking at the gate; but it is only too true that the land-forces were never organized until the hour of danger had, most fortunately and unexpectedly, passed by. Suggestions at this late moment were now given for the defence of the throne, the capital, the kingdom, and the life of the great Queen, which would not have seemed premature had they been made six months before, but which, when offered in August, excite unbounded amazement. Alexander would have had time to march from Dover to Durham before these directions, now leisurely stated with all the air of novelty, could be carried into effect.

„Now for the placing of your army,” says the lieutenant-general on the memorable Saturday, 6th of August: „no doubt but I think about London the meetest, and I suppose that others will be of the same mind. And your Majesty should forthwith give the *charge thereof to some special nobleman* about you, and likewise place all your chief officers that every man *may know what he shall do, and gather as many good horse* above all things—as you can, and the oldest, best, and assuredest captains to lead; for therein will consist the greatest hope of good success under God. And so soon as your army is assembled, *let them by and by be exercised, every man to know his weapon*, and that there be all other things prepared in readiness for your army, as if they should march upon a day’s warning, especially carriages, and a commissary of victuals, and a master of ordnance.” 2

Certainly, with Alexander of Parma

1 Leicester to the Queen, 27 July, 1538.

6 Aug.

(S. P. Office MS.)

1 Leicester to the Queen, MS. last cited  
2 Ibid.

on his way to London, at the head of his Italian pikemen, his Spanish musketeers, his famous veteran legion— „that nursing mother of great soldiers”<sup>1</sup>—it was indeed more than time that every man should know what he should do, that an army of Englishmen should be assembled, and that every man should know his weapon. „By and by” was easily said, and yet on the 6th of August it was by and by that an army, not yet mustered, not yet officered, not yet provided with a general, a commissary of victuals, or a master of ordnance, was to be exercised— „every man to know his weapon.”

English courage might ultimately triumph over the mistakes of those who governed the country, and over those disciplined brigands by whom it was to be invaded. But meantime every man of those invaders had already learned on a hundred battle-field to know *his* weapon.

It was a magnificent determination on the part of Elizabeth to place herself at the head of her troops; and the enthusiasm which her attitude inspired, when she had at last emancipated herself from the delusions of diplomacy and the seductions of thrift, was some recompense at least for the perils caused by her procrastination. But Leicester could not approve of this hazardous though heroic resolution. 2

<sup>1</sup> „Aquel tercio viejo, padre de todos los demas, y seminario de los mayores soldados que ha visto en nuestro tiempo Europa.” Coloma, ii. 26vo.

2 Leicester to the Queen, MS. before cited. „Now for your person,” he said, „being the most dainty and sacred thing we have in this world to care for, a man must tremble when he thinks of it, especially finding your Majesty to have that princely courage to transport yourself to the uttermost confines of your realm to meet your enemies and defend your subjects, I cannot, most dear Queen, consent to that; for upon your well-doing consists all and some for your whole kingdom, and therefore preserve it above all! Yet will I not that, in some sort, so princely and so rare a magnanimity should not appear to your people and the world as it is, and thus far, if it please you, you may do it to draw yourself to your house at Havering; and your army, being about

The danger passed away. The Invincible Armada was driven out of the Channel by the courage, the splendid seamanship, and the enthusiasm of English sailors and volunteers. The Duke of Parma was kept a close prisoner by the fleets of Holland and Zeeland; and the great storm of the 14th and 15th of August at last completed the overthrow of the Spaniards.

It was, however, supposed for a long time that they would come back, for the disasters which had befallen them in the north were but tardily known in England. The sailors by whom England had been thus defended in her utmost need, were dying by hundreds, and even thousands, of ship-fever, in the latter days of August. Men sickened one day, and died the next, so that it seemed probable that the ten thousand sailors by whom the English ships of war were manned would have almost wholly disappeared at a moment when their services might be imperatively required. Nor had there been the least precaution taken for cherishing and saving these brave defenders of their country. They rotted in their ships, or died in the streets of the naval ports, because there were no hospitals to receive them. 1

„’Tis a most pitiful sight,” said the

London, as at Stratford, Eastham, Hackney, and the villages there about, shall be alway not only a defence but a ready supply to those counties of Essex and Kent, if need be, and in the meantime your Majesty may comfort this army and the people of both those counties, and may see both the camp and the forts. It is not above fourteen miles from Havering, and a very convenient place for your Majesty to lie in by the way. To rest you at the camp, I trust you will be pleased with your poor lieutenant’s cabin, and within a mile there is a gentleman’s house where you may also lie. Thus you may comfort not only these thousands, but many more that shall hear of it, and thus far, but no farther, can I consent to adventure your person.”

1 Lord Howard to the Queen; same to Walsingham; same to Privy Council, 22 Aug. 1 Sept.

(S. P. Office MSS.)



Lord-Admiral, „to see here at Margate how the men, having no place where they can be received, die in the streets. I am driven of force myself to come on land to see them bestowed in some lodgings; and the best I can get is barns and such outhouses, and the relief is small that I can provide for them here. It would *grieve any man's heart to see men that have served so valiantly die so miserably.*” 1

The survivors, too, were greatly discontented; for, after having been eight months at sea, and enduring great privations, they could not get their wages. „Finding it to come thus scantily,” said Howard, „it breeds a marvellous alteration among them.” 2

But more dangerous than the pestilence or the discontent was the misunderstanding which existed at the moment between the leading admirals of the English fleet. Not only was Seymour angry with Howard, but Hawkins and Frobisher were at daggers drawn with Drake; and Sir Martin—if contemporary affidavits can be trusted—did not scruple to heap the most virulent abuse upon Sir Francis, calling him, in language better fitted for the fore-castle than the quarter-deck, a thief and a coward, for appropriating the ransom of Don Pedro Valdez, in which both Frobisher and Hawkins claimed at least an equal share with himself. 3

1 Howard to Burghley,  $\frac{10}{20}$  Aug. (S. P. Office MS.)

2 Howard to Privy Council,  $\frac{22}{1}$  Aug., 1588. (S. P. Office MS.)

3 „The  $\frac{10}{20}$ th day of August, 1588, I arrived at Harwich,” says Matthew Starke, mariner on board the *Revenge*, flagship of Sir Francis Drake, „and delivered letters sent by the Lord-Admiral to the Lord Sheffield... I found with him Sir John Hawkins, Sir Martin Frobisher, with divers others . . . . Then Sir Martin Frobisher began some speeches concerning the service done in this action, and said:—„Sir Francis Drake reporteth that no man hath done any good service but he, but he shall well understand

And anxious enough was the Lord-Admiral, with his sailors perishing by

that others have done as good service as he, and better too. He came bragging up at the first indeed, and gave them his prow and his broadside, and then kept his luff, and was glad that he was gone again, like a cowardly knave or traitor—I rest doubtful which, but the one I will swear.

„Further, said he, he hath done good service indeed, for he took *Don Pedro*; for after he had seen her in the evening that she had spent her masts, then, like a coward, he kept by her all night, because he would have the spoil. He thinketh to cozen us of our shares of 15,000 ducats, but we will have our shares, or I will make him spend the best blood in his belly, for he hath done enough of those cozening cheats already.

„He hath used certain speeches of me (continued Sir Martin) which I will make him eat again, or I will make him spend the best blood in his belly. Furthermore, he reporteth that no man hath done so good service as he, but he lieth in his teeth, for there are others that have done as good, and better too.

„Then he demanded of me if we (in the *Revenge*) did not see *Don Pedro* overnight or no. Unto which I answered No. Then he told me that I lied, for she was seen to all the fleet. Unto which I answered I would lay my head that not any one man in the fleet did see her until it was morning, that we were within two or three cables' lengths of her. Whereunto he answered, Aye, marry, you were within two or three cables' lengths, for you were no farther off all night, but lay a-hull by her. Whereunto I answered No, for we bear a good sail all night, off and on.

„Then he asked me to what end we stood off from the fleet all night. I answered that we had descried three or four hulks, and to that end we wrought, not knowing what they were. Then said he, Sir Francis was appointed to bear a light all that night, which light we looked for, but there was none to be seen; and in the morning, when we should have dealt with them, there was not about five or six near to the admiral, by reason we saw not his light. After this, and many more speeches which I am not able to remember, the Lord Sheffield demanded of me what I was. Unto which I answered I had been in the action with Sir Francis in the *Revenge* this seven or eight months. Then he demanded of me. What art thou—a soldier? And I answered, I am a mariner, like your Honour. Then, said he, I have no more to say unto you. You may depart.”

„All this I do confess to be true, as it was spoken by Sir Martin Frobisher, and do acknowledge it in the presence of these parties whose names are hereunder written. Captain Platt; Captain Vaughan; Mr. Grange,

pestilence, with many of his ships so weakly manned that—as Lord Henry Seymour declared—there were not mariners enough to weigh the anchors, 1 and with the great naval heroes, on whose efforts the safety of the realm depended, wrangling like fishwomen among themselves, when rumours came, as they did almost daily, of the return of the Spanish Armada, and of new demonstrations on the part of Farnese. He was naturally unwilling that the fruits of English valour on the seas should now be sacrificed by the false economy of the government. He felt that, after all that had been endured and accomplished, the Queen and her counsellors were still capable of leaving England at the mercy of a renewed attempt. „I know not what you think at the court,” said he; „but I think, and so do all here, that there cannot be too great forces maintained for the next five or six weeks. God knoweth whether the Spanish fleet will not, after refreshing themselves in Norway, Denmark, and the Orkneys, return. I think they dare not go back to Spain, with this dishonour to their King and overthrow of the Pope’s credit. Sir, sure bind, sure find. A kingdom is a grand wager. Security is dangerous, and *if God had not been our best friend, we should have found it so.*” 2

master of the *Arke*; John Graye, master of the *Revenge*; Captain Spendeloe

„Moreover, he said that Sir Francis was the cause of all these troubles, and in this action he showed himself the most coward. By me, Matthew Starke, Aug. <sup>10</sup>/<sub>20</sub>, 1588.”

(S. P. Office MS.)

1 Seymour to Walsingham, <sup>22</sup>/<sub>2 Sept.</sub> Aug., 1588.

(S. P. Office MS.)

2 Howard to Walsingham, <sup>8</sup>/<sub>18</sub> Aug. 1588.

(S. P. Office MS.)

„Some haply may say that winter cometh on apace,” said Drake, „but my poor opinion is that I dare not advise her Majesty to hazard a kingdom with the saving of a little charge. The Duke of Parma is nigh, and will not let to send daily to the Duke of Si-

Nothing could be more replete with sound common sense than this simple advice, given as it was in utter ignorance of the fate of the Armada, after it had been lost sight of by the English vessels off the Frith of Forth, and of the cold refreshment which it had found in Norway and the Orkneys. But Burghley had a store of pithy apophthegms, for which he knew he could always find sympathy in the Queen’s breast, and with which he could answer these demands of admirals and generals. „To spend in time convenient is wisdom;” he observed—„to continue charges without needful cause bringeth repentance;”—„to hold on charges without knowledge of the certainty thereof and of means how to support them, is lack of wisdom;” 1 and so on.

Yet the Spanish fleet might have returned into the Channel—for aught the Lord-Treasurer on the 22nd August knew—or the Dutch fleet might have relaxed in its vigilant watching of Farnese’s movements. It might have then seemed a most plentiful lack of wisdom to allow English sailors to die of plague in the streets for want of hospitals, and to grow mutinous for default of pay. To have saved under such circumstances would perhaps have brought repentance.

The invasion of England by Spain had been most portentous. That the danger was at last averted is to be ascribed to the enthusiasm of the English nation—both patricians and plebeians—to the heroism of the little English fleet, to the spirit of the naval commanders and volunteers, to the stanch and effective support of the Hollanders, and to the hand of God shattering the Armada at last; but very little credit can be conscientiously awarded to the diplomatic or the military donia, if he may find him.” Drake to Walsingham, <sup>8</sup>/<sub>18</sub> Aug. 1588. (S. P. Office MS.)

1 Memorial in Burghley’s hand, <sup>12</sup>/<sub>29</sub> Aug. 1588. (S. P. Office MS.)

efforts of the Queen's government. 1 Miracles alone, in the opinion of Roger Williams, had saved England on this occasion from perdition. 2

Towards the end of August, Admiral de Nassau paid a visit to Dover with forty ships, „well appointed and furnished.” 3 He dined and conferred with Seymour, Palmer, and other officers—Winter being still laid up with his wound—and expressed the opinion that Medina Sidonia would hardly return to the Channel, after the banquet he had received from her Majesty's navy between Calais and Gravelines. He also gave the information that the States had sent fifty Dutch vessels in pursuit of the Spaniards, and had compelled all the herring-fishermen for the time to serve in the ships of war, although the prosperity of the country depended on that industry. „I find the man very wise, subtle, and cunning,” said Seymour

1 An exception is always to be made in favour of the Secretary of State. Although stunned for a moment by the superhuman perfidy of Philip and Farnese, and deceived by false intelligence as to the conditions of the Armada after the gale near Coruna, Walsingham had been ever watchful, and constantly uttering words of solemn warning. „Plain dealing is best among friends,” said Seymour. „I will not flatter you, but you have fought more with your pen than many here in our English navy with their enemies. But that your place and most necessary attendance about her Majesty cannot be spared, your value and deserts opposite the enemy had showed itself.

„For myself,” added the bold sailor, who was much dissatisfied at the prospect of „being penned and moored in roads,” instead of cruising after the Spaniards, „I have not spared my body, which, I thank God, is able to go through thick and thin . . . Spare me not while I am abroad, for when God shall return me, I will be kin to the bear. I will hold to the stake before I come abroad again.” Lord H. Seymour to Walsingham, from the *Rainbow*, <sup>18</sup>/<sub>28</sub> Aug. 1588.

(S. P. Office MS.) Same to same, <sup>23</sup>/<sub>2 Sept.</sub> Aug. MS.

2 R. Williams to Walsingham, July, 1588. (S. P. Office MS.)

3 Seymour to Walsingham, <sup>17</sup>/<sub>27</sub> Aug. 1588. (S. P. Office MS.)

of the Dutch Admiral, „and therefore do I trust him.” 1

Nassau represented the Duke of Parma as evidently discouraged, as having already disembarked his troops, and as very little disposed to hazard any further enterprise against England. I have left twenty-five Kromstevens,” said he, „to prevent his egress from Sluys, and I am immediately returning thither myself. The tide will not allow his vessels at present to leave Dunkirk, and I shall not fail—before the next full moon—to place myself before that place, to prevent their coming out, or to have a brush with them if they venture to put to sea.” 2

But, after the scenes on which the last full moon had looked down in those waters, there could be no further pretence on the part of Farnese to issue from Sluys and Dunkirk, and England and Holland, where thenceforth saved from all naval enterprises on the part of Spain.

Meantime, the same uncertainty which prevailed in England as to the condition and the intentions of the Armada was still more remarkable elsewhere. There was a systematic deception practised not only upon other governments, but upon the King of Spain as well. Philip, as he sat at his writing-desk, was regarding himself as the monarch of England, long after his Armada had been hopelessly dispersed. 3

In Paris, rumours were circulated during the first ten days of August that England was vanquished, and that the

1 Seymour to Walsingham, <sup>14</sup>/<sub>24</sub> Aug. 1588. (S. P. Office MS.)

2 „Cependant je ne faudrai de me retourner contre la prochaine lune devant Dunkerque pour empêcher la sortie a ceux dedans, ou de me mêler avec eux s'ils se deliberent se mettre en mer.” Just. de Nassau to Walsingham, <sup>17</sup>/<sub>27</sub> Aug. 1588. (S. P. Office MS.)

3 Philip II. to Parma, 18 Aug. 1588. (Arch. de Sim. MS.)



Queen was already on her way to Rome as a prisoner, where she was to make expiation, barefoot, before his Holiness. Mendoza—now more magnificent than ever—stalked into Notre Dame with his drawn sword in his hand, crying out with a loud voice, „Victory, victory!”<sup>1</sup> and on the 10th of August ordered bonfires to be made before his house; but afterwards thought better of that scheme.<sup>2</sup> He had been deceived by a variety of reports sent to him day after day by agents on the coast, and the King of France—better informed by Stafford, but not unwilling thus to feed his spite against the insolent ambassador—affected to believe his fables. He even confirmed them by intelligence, which he pretended to have himself received from other sources, of the landing of the Spaniards in England without opposition, and of the entire subjugation of that country without the striking of a blow,<sup>3</sup>

Hereupon, on the night of August 10th, the envoy—„like a wise man,” as Stafford observed<sup>4</sup>—sent off four couriers, one after another, with the great news to Spain, that his master’s heart might be rejoiced, and caused a pamphlet on the subject to be printed and distributed over Paris.<sup>5</sup> „I will not waste a large sheet of paper to express the joy which we must all feel,” he wrote to Idiaquez, „at this good news. God be praised for all, who gives us small chastisements to make us better, and then, like a merciful Father, sends us infinite rewards.”<sup>6</sup> And in the same strain he

wrote, day after day, to Moura and Idiaquez, and to Philip himself.

Stafford, on his side, was anxious to be informed by his government of the exact truth, whatever it were, in order that these figments of Mendoza might be contradicted. „That which cometh from me,” he said, „will be believed, for I have not been used to tell lies, and in very truth I have not the face to do it.”<sup>1</sup>

And the news of the Calais squibs, of the fight off Gravelines, and the retreat of the Armada towards the north, could not be very long concealed. So soon, therefore, as authentic intelligence reached the English envoy of those events—which was not, however, for *nearly ten days* after their occurrence<sup>2</sup>—Stafford in his turn wrote a pamphlet, in answer to that of Mendoza, and decidedly the more successful one of the two. It cost him but five crowns, he said, to print four hundred copies of it; but those in whose name it was published got one hundred crowns by its sale. The English ambassador was unwilling to be known as the author—although „desirous of touching up the impudence of the Spaniard;”—but the King had no doubt of its origin. Poor Henry, still smarting under the insults of Mendoza and „Mucio,” was delighted with this blow to Philip’s presumption, was loud in his praises of Queen Elizabeth’s valour, prudence, and marvellous fortune, and declared that what she had just done could be compared

de Sim. [Paris], MS.) Same to Philip II., same date.

The envoy thought that the „Almighty Father of mercy had conferred, as infinite rewards and benefits,” upon his Spanish children, the sacking of London, and the butchering of the English nation—rewards and benefits similar to those which they had formerly enjoyed in the Netherlands.

1 Stafford to Walsingham,  $\frac{1}{11}$  Aug. MS. before cited.

2 Stafford to Walsingham,  $\frac{9}{19}$  Aug. 1588. (S. P. Office MS.)

1 Stowe, 744-750.

2 Sir E. Stafford to Walsingham,  $\frac{1}{11}$  Aug.

1588. (S. P. Office MS.)

3 Reyd, viii. 148.

4 Stafford to Walsingham, MS. last cited.

5 Ibid. Reyd, *ubi sub.*

6 „No quiero ocupar V. M. con larga carta el Regozijo que tendra con las buenas nuevas con que queria despachar. Dios sea alavado por todo, qui nos muestra chicos castigos por enmendarnos, y da como padre de misericordia infinitos mercedes y beneficios.” Mendoza de Idiaquez, 13 Aug. 1588. (Arch.

to the greatest exploits of the most illustrious men in history. 1 „So soon as ever he saw the pamphlet,” said Stafford, „he offered to lay a wager it was my doing, and laughed at it heartily.” 2 And there were malicious pages about the French court, who also found much amusement in writing to the ambassador, begging his interest with the Duke of Parma that they might obtain from that conqueror some odd refuse town or so in England, such as York, Canterbury, London, or the like—till the luckless Don Bernardino was ashamed to show his face. 3

A letter from Farnese, however, of 10th August, apprized Philip before the end of August of the Calais disaster, and caused him great uneasiness, without driving him to despair. „At the very moment,” wrote the King to Medina Sidonia, „when I was expecting news of the effect hoped for from my Armada, I have learned the retreat from before Calais, *to which it was compelled by the weather*; [1] and I have received a very great shock, which keeps me in anxiety not to be exaggerated. Nevertheless I hope in our Lord that He will have provided a remedy, and that

1 „Este Rey ha loado, hablandose con algunos de sus favoritos grandemente del valor, animo, y prudencia de la Reyna de Inglaterra, favorecida de una maravillosa fortuna, diziendo que lo que ella avia hecho ultimamente se podia comparar con las mayores hazañas de los hombres mas ilustres del tiempo pasado, pues avio osado con solas sus fuerzas aguardar las que eran tan pujantes como las de Espana y combatir las, cerrando juntamente el paso a la armada del duca de Parma, que era no menos poderosa, y aver tardado quatro años V. Magd. con juntar semejantes armadas, poniendo al mundo en admiracion de ser las de las quales se podia dezir aver trionfado la Reyna de Inglaterra.” Mendoza to Philip, 13 Oct. 1588. (Arch. de Sim. [Paris], MS.)

Of course all the exploits of the English and Dutch admirals and their crews were, in the opinion of Henry III., the work of Queen Elizabeth. It was the royal prudence, valour, and good fortune, which saved England, not the merits of Drake and Howard, Nassau and De Moor.

2 Stafford to Walsingham, MS. before cited.

3 Stowe, 774-750.

if it was possible for you to return upon the enemy, to come back to the appointed post, and to watch an opportunity for the great stroke, you will have done as the case required; and so I am expecting, with solicitude, to hear what has happened, and please God it may be that which is so suitable for His service.” 1

And in the same strain, melancholy yet hopeful, were other letters despatched on that day to the Duke of Parma. „The satisfaction caused by your advices on the 8th August of the arrival of the Armada near Calais, and of your preparations to embark your troops, was changed into a sentiment which you can imagine, by your letter of the 10th. The anxiety thus occasioned it would be impossible to exaggerate, although—the cause being such as it is—there is no ground for distrust. Perhaps the Armada, keeping together, has returned upon the enemy, and given a good account of itself, with the help of the Lord. So I still promise myself that you will have performed your part in the enterprise in such wise as that the service intended to the Lord may have been executed, and repairs made to the reputation of all, which has been so much compromised.” 2

1 „Al tiempo que se aguardavan nuevas del efecto que de las fuerzas dessa armada se esperaba, se ha entendido la derrota que desde sobre Cales la forço a tomar el temporal, y recibido muy gran sobresalto que me tiene con mas cuydado que se puede encarecer, aunque espero en nuestro Señor que avra proveído de remedio, y que os fue posible revolver sobre el enemigo y acudir al puesto señalado, y atender el efecto principal lo pardiades como pedia el caso, y assi aguardo con desseo aviso de lo sucedido, que plega a Dios sea lo que tanto conviene a su servicio.” Philip II. to Medina Sidonia, 31 Aug. 1588. (Arch. de Sim. MS.)

2 „Prometo me de vos que avreys executado lo que os toca de manera que se consiga al servicio que se ha pretendido hazer a Dios, y el reparo de la reputacion de todos que esta tan empeñada.” The underlined words were stricken out by Philip, from the draft of the letter—prepared as usual by the secretary—with the note in the King's hand: „See if it be well to omit

And the King's drooping spirits were revived by fresh accounts which reached him in September, by way of France. He now learned that the Armada had taken captive four Dutch men-of-war and many English ships; that, after the Spaniards had been followed from Calais roads by the enemy's fleet, there had been an action, which the English had attempted in vain to avoid, off New-castle; that Medina Sidonia had charged upon them so vigorously as to sink twenty of their ships, and to capture twenty-six others, good and sound; that the others, to escape perdition, had fled, after suffering great damage, and had then gone to pieces, all hands perishing; that the Armada had taken a port in Scotland, where it was very comfortably established; that the flagship of Lord-Admiral Howard, of Drake, and of that „distinguished mariner Hawkins,” had been all sunk in action, and that no soul had been saved except Drake, who had escaped in a cock-boat. „This is good news,” added the writer, „and it is most certain.” 1

The King pondered seriously over these conflicting accounts, and remained very much in the dark. Half the month of September went by, and he had heard nothing official since the news of the Calais catastrophe. It may be easily understood that Medina Sidonia, while flying round the Orkneys, had not much opportunity for despatching couriers to Spain, and, as Farnese had not written since the 10th August, Philip was quite at a loss whether to consider himself triumphant or defeated. From the reports by way of Calais, Dunkirk, and Rouen,

the passage erased, because in that which God does, or by which He is served, there is no gaining or losing of reputation, and it is better not to speak of it at all.” („Pues en lo que Dios haze, y es servido, no ay que perder ni ganar reputacion, y es major no hablar en ello.” Philip II. to Parma, 31 Aug. 1588. (Arch. de Sim. MS.)

1 Avisos de Dunquerque, 30 Aug. 1588. Carta de Roan de Juan de Gamarra, 31 Aug. 1588. „A sido buena nueva, y esto es certissimo.” (Arch. de Sim. [Paris], MSS.)

he supposed that the Armada had inflicted much damage on the enemy. He suggested accordingly, on the 3rd September, to the Duke of Parma, that he might now make the passage to England, while the English fleet, if anything was left of it, was repairing its damages. „Twill be easy enough to conquer the country,” said Philip, „so soon as you set foot on the soil. Then perhaps our Armada can come back and station itself in the Thames to support you.” 1

Nothing could be simpler. Nevertheless the King felt a pang of doubt lest affairs, after all, might not be going on so swimmingly; so he dipped his pen in the inkstand again, and observed with much pathos, „But if this hope must be given up, you must take the Isle of Walcheren: something must be done to console me.” 2

And on the 15th September he was still no wiser. „This business of the Armada leaves me no repose,” he said; „I can think of nothing else. I don't content myself with what I have written, but write again and again, although in great want of light. I hear that the Armada has sunk and captured many English ships, and is refitting in a Scotch port. If this is in the territory of Lord Huntley, I hope he will stir up the Catholics of that country.” 3

And so, in letter after letter, Philip clung to the delusion that Alexander could yet cross to England, and that the Armada might sail up the Thames. The Duke was directed to make immediate arrangements to that effect with Medina Sidonia, at the very moment when that tempest-tossed grandee was painfully creeping back towards the Bay of Biscay, with what remained of his invincible fleet.

Sanguine and pertinacious, the King

1 Philip II. to Parma, 3 Sept. 1588. (Arch. de Sim. MS.) 2 Ibid.

3 Philip II. to Parma, 15 Sept. 1588. (Arch. de Sim. MS.)



refused to believe in the downfall of his long cherished scheme; and even when the light was at last dawning upon him, he was like a child crying for a fresh toy, when the one which had long amused him had been broken. If the Armada were really very much damaged, it was easy enough, he thought, for the Duke of Parma to make him a new one, while the old one was repairing. „In case the Armada is too much shattered to come out,” said Philip, „and winter compels it to stay in that port, *you must cause another Armada to be constructed at Emden* and the adjacent towns, at my expense, and, with the two together, you will certainly be able to conquer England.”<sup>1</sup>

And he wrote to Medina Sidonia in similar terms. That naval commander was instructed to enter the Thames at once, if strong enough. If not, he was to winter in the Scotch port which he was supposed to have captured. Meantime Farnese would build a new fleet at Emden, and in the spring the two dukes would proceed to accomplish the great purpose.<sup>2</sup>

But at last the arrival of Medina Sidonia at Santander<sup>3</sup> dispelled these visions, and now the King appeared in another attitude. A messenger, coming post-haste from the captain-general, arrived in the early days of October at the Escorial. Entering the palace he found Idiaquez and Moura pacing up and down the corridor, before the door of Philip's cabinet, and was immediately interrogated by those counsellors, most anxious, of course, to receive authentic intelligence, at last, as to the fate of the Armada.<sup>4</sup> The entire overthrow of the great project was now, for the first time, fully revealed in Spain; the fabu-

lous victories over the English, and the annihilation of Howard and all his ships, were dispersed in air. Broken, ruined, forlorn, the Invincible Armada—so far as it still existed—had reached a Spanish port. Great was the consternation of Idiaquez and Moura, as they listened to the tale, and very desirous was each of the two secretaries that the other should discharge the unwelcome duty of communicating the fatal intelligence to the King.<sup>1</sup>

At last Moura consented to undertake the task, and entering the cabinet, he found Philip seated at his desk. Of course he was writing letters.<sup>2</sup> Being informed of the arrival of a messenger from the North, he laid down his pen, and inquired the news. The secretary replied that the accounts concerning the Armada were by no means so favourable as could be wished. The courier was then introduced, and made his dismal report. The King did not change countenance. „Great thanks,” he observed, „do I render to Almighty God, by whose generous hand I am gifted with such power that I could easily, if I chose, place another fleet upon the seas. Nor is it of very great importance that a running stream should be sometimes intercepted, so long as the fountain from which it flows remains inexhaustible.”

So saying he resumed his pen, and serenely proceeded with his letters.<sup>3</sup> Christopher Moura stared with unaffected amazement at his sovereign, thus tranquil while a shattered world was falling on his head, and then retired to confer with his colleague.

„And how did his Majesty receive the blow?” asked Idiaquez.

„His Majesty thinks nothing of the blow,” answered Moura, „nor do I,

<sup>1</sup> Philip II. to Parma, 15 Sept. 1588. (Arch. de Sim. MS.)

<sup>2</sup> Philip II. to Medina Sidonia, 15 Sept. 1588. (Arch. de Sim. MS.)

<sup>3</sup> Philip II. to Parma, 10 Oct. 1588. (Arch. de Sim. MS.)

<sup>4</sup> Strada, II. ix. 564.

<sup>1</sup> Ibid.

<sup>2</sup> „Regem literas scribentem reperit.” (Ibid.)

<sup>3</sup> Ibid. „His dictis calorem resumit, et eadem qua ceperat tranquillitate vultus ad scribendum redit.”

consequently, make more of this great calamity than does his Majesty." 1

So the King—as fortune flew away from him—wrapped himself in his virtue; and his counsellors, imitating their sovereign, arrayed themselves in the same garment. Thus draped, they were all prepared to bide the pelting of the storm which was only beating figuratively on their heads, while it had been dashing the King's mighty galleons on the rocks, and drowning by thousands the wretched victims of his ambition. Soon afterwards, when the particulars of the great disaster were thoroughly

1 „Rex, inquit, totum hoc infortunium nihili facit, nec ego pluris quam ipse." (Ibid.)

known, Philip ordered a letter to be addressed in his name to all the bishops of Spain, ordering a solemn thanksgiving to the Almighty for the safety of that portion of the Invincible Armada which it had pleased Him to preserve. 1

And thus, with the sound of mourning throughout Spain—for there was scarce a household of which some beloved member had not perished in the great catastrophe—and with the peals of merry bells over all England and Holland, and with a solemn „Te Deum" resounding in every church, the curtain fell upon the great tragedy of the Armada.

1 Strada, II. ix. 556. Herrera, III. iij. 113.

## CHAPTER XX.

Alexander besieges Bergen-op-Zoom—Pallavicini's Attempt to seduce Parma—Alexander's Fury—He is forced to raise the Siege of Bergen—Gertruydenberg betrayed to Parma—Indignation of the States—Exploits of Schenk—His Attack on Nymegen—He is defeated and drowned—English-Dutch Expedition to Spain—Its meagre Results—Death of Guise and of the Queen-Mother—Combinations after the Murder of Henry III.—Tandem fit Surculus Arbor.

THE fever of the past two years was followed by comparative languor. The deadly crisis was past, the freedom of Europe was saved, Holland and England breathed again; but tension now gave place to exhaustion. The events in the remainder of the year 1588, with those of 1589—although important in themselves—were the immediate results of that history which has been so minutely detailed in these volumes, and can be indicated in a very few pages.

The Duke of Parma, melancholy, disappointed, angry—stung to the soul by calumnies as stupid as they were venomous, and already afflicted with a painful and lingering disease, which his friends attributed to poison administered by command of the master whom he had so faithfully served—determined, if possible, to afford the consolation

which that master was so plaintively demanding at his hands.

So Alexander led the splendid army which had been packed in, and unpacked from, the flat boats of Newport and Dunkirk, against Bergen-op-Zoom, and besieged that city in form. Once of great commercial importance, although somewhat fallen away from its original prosperity, Bergen was well situate on a little stream which connected it with the tide-waters of the Scheldt, and was the only place in Brabant, except Willemstad, still remaining to the States. Opposite lay the Isle of Tholen, from which it was easily to be supplied and and reinforced. The Vosmeer, a branch of the Scheldt, separated the island from the main, and there was a path along the bed of that estuary, which, at dead low-water, was practicable for wading. Alexander, accordingly sent a party of eight hundred pikemen, under Montigny Marquis of Renty, and Ottavio Mansfeld, supported on the dyke by three thousand musketeers, across the dangerous ford, at ebb-tide, in order to seize this important island. It was an adventure similar to those which, in

the days of the grand commander, and under the guidance of Mondragon, had been on two occasions so brilliantly successful. But the Isle of Tholen was now defended by Count Solms and a garrison of fierce amphibious Zeelanders—of those determined bands which had just been holding Farnese and his fleet in prison, and daring him to the issue.—and the invading party, after fortunately accomplishing their night-journey along the bottom of the Vosmeer, were unable to effect a landing, were driven with considerable loss into the waves again, and compelled to find their way back as best they could, along their dangerous path, and with a rapidly rising tide. It was a blind and desperate venture, and the Vosmeer soon swallowed four hundred of the Spaniards. The rest, half-drowned or smothered, succeeded in reaching the shore—the chiefs of the expedition, Renty and Mansfeld, having been with difficulty rescued by their followers, when nearly sinking in the tide. 1

The Duke continued the siege, but the place was well defended by an English and Dutch garrison, to the number of five thousand, and commanded by Colonel Morgan, that bold and much experienced Welshman, so well known in the Netherland wars. Willoughby and Maurice of Nassau, and Olden-Barneveld were, at different times, within the walls; for the Duke had been unable to invest the place so closely as to prevent all communications from without; and, while Maurice was present, there were almost daily sorties from the town, with many a spirited skirmish, to give pleasure to the martial young Prince. 2

The English officers, Vere and Baskerville, 10 Oct. ville, and two Netherland colonels, the brothers Bax, most distinguished themselves on those occasions. The siege was not going on with

1 Bor, iii. xxv. 338-341. Parma to Philip II., 1 Oct. 1588. (Arch. de Sim. MS.) Herrera, iii. ii. 114 seq.

2 Bor, *ubi sup*

the good fortune which had usually attended the Spanish leaguer of Dutch cities, while on the 29th September, a personal incident came to increase Alexander's dissatisfaction and melancholy.

On that day the Duke was sitting in his tent, brooding, as he was apt to do, over the unjust accusations which had been heaped upon him in regard to the failure of the Armada, when a stranger was announced. His name, he said, was Giacomo Morone, and he was the bearer of a letter from Sir Horace Pallavicini, a Genoese gentleman long established in London, and known to be on confidential terms with the English government. Alexander took the letter, and, glancing at the bottom of the last page, saw that it was not signed.

„How dare you bring me a despatch without a signature?” he exclaimed. The messenger, who was himself a Genoese, assured the Duke that the letter was most certainly written by Pallavicini—who had himself placed it, sealed, in his hands—and that he had supposed it signed; although he had, of course, not seen the inside.

Alexander began to read the note, which was not a very long one, and his brow instantly darkened. He read a line or two more, when, with an exclamation of fury, he drew his dagger, and, seizing the astonished Genoese by the throat, was about to strike him dead. Suddenly mastering his rage, however, by a strong effort, and remembering that the man might be a useful witness, he flung Morone from him.

„If I had Pallavicini here,” he said, „I would treat him as I have just refrained from using you. And if I had any suspicion that you were aware of the contents of this letter, I would send you this instant to be hanged.” 1

1 „Y como fué viendo la desvergüenza y vellaqueria me altero de manera que me levante de donde estaba con resolución de darle estocadas, y Dios me alumbro con ponerme delante que convenia que este



The unlucky despatch-bearer protested his innocence of all complicity with Pallavicini, and his ignorance of the tenor of the communication by which the Duke's wrath had been so much excited. He was then searched and cross-examined most carefully by Richardot and other counsellors, and—his innocence being made apparent—he was ultimately discharged.

The letter of Pallavicini was simply an attempt to sound Farnese as to his sentiments in regard to a secret scheme, which could afterwards be arranged in form, and according to which he was to assume the sovereignty of the Netherlands himself, to the exclusion of his King, to guarantee to England the possession of the cautionary towns, until her advances to the States should be refunded, and to receive the support and perpetual alliance of the Queen in his new and rebellious position. 1

Here was additional evidence, if any were wanting, of the universal belief in his disloyalty; and Alexander, faithful, if man ever were, to his master, was cut to the heart, and irritated almost to madness, by such insolent propositions. There is neither proof nor probability that the Queen's government was implicated in this intrigue of Pallavicini, who appears to have been inspired by the ambition of achieving a bit of Machiavellian policy quite on his own account. Nothing came of the proposition, and the Duke, having transmitted to the King a minute narrative of the affair, together with indignant protestations of the fidelity which all

the world seemed determined to dispute, received most affectionate replies from that monarch, breathing nothing but unbounded confidence in his nephew's innocence and devotion. 1

Such assurances from any other man in the world might have disarmed suspicion, but Alexander knew his master too well to repose upon his word, and remembered too bitterly the last hours of Don John of Austria—whose dying pillow he had smoothed, and whose death had been hastened, as he knew, either by actual poison or by the hardly less fatal venom of slander—to regain tranquillity as to his own position.

The King was desirous that Pallavicini should be invited over to Flanders, in order that Alexander, under pretence of listening to his propositions, might draw from the Genoese all the particulars of his scheme, and then, at leisure, inflict the punishment which he had deserved. 2 But insuperable obstacles presented themselves, nor was Alexander desirous of affording still further pretexts for his slanderers.

Very soon after this incident—most important as showing the real situation of various parties, although without any immediate result—Alexander received a visit in his tent from another stranger. This time the visitor was an Englishman, one Lieutenant Grimstone, and the object of his interview with the Duke was not political, but had a direct reference to the siege of Bergen. He was accompanied by a countryman of his own, Redhead by name, a camp-suttler by profession. The two represented themselves a deserters from the besieged city, and offered, for a handsome reward, to conduct a force of Spaniards, by a secret path, into one of the gates. The Duke questioned them narrowly, and, being satisfied with their intelligence and coolness, caused them

hombre se guardase a buen recado, porque V. M. pueda entender del lo que para este nego reporte me; y le dije que si yo tuviesse al Palavicino se la daria cual el merece, y a vos si supiese que sabeis este nego. os mandaria luego colgar. Acabé de leer la carta, y cuanto mas la vi y consideré la hallé mas vellaca y enconsonada." Parma to Philip II., 29 Sept. 1588. (Arch. de Sim. MS.) Compara Strada, II. l. iii. 573 seq.

1 Parma to Philip, MS. last cited. Orazio Pallavicini to Giacomio Morone, 31 Aug. 1588. Arch. de Sim. MSS.) Strada, *ubi sup.*

1 Parma to Idiaquez, 1 Oct. 1588. Philip to Parma, 17 Oct. 1588. Idiaquez to Parma, 17 Oct. 1588. (Arch. de Sim. MSS.)

2 Idiaquez to Parma, MS. last cited.

to take an oath on the Evangelists that they were not playing him false. He then selected a band of one hundred musketeers, partly Spaniards, partly Walloons—to be followed at 20 Oct. a distance by a much more considerable force, two thousand in number, under Sancho de Leyva and the Marquis of Renti—and appointed the following night for an enterprise against the city, under the guidance of Grimstone.

It was a wild autumnal night, moonless, pitch-dark, with a storm of wind and rain. The waters were out—for the dykes had been cut in all directions by the defenders of the city—and, with exception of some elevated points occupied by Parma's forces, the whole country was overflowed. Before the party set forth on their daring expedition, the two Englishmen were tightly bound with cords, and led, each, by two soldiers instructed to put them to instant death if their conduct should give cause for suspicion. But both Grimstone and Redhead preserved a cheerful countenance, and inspired a strong confidence in their honest intention to betray their countrymen. And thus the band of bold adventurers plunged at once into the darkness, and soon found themselves contending with the tempest, and wading breast high in the black waters of the Scheldt.

After a long and perilous struggle they at length reached the appointed gate. The external portcullis was raised, and the fifteen foremost of the band rushed into the town. At the next moment, Lord Willoughby, who had been privy to the whole scheme, cut with his own hand the cords which held the portcullis, and entrapped the leaders of the expedition, who were all at once put to the sword, while their followers were thundering at the gate. The lieutenant and sutler, who had thus overreached that great master of dissimulation, Alexander Farnese, were at the same time

unbound by their comrades, and rescued from the fate intended for them.

Notwithstanding the probability—when the portcullis fell—that the whole party had been deceived by an artifice of war, the adventurers, who had come so far, refused to abandon the enterprise, and continued an impatient battery upon the gate. At last it was swung wide open, and a furious onslaught was made by the garrison upon the Spaniards. There was a fierce, brief struggle, and then the assailants were utterly routed. Some were killed under the walls, while the rest were hunted into the waves. Nearly every one of the expedition (a thousand in number) perished. 1

It had now become obvious to the Duke that his siege must be raised. The days were gone when the walls of Dutch towns seemed to melt before the first scornful glance of the Spanish invader, and when a summons meant a surrender, and a surrender a massacre. Now, strong in the feeling of indepen-

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1 Parma to Philip II. 30 Oct. 1588, (Arch. de Sim. MS.) Meteren, xv. 275<sup>vo</sup>. Bor, iii. xxv. 340. Herrera, iii. ii. 118, *seq.* Strada, ii. x. 582-585. Camero, *Guerras de Flandes* (Bruseles, 1625), p. 231, 232. Coloma, *Guerras de los Estados Baxos*, i. 10, 11. Sir W. Drury to Burghley, <sup>20</sup>/<sub>30</sub> Oct. 1588. (S. P.

Office MS.)

„Seemeth to my simple opinion a great commendation unto the gentleman that could so sweetly charm so wise and learned a master in his own art as the Duke of Parma is,” &c.

The Jesuit Strada, however—who narrates all the trickeries of Philip and of Farnese with so much applause—is shocked at the duplicity of Lieutenant Grimstone; and Coloma is ineffectually disgusted at such sharp practice.

It has been stated by Meteren (xv. 275<sup>vo</sup>) and others, that Sir William Stanley was in this expedition, and that he very narrowly escaped being taken with the first fifteen. This would have been probable enough, had he been there, for his valour was equal to his treachery. But Parma does not mention his name in the letters describing the adventure, and it is therefore unlikely that he was present. At any rate he escaped capture and, with it, a traitor's death. Strada says expressly, „Stanlaeo ad id operis nequaquam adhibito.”

dence, and supported by the courage and endurance of their English allies, the Hollanders had learned to humble the pride of Spain as it had never been humbled before. The hero of a hundred battle-fields, the inventive and brilliant conqueror of Antwerp, seemed in the deplorable issue of the English invasion to have lost all his genius, all his fortune. A cloud had fallen upon his fame, and he now saw himself, at the head of the best army in Europe, compelled to retire, defeated and humiliated, from the walls of Bergen. Winter was coming on apace; the country was flooded; the storms in that bleak region and inclement season were incessant; and he was obliged to retreat before his army should be drowned.

On the night of 12-13 November he set fire to his camp, and took his departure. By daybreak he was descried in full retreat, and was hotly pursued by the English and Dutch from the city, who drove the great Alexander and his legions before them in ignominious flight. Lord Willoughby, in full view of the retiring enemy, indulged the allied forces with a chivalrous spectacle. Calling a halt, after it had become obviously useless, with their small force of cavalry, to follow any longer, through a flooded country, an enemy who had abandoned his design, he solemnly conferred the honour of knighthood, in the name of Queen Elizabeth, on the officers who had most distinguished themselves during the siege, Francis Vere, Baskerville, Powell, Parker, Knowles, and on the two Netherland brothers, Paul and Marcellus Bax. <sup>1</sup>

The Duke of Parma then went into winter-quarters in Brabant, and, before the spring, that obedient Province had been eaten as bare as Flanders had already been by the friendly Spaniards.

An excellent understanding between England and Holland had been the result

of their united and splendid exertions against the Invincible Armada. Late in the year 1588 Sir John Norris had been sent by the Queen to offer her congratulations and earnest thanks to the States for their valuable assistance in preserving her throne, and to solicit their co-operation in some new designs against the common foe. <sup>1</sup> Unfortunately, however, this epoch of good feeling was but of brief duration. Bitterness and dissension seemed the inevitable conditions of the English-Dutch alliance. It will be remembered that, on the departure of Leicester, several cities had refused to acknowledge the authority of Count Maurice and the States; and that civil war in the scarcely-born commonwealth had been the result. Medenblik, Naarden, and the other contumacious cities, had however been reduced to obedience after the reception of the Earl's resignation, but the important city of Gertruydenberg had remained in a chronic state of mutiny. This rebellion had been partially appeased during the year 1588 by the efforts of Willoughby, who had strengthened the garrison by reinforcements of English troops under command of his brother-in-law, Sir John Wingfield.

Early in 1589, however, the whole garrison became rebellious, disarmed and maltreated the burghers, and demanded immediate payment of the heavy arrearages still due to the troops. Willoughby, who—much disgusted with his career in the Netherlands—was about leaving for England, complaining that the States had not only left him without remuneration for his services, but had not repaid his own advances, nor even given him a complimentary dinner, tried in vain to pacify them. A rumour became very current, moreover, that the garrison had

<sup>1</sup> Propositions of Sir John Norris to Council of State. Bor, iii. xxv. 361, 362. Sir Ed. Norris to —, 29 Oct. 1588. (S. P. Office MS.)  
8 Nov.

<sup>1</sup> Bor, *ubi sup.* Meteren. Compare Coloma, i. 11, 12. Herrera, *ubi sup.* Strada, x. 588.



opened negotiations with Alexander Farnese, and accordingly Maurice of Nassau—of whose patrimonial property the city of Gertruydenberg made a considerable proportion, to the amount of eight thousand pounds sterling a year 1—after summoning the garrison, in his own name and in that of the States, to surrender, laid siege to the place in form. It would have been cheaper, no doubt, to pay the demands of the garrison in full, and allow them to depart. But Maurice considered his honour at stake. His letters of summons, in which he spoke of the rebellious commandant and his garrison as self-seeking foreigners and mercenaries, were taken in very ill part. Wingfield resented the statement in very insolent language, and offered to prove its falsehood with his sword against any man and in any place whatever. Willoughby wrote to his brother-in-law, from Flushing, when about to embark, disapproving of his conduct and of his language; and to Maurice, deprecating hostile measures against a city under the protection of Queen Elizabeth. At any rate, he claimed that Sir John Wingfield and his wife, the Countess of Kent, with their newly-born child, should be allowed to depart from the place. But Wingfield expressed great scorn at any suggestion of retreat, and vowed that he would rather surrender the city to the Spaniards than tolerate the presumption of Maurice and the States. The young Prince accordingly opened his batteries, but, before an entrance could be effected into the town, was obliged to retire at the approach of Count Mansfeld with a much superior force. Gertruydenberg was now 10 April, surrendered to the Spaniards 1589.

(10 April, 1589), in accordance with a secret negotiation which had been proceeding all the spring, and had been brought to a conclusion at last. The garrison received twelve months' pay in

full and a gratuity of five months in addition, and the city was then reduced into obedience to Spain and Rome on the terms which had been usual during the government of Farnese. 1

The loss of this city was most severe to the republic, for the enemy had thus gained an entrance into the very heart of Holland. It was a more important acquisition to Alexander than even Bergen-op-Zoom would have been, and it was a bitter reflection that to the treachery of Netherlanders and of their English allies this great disaster was owing. All the wrath aroused a year before by the famous treason of York and Stanley, and which had been successfully extinguished, now flamed forth afresh. The States published a placard denouncing the men who had thus betrayed the cause of freedom, and surrendered the city of Gertruydenberg to the Spaniards, as perjured traitors whom it was made lawful to hang, whenever or wherever caught, without trial or sentence, and offering fifty florins a-head for every private soldier and one hundred florins for any officer of the garrison. A list of these Englishmen and Netherlanders, so far as known, was appended to the placard, and the catalogue was headed by the name of Sir John Wingfield. 2

Thus the consequences of the fatal event were even more deplorable than the loss of the city itself. The fury of Olden-Barneveld at the treason was excessive, and the great Advocate governed the policy of the republic, at this period, almost like a dictator. 3 The

1 Bor, iii. xxvi. 408-419. Strada, ii. x. 600-609. Coloma, i. 20-23.

2 Bor, *ubi sup.* Bodley to Burghley, 10 April, 1589. (B. Mus. Galba, D. iv. 144, MS.)

3 „For all here is directed by Holland, and Holland is carried away by Barneveld, whose resolutions are so full of selfwill, and so opposite to her Majesty's proceedings, as there are of the wisest among themselves that fear by his dealing some great alteration. For the hindrance of which, I cannot propose any better means than if that course which is

1 Ortell to Wolley, 9 April, 1589. (S. P. Office MS.)

States, easily acknowledging the sway of the imperious orator, became bitter and wrathful with the English, side by side with whom they had lately been so cordially standing.

Willoughby, on his part, now at the English court, was furious with the States, and persuaded the leading counsellors of the Queen, as well as her Majesty herself, to adopt his view of the transaction. Wingfield, it was asserted, was quite innocent in the matter; he was entirely ignorant of the French language, and therefore was unable to read a word of the letters addressed to him by Maurice and the replies which had been signed by himself. Whether this strange excuse ought to be accepted or not, it is quite certain that he was no traitor like York and Stanley, and no friend to Spain; for he had stipulated for himself the right to return to England, and had neither received nor desired any reward. He hated Maurice and he hated the States, but he asserted that he had been held in durance, that the garrison was mutinous, and that he was no more responsible for the loss of the city than even Sir Francis Vere had been, who had also been present, and whose name had been subsequently withdrawn, in honourable fashion, from the list of traitors, by authority of the States. His position—so far as he was personally concerned—seemed defensible, and the Queen was thoroughly convinced of his innocence. Willoughby complained that the republic was utterly in the hands of

Barneveld, that no man ventured to lift his voice or his eyes in presence of the terrible Advocate who ruled every Netherlander with a rod of iron, and that his violent and threatening language to Wingfield and himself at the dinner-table in Bergen-op-Zoom on the subject of the mutiny (when one hundred of the Gertruydenberg garrison were within sound of his voice) had been the chief cause of the rebellion.<sup>1</sup> Inspired by these remonstrances, the Queen once more emptied the vials of her wrath upon the United Netherlands. The crimes and recriminations seemed endless, and it was most fortunate that Spain had been weakened, that Alexander, a prey to melancholy and to lingering disease, had gone to the baths of Spa to recruit his shattered health, and that his attention and the schemes of Philip for the year 1589 and the following period were to be directed towards France. Otherwise the commonwealth could hardly have escaped still more severe disasters than those already experienced in this unfortunate condition of its affairs, and this almost hopeless misunderstanding with its most important and vigorous friend.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Bor, *ubi sup.*

<sup>2</sup> Bor, *ubi sup.* and 443-457.

Willoughby published a very bitter pamphlet in reply to the severe attacks of Olden-Barneveld and his partisans. "The child of mildred Willoughby is born at last," said Joachim Ortell: "the book is printed, and is as full of lies as an egg is of meat" (so vol leugens als een ey vol suyvels.)

Walsingham—as might be supposed—much regretted these misunderstandings, although he was inclined to censure the States. "I like very well," he said, "that the placard should rather be answered by Lord Willoughby than by her Majesty. But to have it not answered at all were the best . . . Their ingratitude is great, yet, seeing we cannot sever ourselves from them without infinite danger, their errors are to be winked at for a time. It may be that the disgrace inflicted on them through the loss of Gertruydenberg will somewhat humble them; for seeing Barneveld, the principal ringleader amongst them, begins to stick sail, I think the rest will stoop. But when I look into their strange course in publishing their placard, after the loss of the town to hazard

held between him and Ortell might be stopped in England. For matters here are so handled at this present, as in whatsoever cause the States-General, or they of Holland and Zealand, have to deal with her Majesty, they neither propose it before to the council of state, nor impart it with her Majesty's lieutenant or counsellors; but, by Barneveld's direction, solicit all by Ortell, and so receive their despatch. Whereunto the reputation of every action doth redound unto him, and her Majesty's lieutenant and ministers are little regarded." Bodley to Burghley, 20 Feb.

2 March\* 1589. (Br. Mus. Galba, D. iv. 55, MS.)

While these events had been occurring in the heart of the republic, Martin Schenk, that restless freebooter, had been pursuing a bustling and most lucrative career on its outskirts. All the episcopate of Cologne—that debatable land of the two rival paupers, Bavarian Ernest and Gebhard Truchsess—trembled before him. Mothers scared their children into quiet with the terrible name of Schenk, and farmers and land-youngers throughout the electorate and the land of Berg, Cleves, and Juliers, paid their black-mail, as if it were a constitutional impost, to escape the levying process of the redoubtable partisan.

But Martin was no longer seconded, as he should have been, by the States, to whom he had been ever faithful since he forsook the banner of Spain for their own; and he had even gone to England and complained to the Queen of the shortcomings of those who owed him so much. His ingenious and daring exploit—the capture of Bonn—has already been narrated, but the States had neglected the proper precautions to secure that important city. It had consequently, after a six months' siege, been surrendered to the Spaniards under Prince Chimay, on the 19th of September; 1 while, in December following, the city of Wachtendonk, between the Rhine and Meuse, had fallen into Mansfeld's hands. 2 Rheinberg, the only city of the episcopate which remained to the deposed Truchsess, was soon afterwards invested by the troops of Parma, and Schenk in the loss of her Majesty's favour, I must conclude that with the loss of the town they have lost their wits." Walsingham to Burghley, 27 April, 1589. (Br. Mus. Galba, D. iv. 171, MS.)

9 May

1 Strada, x. 584-595. Coloma, i. 12-14. Bor, iii. xxv. 328.

2 Strade, x. 599, who states that bombs-hells—which he elaborately describes—were first used at this siege of Wachtendonk. They had been invented, he says, a few days before its commencement, by an artisan of Venlo, for his own misfortune and that of his city; for he set the town of Venlo on fire, and burned down two-thirds of it, by a premature explosion of his new projectiles.

vain summoned the States-General to take proper measures for its defence. But with the enemy now eating his way towards the heart of Holland, and with so many dangers threatening them on every side, it was thought imprudent to go so far away to seek the enemy. So Gebhard retired in despair into Germany, and Martin did what he could to protect Rheinberg, and to fill his own coffers at the expense of the whole country side.

He had built a fort, which then and long afterwards bore his name—Schenken Schans, or Schenk's Sconce—at that important point where the Rhine, opening its two arms to enclose the „good-meadow” island of Batavia, becomes on the left the Waal, while on the right it retains its ancient name; and here on the outermost edge of the republic, and looking straight from his fastness into the fruitful fields of Munster, Westphalia, and the electorate, the industrious Martin devoted himself with advantage to his favourite pursuits.

On the 7th of August, on the heath of Lippe, he had attacked a body of Spanish musketeers, more than a thousand strong, who were protecting a convoy of provisions, treasure, and furniture, sent by Farnese to 7 Aug. Verdugo, royal governor of 1589. Friesland. Schenk, without the loss of a single man, had put the greater part of these Spaniards and Walloons to the sword, and routed the rest. The leader of the expedition, Colonel Aristotle Patton, who had once played him so foul a trick in the surrender of Gelder, had soon taken to flight when he found his ancient enemy upon him, and, dashing into the Lippe, had succeeded, by the strength and speed of his horse, in gaining the opposite bank, and effecting his escape. Had he waited many minutes longer it is probable that the treacherous Aristotle would have passed a comfortless half-hour with his former comrade. Treasure to the amount of



seven thousand crowns in gold, five hundred horses, with jewels, plate, and other articles of value, were the fruit of this adventure, and Schenk returned with his followers, highly delighted, to Schenkenschans, 1 and send the captured Spanish colours to her Majesty of England as a token. 2

A few miles below his fortress was Nymegen, and towards that ancient and wealthy city Schenk had often cast longing eyes. It still held for the King, although on the very confines of Batavia; but while acknowledging the supremacy of Philip, it claimed the privileges of the empire. From earliest times it had held its head very high among imperial towns, had been one of the three chief residences of the Emperor Charlemagne, and still paid the annual tribute of a glove full of pepper to the German empire. 3

On the evening of the 10th of August, 1589, there was a wedding-feast in one of the splendid mansions of the stately city. The festivities were prolonged until deep in the midsummer's night, and harp and viol were still inspiring the feet of the dancers, when on a sudden, in the midst of the holiday-groups, appeared the grim visage of Martin Schenk, the man who never smiled. Clad in no wedding-garment, but in armour of proof, with morion on head, and sword in hand, the great freebooter strode heavily through the ball-room, followed by a party of those terrible musketeers who never gave or asked for quarter, while the affrighted revellers fluttered away before them,

Taking advantage of a dark night, he had just dropped down the river from his castle, with five-and-twenty

barges, had landed with his most trusted soldiers in the foremost vessels, had battered down the gate of St. Anthony, and surprised and slain the guard. Without waiting for the rest of his boats, he had then stolen with his comrades through the silent streets, and torn away the lattice-work and other slight defences on the rear of the house which they had now entered, and through which they intended to possess themselves of the market-place. Martin had long since selected this mansion as a proper position for his enterprise, but he had not been bidden to the wedding, and was somewhat disconcerted when he found himself on the festive scene which he had so grimly interrupted. Some of the merry-makers escaped from the house, and proceeded to alarm the town; while Schenk hastily fortified his position, and took possession of the square. But the burghers and garrison were soon on foot, and he was driven back into the house. Three times he recovered the square by main strength of his own arm, seconded by the handful of men whom he had brought with him, and three times he was beaten back by overwhelming numbers into the wedding-mansion. The arrival of the greater part of his followers, with whose assistance he could easily have mastered the city in the first moments of surprise, was mysteriously delayed. He could not account for their prolonged absence, and was meanwhile supported only by those who had arrived with him in the foremost barges.

The truth—of which he was ignorant—was, that the remainder of the flotilla, borne along by the strong and deep current of the Waal, then in a state of freshet, had shot past the landing-place, and had ever since been vainly struggling against wind and tide to force their way back to the necessary point. Meantime Schenk and his followers fought desperately in the marketplace, and desperately in the house which he had seized. But

1 Strada, x. 630, 631. Coloma, ii. 26-27. Bor, iii. xxvi. 459. Bodley to Walsingham,

<sup>2</sup> Aug. 1589. (Br. Mus. Galba, D. v. p. 60, MS.)  
12

2 Bodley to Burghley, <sup>20</sup>/<sub>30</sub> Aug. 1589. (Br.

Mus. Galba, D. iv. p. 55, MS.)

3 Guicciardini, *in voce*..

a whole garrison, and a town full of citizens in arms, proved too much for him, and he was now hotly besieged in the mansion, and at last driven forth into the streets.

By this time day was dawning; the whole population, soldiers and burghers, men, women, and children, were thronging about the little band of marauders, and assailing them with every weapon and every missile to be found. Schenk fought with his usual ferocity, but at last the musketeers, in spite of his indignant commands, began rapidly to retreat towards the quay. In vain Martin stormed and cursed, in vain with his own hand he struck more than one of his soldiers dead. 1 He was swept along with the panic-stricken band, and when, shouting and gnashing his teeth with frenzy, he reached the quay at last, he saw at a glance why his great enterprise had failed. The few empty barges of his own party were moored at the steps; the rest were half a mile off, contending hopelessly against the swollen and rapid Waal. Schenk, desperately wounded, was left almost alone upon the wharf, for his routed followers had plunged helter skelter into the boats, several of which, overladen in the panic, sank at once, leaving the soldiers to drown or struggle with the waves. The game was lost. Nothing was left the freebooter but retreat. Reluctantly turning his back on his enemies, now in full cry close behind him, Schenk sprang into the last remaining boat just pushing from the quay. Already overladen, it foundered with his additional weight, and Martin Schenk, encumbered with his heavy armour, sank at once to the bottom of the Waal. 2

1 „Schencius ira furens et frendens . . . snorum nonnullis sua manu interemptis,” &c. Strada, x. 632.

2 Bor, iii. xxvi. 459, 460. Wagenaar, viii. 307, 308. Strada, x. 631-633. Coloma, ii. 27.

Bodley to Walsingham, <sup>3</sup>/<sub>13</sub> Aug. 1589. (S. P.

Office MS.) Bentivoglio, ii. v. 335. Haraei Tum. Belg. iii. 435.

Some of the fugitives succeeded in swimming down the stream, and were picked up by their comrades in the barges below the town, and so made their escape. Many were drowned with their captain. A few days afterwards the inhabitants of Nymegen fished up the body of the famous partisan. He was easily recognized by his armour, and by his truculent face, still wearing the scowl with which he had last rebuked his followers. His head was taken off at once, and placed on one of the turrets of the town, and his body, divided in four, was made to adorn other portions of the battlements; so that the burghers were enabled to feast their eyes on the remnants of the man at whose name the whole country had so often trembled.

This was end of Sir Martin Schenk of Niddegem, knight, colonel, and brigand; save that ultimately his dis-severed limbs were packed in a chest, and kept in a church-tower, until Maurice of Nassau, in course of time becoming master of Nymegen, honoured the valiant and on the whole faithful freebooter with a Christian and military burial. 1

A few months later (October, 1589) another man who had been playing an important part in the Netherlands' drama lost his life. Count Moeurs and Nieuenaar, stadholder of Utrecht, Gelderland, and Overijssel, while inspecting some newly-invented fireworks, was suddenly killed by their accidental ignition and explosion. 2 His death left vacant three great stadholderates, which before long were to be conferred upon a youth whose

1 Bor, Wagenaar, Strada, *ubi sup.*

„The townsmen since have fished for Schenk, and found him in his armour, and since have cut him in quarters and set him on their gates: which extraordinary inhumanity doth so exasperate the States as they will publish an edict upon it, that no quarter shall be kept with Nymegen.” Bodley to Walsingham

<sup>9</sup>/<sub>19</sub> Aug. 1589. (S. P. Office MS.)

2 Bor. iii. xxvi. 480.

power henceforth was rapidly to grow greater.

The misunderstanding between Holland and England continuing, Olden-Barneveld, Aerssens, and Buys, refusing to see that they had done wrong in denouncing the Dutch and English traitors who had sold Gertruydenberg to the enemy, and the Queen and her counsellors persisting in their anger at so insolent a proceeding, it may easily be supposed that there was no great heartiness in the joint expedition against Spain, which had been projected in the autumn of 1588, and was accomplished in the spring and summer of 1589.

Nor was this well-known enterprise fruitful of any remarkable result. It had been decided to carry the war into Spain itself, and Don Antonio, prior of Crato, bastard of Portugal, and pretender to its crown, had persuaded himself and the English government that his name would be potent to conjure with in that kingdom, hardly yet content with the Spanish yoke. Supported by a determined force of English and Dutch adventurers, he boasted that he should excite a revolution by the magic of his presence, and cause Philip's throne to tremble, in return for the audacious enterprise of that monarch against England.

If foray were to be made into Spain, no general and no admiral could be found in the world so competent to the adventure as Sir John Norris and Sir Francis Drake. They were accompanied, too, by Sir Edward Norris, and another of those „chickens of Mars,” Henry Norris; by the indomitable and ubiquitous Welshman, Roger Williams; and by the young Earl of Essex, whom the Queen in vain commanded to remain at home, and who, somewhat to the annoyance of the leaders of the expedition, concealed himself from her Majesty's pursuit, and at last embarked in a vessel which he had equipped, in order not to be cheated of his share in in the hazard and the booty. „If I

speed well,” said the spendthrift but valiant youth, „I will adventure to be rich; if not, I will never live to see the end of my poverty.”<sup>1</sup>

But no great riches were to be gathered in the expedition. With some fourteen thousand men, and one hundred and sixty vessels—of which six were the Queen's ships of war, including the famous *Revenge* and the *Dreadnought*, and the rest armed merchantmen, English, and forty Hollanders—and with a contingent of fifteen hundred 18 April, Dutchmen under Nicolas van 1589. Meetkerke and Van Laen, the adventurers set sail from Plymouth on the 18th of April, 1589.

They landed at Coruña—at which place they certainly could not expect to create a Portuguese revolution, which was the first object of the expedition—destroyed some shipping in the harbour, captured and sacked the lower town, and were repulsed in the upper; marched with six thousand men to Burgos, crossed the bridge at push of pike, and routed ten thousand Spaniards under Andrada and Altamira—Edward Norris receiving a desperate blow on the head at the passage of the bridge, and being rescued from death by his brother John—took sail for the south after this action, in which they had killed a thousand Spaniards, and had lost but two men of their own; were joined off Cape Finisterre by Essex; landed a force at Peniche, the castle of which place surrendered to them, and acknowledged the authority of Don Antonio; and thence marched with the main body of the troops, under Sir John Norris, forty-eight miles to Lisbon, while Drake, with the fleet, was to sail up the Tagus.

Nothing like a revolution had been effected in Portugal. No one seemed to care for the Pretender, or even to be aware that he had ever existed, except the governor of Peniche Castle, a few

<sup>1</sup> Essex to the Vice-Chamberlain, March, 1589, in Barrow's *Life of Drake*, 377.



ragged and barefooted peasants, who, once upon the road, shouted „Viva Don Antonio,” and one old gentleman by the wayside, who brought him a plate of plums. His hopes of a crown faded rapidly; and when the army reached Lisbon it had dwindled to not much more than four thousand effective men—the rest being dead of dysentery, or on the sick-list from imprudence in eating and drinking—while they found that they had made an unfortunate omission in their machinery for assailing the capital, having not a single fieldpiece in the whole army. Moreover, as Drake was prevented by bad weather and headwinds from sailing up the Tagus, it seemed a difficult matter to carry the city. A few cannon, and the co-operation of the fleet, were hardly to be dispensed with on such an occasion. Nevertheless it would perhaps have proved an easier task than it appeared—for so great was the panic within the place that a large number of the inhabitants had fled, the Cardinal Viceroy Archduke Albert had but a very insufficient guard, and there were many gentlemen of high station who were anxious to further the entrance of the English, and who were afterwards hanged or garotted for their hostile sentiments to the Spanish government. 1

While the leaders were deliberating what course to take, they were informed that Count Fuentes and Henriquez de Guzman, with six thousand men, lay at a distance of two miles from Lisbon, and that they had been proclaiming by sound of trumpet that the English had been signally defeated before Lisbon, and that they were in full retreat.

Fired at this bravado, Norris sent a trumpet to Fuentes and Guzman, with a letter signed and sealed, giving them the lie in plainest terms, appointing the next day for a meeting of the two forces, and assuring them that, when the next encounter should take place,

it should be seen whether a Spaniard or an Englishman would be first to fly; while Essex, on his part, sent a note, defying either or both those boastful generals to single combat. Next day the English army took the field, but the Spaniards retired before them; and nothing came of this exchange of cartels, save a threat on the part of Fuentes to hang the trumpeter who had brought the messages. From the execution of this menace he refrained, however, on being assured that the deed would be avenged by the death of the Spanish prisoner of highest rank then in English hands, and thus the trumpeter escaped.

Soon afterwards the fleet set sail from the Tagus, landed, and burned Vigo on their way homeward, and returned to Plymouth by the middle of July.

Of the thirteen thousand came home six thousand, the rest having perished of dysentery and other disorders. They had braved and insulted Spain, humbled her generals, defied her power, burned some defenceless villages, frightened the peasantry, set fire to some shipping, destroyed wine, oil, and other merchandize, and had divided among the survivors of the expedition, after landing in England, five shillings a head prize-money; but they had not effected a revolution in Portugal. Don Antonio had been offered nothing by his faithful subjects but a dish of plums—so that he retired into obscurity from that time forward—and all this was scarcely a magnificent result for the death of six or seven thousand good English and Dutch soldiers, and the outlay of considerable treasure.

As a freebooting foray—and it was nothing else—it could hardly be thought successful; although it was a splendid triumph compared with the result of the long and loudly heralded Invincible Armada. 1

1 For particulars of this expedition, see Camden, iv. 429-433. Stowe 751-756. Bar-

1 Bor, iii. xxvi. 439.

In France, great events during the remainder of 1588 and the following year, and which are well known even to the most superficial student of history, had much changed the aspect of European affairs. It was fortunate for the two commonwealths of Holland and England, engaged in the great struggle for civil and religious liberty and national independence, that the attention of Philip became more and more absorbed—as time wore on—with the affairs of France. It seemed necessary for him firmly to establish his dominion in that country before attempting once more the

row's 'Life of Drake,' with the letters of Drake, Norris, and others, 335-379. Bor, iii. xxvi. 430-443. Herrera, iii. v. 170 *seq.*

Sir Roger Williams to the Lord Chancellor, Lord Treasurer, and Secretary Walsingham, July, 1589. (S. P. Office MS.)

"Had we gone to Lisbon," says the Welsh knight, "and not touched at the Groyne, we had found the town unprovided with men of war; in such sort, with the favour of God, we had carried it away without blows. . . We have returned the most of our ships into England that *should have been* laden with rich merchandise and great treasures. With that lading, our sovereign and your honours might have returned our shipping unto us with a new supply. In going into the Groyne we lost a number of brave men in dislodging. At the least 2000 took their course—some for England, some for France. There we took our sickness, partly by the hot winds, but chiefly by the old clothes and baggage of those which returned with the Duke of Medina out of England. There we lost many a day, in the which time the enemy arrived, and placed his forces where he thought most necessariest, chiefly in Lisbon. Notwithstanding, when we arrived, we gave the law in the field, that none durst fight with us, in twelve days, with 5000 footmen, and, God knows, poor people, save 2000, and those all volunteers. All the horsemen we had amounted not to 45; we had not any Portuguese to speak of, and such as we had did us more hurt than good. . . . Some will say, How could you have kept Lisbon? Believe it not. With six thousand we would have kept it against all Spain and Portugal. . . . Our journey was most honourable and profitable unto our sovereign and estate. First, and principally, the world will speak how 5000 Englishmen dared the Spaniards to battle at the gates of Lisbon—not stealing, but after giving leave to arm two months; for the world must think they knew where we meant to direct our course, when Don Antonio dislodged from his house at London," &c. &c.

conquest of England, or the recovery of the Netherlands. For France had been brought more nearly to anarchy and utter decomposition than ever. Henry III., after his fatal forgiveness of the deadly offence of Guise, felt day by day more keenly that he had transferred his sceptre—such as it was—to that dangerous intriguer. Bitterly did the King regret having refused the prompt offer of Alphonse Corse on the day of the barricades; for now so long as the new generalissimo should live, the luckless Henry felt himself a superfluity in his own realm. The halcyon days were for ever past, when, protected by the swords of Joyeuse and of Epemon, the monarch of France could pass his life playing at cup and ball, or snipping images out of pasteboard, or teaching his parrots to talk, or his lapdogs to dance. His royal occupations were gone, and murder now became a necessary preliminary to any future tranquillity or enjoyment. Discrowned, as he felt himself already, he knew that life or liberty was only held by him now at the will of Guise. The assassination of the Duke in December was the necessary result of the barricades in May; and accordingly that assassination was arranged with an artistic precision of which the world had hardly suspected the Valois to be capable, and which Philip himself might have envied.

The story of the murders of Blois—the destruction of Guise and his brother the Cardinal, and the subsequent imprisonment of the Archbishop of Lyons, the Cardinal Bourbon, and the Prince de Joinville, now, through the death of his father, become the young Duke of Guise—all these events are too familiar in the realms of history, song, romance, and painting, to require more than this slight allusion here.

Never had an assassination been more technically successful; yet its results were not commensurate with the monarch's hopes. The deed which he had

thought premature in May was already too late in December. His mother denounced his cruelty now, as she had, six months before, execrated his cowardice. And the old Queen, seeing that her game was played out—that the cards had all gone against her—that her son was doomed, and her own influence dissolved in air, felt that there was nothing left for her but to die. In a week she was dead, and men spoke no more of Catherine de' Medici, and thought no more of her than if—in the words of a splenetic contemporary—„she had been a dead she-goat.”<sup>1</sup> Paris howled with rage when it learned the murders of Blois, and the sixteen quarters became more furious than ever against the Valois. Some wild talk there was of democracy and republicanism after the manner of Switzerland, and of dividing France into cantons—and there was an earnest desire on the part of every grandee, every general, every soldier of fortune, to carve out a portion of French territory with his sword, and to appropriate it for himself and his heirs. Disintegration was making rapid progress, and the epoch of the last Valois seemed more dark and barbarous than the times of the degenerate Carolingians had been. The letter-writer of the Escorial, who had earnestly warned his faithful Mucio, 2 week after week, that dangers were impending over him, and that „some trick would be played upon him,” should he venture into the royal presence, now acquiesced in his assassination, and placidly busied himself with fresh combinations and newer tools.

Baffled, hunted, scorned by all beside, the luckless Henry now threw himself

into the arms of the Béarnese—the man who could and would have protected him long before, had the King been capable of understanding their relative positions and his own true interests. Could the Valois have conceived the thought of religious toleration, his throne even then might have been safe. But he preferred playing the game of the priests and bigots, who execrated his name and were bent upon his destruction. At last, at Plessis les Tours, the Béarnese, in his shabby old chamois jacket and his well-dinted cuirass, took the silken Henry in his arms, and the two—the hero and the fribble—swearing eternal friendship, proceeded to besiege

2 Aug. 1589. Paris. A few weeks later, the dagger of Jacques Clément put an end for ever to the line of Valois. 1 Luckless Henry III. slept with his forefathers, and Henry of Bourbon and Navarre proclaimed himself King of France. Catherine and her four sons had all passed away at last, and it would be a daring and a dexterous schemer who should now tear the crown, for which he had so long and so patiently waited, from the iron grasp of the Béarnese. Philip had a more difficult

1 The spelling of the sixteenth century, in all European languages, was capricious and unsettled; yet the little note in which the Duchess Mary of Luxemburg announced the death of Henry III. is a curiosity, even for that age:—

„Qui la ette tue—sa ette par un Jacobin qui luy a donne dun cou de pissetolle dan la taye. Ill i a dotre nouvelle beaucoup avantajeuse pour les bon Catolique, jay donne charge a se deporteur de les vous dire.” Duchess Maria de Luxembourg au Commandeur Moreo, 9 Aug. 1589. (Arch. de Sim. MS.)

Philip's wonderful comment on the words „pissetolle” and „taye” in this communication has been already published, but will bear repetition:—

„Perhaps,” he wrote with his own hand, „pissetolle” is some kind of knife, and „taye,” I don't know if it can be anything else than head, which is not „taye,” but „teyte,” as you know.”

„Quizá es alguna manera de cuchillo, y la taye no sé si podría ser otra coza que cabeza, qui no es taye, sino tete, o teyte, come sabreys.”

1 L'Estoile.

2 A. 56. 148. Arch. de Simancas, [at Paris.] MS. *passim*.

E. g., „Con Mucio a quien siempre aconsejád que mire por sí y no se dexé enganar y hazer alguna burla, pues anda a tanto peligro.” And, in the King's own hand, „Y se acuerde de su padre.” Philip to Mendoza, 3 Sept. 1588, MS.



game than ever to play in France. It would be hard for him to make valid the claims of the Infanta and any husband he might select for her to the crown of her grandfather Henry II. It seemed simple enough for him, while waiting the course of events, to set up a royal effigy before the world in the shape of an effete old Cardinal Bourbon, to pour oil upon its head and to baptize it Charles X.; but meantime the other Bourbon was no effigy, and he called himself Henry IV.

It was easy enough for Paris, and Madam League, and Philip the Prudent, to cry wo upon the heretic; but the cheerful leader of the Huguenots was a philosopher, who in the days of St. Bartholomew had become orthodox to save his life, and who was already „instructing himself” anew in order to secure his crown. Philip was used to deal with fanatics, and had often been opposed by a religious bigotry as fierce as his own; but he might perhaps be baffled by a good-humoured freethinker, who was to teach him a lesson in political theology of which he had never dreamed.

The Leaguers were not long in doubt as to the meaning of „instruction,” and they were thoroughly persuaded that—so soon as Henry IV. should reconcile himself with Rome—their game was likely to become desperate.

Nevertheless prudent Philip sat in his elbow-chair, writing his apostilles, improving himself and his secretaries in orthography, but chiefly confining his attention to the affairs of France. The departed Mucio’s brother Mayenne was installed as chief stipendiary of Spain and lieutenant-general for the League in France, until Philip should determine within himself in what form to assume the sovereignty of that kingdom. It might be questionable however whether that corpulent Duke, who spent more time in eating than Henry IV. did in sleeping, and was longer in reading a letter than Henry in winning a battle,

were likely to prove a very dangerous rival—even with all Spain at his back—to the lively Béarnese. But time would necessarily be consumed before the end was reached, and time and Philip were two. Henry of Navarre and France was ready to open his ears to instruction but even he had declared, several years before, that „a religion was not to be changed like a shirt.” So while the fresh garment was airing for him at Rome, and while he was leisurely stripping off the old, he might perhaps be taken at a disadvantage. Fanaticism on both sides, during this process of instruction, might be roused. The Huguenots on their part might denounce the treason of their great chief, and the Papists, on theirs, howl at the hypocrisy of the pretended conversion. But Henry IV. had philosophically prepared himself for the denunciations of the Protestants, while determined to protect them against the persecutions of the Romanism to which he meant to give his adhesion. While accepting the title of renegade, together with an undisputed crown, he was not the man to rekindle those fires of religious bigotry which it was his task to quench, now that they had lighted his way to the throne. The demands of his Catholic supporters for the exclusion from the kingdom of all religions but their own, were steadily refused.<sup>1</sup>

And thus the events of 1588 and 1589 indicated that the great game of despotism against freedom would be played, in the coming years, upon the soil of France. Already Elizabeth had furnished the new King with 22,000*l.* in gold—a larger sum, as he observed, than he had ever seen before in his life, <sup>2</sup> and the States of the Netherlands had provided him with as much more. <sup>3</sup> Willoughby too, and tough Roger Willi-

<sup>1</sup> De Thou, x. l. 89, pp. 270, 680. Préfixe, 80, 96. L’Etoile, 258, 291.

<sup>2</sup> Camden. iv. 436.

<sup>3</sup> Bodley to Burghiey, 20 Aug. 1589. (Br. Mus. Galba, D. iv. p. 55, MS.)

ams, and Buskerville, and Umpton, and Vere, with 4000 English pikemen at their back, had already made a brief but spirited campaign in France; 1 and the Duke of Parma, after recruiting his health, so far as it was possible, at Spa, was preparing himself to measure swords with the great captain of Huguenots, who now assumed the crown of his ancestors; upon the same ground. It seemed probable that for the coming years England would be safe from Spanish invasion, and that Holland would have a better opportunity than it had ever enjoyed before of securing its liberty and perfecting its political organization. While Parma, Philip, and Mayenne were fighting the Béarnese for the crown of France, there might be a fairer field for the new commonwealth of the United Netherlands.

And thus many of the personages

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1 Camden, *ubi sup.*

who have figured in these volumes have already passed away. Leicester had died just after the defeat of the Armada, and the thrifty Queen, while dropping a tear upon the grave of „sweet Robin,” had sold his goods at auction to defray his debts to herself; and Moeurs and Martin Schenk, and „Mucio,” and Henry III., and Catherine de’ Medici, were all dead. But Philip the Prudent remained, and Elizabeth of England, and Henry of France and Navarre, and John of Olden-Barneveld; and there was still another personage, a very young man still, but a deep-thinking, hard working student, fagging steadily at mathematics and deep in the works of Stevinus, who, before long, might play a conspicuous part in the world’s great drama. But, previously to 1590, Maurice of Nassau seemed comparatively insignificant, and he could be spoken of by courtiers as a cipher, and as an unmannerly boy just let loose from school.

## CHAPTER XXI.

Effect of the Assassination of Henry III.—Concentration of forces for the invasion of France—The Netherlands determine on striking a blow for freedom—Organization of a Dutch army—Stratagem to surprise the castle of Breda—Intrepidity and success of the enterprise.

THE dagger of Jacques Clément had done much, and was likely to do more, to change the face of Europe. Another proof was afforded that assassination had become a regular and recognised factor in the political problems of the sixteenth century. Another illustration was exhibited of the importance of the individual—even although that individual was in himself utterly despicable—to the working out of great historical results. It seemed that the murder of Henry III.—that forlorn caricature of kingship and of manhood—was likely to prove eminently beneficial to the cause of the Netherland commonwealth. Five years

earlier, the murder of William the Silent had seemed to threaten its very existence.

For Philip the Prudent, now that France was deprived of a head, conceived that the time had arrived when he might himself assume the sovereignty of that kingdom. While a thing of straw, under the name of Charles X. and shape of a Cardinal Bourbon, was set up to do battle with that living sovereign and soldier, the heretic Béarnese, the Duke of Parma was privately ordered to bend all his energies towards the conquest of the realm in dispute, under pretence of assisting the Holy League.

Accordingly, early in the year 1590, Alexander concentrated a considerable force on the French frontier in Artois and Hainault, apparently threatening Bergen-op-Zoom and other cities in South Holland, but in reality preparing

to invade France. The Duke of Mayenne, who had assumed the title of lieutenant-general of that kingdom, had already visited him at Brussels in order to arrange the plan of the campaign. 1

While these measures were in preparation, an opportunity was likely to be afforded to the Netherlanders of striking a blow or two for liberty and independence; now that all the force that possibly could be spared was to be withdrawn by their oppressors and to be used for the subjugation of their neighbours. The question was whether there would be a statesman and a soldier ready to make use of this golden opportunity.

There was a statesman ripe and able who, since the death of the Taciturn, had been growing steadily in the estimation of his countrymen and who already was paramount in the councils of the States-General. There was a soldier, still very young, who was possessed of the strongest hereditary claims to the confidence and affection of the United Provinces and who had been passing a studious youth in making himself worthy of his father and his country. Fortunately, too, the statesman and the soldier were working most harmoniously together. John of Olden-Barneveld, with his great experience and vast and steady intellect, stood side by side with young Maurice of Nassau at this important crisis in the history of the new commonwealth.

At length the twig was becoming the tree—*tandem fit surculus arbor*—according to the device assumed by the son of William the Silent after his father's death.

The Netherlands had sore need of a practical soldier to contend with the scientific and professional tyrants against whom they had so long been struggling, and Maurice, although so young, was pre-eminently a practical man. He was no enthusiast; he was no poet. He was

at that period certainly no politician. Not often at the age of twenty has a man devoted himself for years to pure mathematics for the purpose of saving his country. Yet this was Maurice's scheme. Four years long and more, when most other youths in his position and at that epoch would have been alternating between frivolous pleasures and brilliant exploits in the field, the young prince had spent laborious days and nights with the learned Simon Stevinus of Bruges. The scientific work which they composed in common, the credit of which the master assigned to the pupil, might have been more justly attributed perhaps to the professor than to the prince, but it is certain that Maurice was an apt scholar.

In that country, ever held in existence by main human force against the elements, the arts of engineering, hydrostatics and kindred branches were of necessity much cultivated. It was reserved for the young mathematician to make them as potent against a human foe.

Moreover, there were symptoms that the military discipline, learning and practical skill, which had almost made Spain the mistress of the world, were sinking into decay. Farnese, although still in the prime of life, was broken in health, and there seemed no one fit to take the place of himself and his lieutenants when they should be removed from the scene where they had played their parts so consummately. The army of the Netherlands was still to be created. Thus far the contest had been mainly carried on by domestic militia and foreign volunteers or hirelings. The train-bands of the cities were aided in their struggles against Spanish pikemen and artillerymen, Italian and Albanian cavalry by the German riders, whom every little potentate was anxious to sell to either combatant according to the highest bid, and by English mercenaries, whom the love of adventure or the hope of plunder sent forth under such well-seasoned

1 Bor, vol. III. B. xxvi. pp. 516, 518.



captains as Williams and Morgan, Vere and the Norrises, Baskerville and Willoughby.

But a Dutch army there was none, and Maurice had determined that at last a national force should be created. In this enterprise he was aided and guided by his cousin Lewis William, Stadtholder of Friesland—the quaint, rugged little hero, young in years but almost a veteran in the wars of freedom, who was as genial and intellectual in council as he was reckless and impulsive in the field.

Lewis William had felt that the old military art was dying out, and that there was nothing to take its place. He had revived in the swamps of Friesland the old manœuvres, the quickness of wheeling, the strengthening, without breaking ranks or columns, by which the ancient Romans had performed so much excellent work in their day, and which seemed to have passed entirely into oblivion. Old colonels and ritt-masters, who had never heard of Leo the Tracian nor the Macedonian phalanx, smiled and shrugged their shoulders as they listened to the questions of the young count, or gazed with profound astonishment at the eccentric evolutions to which he was accustoming his troops. From the heights of superior wisdom they looked down with pity upon these innovations on the good old battle order. They were accustomed to great solid squares of troops wheeling in one way, steadily, deliberately, all together, by one impulse and as one man. It was true that in narrow fields, and when the enemy was pressing, such stately evolutions often became impossible, or ensured defeat; but when the little Stadtholder drilled his soldiers in small bodies of various shapes, teaching them to turn, advance, retreat, wheel in a variety of ways, sometimes in considerable masses, sometimes man by man, sending the foremost suddenly to the rear, or bringing the hindmost ranks to the

front, and began to attempt all this in narrow fields as well as in wide ones, and when the enemy was in sight, men stood aghast at his want of reverence, or laughed at him as a pedant. But there came a day when they did not laugh, neither friends nor enemies. Meantime the two cousins, who directed all the military operations in the provinces, understood each other thoroughly and proceeded to perfect their new system, to be adopted at a later period by all civilized nations. 1

The regular army of the Netherlands was small in number at that moment—not more than twenty thousand foot with two thousand horse—but it was well disciplined, well equipped, and, what was of great importance, regularly paid. Old campaigners complained that in the halcyon days of paper enrolments, a captain could earn more out of his company than a colonel now received for his whole regiment. The days when a thousand men were paid for, with a couple of hundred in the field, were passing away for the United Provinces and existed only for Italians and Spaniards. While, therefore, mutiny on an organized and extensive scale seemed almost the normal condition of the unpaid legions of Philip, the little army of Maurice was becoming the model for Europe to imitate.

The United Provinces were as yet very far from being masters of their own territory. Many of their most important cities still held for the king. In Brabant, such towns as Breda with its many dependencies and Gertruydenberg; on the Waal, the strong and wealthy Nymegen which Martin Schenk had perished in attempting to surprise; on the Yssel, the thriving city of Zutphen, whose fort had been surrendered by the traitor York, and the stately Deventer, which had been placed in Philip's possession by the treachery of Sir William Stanley; on the borders of Drenthe, the almost impregnable Koevorden, key to the whole

Zwollian country; and in the very heart of ancient Netherland, Groningen, capital of the province of the same name, which the treason of Renneberg had sold to the Spanish tyrant;—all these flourishing cities and indispensable strongholds were garrisoned by foreign troops, making the idea of Dutch independence a delusion.

While Alexander of Parma, sorely against his will and in obedience to what he deemed the insane suggestions of his master, was turning his back on the Netherlands in order to relieve Paris, now hard pressed by the Béarnese, an opportunity offered itself of making at least a beginning in the great enterprise of recovering these most valuable possessions.

The fair and pleasant city of Breda lies on the Merk, a slender stream, navigable for small vessels, which finds its way to the sea through the great canal of the Dintel. It had been the property of the Princes of Orange, Barons of Breda, and had passed with the other possessions of the family to the house of Châlons-Nassau. Henry of Nassau had, half a century before, adorned and strengthened it by a splendid palace-fortress which, surrounded by a deep and double moat, thoroughly commanded the town. A garrison of five companies of Italian infantry and one of cavalry lay in this castle, which was under the command of Edward Lanza-vecchia, governor both of Breda and of the neighbouring Gertruydenberg.

Breda was an important strategic position. It was moreover the feudal superior of a large number of adjacent villages as well as of the cities Osterhout, Steenberg and Rosendaal. It was obviously not more desirable for Maurice of Nassau to recover his patrimonial city than it was for the States-General to drive the Spaniards from so important a position. 1

In the month of February, 1590, Maurice, being then at the castle of Voorn in Zeeland, received a secret visit from a boatman, Adrian van der Berg by name, who lived at the village of Leur, eight or ten miles from Breda; and who had long been in the habit of supplying the castle with turf. In the absence of woods and coal mines, the habitual fuel of the country was furnished by those vast relics of the antediluvian forests which abounded in the still partially submerged soil. The skipper represented that his vessel had passed so often into and out of the castle as to be hardly liable to search by the guard on its entrance. He suggested a stratagem by which it might be possible to surprise the stronghold.

The prince approved of the scheme and immediately consulted with Barneveld. That statesman at once proposed, as a suitable man to carry out the daring venture, Captain Charles de Heraugiere, a nobleman of Cambray, who had been long in the service of the States, had distinguished himself at Sluys and on other occasions, but who had been implicated in Leicester's nefarious plot to gain possession of the city of Leyden a few years before. 1 The Advocate expressed confidence that he would be grateful for so signal an opportunity of retrieving a somewhat damaged reputation. Heraugiere, who was with his company in Voorn at the moment, eagerly signified his desire to attempt the enterprise as soon as the matter was communicated to him; avowing the deepest devotion to the house of William the Silent and perfect willingness to sacrifice his life, if necessary, in its cause and that of the country. Philip Nassau, cousin of Prince Maurice and brother of Lewis William, governor of Gorcum, Dorecum, and Lowenstein Castle, and colonel of

in voce. Meteren, xvi. 290, 291. Em. van Reydt viii. 162-163. Bentivoglio, II. v. 336, 338.

1 Vol. II. of this work, ch. xvii. p. 333. seqq.

1 Bor, III. xxvi. 518, seqq. Giucciardini

a regiment of cavalry, was also taken into the secret, as well as Count Hohenlo, President Van der Myle and a few others; but a mystery was carefully spread and maintained over the undertaking.

Heraugiere selected sixty-eight men, on whose personal daring and patience he knew that he could rely, from the regiments of Philip Nassau and of Famars, governor of the neighbouring city of Heusden, and from his own to company. Besides himself, the officers command the party were captains Logier and Fervet, and lieutenant Matthew Held. The names of such devoted soldiers deserve to be commemorated and are still freshly remembered by their countrymen.

On the 25th of February, Maurice and his staff went to Willemstad on the Isle of Klundert, it having been given out on his departure from the Hague that his destination was Dort. On the same night at about eleven o'clock, by the feeble light of a waning moon, Heraugiere and his band came to the Swertsenburg ferry, as agreed upon, to meet the boatman. They found neither him nor his vessel, and they wandered about half the night, very cold, very indignant, much perplexed. At last, on their way back, they came upon the skipper at the village of Terheyde, who made the extraordinary excuse that he had overslept himself and that he feared the plot had been discovered. It being too late to make any attempt that night, a meeting was arranged for the following evening. No suspicion of treachery occurred to any of the party, although it became obvious that the skipper had grown faint-hearted. He did not come on the next night to the appointed place, but he sent two nephews, boatmen like himself, whom he described as dare-devils.

On Monday night, the 26th of February, the seventy went on board the vessel, which was apparently filled with blocks of turf, and packed themselves

closely in the hold. 1 They moved slowly during a little time on their perilous voyage; for the winter wind, thick with fog and sleet, blew directly down the river, bringing along with it huge blocks of ice and scooping the water out of the dangerous shallows, so as to render the vessel at any moment liable to be stranded. At last the navigation became impossible and they came to a standstill. From Monday night till Thursday morning those seventy Hollanders lay packed like herrings in the hold of their little vessel, suffering from hunger, thirst, and deadly cold; yet not one of them attempted to escape or murmured a wish to abandon the enterprise. Even when the third morning dawned there was no better prospect of proceeding; for the remorseless east wind still blew a gale against them, and the shoals which beset their path had become more dangerous than ever. It was, however, absolutely necessary to recruit exhausted nature, unless the adventurers were to drop powerless on the threshold when they should at last arrive at their destination. In all secrecy they went ashore at a lonely castle called Nordam, where they remained to refresh themselves until about eleven at night, when one of the boatmen came to them with the intelligence that the wind had changed and was now blowing freshly in from the sea. Yet the voyage of a few leagues, on which they were embarked, lasted nearly two whole days longer. On Saturday afternoon they passed through the last sluice, and at about three o'clock the last boom was shut behind them. There was no retreat possible for them now. The seventy were to take the strong castle and city of Breda or to lay down their lives, every man of them. No quarter and short shrift—such was their certain destiny, should that half-crippled, half frozen little band not succeed in their task before another sunrise.

They were now in the outer harbour

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1 Bor, Reynd, Meteren, Bentivoglio, *ubi sup.*



and not far from the watergate which led into the inner castle-haven. Presently an officer of the guard put off in a skiff and came on board the vessel. He held a little conversation with the two boatmen, observed that the castle was much in want of fuel, took a survey of the turf with which the ship was apparently laden, and then lounged into the little cabin. Here he was only separated by a sliding trap-door from the interior of the vessel. Those inside could hear and see his every movement. Had there been a single cough or sneeze from within, the true character of the cargo, then making its way into the castle, would have been discovered and every man would within ten minutes have been butchered. But the officer, unsuspecting, soon took his departure, saying that he would send some men to warp the vessel into the castle dock.

Meantime, as the adventurers were making their way slowly towards the watergate, they struck upon a hidden obstruction in the river and the deeply laden vessel sprang a leak. In a few minutes those inside were sitting up to their knees in water—a circumstance which scarcely improved their already sufficiently dismal condition. The boatmen vigorously plied the pumps to save the vessel from sinking outright; a party of Italian soldiers soon arrived on the shore, and in the course of a couple of hours they had laboriously dragged the concealed Hollanders into the inner harbour and made their vessel fast, close to the guard-house of the castle.

And now a crowd of all sorts came on board. The winter nights had been long and fearfully cold, and there was almost a dearth of fuel both in town and fortress. A gang of labourers set to work discharging the turf from the vessel with such rapidity that the departing daylight began to shine in upon the prisoners much sooner than they wished. Moreover, the thorough wetting, to which after all their other incon-

veniences they had just been exposed in their narrow escape from foundering, had set the whole party sneezing and coughing. Never was a catarrh so sudden, so universal, or so ill-timed. Lieutenant Held, unable to control the violence of his cough, drew his dagger and eagerly implored his next neighbour to stab him to the heart, lest his infirmity should lead to the discovery of the whole party. But the calm and wary skipper who stood on the deck instantly commanded his companion to work at the pump with as much clatter as possible, assuring the persons present that the hold was nearly full of water. By this means the noise of the coughing was effectually drowned. Most thoroughly did the bold boatman deserve the title of dare-devil, bestowed by his more faint-hearted uncle. Calmly looking death in the face, he stood there quite at his ease, exchanging jokes with his old acquaintances, chaffering with the eager purchasers of peat, shouting most noisy and superfluous orders to the one man who composed his crew, doing his utmost, in short, to get rid of his customers and to keep enough of the turf on board to conceal the conspirators. 1

At last, when the case seemed almost desperate, he loudly declared that sufficient had been unladen for that evening and that it was too dark and he too tired for further work. So, giving a handful of stivers among the workmen, he bade them go ashore at once and have some beer and come next morning for the rest of the cargo. Fortunately, they accepted his hospitable proposition and took their departure. Only the servant of the captain of the guard lingered behind, complaining that the turf was not as good as usual and that his master would never be satisfied with it.

„Ah!” returned the cool skipper, *„the best part of the cargo is underneath. This is expressly reserved for*

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1 Reyd, *ubi sup.*

the captain. He is sure to get enough of it to-morrow." 1

Thus admonished, the servant departed and the boatman was left to himself. His companion had gone on shore with secret orders to make the best of his way to Prince Maurice, to inform him of the arrival of the ship within the fortress, and of the important fact which they had just learned, that Governor Lanzavecchia, who had heard rumours of some projected enterprise and who suspected that the object aimed at was Gertruydenberg, had suddenly taken his departure for that city, leaving as his lieutenant his nephew Paolo, a raw lad quite incompetent to provide for the safety of Breda. 2

A little before midnight, Captain Heraugiere made a brief address to his comrades in the vessel, telling them that the hour for carrying out their undertaking had at length arrived. Retreat was impossible, defeat was certain death, only in complete victory lay their own safety and a great advantage for the commonwealth. It was an honour to them to be selected for such an enterprise. To show cowardice now would be an eternal shame for them, and he would be the man to strike dead with his own hand any traitor or poltroon. But if, as he doubted not, every one was prepared to do his duty, their success was assured, and he was himself ready to take the lead in confronting every danger.

He then divided the little band into two companies, one under himself to attack the main guard-house, the other under Fervet to seize the arsenal of the fortress.

Noiselessly they stole out of the ship where they had so long been confined, and stood at last on the ground within the precincts of the castle. Heraugiere marched straight to the guard-house.

1 Reynd. This answer, which is historical, is as good a specimen of ready wit in an emergency as is often met with in real life.

2 Bentivoglio, Bor, Meteren, Reynd, *ubi sup.*

"Who goes there?" cried a sentinel, hearing some movement in the darkness.

"A friend," replied the captain, "seizing him by the throat, and commanding him, if he valued his life, to keep silence except when addressed and then to speak in a whisper.

"How many are there in the garrison?" muttered Heraugiere.

"Three hundred and fifty," whispered the sentinel.

"How many?" eagerly demanded the nearest followers, not hearing the reply.

"He says there are but fifty of them," said Heraugiere, prudently suppressing the three hundred, in order to encourage his comrades.

Quietly as they had made their approach, there was nevertheless a stir in the guard-house. The captain of the watch sprang into the courtyard.

"Who goes there?" he demanded in his turn.

"A friend," again replied Heraugiere, striking him dead with a single blow as he spoke.

Others emerged with torches. Heraugiere was slightly wounded, but succeeded after a brief struggle, in killing a second assailant. His followers set upon the watch who retreated into the guard-house. Heraugiere commanded his men to fire through the doors and windows, and in a few minutes every one of the enemy lay dead.

It was not a moment for making prisoners or speaking of quarter. Meantime Fervet and his band had not been idle. The magazine-house of the castle was seized, its defenders slain. Young Lanzavecchia made a sally from the palace, was wounded and driven back together with a few of his adherents.

The rest of the garrison fled helter-skelter into the town. Never had the musketeers of Italy—for they all belonged to Spinola's famous Sicilian Legion—behaved so badly. 1 They did not even

1 „Non fece mai la soldatesca Italiana più

take the precaution to destroy the bridge between the castle and the town as they fled panic-stricken before seventy Hollanders. Instead of encouraging the burghers to their support they spread dismay, as they ran, through every street.

Young Lanzavecchia, penned into a corner of the castle, began to parley; hoping for a rally before a surrender should be necessary. In the midst of the negotiation and a couple of hours before dawn, Hohenlo, duly apprised by the boatman, arrived with the vanguard of Maurice's troops before the field-gate of the fort. A vain attempt was made to force this portal open, but the winter's ice had fixed it fast. Hohenlo was obliged to batter down the palisade near the watergate, and enter by the same road through which the fatal turf-boat had passed.

Soon after he had marched into the town at the head of a strong detachment, Prince Maurice himself arrived in great haste, attended by Philip Nassau, the Admiral Justinus Nassau, Count Solms, Peter van der Does, and Sir Francis Vere, and followed by another body of picked troops; the musicians playing merrily that national air, then as now so dear to Netherlands—

„Wilhelmus van Nassouwen  
Ben ick van Duytsem bloed.”

The fight was over. Some forty of the garrison had been killed, but not a man of the attacking party. The burgomaster sent a trumpet to the prince, asking permission to come to the castle to arrange a capitulation; and before sunrise the city and fortress of Breda had surrendered to the authority of the States-General and of his Excellency. 1

*indegna attione di questa,*” says Cardinal Bentivoglio, *loc. cit.*

1 Bor, Bentivoglio, Reyd, Meteren, *ubi sup.* Count William Lewis in a letter to his father, dated 1 March, O. S. 1690, in giving a very brief account of this enterprise, speaks of *three turf vessels* as having been employed; „in drie torff schuiten onder dem holtz verborgen 80 soldaten,” but this statement is

The terms were moderate. The plundering was commuted for the payment of two months' wages to every soldier engaged in the affair. Burghers who might prefer to leave the city were allowed to do so with protection to life and property. Those who were willing to remain loyal citizens were not to be molested, in their consciences or their households, in regard to religion. The public exercise of Catholic rites was however suspended until the States-General should make some universal provision on this subject.

Subsequently, it must be allowed, the bargain of commutation proved a bad one for the burghers. Seventy men had in reality done the whole work, but so many soldiers, belonging to the detachments who marched in after the fortress had been taken, came forward to claim their months' wages, as to bring the whole amount required above one hundred thousand florins. The Spaniards accordingly reproached Prince Maurice with having fined his own patrimonial city more heavily than Alexander Farnese had mulcted Antwerp, which had been made to pay but four hundred thousand florins, a far less sum in proportion to the wealth and importance of the place.

Already the Prince of Parma, in the taking of Breda, saw verified his predictions of the disasters about to fall on the Spanish interests in the Netherlands, by reason of Philip's obstinate determination to concentrate all his energies on the invasion of France. Alexander had been unable, in the midst of preparations for his French campaign, to arrest this sudden capture, but his Italian blood was on fire at the ignominy which had come upon the soldiery of his

so much at variance with every other account, and especially with the elaborate narrative of Eberhard van Reyd, Secretary to Count William Lewis, that I cannot doubt the Count had at first been misinformed. Groen v. Prinsterer Archives, &c. II. serie i. 127.



countrymen. Five companies of foot and one of horse—picked troops of Spain and Italy—had surrendered a wealthy, populous town, and a well-fortified castle to a mud-scow, and had fled shrieking in dismay from the onset of seventy frost-bitten Hollanders.

It was too late to save the town, but he could punish, as it deserved, the pusillanimity of the garrison.

Three captains—one of them rejoicing in the martial name of Cesar Guerra—were publicly beheaded in Brussels. A fourth, Ventimiglia, was degraded, but allowed to escape with life, on account of his near relationship to the Duke of Terranova, while Governor Lanzavecchia was obliged to resign the command of Gertruydenberg. The great commander knew better than to encourage the yielding up of cities and fortresses by a mistaken lenity of their unlucky defenders. 1

Prince Maurice sent off letters the same night announcing his success to the States-General. Hohenlo wrote pithily to Olden-Barneveld—„The castle and town of Breda are ours, without a single man dead on our side. The garrison made no resistance, but ran distracted out of the town.” 2

The church bells rang and bonfires blazed and cannon thundered in every city in the United Provinces to commemorate this auspicious event. Olden-Barneveld, too, whose part in arranging the scheme was known to have been so valuable, received from the States-Ge-

neral a magnificent gilded vase with sculptured representations of the various scenes in the drama, 1 and it is probable that not more unmingled satisfaction had been caused by any one event of the war than by this surprise of Breda.

The capture of a single town, not of first-rate importance either, would hardly seem to merit so minute a description as has been given in the preceding pages. But the event, with all its details, has been preserved with singular vividness in Netherland story. As an example of daring, patience, and complete success, it has served to encourage the bold spirits of every generation and will always inspire emulation in patriotic hearts of every age and clime, while, as the first of a series of audacious enterprises by which Dutch victories were to take the place of a long procession of Spanish triumphs on the blood-stained soil of the provinces, it merits, from its chronological position, a more than ordinary attention.

In the course of the summer Prince Maurice, carrying out into practice the lessons which he had so steadily been pondering, reduced the towns and strong places of Heyl, Flemert, Elshout, Crevecœur, Hayden, Steenberg, Rosendaal, and Osterhout. 2 But his time, during the remainder of the year 1590, was occupied with preparations for a campaign on an extended scale, and with certain foreign negotiations to which it will soon be necessary to direct the reader's attention.

1 The story is briefly told by Parma in his correspondence with the king, 14 March, 1590. Archives of Simancas MS.

2 Bor, *ubi sup.*

1 Ibid.

2 Meteren, xvi. 294.

## CHAPTER XXII.

Struggle of the United Provinces against Philip of Spain—Progress of the Republic—Influence of Geographical position on the fate of the Netherlands—Contrast offered by America—Miserable state of the so-called „obedient” provinces—Prosperity of the Commonwealth—Its internal government—Tendency to provincialism—Quibbles of the English Members of the Council, Wilkes and Bodley—Exclusion of Olden-Barneveld from the State Council—Proposals of Philip for mediation with the United Provinces—The Provinces resolutely decline all proffers of intervention.

THE United Provinces had now been engaged in unbroken civil war for a quarter of a century. It is, however, inaccurate to designate this great struggle with tyranny as a civil war. It was a war for independence, maintained by almost the whole population of the United Provinces against a foreigner, a despot, alien to their blood, ignorant of their language, a hater of their race, a scorner of their religion, a trampler upon their liberties, their laws, and institutions—a man who had publicly declared that he would rather the whole nation were exterminated than permitted to escape from subjection to the Church of Rome. Liberty of speech, liberty of the press, liberty of thought on political, religious, and social questions existed within those Dutch pastures and Frisian swamps to a far greater degree than in any other part of the world at that day; than in very many regions of Christendom in our own time. Personal slavery was unknown. In a large portion of their territory it had never existed. The free Frisians, nearest blood-relations of, in this respect, the less favoured Anglo-Saxons, had never bowed the knee to the feudal system, nor worn nor caused to be worn the collar of the serf. In the battles for human liberty no nation has stood with cleaner hands before the great tribunal, nor offered more spotless examples of patriotism to be emulated in all succeeding ages, than the Netherland-

ers in their gigantic struggle with Philip of Spain. It was not a class struggling for their own privileges, but trampling on their fellow-men in a lower scale of humanity. Kings and aristocrats sneered at the vulgar republic where Hans Miller, Hans Baker, and Hans Brewer enjoyed political rights, and prated of a sovereignty other than that of long-descended races and of anointed heads. Yet the pikemen of Spain and the splendid cavalry and musketeers of Italy and Burgundy, who were now beginning to show their backs both behind entrenchments and in the open field to their republican foes, could not deny the valour with which the battles of liberty were fought; while Elizabeth of England, maintainer, if such ever were, of hereditary sovereignty and hater of popular freedom, acknowledged that for wisdom in council, dignity and adroitness in diplomatic debate, there were none to surpass the plain burgher statesmen of the new republic.

And at least these Netherlands were consistent with themselves. They had come to disbelieve in the mystery of kingcraft, in the divine speciality of a few transitory mortals to direct the world's events and to dictate laws to their fellow-creatures. What they achieved was for the common good of all. They chose to live in an atmosphere of blood and fire for generation after generation rather than flinch from their struggle with despotism, for they knew that, cruel as the sea, it would swallow them all at last in one common destruction if they faltered or paused. They fought for the liberty of all. And it is for this reason that the history of this great conflict deserved to be deeply pondered by those who have the instinct of human

1 Bor, III. 205. Compare Fruin, *Tien Jaren uit den Tagtigjarigen Oorlog*, p. 27. A work of remarkable research and power.

freedom. Had the Hollanders basely sunk before the power of Spain, the proud history of England, France, and Germany, would have been written in far different terms. The blood and tears which the Netherlanders caused to flow in their own stormy days have turned to blessings for remotest climes and ages. A pusillanimous peace, always possible at any period of their war, would have been hailed with rapture by contemporary statesmen, whose names have vanished from the world's memory; but would have sown with curses and misery the soil of Europe for succeeding ages. The territory of the Netherlands is narrow and meagre. It is but a slender kingdom now among the powers of the earth. The political grandeur of nations is determined by physical causes almost as much as by moral ones. Had the cataclysm which separated the fortunate British Islands from the mainland happened to occur, instead, at a neighbouring point of the earth's crust; had the Belgian, Dutch, German and Danish Netherland floated off as one island into the sea, while that famous channel between two great rival nations remained dry land, there would have been a different history of the world.

But in the 16th century the history of one country was not an isolated chapter of personages and events. The history of the Netherlands is the history of liberty. It was now combined with the English, now with French, now with German struggles for political and religious freedom, but it is impossible to separate it from the one great complex which makes up the last half of the sixteenth and the first half of the seventeenth centuries.

At that day the Netherland republic was already becoming a power of importance in the political family of Christendom. If, in spite of her geographical disadvantages, she achieved so much, how much vaster might her power have grown, how much stronger through her

example might popular institutions throughout the world have become, and how much more pacific the relations of of European tribes, had nature been less niggard in her gifts to the young commonwealth. On the sea she was strong, for the ocean is the best of frontiers; but on land her natural boundaries faded vaguely away, without strong physical demarcations and with no sharply defined limits of tongue, history, or race. Accident or human caprice seemed to have divided German Highland from German Netherland; Belgic Gaul from the rest of the Gallic realm. And even from the slender body, which an arbitrary destiny had set off for centuries into a separate organism, tyranny and religious bigotry had just hewn another portion away. But the commonwealth was already too highly vitalized to permit peaceful dismemberment. Only the low organisms can live in all their parts after violent separations. The trunk remained, bleeding but alive and vigorous, while the amputated portion lay for centuries in fossilized impotence.

Never more plainly than in the history of this commonwealth was the geographical law manifested by which the fate of nations is so deeply influenced. Courage, enterprise amounting almost to audacity, and a determined will confronted for a long lapse of time the inexorable, and permitted a great empire to germinate out of a few sand-banks held in defiance of the ocean, and protected from human encroachments on the interior only by the artificial barrier of custom-house and fort.

Thus foredoomed at birth, it must increase our admiration of human energy, and of the sustaining influence of municipal liberty, that the republic, even if transitory, should yet have girdled the earth with its possessions and held for a considerable period so vast a portion of the world in fee.

What a lesson to our transatlantic



commonwealth, whom bountiful nature had blessed at her birth beyond all the nations of history and seemed to speed upon an unlimited career of freedom and peaceful prosperity, should she be capable at the first alarm on her track to throw away her inestimable advantages! If all history is not a mockery and a fable, she may be sure that the nation which deliberately carves itself in pieces and substitutes artificial boundaries for the natural and historic ones, condemns itself either to extinction, or to the lower life of political insignificance and petty warfare, with the certain loss of liberty and national independence at last. Better a terrible struggle, better the sacrifice of prosperity and happiness for years, than the eternal setting of that great popular hope, the United American Republic. 1

I speak in the digression only of the relations of physical nature to liberty and nationality, making no allusion to the equally stringent moral laws which no people can violate and yet remain in health and vigour.

Despite a quarter of a century of what is commonly termed civil war, the United Netherlands were prosperous and full of life. It was in the provinces which had seceded from the union of Utrecht that there was silence as of the grave, destitution, slavery, abject submission to a foreign foe. The leaders in the movement which had brought about the scission of 1579—commonly called the „Reconciliation”—enjoyed military and civil posts under a foreign tyrant, but were poorly rewarded for subserviency in fighting against their own brethren by contumely on the part of their masters. As for the mass of the people it would be difficult to find a desolation more complete than that recorded of the „obedient” provinces. Even as six years before, wolves littered their whelps in deserted farm-houses, cane-brake and thicket usurped the place of cornfield

and orchard, robbers swarmed on the highways once thronged by a most thriving population, nobles begged their bread in the streets of cities whose merchants once entertained emperors and whose wealth and traffic were the wonder of the world, while the Spanish viceroy formally permitted the land in the agricultural districts to be occupied and farmed by the first comer for his own benefit, until the vanished proprietors of the soil should make their reappearance. 1

„Administered without justice or policy,” said a Netherlander who was intensely loyal to the king and a most uncompromising Catholic, „eaten up and abandoned for that purpose to the arbitrary will of foreigners who suck the substance and marrow of the land without benefit to the king, gnaw the obedient cities to the bones, and plunder the open defenceless country at their pleasure, it may be imagined how much satisfaction these provinces take in their condition. Commerce and trade have ceased in a country which traffic alone has peopled, for without it no human habitation could be more miserable and poor than our land.” 2

1 Meteren, xvi. 297.

2 Discours du Seigneur de Champagny sur les affaires des Pays Bas, 21 Dec. 1589. Bibl. de Bourgogne, MS. No. 12,962.

„Considerando assi mismo el mal termino que con todos usa, los pocos consejos el desautorizar los que el Rey a puesto, y que solo lo emprende y maneje todo con sus hechuras para aprovecharlas, y la increyble disorden no solo en lo politico mas en la gente de guerra, haze que no solo todos los de los estados mas aun que quantos con el han de negociar pierdan toda opinion no solo de su discretion o prudencia mas del respeto que devria tener al Rey. Asi manejandose todo sin justicia y policia, comidos todos estos estados y abandonados por esta al alvidrio y gobierno de cstrangeros qui chupan la sustancia del pays sin beneficio del Rey, y solos teniendo credito con este hombre (Farnese) royendose quantas villas ternan a l'obediencia del Rey hasta los huesos y el plat pays sin defensa contra el enemigo que come y roba a todas partas como quiere—se puede coligar desto la satisfaccion que del tendran todos estados que indifferentemente assi prelados, nobles como

Nothing could be more gloomy than the evils thus described by the Netherland statesman and soldier, except the remedy which he suggested. The obedient provinces, thus scourged and blasted for their obedience, were not advised to improve their condition by joining hands with their sister States, who had just constituted themselves by their noble resistance to royal and ecclesiastical tyranny into a free and powerful commonwealth. On the contrary, two great sources of regeneration and prosperity were indicated, but very different ones from those in which the republic had sought and found her strength. In the first place, it was suggested as indispensable that the obedient provinces should have more Jesuits and more Friars. The mendicant orders should be summoned to renewed exertions, and the king should be requested to send seminary priests to every village in numbers proportionate to the population, who should go about from house to house, counting the children, and seeing that they learned their catechism if their parents did not teach them, and, even in case they did, examining whether it was done thoroughly and without deception.

In the second place it was laid down as important that the bishops should confirm no one who had not been sufficiently catechised. „And if the mendicant orders,” said Champagny, „are not numerous enough for these catechisations, the Jesuits might charge themselves therewith, not more and not less than the said mendicants, some of

each being deputed to each parish. To this end it would be well if his Majesty should obtain from the Pope a command to the Jesuits to this effect, since otherwise they might not be willing to comply. It should also be ordered that all Jesuits, natives of these provinces, should return hither, instead of wandering about in other regions as if their help were not so necessary here.” 1

It was also recommended that the mendicant friars should turn their particular attention to Antwerp, and that one of them should preach in French, another in German, another in English, every day at the opening of the Exchange.

With the appliances it was thought that Antwerp would revive out of its ruins and, despite the blockade of its river, renew its ancient commercial glories. Founded on the substantial rocks of mendicancy and jesuitism, it might again triumph over its rapidly rising rival, the heretic Amsterdam, which had no better basis for its grandeur than religious and political liberty, and uncontrolled access to the ocean.

Such were the aspirations of a distinguished and loyal Netherlander for the regeneration of his country. Such

villas y pueblos no solo murmuran del mas lo dizen y a voces,” etc. etc. etc. „demás que destos los rebeldes s'endurescen diciendo que no se deven fiar de nuestras promesas, representando la miseria y calamidad en que viven los reducidos por la violencia y cohechos de nuestra propia gente, gobernandose todo sin policia, justicia, verdad ni consejo por cabezas codiciosas sin otra mira que a su provecho y ninguna al del Rey. . . . que solo el trato puebla, porque cessando la comodidad del, no ay abitacion mas miserable y pobre.”

1 „Por lo qual primero encarguense de nuevo todas las ordenes mendicantes en las quales santissamente el Rey nro Señor introduce seminarios a que como siempre en estos estados han sido el socorro de los curas que a cada parrochia acuden dellos a catechisar conforme al numero de las casas que debaxo de las parrochias resultan, y de casa en casa vayan, scaviendo que niños ay, y que entienden en catechisarlos quando los mismos papres no lo hagan, y aunque esso sea que lo hagan no sea sin su examinacion porque no aya engano. . . Quando tambien no bastan para estas catecisiones las ordenes mendicantes, pueden se encargar deste los Jesuitas ne mas ne menos con dichos mendicantes, deputando algunos dellos juntamente con esotros por las parrochias. Para esto mesmo seria bien su Magd impetrasse del papa mandado a los Jesuitas porque de otra manera no querran submitirse a ello, y para que buelvan a estos estados todos los Jesuitas naturales del que distraydos en otras provincias, dexan esta como si aqui no fuesse tanto menester su asistencia.” . . . —Ibid.

were his opinions as to the true sources of the wealth and greatness of nations. Can we wonder that the country fell to decay, or that this experienced statesman and brave soldier should himself, after not many years, seek to hide his dishonoured head under the cowl of a monk?

The coast of the obedient provinces was thoroughly blockaded. The United Provinces commanded the sea, their cruisers, large and small, keeping diligent watch off every port and estuary of the Flemish coast, so that not a herring-boat could enter without their permission. Antwerp, when it fell into the hands of the Spaniard, sank for ever from its proud position. That city which Venetians but lately had confessed with a sigh to be superior in commercial grandeur to their own magnificent capital, had ceased to be a seaport. Shut in from the ocean by Flushing—firmly held by an English garrison as one of the cautionary towns for the Queen's loan—her world-wide commerce withered before men's eyes. Her population was dwindling to not much more than half its former numbers, while Ghent, Bruges, and other cities were diminished by two-thirds.

On the other hand, the commerce and manufactures of the United Republic had enormously augmented. Its bitterest enemies bore witness to the sagacity and success by which its political affairs were administered, and to its vast superiority in this respect over the obedient provinces. „The rebels are not ignorant of our condition,” said Champagny, „they are themselves governed with consummate wisdom, and they mock at those who submit themselves to the Duke of Parma. They are the more confirmed in their rebellion, when they see how many are thronging from us to them, complaining of such bad government, and that all take refuge in flight who can from the misery and famine which it has caused throughout these provin-

ces!” 1 The industrial population had flowed from the southern provinces into the north, in obedience to an irresistible law. The workers in iron, paper, silk, linen, lace, the makers of brocade, tapestry, and satin, as well as of all the coarser fabrics, had fled from the land of oppression to the land of liberty. Never in the history of civilization had there been a more rapid development of human industry than in Holland during these years of bloodiest warfare. The towns were filled to overflowing. Amsterdam multiplied in wealth and population as fast as Antwerp shrank. Almost as much might be said of Middelburg, Enkhuizen, Horn, and many other cities. It is the epoch to which the greatest expansion of municipal architecture is traced. Warehouses, palaces, docks, arsenals, fortifications, dykes, splendid streets and suburbs, were constructed on every side, and still there was not room for the constantly increasing population, large numbers of which habitually dwelt in the shipping. For even of that narrow span of earth called the province of Holland, one-third was then interior water, divided into five considerable lakes, those of Harlem, Schermer, Beemster, Waert, and Purmer. The sea was kept out by a magnificent system of dykes under the daily superintendence of a board of officers, called dyke-graves, while the rain water, which might otherwise have drowned the soil thus painfully reclaimed, was pumped up by windmills and drained off through sluices opening and closing with the movement of the tides.

The province of Zeeland was one vast „polder.” It was encircled by an outer dyke of forty Dutch, equal to one hun-

1 Discours du Seigneur de Champagny. „Esto no ignoran los Rebeldes que con grandissima policia gobernados se burlan de lo que se sumetten al D. de Parma y se confirman mas en su rebelion, con ver quantos van a ellos quexosos de tan mal gobierno, y quantos pueden, huyen con la miseria, hambre, pobreza y carestia causada generalmente por esto en todas partes,” etc. etc. etc.



dred and fifty English, miles in extent, and traversed by many interior barriers. The average cost of dyke-building was sixty florins the rod of twelve feet, or 84,000 florins the Dutch mile. The total cost of the Zeeland dykes was estimated at 3,360,000 florins, besides the annual repairs. 1

But it was on the sea that the Netherlands were really at home, and they always felt it in their power—as their last resource against foreign tyranny—to bury their land for ever in the ocean, and to seek a new country at the ends of the earth. It has always been difficult to doom to political or personal slavery a nation accustomed to maritime pursuits. Familiarity with the boundless expanse of ocean, and the habit of victoriously contending with the elements in their stormy strength, would seem to inspire a consciousness in mankind of human dignity and worth. With the exception of Spain, the chief seafaring nations of the world were already protestant. The counter-league, which was to do battle so strenuously with the Holy Confederacy, was essentially a maritime league. „All the maritime heretics of the world, since heresy is best suited to navigators, will be banded together,” said Champagny, „and then woe to the Spanish Indies, which England and Holland are already threatening.” 2

The Netherlands had been noted from earliest times for a free-spoken and independent personal demeanour. At this epoch they were taking the lead of the whole world in marine adventure. At least three thousand vessels of between one hundred and four hundred tons, besides innumerable doggers, busses, cromstevens, and similar craft used on the rivers and in fisheries, were to

be found in the United Provinces, and one thousand, it was estimated, were annually built. 1

They traded to the Baltic regions for honey, wax, tallow, lumber, iron, turpentine, hemp. They brought from farthest Indies and from America all the fabrics of ancient civilization, all the newly discovered products of a virgin soil, and dispensed them among the less industrious nations of the earth. Enterprise, led on and accompanied by science, was already planning the boldest flights into the unknown yet made by mankind, and it will soon be necessary to direct attention to those famous arctic voyages, made by Hollanders in pursuit of the north-west passage to Cathay, in which as much heroism, audacity, and scientific intelligence were displayed as in later times have made so many men belonging to both branches of the Anglo-Saxon race illustrious. A people, engaged in perennial conflict with a martial and sacerdotal despotism the most powerful in the world, could yet spare enough from its superfluous energies to confront the dangers of the polar oceans, and to bring back treasures of science to enrich the world.

Such was the spirit of freedom. Inspired by its blessed influence this vigorous and inventive little commonwealth triumphed over all human, all physical obstacles in its path. It organized armies on new principles to drive the most famous legions of history from its soil. It built navies to help rescue, at critical moments, the cause of England, of protestantism, of civil liberty, and even of French nationality. More than all, by its trade with its arch-enemy, the republic constantly multiplied its resources for destroying his power and aggrandizing its own.

The war navy of the United Provinces was a regular force of one hundred ships—large at a period when a vessel of thirteen hundred tons was a

1 Meteren, xvi. 288, 289, 290.

2 Discours du Seigneur de Champagny. „Todos los herejes del oceano que lo son quasi todos sino solo Espana . . . y pues la heresia es lo que mas conforme en estos maritimos,” etc. etc. etc.

1 Meteren, *ubi sup.*

monster—together with an indefinite number of smaller craft, which could be put into the public service on short notice. <sup>1</sup> In those days of close quarters and light artillery a merchant ship was converted into a cruiser by a very simple process. The navy was a self-supporting one, for it was paid by the produce of convoy fees and licenses to trade. It must be confessed that a portion of these revenues savoured much of black-mail to be levied on friend and foe; for the distinctions between freebooter, privateer, pirate, and legitimate sea-robber, were not very closely drawn in those early days of seafaring.

Prince Maurice of Nassau was lord high admiral, but he was obliged to listen to the counsels of various provincial boards of admiralty, which often impeded his action and interfered with his schemes.

It cannot be denied that the inherent vice of the Netherland polity was already a tendency to decentralization and provincialism. The civil institutions of the country, in their main characteristics, have been frequently sketched in these pages. At this period they had entered almost completely into the forms which were destined to endure until the commonwealth fell in the great crash of the French Revolution. Their beneficial effects were more visible now—sustained and bound together as the nation was by the sense of a common danger, and by the consciousness of its daily developing strength—than at a later day when prosperity and luxury had blunted the fine instincts of patriotism.

The supreme power, after the deposition of Philip, and the refusal by France and by England to accept the sovereignty of the provinces, was definitely lodged in the States-General. But the States-General did not technically represent the people. Its members were not elected by the people. It was a body composed of delegates from each pro-

vincial assembly, of which there were now five—Holland, Zeeland, Friesland, Utrecht, and Gelderland. Each provincial assembly consisted again of delegates, not from the inhabitants of the provinces; but from the magistracies of the cities. Those magistracies, again, were not elected by the citizens. They elected themselves by renewing their own vacancies, and were, in short, immortal corporations. Thus, in final analysis, the supreme power was distributed and localized among the mayors and aldermen of a large number of cities, all independent alike of the people below and of any central power above.

It is true that the nobles, as a class, had a voice in the provincial and in the general assembly, both for themselves and as technical representatives of the smaller towns and of the rural population. But, as a matter of fact, the influence of this caste had of late years very rapidly diminished, through its decrease in numbers, and the far more rapid increase in wealth and power of the commercial and manufacturing classes. Individual nobles were constantly employed in the military, civil, and diplomatic service of the republic, but their body had ceased to be a power. It had been the policy of William the Silent to increase the number of cities entitled to send deputies to the States; for it was among the cities that his resistance to the tyranny of Spain, and his efforts to obtain complete independence for his country, had been mainly supported. Many of the great nobles, as has been seen in these pages, denounced the liberator, and took sides with the tyrant. Lamoral Egmont had walked to the scaffold to which Philip had condemned him, chanting a prayer for Philip's welfare. Egmont's eldest son was now foremost in the Spanish army, doing battle against his own country in behalf of the tyrant who had taken his father's life. Aremborg and Ligny, Arschot, Chimay, Croy, Capres, Mon-

<sup>1</sup> Meteren, *ubi sup.*

tigny, and most of the great patrician families of the Netherlands, fought on the royal side.

The revolution which had saved the country from perdition and created the great Netherland republic was a burgher revolution, and burgher statesmen now controlled the State. The burgher class of Europe is not the one that has been foremost in the revolutionary movements of history, or that has distinguished itself—especially in more modern times—by a passionate love of liberty. It is always easy to sneer at Hans Miller and Hans Baker, and at the country where such plebeians are powerful. Yet the burghers played a prominent part in the great drama which forms my theme, and there has rarely been seen a more solid or powerful type of their class than the burger statesman, John of Oldenbarneveld, who, since the death of William the Silent and the departure of Lord Leicester, had mainly guided the destinies of Holland. Certainly no soldier nor statesman who ever measured intellects with that potent personage was apt to treat his genius otherwise than with profound respect.

But it is difficult to form a logical theory of government, except on the fiction of divine right as a basis, unless the fact of popular sovereignty, as expressed by a majority, be frankly accepted in spite of philosophical objections.

In the Netherlands there was no king, and strictly speaking no people. But this latter and fatal defect was not visible in the period of danger and of contest. The native magistrates of that age were singularly pure, upright, and patriotic. Of this there is no question whatever. And the people acquiesced cheerfully in their authority, not claiming a larger representation than such as they virtually possessed in the multiple power exercised over them, by men moving daily among them, often of modest fortunes and of simple lives. Two generations later, and in the wil-

derness of Massachusetts, the early American colonists voluntarily placed in the hands of their magistrates, few in number, unlimited control of all the functions of government, and there was hardly an instance known of an impure exercise of authority. Yet out of that simple kernel grew the least limited and most powerful democracy ever known.

In the later days of Netherland history a different result became visible, and with it came the ruin of the State. The governing class, of burgher origin, gradually separated itself from the rest of the citizens, withdrew from commercial pursuits, lived on hereditary fortunes in the exercise of functions which were likewise virtually hereditary, and so became an oligarchy. This result, together with the physical causes already indicated, made the downfall of the commonwealth probable whenever it should be attacked by an overwhelming force from without.

The States-General, however, at this epoch—although they had in a manner usurped the sovereignty, which in the absence of a feudal lord really belonged to the whole people, and had silently repossessed themselves of those executive functions which they had themselves conferred upon the state council—were at any rate without self-seeking ambition. The Hollanders, as a race, were not office-seekers, but were singularly docile to constituted authority, while their regents—as the municipal magistrates were commonly called—were not very far removed above the mass by birth or habitual occupation. The republic was a social and political fact, against which there was no violent antagonism either of laws or manners, and the people, although not technically existing, in reality was all in all. In Netherland story the People is ever the true hero. It was an almost unnoticed but significant revolution—that by which the state council was now virtually deprived of its authority. During Lei-



cester's rule it had been a most important college of administration. Since his resignation it had been entrusted by the States-General with high executive functions, especially in war matters. It was an assembly of learned counsellors appointed from the various provinces for wisdom and experience, usually about eighteen in number, and sworn in all things to be faithful to the whole republic. The allegiance of all was rendered to the nation. Each individual member was required to „forswear his native province in order to be true to the generality.” They deliberated in common for the general good, and were not hampered by instructions from the provincial diets, nor compelled to refer to those diets for decision when important questions were at issue. It was an independent executive committee for the whole republic. 1

But Leicester had made it unpopular. His intrigues, in the name of democracy, to obtain possession of sovereign power, to inflame the lower classes against the municipal magistracies, and to excite the clergy to claim a political influence to which they were not entitled and which was most mischievous in its effects, had exposed the state council, with which he had been in the habit of consulting, to suspicion.

1 „Sa Majesté voit journellement par expérience qu'a cause que l'autorité qui appartient au conseil d'état de ces provinces suivant les articles du contract fait entre S. M. et ces pays cy luy est en plusieurs points du tout ostée et quasi en tout fort raccourcie par V. S. De la naist une telle confusion et désordre au gouvernement de ces provinces que non seulement c'est l'occasion de beaucoup de malentenduz et mescontentemens, mais aussi faict que l'ennemi n'est si vivement repoussé comme il pourrait estre, et conséquemment met S. M. et ces provinces en plus grand trouble et despense qu'aultrement ne requerrait le maintien de ces guerres; en esgard de quoi je suis chargé de par S. M. de vous signifier, qu'elle desire de V. S. que quelque pouvoir qui a este baillie au conseil d'état par la susdite convention, soit aussi pleinement restitué et establi,” etc. etc. (Paper sent to the States-General by Sir Thomas Bodley, 26 April, 1590; Archives of the Hague MS.)

The Queen of England, by virtue of her treaty, had the right to appoint two of her subjects to be members of the council. The governor of her auxiliary forces was also entitled to a seat there. Since the malpractices of Leicester and the danger to which the country had been subjected in consequence had been discovered, it was impossible that there should be very kindly feeling towards England in the public mind, however necessary a sincere alliance between the two countries was known to be for the welfare of both.

The bickering of the two English councillors, Wilkes and Bodley, and of the governor of the English contingent with the Hollanders, was incessant. The Englishmen went so far as to claim the right of veto upon all measures passed by the council, but the States-General indignantly replied that the matters deliberated and decided upon by that board were their own affairs, not the state affairs of England. The two members and the military officer who together represented her Majesty were entitled to participate in the deliberations and to vote with their brother members. For them to claim the right, however, at will to annul the proceedings was an intolerable assumption, and could not be listened to for a moment. Certainly it would have been strange had two Dutchmen undertaken to veto every measure passed by the Queen's council at Richmond or Windsor, and it was difficult to say on what article of the contract this extraordinary privilege was claimed by Englishmen at the Hague. 1

1 „In den Raedt van State deser Landen,” said the States-General to the English councillors, „worden gehandelt, geconsulteert ende geresolveert de saecken den staet derzelve Landen aengaende ende niet den staet van Engeland. Ende daeromme en connen die staten niet verstaen dat tot dienste van dese Landen ofte van haer Mat by forme van een negative voix can worden geprocedeert omme den voortganct der resolutie te beletten, maer hebben den gouverneur van

Another cause of quarrel was the inability of the Englishmen to understand the language in which the debates of the state council were held.

According to a custom not entirely unexampled in parliamentary history the members of assembly and council made use of their native tongue in discussing the state affairs of their native land. It was however considered a grievance by the two English members that the Dutchmen should speak Dutch, and it was demanded in the Queen's name that they should employ some other language which a foreigner could more easily understand. 1

The Hollanders however refused this request, not believing that in a reversed case her Majesty's Council or Houses of Parliament would be likely or competent to carry on their discussions habitually in Italian or Latin for the benefit of a couple of strangers who might not be familiar with English. The more natural remedy would have been for the foreigners to take lessons in the tongue of the country, or to seek for an interpreter among their colleagues; especially as the States, when all the Netherlands were but provinces, had steadily refused to adopt any language but their mother tongue, even at the demand of their sovereign prince. 2

hare Mat secours ende de Raeden by haere Mat geintroduceert hare stemmen negative ofte affirmative te geven als andere van den Raede." (Answer to Wilkes and Bodley, 15 Oct. 1590; Hague Archives MS.)

1 "S. Majesté trouvant estrange que vousissiez que les siens demeurassent par ce moyen muets au dit conseil, requiert que dès a present et a l'avenir toutes les propositions, consultations, conférences et deliberations qui se feront au dit conseil soient tousjours es langues Latine ou Francoise, et que les actes et registres desdictes consultations, resolutions, et deliberations se tiennent en l'une deux langues susdictes." (Wilkes and Bodley to the States-General, 20 July, 1590; Hague Archives MS.)

2 "Alle de provincien, Steden ende Leden van dien tegenwoordig in de Unie wezende," said the States, "gebruycken de Nederlantsche spraecke, ende volgende verscheyde privilegien, ende rechten der voorscreven Landen

At this moment, Sir Thomas Bodley was mainly entrusted with her Majesty's affairs at the Hague, but his overbearing demeanour, intemperate language, and passionate style of correspondence with the States and with the royal government, did much injury to both countries. The illustrious Walsingham—whose death in the spring of this year England had so much reason to deplore—had bitterly lamented, just before his death, having recommended so unquiet a spirit for so important a place. Ortel, envoy of the States to London, expressed his hopes that affairs would now be handled more to the satisfaction of the States; as Bodley would be obliged, since the death of Sir Francis, to address his letters to the Lord High Treasurer, with whom it would be impossible for him to obtain so much influence as he had enjoyed with the late Secretary of State. 1

Moreover it was exactly at this season that the Advocate of Holland, Olden-Barneveld, was excluded from the state council. 2 Already the important province of Holland was dissatisfied with

en mogende Gecommitteerden der Staten van de respectie provincien in de zaacken van den Lande geen. ander als de Nederlandtsche spraecke gebruycken. Daeromme en is niet practicaabel en dit punct eeuwige veranderinghe inne te voeren. Temin nade-mael die Staten der voorscreven respectie provincien noyt hebben willen gedooogen dat haere Gecommitteerden in saecken der Landen vreemde spraeken zouden gebruycken; oock niettegenstaende het verzoek van haerlicker princen selfs geschiet uit wichtige ende wel gefondeerde redenen. Ende daer zulcx in eenige zaacken specialyck met veelte difficulteyten is geconsenteert geweest, ten tyde als in de vergaderinge van de Staten verscheyden provincien van Walscher sprake warer comparerende hebben de princen daervan den Staten gegeven solennele acte van non-prejuditie met belofte dat zulcx niet in consequentie zoude worden getoogen. Ende hebben de ondersaten van haere Mat hen beter te laeten onderrichten in den Raedt van staet vant gunt aldaer geproponeert ende gedelibereert zal worden, dan dat de Ingesetenen deser Landen jegens de rechten ende privilegien derzelver in de beleydighe van des Landes zaacken vreemde spraecke zouden moeten gebruycken." Ibid.

1 Bor, III. xxvii. 530.

2 Fruin, 24.

its influence in that body. Bearing one half of the whole burthen of the war, it was not content with one quarter of the council vote, and very soon it became the custom for the States-General to conduct all the most important affairs of the republic. <sup>1</sup> The state-council complained that even in war matters it was not consulted, and that most important enterprises were undertaken by Prince Maurice without its knowledge, and on advice of the Advocate alone. Doubtless this was true, and thus, most unfortunately, the commonwealth was degraded to a confederacy instead of becoming an incorporate federal State. The members of the States-General—as it has been seen—were responsible only to their constituents, the separate provinces. They avowed allegiance, each to his own province, none to the central government. Moreover they were not representatives, but envoys, appointed by petty provinces, bound by written orders, and obliged to consult at every step with their sovereigns at home. The Netherland polity was thus stamped almost at its birth with a narrow provincialism. Delay and hesitation thus necessarily engendered were overcome in the days of danger by patriotic fervour. The instinct of union for the sake of the national existence was sufficiently strong, and the robust, practical common sense of the people sufficiently enlightened to prevent this weakness from degenerating into impotence so long as the war pressure remained to mould them into a whole. But a day was to come for bitterly rueing this paralysis of the imperial instincts of the people, this indefinite decentralization of the national strength.

For the present, the legislative and executive body was the States-General. But the States-General were in reality the States provincial, and the States provincial were the city municipalities, among which the magistracies of Holland were preponderant.

<sup>1</sup> Fruin, 24.

Ere long it became impossible for an individual to resist the decrees of the civic authorities. In 1591, the States-General passed a resolution by which these arrogant corporations virtually procured their exemption from any process at the suit of a private person to be placed on record. So far could the principle of sovereignty be pulverized. City council boards had become supreme. <sup>1</sup>

It was naturally impossible during the long continuance of this great struggle, that neutral nations should not be injuriously affected by it in a variety of ways. And as a matter of course neutral nations were disposed to counsel peace. Peace, peace, peace was the sigh of the bystanders whose commerce was impeded, whose international relations were complicated, and whose own security was endangered in the course of the bloody conflict. It was however not very much the fashion of that day for governments to obtrude advice upon each other, or to read to each other moral lectures. It was assumed that when the expense and sacrifice of war had been incurred, it was for cause, and the discovery had not yet been made that those not immediately interested in the fray were better acquainted with its merits than the combatants themselves, and were moreover endued with superhuman wisdom to see with perfect clearness that future issue which to the parties themselves was concealed.

Cheap apothegms upon the blessings of peace and upon the expediency of curbing the angry passions, uttered by the belligerents of yesterday to the belligerents of to-day, did not then pass current for profound wisdom.

Still the emperor Rudolph, abstaining for a time from his star-gazing, had again thought proper to make a feeble

<sup>1</sup> Kluit, iii. 52. Compare Fruin, iv. pp. 18-31, to whose lucid and learned exposition of the Netherland polity I am under great obligations.



attempt at intervention in those sub-lunary matters which were supposed to be within his sphere. <sup>1</sup>

It was perfectly well known that Philip was incapable of abating one jot of his pretensions, and that to propose mediation to the United Provinces was simply to request them, for the convenience of other powers, to return to the slavery out of which, by the persistent efforts of a quarter of a century, they had struggled. Nevertheless it was formally proposed to re-open those lukewarm fountains of diplomatic common-place in which healing had been sought during the peace negotiations of Cologne in the year 1579. But the States-General resolutely kept them sealed. They simply answered his imperial Majesty by a communication of certain intercepted correspondence between the King of Spain and his ambassador at Vienna, San Clemente, through which it was satisfactorily established that any negotiation would prove as gigantic a comedy on the part of Spain as had been the memorable conferences at Ostend, by which the invasion of England had been masked. <sup>2</sup>

There never was a possibility of mediation or of compromise except by complete submission on the part of the Netherlanders to Crown and Church. Both in this, as well as in previous and subsequent attempts at negotiations, the secret instructions of Philip forbade any real concessions on his side. He was always ready to negotiate, he was especially anxious to obtain a suspension of arms from the rebels during negotiation, but his agents were instructed to use great dexterity and dissimulation in order that the proposal for such armistice, as well as for negotiation at all, should appear to proceed, not from himself as was the fact, but from the emperor as a neutral potentate. The king uniformly proposed three points; firstly, that the rebels

should reconvert themselves to the Catholic religion; secondly, that they should return to their obedience to himself; thirdly, that they should pay the expenses of the war. Number three was, however, usually inserted in order that, by conceding it subsequently, after much contestation, he might appear conciliatory. It was a vehicle of magnanimity towards men grown insolent with temporary success. <sup>1</sup> Numbers one and two were immutable.

Especially upon number one was concession impossible. „The Catholic religion is the first thing,” said Philip, „and although the rebels do not cease to insist that liberty of conscience should be granted them, in order that they may preserve that which they have had during these past years, this is never to be thought of in any event.” The king always made free use of the terrible weapon which the Protestant princes of Germany had placed in his hands. For indeed if it were right that one man, because possessed of hereditary power over millions of his fellow creatures, should compel them all to accept the dogmas of Luther or of Calvin because agreeable to himself, it was difficult to say why another man, in a similarly elevated position, might not compel his subjects to accept the creed of Trent, or the doctrines of Mahomet or Confucius. The Netherlanders were fighting—even more than they knew—for liberty of conscience, for equality of all religions; not for Moses, nor for Melancthon; for Henry, Philip, or Pius; while Philip justly urged that no prince in Christendom permitted license. „Let them well understand,” said his Majesty, „that since others, who live in

<sup>1</sup> Minuta de instruction al Marques de Carvalho, 25 Jan. 1592, Arch. de Simancas, MS. „Como hombres insolentes con los buenos sucesos destos dias, pidieren que se hagan con ellos algunas cosas sin fundamento, por desviarlos dellos se deben a lo menos deshecharlos con esta recompensa de gastos las otras pretenciones que tuvierien mal fundadas.”

<sup>1</sup> Meteren, xvi. 297.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid.

error, hold the opinion that vassals are to conform to the religion of their master, *it is insufferable that it should be proposed to me that my vassals should have a different religion from mine*—and that too being the true religion, proved by so many testimonies and miracles, while all others are deception. This must be arranged with the authority of the commissioners of the emperor, since it is well understood by them that *the vassal is never to differ from the opinion of his master.*"<sup>1</sup> Certainly it was worth an eighty years' war to drive such blasphemous madness as this out of human heads, whether crowned or shaven.

There was likewise a diet held during the summer of this year, of the circles of the empire nearest to the Netherlands—Westphalia, Cleves, Juliers, and Saxony—from which commissioners were deputed both to Brussels and to the Hague, to complain of the misfortunes suffered by neutral and neighbouring nations in consequence of the civil war.

1 „Lo de la religion Catolica es la primera cosa; y aunque no dexaran de insistir rebeldes en que se les de libertad de conciencia por conservar la que han tenido estos anos, no se ha de dar lugar a esto por ninguno caso—dando les bien a entender que pues otros qui viven en errores tienen por opinion que sus vassalos se han de conformar con la religion de su Señor, no se sufre que a mi se me proponga que los mios la tengan diferente que yo, siendo esta la verdadera y probada con tantos testimonios y milagros, y todo lo demas engaño, y esto se ha de procurar con la autoridad de los comisarios del emperador pues es muy recibido entre ellos de no haberse de apartar el vassallo de la opinion de su señor." Ibid.

In July of this year, Farnese had much talk with the Elector of Cologne at Spa about peace with the rebels through the mediation of the Emperor. It was agreed that a congress should be proposed at Cologne, but the suggestion was not to appear as coming from Philip, and Farnese informed his master that the Duke of Wirtemberg and the Landgrave of Hesse would both attend. Although heretics, they were described as pacific and profoundly of opinion „that in the matter of religion vassals were necessarily to conform to the will and command of their princes." Parma to Philip, 31 July, 1590; (Arch. de Simancas MS.)

They took nothing by their mission to the Duke of Parma. At the Hague 22 Aug. the deputies were heard on 1590. the 22nd August, 1590. They complained to the States-General of „brandschatting" on the border, of the holding of forts beyond the lines and of other invasions of neutral territory, of the cruising of the war-vessels of the States off the shores and on the rivers, and of their interference with lawful traders. Threats were made of forcible intervention and reprisals.<sup>1</sup>

The united States replied on the 13th September. Expressing deep regret that neutral nations should suffer, they pronounced it to be impossible 13 Sept. but that some sparks from the great fire, now desolating their land, should fly over into their neighbours ground. The States were fighting the battle of liberty against slavery, in which the future generations of Germany, as well as of the Netherlands, were interested. They were combating that horrible institution, the Holy Inquisition. They were doing their best to strike down the universal monarchy of Spain, which they described as a bloodthirsty, insatiable, insolent, absolute dominion of Saracenic, Moorish Christians.<sup>2</sup> They warred with a system which placed inquisitors on the seats of judges, which made it unlawful to read the Scriptures, which violated all oaths, suppressed all civic freedom, trampled on all laws and customs, raised inordinate taxes by arbitrary decree, and subjected high and low to indiscriminate murder. Spain had sworn the destruction of the provinces and their subjugation to her absolute dominion, in order to carry out her scheme of universal empire.

These were the deeds and designs against which the States were waging that war, concerning some inconvenient results of which their neighbours, now happily neutral, were complaining. But the cause of the States was the cause

<sup>1</sup> Meteren, xvi. 295, seqq.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid.

of humanity itself. This Saracenic, Moorish, universal monarchy had been seen by Germany to murder, despoil, and trample upon the Netherlands. It had murdered millions of innocent Indians and Granadians. It had kept Naples and Milan in abject slavery. It had seized Portugal. It had deliberately planned and attempted an accursed invasion of England and Ireland. It had overrun and plundered many cities of the empire. It had spread a web of secret intrigue about Scotland. At last it was sending great armies to conquer France and snatch its crown. Poor France now saw the plans of this Spanish tyranny and bewailed her misery. The subjects of her lawful king were ordered to rise against him, on account of religion and conscience. Such holy pretexts were used by these Saracenic Christians in order to gain possession of that kingdom.

For all these reasons, men should not reproach the inhabitants of the Netherlands, because seeing the aims of this accursed tyranny, they had set themselves to resist it. It was contrary to reason to consider them as disturbers of the general peace, or to hold them guilty of violating their oaths or their duty to the laws of the holy empire. The States-General were sure that they had been hitherto faithful and loyal, and they were resolved to continue in that path.

As members of the holy empire, in part—as of old they were considered to be—they had rather the right to expect, instead of reproaches, assistance against the enormous power and inhuman oppression of their enemies. They had demanded it heretofore by their ambassadors, and they still continued to claim it. They urged that, according to the laws of the empire, all foreign soldiers, Spaniards, Saracens, and the like should be driven out of the limits of the empire. Through these means the German Highland and the German Netherland might be restored once more to their

old friendship and unity, and might deal with each other again in amity and commerce.

If, however, such requests could not be granted, they at least begged his electoral highness and the other dukes, lords, and states to put on the deeds of Netherlanders in this laborious and heavy war the best interpretation, in order that they might, with the better courage and resolution, bear those inevitable burthens which were becoming daily heavier in this task of resistance and self-protection; in order that the provinces might not be utterly conquered, and serve, with their natural resources and advantageous situation, as *sedes et media belli* for the destruction of neighbouring States and the building up of the contemplated universal, absolute monarchy. 1

The United Provinces had been compelled by overpowering necessity to take up arms. That which had resulted was and remained in *terminis defensionis*. Their object was to protect what belonged to them, to recover that which by force or fraud had been taken from them.

In regard to excesses committed by their troops against neutral inhabitants on the border, they expressed a strong regret, together with a disposition to make all proper retribution and to cause all crimes to be punished.

They alluded to the enormous sins of this nature practised by the enemy against neutral soil. They recalled to mind that the Spaniards paid their troops ill or not at all, and that they allowed them to plunder the innocent and the neutral, while the united States had paid their troops better wages, and more punctually, than had ever been done by the greatest potentates of Europe. It was true that the States kept many cruisers off the coasts and upon the rivers, but these were to protect their own citizens and friendly traders against



pirates and against the common foe. Germany derived as much benefit from this system as did the Provinces themselves. 1

Thus did the States-General, respect-

1 Meteren, xvi. 295, *seqq.*

fully but resolutely, decline all proffers of intervention, which, as they were well aware, could only enure to the benefit of the enemy. Thus did they avoid being entrapped into negotiations which could only prove the most lamentable of comedies.

## CHAPTER XXIII.

Philip's scheme of aggrandizement—Projected invasion of France—Internal condition of France—Character of Henry of Navarre—Preparation for action—Battle of Ivry—Victory of the French king over the League—Reluctance of the king to attack the French capital—Siege of Paris—The pope indisposed towards the League—Extraordinary demonstration of ecclesiastics—Influence of the priests—Extremities of the siege—Attempted negotiation—State of Philip's army—Difficult position of Farnese—March of the allies to the relief of Paris—Lagny taken and the city relieved—Desertion of the king's army—Siege of Corbeil—Death of Pope Sixtus V.—Recapture of Lagny and Corbeil—Return of Parma to the Netherlands—Result of the expedition.

THE scene of the narrative shifts to France. The history of the United Netherlands at this epoch is a world-history. Were it not so, it would have far less of moral and instruction for all time than it is really capable of affording. The battle of liberty against despotism was now fought in the hop-fields of Brabant or the polders of Friesland, now in the narrow seas which encircle England, and now on the sunny plains of Dauphiny, among the craggy inlets of Brittany, or along the high roads and rivers which lead to the gates of Paris. But every-where a noiseless, secret, but ubiquitous negotiation was speeding with never an instant's pause to accomplish the work which lansquenettes and riders, pikemen and carabineers were contending for on a hundred battle-fields and amid a din of arms which for a quarter of a century had been the regular hum of human industry. For nearly a generation of mankind, Germans and Hollanders, Englishmen,

Frenchmen, Scotchmen, Irishmen, Spaniards and Italians seemed to be born into the world mainly to fight for or against a system of universal monarchy, conceived for his own benefit by a quiet old man who passed his days at a writing desk in a remote corner of Europe. It must be confessed that Philip II. gave the world work enough. Whether—had the peoples governed themselves—their energies might not have been exerted in a different direction, and on the whole have produced more of good to the human race than came of all this blood and smoke, may be questioned.

But the divine right of kings, associating itself with the power supreme of the Church, was struggling to maintain that old mastery of mankind which awakening reason was inclined to dispute. Countries and nations being regarded as private property to be inherited or bequeathed by a few favoured individuals—provided always that those individuals were obedient to the chief-priest—it had now become right and proper for the Spanish monarch to annex Scotland, England, and France to the very considerable possessions which were already his own. Scotland he claimed by virtue of the expressed wish of Mary to the exclusion of her heretic son. France, which had been unjustly usurped by another family in times past to his detriment, and which only a mere human invention—„a pleasantry” as Alva had happily termed it, „called the Salic law”—prevented from passing

quietly to his daughter, as heiress to her mother, daughter of Henry II., he was now fully bent upon making his own without further loss of time. England, in consequence of the mishap of the year eighty-eight, he was inclined to defer appropriating until the possession of the French coasts, together with those of the Netherlands, should enable him to risk the adventure with assured chances of success.

The Netherlands were fast slipping beyond his control, to be sure, as he engaged in these endless schemes; and ill-disposed people of the day said that the king was like *Æsop's dog*, lapping the river dry in order to get at the skins floating on the surface. The Duke of Parma was driven to his wits' ends for expedients, and beside himself with vexation, when commanded to withdraw his ill-paid and mutinous army from the Provinces for the purpose of invading France.<sup>1</sup> Most importunate were the appeals and potent the arguments by which he attempted to turn Philip from his purpose. It was in vain. Spain was the great, aggressive, over-shadowing power at that day, before whose plots and whose violence the nations alternately trembled, and it was France that now stood in danger of being conquered or dismembered by the common enemy of all. That unhappy kingdom, torn by intestine conflict, naturally invited the ambition and the greediness of foreign powers. Civil war had been its condition, with brief intervals, for a whole generation of mankind. During the last few years, the sword had been never sheathed while „the holy Confederacy” and the Béarnese struggled together for the mastery. Religion was the mantle under which the chiefs on both sides concealed their real designs

as they led on their followers year after year to the desperate conflict. And their followers, the masses, were doubtless in earnest. A great principle—the relation of man to his Maker and his condition in a future world as laid down by rival priesthoods—has in almost every stage of history had power to influence the multitude to fury and to deluge the world in blood. And so long as the superstitious element of human nature enables individuals or combinations of them to dictate to their fellow-creatures those relations, or to dogmatize concerning those conditions—to take possession of their consciences in short, and to interpose their mummeries between man and his Creator—it is probable that such scenes as caused the nations to shudder throughout so large a portion of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries will continue to repeat themselves at intervals in various parts of the earth. Nothing can be more sublime than the self-sacrifice, nothing more demoniac than the crimes, which human creatures have seemed always ready to exhibit under the name of religion.

It was and had been really civil war in France. In the Netherlands it had become essentially a struggle for independence against a foreign monarch; although the germ out of which both conflicts had grown to their enormous proportions was an effort of the multitude to check the growth of papacy. In France, accordingly, civil war, attended by that gaunt sisterhood, murder, pestilence, and famine, had swept from the soil almost everything that makes life valuable. It had not brought in its train that extraordinary material prosperity and intellectual development at which men wondered in the Netherlands, and to which allusion has just been made. But a fortunate conjunction of circumstances had now placed Henry of Navarre in a position of vantage. He represented the principle of nationality, of French unity.

<sup>1</sup> „Con todo, claro es,” said Champany, with bitterness, „que no bastando ya para la guerra que tenemos, mucho menos para si nos engolfamos en la de Francia.”—Discours sur les affaires des Pays Bas. (MS. before cited.)

It was impossible to deny that he was in the regular line of succession, now that luckless Henry of Valois slept with his fathers, and the principle of nationality might perhaps prove as vital a force as attachment to the Roman Church. Moreover, the adroit and unscrupulous Béarnese knew well how to shift the mantle of religion from one shoulder to the other, to serve his purposes or the humours of those whom he addressed.

„The King of Spain would exclude me from the kingdom and heritage of my father because of my religion,” he said to the Duke of Saxony; „but in that religion *I am determined to persist so long as I shall live.*”<sup>1</sup> The hand was the hand of Henry, but it was the voice of Duplessis Mornay.

„Were there thirty crowns to win,” said he, at about the same time to the States of France, „*I would not change my religion on compulsion*, the dagger at my throat. Instruct me, instruct me, *I am not obstinate.*”<sup>2</sup> There spoke the wily free-thinker, determined not to be juggled out of what he considered his property by fanatics or priests of either church. Had Henry been a real devotee, the fate of Christendom might have been different. The world has long known how much misery it is in the power of crowned bigots to inflict.

On the other hand, the Holy League, the sacred Confederacy, was catholic or nothing. Already it was more papist than the pope, and loudly denounced Sixtus V. as a Huguenot because he was thought to entertain a weak admiration both for Henry the heretic and for the Jezebel of England.

But the holy confederacy was bent on destroying the national government of France, and dismembering the national domain. To do this the pretext of

trampling out heresy and indefinitely extending the power of Rome, was most influential with the multitude, and entitled the leaders to enjoy immense power for the time being, while maturing their schemes for acquiring permanent possession of large fragments of the national territory. Mayenne, Nemours, Aumale, Mercœur longed to convert temporary governments into independent principalities. The Duke of Lorraine looked with longing eyes on Verdun, Sedan, and the other fair cities within the territories contiguous to his own domains. The reckless house of Savoy, with whom freebooting and land-robbery seemed geographical and hereditary necessities, was busy on the southern borders, while it seemed easy enough for Philip II., in right of his daughter, to secure at least the duchy of Brittany before entering on the sovereignty of the whole kingdom.

To the eyes of the world at large France might well seem in a condition of hopeless disintegration; the restoration of its unity and former position among the nations, under the government of a single chief, a weak and wicked dream. Furious and incessant were the anathemas hurled on the head of the Béarnese for his persistence in drowning the land in blood in the hope of recovering a national capital which never could be his, and of wresting from the control of the confederacy that power which, whether usurped or rightful, was considered at least by the peaceably inclined, to have become a solid fact.

The poor puppet locked in the tower of Fontenay, and entitled Charles X., deceived and scared no one. Such money as there was might be coined in its name, but Madam League reigned supreme in Paris. The confederates, inspired by the eloquence of a cardinal legate, and supplied with funds by the faithful, were ready to dare a thousand deaths rather than submit to the rule of a tyrant and heretic.

<sup>1</sup> Lettre du Roy au Duc de Saxe, dressée par Duplessis. Mem. and Corresp. de Duplessis Mornay, iv. 491.

<sup>2</sup> Lettre du Roy de Navarre aux états de ce royaume. Ibid. 322, seqq.



What was an authority derived from the laws of the land and the history of the race compared with the dogmas of Rome and the trained veterans of Spain? It remained to be seen whether nationality or bigotry would triumph. But in the early days of 1590 the prospects of nationality were not encouraging.

François de Luxembourg, duc de Pincey, was in Rome at that moment, deputed by such catholic nobles of France as were friendly to Henry of Navarre. 1 Sixtus might perhaps be influenced as to the degree of respect to be accorded to the envoy's representations by the events of the campaign about to open. Meantime the legate Gaetano, young, rich, eloquent, unscrupulous, distinguished alike for the splendour of his house and the brilliancy of his intellect, had arrived in Paris. 2

Followed by a great train of adherents he had gone down to the House of Parliament, and was about to seat himself under the dais reserved for the king, when Brisson, first President of Parliament, plucked him back by the arm, and caused him to take a seat immediately below his own. 3

Deeply was the bold president to expiate this defence of king and law against the Holy League. For the moment however the legate contented himself with a long harangue, setting forth the power of Rome, while Brisson replied by an oration magnifying the grandeur of France.

Soon afterwards the cardinal addressed himself to the counteraction of Henry's projects of conversion. For well did the subtle priest understand that in purging himself of heresy, the Béarnese was about to cut the ground from beneath his enemies' feet. In a letter to the archbishops and bishops of France he argued the matter at length. Especially he denied

the necessity or the legality of an assembly of all the prelates of France, such as Henry desired to afford him the requisite „instruction” as to the respective merits of the Roman and the reformed Church. Certainly, he urged, the Prince of Béarn could hardly require instruction as to the tenets of either, seeing that at different times he had faithfully professed both. 1

But while benches of bishops and doctors of the Sorbonne were burnishing all the arms in ecclesiastical and legal arsenals for the approaching fray, the sound of louder if not more potent artillery began to be heard in the vicinity of Paris. The candid Henry, while seeking ghostly instruction with eagerness from his papistical patrons, was equally persevering in applying for the assistance of heretic musketeers and riders from his protestant friends in England, Holland, Germany, and Switzerland.

Queen Elizabeth and the States-General vied with each other in generosity to the great champion of protestantism, who was combating the Holy League so valiantly, and rarely has a great historical figure presented itself to the world so bizarre of aspect, and under such shifting perplexity of light and shade, as did the Béarnese in the early spring of 1590.

The hope of a considerable portion of the catholic nobility of his realm, although himself an excommunicated heretic; the mainstay of Calvinism while secretly bending all his energies to effect his reconciliation with the pope; the idol of the austere and grimly puritanical, while himself a model of profligacy; the leader of the earnest and the true, although false as water himself in every relation in which human beings can stand to each other; a standard-bearer of both great brauches of the Christian Church in an age when religion was the atmosphere of men's daily lives, yet finding his sincerest admirer,

1 De Thou, xi. 97, pp. 100-103.

2 Dondini. De rebus in Gallia gestis ab Alexandro Farnesio, i. 181.

3 De Thou, *ubi sup.* p. 108.

1 Ibid.

and one of his most faithful allies, in the Grand Turk, 1 the representative of national liberty and human rights against regal and sacerdotal absolutism, while himself a remorseless despot by nature and education, and a believer in no rights of the people save in their privilege to be ruled by himself, it seems strange at first view that Henry of Navarre should have been for centuries so heroic and popular an image. But he was a soldier, a wit, a consummate politician; above all, he was a man, at a period when to be a king was often to be something much less or much worse.

To those accustomed to weigh and analyse popular forces it might well seem that he was now playing an utterly hopeless game. His capital garrisoned by the Pope and the King of Spain, with its grandees and its populace scoffing at his pretence of authority and loathing his name; with an exchequer consisting of what he could beg or borrow from Queen Elizabeth—most

1 A portion of the magnificently protective letter of Sultan Amurath, in which he complimented Henry on his religious steadfastness, might almost have made the king's cheek tingle.

„ . . . ” a toi, Henri de Navarre de la race invincible des Bourbons, nous avons entendu que Don Philippe, de la maison d'Autriche, favorisant aucuns de tes ennemis, tache de te priver de la succession légitime qui t'appartient au royaume de France qui est de notre alliance et confédération en haine de ce que tu detestes les faux services des idoles, très déplaisantes au grand Dieu, pour tenir purement ce que tu tiens qui est le meilleur du monde; je te fais assavoir qu'ayant en horreur cette cause qui ne tend qu'au profit particulier de ceux qui se sont élevés contre toi, je veux pendre ta protection et tellement dompter la folie de tes ennemis et de l'Espagnol qui t'occupe injustement le royaume de Navarre, qu'il en sera mémoire à jamais, et te rendant victorieux, je veux te rétablir avec ma puissance redoutable par tout le monde au grand épouvantement de tous les roys, ayant moyen de les réduire en telle extrémité qu'ils ne te feront jamais ennui.” Arch. de Simancas (Paris) B. 64<sup>17</sup>. Cited by Capefigue, Hist. de la Réforme, de la Ligue et du règne de Henri IV. v. 361.

parsimonious of sovereigns reigning over the half of a small island—and from the States-General governing a half-born, half-drowned little republic, engaged in a quarter of a century's warfare with the greatest monarch in the world; with a wardrobe consisting of a dozen shirts and five pocket-handkerchiefs, 1 most of them ragged, and with a commissariat made up what could be brought in the saddle-bags of his Huguenot cavaliers, who came to the charge with him to-day, and to-morrow were dispersed again to their mountain fastnesses; it did not seem likely on any reasonable theory of dynamics that the power of the Béarnese was capable of outweighing Pope and Spain, and the meaner but massive populace of France, and the Sorbonne, and the great chiefs of the confederacy, wealthy, long, descended, allied to all the sovereigns of Christendom, potent in territorial possessions and skilful in wielding political influences.

„The Béarnese is poor, but a gentleman of good family,” 2 said the cheerful Henry, and it remained to be seen whether nationality, unity, legitimate authority, history, and law would be able to neutralize the powerful combination of opposing elements. The king had been besieging Dreux and had made good progress in reducing the outposts of the city. As it was known that he was expecting considerable reinforcements of English ships, Netherlanders, and Germans, the chiefs of the league issued orders from Paris for an attack before he should thus be strengthened.

For Parma, unwillingly obeying the stringent commands of his master, had sent from Flanders eighteen hundred picked cavalry under Count Philip Egmont to join the army of Mayenne. This force comprised five hundred Belgian heavy dragoons under the chief nobles of the land, together with a selection, in even proportions, of Wal-

1 L'Etoile, p. 203. 2 Ibid.

loon, German, Spanish, and Italian troopers.

Mayenne accordingly crossed the Seine at Mantes with an army of ten thousand foot, and, including Egmont's contingent, about four thousand horse. A force under Marshal d'Aumont, which lay in Ivry at the passage of the Eure, fell back on his approach, and joined the remainder of the king's army. The siege of Dreux was abandoned, and Henry withdrew to the neighbourhood of Nonancourt. It was obvious that the duke meant to offer battle, and it was rare that the king under any circumstances could be induced to decline a combat. 1

On the night of the 12th-13th March, Henry occupied Saint André, a village situated on an elevated and extensive plain four leagues from Nonancourt, in the direction of Ivry, fringed on three sides by villages and by a wood, and commanding a view of all the approaches from the country between the Seine and Eure. It would have been better had Mayenne been beforehand with him, as the sequel proved; but the Duke was not famed for the rapidity of his movements. During the greater part of the night, Henry was employed in distributing his orders for that conflict which was inevitable on the following day. His army was drawn up according to a plan prepared by himself, and submitted to the most experienced of his generals for their approval. He then personally visited every portion of the encampment, speaking words of encouragement to his soldiers, and perfecting his arrangements for the coming conflict. Attended by Marshals D'Aumont and Biron he remained on horseback during a portion of the night, having ordered his officers to their tents and reconnoitred as well as he could the position of the enemy. Towards morning he retired to his head-quarters at Fou-

rainville, where he threw himself half dressed on his truckle bed, and although the night was bitterly cold, with no covering but his cloak. He was startled from his slumber before the dawn by a movement of lights in the enemy's camp, and he sprang to his feet supposing that the duke was stealing a march upon him despite all his precautions. The alarm proved to be a false one, but Henry lost no time in ordering his battle. His cavalry he divided in seven troops or squadrons. The first, forming the left wing, was a body of three hundred under Marshal d'Aumont, supported by two regiments of French infantry. Next, separated by a short interval, was another troop of three hundred under the Duke of Montpensier, supported by two other regiments of foot, one Swiss and one German. In front of Montpensier was Baron Biron the younger, at the head of still another body of three hundred. Two troops of cuirassiers, each four hundred strong, were on Biron's left, the one commanded by the Grand Prior of France, Charles d'Angoulême, the other by Monsieur de Givry. Between the Prior and Givry were six pieces of heavy artillery, while the battalia, formed of eight hundred horse in six squadrons, was commanded by the king in person, and covered on both sides by English and Swiss infantry, amounting to some four thousand in all. The right wing was under the charge of old Marshal Biron, and comprised three troops of horse, numbering one hundred and fifty each, two companies of German riders, and four regiments of French infantry. These numbers, which are probably given with as much accuracy as can be obtained, show a force of about three thousand horse and twelve thousand foot.

The Duke of Mayenne, seeing too late the advantage of position which he might have easily secured the day before, led his army forth with the early light, and arranged it in an order not

1 De thou, t. xi. lib. 97, pp. 116, *seqq.* Coloma, *Guerras de los Estados Baxos*, ii. 43, *seqq.* Parma to Philip, 24 March, 1590. (Arch. de Simancas MS.)



very different from that adopted by the king, and within cannon-shot of his lines. The right wing under Marshal de la Châtre consisted of three regiments of French and one of Germans, supporting three regiments of Spanish lancers, two cornets of German riders under the Bastard of Brunswick, and four hundred cuirassiers. The battalia, which was composed of six hundred splendid cavalry, all noblemen of France, guarding the white banner of the Holy League, and supported by a column of three thousand Swiss and two thousand French infantry, was commanded by Mayenne in person, assisted by his half-brother, the Duke of Nemours. In front of the infantry was a battery of six cannon and three culverines. The left wing was commanded by Marshal de Rêne, with six regiments of French and Lorrainers, two thousand Germans, six hundred French cuirassiers, and the mounted troopers of Count Egmont. It is probable that Mayenne's whole force, therefore, amounted to nearly four thousand cavalry and at least thirteen thousand foot. 1

Very different was the respective appearance of the two armies, so far, especially, as regarded the horsemen on both sides. Gay in their gilded armour and waving plumes, with silken scarves across their shoulders, and the fluttering favours of fair ladies on their arms or in their helmets, the brilliant champions of the Holy Catholic Confederacy clustered around the chieftains of the great house of Guise, impatient for the conflict. It was like a muster for a brilliant and chivalrous tournament. The Walloon and Flemish nobles outrivalling even the self-confidence of their companions in arms, taunted them with their slowness. The impetuous Egmont, burning to eclipse the fame of his ill-fated father at Gravelines and St.

Quentin in the same holy cause, urged on the battle with unseemly haste, loudly proclaiming that if the French were faint-hearted he would himself give a good account of the Navarrese prince without any assistance from them. 1

A cannon-shot away, the grim puritan nobles who had come forth from their mountain fastnesses to do battle for king and law and for the rights of conscience against the Holy League—men seasoned in a hundred battle-fields, clad all in iron, with no dainty ornaments nor holiday luxury of warfare—knelt on the ground, smiting their mailed breasts with iron hands, invoking blessings on themselves and curses and confusion on their enemies in the coming conflict, and chanting a stern psalm of homage to the God of battles and of wrath. And Henry of France and Navarre, descendant of Lewis the Holy and of Hugh the Great, beloved chief of the Calvinist cavaliers, knelt among his heretic brethren, and prayed and chanted with them. But not the staunchest Huguenot of them all, not Duplessis, nor D'Aubigné, nor De la Noue with the iron arm, was more devoted on that day to crown and country than were such papist supporters of the rightful heir as had sworn to conquer the insolent foreigner on the soil of France or die.

When this brief prelude was over, Henry made an address to his soldiers, but its language has not been preserved. It is known, however, that he wore that day his famous snow-white plume, and that he ordered his soldiers, should his banner go down in the conflict, to follow wherever and as long as that plume should be seen waving on any part of the field. He had taken a position by which his troops had the sun and wind in their backs, so that the smoke rolled toward the enemy and the light shone in their eyes. The combat began with the play of artillery, which

1 De Thou, Coloma, *ubi sup.* Dondini, i. 140, *seqq.* Meteren, xvi. 392. Parma's letters before cited.

1 De Thou, *ubi sup.*

soon became so warm that Egmont, whose cavalry—suffering and galled—soon became impatient, ordered a charge. It was a most brilliant one. The heavy troopers of Flanders and Hainault, following their spirited chieftain, dashed upon old Marshal Biron, routing his cavalry, charging clean up to the Huguenot guns and sabring the cannoneers. The shock was square, solid, irresistible, and was followed up by the German riders under Eric of Brunswick, who charged upon the battalia of the royal army, where the king commanded in person.

There was a panic. The whole royal cavalry wavered, the supporting infantry recoiled, the day seemed lost before the battle was well begun. Yells of „Victory! Victory! up with the Holy League, down with the heretic Béarnese,” resounded through the Catholic squadrons. The king and Marshal Biron, who were near each other, were furious with rage, but already doubtful of the result. They exerted themselves to rally the troops under their immediate command, and to reform the shattered ranks. 1

The German riders and French lancers under Brunswick and Bassompierre had, however, not done their work as thoroughly as Egmont had done. The ground was so miry and soft that in the brief space which separated the hostile lines they had not power to urge their horses to full speed. Throwing away their useless lances, they came on at a feeble canter, sword in hand, and were unable to make a very vigorous impression on the more heavily armed troopers opposed to them. Meeting with a firm resistance to their career, they wheeled, faltered a little and fell a short distance back. 2 Many of the riders

being of the reformed religion, refused moreover to fire upon the Huguenots, and discharged their carbines in the air. 1

The king, whose glance on the battlefield was like inspiration, saw the blot, and charged upon them in person with his whole battalia of cavalry. The veteran Biron followed hard upon the snow-white plume. The scene was changed, victory succeeded to impending defeat, and the enemy was routed. The riders and cuirassiers, broken into a struggling heap of confusion, strewed the ground with their dead bodies, or carried dismay into the ranks of the infantry as they strove to escape. Brunswick went down in the *mêlée*, mortally wounded as it was believed. Egmont, renewing the charge at the head of his victorious Belgian troopers, fell dead with a musket-ball through his heart. The shattered German and Walloon cavalry, now pricked forward by the lances of their companions, under the passionate commands of Mayenne and Aumale, now falling back before the furious charges of the Huguenots, were completely overthrown and cut to pieces. Seven times did Henry of Navarre in person lead his troopers to the charge; but suddenly, in the midst of the din of battle and the cheers of victory, a message of despair went from lip to lip throughout the royal lines. The king had disappeared. He was killed, and the hopes of Protestantism and of France were fallen for ever with him. The white standard of his battalia had been seen floating wildly and purposelessly over the field; for his bannerman, Pot de

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de Sully, who fought in the squadron which sustained Egmont's first onset, and who received seven wounds, states expressly that the king would have been hopelessly defeated, had the whole army of the League displayed the same remarkable valour as was manifested by Egmont's command. The right of the royal cavalry broke into a panic flight, after the hand to hand combat had lasted a quarter of an hour, and the left was broken and thrown into utter confusion.

1 Sully, *ubi sup.*

1 De Thou, Dondini, Coloma, Meteren, *ubi sup.*

2 William Lyly to Sir F. Walsingham, 20 March, 1590 (S. P. Office MS.), a blunt, plain-spoken Englishman and eye-witness, writing from the spot. *Memoires de Sully*, ed. Londres, 1747, iii. L. 168, 169. The Duc

Rhodes, a young noble of Dauphiny, wounded mortally in the head, with blood streaming over his face and blinding his sight, was utterly unable to control his horse, who galloped hither and thither at his own caprice, misleading many troopers who followed in his erratic career. A cavalier, armed in proof, and wearing the famous snow-white plume, after a hand to hand struggle with a veteran of Count Bossu's regiment, was seen to fall dead by the side of the bannerman. The Fleming, not used to boast, loudly asserted that he had slain the Béarnese, and the news spread rapidly over the battle-field. The defeated Confederates gained new courage, the victorious royalists were beginning to waver, when suddenly, between the hostile lines, in the very midst of the battle, the king galloped forward, bare-headed, covered with blood and dust, but entirely unhurt. A wild shout of „*Vive le Roi!*” rang through the air. Cheerful as ever, he addressed a few encouraging words to his soldiers, with a smiling face, and again led a charge. It was all that was necessary to complete the victory. The enemy broke and ran away on every side in wildest confusion, followed by the royalist cavalry, who sabred them as they fled. The panic gained the foot-soldiers, who should have supported the cavalry, but had not been at all engaged in the action. The French infantry threw away their arms as they rushed from the field and sought refuge in the woods. The Walloons were so expeditious in the race, that they never stopped till they gained their own frontier. 1 The day was hopelessly lost, and although Mayenne had conducted himself well in the early part of the day, it was certain that he was excelled by none in the celerity of his flight when the rout had fairly begun. Pausing to draw breath as he gained the wood, he was seen to deal blows

with his own sword among the mob of fugitives, not that he might rally them to their flag and drive them back to another encounter, but because they encumbered his own retreat. 1

The Walloon carbineers, the German riders, and the French lancers, disputing as to the relative blame to be attached to each corps, began shooting and sabring each other, almost before they were out of the enemy's sight. Many were thus killed. The lansquenets were all put to the sword. The Swiss infantry were allowed to depart to their own country on pledging themselves not again to bear arms against Henry IV. It is probable that eight hundred of the leaguers were either killed on the battle-field or drowned in the swollen river in their retreat. About one-fourth of that number fell in the army of the king. It is certain that of the contingent from the obedient Netherlands, two hundred and seventy, including their distinguished general, lost their lives. 2 The Bastard of Brunswick, crawling from beneath a heap of slain, escaped with life. 3 Mayenne lost all his standards and all the baggage of his army, while the army itself was for a time hopelessly dissolved. 4

Few cavalry actions have attained a wider celebrity in history than the fight of Ivry. Yet there have been many hard-fought battles, where the struggle was fiercer and closer, where the issue was

1 Decorous Chroniclers like Dondini (i. 143) and others, represent the duke as vigorously rallying and rebuking the fugitives; but, says honest William Lyly, telling what he saw: „The enemy thus ran away, Mayenne to Ivry, where the Walloons and Reiters followed so fast, that there standing, hasting to draw breath, and not able to speak, he was constrained to draw his sword to strike the flyers to make place for his own flight.” (MS. letter before cited.)

2 De Thou says eight hundred, Dondini four hundred, but Farnese in his letter to the king says two hundred and seventy.

3 So says Dondini, i. 149. Coloma says he was killed.

4 Dondini, De Thou, Coloma, Meteren Parma's letters, Lyly's letter.

1 Lyly's letter before cited. Compare Coloma, Dondini, de Thou, Meteren, *ubi sup.*



for a longer time doubtful, where far more lives on either side were lost, where the final victory was immediately productive of very much greater results, and which, nevertheless, have sunk into hopeless oblivion. The personal details which remain concerning the part enacted by the adventurous king at this most critical period of his career, the romantic interest which must always gather about that ready-witted, ready-sworded Gascon, at the moment when, to contemporaries, the result of all his struggles seemed so hopeless or at best so doubtful; above all, the numerous royal and princely names which embellished the roll-call of that famous passage of arms, and which were supposed, in those days at least, to add such lustre to a battle-field, as humbler names, however illustrious by valour or virtue, could never bestow, have made this combat for ever famous.

Yet it is certain that the most healthy moral, in military affairs, to be derived from the event, is that the importance of a victory depends less upon itself than on the use to be made of it. Mayenne fled to Mantes, the Duke of Nemours to Chartres, other leaders of the League in various directions. Mayenne told everybody he met that the Béarnese was killed, and that although his own army was defeated, he should soon have another one on foot. The same intelligence was communicated to the Duke of Parma, and by him to Philip. Mendoza and the other Spanish agents went about Paris spreading the news of Henry's death, but the fact seemed woefully to lack confirmation, while the proofs of the utter overthrow and shameful defeat of the Leaguers were visible on every side. The Parisians—many of whom the year before had in vain hired windows in the principal streets, in order to witness the promised entrance of the Béarnese, bound hand and foot, and with a gag in his mouth, 1 to

swell the triumph of Madam League—were incredulous as to the death now reported to them of this very lively heretic, by those who had fled so ignominiously from his troopers.

De la Noue and the other Huguenot chieftains earnestly urged upon Henry the importance of advancing upon Paris without an instant's delay, and it seems at least extremely probable that, had he done so, the capital would have fallen at once into his hands. It is the concurrent testimony of contemporaries that the panic, the destitution, the confusion would have made resistance impossible had a determined onslaught been made. 1 And Henry had a couple of thousand horsemen, flushed with victory, and a dozen thousand foot who had been compelled to look upon a triumph in which they had no opportunity of sharing. Success and emulation would have easily triumphed over dissension and despair.

But the king, yielding to the councils of Biron and other catholics, declined attacking the capital, and preferred waiting the slow, and in his circumstances eminently hazardous, operations of a regular siege. Was it the fear of giving a signal triumph to the cause of protestantism that caused the Huguenot leader—so soon to become a renegade—to pause in his career? Wat it anxiety lest his victorious entrance into Paris might undo the diplomacy of his catholic envoys at Rome? or was it simply the mutinous condition of his army, especially of the Swiss mercenaries, who refused to advance a step unless their arrears of pay were at once furnished them out of the utterly empty exchequer of the king? 2 Whatever may have been the cause of the delay, it is certain that the golden fruit of victory was not plucked, and that although the confe-

1 Dondini, Coloma, *ubi sup.* Compare De Thou, Meteren, Sully, *et mult. al.*

2 Mémoires de Sully, lib. iv. 177, *seqq.*

1 L'Estoile Reg. Journal de Henri IV. p. 6.

derate army had rapidly dissolved, in consequence of their defeat, the king's own forces manifested as little cohesion.

And now began that slow and painful siege, the details of which are as terrible, but as universally known, as those of any chapters in the blood-stained history of the century. Henry seized upon the towns guarding the rivers Seine and Marne, twin nurses of Paris. By controlling the course of those streams as well as that of the Yonne and Oise—especially by taking firm possession of Lagny on the Marne, whence a bridge led from the Isle of France to the Brie country—great thoroughfare of wine and corn—and of Corbeil at the junction of the little river Essonne with the Seine—it was easy in that age to stop the vital circulation of the imperial city.

By midsummer, Paris, unquestionably the first city of Europe at that day, I was in extremities, and there are few events in history in which our admiration is more excited by the power of mankind to endure almost preternatural misery, or our indignation more deeply aroused by the cruelty with which the sublimest principles of human nature may be made to serve the purposes of selfish ambition and grovelling superstition, than this famous laquer.

Rarely have men at any epoch defended their fatherland against foreign oppression with more heroism than that which was manifested by the Parisians of 1590 in resisting religious toleration, and in obeying a foreign and priestly despotism. Men, women, and children cheerfully laid down their lives by thousands in order that the papal legate and the king of Spain might trample upon that legitimate sovereign of France who was one day to become the idol of Paris and of the whole kingdom.

A census taken at the beginning of the siege had showed a population of

two hundred thousand souls, with a sufficiency of provisions, it was thought, to last one month.<sup>1</sup> But before the terrible summer was over—so completely had the city been invested—the bushel of wheat was worth three hundred and sixty crowns, rye and oat being but little cheaper.<sup>2</sup> Indeed, grain might as well have cost three thousand crowns the bushel, for the prices recorded placed it beyond the reach of all but the extremely wealthy. The flesh of horses, asses, dogs, cats, rats had become rare luxuries. There was nothing cheap, said a citizen bitterly, but sermons.<sup>3</sup> And the priests and monks of every order went daily about the streets, preaching fortitude in that great resistance to heresy, by which Paris was earning for itself a crown of glory, and promising the most direct passage to paradise for the souls of the wretched victims who fell daily, starved to death, upon the pavements. And the monks and priests did their work nobly, aiding the general resolution by the example of their own courage. Better fed than their fellow citizens, they did military work in trench, guard-house and rampart, as the population became rapidly unfit, from physical exhaustion, for the defence of the city.

The young Duke of Nemours, governor of the place, manifested as much resolution and conduct in bringing his countrymen to perdition as if the work in which he was engaged had been the highest and holiest that ever tasked human energies. He was sustained in his task by that proud princess, his own and Mayenne's mother, by Madame Montpensier, by the resident trium-

<sup>1</sup> De Thou, t. xi. lib. 97. 162.

<sup>2</sup> Bor, III. xviii. 535.

<sup>3</sup> L'Estoile, 23—„Tout ce qui estoit bon marché à Paris estoient les sermons où on repaissoit le pauvre monde affamé de vent, c'est à dire de meneries . . . persuadant qu'il valoit mieux tuer ses propres enfants, n'ayant de quoi leur donner à manger, que de recevoir et reconnoître un roy hérétique,” &c.

<sup>1</sup> „Aquella vasta ciudad, sin disputa la mayor de Europa,” says Coloma, iii. 45.

virate of Spain, Mendoza, Commander Mereo, and John Baptist Tassis, by the cardinal legate Gaetano, and, more than all, by the sixteen chiefs of the wards, those municipal tyrants of the unhappy populace. 1

Pope Sixtus himself was by no means eager for the success of the League. After the battle of Ivry he had most seriously inclined his ear to the representations of Henry's envoy, and showed much willingness to admit the victorious heretic once more into the bosom of the Church. Sixtus was not desirous of contributing to the advancement of Philip's power. He feared his designs on Italy, being himself most anxious at that time to annex Naples to the holy see. He had amassed a large treasure, but he liked best to spend it in splendid architecture, in noble fountains, in magnificent collections of art, science, and literature, and above all, in building up fortunes for the children of his sister the washerwoman, and in allying them all to the most princely houses of Italy, while never allowing them even to mention the name of their father, so base was his degree; but he cared not to disburse from his hoarded dollars to supply the necessities of the League. 2

But Gaetanc, although he could wring but fifty thousand crowns from his Holiness, after the fatal fight of Ivry, to further the good cause, was lavish in expenditures from his own purse and from other sources, and this too at a time when thirty-three per cent, interest was paid to the usurers of Antwerp for one month's loan of ready money. 3 He was indefatigable, too, and most successful in his exhortations and ghostly consolations to the people. Those proud priests and great nobles were playing a reckless game, and the hopes of man-

kind beyond the grave were the counters on their table. For themselves there were rich prizes for the winning. Should they succeed in dismembering the fair land where they were enacting their fantastic parts, there were temporal principalities, great provinces, petty sovereignties, to be carved out of the heritage which the Béarnese claimed for his own. Obviously then, their consciences could never permit this shameless heretic, by a simulated conversion at the critical moment, to block their game and restore the national unity and laws. And even should it be necessary to give the whole kingdom, instead of the mere duchy of Brittany, to Philip of Spain, still there were mighty guerdons to be bestowed on his supporters before the foreign monarch could seat himself on the throne of Henry's ancestors.

As to the people who were fighting, starving, dying by thousands in this great cause, there were eternal rewards in another world profusely promised for their heroism instead of the more substantial bread and beef for lack of which they were laying down their lives.

It was estimated that before July twelve thousand human beings in Paris had died, for want of food, within three months. But as there were no signs of the promised relief by the army of Parma and Mayenne, and as the starving people at times appeared faint-hearted, their courage was strengthened one day by a stirring exhibition.

An astonishing procession marched through the streets of the city, led by the Bishop of Senlis and the Prior of Chartreux, each holding a halberd in one hand and a crucifix in the other, and graced by the presence of the cardinal-legate, and of many prelates from Italy. A lame monk, adroitly manipulating the staff of a drum-major, went hopping and limping before them, much to the amazement of the crowd. Then came a long file of monks—Capuchins, Ber-

1 L'Estoile, 23, *seqq.* De Thou, *ubi sup.*, 162, *seqq.* Bor, *ubi sup.*

2 De Thou, lib. 97.

3 Meteren, xvi. 293.



nardists, Minimes, Franciscans, Jacobins, Carmelites, and other orders—each with his cowl thrown back, his long robes trussed up, a helmet on his head, a cuirass on his breast, and a halberd in his hand. The elder ones marched first, grinding their teeth, rolling their eyes, and making other ferocious demonstrations. Then came the younger friars, similarly attired, all armed with arquebusses, which they occasionally and accidentally discharged to the disadvantage of the spectators, several of whom were killed or wounded on the spot. Among others a servant of Cardinal Caetano was thus slain, and the event caused much commotion, until the cardinal proclaimed that a man thus killed in so holy a cause had gone straight to heaven and had taken his place among the just. It was impossible, thus argued the people in their simplicity, that so wise and virtuous a man as the cardinal should not know what was best.

The procession marched to the church of our Lady of Loretto, where they solemnly promised to the blessed Virgin a lamp and a ship of gold—should she be willing to use her influence in behalf of the suffering city—to be placed on her shrine as soon as the siege should be raised. 1

But these demonstrations, however cheering to the souls, had comparatively little effect upon the bodies of the sufferers. It was impossible to walk through the streets of Paris without stumbling over the dead bodies of the citizens. Trustworthy eye-witnesses of those dreadful days have placed the number of the dead during the summer at thirty thousand. 2 A tumultuous assemblage of the starving and the forlorn rushed at last to the municipal palace, demanding peace or bread. The rebels were soon dispersed however by a charge, headed by the Chevalier d'Aumale, and

assisted by the chiefs of the wards, and so soon as the riot was quelled, its ringleader, a leading advocate, Renaud by name, was hanged. 1

Still, but for the energy of the priests, it is doubtful whether the city could have been held by the Confederacy. The Duke of Nemours confessed that there were occasions when they never would have been able to sustain a determined onslaught, and they were daily expecting to see the Prince of Béarnes battering triumphantly at their gates. But the eloquence of the preachers, especially of the ony-eyed father Boucher, sustained the fainting spirits of the people, and consoled the sufferers in their dying agonies by glimpses of paradise. Sublime was that devotion, superhuman that craft, but it is only by weapons from the armoury of the Unseen that human creatures can long confront such horrors in a wicked cause. Superstition, in those days at least, was a political force absolutely without limitation, and most adroitly did the agents of Spain and Rome handle its tremendous enginry against unhappy France. For the hideous details of the most dreadful sieges recorded in ancient or modern times were now reproduced in Paris. Not a revolutionary circumstance, at which the world had shuddered in the accounts of the siege of Jerusalem, was spared. Men devoured such dead vermin as could be found living in the streets. They crowded greedily around stalls in the public squares where the skin, bones, and offal of such dogs, cats, and unclean beasts as still remained for the consumptions of the wealthier classes were sold to the populace. Over the doorways of these flesh markets might be read, "*Haec sunt munera pro iis qui vitam pro Philippo profuderunt.*" 2 Men stood in archways and nar-

1 De Thou, *ubi sup.* 177.

2 L'Estoile, 27. "De ce que j'écris," adds the journalist, "mes yeux ont vu une bonne partie."

De Thou, t. xi. lib. 97, p. 161. Herrera, P. iii. lib. v. cl. 210.

2 L'Estoile, p. 25. Herrera says 50000, *loc. cit.*

row passages lying in wait for whatever stray dogs still remained at large, noosed them, strangled them, and like savage beasts of prey tore them to pieces and devoured them alive.<sup>1</sup> And it sometimes happened, too, that the equally hungry dog proved the more successful in the foul encounter, and fed upon the man. A lady visiting the Duchess of Nemours—called for the high pretensions of her sons by her two marriages the queen-mother—complained bitterly that mothers in Paris had been compelled to kill their own children outright to save them from starving to death in lingering agony. „And if you are brought to that extremity,” replied the duchess, „as for the sake of our holy religion to be forced to kill your own children, do you think that so great a matter after all? What are your children made of more than other people’s children? What are we all but dirt and dust?”<sup>2</sup> Such was the consolation administered by the mother of the man who governed Paris, and defended its gates against its lawful sovereignty at the command of a foreigner, while the priests in their turn persuaded the populace that it was far more righteous to kill their own children, if they had no food to give them, than to obtain food by recognizing a heretic king.<sup>3</sup>

It was related, too, and believed, that in some instances mothers had salted the bodies of their dead children and fed upon them, day by day, until the hideous repast would no longer support their own life. They died, and the secret was revealed by servants who had partaken of the food.<sup>4</sup> The Spanish ambassador, Mendoza, advised recourse to an article of diet which had been used in some of the oriental sieges. The counsel at first was rejected as coming from the agent of Spain, who wished at all hazards to save the capital of France from falling out of the hands

of his master into those of the heretic. But dire necessity prevailed, and the bones of the dead were taken in considerable quantities from the cemeteries, ground into flour, baked into bread, and consumed. It was called Madame Montpensier’s cake, because the duchess earnestly proclaimed its merits to the poor Parisians. „She was never known to taste it herself, however,” bitterly observed one who lived in Paris through that horrible summer. She was right to abstain, for all who ate of it died, and the Montpensier flour fell into disuse.<sup>1</sup>

Lansquenets and other soldiers, mad with hunger and rage, when they could no longer find dogs to feed on, chased children through the streets, and were known in several instances to kill and devour them on the spot.<sup>2</sup> To those expressing horror at the perpetration of such a crime, a leading personage, member of the Council of Nine, maintained that there was less danger to one’s soul in satisfying one’s hunger with a dead child, in case of necessity, than in recognizing the heretic Béarnese, and he added that all the best theologians and doctors of Paris were of his opinion.<sup>3</sup>

As the summer wore on to its close,

1 L’Estoile, 25. De Thou, *ubi sup.* 177.

2 L’Estoile, 30.

3 *Ibid.* „Lansquenets, gens de soi barbares et inhumains, mourans de male rage et faim, commencèrent à chasser aux enfans comme aux chiens, et en mangerent trois, deux à l’hostel Saint Denis et un à l’hôtel de Palaiseau, et fut commis ce cruel et barbare acte dans l’enceinte des murailles de Paris, tant l’ire de Dieu estoit embrassée sur nos testes. Ce qui tenant du commencement pour une fable pour ce que me sembloit que *hoc erat atrocius vero*, j’ai trouvé depuis que c’estoit verité, confessé et temoigné par les propres bouches des lansquenets. De moi j’ai oui tenir ceste proposition à un grand Catholique de Paris qui estoit du Conseil des Neuf qu’il y avoit moins de danger de s’accomoder d’un enfant mort en telle nécessité que de reconnoître le Béarnais, estant hérétique comme il estoit, et que de son opinion estoient tous les meilleurs théologiens et docteurs de Paris.”

Compare Meteren, xvi. 293, who relates that eighteen children were said to have been eaten.

1 De Thou, *ubi sup.* 177.

2 L’Estoile, 29. 3 *Ibid.* 23. 4 *Ibid.* 25.

through all these horrors, and as there were still no signs of Mayenne and Parma leading their armies to the relief of the city, it became necessary to deceive the people by a show of negotiation with the beleaguering army. Accordingly, the Spanish ambassador, the legate, and the other chiefs of the Holy League appointed a deputation, consisting of the Cardinal Gondy, the Archbishop of Lyons, and the Abbé d'Elbéne, to Henry. <sup>1</sup> It soon became evident to the king, however, that these commissioners were but trifling with him in order to amuse the populace. His attitude was dignified and determined throughout the interview. The place appointed was St. Anthony's Abbey, before the gates of Paris. Henry wore a cloak and the order of the Holy Ghost, and was surrounded by his council, the princes of the blood, and by more than four hundred of the chief gentlemen of his army. After passing the barricade, the deputies were received by old Marshal Biron, and conducted by him to the king's chamber of state. When they had made their salutations, the king led the way to an inner cabinet, but his progress was much impeded by the crowding of the nobles about him. Wishing to excuse this apparent rudeness, he said to the envoys: „Gentlemen, these men thrust me on as fast to the battle against the foreigner as they now do to my cabinet. Therefore bear with them.” Then turning to the crowd, he said: „Room, gentlemen, for the love of me,” upon which they all retired. <sup>2</sup>

The deputies then stated that they had been sent by the authorities of Paris to consult as to the means of obtaining a general peace in France. They expressed the hope that the king's disposition was favourable to this end, and that he would likewise permit them

to confer with the Duke of Mayenne. This manner of addressing him excited his choler. He told Cardinal Gondy, who was spokesman of the deputation, that he had long since answered such propositions. He alone could deal with his subjects. He was like the woman before Solomon; he would have all the child or none of it. <sup>1</sup> Rather than dismember his kingdom he would lose the whole. He asked them what they considered him to be. They answered that they knew his rights, but that the Parisians had different opinions. If Paris would only acknowledge him to be king there could be no more question of war. He asked them if they desired the King of Spain or the Duke of Mayenne for their king, and bade them look well to themselves. The King of Spain could not help them, for he had too much business on hand; while Mayenne had neither means nor courage, having been within three leagues of them for three weeks doing nothing. Neither king nor duke should have that which belonged to him, of that they might be assured. <sup>2</sup> He told them he loved Paris as his capital, as his eldest daughter. If the Parisians wished to see the end of their miseries it was to him they should appeal, not to the Spaniard nor to the Duke of Mayenne. By the grace of God and the swords of his brave gentlemen he would prevent the King of Spain from making a colony of France as he had done of Brazil. He told the commissioners that they ought to die of shame that they, born Frenchmen, should have so forgotten their love of country and of liberty as thus to bow the head to the Spaniard, and—while famine was carrying off thousands of their countrymen before their eyes—to be so cowardly as not to utter one word for the public welfare from fear of offending Cardinal Gaetano, Mendoza, and Moreo. <sup>3</sup> He

<sup>1</sup> De Thou, *ubi sup.*

<sup>2</sup> W. Lyly to Sir E. Stafford, <sup>29 July</sup>  
<sup>8 Aug.</sup>

1590. (S. P. Office MS.)

<sup>1</sup> Ibid.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid. Compare De Thou, xi. 97.

<sup>3</sup> De Thou, *ubi sup.*



said that he longed for a combat to decide the issue, and that he had charged Count de Brissac to tell Mayenne that he would give a finger of his right hand for a battle, and two for a general peace. 1 He knew and pitied the sufferings of Paris, but the horrors now raging there were to please the King of Spain. That monarch had told the Duke of Parma to trouble himself but little about the Netherlands so long as he could preserve for him his city of Paris. But it was to lean on a broken reed to expect support from this old, decrepit king, whose object was to dismember the flourishing kingdom of France, and to divide it among as many tyrants as he had sent viceroys to the Indies. 2 The crown was his own birthright. Were it elective he should receive the suffrages of the great mass of the electors. He hoped soon to drive those red-crossed foreigners out of his kingdom. Should he fail, they would end by expelling the Duke of Mayenne and all the rest who had called them in, and Paris would become the theatre of the bloodiest tragedy ever yet enacted. 3 The king then ordered Sir Roger Williams to see that a collation was prepared for the deputies, and the veteran Welshman took occasion to indulge in much blunt conversation with the guests. He informed them that he, Mr. Sackville, and many other strangers were serving the king from the hatred they bore the Spaniards and Mother League, and that his royal mistress had always 8000 Englishmen ready to maintain the cause.

While the conferences were going on, the officers and soldiers of the besieging army thronged to the gate, and had much talk with the townsmen. Among others, time-honoured La Noue with the iron arm stood near the gate and harangued the Parisians. „We are here,” said he, „five thousand gentlemen; we desire your good, not your ruin. We

will make you rich; let us participate in your labour and industry. Undo not yourselves to serve the ambition of a few men.” The townspeople, hearing the old warrior discoursing thus earnestly, asked who he was. When informed that it was La Noue they cheered him vociferously, and applauded his speech with the greatest vehemence. 1 Yet La Noue was the foremost Huguenot that the sun shone upon, and the Parisians were starving themselves to death out of hatred to heresy. After the collation the commissioners were permitted to go from the camp in order to consult Mayenne.

Such then was the condition of Paris during that memorable summer of tortures. What now were its hopes of deliverance out of this Gehenna? The trust of Frenchmen was in Philip of Spain, whose legions, under command of the great Italian chieftain, were daily longed for to save them from rendering obedience to their lawful prince.

For even the king of straw—the imprisoned cardinal—was now dead, and there was not even the effigy of any other sovereign than Henry of Bourbon to claim authority in France. Mayenne, in the course of long interviews with the Duke of Parma at Condé and Brussels, had expressed his desire to see Philip king of France, and had promised his best efforts to bring about such a result. In that case he stipulated for the second place in the kingdom for himself, together with a good rich province in perpetual sovereignty, and a large sum of money in hand. Should this course not run smoothly, he would be willing to take the crown himself, in which event he would cheerfully cede to Philip the sovereignty of Brittany and Burgundy, besides a selection of cities to be arranged for at later day. Although he spoke of himself with modesty, said Alexander, it was very plain that he meant to arrive at the crown him-

1 De Thon, *ubi sup.*

2 Ibid.

3 Ibid.

1 Lely's letter before cited.

self. 1 Well had the Béarnese alluded to the judgment of Solomon. Were not children, thus ready to dismember their mother, as foul and unnatural as the mother who would divide her child?

And what was this dependence on a foreign tyrant really worth? As we look back upon those dark days with the light of what was then the almost immediate future turned full and glaring upon them, we find it difficult to exaggerate the folly of the chief actors in those scenes of crime. Did not the peniless adventurer, whose keen insight and wise recklessness were passing for hallucination and foolhardiness in the eyes of his contemporaries, understand the game he was playing better than did that profound thinker, that mysterious but infallible politician, who sat in the Escorial and made the world tremble at every hint of his lips, every stroke of his pen?

The Netherlands—that most advanced portion of Philip's domain, without the possession of which his conquest of England and his incorporation of France were but childish visions, even if they were not monstrous chimeras at best—were to be in a manner left to themselves, while their consummate governor and general was to go forth and conquer France at the head of a force with which he had been in vain attempting to hold those provinces to their obedience. At that very moment the rising young chieftain of the Netherlands was most successfully inaugurating his career of military success. His armies well disciplined, well paid, full of heart and of hope, were threatening their ancient enemy in every quarter, while the veteran legions of Spain and Italy, heroes of a hundred Flemish and Frisian battlefields, were disorganized, starving, and mutinous. The famous ancient legion, the *terzo viejo*, had been disbanded for its obstinate and confirmed unruliness.

1 Parma to Philip, 20 May, 1590. (Arch. de Simancas MS.)

The legion of Manrique, sixteen hundred strong, was in open mutiny at Courtray. Farnese had sent the Prince of Ascoli to negotiate with them, but his attempts were all in vain. 1 Two years' arrearages—to be paid, not in cloth at four times what the contractors had paid for it, but in solid gold—were their not unreasonable demands after years of as hard fighting and severe suffering as the world has often seen. But Philip, instead of ducats or cloth, had only sent orders to go forth and conquer a new kingdom for him. Verdugo, too, from Friesland was howling for money, garrotting and hanging his mutinous veterans every day, 2 and sending complaints and most dismal forebodings as often as a courier could make his way through the enemy's lines to Farnese's headquarters. And Farnese, on his part, was garrotting and hanging the veterans. 3

Alexander did not of course inform his master that he was a mischievous lunatic, who upon any healthy principle of human government ought long ago to have been shut up from all communion with his species. It was very plain, however, from his letters, that such was his innermost thought, had it been safe, loyal, or courteous to express it in plain language.

He was himself stung almost to madness moreover by the presence of Commander Moreo, who hated him, who was perpetually coming over from France to visit him, who was a spy upon all his actions, and who was regularly distilling his calumnies into the ears of Secretary Idiaquez and of Philip himself. 4 The king was informed that Farnese was working for his own ends, and was disgusted with his sovereign; that there never had been a petty prince

1 Parma to Philip, 10 April, 1590. (Arch. de Sim. MS.)

2 Same to same.

3 Same to same, 26 June and 22 July, 1590. (Ibid.)

4 Moreo to Idiaquez, 30 Jan. 1590. (Ibid.)

of Italy that did not wish to become a greater one, or that was not jealous of Philip's power, and that there was not a villain in all Christendom but wished for Philip's death. Moreo followed the prince about to Antwerp, to Brussels, to Spa, whither he had gone to drink the waters for his failing health, pestered him, lectured him, pried upon him, counselled him, enraged him. Alexander told him at last he cared not if the whole world came to an end so long as Flanders remained, which alone, had been entrusted to him, and that, if he was expected to conquer France it would be as well to give him the means of performing that exploit. So Moreo told the king that Alexander was wasting time and wasting money, that he was the cause of Egmont's overthrow, and that he would be the cause of the loss of Paris and of the downfall of the whole French scheme; for that he was determined to do nothing to assist Mayenne, or that did not conduce to his private advantage. 1

Yet Farnese had been not long before informed in sufficiently plain language, and by personages of great influence, that in case he wished to convert his vice-royalty of the Netherlands into a permanent sovereignty, he might rely on the assistance of Henry of Navarre, and perhaps of Queen Elizabeth. 2 The scheme would not have been impracticable, but the duke never listened to it for a moment.

If he were slow in advancing to the relief of starving, agonising Paris, there were sufficient reasons for his delay. Most decidedly and bitterly, but loyally, did he denounce the madness of his master's course in all his communications to that master's private ear.

He told him that the situation in which he found himself was horrible.

He had no money for his troops, he had not even garrison bread to put in their mouths. He had not a single stiver to advance them on account. From Friesland, from the Rhine country, from every quarter, cries of distress were rising to heaven, and the lamentations were just. He was in absolute penury. He could not negotiate a bill on the royal account, but had borrowed on his own private security a few thousand crowns which he had given to his soldiers. He was pledging his jewels and furniture like a bankrupt, but all was now in vain to stop the mutiny at Courtray. If that went on it would be of most pernicious example, for the whole army was disorganised, malcontent, and of portentous aspect. „These things,” said he, „ought not to surprise people of common understanding, for without money, without credit, without provisions, and in an exhausted country, it is impossible to satisfy the claims, or even to support the life of the army. 1 When he sent the Flemish cavalry to Mayenne in March, it was under the impression that with it that prince would have maintained his reputation and checked the progress of the Béarnese until greater reinforcements could be forwarded. He was now glad that no larger number had been sent, for all would have been sacrificed on the fatal field of Ivry. 2

The country around him was desperate, believed itself abandoned, and was expecting fresh horrors every day. He had been obliged to remove portions of the garrisons at Deventer and Zutphen purely to save them from starving and desperation. Every day he was informed by his garrisons that they could feed no longer on fine words or hopes, for in them they found no sustenance. 3

But Philip told him that he must proceed forthwith to France, where he

1 Moreo to Philip, 22 June, 1590. (Arch. de Sim. MS.)

2 Duplessis to Buzanval. Mem. et Corresp. de Duplessis Morua, iv. 270.

1 Parma to Philip, 30 Jan. 20 Feb. 14 March, 24 March, 30 March, 19 April, 1590. (Arch. de Sim. MS.) 2 Ibid. 3 Ibid.



was to raise the siege of Paris, and occupy Calais and Boulogne in order to prevent the English from sending succour to the Béarnese, and in order to facilitate his own designs on England. Every effort was to be made before the Béarnese climbed into the seat. The Duke of Parma was to talk no more of difficulties, but to conquer them; 1 a noble phrase on the battle-field, but comparatively easy of utterance at the writing desk!

At last, Philip having made some remittances, miserably inadequate for necessities of the case, but sufficient to repress in part the mutinous demonstrations throughout the army, Farnese addressed himself with a heavy heart to the work required of him. He confessed the deepest apprehensions of the result both in the Netherlands and in France. He intimated a profound distrust of the French, who had ever been Philip's enemies, and dwelt on the danger of leaving the provinces, unable to protect themselves, badly garrisoned, and starving. „It grieves me to the soul, it cuts me to the heart,” he said, „to see that your Majesty commands things which are impossible, for it is our Lord alone that can work miracles. Your Majesty supposes that with the little money you have sent me, I can satisfy all the soldiers serving in these provinces, settle with the Spanish and the German mutineers—because, if they are to be used in the expedition, they must at least be quieted—give money to Mayenne and the Parisians, pay retaining wages (wartgeld) to the German Riders for the protection of these provinces, and make sure of the maritime places where the same mutinous language is held as at Courtray. The poverty, the discontent, and the desperation of this unhappy country,” he added, „have been so often described to your Majesty that I have nothing to add. I am hanging and gar-

rotting my veterans everywhere, only because they have rebelled for want of pay without committing any excess. Yet under these circumstances I am to march into France with twenty thousand troops—the least number to effect anything withal. I am confused and perplexed because the whole world is exclaiming against me, and protesting that through my desertion the country entrusted to my care will come to utter perdition. On the other hand, the French cry out upon me that I am the cause that Paris is going to destruction, and with it the Catholic cause in France. Every one is pursuing his private ends. It is impossible to collect a force strong enough for the necessary work. Paris has reached its extreme unction, and neither Mayenne nor any one of the confederates has given this invalid the slightest morsel to support her till your Majesty's forces should arrive.” 1

He reminded his sovereign that the country around Paris was eaten bare of food and forage, and yet that it was quite out of the question for him to undertake the transportation of supplies for his army all the way—supplies from the starving Netherlands to starving France. Since the king was so peremptory, he had nothing for it but to obey, but he vehemently disclaimed all responsibility for the expedition, and in case of his death, he called on his Majesty to vindicate his honour, which his enemies were sure to assail. 2

The messages from Mayenne becoming daily more pressing, Farnese hastened as much as possible those preparations which at best were so woefully inadequate, and avowed his determination not to fight the Béarnese if it were possible to avoid an action. He feared, however, that with totally insufficient forces he should be obliged to accept the chances of an engagement. 3

1 Philip to Parma, 20 June, 1590. (Arch. de Sim. MS.)

1 Parma to Philip, 22 July, 1590. (Arch. de Sim. MS.) 2 Ibid.

3 Same to same, 23 July, 1590. Ibid.

With twelve thousand foot and three thousand horse Farnese left the Netherlands in the beginning of August, and arrived on the 3rd of that month at Valenciennes. His little army, notwithstanding his bitter complaints, was of imposing appearance, 1 The archers and halberdiers of his bodyguard were magnificent in taffety and feathers and surcoats of cramoisy velvet. Four hundred nobles served in the cavalry. Arenberg and Barlaymont and Chimay, and other *grande*es of the Netherlands, in company with Ascoli and the sons of Terranova and Pastrana, and many more great lords of Italy and Spain were in immediate attendance on the illustrious captain. The son of Philip's Secretary of State, Idiaquez, and the nephew of the cardinal-legate, Gaetano, were among the marshals of the camp. 2

Alexander's own natural authority and consummate powers of organization had for the time triumphed over the disintegrating tendencies which, it has been seen, were everywhere so rapidly destroying the foremost military establishment of the world. Nearly half his forces, both cavalry and infantry, were *Netherlanders*; for—as if there were not graves enough in their own little territory—those *Flemings*, *Walloons*, and *Hollanders* were destined to leave their bones on both sides of every well-stricken field of that age between liberty and despotism. And thus thousands of them had now gone forth under the banner of Spain to assist their own tyrant in carrying out his designs upon the capital of France, and to struggle to the death with thousands of their own countrymen who were following the fortunes of the *Béarnese*. Truly in that age it was religion that drew the boundary line between nations.

The army was divided into three por-

tions. The vanguard was under the charge of the *Netherland General*, *Marcquis of Renty*. The *battalia* was commanded by Farnese in person, and the rearguard was entrusted to that veteran *Netherlander* *La Motte*, now called the *Count of Everbeck*. Twenty pieces of artillery followed the last division. 1 At Valenciennes Farnese remained eight days, and from this place *Count Charles Mansfeld* took his departure in a great rage—resigning his post as chief of artillery because *La Motte* had received the appointment of general-marshal of the camp—and returned to his father, old *Peter Ernest Mansfeld*, who was lieutenant-governor of the Netherlands in *Parma's* absence. 2

Leaving Valenciennes on the 11th the army proceeded by way of *Quesney*, *Guise*, *Soissons*, *Fritemilon* to *Meaux*. At this place, which is ten leagues from Paris, Farnese made his junction, on the 22nd of August, with *Mayenne*, who was at the head of six thousand infantry—one half of them *Germans* under *Cobalto*, and the other half *French*—and of two thousand horse. 3

On arriving at *Meaux*, Alexander proceeded straightway to the cathedral, and there, in presence of all, he solemnly swore that he had not come to France in order to conquer that kingdom or any portion of it, in the interests of his master, but only to render succour to the Catholic cause and to free the friends and confederates of his Majesty from violence and heretic oppression. 4 Time was to show the value of that oath.

Here the deputation from Paris—the *Archbishop of Lyons* and his colleagues,

1 *Bor*, *Coloma*, *ubi sup.* *Dondini*, ii. 300, *seqq.* *De Thou*, t. lxi. lib. 97. p. 183, *seqq.* *Bentivoglio*, P. II. lib. iv. 340, *seqq.* *Meteren*, 293, *seqq.*

2 Letters of *Mansfeld* to Philip and to Parma, 11 Aug. 1590. (*Arch. de Sim. MS.*)

3 Lo sucedido a este felicissimo exercito despues que entro en Francia hasta el 3 de Octubre. *Arch. de Simancas*, MS. Parma to Philip, 28 Aug. 1590. *Ibid.*

4 *Coloma*, iii. 47v.

1 Same to same, 28 Aug. 1590. (*Arch. de Sim. MS.*)

2 *Bor*, III. xviii. 535. *Coloma*, iii. 47. *Bentivoglio*, P. II. lib. iv. 340, *seqq.*

whose interview with Henry has just been narrated—were received by the two dukes. They departed, taking with them promises of immediate relief for the starving city. The allies remained five days at Meaux, and leaving that place on the 27th, arrived in the neighbourhood of Chelles, on the last day but one of the summer. They had a united force of five thousand cavalry and eighteen thousand foot. <sup>1</sup>

The summer of horrors was over, and thus with the first days of autumn there had come a ray of hope for the proud city which was lying at its last gasp. When the allies came in sight of the monastery of Chelles they found themselves in the immediate neighbourhood of the Béarnese.

The two great captains of the age had at last met face to face. They were not only the two first commanders of their time, but there was not a man in Europe at that day to be at all compared to either of them. The youth, concerning whose earliest campaign an account will be given in the following chapter, had hardly yet struck his first blow. Whether that blow was to reveal the novice or the master was soon to be seen. Meantime in 1590 it would have been considered a foolish adulation to mention the name of Maurice of Nassau in the same breath with that of Navarre or of Farnese.

The scientific duel which was now to take place was likely to task the genius and to bring into full display the peculiar powers and defects of the two chieftains of Europe. Each might be considered to be still in the prime of life, but Alexander, who was turned of forty-five, was already broken in health, while the vigorous Henry was eight years younger, and of an iron constitution. Both had passed their lives in the field, but the king, from nature, education, and the force of circumstan-

ces, preferred pitched battles to scientific combinations, while the duke, having studied and practised his art in the great Spanish and Italian schools of warfare, was rather a profound strategist than a professional fighter, although capable of great promptness and intense personal energy when his judgment dictated a battle. Both were born with that invaluable gift which no human being can acquire, authority, and both were adored and willingly obeyed by their soldiers, so long as those soldiers were paid and fed.

The prize now to be contended for was a high one. Alexander's complete success would tear from Henry's grasp the first city of Christendom, now sinking exhausted into his hands, and would place France in the power of the Holy League and at the feet of Philip. Another Ivry would shatter the confederacy, and carry the king in triumph to his capital and his ancestral throne. On the approach of the combined armies under Parma and Mayenne, the king had found himself most reluctantly compelled to suspend the siege of Paris. His army, which consisted of sixteen thousand foot and five thousand horse, was not sufficiently numerous to confront at the same time the relieving force and to continue the operations before the city. <sup>1</sup> So long, however, as he held the towns and bridges on the great rivers, and especially those keys to the Seine and Marne, Corbeil and Lagny, he still controlled the life-blood of the capital, which indeed had almost ceased to flow.

On the 31st August he advanced towards the enemy. Sir Edward Stafford, Queen Elizabeth's ambassador, arrived at St. Denis in the night of the 30th August. At a very early hour next morning he heard a shout under his

31 Aug. window, and looking down 1590. beheld King Henry at the head of his troops, cheerfully calling out to his English friends as he passed

<sup>1</sup> Lo sucedido, &c., *ubi sup.* Parma's letter last cited.

<sup>1</sup> De Thou, *ubi sup.*



his door. „Welcoming us after his familiar manner,” said Stafford, „he desired us, in respect of the battle every hour expected, to come as his friends to see and help him, and not to treat of anything which afore we meant, seeing the present state to require it, and the enemy so near that we might well have been interrupted in half-an-hour’s talk, and necessity constrained the king to be in every corner, where for the most part we follow him.”<sup>1</sup> That day Henry took up his headquarters at the monastery of Chelles, a fortified place within six leagues of Paris, on the right bank of the Marne. His army was drawn up in a wide valley somewhat encumbered with wood and water, extending through a series of beautiful pastures towards two hills of moderate elevation. Lagny, on the left bank of the river, was within less than a league of him on his right hand. On the other side of the hills, hardly out of cannon-shot, was the camp of the allies. Henry, whose natural disposition in this respect needed no prompting, was most eager for a decisive engagement. The circumstances imperatively required it of him. His infantry consisted of Frenchmen, Netherlanders, English, Germans, Scotch; but of his cavalry four thousand were French nobles, serving at their own expense, who came to a battle as to a banquet, but who were capable of riding off almost as rapidly, should the feast be denied them. They were volunteers, bringing with them rations for but a few days, and it could hardly be expected that they would remain as patiently as did Parma’s veterans, who, now that their mutiny had been appeased by payment of a portion of their arrears, had become docile again. All the great chieftains who surrounded Henry, whether Catholic or Protestant—Montpensier, Nevers, Soissons, Conti, the

Birons, Lavradin, d’Aumont, Tremouille, Turenne, Chatillon, La Noue—were urgent for the conflict, concerning the expediency of which there could indeed be no doubt, while the king was in raptures at the opportunity of dealing a decisive blow at the confederacy of foreigners and rebels who had so long defied his authority and deprived him of his rights.

Stafford came up with the king, according to his cordial invitation, on the same day, and saw the army all drawn up in battle array. While Henry was „eating a morsel in an old house,” Turenne joined him with six or seven hundred horsemen and between four and five thousand infantry. „They were the likeliest footmen,” said Stafford, „the best countenanced, the best furnished that ever I saw in my life; the most part of them old soldiers that had served under the king for the Religion all this while.”

The envoy was especially enthusiastic, however, in regard to the French cavalry. „There are near six thousand horse,” said he, „whereof gentlemen above four thousand, about twelve hundred other French, and eight hundred reiters. I never saw, nor I think never any man saw, in France such a company of gentlemen together so well horsed and so well armed.”<sup>1</sup>

Henry sent a herald to the camp of the allies, formally challenging them to a general engagement, and expressing a hope that all differences might now be settled by the ordeal of battle, rather than that the sufferings of the innocent people should be longer protracted.<sup>2</sup>

Farnese, on arriving at Meaux, had resolved to seek the enemy and take the hazards of a stricken field. He had misgivings as to the possible result, but he expressly announced this intention in his letters to Philip, and Mayenne

<sup>1</sup> Stafford to Burghley, <sup>28 August</sup>, 1590.  
<sup>7 Sept.</sup>

(S. P. Office MS.)

<sup>1</sup> Ibid.

<sup>2</sup> Bor, Coloma, Dondini, De Thou, Bentivoglio, Meteren, *ubi sup.*

confirmed him in his determination. 1 Nevertheless, finding the enemy so eager and having reflected more maturely, he saw no reason for accepting the chivalrous cartel. As commander-in-chief—for Mayenne willingly conceded the supremacy which it would have been absurd in him to dispute—he accordingly replied that it was his custom to refuse a combat when a refusal seemed advantageous to himself, and to offer battle whenever it suited his purposes to fight. When that moment should arrive the king would find him in the field. And, having sent this courteous, but unsatisfactory answer to the impatient Béarnese, 2 he gave orders to fortify his camp, which was already sufficiently strong. Seven days long the two armies lay face to face—Henry and his chivalry chafing in vain for the longed-for engagement—and nothing occurred between those forty or fifty thousand mortal enemies, encamped within a mile or two of each other, save trifling skirmishes leading to no result. 3

At last Farnese gave orders for an advance. Renty, commander of the vanguard, consisting of nearly all the cavalry, was instructed to move slowly forward over the two hills, and descending on the opposite side, to deploy his forces in two great wings to the right and left. He was secretly directed in this movement to magnify as much as possible the apparent dimensions of his force. Slowly the columns moved over the hills. Squadron after squadron, nearly all of them lancers, with their pennons flaunting gaily in the summer wind, displayed themselves deliberately and ostentatiously in the face of the Royalists. The splendid light-horse of

Basti, the ponderous troopers of the Flemish bands of ordnance under Chimay and Barlaymont, and the famous Albanian and Italian cavalry, were mingled with the veteran Leaguers of France who had fought under the Balafre, and who now followed the fortunes of his brother Mayenne. It was an imposing demonstration. 1

Henry could hardly believe his eyes as the much-coveted opportunity, of which he had been so many days disappointed, at last presented itself, and he waited with more than his usual caution until the plan of attack should be developed by his great antagonist. Parma, on his side, pressed the hand of Mayenne as he watched the movement, saying quietly. „We have already fought our battle and gained the victory. 2 He then issued orders for the whole battalia—which, since the junction, had been under command of Mayenne, Farnese reserving for himself the superintendence of the entire army—to countermarch rapidly towards the Marne and take up a position opposite Lagny. La Motte, with the rearguard, was directed immediately to follow. The battalia had thus become the van, the rearguard the battalia, while the whole cavalry corps by this movement had been transformed from the vanguard into the rear. Renty was instructed to protect his manoeuvres; to restrain the skirmishing as much as possible, and to keep the commander-in-chief constantly informed of every occurrence. In the night he was to intrench and fortify himself rapidly and thoroughly, without changing his position.

Under cover of this feigned attack, Farnese arrived at the river 15 Sept. side on the 15th September, 1590. 1590, seized an open village directly opposite Lagny, which was connected with it by a stone bridge, and planted

1 Parma to Philip, 28 Aug. 1590. (Arch. de Sim. MS.)

2 Coloma, Bentivoglio, De Thou, *ubi sup.*

3 Alexander estimated the forces of Henry at 14,000 foot and 5000 horse. Stafford placed them at 17,000 foot and 6000 horse. Letters cited. The united forces of Mayenne and Farnese, as we have seen, amounted to 18,000 foot and 5000 horse.

1 Bor, Coloma, Bentivoglio, Dondini, De Thou, Meteren, *ubi sup.*

2 Bentivoglio, *loc. cit.*

a battery of nine pieces of heavy artillery directly opposite the town. Lagny was fortified in the old-fashioned manner, with not very thick walls, and without a terreplain. Its position, however, and its command of the bridge, seemed to render an assault impossible, and De la Fin, who lay there with a garrison of twelve hundred French, had no fear for the security of the place. But Farnese, with the precision and celerity which characterized his movements on special occasions, had thrown pontoon bridges across the river three miles above, and sent a considerable force of Spanish and Walloon infantry to the other side. These troops were ordered to hold themselves ready for an assault, so soon as the batteries opposite should effect a practicable breach. The next day Henry, reconnoitring the scene, saw, with intense indignation, that he had been completely out-generalled. Lagny, the key to the Marne, by holding which he had closed the door on nearly all the food supplies for Paris, was about to be wrested from him. What should he do? Should he throw himself across the river and rescue the place before it fell? This was not to be thought of even by the audacious Béarnese. In the attempt to cross the river, under the enemy's fire, he was likely to lose a large portion of his army. Should he fling himself upon Renty's division which had so ostentatiously offered battle the day before? This at least might be attempted, although not so advantageously as would have been the case on the previous afternoon. To undertake this was the result of a rapid council of generals. It was too late. Renty held the hills so firmly entrenched and fortified that it was an idle hope to carry them by assault. He might hurl column after column against those heights, and pass the day in seeing his men mowed to the earth without result.

His soldiers, magnificent in the open field, could not be replied upon to carry

so strong a position by sudden storm, and there was no time to be lost. He felt the enemy a little. There was some small skirmishing, and while it was going on, Farnese opened a tremendous fire across the river upon Lagny. The weak walls soon crumbled, a breach was effected, the signal for assault was given, and the troops, posted on the other side, after a brief but sanguinary struggle, overcame all resistance, and were masters of the town. The whole garrison, twelve hundred strong, was butchered, and the city thoroughly sacked; for Farnese had been brought up in the old-fashioned school of Alva and Julian Romero and Commander Requesens.

Thus Lagny was seized before the eyes of Henry, who was forced to look helplessly on his great antagonist's triumph.<sup>2</sup> He had come forth in full panoply and abounding confidence to offer battle. He was foiled of his combat, and he had lost the prize. Never was blow more successfully parried, a counter-stroke more ingeniously planted. The bridges of Charenton and St. Maur now fell into Farnese's hands without a contest. In a incredible short space of time provisions and munitions were poured into the starving city, two thousand boat-loads arriving in a single day. Paris was relieved.<sup>3</sup> Alexander had made this demonstration, and solved the problem. He had left the Netherlands against his judgment, but he had at least accomplished his French work as none but he could have done it. The king was now in worse plight than ever.<sup>4</sup> His army fell to pieces.

<sup>1</sup> Coloma, *loc. cit.*

<sup>2</sup> Coloma, De Thou, Dondini, Bentivoglio, Meteren, *ubi sup.*

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>4</sup> „I dare assure you this king runneth as hard a fortune as ever he did in his life,” said Stafford, adding somewhat cynically, „If with his loss was lost nothing I would care but little, though somewhat for Christianity, but it maketh my heart bleed to think if the Spaniard grow here (as he beginneth to settle, and that deplier than I could ever have believed Frenchmen's hearts would have endured) what mischief



His cavaliers, cheated of their battle, and having neither food nor forage, rode off by hundreds every day. „Our state is such,” said Stafford, on the 16th September, „and so far unexpected and wonderful, that I am almost ashamed to write, because methinks everybody should think I dream. Myself seeing of it methinketh that I dream. For, my lord, to see an army such a one I think as I shall never see again—especially for horsemen and gentlemen—to take a mind to disband upon the taking of such a paltry thing as Lagny, a town no better indeed than Rochester, it is a thing so strange to me that seeing of it I can scarce believe it. They make their excuses of their want, which I know indeed is great—for there were few left with one penny in their purses—but yet that extremity could not be such but that they might have tarried ten days or fifteen at the most that the king desired of them . . . . From six thousand horse that we were and above, we are come to two thousand—and I do not see an end of our leave-takers, for those be hourly.

„The most I can see we can make account of to tarry are the Viscount Turenne’s troops, and Monsieur de Chatillon’s, and our Switzers, and Lansquenettes, which make very near five thousand. The first that went away, though he sent word to the king an hour before he would tarry, was the Count Soissons, by whose parting on a sudden and without leave-taking, we judge a discontentment.” 1

will follow to us; and therefore in the mean time, while they may be provided for. if there be not present order given to send men into Flanders to make a present retractive for the Prince of Parma, I do not only doubt, but I do assure myself that we shall not have leisure to tarry here, or expect the good that the helps out of Germany may bring hereafter.” Stafford to Burghley,

28 Aug. 1590. (S. P. Office MS.)

7 Sept.

1 Stafford to Burghley,  $\frac{6}{16}$  Sept. 1590.  
(S. P. Office MS.)

• The king’s army seemed fading into air. Making virtue of necessity he withdrew to St. Denis, and decided to disband his forces, reserving to himself only a flying camp with which to harass the enemy as often as opportunity should offer.

It must be confessed that the Béarnese had been thoroughly out-generalled. „It was not God’s will,” said Stafford, who had been in constant attendance upon Henry through the whole business; „we deserved it not; for the king might as easily have had Paris as drunk, four or five times. And at the last, if he had not committed those faults that children would not have done, only with the desire to fight and give the battle (which the other never meant), he had had it in the Duke of Parma’s sight as he took Lagny in ours.” 1 He had been foiled of the battle on which he had set his heart, and in which he felt confident of overthrowing the great captain of the age, and trampling the League under his feet. His capital just ready to sink exhausted into his hands had been wrested from his grasp, and was alive with new hope and new defiance. The League was triumphant, his own army scattering to the four winds. Even a man of high courage and sagacity might have been in despair. Yet never were the magnificent hopefulness, the wise audacity of Henry more signally manifested than now when he seemed most blundering and most forlorn. His hardy nature ever met disaster with so cheerful a smile as almost to perplex disaster herself.

Unwilling to relinquish his grip without a last effort, he resolved on a midnight assault upon Paris. Hoping that the joy at being relieved, the unwonted feasting which had succeeded the long fasting, and the consciousness of security from the presence of the combined armies of the victorious League, would throw garrison and citizens off their guard, he came into the neighbourhood of the

1 Ibid.

Faubourgs St. Jacques, St. Germain, St. Marcel, and St. Michel on the night of 9th September. A desperate effort was made to escalate the walls between St. Jacques and St. Germain. It was foiled, not by the soldiers nor the citizens, but by the sleepless Jesuits, who, as often before during this memorable siege, had kept guard on the ramparts, and who now gave the alarm. 1 The first assailants were hurled from their ladders, the city was roused, and the Duke of Nemours was soon on the spot, ordering burning pitch hoops, stones, and other missiles to be thrown down upon the invaders. The escalade was baffled; yet once more that night, just before dawn, the king in person renewed the attack on the Faubourg St. Germain. The faithful Stafford stood by his side in the trenches, and was witness to his cool determination, his indomitable hope. La Noue too was there, and was wounded in the leg—an accident the results of which were soon to cause much weeping through Christendom. 2 Had one of those garlands of blazing tar which all night had been fluttering from the walls of Paris alighted by chance on the king's head there might have been another history of France. The ladders, too, proved several feet too short, and there were too few of them. Had they been more numerous and longer, the tale might have been a different one. As it was, the king was forced to retire with the approaching daylight. 3

1 „Acudieron los primeros á la muralla los padres Jesuitas, guiados por el padre Francisco Xuarez Espanol,” &c. Coloma, iii. 51.

2 Meteren, *ubi sup.*

3 Coloma, Bentivoglio, Dondini, De Thou, Meteren, *ubi sup.* „The king to stay awhile, his troops together had an enterprise on Paris this day se'night at night, and, with some intelligence that he said he had in it which I could perceive no token of, had an enterprise to take it by escalade, and to that purpose had 6000 footmen and 1200 horse that passed the bridge that he had made at Gonfolar with boats. The king himself was in the enterprise, and I with him, and in the ditch with him, though when

The characteristics of the great commander of the Huguenots and of the Leaguers' chieftain respectively were well illustrated in several incidents of this memorable campaign. Farnese had been informed by scouts and spies of this intended assault by Henry on the walls of Paris. With his habitual caution he discredited the story. 1 Had he believed it, he might have followed the king in overwhelming force and taken him captive. The penalty of Henry's unparalleled boldness was thus remitted by Alexander's exuberant discretion.

Soon afterwards Farnese laid siege to Corbeil. This little place—owing to the extraordinary skill and determination of its commandant, Rigaut, and old Huguenot officer, who had fought with La Noue in Flanders—resisted for nearly four weeks. It was assaulted at last, Rigaut killed, the garrison of one thousand French soldiers put to the sword, and the town sacked. With the fall of Corbeil both the Seine and Marne were reopened. 2

Alexander then made a visit to Paris, where he was received with great enthusiasm. The legate, whose efforts and 29 August, whose money had so much 1590. contributed to the successful defence of the capital, had returned to Italy to participate in the election of a new pope. For the „Huguenot pope,” 3

he told me the manner I saw it impossible, yet I went with him because he should not say I was against it for fear. But when we came there our ladders were too short by five foot, the larme in the town an hour before and no word of any intelligence, and so we retired without Paris, which I dare assure you the king might have had above five times within these five months, but he is too good a king, and loveth his subjects too well that hate him deadly. There was upon the return of that enterprise no stay, but everybody would be gone, and the king, seeing that there was no remedy, gave them leave on promise of return.” Stafford to Burghley, Sept. <sup>6</sup>/<sub>16</sub> 1590. (S. P. Office MS.)

1 Coloma, iii. 51vo.

2 Coloma, iii. 51, *seqq.* Bentivoglio, Dondini, De Thou, Meteren, *ubi sup.*

3 „At Paris the pope is accounted a Hu-

Sixtus V., had died at the end of August, having never bestowed on the League any of his vast accumulated treasures to help it in its utmost need. It was not surprising that Philip was indignant, and had resorted to menace of various kinds against the holy father, when he found him swaying so perceptibly in the direction of the hated Béarnese. Of course when he died his complaint was believed to be Spanish poison. In those days, none but the very obscure were thought capable of dying natural deaths, and Philip was esteemed too consummate an artist to allow so formidable an adversary as Sixtus to pass away in God's time only. Certainly his death was hailed as matter of great rejoicing by the Spanish party in Rome, and as much ignominy bestowed upon his memory as if he had been heretic; while in Paris his decease was celebrated with bonfires and other marks of popular hilarity. 1

To circumvent the great Huguenot's reconciliation with the Roman Church was of course an indispensable portion of Philip's plan; for none could be so dull as not to perceive that the resistance of Paris to its heretic sovereign would cease to be very effective, so soon as the sovereign had ceased to be heretic. It was most important therefore that the successor of Sixtus should be the tool of Spain. The leading confederates were well aware of Henry's intentions to renounce the reformed faith, and to return to the communion of Rome whenever he could formally accomplish that measure. The crafty Béarnese knew full well that the road to Paris lay through the gates of Rome. Yet it is proof either of the privacy with which great public matters were then transacted,

or of the extraordinary powers of deceit with which Henry was gifted, that the leaders of protestantism were still hoodwinked in regard to his attitude. Notwithstanding the embassy of Luxembourg, and the many other indications of the king's intentions, Queen Elizabeth continued to regard him as the great champion of the reformed faith. She had just sent him an emerald, which she had herself worn, accompanied by the expression of her wish that the king in wearing it might never strike a blow without demolishing an enemy, and that in his farther progress he might put all his enemies to rout and confusion. „You will remind the king, too,” she added, „that the emerald has this virtue, never to break so long as faith remains entire and firm. 1

And the shrewd Stafford, who was in daily attendance upon him, informed his sovereign that there were no symptoms of wavering on Henry's part. „The Catholics here,” said he, „cry hard upon the king to be a Catholic or else that he is lost, and they would persuade him that for all their calling in the Spaniards, both Paris and all other towns will yield to him, if he will but assure them that he will become a Catholic. For my part, I think they would laugh at him when he had done so, and so I find he believeth the same, if he had mind to it, which I find no disposition in him unto it.” 2 The not very distant future was to show what the disposition of the bold Gascon really was in this great matter, and whether he was likely to reap nothing but ridicule from his apostasy, should it indeed become a fact. Meantime it was the opinion of the wisest sovereign in Europe, and of one

guenot.” Lyly to Walsingham, April <sup>2</sup>/<sub>12</sub> 1590. (S. P. Office MS.)

1 Stafford to Burghley, <sup>14</sup>/<sub>24</sub> Sept. 1590. (S. P. Office MS.) De Thou, t. xi. lib. 97 pp. 270-273.

1 „Vous ferez souvenir un roi que l'esmerade a ceste vertu de ne point rompre (a ce que l'on dict) tant que la foy demeure entiere et ferme.” Queen to the French Ambassador, „from Oatlands, on a Saturday night, after her coming from hunting.” 13 Aug. 1590. (S. P. Office MS.)

2 Stafford to Burghley, <sup>14</sup>/<sub>24</sub> Sept. 1590. Ibid.



of the most adroit among her diplomatists, that there was really nothing in the rumours as to the king's contemplated conversion.

It was, of course, unfortunate for Henry that his staunch friend and admirer Sixtus was no more. But English diplomacy could do but little in Rome, and men were trembling with apprehension lest that arch-enemy of Elizabeth, that devoted friend of Philip, the English Cardinal Allen, should be elected to the papal throne. „Great ado is made in Rome,” said Stafford, „by the Spanish ambassador, by all corruptions and ways that may be, to make a pope that must needs depend and be altogether at the King of Spain's devotion. If the princes of Italy put not their hands unto it, no doubt they will have their wills, and I fear greatly our villanous Allen, for, in my judgment, I can comprehend no man more with reason to be tied altogether to the King of Spain's will than he. I pray God send him either to God or the Devil first. An evil-minded Englishman, tied to the King of Spain by necessity, finding almost four millions of money, is a dangerous beast for a pope in this time.”<sup>1</sup>

Cardinal Allen was doomed to disappointment. His candidacy was not successful, and, after the brief reign—thirteen days long—of Urban VII., Sfondrato wore the triple tiara with the title of Gregory XIV. Before the year closed, that pontiff had issued a brief urging the necessity of extirpating heresy in France, and of electing a Catholic king, and asserting his determination to send to Paris—that bulwark of the Catholic faith—not empty words alone but troops, to be paid fifteen thousand crowns of gold each month, so long as the city should need assistance.<sup>2</sup> It was therefore probable that the great leader of the Huguenots, now that he had been defeated by Farnese, and that

his capital was still loyal to the League, would obtain less favour—however conscientiously he might instruct himself—from Gregory XIV. than he had begun to find in the eyes of Sixtus after the triumph of Ivry.

Parma refreshed his army by a fortnight's repose, and early in November determined on his return to the Netherlands. The Leaguers were aghast at his decision, and earnestly besought him to remain. But the duke had given them back their capital, and although this had been accomplished without much bloodshed in their army or his own, sickness was now making sad ravages among his troops, and there was small supply of food or forage for such large forces as had now been accumulated in the neighbourhood of Paris. Moreover, dissensions were breaking out between the Spaniards, Italians, and Netherlands of the relieving army with their French allies. The soldiers and peasants hated the foreigners who came there as victors, even although to assist the Leaguers in overthrowing the laws, government, and nationality of France. The stragglers and wounded on Farnese's march were killed by the country people in considerable numbers, and it was a pure impossibility for him longer to delay his return to the provinces which so much against his will he had deserted.

He marched back by way of Champagne rather than by that of Picardy, in order to deceive the king. Scarcely had he arrived in Champagne when he heard of the retaking of Lagny and Corbeil. So soon as his back was turned, the League thus showed its impotence to retain the advantage which his genius had won. Corbeil, which had cost him a month of hard work, was recaptured in two days. Lagny fell almost as quickly. Earnestly did the confederates implöre him to return to their rescue, but he declined almost contemptuously to retrace his steps. His march

<sup>1</sup> MS. letter last cited.

<sup>2</sup> De Thou, t. xi. lib. 97, p. 343.

was conducted in the same order and with the same precision which had marked his advance. Henry, with his flying camp, hung upon his track, harassing him now in front, now in rear, now in flank. None of the skirmishes were of much military importance. A single cavalry combat, however, in which old Marshal Biron was nearly surrounded and was in imminent danger of death or capture, until chivalrously rescued by the king in person at the head of a squadron of lancers, will always possess romantic interest. 1 In a subsequent encounter, near Baroges on the Vesle, Henry had sent Biron forward with a few companies of horse to engage some five hundred carabineers of Farnese on their march towards the frontier, and had himself followed close upon the track with his usual eagerness to witness or participate in every battle. Suddenly Alphonse Corse, who rode at Henry's side, pointed out to him, not more than a hundred paces off, an officer wearing a felt hat, a great ruff, and a little furred cassock, mounted on a horse without armour or caparisons, galloping up and down and brandishing his sword at the carabineers to compel them to fall back. This was the Duke of Parma, and thus the two great champions of the Huguenots and of the Leaguers—the two foremost captains of the age—had met face to face. 2 At that moment La Noue, riding up, in-

1 Bentivoglio. P. II. lib. v. 348. 349. Dondini, ii. 363, *seqq.* Coloma, iii. 52, *seqq.* Report of the King's actions by Grimstone, 23—28 Nov. 1590. (S. P. Office MS.)

2 Grimstone's letter. MS. last cited. Compare Coloma, Dondini, Bentivoglio, *ubi sup.*

formed the king that he had seen the whole of the enemy's horse and foot in battle array, and Henry, suspecting the retreat of Farnese to be a feint for the purpose of luring him on with his small force to an attack, gave orders to retire as soon as possible. 1

At Guise, on the frontier, the duke parted with Mayenne, leaving with him an auxiliary force of four thousand foot and five hundred horse, which he could ill spare. He then returned to Brussels, which city he reached on the 4th

4 Dec. December, filling every hotel 1590. and hospital with his sick soldiers, and having left one-third of his numbers behind him. He had manifested his own military skill in the adroit and successful manner in which he had accomplished the relief of Paris, while the barrenness of the result from the whole expedition vindicated the political sagacity with which he had remonstrated against his sovereign's infatuation.

Paris, with the renewed pressure on its two great arteries at Lagny and Corbeil, soon fell into as great danger as before; the obedient Netherlands during the absence of Farnese had been sinking rapidly to ruin, while, on the other hand, great progress and still greater preparations in aggressive warfare had been made by the youthful general and stadholder of the Republic. 2

1 Ibid.

2 Coloma, Dondini, Bentivoglio, *ubi sup.* De Thou, t. xi. lib. p. 97, 205, *seqq.* Lo succedido, &c. (Arch. de Sim. MS.) Parma to Philip, 3 and 21 Oct. 1590.—Ibid. Same to same, 19 Nov. 1590.—Ibid. Same to same, 28 Nov. 1590.—Ibid. Same to same, 31 Dec. 1590.—Ibid.

## CHAPTER XXIV.

Prince Maurice—State of the Republican army—Martial science of the period—Reformation of the military system by Prince Maurice—His military genius—Campaign in the Netherlands—The fort and town of Zutphen taken by the States' forces—Attack upon Deventer—Its capitulation—Advance on Groningen, Delfzyl, Opslag, Yementil, Steenwyck, and other places—Farnese besieges Fort Knodsenburg—Prince

Maurice hastens to its relief—A skirmish ensues resulting in the discomfiture of the Spanish and Italian troops—Surrender of Hulst and Nymegen—Close of military operations of the year

WHILE the events revealed in the last chapter had been occupying the energies of Farnese and the resources of his

sovereign, there had been ample room for Prince Maurice to mature his projects, and to make a satisfactory beginning in the field. Although Alexander had returned to the Netherlands before the end of the year 1590, and did not set forth on his second French campaign until late in the following year, yet the condition of his health, the exhaustion of his funds, and the dwindling of his army, made it impossible for him to render any effectual opposition to the projects of the youthful general.

For the first time Maurice was ready to put his theories and studies into practice on an extensive scale. Compared with modern armaments, the warlike machinery to be used for liberating the republic from its foreign oppressors would seem almost diminutive. But the science and skill of a commander are to be judged by the results he can work out with the materials within reach. His progress is to be measured by a comparison with the progress of his contemporaries—coheirs with him of what Time had thus far bequeathed.

The regular army of the republic, as reconstructed, was but then thousand foot and two thousand horse, but it was capable of being largely expanded by the trainbands of the cities, well disciplined and enured to hardship, and by the levies of German reiters and other foreign auxiliaries in such numbers as could be paid for by the hard-pressed exchequer of the provinces.

To the state-council, according to its original constitution, belonged the levying and disbanding of troops, the conferring of military offices, and the supervision of military operations by sea and land. It was its duty to see that all officers made oath of allegiance to the United Provinces.

The course of Leicester's administration, and especially the fatal treason of Stanley and of York, made it seem important for the true lovers of their

country to wrest from the state-council, where the English had two seats, all political and military power. And this, as has been seen, was practically but illegally accomplished. The silent revolution by which at this epoch all the main attributes of government passed into the hands of the States-General—acting as a league of sovereignties—has already been indicated. The period during which the council exercised functions conferred on it by the States-General themselves was brief and evanescent. The jealousy of the separate provinces soon prevented the state-council—a supreme executive body entrusted with the general defence of the commonwealth—from causing troops to pass into or out of one province or another without a patent from his Excellency the Prince, not as chief of the whole army, but as governor and captain-general of Holland, or Gelderland, or Utrecht, as the case might be.

The highest military office in the Netherlands was that of captain-general or supreme commander. This quality was from earliest times united to that of stadholder, who stood, as his title implied, in the place of the reigning sovereign, whether count, duke, king, or emperor. After the foundation of the Republic this dynastic form, like many others, remained, and thus Prince Maurice was at first only captain-general of Holland and Zeeland, and subsequently of Gelderland, Utrecht, and Overijssel, after he had been appointed stadholder of those three provinces in 1590 on the death of Count Nieuwenaar. However much in reality he was general-in-chief of the army, he never in all his life held the appointment of captain-general of the Union.

To obtain a captain's commission in the army, it was necessary to have served four years, while three years' service was the necessary preliminary to the post of lieutenant or ensign. Three candidates were presented by the pro-



vince for each office, from whom the stadholder appointed one. The commissions, except those of the highest commanders, were made out in the name of the States-General, by advice and consent of the council of state. The oath of allegiance, exacted from soldiers as well as officers, mentioned the name of the particular province to which they belonged, as well as that of the States-General. <sup>1</sup> It thus appeared that, especially after Maurice's first and successful campaigns, the supreme authority over the army really belonged to the States-General, and that the powers of the state-council in this regard fell, in the course of four years, more and more into the back-ground, and at last disappeared almost entirely. During the active period of the war, however, the effect of this revolution was in fact rather a greater concentration of military power than its dispersion, for the States-General meant simply the province of Holland. Holland was the republic.

The organization of the infantry was

<sup>1</sup> For example, the oath for a soldier of Holland was:—I promise and swear to the States-General of the United Netherlands who remain by the Union, and by the maintenance of the reformed religion, and also to the knights, nobles, and regents (magistrates), of the countship and province of Holland representing the States of said province, and therewith to the States of the other provinces in which I may be employed, and also to the regents of the cities as well within as without the province of Holland where I may be placed in garrison to be faithful and true. See *Journal van Anthonis Duyck* (1591—1602): uitgegeven op Last van het Departement van Oorlog, met Inleiding en Aanteekeningen door Lodewijk Mulder, Kapitein der Infanterie. 's Gravenhage Martinus Nyhoff, 1862, pp. xlv. xlvii. All lovers of Dutch history must sincerely rejoice that this valuable contemporary manuscript is at last in course of publication, and that it is in the hands of so accomplished and able an editor. I am under the deepest obligations to Captain Mulder for the information derived, in regard to the military history of this epoch in the Netherlands, from his learned and lucid introduction, and in drawing largely and almost exclusively from this source in the first part of the present chapter, I desire to express my thanks in the warmest manner.

very simple. The tactical unit was the company. A temporary combination of several companies made a regiment, commanded by a colonel or lieutenant-colonel, but for such regiments there was no regular organization. Sometimes six or seven companies were thus combined, sometimes three times that number, but the strength of a force, however large, was always estimated by the number of companies, not of regiments. <sup>1</sup>

The normal strength of an infantry company, at the beginning of Maurice's career, may be stated at one hundred and thirteen, commanded by one captain, one lieutenant, one ensign, and by the usual non-commissioned officers. Each company was composed of musketeers, harquebusseers, pikemen, halberdeers, and buckler-men. Long after portable firearms had come into use, the greater portion of foot soldiers continued to be armed with pikes, until the introduction of the fixed bayonet enabled the musketeer to do likewise the duty of pikeman. Maurice was among the first to appreciate the advantage of portable firearms, and he accordingly increased the proportion of soldiers armed with the musket in his companies. In a company of a hundred and thirteen, including officers, he had sixty-four armed with firelocks to thirty carrying pikes and halberds. As before his time the proportion between the arms had been nearly even, he thus more than doubled the number of firearms. <sup>2</sup>

Of these weapons there were two sorts, the musket and the harquebus. The musket was a long, heavy, unmanageable instrument. When fired it was placed upon an iron gaffle or fork, which the soldier carried with him, and stuck before him into the ground. The bullets of the musket were twelve to the pound. <sup>3</sup>

The harquebus—or hak-bus, hook-

<sup>1</sup> Mulder, *Inleiding*, l. li.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.* li. lii.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.* liv.

gun, so called because of the hook in the front part of the barrel to give steadiness in firing—was much lighter, was discharged from the hand, and carried bullets of twenty-four to the pound. Both weapons had matchlocks. 1

The pike was eighteen feet long at least, and pikemen as well as halberds-men carried rapiers. 2

There were three buckler-men to each company, introduced by Maurice for the personal protection of the leader of the company. The prince was often attended by one himself, and, on at least one memorable occasion, was indebted to this shield for the preservation of his life. 3

The cavalry was divided into lancers and carabineers. The unit was the squadron, varying in number from sixty to one hundred and fifty, until the year 1591, when the regular complement of the squadron was fixed at one hundred and twenty. 4

As the use of cavalry on the battlefield at that day, or at least in the Netherlands, was not in rapidity of motion, nor in severity of shock—the attack usually taking place on a trot—Maurice gradually displaced the lance in favour of the carbine. 5 His troopers thus became rather mounted infantry than regular cavalry.

The carbine was at least three feet long, with wheellocks, and carried bullets of thirty to the pound. 6

The artillery was a peculiar organization. It was a guild of citizens, rather than a strictly military force like the cavalry and infantry. The arm had but just begun to develop itself, and it was cultivated as a special trade by the guild of the holy Barbara existing in all the principal cities. Thus a municipal artillery gradually organized itself, under the direction of the gun-masters (bus-meesters), who in secret laboured at the perfection of their art, and who

taught it to their apprentices and journeymen, as the principles of other crafts were conveyed by master to pupil. This system furnished a powerful element of defence at a period when every city had in great measure to provide for its own safety." 1

In the earlier campaigns of Maurice three kinds of artillery were used; the whole cannon (kartow) of forty-eight pounds; the half-cannon, or twenty-four pounder; and the field-piece carrying a ball of twelve pounds. The two first were called battering pieces or siege-guns. All the guns were of bronze. 2

The length of the whole cannon was about twelve feet; its weight one hundred and fifty times that of the ball, or about seven thousand pounds. It was reckoned that the whole kartow could fire from eighty to one hundred shots in an hour. Wet hair cloths were used to cool the piece after every ten or twelve discharges. The usual charge was twenty pounds of powder. 3

The whole gun was drawn by thirty-one horses. the half cannon by twenty-three. 4

The field-piece required eleven horses. but a regular field artillery, as an integral part of the army, did not exist, and was introduced in much later times. In the greatest pitched battle ever fought by Maurice, that of Nieuport, he had but six field-pieces 5

The prince also employed mortars in his sieges, from which were thrown grenades, hot shot, and stones; but no greater distance was reached than six hundred yards. Bomb-shells were not often used although they had been known for a century. 6

Before the days of Maurice a special education for engineers had never been contemplated. Persons who had privately acquired a knowledge of fortification and similar branches of the science were employed upon occasion, but regular

1 Mulder, *Inleiding*, liv.-lix.

2 *Ibid.*

3 *Ibid.*

4 *Ibid.*

5 *Ibid.*

6 *Ibid.*

1 *Ibid.* lix.-lxxiv.

2 *Ibid.*

3 *Ibid.*

4 *Ibid.*

5 *Ibid.*

6 *Ibid.*

corps of engineers there were none. The prince established a course of instruction in this profession at the University of Leyden, according to a system drawn up by the celebrated Stevinus." 1

Doubtless the most important innovation of the prince, and the one which required the most energy to enforce, was the use of the spade. His soldiers were jeered at by the enemy as mere boors and day labourers who were dishonouring themselves and their profession by the use of that implement instead of the sword. Such a novelty was a shock to all the military ideas of the age, and it was only the determination and vigour of the prince and of his cousin Lewis William that ultimately triumphed over the universal prejudice. 2

The pay of the common soldier varied from ten to twenty florins the month, but every miner had eighteen florins, and, when actually working in the mines, thirty florins monthly. Soldiers used in digging trenches received, over and above their regular pay, a daily wage of from ten to fifteen stuyvers, or nearly a shilling sterling. 3

Another most wholesome improvement made by the prince was in the payment of his troops. The system prevailing in every European country at that day, by which Governments were defrauded and soldiers starved, was most infamous. The soldiers were paid through the captain, who received the wages of a full company, when perhaps not one-third of the names on the muster-roll were living human beings. Accordingly two-thirds of all the money stuck to the officer's fingers, and it was not thought a disgrace to cheat the Government by dressing and equipping for the day a set of ragamuffins, caught up in the streets for the purpose, and made to pass muster as regular soldiers. 4

These *passe-volants*, or scarecrows,

were passed freely about from one company to another, and the indecency of the fraud was never thought a disgrace to the colours of the company.

Thus, in the Armada year, the queen had demanded that a portion of her auxiliary force in the Netherlands should be sent to England. The States agreed that three thousand of these English troops together with a few cavalry companies, should go, but stipulated that two thousand should remain in the provinces. The queen accepted the proposal, but when the two thousand had been counted out it appeared that there was scarcely a man left for the voyage to England. Yet every one of the English captains had claimed full pay for his company from her Majesty's exchequer. 1

Against this tide of speculation and corruption the strenuous Maurice set himself with heart and soul, and there is no doubt that to his reformation in this vital matter much of his military success was owing. It is impossible that roguery and venality should ever furnish a solid foundation for the martial science.

To the student of military history the campaigns and sieges of Maurice, and especially the earlier ones, are of great importance. There is no doubt whatever, that the youth who now, after deep study and careful preparation, was measuring himself against the first captains of the age, was founding the great modern school of military science. It was in this Netherland academy, and under the tuition of its consummate professor, that the commanders of the seventeenth century not only acquired the rudiments, but perfected themselves in the higher walks of their art. Therefore the siege operations, in which all that been invented by modern genius or rescued from the oblivion which had gathered over ancient lore during the more vulgar and commonplace practice of the mercenary commanders of the day

1 Mulder, lxxiv.-lxxix.

2 Reynd, ix. 180, *seqq.*

3 Mulder, *ubi sup.*

4 Ibid. xciv. xcv.

1 Ibid. xcix.



was brought into successful application, must always engage the special attention of the military student.

To the general reader, more interested in marking the progress of civilization and the advance of the people in the path of development and true liberty, the spectacle of the young stadholder's triumphs has an interest of another kind. At the moment when a thorough practical soldier was most needed by the struggling little commonwealth, to enable it to preserve liberties partially secured by its unparalleled sacrifices of blood and treasure during a quarter of a century, and to expel the foreign invader from the soil which he had so long profaned, it was destined that a soldier should appear.

Spade in hand, with his head full of Roman castrametation and geometrical problems, a prince, scarce emerged from boyhood, presents himself on that stage where grizzled Mansfelds, drunken Hohenlos, and truculent Verdugos have been so long enacting that artless military drama which consists of hard knocks and wholesale massacres. The novice is received with universal hilarity. But although the machinery of war varies so steadily from age to age that a commonplace commander of to-day, rich in the spoils of preceding time, might vanquish the Alexanders, and Cæsars, and Frederics, with their antiquated enginry, yet the moral stuff out of which great captains, great armies, great victories are created, is the simple material it was in the days of Sesostris or Cyrus. The moral and physiological elements remain essentially the same as when man first began to walk up and down the earth and destroy his fellow-creatures.

To make an army a thorough mowing-machine, it then seemed necessary that it should be disciplined into complete mechanical obedience. To secure this, prompt payment of wages and inexorable punishment of delinquencies were in-

dispensable. Long arrearsages were now converting Farnese's veterans into systematic marauders; for unpaid soldiers in every age and country have usually degenerated into highwaymen, and it is an impossibility for a sovereign, with the strictest intentions, to persist in starving his soldiers and in killing them for feeding themselves. In Maurice's little army, on the contrary, there were no back-wages and no thieving. At the siege of Delfzyl Maurice hung two of his soldiers for stealing, the one a hat and the other a poniard, from the townsfolk, after the place had capitulated. 1 At the siege of Hulst he ordered another to be shot, before the whole camp, for robbing a woman. 2 This seems sufficiently harsh, but war is not a pastime nor a very humane occupation. The result was, that robbery disappeared, and it is better for all that enlisted men should be soldiers rather than thieves. To secure the ends which alone can justify war—and if the Netherlanders engaged in defending national existence and human freedom against foreign tyranny were not justifiable, then a just war has never been waged—a disciplined army is vastly more humane in its operations than a band of brigands. Swift and condign punishment by the law-martial for even trifling offences, in the best means of discipline yet devised.

To bring to utmost perfection the machinery already in existence, to encourage invention, to ponder the past with a practical application to the present, to court fatigue, to scorn pleasure, to concentrate the energies on the work in hand, to cultivate quickness of eye and calmness of nerve in the midst of danger, to accelerate movements, to economise blood even at the expense of time, to strive after ubiquity and omniscience in the details of person and place, these were the characteristics of

1 Reyd, ix. 171.

2 Van der Kemp, 112.

Maurice, and they have been the prominent traits of all commanders who have stamped themselves upon their age. Although his method of war-making differed as far as possible from that of the Béarnese, yet the two had one quality in common, personal insensibility to fear. But in the case of Henry, to confront danger for its own sake was in itself a pleasure, while the calmer spirit of Maurice did not so much seek the joys of the combat as refuse to desist from scientific combinations in the interests of his personal safety. Very frequently, in the course of his early campaigns, the prince was formally and urgently requested by the States-General not to expose his life so recklessly, and before he had passed his twenty-fifth year he had received wounds which, but for fortunate circumstances, would have proved mortal, because he was unwilling to leave special operations on which much was depending to other eyes than his own. The details of his campaigns are, of necessity, the less interesting to a general reader from their very completeness. Desultory or semi-civilized warfare, where the play of the human passions is distinctly visible, where individual man, whether in buff jerkin or Milan coat of proof, meets his fellow man in close mortal combat, where men starve by thousands or are massacred by town-falls, where hamlets or villages blaze throughout whole districts or are sunk beneath the ocean—scenes of rage, hatred, vengeance, self-sacrifice, patriotism, where all the virtues and vices of which humanity is capable stride to and fro in their most violent colours and most colossal shape—where man in a moment rises almost to divinity, or sinks beneath the beasts of the field—such tragical records of which the sanguinary story of mankind is full—and no portion of them more so than the *Netherland chronicles*—appeal more vividly to the imagination than the neatest solution of mathematical problems. Yet

if it be the legitimate end of military science to accomplish its largest purposes at the least expense of human suffering; if it be progress in civilization to acquire by scientific combination what might be otherwise attempted, and perhaps vainly attempted, by infinite carnage, then is the professor with his diagrams, standing unmoved amid danger, a more truly heroic image than *Cœur-de-Lion* with his battle-axe, or *Alva* with his truncheon.

The system—then a new one—which Maurice introduced to sustain that little commonwealth from sinking of which he had become at the age of seventeen the predestined chief, was the best under the circumstances that could have been devised. Patriotism the most passionate, the most sublime, had created the republic. To maintain its existence against perpetual menace required the exertion of perpetual skill.

Passionless as algebra, the genius of Maurice was ready for the task. Strategic points of immense value, important cities and fortresses, vital river-courses and communications—which foreign tyranny had acquired during the tragic past with a patient iniquity almost without a parallel, and which patriotism had for years vainly struggled to recover—were the earliest trophies and prizes of his art. But the details of his victories may be briefly indicated, for they have none of the picturesqueness of crime. The sieges of *Naarden*, *Harlem*, *Leyden*, were tragedies of maddening interest, but the recovery of *Zutphen*, *Deventer*, *Nymegen*, *Groningen*, and many other places—all important though they were—was accomplished with the calmness of a consummate player, who throws down on the table the best half-dozen invincible cards which it thus becomes superfluous to play.

There were several courses open to the prince before taking the field. It was desirable to obtain control of the line of the *Waal*, by which that heart

of the republic—Holland—would be made entirely secure. To this end, Gertruydenberg—lately surrendered to the enemy by the perfidy of the Englishman Wingfield, to whom it had been entrusted—Bois le Duc, and Nymegen were to be wrested from Spain.

It was also important to hold the Yssel, the course of which river led directly through the United Netherlands, quite to the Zuyder Zee, cutting off Friesland, Groningen, and Gelderland from their sister provinces of Holland and Zeeland. And here again the keys to this river had been lost by English treason. The fort of Zutphen and the city of Deventer had been transferred to the Spaniard by Roland Yorke and Sir William Stanley, 1 in whose honour the republic had so blindly confided, and those cities it was necessary to reduce by regular siege before the communications between the eastern and western portions of the little commonwealth could ever be established.

Still farther in the ancient Frisian depths, the memorable treason of that native Netherlander, the high-born Renneberg, had opened the way for the Spaniard's foot into the city of Groningen. Thus this whole important province—with its capital—long subject to the foreign oppressor, was garrisoned with his troops.

Verdugo, a veteran officer of Portuguese birth, who had risen from the position of hostler 2 to that of colonel and royal stadholder, commanded in Friesland. He had in vain demanded reinforcements and supplies from Farnese, who most reluctantly was obliged to refuse them in order that he might obey his master's commands to neglect everything for the sake of the campaign in France.

And Verdugo, stripped of all adequate forces to protect his important province, was equally destitute of means for feeding

the troops that were left to him. „I hope to God that I may do my duty to the king and your highness,” he cried, „but I find myself sold up and pledged to such an extent that I am poorer than when I was a soldier at four crowns a month. And every body in the town is as desperate as myself. 1

Maurice, after making a feint of attacking Gertruydenberg and Bois le Duc, so that Farnese felt compelled, with considerable difficulty, to strengthen the garrison of those places, came unexpectedly to Arnhem with a force of nine thousand foot and sixteen hundred horse. He had previously and with great secrecy sent some companies of infantry under Sir Francis Vere to Doesburg.

On the 23d May (1591) five peasants 23 May, and six peasant women made 1591. their appearance at dawn of day before the chief guard-house of the great fort in the Bad meadow (Veluwe), opposite Zutphen, on the west side of the Yssel. It was not an unusual occurrence. These boors and their wives had brought baskets of eggs, butter, and cheese, for the garrison, and they now set themselves quietly down on the ground before the gate, waiting for the soldiers of the garrison to come out and traffic with them for their supplies. Very soon several of the guard made their appearance, and began to chaffer with the peasants,—when suddenly one of the women plucked a pistol from under her petticoats and shot dead the soldier who was cheapening her eggs. The rest of the party, transformed in an instant from boors to soldiers, then sprang upon the rest of the guard, overpowered and bound them, and took possession of the gate. A considerable force, which had been placed in ambush by Prince Maurice near the spot, now rushed forward, and in a few minutes the great fort of Zutphen was mastered by the States' forces

1 Vol. II. of this work, chap. xiii.

2 Reynd, ix. 172.

1 Groen v. Prinsterer. (Archives, &c., II. Serie i. 128.)



without the loss of a man. It was a neat and perfectly successful stratagem. 1

Next day Maurice began the regular investment of the city. On the 26th, Count Lewis William arrived with some Frisian companies. On the 27th, Maurice threw a bridge of boats

from the Bad-meadow side, <sup>24 May.</sup> across the river to the Weert before the city. On the 28th he had got batteries, mounting thirty-two guns, into position, commanding the place at three points. On the 30th the town capitulated. Thus within exactly <sup>30 May.</sup>

one week from the firing of the pistol shot by the supposed butterwoman, this fort and town, which had so long resisted the efforts of the States, and were such important possessions of the Spaniards, fell into the hands of Maurice. The terms of surrender were easy. The city being more important than its garrison, the soldiers were permitted to depart with bag and baggage. The citizens were allowed three days to decide whether to stay under loyal obedience to the States-General, or to take their departure. Those who chose to remain were to enjoy all the privileges of citizens of the United Provinces. 2

But very few substantial citizens were left, for such had been the tyranny, the misery, and the misrule during the long occupation by a foreign soldiery of what was once a thriving Dutch town, that scarcely anybody but paupers and vagabonds were left. One thousand houses were ruined and desolate. It is superfluous to add that the day of its restoration to the authority of the Union was the beginning of its renewed prosperity.

Maurice, having placed a national garrison in the place, marched the same evening straight upon Deventer, seven miles farther down the river, without pausing to <sup>30 May.</sup> sleep upon his victory. His artillery

and munitions were sent rapidly down the Yssel.

Within five days he had thoroughly invested the city, and brought twenty-eight guns to bear upon the weakest part of its defences.

It was a large, populous, well-built town, once a wealthy member of the Hanseatic League, full of fine buildings, both public and private, the capital of the rich and fertile province of Overijssel, and protected by a strong wall and moat—as well-fortified a place as could be found in the Netherlands. 1 The garrison consisted of fourteen hundred Spaniards and Walloons, under the command of Count Herman van den Berg, first cousin of Prince Maurice.

No sooner had the States army come before the city than a Spanish captain observed—„We shall now have a droll siege—cousins on the outside, cousins on the inside. There will be a sham fight or two, and then the cousins will make it up, and arrange matters to suit themselves.” 2

Such hints had deeply wounded Van den Berg, who was a fervent Catholic, and as loyal a servant to Philip II. as he could have been, had that monarch deserved, by the laws of nature and by his personal services and virtues, to govern all the swamps of Friesland. He slept on the gibe, having ordered all the colonels and captains of the garrison to attend at solemn mass in the great church the next morning. He there declared to them all publicly that he felt outraged at the suspicions concerning his fidelity, and after mass he took the sacrament, solemnly swearing never to give up the city or even to speak of it until he had made such resistance that he must be carried from the breach. So long as he could stand or sit he would defend the city entrusted to his care. 3

The whole council who had come

1 Meteren, xv. 298. Bor, III. xxviii. 560, 562.

2 Bor, Meteren, *ubi sup.* Duyck, 6-14.

1 Guicciardini, *in voce*.

2 Reyd, ix. 169.

3 Ibid.

from Zutphen to Maurice's camp were allowed to deliberate concerning the siege. The enemy had been seen hovering about the neighbourhood in considerable numbers, but had not ventured an attempt to throw reinforcements into the place. Many of the counsellors argued against the siege. It was urged that the resistance would be determined and protracted, and that the Duke of Parma was sure to take the field in person to relieve so important a city, before its reduction could be effected.

But Maurice had thrown a bridge across the Yssel above and another below the town, had carefully and rapidly taken measures in the success of which he felt confident, and now declared that it would be cowardly and shameful to abandon an enterprise so well begun.

The city had been formally summoned to surrender, and a calm but most decided refusal had been returned.

9 June; On the 9th June the batteries began playing, and after 1591. four thousand six hundred shots a good breach had been effected in the defences along the Kaye—an earthen work lying between two strong walls of masonry.

The breach being deemed practicable, a storm was ordered. To reach the Kaye it was necessary to cross a piece of water called the Haven, over which a pontoon bridge was hastily thrown. There was now a dispute among the English, Scotch, and Netherlanders for precedence in the assault. It was ultimately given to the English, in order that the bravery of that nation might now on the same spot wipe out the disgrace inflicted upon its name by the treason of Sir William Stanley. The English did their duty well, and rushed forward merrily, but the bridge proved too short. Some sprang over and pushed boldly for the breach. Some fell into the moat and were drowned. Others, sustained by the Netherlanders under

Solms, Meetkerke, and Brederode, effected their passage by swimming, leaping, or wading, so that a resolute attack was made. Herman van den Berg met them in the breach at the head of seven companies. The defenders were most ferocious in their resistance. They were also very drunk. The count had placed many casks of Rhenish and of strong beer within reach, and ordered his soldiers to drink their fill as they fought. 1 He was himself as vigorous in his potations as he was chivalrous with sword and buckler. Two pages and two lieutenants fell at his side, but still he fought at the head of his men with a desperation worthy of his vow, until he fell wounded in the eye and was carried from the place. Notwithstanding this disaster to the commander of the town, the assailants were repulsed, losing two hundred and twenty-five in killed and wounded—Colonel Meetkerke and his brother, two most valuable Dutch officers, among them. 2

During the whole of the assault, a vigorous cannonade had been kept up upon other parts of the town, and houses and church-towers were toppling down in all directions. Meanwhile the

1 Reyd, ix. 169.

2 Ibid. Bor. III. xxviii. 563, 564. Meteren, xvi. 298. Duyck, 20, 21. Colonel Nicolas Meetkerke died of his wounds in this assault. He was less than thirty years of age, but already a veteran soldier, and had distinguished himself in the English-Dutch expedition, under Essex, against Portugal in 1587. His elder brother Anthony had been killed before Zutphen fort in 1586. His two younger brothers Baldwin and Adolph, were both in the army. Adolph was shot through the body in this same storming party in which Nicolas was killed, but seems to have recovered. They were the sons of Adolph Meetkerke, formerly president of Flanders, who, on account of his participation in Leicester's attempt upon Leyden (see vol. II. of this work, chap. xvii.) was a refugee in England. See Mulder's note to Duyck, p. 20.

How much does the brief martial record of these four brothers in this war of Dutch Burghers for national existence remind us of the simple but heroic annals of many a family of our own countrymen in the great war now waging for the same object! (1863.)

inhabitants—for it was Sunday—instead of going to service were driven towards the breach by the serjeant-major, a truculent Spaniard, next in command to Van den Berg, who ran about the place with a great stick, summoning the Dutch burghers to assist the Spanish garrison on the wall. 1 It was thought afterwards that this warrior would have been better occupied among the soldiers, at the side of his commander.

A chivalrous incident in the open field occurred during the assault. A gigantic Albanian cavalry officer came prancing out of Deventer into the spaces between the trenches, defying any officer in the States' army to break a lance with him. Prince Maurice forbade any acceptance of the challenge, but Lewis van der Cathulle, son of the famous Ryhove of Ghent, unable to endure the taunts and bravado of this champion, at last obtained permission to encounter him in single combat. They met accordingly with much ceremony, tilted against each other, and shivered their lances in good style, but without much effect. The Albanian then drew a pistol. Cathulle had no weapon save a cutlass, but with this weapon he succeeded in nearly cutting off the hand which held the pistol. He then took his enemy prisoner, the vainglorious challenger throwing his gold chain around his conqueror's neck in token of his victory. Prince Maurice caused his wound to be bound up and then liberated him, sending him into the city with a message to the governor. 2

During the following night the bridge, over which the assailants had nearly forced their way into the town, was vigorously attacked by the garrison, but Count Lewis William, in person, with a chosen band, defended it stoutly till morning, beating back the Spaniards with heavy loss in a sanguinary midnight contest. 3

Next morning there was a unanimous outcry on the part of the besieged for a capitulation. It was obvious June 10, that, with the walls shot to 1591. ruins as they had been, the place was no longer tenable against Maurice's superior forces. A trumpet was sent to the prince before the dawn of day, and on the 10th of June, accordingly, the place capitulated. 1

It was arranged that the garrison should retire with arms and baggage whithersoever they chose. Van den Berg stipulated nothing in favour of the citizens, whether through forgetfulness or spite does not distinctly appear. But the burghers were received like brothers. No plunder was permitted, no ransom demanded, and the city took its place among its sisterhood of the United Provinces. 2 Van den Berg himself was received at the prince's head-quarters with much cordiality. He was quite blind; but his wound seemed to be the effect of exterior contusions, and he ultimately recovered the sight of one eye. There was much free conversation between himself and his cousins during the brief interval in which he was their guest.

„I've often told Verdugo," said he, „that the States had no power to make a regular siege, nor to come with proper artillery into the field, and he agreed with me. But we were both wrong, for I now see the contrary."

To which Count Lewis William replied with a laugh: „My dear cousin, I've observed that in all your actions you were in the habit of despising us Beggars, and I have said that you would one day draw the shortest straw in consequence. I'm glad to hear this avowal from your own lips."

Herman attempted no reply but let the subject drop, seeming to regret having said so much. 3

1 Bor, *ubi sup.* Meteren, *ubi sup.*  
Duyck, 20-25. Parma to Philip, 10 June, 1591.  
(Arch. de Sim. MS.) 2 Ibid.

3 Reynd, *ubi sup.*

1 Reynd, *ubi sup.*

2 Meteren, *ubi sup.*

3 Bor, *ubi sup.*



Soon afterwards he was forwarded by Maurice in his own coach to Ulff, where he was attended by the prince's body physician till he was re-established in health. 1

Thus within ten days of his first appearance before its walls, the city of Deventer, and with it a whole province, had fallen into the hands of Maurice. It began to be understood that the young pedant knew something about his profession, and that he had not been fagging so hard at the science of war for nothing. 2

The city was in a sorry plight when the States took possession of it. As at Zutphen, the substantial burghers had wandered away, and the foreign soldiers bivouacing there so long had turned the stately old Hanseatic city into a brick and mortar wilderness. Hundreds of houses had been demolished by the garrison, that the iron might be sold and the woodwork burned for fuel; for the enemy had conducted himself as if feeling in his heart that the occupation could not be a permanent one, and as if desirous to make the place as desolate as possible for the Beggars when they should return. 3

The dead body of the traitor Yorke, who had died and been buried in Deventer, was taken from the tomb, after the capture of the city, and with the vulgar ferocity so characteristic of the times, was hung, coffin and all, on the gibbet for the delectation of the States' soldiery. 4

Maurice, having thus in less than three weeks recovered two most important cities, paused not an instant in

his career but moved at once on Groningen. There was a strong pressure put upon him to attempt the capture of Nymegen, but the understanding with the Frisian stadholder and his troops had been that the enterprise upon Groningen should follow the reduction of Deventer.

On the 26th June Maurice appeared before Groningen. Next day, 26 June, 1591, as a precautionary step, he moved to the right and attacked the strong city of Delfzyl. This place capitulated to him on the 2nd July. The fort of Opslag surrendered on the 7th July. He then moved to the west of Groningen, and attacked the forts of Yementil and Lettebaest, which fell into his hands on the 11th July. He then moved along the Nyenoort through the Seven Wolds and Drenthe to Steenwyk, before which strongly fortified city he arrived on the 15th July. 1

Meantime, he received intercepted letters from Verdugo to the Duke of Parma, dated 19th June from Groningen. In these, the Spanish stadholder informed Farnese that the enemy was hovering about his neighbourhood, and that it would be necessary for the duke to take the field in person in considerable force, or that Groningen would be lost, and with it the Spanish forces in the province. He enclosed a memorial of the course proper to be adopted by the duke for his relief. 2

Notwithstanding the strictness by which Philip had tied his great general's hands, Farnese felt the urgency of the situation. 3 By the end of June, accordingly, although full of his measures for marching to the relief of the Leaguers in Normandy, he moved into Gelderland,

1 Bor, *ubi sup.*  
2 Turenne (Duc de Bouillon) was excessively enthusiastic. „Je ne vous scauroy dire la joie,” he wrote to Count John the Elder, „que j'ay de l'honneur que Monsieur le Comte Maurice votre neveu a acquis en la prise de Zutphen et Deventer. Il a effacé en huit jours la réputation que le Duc de Parma a acquis en dix ans, et fait bien paraître que la vertu et générosité de sa Maison est immortelle.” Groen v. Prinsterer. (Archives, II. s. i. 169.) 3 Reyd, *ubi sup.*  
4 Bor. Reyd, Meteren, *ubi sup.*

1 Bor, III. xxviii. 566-569. Meteren, xvii. 298, 299. Reyd, ix. 169-172. Dnyck, 25-34.

2 Bor, *ubi sup.* 568.

3 Bor, *ubi sup.* 570, *seqq.* Meteren, *ubi sup.*

coming by way of Xanten, Rees, and neighbouring places. Here he paused for a moment perplexed, doubting whether to take the aggressive in Gelderland or to march straight to the relief of Groningen. He decided that it was better for the moment to protect the line of the Waal. Shipping his army accordingly into the Batavian Island or Good-meadow (Bet-uwe), which lies between the two great horns of the Rhine, he laid siege to Fort Knodsenburg, which Maurice had built the year before, on the right bank of the Waal for the purpose of attacking Nymegen. Farnese, knowing that the general of the States was occupied with this whole army far away to the north, and separated from him by two great rivers, wide and deep, and by the whole breadth of that dangerous district called the Foul-meadow (Vel-uwe), and by the vast quagmire known as the Rouvenian morass, which no artillery nor even any organised forces had ever traversed since the beginning of the world, had felt no hesitation in throwing his army in boats across the Waal. He had no doubt of reducing a not very powerful fortress long before relief could be brought to it, and at the same time of disturbing by his presence in Batavia the combinations of his young antagonist in Friesland and Groningen.<sup>2</sup>

So with six thousand foot and one thousand horse,<sup>3</sup> Alexander came before Knodsenburg. The news reached Maurice at Steenwyk on the 15th July. Instantly changing his plans, the prince decided that Farnese must be faced at once, and, if possible, driven from the ground, thinking it more important to maintain, by concentration, that which had already been gained, than to weaken and diffuse his forces in insufficient attempts to acquire more. Before two days

had passed, he was on the march southward, having left Lewis William with a sufficient force to threaten Groningen. Coming by way of Hasselt Zwol to Deventer, he crossed the Yssel on a bridge

18 July, of boats on the 18th of July, 1591. and proceeded to Arnhem. 1

His army, although excessively fatigued by forced marches in very hot weather, over nearly impassable roads, was full of courage and cheerfulness, having learned implicit confidence in their

20 July. commander. On the 20 he was 22 July. at Arnhem. On the 22nd his bridge of boats was made, and he had thrown his little army across the Rhine into Batavia, and entrenched himself with his six thousand foot and fourteen hundred horse in the immediate neighbourhood of Farnese—Foul-meadow and Good-meadow, dyke, bog, wold, and quagmire, had been successfully traversed, and within one week of his learning that the great viceroy of Philip had reached the Batavian Island, Maurice stood confronting that famous chieftain in battle-array.

On the 22nd July, Farnese, after firing two hundred and eighty- 22 July. five shots at Fort Knodsenburg, ordered an assault, expecting that so trifling a work could hardly withstand a determined onslaught by his veterans. To his surprise they were so warmly received that two hundred of the assailants fell at the first onset, and the attack was most conclusively repulsed.<sup>2</sup>

And now Maurice had appeared upon the scene, determined to relieve a place

24 July, so important for his ulterior 1591. designs. On the 24th July he sent out a small but picked force of cavalry to reconnoitre the enemy. They were attacked by a considerable body of Italian and Spanish horse from the camp before Knodsenburg, including Alexander's own company of lancers under Nicelli. The States troops fled before them in apparent dismay for a

1 Van der Kemp, i. 111.

2 Bor, Meteren, *ubi sup.* Parma to Philip, 24 July, 1591. (Arch. de Sim. MS.)

3 Parma's letter last cited.

1 Bor, Meteren, *ubi sup.*

2 *Ibid.*

little distance, hotly pursued by the royalists, until, making a sudden halt, they turned to the attack, accompanied by five fresh companies of cavalry and a thousand musketeers, who fell upon the foe from all directions. It was an ambush, which had been neatly prepared by Maurice in person, assisted by Sir Francois Vere. Sixty of the Spaniards and Italians were killed and one hundred and fifty prisoners, including Captain Nicelli, taken, while the rest of the party sought safety in ignominious flight. 1 This little skirmish, in which ten companies of the picked veterans of Alexander Farnese had thus been utterly routed before his eyes, did much to inspire the States troops with confidence in themselves and their leader. 2

Parma was too experienced a campaigner, and had too quick an eye, not to recognize the error which he had committed in placing the dangerous river Waal, without a bridge, between himself and his supplies. He had not dreamed that his antagonist would be capable of such celerity of movement as he had just displayed, and his first business now was to extricate himself from a position which might soon become fatal. Without hesitation, he did his best to amuse the enemy in front of the fort, and then passed the night in planting batteries upon the banks of the river, under cover of which he succeeded next day in transporting in ferry-boats his whole force, artillery and baggage, to the opposite shore, without loss, and with his usual skill. 3

1 Bor, Meteren, *ubi sup.* Groen v. Prinsterer. (Archives, II. s. i. 172.)

2 Duyck, 38, 39. Bor, Meteren, *ubi sup.*

3 Duyck, 41: „We may thank God Almighty,” says, under date of 27 July, the faithful journalist of these transactions, „that he has so guided our affairs that the Duke of Parma, whom hardly any cities or provinces could hitherto resist, and who therefore has usurped the title of the great Alexander, now with great shame and loss has been obliged to retreat from before the single fort of Knodsenburg.” Compare Bor, Meteren, *ubi sup.* Van der Kemp, i. 111. Coloma, iv. 74v.

He remained but a short time in Nymegen, but he was hampered by the express commands of the king. Moreover, his broken health imperatively required that he should once more seek the healing influence of the waters of Spa, before setting forth on his new French expedition. Meanwhile, although he had for a time protected the Spanish possessions in the north by his demonstration in Gelderland, it must be confessed that the diversion thus given to the plans of Maurice was but a feeble one.

Having assured the inhabitants of Nymegen that he would watch over the city like the apple of his eye, 1 he took his departure on the 4th of August for Spa. He was accompanied on his journey by his son, Prince Ranuccio, just arrived from Italy.

After the retreat of Farnese, Maurice mustered his forces at Arnhem, and found himself at the head of seven thousand foot and fifteen hundred horse. It was expected by all the world that, being thus on the very spot, he would forthwith proceed to reduce the ancient, wealthy, imperial city of Nymegen. The garrison and burghers accordingly made every preparation to resist the attack, disconcerted as they were, however, by the departure of Parma, and by the apparent incapacity of Verdugo to bring them effectual relief.

But to the surprise of all men, the States forces suddenly disappeared from the scene, having been, as it were, spirited away by night-time, along those silent watery highways and crossways of canal, river, and estuary—the military advantages of which to the Netherlands, Maurice was the first thoroughly to demonstrate. Having previously made great preparations of munitions and provisions in Zeeland, the young general, who was thought hard at work in Gelderland, suddenly presented himself, on the 19th September, before the gates of Hulst, on the

19 Sept.

1 Meteren, xvi. 299, 300.



border of Zeeland and Brabant. It was a place of importance from its situation, its possession by the enemy being a perpetual thorn in the side of the States, and a constant obstacle to the plans of

Maurice. His arrangements 24 Sept. having been made with the customary neatness, celerity, and completeness, he received the surrender of the city on the fifth day after his arrival. 1

Its commander, Castillo, could offer no resistance, and was subsequently, it is said, beheaded by order of the Duke of Parma for his negligence. 2 The place is but a dozen miles from Antwerp, which city was at the very moment keeping great holiday and outdoing itself in magnificent festivals in honour of young Ranuccio. 3 The capture of Hulst before his eyes was a demonstration quite unexpected by the prince, and great was the wrath of old Mondragon, governor of Antwerp, thus bearded in his den. The veteran made immediate preparations for chastising the audacious beggars of Zeeland and their pedantic young commander, but no sooner had the Spaniards taken the field than the wily foe had disappeared as magically as he had come.

The Flemish earth seemed to have bubbles as the water hath, and while Mondragon was beating the air in vain on the margin of the Scheld, Maurice was back again upon the Waal, horse, foot, and artillery, bag, baggage, and munition, and had fairly set himself down in earnest to besiege Nymegen, before the honest burghers and the garrison had finished drawing long breaths at their recent escape. Between

14-16 Oct. the 14th and 16th October 1591. he had bridged the deep, wide, and rapid river, had transported eight thousand five hundred infantry and sixteen companies of cavalry to the

southern side, had entrenched his camp and made his approaches, and had got sixty-eight pieces of artillery into three positions commanding the weakest part of the defences of the city between the Falcon Tower and the Hoender gate. 1 The fort of Knodsenburg was also ready to throw hot shot across the river into the town. Not a detail in all these preparations escaped the vigilant eye of the Commander-in-Chief, and again and again was he implored not so recklessly to expose a life already become precious to his country. On the 20th 20 Oct. October, Maurice sent to demand the surrender of the city. The reply was facetious but decisive.

The prince was but a young suitor, it was said, and the city a spinster not so lightly to be won. A longer courtship and more trouble would be necessary. 2

Whereupon the suitor opened all his batteries without further delay, and the spinster gave a fresh example of the inevitable fate of talking castles and listening ladies.

Nymegen, despite her saucy answer on the 20th, surrendered on 21 Oct. the 21st. Relief was impos- sible. Neither Parma, now on his way to France, nor Verdugo, shut up in Friesland, could come to the rescue of the place, and the combinations of Maurice were an inexorable demonstration.

The terms of the surrender were similar to those accorded to Zutphen and Deventer. In regard to the religious point it was expressly laid down by Maurice that the demand for permission to exercise publicly the Roman Catholic religion should be left to the decision of the States-General. 3

And thus another most important city had been added to the domains of the republic. Another triumph was inscribed on the record of the young com-

1 Meteren, *ubi sup.* Bor, *ubi sup.* 574 Duyck, 48, 58.

2 Meteren, *ubi sup.*

3 Ibid.

1 Meteren, xvi. 300. Bor, xxviii. 575. Duyck, 59-67.

2 Meteren, *ubi sup.*

3 Meteren, Bor, Duyck, *ubi sup.* Van der Kemp. i. 113.

mander. The exultation was very great throughout the United Netherlands, and heartfelt was the homage rendered by all classes of his countrymen of the son of William the Silent.

Queen Elizabeth wrote to congratulate him in warmest terms on his great successes, and even the Spaniards began to recognize the merits of the new chieftain. An intercepted letter from Verdugo, who had been foiled in his efforts to arrest the career of Maurice, indicated great respect for his prowess. „I have been informed,” said the veteran, „that Count Maurice of Nassau wishes to fight me. Had I the opportunity I assure you that I should not fail him, for even if ill luck were my portion, I should at least not escape the honour of being beaten by such a personage. I beg you to tell him so with my affectionate compliments. Yours, FRANCIS VERDUGO. 1

These chivalrous sentiments towards Prince Maurice had not however prevented Verdugo from doing his best to assassinate Count Lewis William. Two Spaniards had been arrested in the States camp this summer, who came in as deserters, but who confessed „with little, or mostly without torture,” that they had been sent by their governor and colonel with instructions to seize a favourable opportunity to shoot Lewis William and set fire to his camp. But such practices were so common on the part of the Spanish commanders as to occasion no surprise whatever. 2

It will be remembered that two years before, the famous Martin Schenk had come to a tragic end at Nymegen. 3 He had been drowned, fished up, hanged, drawn, and quartered; after which his scattered fragments, having been exposed on all the principal towers of the city, had been put in pickle and deposited in a chest. They were now

collected and buried triumphantly in the tomb of the Dukes of Gelderland. Thus the shade of the grim freebooter was at last appeased. 1

The government of the city was conferred upon Count Lewis William, with Gerard de Jonge as his lieutenant. A substantial garrison was placed in the city, and, the season being now far advanced, Maurice brought the military operations of the year, saving a slight preliminary demonstration against Gertruydenberg, to a close. 2 He had deserved and attained considerable renown. He had astonished the leisurely war-makers and phlegmatic veterans of the time, both among friends and foes, by the unexampled rapidity of his movements and the concentration of his attacks. He had carried great waggon trains and whole parks of siege artillery—the heaviest then known—over roads and swamps which had been deemed impassable even for infantry. He had traversed the length and breadth of the republic in a single campaign, taken two great cities in Overijssel, picked up cities and fortresses in the province of Groningen, and threatened its capital, menaced Steenwyk, relieved Knodsenburg though besieged in person by the greatest commander of the age, beaten the most famous cavalry of Spain and Italy under the eyes of their chieftain, swooped as it were through the air upon Brabant, and carried off an important city almost in the sight of Antwerp, and sped back again in the freezing weather of early autumn, with his splendidly served and invincible artillery, to the imperial city of Nymegen, which Farnese had sworn to guard like the apple of his eye, and which, with consummate skill, was forced out of his grasp in five days.

„Some might attribute these things to blind fortune,” says an honest chronicler who had occupied important posts

1 Bor, *ubi sup.* 578.

2 Groen v. Prinsterer, (Arch. II. Serie i. 148.)

3 Vol. II. of this work, chap. xx.

1 Bor, *ubi sup.*

2 Bor, Meteren, Duyck, *ubi sup.*

in the service of the prince and of his cousin Lewis William, „but they who knew the prince's constant study and laborious attention to detail, who were aware that he never committed to another what he could do himself, who saw his sobriety, vigilance, his perpetual study and holding of council wit Count Lewis William (himself possessed of all these good gifts, perhaps even in greater degree), and who never found him seeking, like so many other commanders, his own ease and comfort, would think differently.” 1

1 Reyd, ix. 175.

„It is indeed impossible to regard the simple, earnest, genial, valorous, and studious character of Lewis William without affection. His private letters are charming. In the intervals of his busy campaignings, he found time not only for his own studies, but also for superintending the education of his two younger brothers. It had at first been proposed that they should go to an English university, but old Count John objected to the expense, and to the luxurious habits which they would encounter there. He liked not the „mores” of the young English nobles, he said, while he denounced in vehement language the drunkenness and profligacy of the Germans. It was now decided that Count Lewis William should take charge of them himself: „As there is no good opportunity for them at Dillenburg,” he wrote to his father, „and as the expense of Leyden seems too great, it is better that they should remain with me. Although living is very dear here and my housekeeping is very hard upon me, yet are my young brothers, and their good education, on which their weal and woe depend, so dear to me that I will take charge of them with all my heart. In this case your grace will please send them a learned preceptor, and pay for his salary and for my brothers' clothing. For the rest I will provide; and I will myself be their tutor in reading and studying, in which I exercise myself as much as I have opportunity to do, and I will take them with me

to the field whenever there is anything to see there, and anything going on against the enemy.” Groen v. Prinsterer. (Archives, II. S. i. 149, 227, 131. 144.

This was the stuff out of which the Nassaus were made. William the Silent and his three brethren had already laid down their lives for the commonwealth which he had founded, and now there were his son and nine more of the race in arms for its defence, or devoting all their energies and their means to emulate the example set them by their predecessors. Nor can I refrain in this connection from citing the noble language in which the patriarch of the Nassaus, Count John the Elder, urged upon his sons and nephews the necessity of establishing a system of common schools in the United Provinces—an institution which, when adopted in that commonwealth, became a source of incalculable good, and which, transplanted in the next generation by English pilgrims from Leyden to Massachusetts, and vastly developed in the virgin soil of America, has long been the chief safeguard and the peculiar glory of our own republic. „You must urge upon the States-General,” said the only surviving brother of William the Silent, „that they, according to the example of the Pope and the Jesuits, should establish free schools where children of quality as well as of poor families, for a very small sum, could be well and Christianly educated and brought up. This would be the greatest and most useful work, and the highest service that you could ever accomplish for God and Christianity, and especially for the Netherlands themselves. . . . In summa, one may jeer at this as popish trickery, and undervalue it as one will, there still remains in the work an inexpressible benefit. *Soldiers and patriots thus educated, with a true knowledge of God and a Christian conscience: item, churches and schools, good libraries, books, and printing-presses, are better than all armies, arsenals, armouries munitions, alliances, and treaties that can be had or imagined in the world.* . . . Pray urge upon his Grace (Prince Maurice), in cousinly and friendly manner, that he should not shrink from nor find shame or difficulty in these things, nor cease, under invocation of Divine aid, from reflecting upon them, and furthering them with earnest diligence.” Groen van Prinsterer. (Archives, II. S. i. Letter 95, p. 210 *seqq.*

## CHAPTER XXV.

War in Brittany and Normandy—Death of La Nune—Religious and political persecution in Paris—Murder of President Brisson, Larcher, and Tardif—The sceptre of France offered to Philip—The Duke of Mayenne punishes the murderers of the magistrates—Speech of Henry's envoy to the States-General—Letter of Queen Elizabeth to Henry—Siege of Rouen—Farnese leads an army to its relief—The king is

wounded in a skirmish—Siege of Rue by Farnese—Henry raises the siege of Rouen—Siege of Caudebec—Critical position of Farnese and his army—Victory of the Duke of Mercœur in Brittany.

AGAIN the central point towards which the complicated events to be described in this history gravitate is found on



the soil of France. Movements apparently desultory and disconnected—as they may have seemed to the contemporaneous observer, necessarily occupied with the local and daily details which make up individual human life—are found to be necessary parts of a whole, when regarded with that breadth and clearness of vision which is permitted to human beings only when they can look backward upon that long sequence of events which make up the life of nations and which we call the Past. It is only by the anatomical study of what has ceased to exist that we can come thoroughly to comprehend the framework and the vital conditions of that which lives. It is only by patiently lifting the shroud from the Past that we can enable ourselves to make even wide guesses at the meaning of the dim Present and the veiled Future. It is only thus that the continuity of human history reveals itself to us as the most important of scientific facts.

If ever commonwealth was apparently doomed to lose that national existence which it had maintained for a brief period at the expense of infinite sacrifice of blood and treasure, it was the republic of the United Netherlands in the period immediately succeeding the death of William the Silent. Domestic treason, secession of important provinces, religious hatred, foreign intrigue, and foreign invasion—in such a sea of troubles was the republic destined generations long to struggle. Who but the fanatical, the shallow-minded, or the corrupt could doubt the inevitable issue of the conflict? Did not great sages and statesmen whose teachings seemed so much wiser in their generation than the untaught impulses of the great popular heart, condemn over and over again the hopeless struggles and the atrocious bloodshed which were thought to disgrace the age, and by which it was held impossible that the cause of human liberty should ever be advanced?

To us who look back from the vantage summit which humanity has reached—thanks to the toil and sacrifices of those who have preceded us—it may seem doubtful whether a premature peace in the Netherlands, France, and England would have been an unmitigated blessing, however easily it might have been purchased by the establishment all over Europe of that holy institution called the Inquisition, and by the tranquil acceptance of the foreign domination of Spain.

If, too, ever country seemed destined to the painful process of national vivisection and final dismemberment, it was France. Its natural guardians and masters, save one, were in secret negotiation with foreign powers to obtain with their assistance a portion of the national territory under acknowledgment of foreign supremacy. There was hardly an inch of French soil that had not two possessors. In Burgundy Baron Biron was battling against the Viscount Tavannes; in the Lyonesse and Dauphiny Marshal des Digiueres was fighting with the Dukes of Savoy and Nemours; in Provence, Epemon was resisting Savoy; in Languedoc, Constable Montmorency contended with the Duke of Joyeuse; in Brittany, the Prince of Dombes was struggling with the Duke of Mercœur.

But there was one adventurer who thought he could show a better legal title to the throne of France than all the doctors of the Sorbonne could furnish to Philip II. and his daughter, and who still trusted, through all the disasters which pursued him, and despite the machinations of venal warriors and mendicant princes, to his good right and his good sword, and to something more potent than both, the cause of national unity. His rebuke to the intriguing priests at the interview of St. Denis, and his reference to the judgment of Solomon formed the text to his whole career.

The brunt of the war now fell upon Brittany and Normandy. Three thousand

Spaniards under Don John de Aquila had landed in the port of Blavet, which they had fortified as a stronghold on the coast. 1 And thither, to defend the integrity of that portion of France, which, in Spanish hands, was a perpetual menace to her realm, her crown, even to her life, Queen Elizabeth had sent some three thousand Englishmen, under commanders well known to France and the Netherlands. There was black Norris again dealing death among the Spaniards and renewing his perpetual squabbles with Sir Roger Williams. There was that doughty Welshman himself, truculent and caustic as ever, and as ready with sword or pen, foremost in every mad adventure or every forlorn hope, criticising with sharpest tongue the blunders and shortcomings of friend and foe, and devoting the last drop in his veins with chivalrous devotion to his Queen. „The world cannot deny,” said he, „that any carcass living ventured himself freer and oftener for his prince, state, and friends than I did mine. There is no more to be had of a poor beast than his skin, and for want of other means I never respected mine in the least respect towards my sovereign’s service, or country.” 2

1 Coloma, iv. 61<sup>vo</sup>.

2 Williams to Burghley, Feb. 15, 1592. (S. P. Office MS.)

A most brilliant combat had recently occurred before Dieppe, in which Sir Roger, at the head of six hundred men—four hundred of them English—had attacked two full regiments of the League in their intrenchments, and routed them utterly, with the loss of five hundred killed and wounded, four hundred prisoners, and sustaining but little loss himself. The achievement seems an extraordinary one, but is vouched for by the Governor of Dieppe, on whose authority it was communicated by the French ambassador in London to the Queen: „Glory to God and to the said Sir Williams,” said the ambassador, „who has not belied by this action the good opinion that all good people of both nations had of him this long time, and has shown us that the English of our day have not degenerated from the ancient virtue of their fathers.” Beauvoir la Noüe to Burghley, May 24, 1591. (S. P. Office MS.)

No one gave better or blunter advice to both Queen and King than this hard-fighting,

And so passing his life in the saddle and under fire, yet finding leisure to

sharp-writing Welshman. No one insisted more earnestly than he did on the entire union in interest and danger of Elizabeth, Henry, and the Dutch Republic; and that every battle gained in Brittany, Normandy, or the Netherlands, was a blow struck in immediate defence of England’s very existence.—„Therefore, Sacred Majesty,” wrote Williams, „If you can, help the King to take Rouen. If he be in Rouen, your Majesty may be assured this king is on his horseback in such sort that all Spain and their confederators will shake and dare think on nothing else but how to prevent him. Then shall he be well able to maintain himself, and your Majesty’s purse he well spared, but doth he not take Rouen, and the Spaniards enter into these parts, as Villars and Tavannes doth demand them, then be assured all the charges of these wars must be on your Majesty, for the poor king shall not be able to pay 500 soldiers. If he should be beaten, be assured in few months to fight for the English ports, in such sort that I pray God I may never see it. I fear I angered the king. If he be doing me right, your Majesty and the world found me ever his servant to the uttermost of my power. I found him sometimes speaking he would besiege Pontoise, sometimes Sancy in Champagne, and how he should join with the Almayn army. Besides other speeches, although not flattering, I am assured honest, I told his Majesty, Sir, if you will have the world to confess you as great a captain as yourself, and all we here think you to be, you must recover or at least save your seaports, rather than those bicoques, or places of small importance in respect of them, else your best friends will despair of your government, and in short time not able to succour you for want of ports to land your necessaries.” Williams to the Queen, from Dieppe, 4 June 1591. (S. P. Office MS.)

And again:—„Doth the King prosper, your Majesty and estate must needs flourish, for the wars will rest all on him. Doth he decay, your Majesty must needs maintain his wars, or in a short time fight of yourself, not only against the Spanish, but against all the League, the which will increase daily, for all the mercenaries will follow the fortunate, I mean the victorious. Doth the Spanish ruin this king, Holland and Zeeland will be found good cheap, and England in that case I pray God never to see it. Therefore, most sacred Sovereign, a penny to save a pound is well bestowed, and to ruin a suburb to save a city is done to good purpose. My meaning is better to spend part of your wealth and subjects than to hazard the whole. This king is on making or marring, resolving only on your Majesty’s succour. Having it, he doubts nothing to take Rouen.” Williams to the Queen, 9 June, 1591. (S. P. Office MS.)

collect the materials for, and to complete the execution of, one of the most valuable and attractive histories of the age, the bold Welshman again and again appears, wearing the same humorous but truculent aspect that belonged to him when he was wont to run up and down in a great morion and feathers on Flemish battle-fields, a mark for the Spanish sharpshooters.

There, too, under the banner of the Béarnese, that other historian of those sanguinary times, who had fought on almost every battle-field where tyranny and liberty had sought to smite each other dead, on French or Flemish soil, and who had prepared his famous political and military discourses in a foul dungeon swarming with toads and rats and other villanous reptiles to which the worse than infernal tyranny of Philip II. had consigned him for seven years long as a prisoner of war—the brave and good La Noue, with the iron arm, hero of a hundred combats, was fighting his last fight. At the siege of Lamballe in Brittany, he had taken off his casque and climbed a ladder to examine the breach effected by the batteries. An arquebus shot from the town grazed his forehead, and, without inflicting a severe wound, stunned him so much that he lost his balance and fell head foremost towards the ground; his leg, which had been wounded at the midnight assault upon Paris, where he stood at the side of King Henry, caught in the ladder and held him suspended. His head was severely bruised, and the contusions and shock to his war-worn frame were so great that he died after lingering eighteen days.

His son de Teligny, who in his turn had just been exchanged and released from the prison where he had lain since his capture before Antwerp, had hastened with joy to join his father in the camp, but came to close his eyes. The veteran caused the chapter in Job on the resurrection of the body to be read to him

on his death-bed, and died expressing his firm faith in a hereafter. Thus passed away, at the age of sixty, on the 4th August, 1591, one of the most heroic spirits of France. Prudence, courage, experience, military knowledge both theoretic and practical, made him one of the first captains of the age, and he was not more distinguished for his valour than for the purity of his life, and the moderation, temperance, and justice of his character. 1 The Prince of Dombes, in despair at his death, raised the siege of Lamballe.

There was yet another chronicler, fighting among the Spaniards, now in Brittany, now in Normandy, and now in Flanders, and doing his work as thoroughly with his sword as afterwards with his pen, Don Carlos Coloma, captain of cavalry, afterwards financier, envoy, and historian. For it was thus that those writers prepared themselves for their work. They were all actors in the great epic, the episodes of which they have preserved. They lived and fought, and wrought and suffered and wrote. Rude in tongue, aflame with passion, twisted all awry by prejudice, violent in love and hate, they have left us narratives which are at least full of colour and thrilling with life.

Thus Netherlanders, Englishmen, and Frenchmen were again mingling their blood and exhausting their energies on a hundred petty battle-fields of Brittany and Normandy; but perhaps to few of those hard fighters was it given to discern the great work which they were slowly and painfully achieving.

In Paris the League still maintained its ascendancy. Henry, having again withdrawn from his attempts to reduce the capital, had left the sixteen tyrants who governed it more leisure to occupy themselves with internal politics. A network of intrigue was spread through the whole atmosphere of the place. The



Sixteen, sustained by the power of Spain and Rome, and fearing nothing so much as the return of peace, by which their system of plunder would come to an end, proceeded with their persecution of all heretics, real or supposed, who were rich enough to offer a reasonable chance of spoil. The soul of all these intrigues was the new legate Sega, bishop of Piacenza. Letters from him to Alexander Farnese, intercepted by Henry, showed a determination to ruin the Duke of Mayenne and Count Berlin governor of Paris, whom he designated as Colossus and Renard, to extirpate the magistrates, and to put Spanish partizans in their places, and in general to perfect the machinery by which the authority of Philip was to be established in France. He was perpetually urging upon that monarch the necessity of spending more money among his creatures in order to carry out these projects. <sup>1</sup>

Accordingly the attention of the Sixteen had been directed to President Brisson, who had already made himself so dangerously conspicuous by his resistance to the insolent assumption of the cardinal-legate. This eminent juris-consult had succeeded Pomponne de Believre as first president of the Parliament of Paris. He had been distinguished for talent, learning, and eloquence as an advocate, and was the author of several important legal works. His ambition to fill the place of first president had caused him to remain in Paris after its revolt against Henry III. He was no leaguer, and since his open defiance of the ultra-Catholic party, he had been a marked man—doomed secretly by the confederates who ruled the capital. He had fondly imagined that he could govern the Parisian populace as easily as he had been in the habit of influencing the Parliament or directing his clients. He expected to restore the city to its obedience to the constituted

authorities. He hoped to be himself the means of bringing Henry IV. in triumph to the throne of his ancestors. He found, however, that a revolution was more difficult to manage than a law case, and that the confederates of the Holy League were less tractable than his clients had usually been found.

On the night of the 14th November, 1591, he was seized on the 14 Nov. bridge St. Michel, while on 1591. his way to Parliament, and was told that he was expected at the Hotel de Ville. He was then brought to the prison of the little Châtelet.

Hardly had he been made secure in the dimly-lighted dungeon, when Cromé, a leader among the Parisian populace, made his appearance, accompanied by some of his confederates, and dressed in a complete suit of mail. He ordered the magistrate to take off his hat and to kneel. He then read a sentence condemning him to death. Profoundly astonished, Brisson demanded to know of what crime he was accused, and under what authority. The answer was a laugh, and an assurance that he had no time to lose. He then begged that at least he might be imprisoned long enough to enable him to complete a legal work on which he was engaged, and which, by his premature death, would be lost to the commonwealth. This request produced no doubt more merriment than his previous demands. His judges were inflexible, and allowed him hardly time to confess himself. He was then hanged in his dungeon. <sup>1</sup>

Two other magistrates, Larcher and Tardif, were executed in the same way, in the same place, and on the same night. The crime charged against them was having spoken in a public assembly somewhat freely against the Sixteen, and having aided in the circulation in Paris of a paper drawn up by the Duke of Nevers, filled with bitterness against the Lorraine princes and the

<sup>1</sup> De Thou, 438, 439.

<sup>1</sup> De Thou, 442, 443.

League, and addressed to the late Pope Sixtus. 1

The three bodies were afterwards gibbeted on the Grève in front of the Hotel de Ville, and exposed for two days to the insults and fury of the populace.

This was the culminating point of the reign of terror in Paris. Never had the sixteen tyrants, lords of the market-halls, who governed the capital by favour of and in the name of the populace, seemed more omnipotent. As representatives or plenipotentiaries of Madam League they had laid the crown at the feet of the King of Spain, hoping by still further drafts on his exchequer and his credulity to prolong indefinitely their own ignoble reign. The extreme democratic party, which had hitherto supported the House of Lorraine, and had seemed to idolize that family in the person of the great Balafre, now believed themselves possessed of sufficient power to control the Duke of Mayenne and all his adherents. They sent the Jesuit Claude Mathieu with a special memorial to Philip II. That monarch was implored to take the sceptre of France, and to reign over them, inasmuch as they most willingly threw themselves into his arms. 2 They assured him that all reasonable people, and especially the Holy League, wished him to take the reins of government, on condition of exterminating heresy throughout the kingdom by force of arms, of publishing the Council of Trent, and of establishing everywhere the Holy Inquisition—and institution formidable only to the wicked and desirable for the good. It was suggested that Philip should not call himself any longer King of Spain nor adopt the title of King of France, but that he should proclaim himself

the Great King, or make use of some similar designation, not indicating any specialty but importing universal dominion. 1

Should Philip, however, be disinclined himself to accept the monarchy, it was suggested that the young Duke of Guise, son of the first martyr of France, would be the most appropriate personage to be honoured with the hand of the legitimate Queen of France, the Infanta Clara Isabella.

But the Sixteen were reckoning without the Duke of Mayenne. That great personage, although an indifferent warrior and an utterly unprincipled and venal statesman, was by no means despicable as a fisherman in the troubled waters of revolution. He knew how to manage intrigues with both sides for his own benefit. Had he been a bachelor he might have obtained the Infanta and shared her prospective throne. Being encumbered with a wife he had no hope of becoming the son-in-law of Philip, and was determined that his nephew Guise should not enjoy a piece of good fortune denied to himself. The escape of the young duke from prison had been the signal for the outbreak of jealousies between uncle and nephew, which Parma and other agents had been instructed by their master to foster to the utmost. „They must be maintained in such disposition in regard to me,” he said, „that the one being ignorant of my relations to the other, both may without knowing it do my will.” 2

But Mayenne, in this grovelling career of self-seeking, in this perpetual loading of dice and marking of cards, which formed the main occupation of so many kings and princes of the period, and which passed for Machiavellian po-

1 De Thou, 442, 443.

2 Arch. de Simancas (Paris) B. 71, 124,

cited by Capefigue, *Hist. de la Ligue*, &c. vi. 64, *seqq.*

1 Arch. de Simancas (Paris) B. 72, 13-16

*ibid.* p. 123.

2 Arch. de Simancas (Paris) 57, 503,

cited by Capefigue, vi. 193.

litica, was a fair match for the Spanish king and his Italian viceroy. He sent President Jeannin on special mission to Philip, asking for two armies, one to be under his command, the other under that of Farnese, and assured him that he should be king himself, or appoint any man he liked to the vacant throne. Thus he had secured one hundred thousand crowns a month to carry on his own game withal. „The maintenance of these two armies costs me 261,000 crowns a month,” said Philip to his envoy Ybarra. <sup>1</sup>

And what was the result of all this expenditure of money, of all this lying and counter-lying, of all this frantic effort on the part of the most powerful monarch of the age to obtain property which did not belong to him—the sovereignty of a great kingdom, stocked with a dozen millions of human beings—of all this endless bloodshed of the people in the interest of a high-born family or two, of all this infamous brokerage charged by great nobles for their attempts to transfer kingdoms like private farms from one owner to another? Time was to show. Meanwhile men trembled at the name of Philip II. and grovelled before him as the incarnation of sagacity, high policy, and king-craft.

But Mayenne, while taking the brokerage, was less anxious about the transfer. He had fine instinct enough to suspect that the Béarnese, outcast though he seemed, might after all not be playing so desperate a game against the League as it was the fashion to suppose. He knew whether or not Henry was likely to prove a more fanatical Huguenot in 1592 than he had shown himself twenty years before at the Bartholomew festival. And he had wit enough to foresee that the „instruction” which the gay free-thinker held so cautiously in his fingers

might perhaps turn out the trump card. A bold, valorous Frenchman with a flawless title, and washed whiter than snow by the freshest of holy water, might prove a more formidable claimant to the allegiance of Frenchmen than a foreign potentate, even though backed by all the doctors of the Sorbonne.

The murder of President Brisson and his colleagues by the confederates of the sixteen quarters, was in truth the beginning of the end. What seemed a proof of supreme power was the precursor of a counter-revolution, destined ere long to lead farther than men dreamed. The Sixteen believed themselves omnipotent. Mayenne being in their power, it was for them to bestow the crown at their will, or to hold it suspended in air as long as seemed best to them. They felt no doubt that all the other great cities in the kingdom would follow the example of Paris.

But the lieutenant-general of the realm felt it time for him to show that his authority was not a shadow—that he was not a pasteboard functionary like the deceased cardinal-king, Charles X. The letters entrusted by the Sixteen to Claude Mathieu were intercepted by Henry, and, very probably, an intimation of their contents was furnished to Mayenne. At any rate, the duke, who lacked not courage nor promptness when his own interests were concerned, who felt his authority slipping away from him, now that it seemed the object of the Spaniards to bind the democratic party to themselves by a complicity in crime, hastened at once to Paris, determined to crush these intrigues and to punish the murderers of the judges. <sup>1</sup> The Spanish envoy Ybarra, proud, excitable, violent, who had been privy to the assassinations, and was astonished that the deeds had excited indignation and fury instead of the terror counted upon, remonstrated with Mayenne, intimating that in times of civil commo-

<sup>1</sup> Arch. de Simancas (Paris) 57, <sup>366</sup>

cited by Capefigue, vi. 193.

<sup>1</sup> De Thou, xi. 446.



tion it was often necessary to be blind and deaf.

In vain. The duke carried it with a high and firm hand. He arrested the ringleaders, and hanged four 4 Dec. of them in the basement of 1851.

the Louvre within twenty days after the commission of their crime. The energy was well-timed and perfectly successful. The power of the Sixteen was struck to the earth at a blow. The ignoble tyrants became in a moment as despicable as they had been formidable and insolent. Cromé, more fortunate than many of his fellows, contrived to make his escape out of the kingdom. 1

Thus Mayenne had formally broken with the democratic party, so called—with the market-halls oligarchy. In thus doing, his ultimate rupture with the Spaniards was foreshadowed. The next combination for him to strive for would be one to unite the moderate catholics and the Béarnese. Ah! if Henry would but „instruct” himself out of hand, what a game the duke might play!

The burgess-party, the mild royalists, the disgusted portion of the Leaguers, coalescing with those of the Huguenots whose fidelity might prove stanch even against the religious apostasy contemplated by their chief—this combination might prove an over-match for the ultra-leaguers, the democrats, and the Spaniards. The king's name would be a tower of strength for that „third party,” which began to rear its head very boldly and to call itself „Politica.” Madam League might succumb to this new rival in the fickle hearts of the French.

At the beginning of the year 1591, Buzanval had presented his 26 Jan. credentials to the States-Ge- 1591. neral at the Hague as envoy of Henry IV. In the speech which he made on this occasion he expressed the hope that the mission of the Viscount Turenne, his Majesty's envoy to England and to the Netherlands, had made known the

royal sentiments towards the States and the great satisfaction of the king with their energetic sympathy and assistance. It was notorious, said Buzanval, that the King of Spain for many years had been governed by no other motive than to bring all the rest of Christendom under his dominion, while at the same time he forced upon those already placed under his sceptre a violent tyranny, passing beyond all the bounds that God, nature, and reason had set to lawful forms of government. In regard to nations born under other laws than his, he had used the pretext of religion for reducing them to servitude. The wars stirred up by his family in Germany, and his recent invasion of England, were proofs of this intention, still fresh in the memory of all men. Still more flagrant were his machinations in the present troubles of France. Of his dealings with his hereditary realms, the condition of the noble provinces of the Netherlands, once so blooming under reasonable laws, furnished a sufficient illustration. You see, my masters, continued the envoy, the subtle plans of the Spanish king and his counsellors to reach with certainty the object of their ambition. They have reflected that Spain, which is the outermost corner of Europe, cannot conveniently make war upon other Christian realms. They have seen that a central position is necessary to enable them to stretch their arms to every side. They have remembered that princes who in earlier days were able to spread their wings over all Christendom had their throne in France, like Charles the Great and his descendants. Therefore the king is now earnestly bent on seizing this occasion to make himself master of France. The death of the late king (Henry III.) had no sooner occurred, than—as the blood through great terror rushes from the extremities and overflows the heart—they here also, fearing to lose their opportunity and astonished at the valour

of our present king, abandoned all their other enterprises in order to pour themselves upon France. 1

Buzanval further reminded the States that Henry had received the most encouraging promises from the protestant princes of Germany, and that so great a personage as the Viscount Turenne, who had now gone thither to reap the fruit of those promises, would not have been sent on such a mission except that its result was certain. The Queen of England, too, had promised his Majesty most liberal assistance.

It was not necessary to argue as to the close connection between the cause of the Netherlands and that of France. The king had beaten down the mutiny of his own subjects, and repulsed the invasion of the Dukes of Savoy and of Lorraine. In consideration of the assistance promised by Germany and England—for a powerful army would be at the command of Henry in the spring—it might be said that the Netherlands might repose for a time and recruit their exhausted energies, under the shadow of these mighty preparations. 2

„I do not believe, however,” said the minister, „that you will all answer me thus. The faint-hearted and the inexperienced might flatter themselves with such thoughts, and seek thus to cover their cowardice, but the zealous and the courageous will see that it is time to set sail on the ship, now that the wind is rising so freshly and favourably.

„For there are many occasions when an army might be ruined for want of twenty thousand crowns. What a pity if a noble edifice, furnished to the roof-tree, should fall to decay for want of a few tiles. No doubt your own interests are deeply connected with our own. Men may say that our proposals should be rejected on the principle that the shirt is nearer to the skin than the coat, but it can be easily proved that

our cause is one. The mere rumour of this army will prevent the Duke of Parma from attacking you. His forces will be drawn to France. He will be obliged to intercept the crash of this thunder-bolt. The assistance of this army is worth millions to you, and has cost you nothing. To bring France into hostility with Spain is the very policy that you have always pursued and always should pursue in order to protect your freedom. You have always desired a war between France and Spain, and here is a fierce and cruel one in which you have hazarded nothing. It cannot come to an end without bringing signal advantages to yourselves.

„You have always desired an alliance with a French sovereign, and here is a firm friendship offered you by our king, a natural alliance.

„You know how unstable are most treaties that are founded on shifting interests, and do not concern the freedom of bodies and souls. The first are written with pen upon paper, and are generally as light as paper. They have no roots in the heart. Those founded on mutual assistance on trying occasions have the perpetual strength of nature. They bring always good and enduring fruit in a rich soil like the heart of our king; that heart which is as beautiful and as pure from all untruth as the lily upon his shield.

„You will derive the first profits from the army thus raised. From the moment of its mustering under a chief of such experience as Turenne, it will absorb the whole attention of Spain, and will draw her thoughts from the Netherlands to France.”

At this and more in the same earnest manner did the envoy urge upon the consideration of the States-General, concluding with a demand of 100,000 florins as their contribution towards the French campaign. 1

His eloquence did not fall upon un-

1 Bor, III. xxviii. 551, 552.

2 Ibid.

1 Bor, III. xxviii. 551, 552.

willing ears; for the States-General, 9 May, after taking time to deliberate, 1591, ate, replied to the propositions by an expression of the strongest sympathy with, and admiration for, the heroic efforts of the King of France. Accordingly, notwithstanding their own enormous expenses, past and present, and their strenuous exertions at that very moment to form an army of foot and horse for the campaign, the brilliant results of which have already been narrated, they agreed to furnish the required loan of 100,000 florins to be repaid in a year, besides six or seven good ships of war to co-operate with the fleets of England and France upon the coasts of Normandy.<sup>1</sup> And the States were even better than their word.

Before the end of autumn of the year 1591, Henry had laid siege to Rouen, then the second city of the kingdom. To leave much longer so important a place—dominating, as it did, not only Normandy but a principal portion of the maritime borders of France—under the control of the League and of Spain was likely to be fatal to Henry's success. It was perfectly sound in Queen Elizabeth to insist as she did, with more than her usual imperiousness towards her excellent brother, that he should lose no more time before reducing that city. It was obvious that Rouen in the hands of her arch-enemy was a perpetual menace to the safety of her own kingdom. It was therefore with correct judgment, as well as with that high-flown gallantry so dear to the heart of Elizabeth, that her royal champion and devoted slave assured her of his determination no longer to defer obeying her commands in this respect.

The queen had repeatedly warned him of the necessity of defending the maritime frontier of his kingdom, and she was not sparing of her reproaches that the large sums which she expended in his cause had been often ill bestowed.

Her criticisms on what she considered his military mistakes were not few, her threats to withdraw her subsidies frequent. „Owing neither the East nor the West Indies,” she said, „we are unable to supply the constant demands upon us; and although we have the reputation of being a good housewife, it does not follow that we can be a housewife for all the world.”<sup>1</sup> She was persistently warning the king of an attack upon Dieppe, and rebuking him for occupying himself with petty enterprises to the neglect of vital points. She expressed her surprise that after the departure of Parma, he had not driven the Spaniards out of Brittany, without allowing them to fortify themselves in that country. „I am astonished,” she said to him, „that your eyes are so blinded as not to see this danger. Remember, my dear brother,” she frankly added, „that it is not only France that I am aiding, nor are my own natural realms of little consequence to me. Believe me, if I see that you have no more regard to the ports and maritime places nearest to us, it will be necessary that my prayers should serve you in place of any other assistance, because it does not please me to send my people to the shambles where they may perish before having rendered you any assistance. I am sure the Spaniards will soon besiege Dieppe. Beware of it, and excuse my bluntness, for if in the beginning you had taken the maritime forts, which are the very gates of your kingdom, Paris would not have been so well furnished, and other places nearer the heart of the kingdom would not have received so much foreign assistance, without which the others would have soon been vanquished. Pardon my simplicity as belonging to my own sex wishing to give a lesson to one who knows better, but my experience in government makes me a little obsti-

<sup>1</sup> Bor, III. xlviii. 552, 553.

<sup>1</sup> Queen to the Duke d'Espernon, 19 Feb. 1592. (S. P. Office MS.)



nate in believing that I am not ignorant of that which belongs to a king, and I persuade myself that in following my advice you will not fail to conquer your assailants." 1

Before the end of the year Henry had obtained control of the Seine, both above and below the city, holding Pont de l'Arche on the north—where was the last bridge across the river; that of Rouen, built by the English when they governed Normandy, being now in ruins—and Caudebec on the south in an iron grasp. Several war-vessels sent by the Hollanders, according to the agreement with Buzanval, cruised in the north of the river below Caudebec, and rendered much service to the king in cutting off supplies from the beleaguered place, while the investing army of Henry, numbering twenty-five thousand foot—inclusive of the English contingent, and three thousand Netherlanders—and

ten thousand cavalry, nearly all French, was fast reducing the place to extremities.

Parma, as usual, in obedience to his master's orders, but entirely against his own judgment, had again left the rising young general of the Netherlands to proceed from one triumph to another, while he transferred beyond the borders of that land which it was his first business to protect, the whole weight of his military genius and the better portion of his well-disciplined forces.

Most bitterly and indignantly did he express himself, both at the outset and during the whole progress of the expedition, concerning the utter disproportions between the king's means and aims. The want of money was the cause of wholesale disease, desertion, mutiny, and death in his slender army. Such great schemes as his master's required, as he perpetually urged, liberality of expenditure and measures of breadth. He protested that he was not to blame for the ruin likely to come upon the whole enterprise. He had besought, remonstrated, reasoned with the king in vain. He had seen his beard first grow, he said, in the king's service, and he had grown gray in that service, but rather than be kept longer in such a position, without money, men, or means to accomplish the great purposes on which he was sent, he protested that he would abandon his office and retire into the woods to feed on roots. 1 Repeatedly did he implore his master for a large and powerful army; for money and again money. The royal plans should be enforced adequately or abandoned entirely. To spend money in small sums, as heretofore, was only throwing it into the sea. 2

It was deep in the winter, however, before he could fairly come to the rescue of the besieged city. Towards January, the end of January, 1592, 1592

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1 Queen to the King of France, 7 March, 1592. (8. P. Office MS. in French, in her own hand.) „The poor king," said Umton, „must be miraculously defended by God, or else he cannot long subsist. He wanteth means and has need of miracles, and without her Majesty's upholding would quickly perish. She only giveth life to his actions and terror to his enemies." To Burghley, from Dieppe, 15 March, 1592. (S. P. Office MS.)

„Knowing," said Sir Robert Cecil, „that no place in all France, no, not Paris itself, was of more importance to be recovered than Rouen and Newhaven, the Queen levied and sent over troops with such speed as the like has seldom been seen, being performed within twenty days, sending also a nobleman of her own realm to conduct them, but how contrarily the King took another course to seek other towns and places, and to permit her M.'s forces to remain about Dieppe almost two months without any use but to spend her M.'s money, and to waste her people, and instead of besieging of Rouen, suffered it to be virtualled, manned, and fortified in such sort as experience hath taught the King how difficult, or rather how desperate, it hath been as yet to recover it. . . . And of this error hath followed the opportunity of the Duke of Parma's entering with so mighty an army, and the King's professed disability to fight with him." Mr. Wilkes's Instructions to the French King; the whole in Sir R. Cecil's handwriting; 19 March, 1592. (S. P. Office MS.)

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1 Parma to Philip, 11 March, 1592. „Que antes me determinaria a recogerme en un bosque á comer raíces." (Arch. de Simancas MS.) 2 Ibid.

he moved out of Hainault, and once more made his junction at Guise with the Duke of Mayenne. At a review of his forces on 16th January, 1592, Alexander found himself at the head of thirteen thousand five hundred and sixteen infantry and four thousand and sixty-one cavalry. The Duke of Mayenne's army, for payment of which that personage received from Philip 100,000 dollars a month, besides 10,000 dollars a month for his own pocket, ought to have numbered ten thousand foot and three thousand horse, according to contract, but was in reality much less. 1

The Duke of Montemarcano, nephew of Gregory XIV., had brought two thousand Swiss, furnished by the pontiff to the cause of the League, and the Duke of Lorraine had sent his kinsmen, the Counts Chaligny and Vaudemont, with a force of seven hundred lancers and cuirassiers. 2

The town of Fère was assigned in pledge to Farnese to hold as a convenient mustering-place and station in proximity

to his own borders, and, as usual, the chief command over the united armies was placed in his hands. These arrangements concluded, the allies moved slowly forward much in the same order as in the previous year. The young Duke of Guise, who had just made his escape from the prison of Tours, where he had been held in durance since the famous assassination of his father and uncle, and had now come to join his uncle Mayenne, led the vanguard. Ranuccio, son of the duke, rode also in the advance, while two experienced commanders, Vitry and De la Châtre, as well as the famous Marquis del Vasto, formerly general of cavalry in the Netherlands, who had been transferred to Italy but was now serving in the League's army as a volunteer, were associated with the young princes. Parma, Mayenne, and Montemarcano rode in the battalia, the rear being under command of the Duke of Aumale and the Count Chaligny. Wings of cavalry protected the long trains of wagons which were ar-

1 From a statement in the Archives of Simancas, dated 25 Nov. 1591, it appears that the force called the "greater army of France" (*el ejército mayor de Francia*), provided by Philip, and under command of Farnese, was composed of—

Infantry . . . . .	23,512	Costing per month	115,981 dols.
Cavalry . . . . .	4,969	" "	44,505 "

Other expenses of the army, including 12,629 dols. per month for artillery; salaries of which the Duke of Parmas' was 3600 dols. per month, and other contingencies . . . . .	" "	42,321 "
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Besides a large monthly sum for secret military service

Thus the whole force was . . . . .	24,481 men, costing per month	202,807 "
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But there were 7681 wanting to the number determined upon, which added would give a total of . . . . .

7,681	36,162 men, costing per month	250,871 "
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The force included—of Spanish infantry . . . . .	6,078 men
German " . . . . .	11,518 "

The rest being Walloons and Italians.

The lesser army of France (*ejército menor de Francia*) was stated at—

10,000 foot . . . . .	costing per month	49,912 dols.
3,000 horse . . . . .	" "	49,750 "

Total . . . . .	99,662 "
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and was commanded by the Duke of Mayenne, but paid by the King of Spain.

To the Duke of Mayenne, *in person*, according to order, 10,000 dols. per month.— („*A la persona del Duque de Umena conforme la orden.*")

The total of the King's army in the Netherlands was stated at 29,233 men, at a monthly cost of 149,187 dols.; but there was a large number wanting. The total force of the three armies paid for by Philip was intended to be 86,561 men, at a monthly cost of 542,428 dols.

2 De Thou, t. xi. 542, *seqq.* Bentivoglio, P. II. lib. vi. p. 356-369.

ranged on each flank of the invading army. The march was very slow, it being Farnese's uniform practice to guard himself scrupulously against any possibility of surprise and to entrench himself thoroughly at nightfall. 1

By the middle of February they reached the vicinity of Aumale in Picardy. Meantime Henry, on the news of the advance of the relieving army, had again the same problem to solve which had been presented to him before Paris in the summer of 1590. Should he continue in the trenches, pressing more and more closely the city already reduced to great straits? Should he take the open field against the invaders and once more attempt to crush the League and its most redoubtable commander in a general engagement? Biron strenuously advised the continuance of the siege. Turenne, now, through his recent marriage with the heiress, called Duc de Bouillon, great head of the Huguenot party in France, counselled as warmly the open attack. Henry, hesitating more than was customary with him, at last decided on a middle course. The resolution did not seem a very wise one, but the king, who had been so signally out-generalled in the preceding campaign by the great Italian, was anxious to avoid his former errors, and might perhaps fall into as great ones by attempting two inconsistent lines of action: Leaving Biron in command of the infantry and a portion of the horse to continue the siege, he took the field himself with the greater part of the cavalry, intending to intercept and harass the enemy and to prevent his manifest purpose of throwing reinforcements and supplies into the invested city.

Proceeding to Neufchâtel and Aumale, he soon found himself in the neighbourhood of the Leaguers, and it was not long before skirmishing began. At this time, on a memorable occasion, Henry,

forgetting as usual in his eagerness for the joys of the combat that he was not a young captain of cavalry with his spurs to win by dashing into every mad adventure that might present itself, but a king fighting for his crown, with the welfare of a whole people depending on his fortunes, thought proper to place himself at the head of a handful of troopers to reconnoitre in person the camp of the Leaguers. Starting with five hundred horse, and ordering Lavaradin and Givery to follow with a larger body, while the Dukes of Nevers and Longueville were to move out, should it prove necessary, in force, the king rode forth as merrily as to a hunting party, drove in the scouts and pickets of the confederated armies, and, advancing still farther in his investigations, soon found himself attacked by a cavalry force of the enemy much superior to his own. A skirmish began, and it was necessary for the little troop to beat a hasty retreat, fighting as it ran. It was not long before Henry was recognised by the enemy, and the chase became all the more lively; George Basti, the famous Albanian trooper, commanding the force which pressed most closely upon the king. The news spread to the camp of the League that the Béarnese was the leader of the skirmishers. Mayenne believed it, and urged the instant advance of the flying squadron and of the whole vanguard. Farnese refused. It was impossible that the king should be there, he said, doing picket duty at the head of a company. It was a clumsy ambush to bring on a general engagement in the open field, and he was not to be drawn out of his trenches into a trap by such a shallow device. A French captain, who by command of Henry had purposely allowed himself to be taken, informed his captors that the skirmishers were in reality supported by a heavy force of infantry. This suggestion of the ready Béarnese confirmed the doubts of Alexander. Meantime the

1 Bentivoglio, *ubi sup.* De Thou, *ubi sup.* Dondini, iil. 474, *seqq.*



skirmishing steeplechase went on before his eyes. The king dashing down a hill received an arquebus shot in his side, but still rode for his life. Lavardin and Givry came to the rescue, but a panic seized their followers as the rumour flew that the king was mortally wounded—was already dead—so that they hardly brought a sufficient force to beat back the Leaguers. Givry's horse was soon killed under him, and his own thigh crushed; Lavardin was himself dangerously wounded. The king was more hard pressed than ever, men were falling on every side of him, when four hundred French dragoons—as a kind of musketeers who rode on hacks to the scene of action but did their work on foot, were called at that day—now dismounted and threw themselves between Henry and his pursuers. Nearly every man of them laid down his life, but they saved the king's. Their vigorous hand to hand fighting kept off the assailants until Nevers and Longueville received the king at the gates of Aumale with a force before which the Leaguers were fain to retreat as rapidly as they had come. 1

1 Bentivoglio, *ubi sup.* Dondini, iii. 480-494. Coloma, v. 81, *seqq.*, who gives the date of this remarkable skirmish as Feb. 16, while Umton furnishes a description of the affair in his letter of <sup>27 Jan.</sup><sub>6 Feb.</sub> Both were present on the ground.

"The king was most unhappily shot into the lowest part of his reins, which did nothing amaze him, and he notwithstanding, with great resolution, comforted the rest, and made his retreat. . . . The shot entered with obliquity downwards into the flesh, and not directly into the body, so that great hope is received of his short recovery, and the surgeon is of opinion that no vital part is offended." Umton (who made the whole campaign with the King) to Burghley, <sup>27 Jan.</sup><sub>6 Feb.</sub>

1592. (S. P. Office MS.)

Sir E. Stafford, who died towards the end of 1590, was succeeded as ambassador to Henry IV. by Sir Henry Umton or Umpton, son of Sir Edward Umpton, by Anne, relict of John Dudley, Earl of Warwick, and eldest daughter of Edward Seymour, Duke of Somerset. In the spring of this year he challenged the Duke of Guise for speaking of Queen

In this remarkable skirmish of Aumale the opposite qualities of Alexander and of Henry were signally illustrated. The king, by his constitutional temerity, by his almost puerile love of confronting danger for the danger's sake, was on the verge of sacrificing himself, with all the hopes of his house and of the nobler portion of his people, for an absolute nothing; while the duke, out of his superabundant caution, peremptorily refused to stretch out his hand and seize the person of his great enemy when directly within his grasp. Dead or alive, the Béarnese was unquestionably on that day in the power of Farnese, and with him the whole issue of the campaign and of the war. Never were the narrow limits that separate valour on the one side and discretion on the other from unpardonable lunacy more nearly effaced than on that occasion.

When would such an opportunity occur again?

The king's wound proved not very dangerous, although for many days troublesome, and it required, on account of his general state of health, a thorough cure. Meantime the royalists fell back from Aumale and Neufchâtel, both of which places were at once occupied by the Leaguers.

In pursuance of his original plan, the Duke of Parma advanced with his customary steadiness and deliberation towards Rouen. It was his intention to assault the king's army in its entrenchments in combination with a determined

Elizabeth "impudently, lightly, and overboldly, whose sacred person he represented." He proposed to meet the Duke with whatever arms he should choose, and on horseback or foot. "Nor would I have you to think," said the envoy, "any inequality of person between us, I being issued of as great a race and noble house every way as yourself. . . . If you consent not to meet me, I will hold you, and cause you to be generally held, for the errantest coward, and most slanderous slave that lives in all France." nothing came of the challenge. Umpton died four years afterwards in the French King's camp at La Fère, 8 July, 1596. Vide Fuller's *Worthies*, vol. i. pp. 91, 92 (ed 1811.)

sortie to be made by the besieged garrison. His preparations for the attack were ready on the 26th February, when he suddenly received a communication from de Villars, who had thus far most ably and gallantly conducted the defence of the place, informing him that it was no longer necessary to make a general attack. On the day before he had made a sally from the four gates of the city, had fallen upon the besiegers in great force, had wounded Biron and killed six hundred of his soldiers, had spiked several pieces of artillery and captured others which he had successfully brought into the town, and had in short so damaged the enemy's works and disconcerted him in all his plans, that he was confident of holding the place longer than the king could afford to stay in front of him." 1 All he wished was a moderate reinforcement of men and munitions. Farnese by no means sympathized with the confident tone of Villars nor approved of his proposition. He had come to relieve Rouen and to raise the siege, and he preferred to do his work thoroughly. Mayenne was however most heartily in favour of taking the advice of Villars. He urged that it was difficult for the Béarnese to keep an army long in the field, still more so in the trenches. Let them provide for the immediate wants of the city; then the usual process of decomposition would soon be witnessed in the ill-paid, ill-fed, desultory forces of the heretic pretender.

Alexander deferred to the wishes of Mayenne, although against his better judgment. Eight hundred infantry were successfully sent into Rouen. The army of the League then counter-marched into Picardy near the confines of Artois. 2

They were closely followed by Henry

at the head of his cavalry, and lively skirmishes were of frequent occurrence. In a military point of view none of these affairs were of consequence, but there was one which partook at once of the comic and the pathetic. For it chanced that in a cavalry action of more than common vivacity the Count Chaligny found himself engaged in a hand to hand conflict with a very dashing swordsman, who, after dealing and receiving many severe blows, at last succeeded in disarming the count and taking him prisoner. It was the fortune of war, and, but a few days before, might have been the fate of the great Henry himself. But Chaligny's mortification at his captivity became intense when he discovered that the knight to whom he had surrendered was no other than the king's jester. 1 That he, a chieftain of the Holy League, the long descended scion of the illustrious house of Loraine brother of the great Duke of Mercœur, should become the captive of a Huguenot buffoon seemed the most stinging jest yet perpetrated since fools had come in fashion. The famous Chicot—who was as fond of a battle as of a gibe, and who was almost as reckless a rider as his master—proved on this occasion that the cap and bells could cover as much magnanimity as did the most chivalrous crest. Although desperately wounded in the struggle which had resulted in his triumph, he generously granted to the Count his freedom without ransom. The proud Lorrainer returned to his Leaguers, and the poor fool died afterwards of his wounds. 2

The army of the allies moved through Picardy toward the confines of Artois, and sat down leisurely to beleague Rue, a low-lying place on the banks and near the mouth of the Somme, the only town in the province which still held for the king. It was suffi-

1 Parma to Philip, 11 March, 1592. (Arch. de Sim. MS.) Compare Bentivoglio, *ubi sup.* De Thou, xi. 470, *segg.*

2 Bentivoglio, *ubi sup.* Dondini iii. 497-630. Coloma, v. 85-95. Meteren, xvi. 302, 303. Bor, III. xxviii. 616-620.

1 De Thou, *ubi sup.* 468. Umton to Burghley, 8 Feb. 1592. (S. P. Office MS.)

2 De Thou, *loc. cit.*

ciently fortified to withstand a good deal of battering, and it certainly seemed mere trifling for the great Duke of Parma to leave the Netherlands in such confusion, with young Maurice of Nassau carrying everything before him, and to come all the way into Normandy in order, with the united armies of Spain and the League, to besiege the insignificant town of Rue.

And this was the opinion of Farnese, but he had chosen throughout the campaign to show great deference to the judgment of Mayenne. Meantime the month of March wore away, and what had been predicted came to pass. Henry's forces dwindled away as usual. His cavaliers rode off to forage for themselves, when their battles were denied them, and the king was now at the head of not more than sixteen thousand foot and five thousand horse. On the other hand the Leaguers' army had been melting quite as rapidly. With the death of Pope Sfondrato, his nephew Montemarciano had disappeared with his two thousand Swiss; while the French cavalry and infantry, ill-fed and uncomfortable, were diminishing daily. Especially the Walloons, Flemings, and other Netherlanders of Parma's army, took advantage of their proximity to the borders, and escaped in large numbers to their own homes. It was but meagre and profitless campaigning on both sides during those wretched months of winter and early spring, although there was again an opportunity for Sir Roger Williams, at the head of two hundred musketeers and one hundred and fifty pikemen, to make one of his brilliant skirmishes under the eye of the Béarnese. Surprised and without armour, he jumped in doublet and hose, on horseback, and led his men merrily against five squadrons of Spanish and Italian horse, and six companies of Spanish infantry; singled out and unhorsed the leader of the Spanish troopers, and nearly cut off the head of the

famous Albanian chief George Basti with one swinging blow of his sword. Then, being reinforced by some other English companies, he succeeded in driving the whole body of Italians and Spaniards, with great loss, quite into their entrenchments. „The king doth commend him very highly,” said Umtom, „and doth more than wonder at the valour of our nation. I never heard him give more honour to any service nor to any man than he doth to Sir Roger Williams and the rest, whom he held as lost men, and for which he has caused public thanks to be given to God.” 1

At last Villars, who had so peremptorily rejected assistance at the end of February, sent to say that if he were not relieved by the middle of April he should be obliged to surrender the city. If the siege were not raised by the twentieth of the month he informed Parma, to his profound astonishment, that Rouen would be in Henry's hands. 2

In effecting this result the strict blockade maintained by the Dutch squadron at the mouth of the river, and the resolute manner in which those cruisers dashed at every vessel attempting to bring relief to Rouen, were mainly instrumental. As usual with the stern Hollanders and Zeelanders when engaged at sea with the Spaniards, it was war to the knife. Early in April twelve large vessels, well armed and manned, attempted to break the blockade. A combat ensued, at the end of which eight of the Spanish ships were captured, two were sunk, and two were set on fire in token of victory, every man on board of all being killed and thrown into the sea. Queen Elizabeth herself gave the first news of this achievement to the Dutch envoy in London. „And in truth,” said he, „her Majesty expressed herself, in commu-

1 Umtom to Burghley, 21 April, 1592. (S. P. Office MS.)

2 Bentivoglio, Dondini, Coloma, Meteren, Bor, *ubi sup.*



nicating these tidings, with such affection and extravagant joy to the glory and honour of our nation and men-of-war's-men, that it wonderfully delighted me, and did me good into my very heart to hear it from her." 1

Instantly Farnese set himself to the work, which, had he followed his own judgment, would already have been accomplished. Henry with his cavalry had established himself at Dieppe and Arques, within a distance of five or six leagues from the infantry engaged in the siege of Rouen. Alexander saw the profit to be derived from the separation between the different portions of the enemy's forces, and marched straight upon the enemy's entrenchments. He knew the disadvantage of assailing a strongly fortified camp, but believed that by a well-concerted, simultaneous assault by Villars from within and the Leaguers from without, the king's forces would be compelled to raise the siege or be cut up in their trenches.

But Henry did not wait for the attack. He had changed his plan, and, for once in his life, substituted extreme caution for his constitutional temerity. Neither awaiting the assault upon his entrenchments nor seeking his enemy in the open field, he ordered the whole camp to be broken up, and on the 20th of April raised the siege. 2

Farnese marched into Rouen, where the Leaguers were received with tumultuous joy, and this city, most important for the purposes of the League and for Philip's ulterior designs, was thus rescued from the grasp just closing upon it. Henry's main army now concentrated itself in the neighbourhood of Dieppe, but the cavalry under his immediate superintendence continued to harass the Leaguers. It was now determined to lay

siege to Caudebec, on the right bank of the Seine, three leagues below Rouen; the possession of this place by the enemy being a constant danger and difficulty to Rouen, whose supplies by the Seine were thus cut off.

Alexander, as usual, superintended the planting of the batteries against the place. He had been suffering during the whole campaign from those dropsical ailments which were making life a torture to him; yet his indomitable spirit rose superior to his physical disorders, and he wrought all day long on foot or on horseback, when he seemed only fit to be placed on his bed as a rapid passage to his grave. On this occasion, in company with the Italian engineer Properzio, he had been for some time examining with critical nicety the preliminaries for the siege, when it was suddenly observed by those around him that he was growing pale. It then appeared that he had received a musket-ball between the wrist and the elbow, and had been bleeding profusely; but had not indicated by a word or the movement of a muscle that he had been wounded, so intent was he upon carrying out the immediate task to which he had set himself. It was indispensable, however, that he should now take to his couch. The wound was not trifling, and to one in his damaged and dropsical condition it was dangerous. Fever set in, with symptoms of gangrene, and it became necessary to entrust the command of the League to Mayenne. 1 But it was hardly concealed from Parma that the duke was playing a double game. Prince Ranuccio, according to his father's express wish, was placed provisionally at the head of the Flemish forces. This was conceded, however, with much heart-burning, and with consequences easily to be imagined.

Meantime Caudebec fell at once.

1 Noel de Caron to the States-General, 22 April, 1592. (Hague Archives MS.)

2 Noel de Caron to the States-General, 22 April, 1592. (Hague Archives MS.) Parma to Philip, 25 April, 1592. (Arch. de Simancas MS.) 1592. Ibid.

1 Bentivoglio, Dondini, Coloma, De Thou, Meteren, Bor, *ubi sup.* (Letter of Parma last cited.)

Henry did nothing to relieve it, and the place could offer but slight resistance to the force arrayed against it. The bulk of the king's army was in the neighbourhood of Dieppe, where they had been recently strengthened by twenty companies of Netherlanders and Scotchmen brought by Count Philip Nassau.<sup>1</sup> The League's headquarters were in the village of Yvetot, capital to the realm of the whimsical little potentate so long renowned under that name.<sup>2</sup>

The king, in pursuance of the plan he had marked out for himself, restrained

3 May, his skirmishing more than 1592, was his wont. Nevertheless

he lay close to Yvetot. His cavalry, swelling and falling as usual like an Alpine torrent, had now filled up its old channels again, for once more the mountain chivalry had poured themselves around their king. With ten thousand horsemen he was now pressing the Leaguers, from time to time, very hard, and on one occasion the skirmishing became so close and so lively that a general engagement seemed imminent. Young Ranuccio had a horse shot under him, and his father—suffering as he was—had himself dragged out of bed and brought on a litter into the field, where he was set on horseback, trampling on wounds and disease, and, as it were, on death itself, that he might by his own unsurpassed keenness of eye and quickness of resource protect the army which had been entrusted to his care. The action continued all day; young Bentivoglio, nephew of the famous Cardinal, historian and diplomatist, receiving a bad wound in the leg, as he fought gallantly at the side of Ranuccio. Carlo Coloma also distinguished himself in the engagement. Night separated the combatants before either side had gained a manifest advantage, and on the morrow

it seemed for the interest of neither to resume the struggle.<sup>1</sup>

The field where this campaign was to be fought was a narrow peninsula enclosed between the sea and the rivers Seine and Dieppe.<sup>2</sup> In this peninsula, called the Land of Caux, it was Henry's intention to shut up his enemy. Farnese had finished the work that he had been sent to do, and was anxious, as Henry was aware, to return to the Netherlands. Rouen was relieved, Caudebec had fallen. There was not food or forage enough in the little peninsula to feed both the city and the whole army of the League. Shut up in this narrow area, Alexander must starve or surrender. His only egress was into Picardy and so home to Artois, through the base of the isosceles triangle between the two rivers and on the borders of Picardy. On this base Henry had posted his whole army. Should Farnese assail him, thus provided with a strong position and superiority of force, defeat was certain. Should he remain where he was, he must inevitably starve. He had no communications with the outside. The Hollanders lay with their ships below Caudebec, blockading the river's mouth and the coast. His only chance of extrication lay across the Seine. But Alexander was neither a bird nor a fish, and it was necessary, so Henry thought, to be either the one or the other to cross that broad, deep, and rapid river, where there were no bridges, and where the constant ebb and flow of the tide made transportation almost impossible in face of a powerful army in rear and flank. Farnese's situation seemed desperate, while the shrewd Béarnese sat smiling serenely, carefully watching at the mouth of the trap into which he had at last inveigled his mighty adversary. Secure of his triumph, he seemed

<sup>1</sup> Bentivoglio, Dondini, Coloma, Meteren, Bor, De Thou, *ubi sup.*

<sup>2</sup> The stream, the mouth of which is at Dieppe, was then called by the same name as the town.

<sup>1</sup> Bor, III. xxviii. 604.

<sup>2</sup> De Thou, xi. 481, *seqq.*

to have changed his nature, and to have become as sedate and wary as, by habit, he was impetuous and hot.

And in truth Farnese found himself in very narrow quarters. There was no hay for his horses, no bread for his men. A penny loaf was sold for two shillings. A jug of water was worth a crown. As for meat or wine, they were hardly to be dreamed of. His men were becoming furious at their position. They had enlisted to fight, not to starve, and they murmured that it was better for an army to fall with weapons in its hands than to drop to pieces hourly with the enemy looking on and enjoying their agony.

It was obvious to Farnese that there were but two ways out of his dilemma. He might throw himself upon Henry—strongly entrenched as he was, and with much superior forces to his own, upon ground deliberately chosen for himself—defeat him utterly, and march over him back to the Netherlands. This would be an agreeable result; but the undertaking seemed difficult, to say the least. Or he might throw his army across the Seine and make his escape through the isle of France and Southern Picardy back to the so-called obedient provinces. But it seemed hopeless without bridges or pontoons to attempt the passage of the Seine.

There was, however, no time left for hesitation. Secretly he took his resolution and communicated it in strict confidence to Mayenne, to Ranuccio, and to one or two other chiefs. He came to Caudebec, and there, close to the margin of the river, he threw up a redoubt. On the opposite bank he constructed another. On both he planted artillery, placing a force of eight hundred Netherlands under Count Bossu in the one and an equal number of the same nation, Walloons chiefly, under Barlotte in the other. He collected all the vessels, flatboats, wherries, and

rafts that could be found or put together at Rouen, and then under cover of his forts he transported all the Flemish infantry, and the Spanish, French, and Italian cavalry, during the night

22 May, of 22nd May to the opposite bank of the Seine. Next morning he sent up all the artillery together with the Flemish cavalry to Rouen, where, making what use he could by temporary contrivances of the broken arches of the broken bridge, in order to shorten the distance from shore to shore, he managed to convey his whole army with all its trains across the river. 1

A force was left behind, up to the last moment, to engage in the customary skirmishes, and to display themselves as largely as possible for the purpose of imposing upon the enemy. The young Prince of Parma had command of this rearguard. The device was perfectly successful. The news of the movement was not brought to the ears of Henry until after it had been accomplished. When the king reached the shore of the Seine, he saw to his infinite chagrin and indignation that the last stragglers of the army, including the garrison of the fort on the right bank, were just ferrying themselves across under command of Ranuccio. 2

Furious with disappointment he brought some pieces of artillery to bear upon the triumphant fugitives. Not a shot told, and the Leaguers had the satisfaction of making a bonfire in the king's face, of the boats which had brought them over. Then, taking up their line of march rapidly inland, they placed themselves completely out of the reach of the Huguenot guns.

Henry had a bridge at Pont de l'Arche, and his first impulse was to pursue with his cavalry, but it was obvious that his

1 Bentivoglio, Dondini, Coloma, De Thou, Bor, Meteren, *ubi sup.* Letter of Parma last cited.

2 Bentivoglio, Dondini, Coloma, De Thou, Bor, Meteren, *ubi sup.*

1 Bor, III. xxviii, 619.



infantry could never march by so circuitous a route fast enough to come up with the enemy, who had already so prodigious a stride in advance.<sup>1</sup>

There was no need to disguise it to himself. Henry saw himself for the second time out-generalled by the consummate Farnese; The trap was broken, the game had given him the slip. The manner in which the duke had thus extricated himself from a profound dilemma, in which his fortunes seemed hopelessly sunk, has usually been considered one of the most extraordinary exploits of his life.<sup>2</sup>

Precisely at this time, too, ill news reached Henry from Brittany and the neighbouring country. The Princes Conti and Dombes had been obliged, on the 13th May, 1592, to raise the siege of Crayon, in consequence of the advance of the Duke of Mercœur, with a force of seven thousand men.<sup>3</sup> They numbered, including lanzknechts and the English contingent, about half as many, and before they could effect their retreat were attacked by Mercœur, and utterly routed. The English, who alone stood to their colours, were nearly all cut to pieces. The rest made a disorderly retreat,<sup>4</sup> „but were ultimately, with few exceptions, captured or slain. The duke, following up his victory, seized Château Gontier and La Val, important crossing places on the river Mayenne, and laid siege to Mayenne, capital city of that region. The panic, spreading through Brittany and Maine, threatened the king's cause there with complete overthrow, hampered his operations in Normandy, and vastly encouraged the Leaguers. It became necessary for Henry to renounce his designs upon Rouen, and the pursuit of Parma, and to retire to Vernon, there to occupy himself with plans for the relief of Brittany. In vain

had the Earl of Essex, whose brother had already been killed in the campaign, manifested such head-long gallantry in that country as to call forth the sharpest rebukes from the admiring but anxious Elizabeth. The handful of brave Englishmen who had been withdrawn from the Netherlands, much to the dissatisfaction of the States-General, in order to defend the coasts of Brittany, would have been better employed under Maurice of Nassau. So soon as the heavy news reached the king, the faithful Umton was sent for. „He imparted the same unto me,” said the envoy, „with extraordinary passion and discontent. He discoursed at large of his miserable estate, of the factions of his servants, and of their ill-dispositions, and then required my opinion touching his course for Brittany, as also what further aid he might expect from her majesty; alleging that unless he were presently strengthened by England it was impossible for him longer to resist the greatness of the King of Spain, who assailed his country by Brittany, Languedoc, the Low Countries by the Duke of Saxony and the Duke of Lorraine, and so ended his speech passionately.<sup>1</sup> Thus adjured, Sir Henry spoke to the king firmly but courteously, reminding him how, contrary to English advice, he had followed other counsellors to the neglect of Brittany, and had broken his promises to the queen. He concluded by urging him to advance into that country in person, but did not pledge himself on behalf of her Majesty to any further assistance. „To this,” said Umton, „the king gave a willing ear, and replied, with many thanks, and without disallowing of anything that I alleged, yielding many excuses of his want of means, not of disposition, to provide a remedy, not forgetting to acknowledge her Majesty's care of him and his country, and especially of Brittany, excusing much the

1 Bentivoglio, Dondini, Coloma, De Thou, Sor, Meteren, *ubi sup.*

2 Ibid.

3 Umton to Burghley, 24 May, 1592, O. S. S. P. Office MS.)

4 Ibid.

1 Ibid.

bad disposition of his counsellors, and inclining much to my motion to go in person thither, especially because he might thereby give her Majesty better satisfaction; . . . and protesting that he would either immediately himself make war there in those parts or send an army thither. I do not doubt," added the ambassador, „but with good handling her Majesty may now obtain any reasonable matter for the conservation of Brittany, as also for a place of retreat for the English, and I urge continually the yielding of Brest into her Majesty's hands, whereunto I find the king well inclined, if he might bring it to pass." 1

Alexander passed a few days in Paris, where he was welcomed with much cordiality, recruiting his army for a brief period in the land of Brie, and then—broken in health but entirely successful—he dragged himself once more to Spa to drink the waters. He left an auxiliary force with Mayenne, and promised—infinitely against his own wishes—to obey his master's commands and return again before the winter to do the League's work. 2

And thus Alexander had again solved a difficult problem. He had saved for his master and for the League the second city of France and the whole coast of Normandy. Rouen had been relieved in masterly manner even as Paris had been succoured the year before. He had done this, although opposed by the sleepless energy and the exuberant valour of the quick-witted Navarre, and although encumbered by the assistance of the ponderous Duke of Mayenne. His military reputation, through these two famous reliefs and retreats, grew greater than ever.

No commander of the age was thought capable of doing what he had thus done. Yet, after all, what had he accomplished? Did he not feel in his heart of hearts that he was but a strong and most

skilful swimmer struggling for a little while against an ocean-tide which was steadily sweeping him and his master and all their fortunes far out into the infinite depths?

Something of this breathed ever in his most secret utterances. But, so long as life was in him, his sword and his genius were at the disposal of his sovereign, to carry out a series of schemes as futile as they were nefarious.

For us, looking back upon the Past, which was then the Future, it is easy to see how remorselessly the great current of events was washing away the system and the personages seeking to resist its power and to oppose the great moral principles by which human affairs in the long run are invariably governed. Spain and Rome were endeavouring to obliterate the landmarks of race, nationality, historical institutions, and the tendencies of awakened popular conscience, throughout Christendom, and to substitute for them a dead level of conformity to one regal and sacerdotal despotism.

England, Holland, the Navarre party in France, and a considerable part of Germany were contending for national unity and independence, for vested and recorded rights. Much farther than they themselves or their chieftains dreamed those millions of men were fighting for a system of temperate human freedom; for that emancipation under just laws from arbitrary human control, which is the right—however frequently trampled upon—of all classes, conditions, and races of men; and for which it is the instinct of the human race to continue to struggle under every disadvantage, and often against all hope, throughout the ages, so long as the very principle of humanity shall not be extinguished in those who have been created after their Maker's image.

It may safely be doubted whether the great Queen, the Béarnese, Alexander Farnese, or his master, with

1 Umton to Burghley, 24 May, 1593, O. S. (S. P. Office MS.)

2 Ibid.

many of their respective adherents, differed very essentially from each other in their notions of the right divine and the right of the people. But history has shown us which of them best understood the spirit of the age, and had the keenest instinct to keep themselves in the advance by moving fastest in the direction whither it was marshalling all men. There were many earnest, hard-toiling men in those days, men who believed

in the work to which they devoted their lives. Perhaps, too, the devil-worshippers did their master's work as strenuously and heartily as any, and got fame and pelf for their pains. Fortunately, a good portion of what they so laboriously wrought for has vanished into air; while humanity has at least gained something from those who deliberately or instinctively conformed themselves to her eternal laws.

## CHAPTER XXVI.

Return of Prince Maurice to the siege of Steenwyck—Capitulation of the besieged—Effects of the introduction of mining operations—Maurice besieges Coeworden—Verdugo attempts to relieve the city, but fails—The city capitulates, and Prince Maurice retreats into winter-quarters.

WHILE Farnese had thus been strengthening the bulwarks of Philip's universal monarchy in that portion of his proposed French dominions which looked towards England, there had been opportunity for Prince Maurice to make an assault upon the Frisian defences of this vast realm. It was difficult to make half Europe into one great Spanish fortification, guarding its every bastion and every point of the curtain, without far more extensive armaments than the „Great King,” as the Leaguers proposed that Philip should entitle himself, had ever had at his disposal. It might be a colossal scheme to stretch the rod of empire over so large a portion of the earth, but the dwarfish attempts to carry the design into execution hardly reveal the hand of genius. It is astonishing to contemplate the meagre numbers and the slender funds with which this world-empire was to be asserted and maintained. The armies arrayed at any important point hardly exceeded a modern division or two; while the resources furnished for a year would hardly pay in later days for a few weeks' campaign.

When Alexander, the first commander

of his time, moved out of Flanders into France with less than twenty thousand men, he left most vital portions of his master's hereditary dominions so utterly unprotected that it was possible to attack them with a handful of troops. The young disciple of Simon Stevinus now resumed that practical demonstration of his principles which had been in the previous year so well begun.

On the 28th May, 1592, Maurice, 28 May, taking the field with six thousand foot and two thousand horse, came once more before Steenwyck. It will be remembered that he had been obliged to relinquish the siege of this place in order to confront the Duke of Parma in July, 1591, at Nymegen.

The city—very important from its position, being the key to the province of Drenthe as well as one of the safeguards of Friesland—had been besieged in vain by Count Renneberg after his treasonable surrender of Groningen, of which he was governor, to the Spaniards, but had been subsequently surprised by Tassis. Since that time it had held for the king. Its fortifications were strong, and of the best description known at that day. Its regular garrison was sixteen companies of foot and some cavalry under Antoine de Quocqueville, military governor. Besides these troops were twelve hundred Walloon infantry, commanded by Lewis, youngest Count



van den Berg, a brave lad of eighteen years, with whom were the lord of Waterdyck and other Netherland nobles.<sup>1</sup>

To the military student the siege may possess importance as marking a transitional epoch in the history of the beleaguering science. To the general reader, as in most of the exploits of the young Poliorcetes, its details have but slender interest. Perhaps it was here that the spade first vindicated its dignity, and entitled itself to be classed as a military weapon of value along with pike and arquebus. It was here that the soldiers of Maurice, burrowing in the ground at ten stuyvers a day, were jeered at by the enemy from the battlements as boors and ditchers, who had forfeited their right to be considered soldiers—but jeered at for the last time.

From 30th May to 9th June the prince was occupied in throwing up earthworks on the low grounds in order to bring his guns into position. On the 13th June he began to batter forty-five pieces, but effected little more than to demolish some of the breast-works. He threw hot shot into the town very diligently, too, but did small damage. The cannonading went on for nearly a week, but the practice was so very indifferent—notwithstanding the protection of the blessed Barbara and the tuition of the busmasters—that the besieged began to amuse themselves with these empty and monotonous salvos of the honourable Artillery Guild. When all this blazing and thundering had led to no better result than to convert a hundred thousand good Flemish florins into noise and smoke, the thrifty Netherlanders on both sides the walls began to disparage the young general's reputation. After all, they said, the Spaniards were right when they called artillery mere *espanta-*

*vellacos* or scare-cowards.<sup>1</sup> This burrowing and bellowing must at last give place to the old-fashioned push of pike, and then it would be seen who the soldiers were. Observations like these

were freely made under a 19 June. flag of truce; for on the 19th June—notwithstanding their contempt for the *espanta-vellacos*—the besieged had sent out a deputation to treat for an honourable surrender. Maurice entertained the negotiators hospitably in his own tent, but the terms suggested to him were inadmissible. Nothing came of the conference therefore but mutual criticisms, friendly enough, although sufficiently caustic.

Maurice now ceased cannonading, and burrowed again for ten days without interruption. Four mines, leading to different points of the defences, were patiently constructed, and two large chambers at the terminations, neatly finished off and filled respectively with five thousand and twenty-five hundred pounds of powder, were at last established under two of the principal bastions.<sup>2</sup>

During all this digging there had been a couple of sorties in which the besieged had inflicted great damage on their enemy, and got back into the town with a few prisoners, having lost but six of their own men.<sup>3</sup> Sir Francis Vere had been severely wounded in the leg, so that he was obliged to keep his bed during the rest of the siege. Verdugo, too, had made a feeble attempt to reinforce the place with three hundred men, sixty or seventy of whom had entered, while the rest had been killed or captured.<sup>4</sup> On such a small scale was Philip's world-empire contended for by his stadholder in Friesland; yet it was certainly not the fault of the stout old Portuguese. Verdugo would rather have sent thirty thousand men to

<sup>1</sup> Reyd, *ubi sup.*

<sup>2</sup> Bor, Meteren, Reyd, Coloma, *ubi sup.*

<sup>3</sup> Ibid. Coloma says that three hundred of the besiegers were killed in this sally.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid.

<sup>1</sup> Bor, III. xxviii. 628-633. Meteren, xvi. 304, 305. Reyd, ix. 177-180. Coloma, v. 99, 100.

save the front door of his great province than three hundred. But every available man—and few enough of them they were—had been sent out of the Netherlands, to defend the world-empire in its outposts of Normandy and Brittany.

This was Philip the Prudent's system for conquering the world, and men looked upon him as the consummation of kingcraft.

On the 3rd July Maurice ordered his whole force to be in readiness for the assault. The mines were then sprung. The bastion of the east gate was blown to ruins. The mine under the Gast-Huys bulwark burst outwardly, and buried alive many Hollanders standing ready for the assault. 1 At this untoward accident Maurice hesitated to give the signal for storming the breach, but the panic within the town was so evident that Lewis William lost no time in seizing the overthrown eastern bulwark, from the ruins of which he looked over the whole city. 2 The other broken bastion was likewise easily mastered, and the besieged, seeing the storm about to burst upon them with irresistible fury, sent a trumpet. Meantime Maurice, inspecting the effects of the explosion and preparing for the assault, had been shot through the left cheek. The wound was not dangerous, and the prince extracted the bullet with his own hand, 3 but the change of half an inch would have made it fatal. He was not incapacitated—after his wound had been dressed, amidst the remonstrances of his friends for his temerity—from listening to the propositions of the city. They were refused, for the prince was sure of having his town on his own terms.

Next day he permitted the garrison to depart; the officers and soldiers promising not to serve the King of Spain on the Netherland

side of the Rhine for six months. They were to take their baggage but to leave arms, flags, munitions, and provisions. Both Maurice and Lewis William were for insisting on sterner conditions, but the States' deputies and members of the council who were present, as usual, in camp urged the building of the golden bridge. After all, a fortified city, the second in importance after Groningen of all those regions, was the real prize contended for. The garrison was meagre and much reduced during the siege. The fortifications, of masonry and earthwork combined, were nearly as strong as ever. Saint Barbara had done them but little damage, but the town itself was in a sorry plight. Churches and houses were nearly all shot to pieces, and the inhabitants had long been dwelling in the cellars. Two hundred of the garrison remained, severely wounded, in the town; three hundred and fifty had been killed, among others the young cousin of the Nassaus, Count Lewis van den Berg. The remainder of the royalists marched out, and were treated with courtesy by Maurice, who gave them an escort, permitting the soldiers to retain their side-arms, and furnishing horses to the governor.

In the besieging army five or six hundred had been killed and many wounded, but not in numbers bearing the same proportion to the slain as in modern battles. 1

The siege had lasted forty-four days. When it was over, and men came out

1 At least this is the testimony of all the Dutch historians, but—as has been the case in all sieges and battles since men began to besiege and to fight battles—the evidence given by the two sides is in almost direct conflict.

According to Coloma, thirteen hundred of the besiegers had been killed outright during the assaults, and there were so many wounded that not 5000 were left unhurt in their camp, out 10,000 with which the siege began. On the other hand, according to the same authority, the besieged had lost but 150 killed, and a few more that number wounded: f. 99<sup>vo</sup>. But we have seen that the whole of the besieging army amounted only to 8000.

1 Bor, Meteren, Reyd, Coloma, *ubi sup*.

2 Ibid.

3 Ibid. Letter of John the Younger to his father, in Groen v. Prinsterer. (Archives II. s. i. 198.)

from the town to examine at leisure the prince's camp and his field of operations, they were astounded at the amount of labour performed in so short a time. The oldest campaigners confessed that they never before had understood what a siege really was, and they began to conceive a higher respect for the art of the engineer than they had ever done before. „Even those who were wont to rail at science and labour,” said one who was present in the camp of Maurice, „declared that the siege would have been a far more arduous undertaking had it not been for those two engineers, Joost Matthes of Alost, and Jacob Kemp of Gorcum. It is high time to take from soldiers the false notion that it is shameful to work with the spade; an error which was long prevalent among the Netherlands, and still prevails among the French, to the great detriment of the king's affairs, as may be seen in his sieges.”<sup>1</sup>

Certainly the result of Henry's recent campaign before Rouen had proved sufficiently how much better it would have been for him had there been some Dutch Joosts and Jacobs with their picks and shovels in his army at that critical period. They might perhaps have baffled Parma as they had done Verdugo.

Without letting the grass grow under his feet, Maurice now led his army from 26 July, Steenwyck to Zwoll, and arrived on the 26th July before Coeworden.

This place, very strong by art and still stronger by nature, was the other key to all north Netherland—Friesland, Groningen, and Drenthe. Should it fall into the hands of the republic it would be impossible for the Spaniards to retain much longer the rich and important capital of all that country, the city of Groningen. Coeworden lay between two vast morasses, one of which—the Bour-tange swamp—extended some thirty miles to the bay of the Dollart; while the

other spread nearly as far in a westerly direction to the Zuyder Zee. Thus these two great marshes were a frame—an almost impassable barrier—by which the northern third of the whole territory of the republic was encircled and defended. Throughout this great morass there was not a handbreadth of solid ground—not a resting-place for a human foot, save the road which led through Coeworden. This passage lay upon a natural deposit of hard, dry sand, interposed as if by a caprice of nature between the two swamps, and was about half a mile in width.<sup>1</sup>

The town itself was well fortified, and Verdugo had been recently strengthening the position with additional earth-works.<sup>2</sup> A thousand veterans formed the garrison under command of another Van den Berg, the Count Frederic.<sup>3</sup> It was the fate of these sister's-children of the great founder of the republic to serve the cause of foreign despotism with remarkable tenacity against their own countrymen; and against their nearest blood relations. On many conspicuous occasions they were almost as useful to Spain and the Inquisition as the son and nearly all the other kinsmen of William the Silent had rendered themselves to the cause of Holland and of freedom.

Having thoroughly entranced his camp before Coeworden and begun the regular approaches Maurice left his cousin Lewis William to superintend the siege operations for the moment, and advanced towards Ootmarsum, a frontier town which might give him trouble if in the hands of a relieving force. The place fell at once, with the loss of but one life to the States army, but that a very valuable one; General de Famars, one of the original signers of the famous Compromise, and a most

<sup>1</sup> Guicciardini *in voce*. Reyd, ix. 186, *seqq.*

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>3</sup> Reyd, *ubi sup.* Meteren, xvi. 306. Bor, III. xxviii. 639, *seqq.*

<sup>1</sup> Reyd, *ubi sup.*



distinguished soldier of the republic, having been killed before the gates.

On the 31st July, Maurice returned July 31, to his entrenchments. The 1592. enemy professed unbounded confidence; Van den Berg not doubting that he should be relieved by Verdugo, and Verdugo being sure that Van den Berg would need no relief. The Portuguese veteran indeed was inclined to wonder at Maurice's presumption in attacking so impregnable a fortress. „If Coeworden does not hold,” said he, „there is no place in the world that can hold.”<sup>1</sup>

Count Peter Ernest was still acting as governor-general; for Alexander Farnese, on returning from his second French campaign, had again betaken himself, shattered and melancholy, to the waters of Spa, leaving the responsibility for Netherland affairs upon the German octogenarian.<sup>2</sup> To him, and to the nonagenarian Mondragon at Antwerp, the veteran Verdugo now called loudly for aid against the youthful pedant, whom all men had been laughing at a twelvemonth or so before. The Macedonian phalanx, Simon Stevinus, and delving Dutch boors—unworthy of the name of soldiers—seemed to be steadily digging the ground from under Philip's feet in his hereditary domains.

What would become of the world-empire, where was the great king—not of Spain alone, nor of France alone—but the great monarch of all Christendom, to plant his throne securely, if his Frisian strongholds, his most important northern outposts, were to fall before an almost beardless youth at the head of a handful of republican militia?

Verdugo did his best, but the best was little. The Spanish and Italian legions had been sent out of the Netherlands into France. Many had died there,

many were in hospital after their return, nearly all the rest were mutinous for want of pay.

On the 16th August, Maurice formally summoned Coeworden 16 Aug. to surrender. After the trum- 1592. peter had blown thrice, Count Van den Berg forbidding all others, came alone upon the walls and demanded his message. „To claim this city in the name of Prince Maurice of Nassau and of the States-General,” was the reply.

„Tell him first to beat down my walls as flat as the ditch,” said Van den Berg, „and then to bring five or six storms. Six months after that I will think whether I will send a trumpet.”<sup>1</sup>

The prince proceeded steadily with his approaches, but he was infinitely chagrined by the departure out of his camp of Sir Francis Vere with his English contingent of three regiments, whom Queen Elizabeth had peremptorily ordered to the relief of King Henry in Brittany.

Nothing amazes the modern mind so much as the exquisite paucity of forces and of funds by which the world-empire was fought for and resisted in France, Holland, Spain, and England. The scenes of war were rapidly shifted—almost like the slides of a magic-lantern—from one country to another; the same conspicuous personages, almost the same individual armies, perpetually re-appearing in different places as if a wild phantasmagoria were capriciously repeating itself to bewilder the imagination. Essex, and Vere, and Roger Williams, and Black Norris—Van der Does, and Admiral Nassau, the Meetkerks and Count Philip—Farnese and Mansfeld, George Basti, Arenberg, Berlaymont, La Noue and Telnigny, Aquila and Coloma—were seen alternately fighting, retreating, triumphant, beleaguering, campaigning all along the great territory which extends from the Bay of Biscay to the

<sup>1</sup> Reynd, *ubi sup.*

<sup>2</sup> Parma to P. E. Mansfeld, 16 Aug. 1592. Same to Philip, 24 Aug. 1592. (Arch. de Simancas MS.)

<sup>1</sup> Bor, Reynd, Meteren, *ubi sup.*

crag of Brittany, and across the narrow seas to the bogs of Ireland, and thence through the plains of Picardy and Flanders to the swamps of Groningen and the frontiers of the Rhine.

This was the arena in which the great struggle was ever going on, but the champions were so few in number that their individual shapes become familiar to us like the figures of an oft-repeated pageant. And now the withdrawal of certain companies of infantry and squadrons of cavalry from the Spanish armies into France, had left obedient Netherland too weak to resist rebellious Netherland, while, on the other hand, the withdrawal of some twenty or thirty companies of English auxiliaries—most hard-fighting veterans it is true, but very few in number—was likely to imperil the enterprise of Maurice in Friesland.

The removal of these companies from the Low Countries to strengthen the Béarnese in the north of France, formed the subject of much bitter diplomatic conference between the States and England; the order having been communicated by the great queen herself in many a vehement epistle and caustic speech, enforced by big, manly oaths. 1

1 The cantionary towns required to be held at this season with a firm hand. The days were gone when the States looked up to the representative of the queen as a „Messiah,” and felt that she alone sustained them from sinking into ruin. A series of victories over the Spaniards, and the amazing fatuity of the Spanish policy, had given them vast confidence in themselves, and a growing contempt for their great enemy. They did not feel themselves entirely dependent on England, but considered the services rendered by each country to the other as fairly equal, and they therefore the more keenly resented the withdrawal of troops to which they believed themselves thoroughly entitled by their contract. It was an infraction of the treaty, in their opinion, to hold their cities, yet to send the English auxiliaries into France. There were rising commotions in Flushing and Ostend, while at the same time it was felt that the foreign enemy at any moment was capable of making a sudden assault on those most vital places. „It is advertised me out of England,” said

Verdugo, although confident in the strength of the place, had represented

Sir Robert Sidney, Governor of Flushing, „that there be some men of war that say that Flushing may be kept with a white rod. I know not whether they have the Caduceus which the poets write that Mercury had, which was of force to bring sleep upon a man. If they have not, truly they little know this town, or perhaps will not say what indeed they think, being not in their own particular interested in the good or ill of it. . . . The burghers, I confess, carry themselves very honestly, and I persuade myself that the queen hath many true servants among them, notwithstanding the chief way to keep them still honest is to have such a garrison as may pay them at any time the price of doing ill.” The governor protested that twenty-two companies of 135 men each were not a stronger garrison for his town than five companies had been a few years before. The republican sentiment had so much displaced the feeling of dependence on a foreign sovereign that the protectors were grown to appear almost like enemies. Formerly matters were very different. „Then was the name of the queen revered in all these countries,” he said, „as of another saviour; and there was love unto her, and unto her subjects, such as if they had been all of one nation. The Earl of Leicester, in name and effect, was Governour-General of the whole country. My brother (Sir Philip Sydney) had, joined to the government which now I have, the regiment of Zeeland, which are the troops from which this garrison has to fear most any sudden harm. The provinces then were poor, and ill order among them, and the States generally hated of the people. Every day a town lost, the King of Spain’s army mighty, himself entangled with no other wars, and to all these harms there was no show of hope but from the queen, all other princes directly shunning their alliance. The people saw that the queen’s taking the cause in hand, and the succour she sent, had been the only pillar which, after the loss of Antwerp, had held up their State from utter ruin, which bred a love for the queen, and a fear of displeasing her. . . . All this has since been changed: there is a new face on the State and people; the governour-general has lost all authority; all the commandment of the armies is in their hands.” The governour then assigned many pregnant reasons for the withdrawing of love from the English and their queen on part of the Netherlanders, prominent among which were the malpractices of the English in Campveer, Medenblick, and Gertruydenberg, but especially the interference by the English cruisers with their sea-going ships, and the frequent piracies committed on their merchantmen by her Majesty’s navy. „The hindrance of their free traffic,” he said, „and the despoiling of many of their ships by such as have commission by the

to Parma and to Mansfeld the immense importance of relieving Coeworden. The city, he said, was more valuable than

queen to go to sea, are what they exclaim against extremely." He paid an honest tribute to the national unity which had grown up in the republic, and to the good administration of their affairs. "Now are the States and the people firmly united," he said, "the soldiers thoroughly contented by the good government of the count and the good payment made to them. . . . The fear of the King of Spain is almost worn out, their army having now, the third year, almost without opposition kept the field." It was Sidney's opinion that Coeworden would soon fall, after which Groningen would become untenable. Then, without additional expense, the States would be able to take the field with 25,000 men, with which they thought themselves quite capable of holding the King of Spain in play, especially embarked as he was with England and France. "Yet do I not think," he added, "that the States will be willing to have the English companies drawn away, they being, although but few, a great part of the reputation of the army; neither do I think that they would yet be willing to have the contract with her Majesty broken off, because it is one of the principal chains that holds these provinces in union together, and one of the best graces they have with the princes abroad; and because, by the amity with England, they have the free use of the sea by which they live. Though these men be her Majesty's subjects, yet in respect that by the contract they were lent unto them, and that to have them they put their towns into her Majesty's hands, they think they may challenge a great right unto them; and truly I was in a manner asked whether the queen, withdrawing her forces, would still retain the cautionary towns." Truly the question seemed a pertinent one; and it would have been difficult for an honest man to explain why the mortgage should remain when the loan was withdrawn. It needed no Solomon or Daniel to decide so plain a matter, and the States had an uncomfortable habit of insisting on their rights, even in the very face of the English queen. "These men, how simple show soever they bear outwardly, have hearts high enough," said Sidney; "and look to be respected as they which hold themselves chief rulers of the provinces which have so long maintained war against the King of Spain; and truly I do not think that secretly anything is so much indigested by them as the little respect as they imagine is had of them in England, and herein they did look that her Majesty should have proceeded by way of intreating with them, as was done two years ago, when Sir John Norris led the first troops into Brittany." Sidney to Burghley, 14 July, 1592. (S. P. Office MS.) Same to same, 4 Aug. 1592. (Ibid.)

all the towns taken the year before. All Friesland hung upon it, and it would be impossible to save Groningen should Coeworden fall.

Meantime Count Philip Nassau arrived from the campaign in France with his three regiments which he threw into garrison, and thus set free an equal number of fresh troops, which were forthwith sent to the camp of Maurice. The prince at the same time was made aware that Verdugo was about to receive important succour, and he was advised by the deputies of the States-General present at his headquarters to send out his German Reiters to intercept them. Maurice refused. Should his cavalry be defeated, he said, his whole army would be endangered. He determined to await within his fortified camp the attack of the relieving force.

During the whole month of August he proceeded steadily with his sapping and mining. By the middle of the month his lines had come through the ditch, which he drained of water into the counterscarp. By the beginning of September he had got beneath the principal fort, which, in the course of three or four days, he expected to blow into the air. The rainy weather had impeded his operations and the march of the relieving army. Nevertheless that army was at last approaching. The regiments of Mondragon, Charles Mansfeld, Gonzaga, Berlaymont, and Arenberg had been despatched to reinforce

23 Aug. Verdugo. On the 23rd August, having crossed the Rhine at Rheinberg, they reached Olfen in the country of Bentheim, ten miles from Coeworden. Here they threw up rockets and made other signals that relief was approaching the town. On the 3rd of September Verdugo, with the whole force at his disposal, amounting to four thousand foot and eighteen hundred horse, was at the village of Emblichen, within a league of the besieged city.

1 Bor, Reyd, Meteren, *ubi sup.*



That night a peasant was captured with letters from Verdugo to the governor of Coeworden, giving information that 6-7 Sept, he intended to make an assault on the besiegers on the night of 6th-7th September.

Thus forewarned, Maurice took the best precautions and calmly within his entrenchments awaited the onslaught. Punctual to his appointment, Verdugo with his whole force, yelling „Victoria! Victoria!” made a shirt-attack, or *camiciata*—the men wearing their shirts outside their armour to distinguish each other in the darkness—upon that portion of the camp which was under command of Hohenlo. They were met with determination and repulsed, after fighting all night, with a loss of three hundred killed and a proportionate number of wounded. The Netherlands had but three killed and six wounded. Among the latter, however, was Lewis William, who received a musket-ball in the belly, but remained on the ground until the enemy had retreated. It was then discovered that his wound was not mortal the intestines not having been injured—and he was soon about his work again. 1 Prince Maurice, too, as usual, incurred the remonstrances of the deputies and others for the reckless manner in which he exposed himself wherever the fire was hottest. 2 He resolutely refused, however, to permit his cavalry to follow the retreating enemy. His object was Coeworden—a prize more important than a new victory over the already defeated Spaniards would prove—and this object he kept ever before his eyes.

I Bor, Reyd, Meteren, *ubi sup.* „My brother William,” wrote Count John to his father, „was shot in the right side, so that the ball came out again near the navel; but, thank God, there is no danger of his life, as all the barbers agree. . . . After he had received the shot he remained more than an hour fighting on horseback and afoot before his wound was bound up, and he could not be induced by any persuasion to leave the ground.”—Groen v. Prinsterer, Arch. II. s. i. 207, 205.

2 Bor, Reyd, Meteren, *ubi sup.*

This was Verdugo's first and last attempt to relieve the city. He had seen enough of the young prince's tactics and had no further wish to break his teeth against those scientific entrenchments. The Spaniards at last, whether they wore their shirts inside or outside their doublets, could no longer handle the Dutchmen at pleasure. That people of butter, as the iron duke of Alva was fond of calling the Netherlands, were grown harder with the pressure of a twenty-five years' war.

Five days after the sanguinary *camiciata* the besieged offered to capitulate. The trumpet at which the proud Van den Berg had hinted for six months later arrived on the 12th September. 12 Sept. Maurice was glad to get his town. His „little soldiers” did not insist, as the Spaniards and Italians were used to do in the good old days, on unlimited murder, rape, and fire as the natural solace and reward of their labours in the trenches. Civilization had made some progress, at least in the Netherlands. Maurice granted good terms, such as he had been in the habit of conceding to all captured towns. Van den Berg was courteously received by his cousins, as he rode forth from the place at the head of what remained of his garrison, five hundred in number, with colours flying, matches burning, bullet in mouth, and with all their arms and baggage, except artillery and ammunition, and the heroic little Lewis, notwithstanding the wound in his belly, got on horseback and greeted him with a cousinly welcome in the camp. 1

The city was a most important acquisition, as already sufficiently set forth, but Queen Elizabeth, much misinformed on this occasion, was inclined to undervalue it. She wrote accordingly to the States, reproaching them for using all that artillery and that royal force against a mere castle and earth-heap, instead of attempting some considerable capital,

I Bor, Reyd, Meteren.

or going in force to the relief of Brittany. 1 The day was to come when she

1 „Hasardants vos gens es entreprises incertaines et de peu de consequence eu esgard que le poids des affaires qui concernent le bien de notre estat et du votre consiste plus tost a empecher la perte de Bretagne, le recouvrement vous devoit estre beaucoup plus recommande que de vous attaquer a ung petit chateau tel qu'est Coevorden ou autre semblable.” Queen to the States-General, 23 July, 1592. (Hague Arch. MS.)

would acknowledge the advantage of not leaving this earthheap in the hands of the Spaniard. Meantime, Prince Maurice—the season being so far advanced—gave the world no further practical lessons in the engineering science, and sent his troops into winter quarters.

These were the chief military phenomena in France and Flanders during three years of the great struggle to establish Philip's universal dominion.

## CHAPTER XXVII.

Negotiations between Queen Elizabeth and the States—Aspect of affairs between England and the Netherlands—Complaints of the Hollanders on the piratical acts of the English—The Dutch Envoy and the English Government—Caron's interview with Elizabeth—The Queen promises redress of grievances.

It is now necessary to cast a glance at certain negotiations on delicate topics which had meantime been occurring between Queen Elizabeth and the States.

England and the republic were bound together by ties so close that it was impossible for either to injure the other without inflicting a corresponding damage on itself. Nevertheless this very community of interest, combined with a close national relationship—for in the European family the Netherlands and English were but cousins twice removed—with similarity of pursuits, with commercial jealousy, with an intense and evergrowing rivalry for that supremacy on the ocean towards which the monarchy and the republic were so earnestly struggling, with a common passion for civil and religious freedom, and with that inveterate habit of self-assertion—the healthful but not engaging attribute of all vigorous nations—which strongly marked them both—was rapidly producing an antipathy between the two countries which time was likely rather to deepen than efface. And the national divergences were as potent as the traits of resemblance in creating this antagonism.

The democratic element was expanding itself in the republic so rapidly as so stifle for a time the oligarchical principle which might one day be developed out of the same matrix; while, despite the hardy and adventurous spirit which characterised the English nation throughout all its grades, there was never a more intensely aristocratic influence in the world than the governing and directing spirit of the England of that age.

It was impossible that the courtiers of Elizabeth and the burgher-statesmen of Holland and Friesland should sympathise with each other in sentiment or in manner. The republicans in their exuberant consciousness of having at last got rid of kings and kingly paraphernalia in their own land—for since the rejection of the sovereignty offered to France and England in 1585 this feeling had become so predominant as to make it difficult to believe that those offers had been in reality so recent—were insensibly adopting a frankness, perhaps a roughness, of political and social demeanour which was far from palatable to the euphuistic formalists of other countries.

Especially the English statesmen, trained to approach their sovereign with almost Oriental humility, and accustomed to exact for themselves a large amount of deference, 1 could ill brook

1 The Venetian ambassador Contarini relates that in the reign of James I. the great

the free and easy tone occasionally adopted in diplomatic and official intercourse by these upstart republicans. A queen, who to loose morals, imperious disposition, and violent temper united as inordinate a personal vanity as was ever vouchsafed to woman, and who up to the verge of decrepitude was addressed by her courtiers in the language of love-lorn swain to blooming shepherdess, I could naturally find but

nobles of England were served at table by lackeys on their knees.

I Take, for example, among a thousand similar effusions, the language used by Sir Walter Raleigh at exactly the period with which we are now occupied:

"I that was wont to behold her riding like Alexander, walking like Venus, the gentle wind blowing her fair hair about her pure cheeks, like a nymph; sometimes sitting in the shade like a goddess, sometimes singing like an angel, sometimes playing like Orpheus. All wounds have scars but those of fantasy, all affections their relenting but those of womankind. All those times past, the loves, the sighs, the sorrows, the desires, can they not weigh down one frail misfortune? Cannot one drop of gall be hidden in so great heaps of sweetness?" &c. &c. &c. "Do with me now therefore what you list—I am weary of life," &c. &c. &c. Sir W. Raleigh to Sir R. Cecil, July, 1592. (Murdin State Papers, ii. 657.) Let it be remembered that the Venus, nymph, goddess, angel, thus adjoined for pity, had just turned her sixtieth year.

The Chevalier Du Maurier relates in his memoirs a little incident which he witnessed when residing as a boy near the Hague, his father being then French envoy to the States; and which indicates that the rustic and uncourtly independence of the republicans had not diminished with the lapse of a few more years, and with the corresponding increase of popular wealth and strength throughout the commonwealth. The unlucky elector palatine, ex-king of Bohemia, a refugee in Holland since the battle of Prague, was hunting hares in the neighbourhood of Du Maurier's house. In the ardour of the chase, Frederick, having intruded with dogs and horses upon the turnip-field of a wealthy peasant, saw himself pursued with loud cries by the incensed proprietor, accompanied by a very big farm-servant. Both were armed with pitchforks, and the farmer himself presented a truly respectable as well as formidable appearance, dressed as he happened to be in his holiday suit of black Spanish broadcloth, with an under jacket of Florence ratinet, adorned with massive silver buttons. Flourishing his pitchfork, and making no other salutation, he

little to her taste in the hierarchy of Hans Brewer and Hans Baker. Thus her Majesty and her courtiers, accustomed to the faded gallantries with which the serious affairs of State were so grotesquely intermingled, took it ill when they were bluntly informed, for instance, that the State council of the Netherlands, negotiating on Netherlands affairs, could not permit a veto to the representatives of the queen, and that this same body of Dutchmen discussing their own business insisted upon talking Dutch and not Latin.

It was impossible to deny that the young Stadholder was a gentleman of a good house, but how could the insolence of a common citizen like John of Olden-Barneveld be digested? It was certain that behind those shaggy, overhanging brows there was a powerful brain stored with legal and historic lore, which supplied eloquence to an ever-ready tongue and pen. Yet these facts, difficult to gainsay, did not make the demands so frequently urged by the States-General upon the English Government for the enforcement of Dutch rights and the redress of English wrongs the more acceptable.

Bodley, Gilpin, and the rest were

bawled out, "King of Bohemia, King of Bohemia, what do you mean by trampling on my turnips? Don't you know how much pains it costs to plant and to weed them?" The luckless son-in-law of the British sovereign had nothing for it but to apologize for the trespass, and to beat as rapid a retreat before the Dutch farmer as he had recently done before the Duke of Lorraine and the Emperor Ferdinand. *Mémoires de Messire Aubrey du Maurier*, pp. 352, 253.

Perhaps it was as well for the progress of mankind—even at the occasional sacrifice of courtesy to royalty in difficulties—that there should have been a corner of the earth where the theory of natural masters and guardians for the people had already received so rude a shock as in Holland, and where not only the boor but the boor's turnips were safe from being trampled upon. What more poignant satire on human nature than is contained in this very English word boor! The builder, the planter, the creator—the Bauer in short—is made to be identical with the vulgar clown.



in a chronic state of exasperation with the Hollanders, not only because of their perpetual complaints, but because their complaints were perpetually just.

The States-General were dissatisfied, all the Netherlands were dissatisfied—and not entirely without reason—that the English, with whom the republic was on terms not only of friendship but of alliance, should burn their ships on the high seas, plunder their merchants, and torture their sea-captains in order to extort information as to the most precious portions of their cargoes. 1

1 „Nommement que pardessus ung nombre infini de pilleries, forces et outrages, certain navire de Pierre Piateoz, au commencement de ce mois venant d'Espagne vers ces Provinces Unies chargé d'une grande somme d'argent et marchandises précieuses a été forcé, prins et mené a Plymouth par le subject de V. M. le Capitaine Martin Frobisher avec ung autre navire chargé de sel. Lesquels navires sont tenus comme pour bonne prinse soubts pretexte premièrement, comme nous entendons, que le dict Pierre seeroit mis en defence contre le navire de V. M. le quel il na cognu ny peu cognoistre pour le grand nombre de la diversité des navires meemes des pirates qui journellement s'aydant en mer du nom des navires et gens de V. M. forcent et pillent les navires et marchandises des inhabitants de ce pays soubts toute couleur et pretexte traictans les mariniers de toutes sortes de tourments. Et secondement qu'ils disent qu'en iceux deux navires auroient este quelques biens et marchandises appartenans aux Espagnols ou autres subjects et tenants le parti des ennemis: le tout contre la verité et dont il n'apparoistra jamais ainsi que le les propriétaires et mariniers disent. Ces pratiques et traverses dont ils usent journellement même par menaces, concussions et violences pour faire confesser aux bons gens ce qu'on veuille ou de les contraindre a abandonner leurs biens et marchandises ainsi prinsses, sont si notoires et en si grand nombre que nous tenons tout certain qu'elles sont assez cognues et découvertes et indubitablement apparoiſtront encorcs avec le temps plus clairement a V. M." &c. &c. &c. States-General to the Queen, 1 Nov. 1590. (Hague Archives MS.)

„Il n'y a chose que nous faisons avecq plus de regret que de molester si souventes fois V. M. par nos plainctes a l'endroit des doleances des marchands de ces pays, des pilleries, dommages et exces que leur font continuellement en mer les subjects d'icelle par pure force et violence sans cause ny aulcune raison, au lieu de l'ordre et remede qui leur avoit este promis et assésuré. D'autant que sçavons combien cela doit des-

Sharp language against such malpractices was considered but proof of democratic

plaire a une Princesse Chrétienne et droituriere dont V. M. est si renommée par tout le monde. Mais comme voyons les dicts exces s'accroistre journellement en telles exorbitances, et plus ni moins si les Anglois s'estoient déclarés ennemis de ces pays et faisoient leur équipage tout expres pour quant nos marchands ruiner, aussi du tout nostre estat, ou du moins par ce moyen le mettre en rage et desespoir du peuple; si comme nous est apparu par verifications légitimés et autentiques que le 24<sup>e</sup> du mois de Mai dernier une pinasse nommé le Jeune Lion où estoit capitaine ung appellé Manser et deux autres navires Anglois dont l'ung avoit nom Susan et estoit commandé par le capitaine Henry, ont sans mot sonner fureusement attaqué par coups d'artillerie et investie ung navire de la Veere appellé le Griphon, qui avoit pour marinier Gule Adrianszoen, parti auparavant de St. Lucas et estoit chargé de grande quantité d'argent, perles et conchenille le quel ils ont entièrement spolié et pillé apres qu'ils avoient fait prisonniers et gehenné inhumainement plusieurs de ceulx qui y estoient dedans, les contraindants de signer qu'ils n'avoient prins que dix-sept sacs d'argent et huit tonneaux de la diete conchenille en lieu de cent et quinze sacs, toutes les perles et conchenille; non obstant que le dit maistre marinier leur fait voir qu'ils estoient de la Vere et que le tout appartenoit a des marchands de Zelande," &c. &c. &c. States-General to the Queen, 26 June, 1592. (Hague Archives MS.)

„Outre le mescontentement que les peuples ont par les continuelles larcins et pilleries de la mer par où ils sont entièrement aliénés de l'affection qu'ils souloient porter à la nation Anglaise," &c. &c. &c. Noel de Caron to the Lord Treasurer, July, 1592. (Hague Archives MS.)

„The merchants of Middleburgh have of late received such losses as they say by our countrymen that her M.'s letter whereby she signifies the release of four ships is not medicine strong enough any way to appease their griefs. They complain of two ships taken on the coast of Portugal worth 30,000 sterling, and the same day I did deliver the queen's letter they had already had news of the taking of four ships more going out of this river worth as they say as much as the other two. These actions make them almost desperate, as I will write more at large unto yr Lo.: upon the return of the deputies, which they of Zeland did send unto Holdt to let them know of these prisals, and to take some course for it. . . . I am assured that before this happened all the country except Amsterdam were resolved to give contentment unto the queen touching the articles of the traffic. What they will now do I know not, for these things have greatly stirred the humours here, and if it

vulgarity. Yet it would be hard to maintain that Martin Frobisher, Mansfield, Grenfell, and the rest of the seakings, with all their dash and daring and patriotism, were not as unscrupulous pirates as ever sailed blue water, or that they were not apt to commit their depredations upon friend and foe alike.

On the other hand, by a liberality of commerce in extraordinary contrast with the practice of modern times, the Netherlands were in the habit of trading directly with the arch-enemy of both Holland and England, even in the midst of their conflict with him. and it was complained of that even the munitions of war and the implements of navigation by which Spain had been enabled to effect its foot-hold in Brittany, and thus to threaten the English coast, were derived from this very traffic. 1

he continued, not unlikely that some inconvenience may happen which in my opinion were good for her M. to foresee, since the profit comes little, as far as I can see, to herself, and the merchants and committee of these towns, who are the men that most affect her M. and her service, will have their hearts alienated from her if they see their goods, which is their life; taken from them by her M.'s subjects, where they look to be protected by her." Sir R. Sidney to Burghley, 29 Oct. 1590. (S. P. Office MS.)

1, "Touchant ce que vous debriez prohiber le commerce et transportement de vivres et munitions d'icy en Espagne. Qui est une chose partiqué aussi ouvertement et hardiment par certains marchands de Hollande et Zelande que s'il ny avoit point d'inimitie entre les Espaignols et eux. Tellement que si les navires du Roy en Biscaye et Gallice Cales et autres parties méridionales d'Espagne n'eussent point este fournis l'an passé et ce printemps de poudre et de cordage par les marchands de ces pays cy, n'auroit peu envoyer aucunes forces en Bretagne. Or sur ces vostres procedures et autres semblables le roy de France et ses conseillers, le Prince Dombes son lieutenant en Bretagne et son ambassadeur en Angleterre, et de fait tous hommes en general tant princes qu'autres qui ont la commune cause en recommandation, se plaignent grandement tous les jours et adressent leurs plaintes a S. M. presumans qu'elle ayant pris la protection de ces pays cy pourroit et debvroit par ses moyens et autorité redresser ung si notoire desordre pour la preservation d'elle mesme et de tous ceux qui sons touchez en mesme

The Hollanders replied that, according to their contract with England, they were at liberty to send as many as forty or fifty vessels at a time to Spain and Portugal, that they had never exceeded the stipulated number, that England freely engaged in the same traffic herself with the common enemy, that it was not reasonable to consider cordage or dried fish or shoocks and staves, butter, eggs, and corn as contraband of war, that if they were illegitimate the English trade was vitiated to the same degree, and that it would be utterly hopeless for the provinces to attempt to carry on the war, except by enabling themselves, through the widest and most unrestricted foreign commerce, even including the enemy's realms, to provide their nation with the necessary wealth to sustain so gigantic a conflict. 1

cas. Mesmes dans ce peu de jours ledict Ambassadeur a informé S. M. d'une grande quantité de munitions porté à S. Malo et Nantes en Bretagne et de plus de 20 navires chargés de blé et de quelque provision de poudre. . . . Ces actions illicites rendent S. M. tellement offensée qu'elle pense avoir cause de se repentir d'avoir oncques pris la defence de ces pays contre le Roy d'Espagne, considerant que les armes et les forces d'Iceluy par beaucoup d'années ont été entretenues et maintenues en ces Pays Bas par le commun transportement de vivres et fourniture de guerre à icelles qui s'est fait par permission et licence d'icy," &c. &c. &c. Bodley to the States-General, 2 June, 1591. (Hague Archives, MS.)

"Quand vous autres pour vos avantages particuliers laissez fournir de toutes sortes de commodités le dict ennemi commun et puissant, et a ceste heure mesme que pour l'amour de vous nous sommes foreclose de tout commerce à la ruine total ede plusieurs de nos subjects, lesquels comme ils nous ont este plus chers que la vie ainsi ne pouvons que nous ressentir de leurs plaintes touchant les traffiques qui se font journellement soubs des noms empruntés et simuléz, ce qui s'est directement decouvert," &c. &c. &c. Queen to the States-General, 13 Feb. 1593. (Hague Archives MS.)

1 "Nous n'avons encore peu persuader à V. M. combien le transport de quelques vivres ensemble la navigation et traffiq avecq et vers le pays de West important au bien et conservation de nostre estat. Car ny ayant mine d'or ni d'autre metal es dicts pays dont l'on pourroit tirer les frais d'icelle guerre, d'autre part l'affluence annuelle que Dieu y

Here were ever flowing fountains of bitterest discussion and recrimination.

donne de beurre, fromage et quelques autres vivres, y estant par Sa divine grace si abondante que la dixieme part ny peult estre consumée, et la multitude du peuple addonné au traficque et manufacture y estant grande et si independante que faisant tant seulement le moindre semblant de les y vouloir empescher, la plus grande partie d'iceux s'en departiroit vers les pays voisins tirant quand a eulx une infinité de navires et mariniens comme l'expérience à assez montré mesme du tems du dit feu Mons<sup>r</sup> le Comte de Leicester que nous peult on imputer que les beneficions et en tirons les moyens de nostre conservation? L'on nous objecte que les notres vont querir les grains en Oostlande et les meinent vers les pays de West subjects à l'ennemy, qu'icelluy s'en nourrit et fortifie. Nous le croions, mais l'on ne nous sauroit persuader (encores que le traficq des nostres cessat) que ceux d'Oostlande voudroient ou pourraient laisser perir l'abondance des grains y croissant annuellement (qui sont presque l'unique moyen de leur traficq et soutien de leur vie) et que sachant qu'ailleurs en y en auroit disette et traite, eux et autres marchands et mariniens de divers royaumes et pays ne les y transportent et ny a apparence de la leur pouvoir empescher (quant ce ne servit que pour le gaing exorbitant et commoditez qu'ils en tirent) non plus que d'empescher le Roy d'Espagne de s'en faire pouvoir à quelque prix que ce fust d'illecq on d'ailleurs. Et dependant le transport de grains estrangers d'icy, que deviendra si grande quantité qui y est? puisque par la grace de Dieu ces pays en produisent autant et plus qu'il en faut pour la nourriture des manans d'iceulx. Et qui croira qu'on y amenera d'autres pour y demourer establis comme en ung sacq en peril de sy gaster. . . . Cependant cesseroient les convois et licentes d'entrée et issue (principal revenu de ces pays) et les marchands et mariniens qui n'ont autre moyen de vivre et nourrir leurs femmes et enfans se transporteroient avec leur navires en Danemark, Norweghen, Hambourg, Dansig, voire memes en Pologne et ailleurs. . . . Dont ensuivroit non seulement tres grande diminution des imports et autres moyens destines pour l'entretien de la guerre, mais aussi transport et alienation des navires et mariniens (principale force de ces pays). . . Il faut que ce n'est pas par gaieté de cœur que toutes nos terres, maisons rentes et autres bien immeubles, mesmes aussi du bestail, nous paions liberalement une grande partie du fruit et revenu d'iceulx et que de nostre manger, boire, vestemens, chauffage et autres consumptions pardessus le prix nous payons pour impots presque la valeur d'icelles. Et toutes fois tout cela n'est bastant pour en fournir la moitié des fraix de notre guerre sans y comprendre une infinité de dettes es quelles le pays demeure obligé

It must be admitted however that there was occasionally an advantage in the despotic and summary manner in which the queen took matters into her own hands. It was refreshing to see this great sovereign—who was so well able to grapple with questions of State, and whose very imperiousness of temper impelled her to trample on shallow sophistries and specious technicalities—dealing directly with cases of piracy and turning a deaf ear to the counsellors, who in that, as in every age, were too prone to shove by international justice in order to fulfil municipal forms.

It was, however, with much difficulty that the envoy of the republic was able to obtain a direct hearing from her Majesty in order to press the long list of complaints on account of the English piratical proceedings upon her attention. He intimated that there seemed to be special reasons why the great

pardessus toutes autres charges, que les provinces supportent à l'entretien de leurs dicques escluses et dependances contre les inondations des rivières et de la mer contre lesquels ils soustiennent aussi comme une continue guerre. . . . Il est evident qu'il importe singulierement pour la conservation de ces dits pays et service de la cause commune que la navigation et traficque des dits vivres demeurent libres. Et supplions tres humblement qu'il plaise à V. M. donner l'ordre que convient à ce que au dehors et contre icelluy placcart ladite navigation traficq et transport ne soient par ces subjects aucunement empeschez ou sous quelque pretexte que ce soit retardés, mesmes aussi de vouloir relaxer et indemniser ceux qui sont encore empesches et endommagés," &c. &c. &c. States-General to the Queen; 4 May, 1592. (Hague Archives MS.)

„Dat de staten eens met haer geacordeert waren dat zy maer veertig ofte vyftig schepen teffens en zouden zenden. . . . Nocitaens dat ick haere Mat. mochte verzecken datter geen vyftig schepen in alle de vlote naer Spagnien en wilden. &c. &c. . . . Want ick haer verzeckerde dat ons Land (Got lof) trefelycke Coeplyden hadde die t' in allen ecken van der werelt besochten. Dat selfs haere natie met donse in Spaignien trafficqueerde ende dat donse onder de namen van de Oosterlinghen Deynen ende andersints moesten traficqueren, anders dat zy in groot peryckel waren als zy ontdekt wierden," &c. &c. &c. Caron to the States-General, 18 Nov. 1592. (Hague Archives MS.)



ones about her throne were disposed to deny him access to the queen, knowing as they did in what intent he asked for interviews. They described in strong language the royal wrath at the opposition recently made by the States to detaching the English auxiliaries in the Netherlands for the service of the French king in Normandy, hoping thereby to deter him from venturing into her presence with a list of grievances on the part of his Government. „I did my best to indicate the danger incurred by such transferring of troops at so critical a moment,” said Noel de Caron, „showing that it was directly in opposition to the contract made with her Majesty. But I got no answer save very high words from the Lord Treasurer, to the effect that the States-General were never willing to agree to any of her Majesty’s propositions, and that this matter was a necessary to the States’ service as to that of the French king. In effect, he said peremptorily that her Majesty would it and would not recede from her resolution.” 1

The envoy then requested an interview with the queen before her departure into the country.

Next day, at noon, Lord Burghley sent word that she was to leave between 28 July; five and six o’clock that 1592. evening, and that the minister would be welcome meantime at any hour.

„But notwithstanding that I presented myself,” said Caron, „at two o’clock in the afternoon, I was unable to speak to her Majesty until a moment before she was about to mount her horse. Her language was then very curt. She persisted in demanding her troops, and strongly expressed her dissatisfaction that we should have refused them on what she called so good an occasion for using them. I was obliged to cut

my replies very short, as it was already between six and seven o’clock, and she was to ride nine English miles to the place where she was to pass the night. I was quite sensible, however, that the audience was arranged to be thus brief, in order that I should not be able to stop long enough to give trouble, and perhaps to find occasion to renew our complaints touching the plunderings and robberies committed upon us at sea. This is what some of the great personages here, without doubt, are afraid of, for they were wonderfully well overhauled in my last audience. I shall attempt to speak to her again before she goes very deep into the country.” 1

It was not however before the end of the year, after Caron had made a voyage to Holland and had returned, that he was able to bring the subject thoroughly before her Ma- 14 Nov. 1592.

On the 14th November 1592. he had preliminary interviews with the Lord High Admiral and the Lord Treasurer at Hampton Court, where the Queen was then residing. The plundering business was warmly discussed between himself and the Admiral, and there was much quibbling and special pleading in defence of the practices which had created so much irritation and pecuniary loss in Holland. There was a good deal of talk about want of evidence and conflict of evidence, which, to a man who felt as sure of the facts and of the law as the Dutch envoy did—unless it were according to public law for one friend and ally to plunder and burn the vessels of another friend and ally—was not encouraging as to the probable issue of

1 Caron to the States-General, 30 July, 1592. „Emmers ick hebbe wel gevoelt dat deze audientie voor my zoo cort geapposteert was omme dat ick haer niet te lange zoude blyven troubleren ende misschien occasie crygen om onse clagten nopende de plonderingen ende roverien ter zee te vernieuwen twelcksommige groote alhier zonder twyffel vreesen. Want zy wonderlycken zeer overhaelt wierden in myne leste andientie,” &c. &c.

1 „In effecte zeyde absolutelycken dat Haer Mat die begeerde, ende van de resolutie niet soude afstaen.”—Caron to the States-General, 30 July, 1592. (Hague Archives MS.)

his interview with her Majesty. It would be tedious to report the conversation as fully as it was laid by Noel de Caron before the States-General; but at last the admiral expressed a hope that the injured parties would be able to make good their case. At any rate he assured the envoy that he would take care of Captain Mansfield for the present, who was in prison with two other captains, so that proceedings might be had against them if it was thought worth while. 1

Caron answered with Dutch bluntness. „I recommended him very earnestly to do this,” he said, „and told him roundly that this was by all means necessary for the sake of his own honour. Otherwise no man could ever be made to believe that his Excellency was not seeking to get his own profit out of the affair. But he vehemently swore and protested that this was not the case.” 2

He then went to the Lord Treasurer's apartment, where a long and stormy interview followed on the subject of the withdrawal of the English troops. Caron warmly insisted that the measure had been full of danger for the States; that they had been ordered out of Prince Maurice's camp at a most critical moment; that, had it not been for the Stadholder's promptness and military skill, very great disasters to the common cause must have ensued; and that, after all, nothing had been done by the contingent in any other field, for they had been for six months idle and sick, without ever reaching Brittany at all.

„The Lord Treasurer, who, contrary to his custom,” said the envoy, „had been listening thus long to what I had

to say, now observed that the States had treated her Majesty very ill, that they had kept her running after her own troops nearly half a year, and had offered no excuse for their proceedings.” 1

It would be superfluous to repeat the arguments by which Caron endeavoured to set forth that the English troops, sent to the Netherlands according to a special compact, for a special service, and for a special consideration and equivalent, could not honestly be employed, contrary to the wishes of the States-General, upon a totally different service and in another country. The queen willed it, he was informed, and it was ill-treatment of her Majesty on the part of the Hollanders to oppose her will. This argument was unanswerable.

Soon afterwards, Caron was admitted to the presence of Elizabeth. He delivered, at first, a letter from the States-General, touching the withdrawal of the troops. The queen instantly broke the seal and read the letter to the end. Coming to the concluding passage, in which the States observed that they had great and just cause highly to complain on that subject, she paused, reading the sentences over twice or thrice, and then remarked:

„Truly these are comical people. 2 I have so often been complaining that they refused to send my troops, and now the States complain that they are obliged to let them go. Yet my intention is only to borrow them for a little while, because I can give my brother of France no better succour than by sending him these soldiers, and this I consider better than if I should send him four thousand men. I say again, I am only borrowing them, and surely

1 Caron to the States-General, 18 Nov. 1592. (Hague Archives MS.)

2 „Ick hebbe hem tzeve zeer ernstelycken gerecommandeert ende hem rondelyck uitgeseyt dat zulcx om zyn eerewille allesints betaemde anders dat men neymant en soude connen doen gelooven oft zyne E. en zoude willen in dese zaecke zyne prouffit gedoen. Zoo hy hoochelyken swoor ende protesteerde dat hy niet en hadde nochte oock en zoude willen doen.” Caron to the States-General, 18 Nov. 1592. (Hague Archives MS.)

1 Ibid.

2 „Voor waer zy zyn schacke luyden.” Caron to the States-General, 18 Nov. 1592. (Hague Archives MS.) The conversation was of course in French, but as the envoy made his report to the States-General in Dutch, it is not possible to give the exact word which the Queen used. It may be rendered crafty, queer, droll, cunning, or funny.

the States ought never to make such complaints, when the occasion was such a favourable one, and they had received already sufficient aid from these troops, and had liberated their whole country. I don't comprehend these grievances. They complain that I withdraw my people, and meantime they are still holding them and have brought them ashore again. They send me frivolous excuses that the skippers don't know the road to my islands, which is, after all, as easy to find as the way to Caen, for it is all one. I have also sent my own pilots; and I complain bitterly that by making this difficulty they will cause the loss of all Brittany. They run with their people far away from me, and meantime they allow the enemy to become master of all the coasts lying opposite me. But if it goes badly with me they will rue it deeply themselves." 1

There was considerable reason, even if there were but little justice, in this strain of remarks. Her Majesty continued it for some little time longer, and it is interesting to see the direct and personal manner in which this great princess handled the weightiest affairs of State. The transfer of a dozen companies of English infantry from Friesland to Brittany was supposed to be big with the fate of France, England, and the Dutch republic, and was the subject of long and angry controversy, not as a contested point of principle in regard to which numbers, of course, are nothing, but as a matter of practical and pressing importance.

„Her Majesty made many more observations of this nature," said Caron, „but without getting at all into a passion, and, in my opinion, her dis-

course was sensible, and she spoke with more moderation than she is wont at other times." 1

The envoy then presented the second letter from the States-General in regard to the outrages inflicted on the Dutch merchantmen. The queen read it at once, and expressed herself as very much displeased with her people. She said that she had received similar information from Counsellor Bodley, who had openly given her to understand that the enormous outrages which her people were committing at sea upon the Netherlands were a public scandal. It had made her so angry, she said, that she knew not which way to turn. She would take it in hand at once, for she would rather make oath never more to permit a single ship of war to leave her ports than consent to such thieveries and villanies. She told Caron that he would do well to have his case in regard to these matters verified, and then to give it into her own hands, since otherwise it would all be denied her and she would find herself unable to get at the truth. 2

„I have all the proofs and documents of the merchants by me," replied the envoy, „and, moreover, several of the

1 „Doch sonder haer eenighsints te moveren, dan naer myns bedunkens discours gewys ende veel meerder moderatie dan zy op ander tyden wel was gewoon." Caron to the States-General, 18 Nov. 1592. (Hague Archives MS.)

2 „Ende haer zeer tonvreden gehouden jegens haer volck, seyde oock diergelyck verstaen te hebben van den Raetsheer Bodley die haer openlycken adverteerde dat het een open schandael was te verstaen d'enorme stukken die haer volck ter zee op de onsen waren doende, twelck (soo sy seyde) haer zoo tornich gemaect hadde datse niet wiste waer haer keeren, datse oock eens voor haer zoude nemen ende liever versweren nimmermeer meer te consenteren eenich schip van oorlogen te laten uitgaen dan occasie van zulcke dievereyen ende schelmeryen te consenteren, dat ick daeromme wel zoude doen myn zaecke in dit regard te doen verifiseren, ende t'zelve haer in handen te geven, want anders men t'zelve haer al ontkende ende daer geensints tusschen en conste geraeken." Ibid.

1 „Voor waer zy zyn schacke luyden." Caron to the States-General, 18 Nov. 1592. (Hague Archives MS.) The conversation was of course in French, but as the envoy made his report to the States-General in Dutch, it is not possible to give the exact word which the queen used. It may be rendered crafty, queer, droll, cunning, or funny.



sea-captains who have been robbed and outraged have come over with me, as likewise some merchants who were tortured by burning of the thumbs and other kinds of torments." 1

This disturbed the queen very much, and she expressed her wish that Caron should not allow himself to be put off with delays by the council, but should insist upon all due criminal punishment, the infliction of which she promised in the strongest terms to order; for she could never enjoy peace of mind, she said, so long as such scoundrels were tolerated in her kingdom. 2

The envoy had brought with him a summary of the cases, with the names of all the merchants interested, and a list of all the marks on the sacks of money which had been stolen. The queen looked over it very carefully, declaring it to be her intention that there should be no delays interposed in the conduct of this affair by forms of special pleading, but that speedy cognizance should be taken of the whole, and that the property should forthwith be restored. 3

She then sent for Sir Robert Cecil, whom she directed to go at once and tell his father, the Lord Treasurer, that he was to assist Caron in this affair exactly as if it were her own. It was her intention, she said, that her people were in no wise to trouble the Hollanders in legitimate mercantile pursuits. She added that it was not enough for her people to say that they had only been seizing Spaniards' goods and money,

but she meant that they should prove it, too, or else they should swing for it. 1

Caron assured her Majesty that he had no other commission from his masters than to ask for justice, and that he had no instructions to claim Spanish property or enemy's goods. He had brought sufficient evidence with him, he said, to give her Majesty entire satisfaction.

It is not necessary to pursue the subject any further. The great nobles still endeavoured to interpose delays, and urged the propriety of taking the case before the common courts of law. Caron, strong in the support of the queen, insisted that it should be settled, as her Majesty had commanded, by the council, and it was finally arranged that the judge of admiralty should examine the evidence on both sides, and then communicate the documents at once to the Lord Treasurer. Meantime the money was to be deposited with certain aldermen of London, and the accused parties kept in prison. The ultimate decision was then to be made by the council, „not by form of process, but by commission thereto ordained." 2 In the course of the many interviews which followed between the Dutch envoy and the privy counsellors, the Lord Admiral stated that an English merchant residing in the Netherlands had sent to offer him a present of two thousand pounds sterling, in case the affair should be decided against the Hollanders. He communicated the name of the individual

1 „Dede dien volgende roupen Sir Robert Cecil die zy belaste aen den Tresorier zynen vader te gaen zeggen dat hy my hierinne zoude assisteren al oft haer eygen zaecke waere, want haere intentie (zoo zy zeyde) niet en was dat men ons eenigzins in onse coophandelinghe soude troublen als wy daerinne op recht handelden. Seyde oock dat haer niet genoeck en was dat haer volck zeyde dat se Spaignaerts geldt ende goet geatrapeert hadden, maer verstonst dat zy tzelve zouden doen blycken ofte met haren hals betaalen." Ibid.

2 Caron to the States-General, 18 Nov. 1592. (Hague Archives MS.) Also Same to Same, 12 Dec. 1592. (Hague Archives MS.)

1 „Ick zeyde aen haere Mat dat ick alle de bewysen ende documenten van de cooplyuden by my hadde, oock mede datter eenige schippers die men berooft ende gecoultrageert hadde met my waren gecommen, oock cooplyuden die men de duymen hadde gebrant ende andere tormenten van pynigen aen hadde gedaen, twelck haer oock zeer ontstelde," &c. &c. Caron to the States-General, 18 Nov. 1592. (Hague Arch. MS.)

2 „Seggende dat zy in gerusticheyt niet conde geleven als men zulcke schelmen in haer Rycke langer zoude verdragen." Ibid. 3 Ibid.

to Caron under seal of secrecy, and reminded the Lord Treasurer that he too had seen the letter of the Englishman. Lord Burghley observed that he remembered the fact that certain letters had been communicated to him by the Lord Admiral, but that he did not know from whence they came, nor anything about the person of the writer. 1

1 „Den grooten Admiraal began wederomme te seggen van zyne advertentien die hy op dit stuck selfs hadde geerygen uit Zeelant, dat eenige Cooplyden hem hadden doen presenteren twee duysent pond sterlinx, seggende totten grooten Tresorier dat hy hem selfs de brieven hadde gecommuni-ceert die darop antwoorde wel brieven gesien te hebben, maer wiste niet van wiens die quamen doordien by den persoon die dezelve gescreven hadde niet en kende, vragde daeromme van wat natie hy was, den Admiraal zeyde dat het een Engelsch Coopman was die hy oock noemde. Doch dede my erst beloven dat ick hem niet en zoude willen ontdecken, zal daeromme synen naem hier naergelaten worden, ter wylen ick oock tzelve alsoo beloofde, maer nocht ans adviseren zulcke ordre daerinne te stellen als den dienst van den lande wel is verheyschende. Den Admiraal zeyde oock dat hy wel wiste dat den zelve Coopman alrede derwaerts over in dangiere hadde geweest, twelck my dede antwoorden dat hy dan voer dees tyt voor sulcx most wesen

The case of the plundered merchants was destined to drag almost as slowly before the council as it might have done in the ordinary tribunals, and Caron was „kept running,” as he expressed it, „from the court to London, and from London to the court,” and it was long before justice was done to the sufferers. 1 Yet the energetic manner in which the queen took the case into her own hands, and the intense indignation with which she denounced the robberies and outrages which had been committed by her subjects upon her friends and allies, were effective in restraining such wholesale piracy in the future.

On the whole, however, if the internal machinery is examined by which the masses of mankind were moved at this epoch in various parts of Christendom, we shall not find much reason to applaud the conformity of Governments to the principles of justice, reason, or wisdom.

bekant.” Report of Caron to the States-General, 10 Dec. 1592. (Hague Arch. MS.)

1 Letters and reports of Caron, to the States-General, 10 Dec. 1592. (Hague Archives MS.)

## CHAPTER XXVIII.

Influence of the rule and character of Philip II.—Heroism of the sixteenth century—Contest for the French throne—Character and policy of the Duke of Mayenne—Escape of the Duke of Guise from Castle Tours—Propositions for the marriage of the Infanta—Plotting of the Catholic party—Grounds of Philip’s pretensions to the crown of France—Motives of the Duke of Parma maligned by Commander Moreo—He justifies himself to the king—View of the private relations between Philip and the Duke of Mayenne and their sentiments towards each other—Disposition of the French politicians and soldiers towards Philip—Peculiar commercial pursuits of Philip—Confused state of affairs in France—Treachery of Philip towards the Duke of Parma—Recall of the Duke to Spain—His sufferings and death.

THE People—which has been generally regarded as something naturally below its rulers, and as born to be

protected and governed, paternally or otherwise, by an accidental selection from its own species, which by some mysterious process has shot up much nearer to heaven than itself—is often described as brutal, depraved, self-seeking, ignorant, passionate, licentious, and greedy.

It is fitting, therefore; that its protectors should be distinguished, at great epochs of the world’s history, by an absence of such objectionable qualities.

It must be confessed, however, that if the world had waited for heroes during the dreary period which followed the expulsion of something that was called Henry III. of France from the gates of his capital, and especially

during the time that followed hard upon the decease of that embodiment of royalty—its axis must have ceased to turn for a long succession of years. The Béarnese was at least alive, and a man. He played his part with consummate audacity and skill; but alas for an epoch or a country in which such a shape—notwithstanding all its engaging and even commanding qualities—is looked upon as an incarnation of human greatness!

But the chief mover of all things—as far as one man can be prime mover—was still the diligent scribe who lived in the Escorial. It was he whose high mission it was to blow the bellows of civil war, and to scatter curses over what had once been the smiling abodes of human creatures, throughout the leading countries of Christendom. The throne of France was vacant, nominally as well as actually, since the year 1589. During two-and-twenty years preceding that epoch he had scourged the provinces, once constituting the richest and most enlightened portions of his hereditary domains, upon the theory that without the Spanish Inquisition no material prosperity was possible on earth, nor any entrance permitted to the realms of bliss beyond the grave. Had every Netherlander consented to burn his Bible, and to be burned himself should he be found listening to its holy precepts if read to him in shop, cottage, farmhouse, or castle; and had he furthermore consented to renounce all the liberal institutions which his ancestors had earned, in the struggle of centuries, by the sweat of their brows and the blood of their hearts; his benignant proprietor and master, who lived at the ends of the earth, would have consented at almost any moment to peace. His arms were ever open. Let it not be supposed that this is the language of sarcasm or epigram. Stripped of the decorous sophistications by which human beings are so fond of concealing their naked thoughts

from each other, this was the one simple dogma always propounded by Philip. Grimace had done its worst, however, and it was long since it had exercised any power in the Netherlands. The king and the Dutchmen understood each other; and the plain truths with which those republicans answered the imperial proffers of mediation, so frequently renewed, were something new, and perhaps not entirely unwholesome in diplomacy.

It is not an inviting task to abandon the comparatively healthy atmosphere of the battle-field, the blood-stained swamp, the murderous trench—where human beings, even if communing only by bullets and push of pike, were at least dealing truthfully with each other—and to descend into those subterranean regions where the effluvia of falsehood becomes almost too foul for ordinary human organization.

Heroes in those days, in any country, there were few. William the Silent was dead. De la Noue was dead. Duplessis-Mornay was living, but his influence over his royal master was rapidly diminishing. Cecil, Hatton, Essex, Howard, Raleigh, James Croft, Valentine Dale, John Norris, Roger Williams, the „Virgin Queen” herself—does one of these chief agents in public affairs, or do all of them together, furnish a thousandth part of that heroic whole which the England of the sixteenth century presents to every imagination? Maurice of Nassau excellent soldier and engineer as he had already proved himself—had certainly not developed much of the heroic element, although thus far he was walking straightforward like a man, in the path of duty, with the pithy and substantial Lewis William ever at his side. Olden-Barneveld—tough burgher statesman, hard-headed, indomitable man of granite—was doing more work, and doing it more thoroughly, than any living politician, but he was certainly not of the mythological brotherhood who inhabit



the serene regions of space beyond the moon. He was not the son of god or goddess, destined, after removal from this sphere, to shine with planetary lustre, among other constellations, upon the scenes of mortal action. Those of us who are willing to rise—or to descend, if the phrase seems wiser—to the idea of a self-governing people must content ourselves, for this epoch, with the fancy of a hero-people and a people-king.

A plain little republic, thrusting itself uninvited into the great political family-party of heaven-anointed sovereigns and long-descended nobles, seemed a somewhat repulsive phenomenon. It became odious and dangerous when by the blows it could deal in battle, the logic it could chop in council, it indicated a remote future for the world, in which right-divine and regal paraphernalia might cease to be as effective stage-properties as they had always been considered.

Yet it will be difficult for us to find the heroic individualized very perceptibly at this period, look where we may. Already there seemed ground for questioning the comfortable fiction that the accidentally dominant families and castes were by nature wiser, better, braver than that much-contemned entity, the People. What if the fearful heresy should gain ground that the People was at least as wise, honest, and brave as its masters? What if it should become a recognised fact that the great individuals and castes, whose wealth and station furnished them with ample time and means for perfecting themselves in the science of government, were rather devoting their leisure to the systematic filling of their own pockets than to the hiving up of knowledge for the good of their fellow creatures? What if the whole theory of hereditary superiority should suddenly exhale? What if it were found out that we were all fellow-worms together, and that those which had

crawled highest were not necessarily the least slimy?

Meantime it will be well for us, in order to understand what is called the Past, to scrutinize somewhat closely that which was never meant to be revealed. To know the springs which once controlled the world's movements, one must ponder the secret thoughts, purposes, aspirations, and baffled attempts of the few dozen individuals who once claimed that world in fee-simple. Such researches are not in a cheerful field; for the sources of history are rarely fountains of crystal, bubbling through meadows of asphodel. Vast and noisome are the many sewers which have ever run beneath decorous Christendom.

Some of the leading military events in France and Flanders, patent to all the world, which grouped themselves about the contest for the French throne, as the central point in the history of Philip's proposed world-empire, have already been indicated.

It was a species of triangular contest—so far as the chief actors were concerned—for that vacant throne. Philip, Mayenne, Henry of Navarre, with all the adroitness which each possessed, were playing for the splendid prize.

Of Philip it is not necessary to speak. The preceding volumes of this work have been written in vain, if the reader has not obtained from irrefragable testimony—the monarch's own especially—a sufficient knowledge of that human fetich before which so much of contemporary humanity grovelled.

The figure of Navarre is also one of the most familiar shapes in history.

As for the Duke of Mayenne, he had been, since the death of his brother the Balafre, ostensible leader of the League, and was playing, not without skill, a triple game.

Firstly, he hoped for the throne for himself.

Secondly, he was assisting the King of Spain to obtain that dignity.

Thirdly, he was manœuvring in dull, dumb, but not ineffective manner, in favour of Navarre.

So comprehensive and self-contradictory a scheme would seem to indicate an elasticity of principle, and a fertility of resource not often vouchsafed to man.

Certainly one of the most pregnant lessons of history is furnished in the development of these cabals, nor is it, in this regard, of great importance whether the issue was to prove them futile or judicious. It is sufficient for us now, that when those vanished days constituted the Present—the vital atmosphere of Christendom—the world's affairs were controlled by those plotters and their subordinates, and it is therefore desirable for us to know what manner of men they were, and how they played their parts.

Nor should it ever be forgotten that the leading motive with all was supposed to be religion. It was to maintain the supremacy of the Roman Church, or to vindicate, to a certain extent, liberty of conscience, through the establishment of a heterodox organization, that all these human beings of various lineage and language throughout Christendom had been cutting each other's throats for a quarter of a century.

Mayenne was not without courage in the field when he found himself there, but it was observed of him that he spent more time at table than the Béarnese in sleep, and that he was so fat as to require the assistance of twelve men to put him in the saddle again whenever he fell from his horse. Yet slow fighter as he was, he was a most nimble intriguer. As for his private character, it was notoriously stained with every vice, nor was there enough of natural intelligence or superior acquirement to atone for his crapulous, licentious, shameless life. His military efficiency at important emergencies was impaired and his life endangered by vile diseases. He was covetous and greedy

beyond what was considered decent even in that cynical age. He received subsidies and alms with both hands from those who distrusted and despised him, but who could not eject him from his advantageous position.

He wished to arrive at the throne of France. As son of Francis of Guise, as brother of the great Balafré, he considered himself entitled to the homage of the fishwomen and the butchers' halls. The constitution of the country in that age making a People impossible, the subtle connection between a high-born intriguer and the dregs of a populace, which can only exist in societies of deep chasms and precipitous contrasts, was easily established.

The duke's summary dealing with the sixteen tyrants of Paris in the matter of the president's murder had, however, loosened his hold on what was considered the democracy; but this was at the time when his schemes were silently swinging towards the Protestant aristocracy; at the moment when Politics was taking the place of Madam League in his secret affections. Nevertheless, so long as there seemed a chance, he was disposed to work the mines for his own benefit. His position as lieutenant-general gave him an immense advantage for intriguing with both sides, and—in case his aspirations for royalty were baffled—for obtaining the highest possible price for himself in that auction in which Philip and the Béarnese were likely to strain all their resources in outbidding each other.

On one thing his heart was fixed. His brother's son should at least not secure the golden prize if he could prevent it. The young Duke of Guise, who had been immured in Castle Tours since the famous murder of his father and uncle, had made his escape by a rather neat stratagem. Having been allowed some liberty for amusing himself in the corridors in the neighbourhood of his apartment, he had invented a

game of hop, skip, and jump up stairs and down, which he was wont to play with the soldiers of the guard, as a solace to the tediousness of confinement. One day he hopped and skipped up the staircase with a rapidity which excited the admiration of the companions of his sport, slipped into his room, slammed and bolted the doors, and when the guard, after in vain waiting a considerable time for him to return and resume the game, at last forced an entrance, they found the bird flown out of window. Rope-ladders, confederates, fast-galloping post-horses did the rest, and at last the young duke joined his affectionate uncle in camp, much to that eminent relative's discomfiture. 1 Philip gave alternately conflicting instructions to Farnese—sometimes that he should encourage the natural jealousy between the pair; sometimes that he should cause them to work harmoniously together for the common good—that common good being the attainment by the King of Spain of the sovereignty of France.

But it was impossible, as already intimated, for Mayenne to work harmoniously with his nephew. The Duke of Guise might marry with the Infanta and thus become King of France by the grace of God and Philip. To such a consummation in the case of his uncle there stood, as we know, an insuperable obstacle in the shape of the Duchess of Mayenne. Should it come to this at last, it was certain that the Duke would make any and every combination to frustrate such a scheme. Meantime he kept his own counsel, worked amicably with Philip, Parma, and the young duke, and received money in overflowing measure, and poured into his bosom, from that Spanish monarch whose veterans in the Netherlands were maddened by starvation into mutiny.

Philip's plans were a series of alternatives. France he regarded as the property of his family. Of that there could

be no doubt at all. He meant to put the crown upon his own head, unless the difficulties in the way should prove absolutely insuperable. In that case he claimed France and all its inhabitants as the property of his daughter. The Salic law was simply a pleasantry, a bit of foolish pedantry, an absurdity. If Clara Isabella, as daughter of Isabella of France, as grandchild of Henry II., were not manifestly the owner of France—queen-proprietary, as the Spanish doctors called it—then there was no such thing, so he thought, as inheritance of castle, farm-house, or hovel—no such thing as property anywhere in the world. If the heiress of the Valois could not take that kingdom as her private estate, what security could there ever be for any possessions public or private?

This was logical reasoning enough for kings and their counsellors. There was much that might be said, however, in regard to special laws. There was no doubt that great countries, with all their live-stock—human or otherwise—belonged to an individual, but it was not always so clear who that individual was. The doubt gave much work and comfortable fees to the lawyers. There was much learned lore concerning statutes of descent, cutting off of entails, actions for ejectment, difficulties of enforcing processes, and the like, to occupy the attention of diplomatists, politicians and other sages. It would have caused general hilarity, however, could it have been suggested that the live-stock had art or part in the matter; that sheep, swine, or men could claim a choice of their shepherds and butchers.

Philip—humbly satisfied, as he always expressed himself, so long as the purity of the Roman dogmas and the supremacy of the Romish Church over the whole earth were maintained—affected a comparative indifference as to whether he should put the crown of St. Louis and of Hugh Capet upon his own grey head or whether he should govern France

1 De Thou, xi.



through his daughter and her husband. Happy the man who might exchange the symbols of mutual affection with Philip's daughter.

The king had various plans in regard to the bestowal of the hand thus richly endowed. First and foremost it was suggested—and the idea was not held too monstrous to be even believed in by some conspicuous individuals—that he proposed espousing his daughter himself. The pope was to be relied on, in this case, to give a special dispensation. Such a marriage, between parties too closely related to be usually united in wedlock, might otherwise shock the prejudices of the orthodox. His late niece and wife was dead, so that there was no inconvenience on that score, should the interests of his dynasty, his family, and, above all, of the Church, impel him, on mature reflection, to take for his fourth marriage one step farther within the forbidden degrees than he had done in his third. Here is the statement, which, if it have no other value, serves to show the hideous designs of which the enemies of Philip sincerely believed that monarch capable.

„But God is a just God,” wrote Sir Edward Stafford, „and if with all things past, that be true that *the king* (*videlicet* Henry IV.) *yesterday assured me to be true*, and that both his ambassador from Venice writ to him and Monsieur de Luxembourg from Rome, that the Count Olivarez had made a great instance to the pope (Sixtus V.) a little afore his death, to permit his master to marry his daughter, no doubt God will not leave it long unpunished.” 1

Such was the horrible tale which was circulated and believed in by Henry the Great of France and by eminent nobles and ambassadors, and at least thought possible by the English envoy. By such a family arrangement it was obvious

that the conflicting claims of father and daughter to the proprietorship of France would be ingeniously adjusted, and the children of so well assorted a marriage might reign in undisputed legitimacy over France and Spain, and the rest of the world-monarchy. Should the king decide on the whole against this matrimonial project, should Innocent or Clement prove as intractable as Sixtus, then it would be necessary to decide among various candidates for the Infanta's hand.

In Mayenne's opinion the Duke of Guise was likely to be the man; but there is little doubt that Philip, in case these more cherished schemes should fail, had made up his mind—so far as he ever did make up his mind upon anything—to select his nephew the Archduke Ernest, brother of the Emperor Rudolph, for his son-in-law. But it was not necessary to make an immediate choice. His quiver was full of archdukes, any one of whom would be an eligible candidate, while not one of them would be likely to reject the Infanta with France on her wedding-finger. Meantime there was a lion in the path in the shape of Henry of Navarre.

Those who disbelieve in the influence of the individual on the fate of mankind may ponder the possible results to history and humanity, had the dagger of Jacques Clément entered the stomach of Henry IV. rather than of Henry III. in the summer of 1589, or the perturbations in the world's movement that might have puzzled philosophers had there been an unsuspected mass of religious conviction revolving unseen in the mental depths of the Béarnese. Conscience, as it has from time to time exhibited itself on this planet of ours, is a powerful agent in controlling political combinations; but the instances are unfortunately not rare, so far as sublunary progress is concerned, in which the absence of this dominant influence permits a prosperous rapidity to individual careers. Eternal honour

1 Stafford to Burghley, 14 Oct. 1590. (S. P. Office MS.)

to the noble beings, true chieftains among men, who have forfeited worldly power or sacrificed life itself at the dictate of religious or moral conviction—even should the basis of such conviction appear to some of us unsafe or unreal. Shame on the tongue which would malign or ridicule the martyr or the honest convert to any form of Christian faith! But who can discover aught that is inspiring to the sons of men in conversions—whether of princes or of peasants—wrought, not at risk of life and self, but for the sake of securing and increasing the one and the other?

Certainly the Béarnese was the most candid of men. It was this very candour, this freedom from bigotry, this want of conviction, and this openness to conviction, that made him so dangerous and caused so much anxiety to Philip. The Roman Church might or might not be strengthened by the reconversion of the legitimate heir of France, but it was certain that the claims of Philip and the Infanta to the proprietorship of that kingdom would be weakened by the process. While the Spanish king knew himself to be inspired in all his actions by a single motive, the maintenance of the supremacy of the Roman Church, he was perfectly aware that the Prince of Béarn was not so single-hearted nor so conscientious as himself.

The Prince of Béarn—heretic, son of heretics, great chieftain of heretics—was supposed capable of becoming orthodox whenever the Pope would accept his conversion. Against this possibility Philip struggled with all his strength.

Since Pope Sixtus V., who had a weakness for Henry, there had been several popes. Urban VII., his immediate successor, had reigned but thirteen days. Gregory XIV. (Sfondrato) had died 15th October, 1591, ten months after his election. Fachinetti, with the title of Innocent IX., had reigned two months, from 29th October to 29th

December, 1591. He died of „Spanish poison,” said Envoy Umton, as coolly as if speaking of gout, or typhus, or any other recognised disorder. Clement VIII. (Aldobrandini) was elected 30th January, 1592. He was no lover of Henry, and lived in mortal fear of Philip, while it must be conceded that the Spanish ambassador at Rome was much given to brow-beating his Holiness. Should he dare to grant that absolution which was the secret object of the Béarnese, there was no vengeance, hinted the envoy, that Philip would not wreak on the holy father. He would cut off his supplies from Naples and Sicily, and starve him and all his subjects; he would frustrate all his family schemes, he would renounce him, he would unpope him, he would do anything that man and despot could do, should the great shepherd dare to re-admit this lost sheep, and this very black sheep, into the fold of the faithful.

As for Henry himself, his game—for in his eyes it was nothing but a game—lay every day plainer and plainer before him. He was indispensable to the heretics. Neither England, nor Holland, nor Protestant Germany, could renounce him, even should he renounce „the religion.” Nor could the French Huguenots exist without that protection which, even although Catholic, he could still extend to them when he should be accepted as king by the Catholics.

Hereditary monarch by French law and history, released from his heresy by the authority that could bind and loose, purged as with hyssop and washed whiter than snow, it should go hard with him if Philip, and Farnese, and Mayenne, and all the pikemen and reiters they might muster, could keep him very long from the throne of his ancestors.

Nothing could match the ingenuousness with which he demanded the instruction whenever the fitting time for it should arrive; as if, instead of having

been a professor both of the Calvinist and Catholic persuasion, and having relapsed from both, he had been some innocent Peruvian or Hindoo, who was invited to listen to preaching and to examine dogmas for the very first time in his life.

Yet Philip had good grounds for hoping a favourable result from his political and military manœuvre. He entertained little doubt that France belonged to him or to his daughter; that the most powerful party in the country was in favour of his claims, provided he would pay the voters liberally enough for their support, and that if the worst came to the worst it would always be in his power to dismember the kingdom, and to reserve the lion's share for himself, while distributing some of the provinces to the most prominent of his confederates.

The sixteen tyrants of Paris had already, as we have seen, urged the crown upon him, provided he would establish in France the Inquisition, the council of Trent, and other acceptable institutions, besides distributing judiciously a good many lucrative offices among various classes of his adherents.

The Duke of Mayenne, in his own name and that of all the Catholics of France, formally demanded of him to maintain two armies, forty thousand men in all, to be respectively under command of the duke himself and of Alexander Farnese, and regularly to pay for them. These propositions, as has been seen, were carried into effect as nearly as possible, at enormous expense to Philip's exchequer, and he naturally expected as good faith on the part of Mayenne.

In the same paper in which the demand was made Philip was urged to declare himself king of France. He was assured that the measure could be accomplished „by freely bestowing marquisates, baronies, and peerages, in order to content the avarice and am-

bition of many persons, without at the same time dissipating the greatness from which all these members depended. Pepin and Charlemagne,” said the memorialists, „who were foreigners and Saxons by nation, did as much in order to get possession of a kingdom to which they had no other right except that which they acquired there by their prudence and force, and after them Hugh Capet, much inferior to them in force and authority, following their example, had the same good fortune for himself and his posterity, and one which still endures.

„If the authority of the holy see could support the scheme at the same time,” continued Mayenne and friends, „it would be a great help. But it being perilous to ask for that assistance before striking the blow, it would be better to obtain it after the execution.” 1

That these wholesome opinions were not entirely original on the part of Mayenne, nor produced spontaneously, was plain from the secret instructions given by Philip to his envoys, Don Bernardino de Mendoza, John Baptist de Tassis, and the commander Moreo, whom he had sent soon after the death of Henry III. to confer with Cardinal Gaetano in Paris.

They were told, of course, to do everything in their power to prevent the election of the Prince of Béarne, „being as he was a heretic, obstinate and confirmed, who had sucked heresy with his mother's milk.” The legate was warned that „if the Béarnese should make a show of converting himself, it would be frigid and fabricated.” 2

If they were asked whom Philip desired for king—a question which certainly seemed probable under the circumstances—they were to reply that his

1 Arch. de Simancas (Paris), A 57, <sup>133</sup> MS.

2 Instrucción que se dió á Don B. de Mendoza, J. B. de Tassis, y el Com. Moreo, anno 1589. (Arch. de Simancas MS.)



foremost wish was to establish the Catholic religion in the kingdom, and that whatever was most conducive to that end would be most agreeable to him. „As it is however desirable, in order to arrange matters, that you should be informed of everything,” said his Majesty, „it is proper that you should know that I have two kinds of right to all that there is over there. Firstly, because the crown of France has been usurped from me, my ancestors having been unjustly excluded by foreign occupation of it; and secondly, because I claim the same crown as first male of the house of Valois.” 1

Here certainly were comprehensive pretensions, and it was obvious that the king's desire for the establishment of the Catholic religion must have been very lively to enable him to invent or accept such astonishing fictions.

But his own claims were but a portion of the case. His daughter and possible spouse had rights of her own, hard, in his opinion, to be gainsaid. „Over and above all this,” said Philip, „my eldest daughter, the Infanta, has two other rights; one to all the states which as dower-property are joined by matrimony and through females to this crown, which now come to her in direct line, and the other to the crown itself, which belongs directly to the said Infanta, the matter of the Salic law being a mere invention.” 2

Thus it would appear that Philip was the legitimate representative, not only of the ancient races of French monarchs—whether Merovingians, Carlovingians, or otherwise was not stated—but also of the usurping houses themselves, by whose intrusion those earlier dynasties

1 „Es buen que sepays que yo tengo dos maneras de derecho a lo de ay; por una parta a lo que me tiene usurpado essa corona aviendo lo ocupado injustamente a milos pasados, y por otra a la misma corona como Varon mayor de dias de la casa Valesia—y que de mas desto tiene otros dos derechos la Infanta mi hija mayor,” &c.

2 Note last cited.

had been ejected, being the eldest male heir of the extinct line of Valois, while his daughter was, if possible, even more legitimately the sovereign and proprietor of France than he was himself.

Nevertheless in his magnanimous desire for the peace of the world and the advancement of the interests of the Church, he was, if reduced to extremities, willing to forego his own individual rights—when it should appear that they could by no possibility be enforced—in favour of his daughter and of the husband whom he should select for her.

„Thus it may be seen,” said the self-denying man, „that I know how, for the sake of the public repose, to strip myself of my private property.” 1

Afterwards, when secretly instructing the Duke of Feria, about to proceed to Paris for the sake of settling the sovereignty of the kingdom, he reviewed the whole subject, setting forth substantially the same intentions. That the Prince of Béarne could ever possibly succeed to the throne of his ancestors was an idea to be treated only with sublime scorn by all right-minded and sensible men. „The members of the House of Bourbon,” said he, „pretend that by right of blood the crown belongs to them, and hence is derived the pretension made by the Prince of Béarne; but if there were wanting other very sufficient causes to prevent this claim—which however are not wanting—it is quite enough that he is a relapsed heretic, declared to be such by the Apostolic See, and pronounced incompetent, as well as the other members

1 „Tras esto, como yo tiro el suave reparo desse reyno mas que a intereses propios facilmente me absterria de las pretenciones que me tocan, con saber que son muy bien fundadas si viesse abrirse puerta a que consiguiendo las suyas la Infanta y por via de casamiento que estuviesse bien a todos—que menos sombras y celos causaria los invidiosos de fuera—assi para que se vea que sabe por el sosiego publico desnudarme de mi particular.” (MS. last cited.)

of his house, all of them, to say the least, encouragers of heresy, so that not one of them can ever be king of France, where there have been such religious princes in time past, who have justly merited the name of Most Christian; and so there is no possibility of permitting him or any of his house to aspire to the throne, or to have the subject even treated of in the estates. It should on the contrary be entirely excluded as prejudicial to the realm and unworthy to be even mentioned among persons so Catholic as those about to meet in that assembly." 1

The claims of the man whom his supporters already called Henry the Fourth of France being thus disposed of, Philip then again alluded with his usual minuteness to the various combinations which he had formed for the tranquillity and good government of that kingdom and of the other provinces of his world-empire.

It must moreover be never forgotten that what he said passed with his contemporaries almost for oracular dispensations. What he did or ordered to be done was like the achievements or behests of a superhuman being. Time, as it rolls by, leaves the wrecks of many a stranded reputation to bleach in the sunshine of after-ages. It is sometimes as profitable to learn what was *not* done by the great ones of the earth, in spite of all their efforts, as to ponder those actual deeds which are patent to mankind. The Past was once the Present, and once the Future, bright with rainbows or black with impending storm; for history is a continuous whole of which we see only fragments.

He who at the epoch with which we are now occupied was deemed greatest and wisest among the sons of earth, at whose threats men quailed, at whose vast and intricate schemes men gasped

in pale-faced awe, has left behind him the record of his interior being. Let us consider whether he was so potent as his fellow mortals believed, or whether his greatness was merely their littleness; whether it was carved out of the inexhaustible but artificial quarry of human degradation. Let us see whether the execution was consonant with the inordinate plotting; whether the price in money and blood—and certainly few human beings have squandered so much of either as did Philip the Prudent in his long career—was high or low for the work achieved.

Were after generations to learn, only after curious research, of a pretender who once called himself, to the amusement of his contemporaries, Henry the Fourth of France; or was the world-empire for which so many armies were marshalled, so many ducats expended, so many falsehoods told, to prove a bubble after all? Time was to show. Meantime wise men of the day who, like the sages of every generation, read the future like a printed scroll, were pitying the delusion and rebuking the wickedness of Henry the Béarnese; persisting as he did in his cruel, sanguinary, hopeless attempt to establish a vanished and impossible authority over a land distracted by civil war.

Nothing could be calmer or more reasonable than the language of the great champion of the Inquisition.

„And as President Jeannin informs me,” he said, „that the Catholics have the intention of electing me king, that appearing to them the gentlest and safest method to smooth all rivalries likely to arise among the princes aspiring to the crown, I reply, as you will see by the copy herewith sent. You will observe that after not refusing myself to that which may be the will of our Lord, should there be no other mode of serving Him, above all I desire that which concerns my daughter, since to her belongs the kingdom. I desire nothing

1 Instruction general para el Duque de Feria, Madrid, 2 Enero, 1592. A. 57, —. MS.

else nor anything for myself, nor for anybody else, except as a means for her to arrive at her right." 1

He had taken particular pains to secure his daughter's right in Brittany, while the Duchess of Mercœur, by the secret orders of her husband, had sent a certain ecclesiastic to Spain to make over the sovereignty of this province to the Infanta. Philip directed that the utmost secrecy should be observed in regard to this transaction with the duke and duchess, and promised the duke, as his reward for these proposed services in dismembering his country, the government of the province for himself and his heirs. 2

For the king was quite determined—in case his efforts to obtain the crown for himself or for his daughter were unsuccessful—to dismember France, with the assistance of those eminent Frenchmen who were now so industriously aiding him in his projects.

„And in the third place," said he, in his secret instructions to Feria, „if for the sins of all, we don't manage to make any election, and if therefore the kingdom (of France) has to come to separation and to be divided into many hands; in this case we must propose to the Duke of Mayenne to assist him in getting possession of Normandy for himself, and as to the kingdom, I shall

1 „Y por que dixo que avia voluntad en los Catolicos de nombrarme a mi por su rey, pareciendoles esto mas suave y seguro para alleñar las competencias que puede aver entre los mismos principes que aspiran a estos, se le respondio lo que vereys per la copia que con esta se embia por donde entenderereys que tras no negarme a lo que fuessea voluntad de nro Señor quando no huviesse otro medio para su servicio, lo que sobre todo desseo es lo que toca a mi hija, pues a ella venga el reyno; yo no quiero otra cosa ni nada para mi ni para otro, sino es por torçedor y medio para que ella consiga su derecho." Instruccion General para el Duque de Feria, &c. (MS. before cited.)

2 Instruccion secreta para Don Mendo de la Desma, 2 March, 1591. (Arch. de Simancas, A, 57, 184, MS.

take for myself that which seems good to me—all of us assisting each other." 1

But unfortunately it was difficult for any of these fellow-labourers to assist each other very thoroughly, while they detested each other so cordially and suspected each other with such good reason.

Moreo, Ybarra, Feria, Parma, all assured their master that Mayenne was taking Spanish money as fast as he could get it, but with the sole purpose of making himself king. As to any of the House of Lorraine obtaining the hand of the Infanta and the throne with it, Feria assured Philip that Mayenne „would sooner give the crown to the Grand Turk." 2

Nevertheless Philip thought it necessary to continue making use of the duke. Both were indefatigable therefore in expressing feelings of boundless confidence each in the other.

It has been seen too how entirely the king relied on the genius and devotion of Alexander Farnese to carry out his great schemes; and certainly never had monarch a more faithful, unscrupulous, and dexterous servant. Remonstrating, advising, but still obeying—entirely without conscience, unless it were conscience to carry out his master's commands, even when most puerile or most diabolical—he was nevertheless the object of Philip's constant suspicion,

1 „El tercero, si por pecados de todos no se acertasse a hazer election ninguna, y assi huviesse de venir a quel reyno en disipacion, y dividirse en muchos manos, y en este caso se ofrecio el Duque de Umena de asistirle para que se apodere de Normandia para si, y que de lo demas tome yo para mi lo que me pareciere, ayudando nos bien uno a otro."

Instruccion secreta lo que vos Don Lorenzo Suarez de Figueroa, Duque de Feria, mi primo aveys de llevar entendido de mas que contiene la instruccion general que llevays. 2 Enero, 1592. Arch. de Simancas (Paris) MS. A. 57, 151.

2 Duke of Feria to Philip. Arch. de Sim. (Paris), B. 75, 26 to 30, cited by Capefigue, vi. 259.



and felt himself placed under perpetual though secret supervision.

Commander Moreo was unwearied in blackening the duke's character, and in maligning his every motive and action, and greedily did the king incline his ear to the calumnies steadily instilled by the chivalrous spy.

„He has caused all the evil we are suffering,” said Moreo. „When he sent Egmont to France 'twas without infantry, although Egmont begged hard for it, as did likewise the Legate, Don Bernardino, and Tassis. Had he done this there is no doubt at all that the Catholic cause in France would have been safe, and your Majesty would now have the control over that kingdom which you desire. This is the opinion of friends and foes. I went to the Duke of Parma and made free to tell him that the whole world would blame him for the damage done to Christianity, since your Majesty had exonerated yourself by ordering him to go to the assistance of the French Catholics with all the zeal possible. Upon this he was so disgusted that he has never shown me a civil face since. I doubt whether he will send or go to France at all, and although the Duke of Mayenne despatches couriers every day with protestations and words that would soften rocks, I see no indications of a movement.”<sup>1</sup>

Thus, while the duke was making great military preparations for invading France without means; pawning his own property to get bread for his starving veterans, and hanging those veterans whom starving had made mutinous, he was depicted, to the most suspicious and unforgiving mortal that ever wore a crown, as a traitor and a rebel, and this while he was renouncing his own judicious and well-considered policy in obedience to the wild schemes of his master.

„I must make bold to remind your

<sup>1</sup> Moreo to Philip, 22 June, 1590. (Arch. de Simancas MS.)

Majesty,” again whispered the spy, „that there never was an Italian prince who failed to pursue his own ends, and that there are few in the world that are not wishing to become greater than they are. This man here could strike a greater blow than all the rest of them put together. Remember that there is not a villain anywhere that does not desire the death of your Majesty. Believe me, and send to cut off my head if it shall be found that I am speaking from passion, or from other motive than pure zeal for your royal service.”<sup>1</sup>

The reader will remember into what a paroxysm of rage Alexander was thrown on a former occasion, when secretly invited to listen to propositions by which the sovereignty over the Netherlands was to be secured to himself, and how near he was to inflicting mortal punishment with his own hand on the man who had ventured to broach that treasonable matter.<sup>2</sup>

Such projects and propositions were ever floating, as it were, in the atmosphere, and it was impossible for the most just men to escape suspicion in the mind of a king who fed upon suspicion as his daily bread. Yet nothing could be fouler or falser than the calumny which described Alexander as unfaithful to Philip. Had he served his God as he served his master, perhaps his record before the highest tribunal would have been a clearer one.

And in the same vein in which he wrote to the monarch in person did the crafty Moreo write to the principal secretary of state, Idiaques, whose mind,

<sup>1</sup> Moreo to Philip. 22 June, 1590. „Me atreveré a decir que se acuerde V. M. que no hay principe en Italia qui deje de tener sus fines, y que hay pocos en el mundo qui no tengan puesta la mira a ser mas—y el de aqui podría si quiere dar mayor golpe que todos los demas—y que no hay hombre malo qui no desee la muerte de V. Md. Crealo y mandame cortar la cabeza si hallare que digo por pasion ni otro que çelo limpio del servicio de V. Md.”

<sup>2</sup> See vol. ii. of this work, p. 511.

as well as his master's, it was useful to poison, and who was in daily communication with Philip.

„Let us make sure of Flanders,” said he, „otherwise we shall all of us be well cheated. I will tell you something of that which I have already told his Majesty, only not all, referring you to Tassis, who, as a personal witness to many things, will have it in his power to undeceive his Majesty. I have seen very clearly that the duke is disgusted with his Majesty, and one day he told me that he cared not if the whole world went to destruction, only not Flanders. 1

„Another day he told me that there was a report abroad that his Majesty was sending to arrest him, by means of the Duke of Pastrana, and looking at me he said; „See here, seignior commander, no threats, as if it were in the power of mortal man to arrest me, much less of such fellows as these.” 2

„But this is but a small part of what I could say,” continued the detective knight-commander, „for I don't like to trust these ciphers. But be certain that nobody in Flanders wishes well to these estates or to the Catholic cause, and the associates of the Duke of Parma go about saying that it does not suit the Italian potentates to have his Majesty as great a monarch as he is trying to be.” 3

This is but a sample of the dangerous stuff with which the royal mind was steadily drugged, day after day, by those to whom Farnese was especially enjoined to give his confidence. Later on it will be seen how much effect was thus produced both upon the king and upon the duke. Moreo, Mendoza, and Tassis were placed about the governor-general,

nominally as his counsellors, in reality as police-officers.

„You are to confer regularly with Mendoza, Tassis, and Moreo,” said Philip to Farnese. 1

„You are to assist, correspond, and harmonize in every way with the Duke of Parma,” wrote Philip to Mendoza, Tassis, and Moreo. 2 And thus cordially and harmoniously were the trio assisting and corresponding with the duke.

But Moreo was right in not wishing to trust the ciphers, and indeed he had trusted them too much, for Farnese was very well aware of his intrigues, and complained bitterly of them to the king and to Idiaquez.

Most eloquently and indignantly did he complain of the calumnies, ever renewing themselves, of which he was the subject. „'Tis this good Moreo who is the author of the last falsehoods,” said he to the secretary; „and this is but poor payment for my having neglected my family, my parents and children for so many years in the king's service, and put my life ever on the hazard, that these fellows should be allowed to revile me and make game of me now, instead of assisting me.” 3

He was at that time, after almost superhuman exertions, engaged in the famous relief of Paris. He had gone there, he said, against his judgment and remonstrating with his Majesty on the insufficiency of men and money for such an enterprise. His army was half-mutinuous and unprovided with food, artillery, or munitions; and then he found himself slandered, ridiculed, his life's life lied away. 'Twas poor payment for his services, he exclaimed, if his Majesty should give ear to these calumniators, and should give him no chance

1 Moreo to Don I. de Idiaquez, 30 Jan. 1590. (Arch. de Simancas MS.)

2 Ibid. „Y viendome dixo, mire Senor Comdor que calle de amenazas, como si fuese en poder de hombre humano que me pudiese prender, quanto mas semejante gente,” &c.

3 Ibid.

1 Philip to Parma, 30 Jan. 1590. (Arch. de Simancas MS.)

2 Instruccion que S. M. dio a J. B. Tassis, para Don B. de Mendoza and Comdador Moreo, May 3, 1595. (Arch. de Simancas MS.)

3 Parma to Idiaquez, 20 Oct. 1590. (Arch. de Simancas MS.)

of confronting his accusers and clearing his reputation. Moreo detested him, as he knew, and Prince Doria said that the commander once spoke so ill of Farnese in Genoa that he was on the point of beating him; while Moreo afterwards told the story as if he had been maltreated because of defending Farnese against Doria's slanders. 1

And still more vehemently did he inveigh against Moreo in his direct appeals to Philip. 2 He had intended to pass over his calumnies, of which he was well aware, because he did not care to trouble the dead—for Moreo meantime had suddenly died, and the gossips, of course, said it was of Farnese's poison 3—but he had just discovered by documents that the commander had been steadily and constantly pouring these his calumnies into the monarch's ears. He denounced every charge as lies, and demanded proof. Moreo had further been endeavouring to prejudice the Duke of Mayenne against the King of Spain and himself, saying that he, Farnese, had been commissioned to take Mayenne into custody, with plenty of similar lies.

„But what I most feel,” said Alexander, with honest wrath, „is to see that your Majesty gives ear to them without making the demonstration which my

services merit, and has not sent to inform me of them, seeing that they may involve my reputation and honour. People have made more account of these calumnies than of my actions performed upon the theatre of the world. I complain, after all my toils and dangers in your Majesty's service, just when I stood with my soul in my mouth and death in my teeth, forgetting children, house, and friends, to be treated thus, instead of receiving rewards and honour, and being enabled to leave to my children, what was better than all the riches the royal hand could bestow, an unsullied and honourable name.” 1

He protested that his reputation had so much suffered that he would prefer to retire to some remote corner as an humble servant of the king, and leave a post which had made him so odious to all. Above all, he entreated his Majesty to look upon this whole affair „not only like a king but like a gentleman.” 2

Philip answered these complaints and reproaches benignantly, expressed unbounded confidence in the duke, assured him that the calumnies of his supposed enemies could produce no effect upon the royal mind, and coolly professed to have entirely forgotten having received any such letter as that of which his nephew complained. „At any rate I have mislaid it,” he said, „so that you see how much account it was with me.” 3

As the king was in the habit of receiving such letters every week, not only from the commander, since deceased, but from Ybarra and others, his memory, to say the least, seemed to have grown remarkably feeble. But the sequel will very soon show that he

1 Parma to Philip; same date. (Arch. de Simancas MS.)

2 Ibid.

3 „Murio en Miaux a los treynta de Agosto (1590) el Comendador Juan Moreo,” says Coloma (iii. 47, 48,) hombre de ingenio prompto y artificioso, que de moderados principios de un pobre Caballero de Malta, llego á ser primer Mobil de las furiosas guerras que abrasaron tantos años a Francia, excessivo gastador de la hazienda del rey, y atrevidissimo comprador de voluntades; este gano la del Duque de Guisa de manera que le hizo Español de corazon, y le confirmó en el aborrecimiento contra los herejes, y sus fautores sin excepcion de persona, tan a la descubierta que le costo la vida: á el se dixo que le costó la suya lo que escrivio al rey contra el Duque de Parma; murio casi al improviso despues de cierto banquete, que ocasionó esta fama, y en que le trago na menos infamia que acrecentamiento.”

1 Ibid.

2 Parma to Philip, 20 Oct. 1590. (Arch. de Simancas MS.) „Sea servido V. Md considerar no tan solamente con ojos de rey mas de cavallero esto negocio.”

3 Philip to Parma, 5 Dec. 1590. (Arch. de Simancas MS.)



had kept the letters by him and pondered them to much purpose. To expect frankness and sincerity from him, however, even in his most intimate communications to his most trusted servants, would have been to „swim with fins of lead.”

Such being the private relations between the conspirators, it is instructive to observe how they dealt with each other in the great game they were playing for the first throne in Christendom. The military events have been sufficiently sketched in the preceding pages, but the meaning and motives of public affairs can be best understood by occasional glances behind the scenes. It is well for those who would maintain their faith in popular Governments to study the workings of the secret, irresponsible, arbitrary system; for every Government, as every individual, must be judged at last by those moral laws which no man born of woman can evade.

During the first French expedition—in the course of which Farnese had saved Paris from falling into the hands of Henry, and had been doing his best to convert it prospectively into the capital of his master's empire—it was his duty, of course, to represent as accurately as possible the true state of France. He submitted his actions to his master's will, but he never withheld from him the advantage that he might have derived, had he so chosen, from his nephew's luminous intelligence and patient observation.

With the chief personage he had to deal with, he professed himself, at first, well satisfied. „The Duke of Mayenne,” said he to Philip, „persists in desiring your Majesty only as King of France, and will hear of no other candidate, which gives me satisfaction such as can't be exaggerated.”<sup>1</sup> Although there were difficulties in the way, Farnese

thought that the two together with God's help might conquer them. „Certainly it is not impossible that your Majesty may succeed,” he said, „although very problematical; and in case your Majesty does succeed in that which we all desire and are struggling for, Mayenne not only demands the second place in the kingdom for himself, but the fief of some great province for his family.”<sup>1</sup>

Should it not be possible for Philip to obtain the crown, Farnese was, on the whole, of opinion that Mayenne had better be elected. In that event he would make over Brittany and Burgundy to Philip, together with the cities opposite the English coast. If they were obliged to make the duke king, as was to be feared, they should at any rate exclude the Prince of Béarn, and secure, what was the chief point, the Catholic religion. „This,” said Alexander, „is about what I can gather of Mayenne's views, and perhaps he will put them down in a despatch to your Majesty.”<sup>2</sup>

After all the duke was explicit enough. He was for taking all the could get—the whole kingdom if possible—but if foiled, then as large a slice of it as Philip would give him as the price of his services. And Philip's ideas were not materially different from those of the other conspirator.

Both were agreed on one thing. The true heir must be kept out of his rights, and the Catholic religion be maintained in its purity. As to the inclination of the majority of the inhabitants, they could hardly be in the dark. They knew that the Béarnese was instinctively demanded by the nation; for his accession to the throne would furnish the only possible solution to the entanglements which had so long existed.<sup>3</sup>

As to the true sentiments of the other politicians and soldiers of the League with whom Farnese came in contact in

<sup>1</sup> Parma to Philip, 21 Oct. 1590. (Arch. de Simancas MS.) „Que es persistir el D. de Umena en no pretender otro rey que V. Md en este reyno lo cual nos viene tan a cuento que no hay para que encarescello.”

<sup>1</sup> Letter last cited. <sup>2</sup> Ibid.

<sup>3</sup> Parma to Philip, Oct. 3, 1590. (Arch. de Simancas MS.)

France, he did not disguise from his master that they were anything but favourable.

„That you may know the humour of this kingdom,” said he, „and the difficulties in which I am placed, I must tell you that I am by large experience much confirmed in that which I have always suspected. Men don't love nor esteem the royal name of your Majesty; and whatever the benefits and assistance they get from you they have no idea of anything redounding to your benefit and royal service, except so far as implied in maintaining the Catholic religion and keeping out the Béarnes. These two things, however, they hold to be so entirely to your Majesty's profit, that all you are doing appears the fulfilment of a simple obligation. They are filled with fear, jealousy, and suspicion of your Majesty. They dread your acquiring power here. Whatever negotiations they pretend in regard to putting the kingdom or any of their cities under your protection, they have never had any real intention of doing it, but their only object is to keep up our vain hopes while they are carrying out their own ends. If to-day they seem to have agreed upon any measure, to-morrow they are sure to get out of it again. This has always been the case, and all your Majesty's ministers that have had dealings here would say so, if they chose to tell the truth. Men are disgusted with the entrance of the army, and if they were not expecting a more advantageous peace in the kingdom with my assistance than without it, I don't know what they would do; for I have heard what I have heard and seen what I have seen. They are afraid of our army, but they want its assistance and our money.”<sup>1</sup>

Certainly if Philip desired enlightenment as to the real condition of the country he had determined to appro-

priate, and the true sentiments of its most influential inhabitants, here was the man most competent of all the world to advise him, describing the situation for him, day by day, in the most faithful manner. And at every step the absolutely puerile inadequacy of the means employed by the king to accomplish his gigantic purposes became apparent. If the crime of subjugating or at least dismembering the great kingdom of France were to be attempted with any hope of success, at least it might have been expected that the man employed to consummate the deed would be furnished with more troops and money than would be required to appropriate a savage island in the Caribbean, or a German principality. But Philip expected miracles to be accomplished by the mere private assertion of his will. It was so easy to conquer realms at the writing table.

„I don't say,” continued Farnese, „if I could have entered France with a competent army, well paid and disciplined, with plenty of artillery and munitions, and with funds enough to enable Mayenne to buy up the nobles of his party, and to conciliate the leaders generally with presents and promises, that perhaps they might not have softened. Perhaps interest and fear would have made that name agreeable which pleases them so little, now that the very reverse of all this has occurred. My want of means is causing a thousand disgusts among the natives of the country, and it is this penury that will be the chief cause of the disasters which may occur.”<sup>1</sup>

Here was sufficiently plain speaking. To conquer a warlike nation without an army, to purchase a rapacious nobility with an empty purse, were tasks which might break the stoutest heart. They were breaking Alexander's.

Yet Philip had funds enough, if he had possessed financial ability himself, or any talent for selecting good finan-

<sup>1</sup> Parma to Philip, Oct. 3, 1590. (Arch. de Simancas MS.)

<sup>1</sup> Ibid.

ciers. The richest countries of the old world and the new were under his sceptre; the mines of Peru and Mexico, the wealth of farthest Ind, were at his disposition; and moreover he drove a lucrative traffic in the sale of papal bulls and mass-books, which were furnished to him at a very low figure, and which he compelled the wild Indians of America and the savages of the Pacific to purchase of him at an enormous advance. That very year, a Spanish carrack had been captured by the English off the Barbary coast, with an assorted cargo, the miscellaneous nature of which gives an idea of royal commercial pursuits at that period. Besides wine in large quantities, there were fourteen hundred chests of quicksilver, an article indispensable to the working of the silver mines, and which no one but the king could, upon pain of death, send to America. He received, according to contract, for every pound of quicksilver thus delivered a pound of pure silver, weight for weight. The ship likewise contained ten cases of gilded mass-books and papal bulls. The bulls, two million and seventy thousand in number, for the dead and the living, were intended for the provinces of New Spain, Yucatan, Guatemala, Honduras, and the Philippines. The quicksilver and the bulls cost the king three hundred thousand florins, but he sold them for five million. The price at which the bulls were to be sold varied—according to the letters of advice found in the ships—from two to four reals a piece, and the inhabitants of those conquered regions were obliged to buy them. 1 „From all this,” says a contemporary chronicler, „is to be seen what a thrifty trader was the king.” 2

The affairs of France were in such confusion that it was impossible for them, according to Farnese, to remain in such condition much longer without bringing about entire decomposition.

1 Meteren, xvi. 300.

2 Ibid.

Every man was doing as he chose—whether governor of a city, commander of a district, or gentleman in his castle. Many important nobles and prelates followed the Béarnese party, and Mayenne was entitled to credit for doing as well as he did. There was no pretence, however, that his creditable conduct was due to anything but the hope of being well paid. „If your Majesty should decide to keep Mayenne,” said Alexander, „you can only do it with large sums of money. He is a good Catholic and very firm in his purpose, but is so much opposed by his own party, that if I had not so stimulated him by hopes of his own grandeur, he would have grown desperate—such small means has he of maintaining his party—and, it is to be feared, he would have made arrangements with Béarne, who offers him *carte-blanche*.” 1

The disinterested man had expressed his assent to the views of Philip in regard to the assembly of the estates and the election of king, but had claimed the sum of six hundred thousand dollars as absolutely necessary to the support of himself and followers until those events should occur. 2 Alexander not having that sum at his disposal was inclined to defer matters, but was more and more confirmed in his opinion that the Duke was a „man of truth, faith, and his word.” 3 He had distinctly agreed that no king should be elected, not satisfactory to Philip, and had „stipulated in return that he should have in this case, not only the second place in the kingdom, but some very great and special reward in full property. 4

Thus the man of truth, faith, and his word had no idea of selling himself cheap, but manifested as much commercial genius as the Fuggers themselves could have displayed, had they been

1 Parma to Philip, Oct. 3. 1590. (Arch. de Simancas MS.) 2 Ibid.

3 „Hombre de verdad, fé y palabra.” (Ibid.)

4 Parma to Philip, Oct. 3. 1590. (Arch. de Simancas MS.)



employed as brokers in these mercantile transactions.

Above all things, Alexander implored the king to be expeditious, resolute, and liberal; for, after all, the Béarnese might prove a more formidable competitor than he was deemed. „These matters must be arranged while the iron is hot,” he said, „in order that the name and memory of the Béarnese and of all his family may be excluded at once and for ever; for your Majesty must not doubt that the whole kingdom inclines to him, both because he is natural successor to the crown, and because in this way the civil war would cease. The only thing that gives trouble is the religious defect, so that if this should be remedied in appearance, even if falsely, men would spare no pains nor expense in his cause.”<sup>1</sup>

No human being at that moment, assuredly, could look into the immediate future accurately enough to see whether the name and memory of the man, whom his adherents called Henry the Fourth of France, and whom Spaniards, legitimists and enthusiastic papists, called the Prince of Béarnese, were to be for ever excluded from the archives of France; whether Henry, after spending the whole of his life as a pretender, was destined to bequeath the same empty part to his descendants, should they think it worth their while to play it. Meantime the sages smiled superior at his delusion; while Alexander Farnese, on the contrary, better understanding the chances on the great game which they were all playing, made bold to tell his master that all hearts in France were inclining to their natural lord. „Differing from your Majesty,” said he, „I am of opinion that there is no better means of excluding him than to make choice of the Duke of Mayenne,

as a person agreeable to the people, and who could only reign by your permission and support.”<sup>1</sup>

Thus, after much hesitation and circumlocution, the nephew made up his mind to chill his uncle's hopes of the crown, and to speak a decided opinion in behalf of the man of his word, faith, and truth.

And thus through the whole of the two memorable campaigns made by Alexander in France, he never failed to give his master the most accurate pictures of the country, and an interior view of its politics; urging above all the absolute necessity of providing much more liberal supplies for the colossal adventure in which he was engaged. „Money and again money is what is required,” he said. „The principal matter is to be accomplished with money, and the particular individuals must be bought with money. The good will of every French city must be bought with money. Mayenne must be humoured. He is getting dissatisfied. Very probably he is intriguing with Béarnese. Everybody is pursuing his private ends. Mayenne has never abandoned his own wish to be king, although he sees the difficulties in the way; and while he has not the power to do us as much good as is thought, it is certainly in his hands to do us a great deal of injury.”<sup>2</sup>

When his army was rapidly diminishing by disease, desertion, mutiny, and death, he vehemently and perpetually denounced the utter inadequacy of the king's means to his vast projects. He protested that he was not to blame for the ruin likely to come upon the whole enterprise. He had besought, remonstrated, reasoned with Philip—in vain. He assured his master that in the condition of weakness in which they found themselves, not very triumphant negotiations could be expected, but that he

<sup>1</sup> Ibid. „Que con esto quedara escluido totalmente el nombre y memoria de Béarnese y de los de su casa, a quien no dudo V. Ma de que el reyno todo inclina, asi por ser naturalmente sucesores del,” &c.

<sup>1</sup> Letter last cited.

<sup>2</sup> Parma to Philip, 11 March, 1592. (Arch. de Simancas MS.) 3 Ibid.

would do his best. „The Frenchmen,” he said, „are getting tired of our disorders, and scandalized by our weakness, misery, and poverty. They disbelieve the possibility of being liberated through us.” 1

He was also most diligent in setting before the king's eyes the dangerous condition of the obedient Netherlands, the poverty of the finances, the mutinous degeneration of the once magnificent Spanish army, the misery of the country, the ruin of the people, the discontent of the nobles, the rapid strides made by the republic, the vast improvement in its military organization, the rising fame of its young stadholder, the thrift of its exchequer, the rapid development of its commerce, the menacing aspect which it assumed towards all that was left of Spanish power in those regions.

Moreover, in the midst of the toils and anxieties of war-making and negotiation, he had found time to discover and to send to his master the left leg of the glorious apostle St. Philip, and the head of the glorious martyr St. Lawrence, to enrich his collection of relics; and it may be doubted whether these treasures were not as welcome to the king as would have been the news of a decisive victory.” 2

During the absence of Farnese in his expeditions against the Béarnese, the government of his provinces was temporarily in the hands of Peter Ernest Mansfeld.

This grizzled old fighter—testy, chol-

eric, superannuated—was utterly incompetent for his post. He was a mere tool in the hands of his son. Count Charles hated Parma very cordially, and old Count Peter was made to believe himself in danger of being poisoned or poniarded by the duke. He was perpetually wrangling with, importuning and insulting him in consequence, and writing malicious letters to the king in regard to him. 1 The great nobles, Arschot, Chimay, Berlaymont, Champagny, Arenberg, and the rest, were all bickering among themselves, and agreeing in nothing save in hatred to Farnese.

A tight rein, a full exchequer, a well-ordered and well-paid army, and his own constant patience, were necessary, as Alexander too well knew, to make head against the republic, and to hold what was left of the Netherlands. But with a monthly allowance, and a military force not equal to his own estimates for the Netherland work, he was ordered to go forth from the Netherlands to conquer France—and with it the dominion of the world—for the recluse of the Escorial.

Very soon it was his duty to lay bare to his master, still more unequivocally than ever, the real heart of Mayenne. No one could surpass Alexander in this skilful vivisection of political characters; and he soon sent the information that the duke was in reality very near closing his bargain with the Béarnese, while amusing Philip and drawing largely from his funds.

1 Same to same, 2 June, 1592. (Arch. de Simancas MS.)

2 Parma to Philip, 4 July, 1592. (Arch. de Simancas MS.) Philip to Parma, 1 Aug. 1592. Ibid. „Quanto a la cabeza del glorioso San Lorenzo, agradezco os el cuydado que mostrais de haberla, y os encargo que lo lleveis adelante hasta salir con ello que os tendré en mucho particular servicio que se haga por vuestro medio.” Parma to Philip, 24 Aug. 1592. Ibid. Philip to Parma, 11 Sept. 1592. Letter to Parma. (Arch. de Simancas (Paris) MS. A. 56, <sup>33</sup> MS.)

1 Parma to Philip, 31 July, 1592. (Arch. de Simancas MS.) Parma to Peter Ernest Mansfeld, 6 Aug. 1592. Mansfeld to Philip, 8 Aug. 1592. Parma to Mansfeld, 16 Aug. 1592. Parma to Philip, 24 Aug. 1592. „Porque con su larga vejez,” said Fuentes of Peter Ernest, „se halla muy decrepito y desacordado que esto y ver quan sugeto está al hijo qui le gobierna como a una criatura.” Fuentes to Philip, 13 Dec. 1592. (Arch. de Simancas MS.) Esteven de Ybarra to —, 9 April, 1593—Ibid. Fuentes to Philip, 23 April, 1593—Ibid. Ybarra to —, 2 May, 1593—Ibid. Same to Philip, 26 July, 1593—Ibid. Fuentes to the Secretaries of State, 2 Sept. 1593—Ibid.

Thus, while faithfully doing his master's work with sword and pen, with an adroitness such as no other man could have matched, it was a necessary consequence that Philip should suspect, should detest, should resolve to sacrifice him. While assuring his nephew, as we have seen, that elaborate, slanderous reports and protocols concerning him, sent with such regularity by the chivalrous Moreo and the other spies, had been totally disregarded, even if they had ever met his eye, he was quietly preparing—in the midst of all these most strenuous efforts of Alexander, in the field at peril of his life, in the cabinet at the risk of his soul—to deprive him of his office, and to bring him, by stratagem if possible, but otherwise by main force, from the Netherlands to Spain.

This project, once resolved upon, the king proceeded to execute with that elaborate attention to detail, with that feline stealth which distinguished him above all kings or chiefs of police that have ever existed. Had there been a murder at the end of the plot—as perhaps there was to be—Philip could not have enjoyed himself more. Nothing surpassed the industry for mischief of this royal invalid.

The first thing to be done was of course the inditing of a most affectionate epistle to his nephew.

„Nephew,” said he, „you know the confidence which I have always placed in you and all that I have put in your hands; and I know how much you are to me, and how earnestly you work in my service, and so, if I could have you at the same time in several places, it would be a great relief to me. Since this cannot be however, I wish to make use of your assistance, according to the times and occasions, in order that I may have some certainty as to the manner in which all this business is to be managed, may see why the settlement of affairs in France is thus delayed,

and what the state of things in Christendom generally is, and may consult with you about an army which I am getting levied here, and about certain schemes now on foot in regard to the remedy for all this; all which makes me desire your presence here for some time, even if a short time, in order to resolve upon and arrange, with the aid of your advice and opinion, many affairs concerning the public good, and facilitate their execution by means of your encouragement and presence, and to obtain the repose which I hope for in putting them into your hands. And so I charge and command you that, if you desire to content me, you use all possible diligence to let me see you here as soon as possible, and that you start at once for Genoa.”<sup>1</sup>

He was further directed to leave Count Mansfeld at the head of affairs during this temporary absence,—as had been the case so often before,—instructing him to make use of the Marquis of Cerralbo, who was already there, to lighten labours that might prove too much for a man of Mansfeld's advanced age.

„I am writing to the marquis,” continued the king, „telling him that he is to obey all your orders. As to the reasons of your going away, you will give out that it is a decision of your own, founded on good cause, or that is a summons of mine, but full of confidence and good will towards you, as you see that is.”<sup>2</sup>

The date of this letter was 20th February, 1592.

The secret instructions to the man who was thus to obey all the duke's orders were explicit enough upon that point, although they were wrapped in the usual closely-twisted phraseology which distinguished Philip's style when his purpose was most direct.

Cerralbo was entrusted with general

<sup>1</sup> Philip to Parma, 20 Feb. 1592. (Arch de Simancas MS.)

<sup>2</sup> Ibid.



directions as to the French matter, and as to peace negotiations with „the Islands;” but the main purport of his mission was to remove Alexander Farnese. This was to be done by fair means, if possible; if not, he was to be deposed and sent home by force.

This was to be the reward of all the toil and danger through which he had grown grey and broken in the king's service.

„When you get to the Netherlands” (for the instructions were older than the letter to Alexander just cited), „you are,” said the king, „to treat of the other two matters until the exact time arrives for the third, taking good care not to cut the thread of good progress in the affairs of France if by chance they are going on well there.

„When the time arrives to treat of commission number three,” continued his Majesty, „you will take occasion of the arrival of the courier of 20th February, and will give with much secrecy the letter of that date to the duke; showing him at the same time the first of the two which you will have received.”

If the duke showed the letter addressed to him by his uncle—which the reader has already seen—then the marquis was to discuss with him the details of the journey, and comment upon the benefits and increased reputation which would be the result of his return to Spain.

„But if the duke should not show you the letter,” proceeded Philip, „and you suspect that he means to conceal and equivocate about the particulars of it, you can show him your letter number two, in which it is stated that you have received a copy of the letter to the duke. This will make the step easier.”

Should the duke declare himself ready to proceed to Spain on the ground indicated—that the king had need of his services—the marquis was then to hasten his departure as earnestly as possible. Every pains were to be taken to overcome any objections that might be made

by the duke on the score of ill health, while the great credit which attached to this summons to consult with the king in such arduous affairs was to be duly enlarged upon. Should Count Mansfeld meantime die of old age, and should Farnese insist the more vehemently, on that account, upon leaving his son the Prince Ranuccio in his post as governor, the marquis was authorised to accept the proposition for the moment—although secretly instructed that such an appointment was really quite out of the question—if by so doing the father could be torn from the place immediately.

But if all would not do, and if it should become certain that the duke would definitively refuse to take his departure, it would then become necessary to tell him clearly, but secretly, that no excuse would be accepted, but that go he must; and that if he did not depart voluntarily within a fixed time, he would be publicly deprived of office, and conducted to Spain by force. 1

But all these things were to be managed with the secrecy and mystery so dear to the heart of Philip. The marquis was instructed to go first to the castle of Antwerp, as if upon financial business, and there begin his operations. Should he find at last all his private negotiations and coaxings of no avail, he was then to make use of his secret letters from the king to the army commanders, the leading nobles of the country, and the neighbouring princes, all of whom were to be undeceived in regard to the duke, and to be informed of the will of his majesty. 2

The real successor of Farnese was to be the Archduke Albert, Cardinal of Austria, son of Archduke Ferdinand, and the letters on this subject were to be sent by a „decent and confidential

1 Sumario de lo que S. Md es servido que haga V. en su comision principal como mas particularmente se le ha dicho de palabra. 31 Dec. 1591. (Arch. de Simancas MS.)

2 Ibid.

person" so soon as it should become obvious that force would be necessary in order to compel the departure of Alexander. For if it came to open rupture, it would be necessary to have the cardinal ready to take the place. If the affair were arranged amicably, then the new governor might proceed more at leisure. The marquis was especially enjoined, in case the duke should be in France, and even if it should be necessary for him to follow him there on account of commissions number one and two, not to say a word to him then of his recall, for fear of damaging matters in that kingdom. He was to do his best to induce him to return to Flanders, and when they were both there, he was to begin his operations. 1

Thus, with minute and artistic treachery, did Philip provide for the disgrace and ruin of the man who was his near blood relation, and who had served him most faithfully from earliest youth. It was not possible to carry out the project immediately, for, as it has already been narrated, Farnese, after achieving, in spite of great obstacles due to the dulness of the king alone, an extraordinary triumph, had been dangerously wounded, and was unable for a brief interval to attend to public affairs.

On the conclusion of his Rouen campaign he had returned to the Netherlands, almost immediately betaking himself to the waters of Spa. The Marquis de Cerralbo meanwhile had been superseded in his important secret mission by the Count of Fuentes, who received the same instructions as had been provided for the marquis.

But ere long it seemed to become unnecessary to push matters to extremities. Farnese, although nominally the governor, felt himself unequal to take the field against the vigorous young

commander who was carrying everything before him in the north and east. Upon the Mansfelds was the responsibility for saving Steenwyk and Coeworden, and to the Mansfelds did Verdugo send piteously, but in vain, for efficient help. For the Mansfelds and other leading personages in the obedient Netherlands were mainly occupied at that time in annoying Farnese, calumniating his actions, laying obstacles in the way of his administration, military and civil, and bringing him into contempt with the populace. When the weary soldier—broken in health, wounded and harassed with obtaining triumphs for his master such as no other living man could have gained with the means placed at his disposal—returned to drink the waters previously to setting forth anew upon the task of achieving the impossible, he was made the mark of petty insults on the part of both the Mansfelds. Neither of them paid their respects to him, ill as he was, until four days after his arrival. When the duke subsequently called a council, Count Peter refused to attend it on account of having slept ill the night before. Champagny, who was one of the chief mischief makers, had been banished by Parma to his house in Burgundy. He became very much alarmed, and was afraid of losing his head. He tried to conciliate the duke, but finding it difficult he resolved to turn monk, and so went to the convent of Capuchins, and begged hard to be admitted a member. They refused him on account of his age and infirmities. He tried a Franciscan monastery with not much better success, and then obeyed orders and went to his Burgundy mansion, having been assured by Farnese that he was not to lose his head. Alexander was satisfied with that arrangement, feeling sure, he said, that so soon as his back was turned Champagny would come out of his convent before the term of probation had expired, and begin to make

1 MS. last cited. Also Philip to the Duke of Sessa, ambassador at Rome, 3 Nov. 1592. (Arch. de Simancas MS.) Philip to Parma, same date. (Ibid.)

mischievous again. A once valiant soldier, like Champagny, whose conduct in the famous „fury of Antwerp” was so memorable, and whose services both in field and cabinet had been so distinguished, fallen so low as to be used as a tool by the Mansfelds against a man like Farnese, and to be rejected as unfit company by Flemish friars, is not a cheerful spectacle to contemplate.

The walls of the Mansfeld house and gardens, too, were decorated by Count Charles with caricatures, intending to illustrate the indignities put upon his father and himself. Among others, one picture represented Count Peter lying tied hand and foot, while people were throwing filth upon him; Count Charles being pourtrayed as meantime being kicked away from the command of a battery of cannon by De la Motte. It seemed strange that the Mansfelds should make themselves thus elaborately ridiculous, in order to irritate Farnese; but thus it was. There was so much stir about these works of art that Alexander transmitted copies of them to the king, whereupon Charles Mansfeld, being somewhat alarmed, endeavoured to prove that they had been entirely misunderstood. The venerable personage lying on the ground, he explained, was not his father, but Socrates. He found it difficult however, to account for the appearance of La Motte, with his one arm wanting and with artillery by his side, because, as Farnese justly remarked, artillery had not been invented in the time of Socrates<sup>1</sup> nor was it recorded that the sage had lost an arm.

Thus passed the autumn of 1592, and Alexander, having as he supposed somewhat recruited his failing strength, prepared, according to his master's orders, for a new campaign in France. For with almost preterhuman malice Philip was employing the man whom he had doomed to disgrace, herhaps to

death, and whom he kept under constant secret supervision, in those laborious efforts to conquer without an army and to purchase a kingdom with an empty purse, in which, as it was destined, the very last sands of Parma's life were to run away.

Suffering from a badly healed wound, from water on the chest, degeneration of the heart, and gout in the limbs, dropsical, enfeebled, broken down into an old man before his time, Alexander still confronted disease and death with as heroic a front as he had ever manifested in the field to embattled Hollanders and Englishmen, or to the still more formidable array of learned pedants and diplomatists in the hall of negotiation. This wreck of a man was still fitter to lead armies and guide councils than any soldier or statesman that Philip could call into his service, yet the king's cruel hand was ready to stab the dying man in the dark.

Nothing could surpass the spirit with which the soldier was ready to do battle with his best friend coming in the guise of an enemy. To the last moment, lifted into the saddle, he attended personally as usual to the details of his new campaign, and was dead before he would confess himself mortal. 1 On the 3rd of December, 1592, in the city of Arras, he fainted after retiring at his usual hour to bed, and thus breathed his last.

According to the instructions in his last will he was laid out barefoot in the robe and cowl of a Capuchin monk. Subsequently his remains were taken to Parma, and buried under the pavement of the little Franciscan church. 2 A

1 Bentivoglio, t. ii. lib. vi. p. 370. „E prima conosciuto si morto che volesse confessarsi mortale.” Compare Coloma, v. 106. Meteren, xvi. 306. Bor, III. xxix. 661. Reynd, ix. 195. Dondini, iii. 639 *segg.*

2 Bentivoglio, t. ii. lib. vi. p. 370. The inscription over his tomb was as follows:—

Alexander Farnesius,  
Belgis Devictis

Et Francis obsidione levatis

1 Parma to Philip, 28 Oct. 1592. (Arch. de Simancas MS.)



pompous funeral, in which the Italians and Spaniards quarrelled and came to blows for precedence, was celebrated in Brussels, and a statue of the hero was erected in the capital at Rome.

The first soldier and most unscrupulous diplomatist of his age, he died when scarcely past his prime, a wearied, broken-hearted old man. His triumphs, military and civil, have been recorded in these pages, and his character has been elaborately portrayed. Were it possible to conceive of an Italian or Spaniard of illustrious birth in the sixteenth century, educated in the school of Machiavelli, at the feet of Philip, as anything but the supple slave of a master and the blind instrument of a Church, one might for a moment regret that so many gifts of genius and valour had been thrown away or at least to mankind. Could the light of truth ever pierce the atmosphere in which such

men have their being; could the sad music of humanity ever penetrate to their ears; could visions of a world—on this earth or beyond it—not exclusively the property of kings and high-priests be revealed to them, one might lament that one so eminent among the sons of women had not been a great man. But it is a weakness to hanker for any possible connection between truth and Italian or Spanish statecraft of that day. The truth was not in it nor in him, and high above his heroic achievements, his fortitude, his sagacity, his chivalrous self-sacrifice, shines forth the baleful light of his perpetual falsehood. 1

Ut humili hoc loco  
Ejus cadaver reponetur  
Mandavit iiii. Non Decemb.  
An. MDXCII.

Dondini, iii. 642.

It appears by a letter of Marquis d'Havré to Philip that the death of Farnese took place on the 3rd December. (Arch. de Simancas MS.)

So soon as his decease was known at Madrid, the first thought of Philip was to conceal from the pope that it had been his intention forcibly to recall him from the Netherlands. The Spanish ambassador at Rome was accordingly instructed to burn the papers which had been sent to him, and to suppress all the communications which he had been on the point of making to the pope.

"Don Cristoval and Don Juan are of opinion," said their minute laid before the king, "that since the notification sent to Rome was to remedy the damage that the report of the recall might cause at that court, now that all this has ceased with the death of the recalled, . . . it is best to conceal that intention from the pope and from all others, and that it is sufficient for the Duke of Sessa to be informed of the truth," &c.

Philip noted on this memoranda with his own hand a decided approval of the suggestion, ordering it to be carried into effect, adding, "Let the Duke of Sessa be told to burn the letter and the copy that was sent with it," &c. (Arch. de Simancas MS.)

I I pass over, as beneath the level of history, a great variety of censorious and probably calumnious reports as to the private character of Farnese, with which the secret archives of the times are filled. Especially Champagny, the man by whom the duke was most hated and feared, made himself busy in compiling the slanderous chronicle in which the enemies of Farnese, both in Spain and the Netherlands, took so much delight. According to the secret history thus prepared for the enlightenment of the king and his ministers, the whole administration of the Netherlands—especially the financial department, with the distribution of offices—was in the hands of two favourites, a beardless secretary named Cosmo de Massi, and a lady of easy virtue called Franceline, who seems to have had a numerous host of relatives and friends to provide for at the public expense. Towards the latter end of the duke's life, it was even said that the seal of the finance department was in the hands of his valet-de-chambre, who, in his master's frequent absences, was in the habit of issuing drafts upon the receiver-general. As the valet-de-chambre was described as an idiot who did not know how to read, it may be believed that the finances fell into confusion. Certainly, if such statements were to be accepted, it would be natural enough that for every million dollars expended by the king in the provinces, not more than one hundred thousand were laid out for the public service; and this is the estimate made by Champagny, who, as a distinguished financier and once chief of the treasury in the provinces, might certainly be thought to know something of the subject. But Champagny was so beside himself with rage, hatred, and terror, where Alexander was concerned, that he is as unfit a guide for those who wish the truth as Commander Moreo or Ybarra.

"Juan Baptista ayuda de camera, Italiano

## CHAPTER XXIX.

Effect of the death of Farnese upon Philip's schemes—Priestly flattery and counsel—Assembly of the States-General of France—Meeting of the Leaguers at the Louvre—Conference at Surène between the chiefs of the League and the "political" leaders—Henry convokes an assembly of bishops, theologians, and others—Strong feeling on all sides on the subject of the succession—Philip commands that the Infanta and the Duke of Guise be elected King and Queen of France—Manifesto of the Duke of Mayenne—Formal re-admission of Henry to the Roman faith—The pope refuses to consent to his reconciliation with the Church—His consecration with the sacred oil—Entry of the king into Paris—Departure of the Spanish garrison from the capital—Dissimulation of the Duke of Mayenne—He makes terms with Henry—Grief of Queen Elizabeth on receipt of the communications from France.

DURING the past quarter of a century there had been tragic scenes enough in France, but now the only man who could have conducted Philip's schemes to a tragic if not a successful issue was gone. Friendly death had been swifter than Philip, and had removed Alexander from the scene before his master had found fitting opportunity to inflict the disgrace on which he was resolved. Meantime, Charles Mansfeld made a feeble attempt to lead an army from the Netherlands into France, to support the sinking fortunes of the League; but it was not for that general of artillery to attempt the well-graced part of the accomplished Farnese with much hope of success. A considerable force of Spanish

infantry, too, had been sent to Paris, where they had been received with much enthusiasm; a very violent and determined churchman, Sega, archbishop of Piacenza, and cardinal-legate, having arrived to check on the part of the holy father any attempt by the great wavering heretic to get himself readmitted into the fold of the faithful. 1

The King of Spain considered it his duty, as well as his unquestionable right, to interfere in the affairs of France, and to save the cause of religion, civilization and humanity, in the manner so dear to the civilization-savers, by reducing that distracted country—utterly unable to govern itself—under his sceptre. To achieve this noble end no bribery was too wholesale, no violence too brutal, no intrigue too paltry. It was his sacred and special mission to save France from herself. If he should fail, he could at least carve her in pieces, and distribute her among himself and friends. Frenchmen might assist him in either of these arrangements, but it was absurd to doubt that on him devolved the work and the responsibility. Yet among his advisers were some who doubted whether the purchase of the grandees of France was really the most judicious course to pursue. There was a general and uneasy feeling that the grandees were making sport of the Spanish monarch, and that they would be inclined to remain his stipendiaries for an indefinite period, without doing their share of the work. A keen Jesuit, who had been much in France, often whispered to Philip that he was going astray. „Those who best understand the fit remedy for this unfortunate kingdom, and know the tastes and temper of the nation,” said he, „doubt giving these vast presents and rewards in order that the nobles of France may affect your cause and

—para mas vilipendencia de finanzas el sello dellas, que solia guardar uno de los chefs, a estado en manos de Juan Baptista—se sellan sin el (Farnese) mas al alvirdio de Baptista idiota que no seave leer o de Rinaldi. . . . En suma es todo confusion y desorden y reducir solo aprovecho destos y tales quanto se haze. . . . Demas las mohatras de los usureros y mercaderes que con sus cambios y recambios pagas en paños y sedas y otras trampas, entendiendose con estos reforzando el dinero en diversos partes hay en que no viene a resultar al rey su milion quasi en cien mil escudos,” &c. Discours du Seigneur de Champagny sur les affaires des Pays Bas, 21 Dec. 1589. Bibliothèque de Bourgogne, MS. No. 12,962.

1 De Thou, xi. 676.

further your schemes. It is the greatest delusion, because they love nothing but their own interest, and for this reason wish for no king at all, but prefer that the kingdom should remain topsy-turvy in order that they may enjoy the Spanish doubloons, as they say themselves almost publicly, dancing and feasting; that they may take a castle to-day, and to-morrow a city, and the day after a province, and so on indefinitely. What matters it to them that blood flows, and that the miserable people are destroyed, who alone are good for anything?" 1

„The immediate cause of the ruin of France," continued the Jesuit, „comes from two roots which must be torn up; the one is the extreme ignorance and scandalous life of the ecclesiastics, the other is the tyranny and the abominable life of the nobility, who with sacrilege and insatiable avarice have entered upon the property of the Church. This nobility is divided into three factions. The first, and not the least, is heretic; the second and the most pernicious is politic or atheist; the *third and least* is catholic. All these, although they differ in opinion, are the same thing in corruption of life and manners, so that there is no choice among them." He then proceeded to set forth how entirely the salvation of France depended on the King of Spain. „Morally speaking," he said, „it is impossible for any Frenchman to apply the remedy. For this two things are wanting; intense zeal for the honour of God, and power. I ask now what Frenchman has both these, or either of them. No one certainly that we know. It is the King of Spain who alone in the world has the zeal and the power. No man who knows the insolence and arrogance of the French nature will believe that even if a king should be elected out of France he would be

obeyed by the others. The first to oppose him would be Mayenne, even if a king were chosen from his family, unless everything should be given him that he asked, which would be impossible."

Thus did the wily priest instil into the ready ears of Philip additional reasons for believing himself the incarnate providence of God. When were priestly flatterers ever wanting to pour this poison into the souls of tyrants? It is in vain for us to ask why it is permitted that so much power for evil should be within the grasp of one wretched human creature, but it is at least always instructive to ponder the career of these crowned conspirators, and sometimes consoling to find its conclusion different from the goal intended. So the Jesuit advised the king not to be throwing away his money upon particular individuals, but with the funds which they were so unprofitably consuming to form a jolly army (*gallardo exercito*) of fifteen thousand foot, and five thousand horse, all Spaniards, under a Spanish general—not a Frenchman being admitted into it,—and then to march forward, occupy all the chief towns, putting Spanish garrisons into them, but sparing the people, who now considered the war eternal, and who were eaten up by both armies. In a short time the king might accomplish all he wished, for it was not in the power of the Béarnese to make considerable resistance for any length of time. 1

This was the plan of Father Odo for putting Philip on the throne of France, and at the same time lifting up the down trodden Church, whose priests, according to his statement, were so profligate, and whose tenets were rejected by all but a small minority of the governing classes of the country. Certainly it did not lack precision, but it

1 Relacion del Padre Anto Crespo acerca de las cosas de Flandes y Francia (citing the conversations and statements of John de Zelander and Father Odo). 1593. (Arch. de Simancas MS.)

1 MS. last cited.



remained to be seen whether the Béarnese was to prove so very insignificant an antagonist as the sanguine priest supposed.

For the third party—the moderate Catholics—had been making immense progress in France, while the diplomacy of Philip had thus far steadily counteracted their efforts at Rome. In vain had the Marquis Pisani, envoy of the politicians' party, endeavoured to soften the heart of Clement towards Henry. The Pope lived in mortal fear of Spain, and the Duke of Sessa, Philip's ambassador to the holy see, denouncing all these attempts on the part of the heretic and his friends, and urging that it was much better for Rome that the pernicious kingdom of France should be dismembered and subdivided, assured his holiness that Rome should be starved, occupied, annihilated, if such abominable schemes should be for an instant favoured.

Clement took to his bed by sickness brought on by all this violence, but had nothing for it but to meet Pisani and other agents of the same cause with a peremptory denial, and send most stringent messages to his legate in Paris, who needed no prompting. 1

There had already been much issuing of bulls by the pope, and much burning of bulls by the hangman, according to decrees of the parliament of Chalons and other friendly tribunals, and burning of Chalons decrees by Paris hangmen, and edicts in favour of Protestants at Nantz and other places 2—measures the enactment, repeal, and re-enactment of which were to mark the ebb and flow of the great tide of human opinion on the most important of subjects, and the traces of which were to be for a long time visible on the shores of time.

Early in 1593 Mayenne, yielding to the pressure of the Spanish party, reluctantly consented to assemble the States-

General of France, in order that a king might be chosen. 1 The duke, who came to be thoroughly known to Alexander Farnese before the death of that subtle Italian, relied on his capacity to outwit all the other champions of the League and agents of Philip now that the master-spirit had been removed. As firmly opposed as ever to the election of any other candidate but himself, or possibly his son, according to a secret proposition which he had lately made to the pope, 2 he felt himself obliged to confront the array of Spanish diplomatists, Roman prelates, and learned doctors, by whom it was proposed to exclude the Prince of Béarn from his pretended rights. But he did not, after all, deceive them as thoroughly as he imagined. The Spaniards shrewdly suspected the French tactics, and the whole business was but a round game of deception, in which no one was much deceived, whoever might be destined ultimately to pocket the stakes. „I know from a very good source,” said Fuentes, „that Mayenne, Guise, and the rest of them are struggling hard in order not to submit to Béarn, and will suffer everything your Majesty may do to them, even if you kick them in the mouth, but still there is no conclusion on the road we are travelling, at least not the one which your Majesty desires. They will go on procrastinating and gaining time, making authority for themselves out of your Majesty's grandeur, until the condition of things comes

1 Ibid. 665-670.

2 „Entrando en pláticas con el comisario del papa qui vino de Francia ha venido declararme en gran secreto que el Duca de Umena le dixo con el mismo no vendria en la election sino fuese en su hijo como lo escrivia al papa y a el pidio lo hiziesse y dixesse convenia para el bien de aquel reyno.” Fuentes to Philip, 9 June, 1593. (Arch. de Simancas MS.)

„Mostrome algo de lo que le escriven en esto y demas de lo que de Roma le avisa que el de Umena haza instancia para que la gente del papa se de a su hijo y que anda separada de la de V. Md.” Same to same, 20 June, 1593. (Ibid.)

1 De Thou, xxii. 120.

2 Ibid. xi. 369, 370, *seqq.*

which they are desiring. Feria tells me that they are still taking your Majesty's money, but I warn your Majesty that it is his only to fight off Béarne, and that they are only pursuing their own ends at your Majesty's expense." 1

Perhaps Mayenne had already a sufficiently clear insight into the not far-distant future, but he still presented himself in Spanish cloak and most ultramontane physiognomy. His pockets were indeed full of Spanish coin at that moment, for he had just claimed and received eighty-eight thousand nine hundred dollars for back debts, together with one hundred and eighty thousand dollars more to distribute among the deputies of the estates. 2 „All I can say about France," said Fuentes, „is that it is one great thirst for money. The Duke of Feria believes in a good result, but I think that Mayenne is only trying to pocket as much money as he can. 3"

Thus fortified, the Duke of Mayenne issued the address to the States-General of the kingdom, to meet at an early day in order to make arrangements to secure religion and peace, and to throw off the possible yoke of the heretic pretender. The great seal affixed to the document represented an empty throne, instead of the usual effigy of a king. 4

The cardinal-legate issued a thunder-

ing manifesto at the same time sustaining Mayenne and virulently denouncing the Béarnese, 1

The politician's party now seized the opportunity to impress upon Henry that the decisive moment was come.

The Spaniard, the priest, and the League, had heated the furnace. The iron was at a white heat. Now was the time to strike. Secretary of State Rêvol, Caspar de Schomberg, Jacques Auguste de Thou, the eminent historian, and other influential personages, urged the king to give to the great question the only possible solution.

Said the king with much meekness, „If I am in error, let those who attack me with so much fury instruct me, and show me the way of salvation. I hate those who act against their conscience. I pardon all those who are inspired by truly religious motives, and I am ready to receive all into favour whom the love of peace, not the chagrin of ill-will, has disgusted with the war." 2

There was a great meeting of Leaguers, at the Louvre, to listen to Mayenne, the cardinal-legate, Cardinal Pellevé, the Duke of Guise, and other chieftains. The Duke of Feria made a long speech in Latin, setting forth the Spanish policy, veiled as usual, but already sufficiently well known, and assuring the assembly that the King of Spain desired nothing so much as the peace of France and of all the world, together with the supremacy of the Roman Church. Whether these objects could best be attained by the election of Philip or of his daughter, as sovereign, with the Archduke Ernest as king-consort, or with perhaps the Duke of Guise or some other eligible husband, were fair subjects for discussion. No selfish motive influenced the king, and he placed all his wealth and all his armies at the disposal of the League to carry out these great projects. 3

1 „Tambien he sabido de buen original que el D. de Umena, Guisa y los demas por no venir al partido con el de Béarne, aunque vicareen, sufriran todo lo que V. Md. hiziere con ellos aunque les pise la boca, y que en quanto se fuere por el camino que agora, no habra conclusion. a lo menos la que V. Md. dessea, y que iran dando muchas largas para dar tiempo al tiempo, autorizandose en tanto con la grandeza de V. Md. hasta llegar el estado que dessean." Fuentes to Philip, 9 June, 1593. (Arch. de Simancas MS.) Same to same, 20 June, 1593. (Ibid.)

2 Feria to Philip, 20 March, 1593. (Arch. de Simancas MS.)

3 „Lo que puedo dezir de Francia es todo sed de dinero—el de Umena como se espera sacarle quanto dinero pudiere, temo tan ruyn suceso como en todo." &c. Fuentes to —, 22 May, 1593. (Arch. de Simancas MS.)

4 De Thou, *ubi sup.*

1 Ibid. xi. 675.

2 Ibid. 683.

3 Ibid. 703-705.

Then there was a conference at Suréne between the chiefs of the League and the „political” leaders; the 27 April, Archbishop of Lyons, the 1593. cardinal-legate, Villars, Admiral of France and defender of Rouen, Bêlin, Governor of Paris, President Jeannin, and others upon one side; upon the other, the Archbishop of Bourges, Bellièvre, Schomberg, Rêvol, and De Thou. 1

The Archbishop of Lyons said that their party would do nothing either to frustrate or to support the mission of Pisani, and that the pope would, as ever, do all that could be done to maintain the interests of the true religion. 2

The Archbishop of Bourges, knowing well the meaning of such fine phrases, replied that he had much respect for the holy father, but that popes had now become the slaves and tools of the King of Spain, who, because he was powerful, held them subject to his caprice. 3

At an adjourned meeting at the same place, the Archbishop of Lyons said that all questions had been 10 May, asked and answered. All now 1593. depended on the pope, whom the League would always obey. If the pope would accept the reconciliation of the Prince of Béarn it was well. He hoped that his conversion would be sincere. 4

The political archbishop (of Bourges) replied to the League's archbishop, that there was no time for delays, and for journeys by land and sea to Rome. The least obstruction might prove fatal to both parties. Let the Leaguers now show that the serenity of their faces was but the mirror of their minds.

But the Leaguers' archbishop said that he could make no further advances. So ended the conference. 5

The chiefs of the politicians now went to the king and informed him that the decisive moment had arrived. 6

Henry had preserved his coolness

throughout. Amid all the hubbub of learned doctors of law, archbishops—Leaguer and political—Sorbonne pedants, solemn grandees from Spain with Latin orations in their pockets, intriguing Guises, huckstering Mayennes, wrathful Huguenots, sanguinary cardinal-legates, threatening world-monarchs—heralded by Spanish musketeers, Italian lancers, and German reiters—shrill screams of warning from the English queen, grim denunciations from Dutch calvinists, scornful repulses from the holy father; he kept his temper and his eye-sight, as perfectly as he had ever done through the smoke and din of the wildest battle-field. None knew better than he how to detect the weakness of the adversary, and to sound the charge upon his wavering line.

He blew the blast—sure that loyal Catholics and Protestants alike would now follow him pell-mell.

On the 16th May, 1593, he gave 16 May, notice that he consented to 1593. get himself instructed, and that he summoned an assembly at Mantes on the 15th July, of bishops, theologians, princes, lords, and courts of parliament to hold council, and to advise him what was best to do for religion and the State. 1

Meantime he returned to the siege of Dreux, made an assault on the place, was repulsed, and then hung nine prisoners of war in full sight of the garrison as a punishment for their temerity in resisting him. 2 The place soon after capitulated (8th July, 1593).

The interval between the summons and the assembling of the clerical and lay notables at Mantes was employed by the Leaguers in frantic and contradictory efforts to retrieve a game which the most sagacious knew to be lost. But the politicians were equal to the occasion, and baffled them at every point.

1 De Thou, xi. 719-775.

2 Ibid.

3 Ibid.

4 Ibid.

5 Ibid.

6 Ibid. 748.

1 Ibid. 751.

2 Ibid. xii. 6.



The Leaguers' archbishop inveighed bitterly against the abominable edicts recently issued in favour of the Protestants.

The political archbishop (of Bourges) replied not by defending, but by warmly disapproving, those decrees of toleration, by excusing the king for having granted them for a temporary purpose, and by asserting positively that, so soon as the king should be converted, he would no longer countenance such measures. 1

It is superfluous to observe that very different language was held on the part of Henry to the English and Dutch Protestants, and to the Huguenots of his own kingdom.

And there were many meetings of the Leaguers in Paris, many belligerent speeches by the cardinal-legate, proclaiming war to the knife rather than that the name of Henry the heretic should ever be heard of again as candidate for the throne, various propositions spasmodically made in full assembly by Feria, Ybarra, Tassis, the juriconsult Mendoza, and other Spanish agents in favour of the Infanta as queen of France, with Archduke Ernest or the Duke of Guise, or any other eligible prince, for her husband.

The League issued a formal and furious invective in answer to Henry's announcement; proving by copious citations from Jeremiah, St. Epiphany, St. Jerome, St. Cyprian, and St. Bernard, that it was easier for a leopard to change his spots or for a blackamoor to be washed white, than for a heretic to be converted, and that the king was thinking rather of the crown of France than of a heavenly crown, is his approaching conversion—an opinion which there were few to gainsay. 2

And the Duke of Nemours wrote to his half-brother, the Duke of Mayenne, offering to use all his influence to bring about Mayenne's election as king on

condition that if these efforts failed, Mayenne should do his best to procure the election of Nemours. 1

And the Parliament of Paris formally and prospectively proclaimed any election of a foreigner null and void, and sent deputies to Mayenne urging him never to consent to the election of the Infanta.

What help, said they, can the League expect from the old and broken Philip, from a king who in thirty years had not been able, with all the resources of his kingdoms, to subdue the revolted provinces of the Netherlands? How can he hope to conquer France? Pay no further heed to the legate, they said, who is laughing in his sleeve at the miseries and distractions of our country. 2 So spake the deputies of the League-Parliament to the great captain of the League, the Duke of Mayenne. It was obvious that the „great and holy confederacy” was becoming less confident of its invincibility. Madam League was suddenly grown decrepit in the eyes of her adorers.

Mayenne was angry at the action of the Parliament, and vehemently swore that he would annul their decree. Parliament met his threats with dignity, and resolved to stand by the decree, even if they all died in their places. 3

At the same time the Duke of Feria suddenly produced in full assembly of Leaguers a written order from Philip that the Duke of Guise and the Infanta should at once be elected king and queen. 4 Taken by surprise, Mayenne dissembled his rage in masterly fashion, promised Feria to support the election, and at once began to higgler for conditions. He stipulated that he should have for himself the governments of Champagne, Burgundy, and La Brie, and that they should be hereditary in his family. He furthermore demanded that Guise should cede to him the princi-

1 De Thou, xi. 753.

2 Ibid. 761.

1 Ibid. 779.

2 Ibid. 784.

3 Ibid. 787.

4 Ibid. xii. 8.

pality of Joinville, and that they should pay him on the spot in hard money two hundred thousand crowns in gold, six hundred thousand more in different payments, together with an annual payment of fifty thousand crowns. 1

It was obvious that the duke did not undervalue himself, but he had after all no intention of falling into the trap set for him. „He has made these promises (as above given) in writing,” said the Duke of Savoy’s envoy to his master, „but he will never keep them. The Duchess of Mayenne could not help telling me that her husband will never consent that the Duke of Guise should have the throne.” 2 From this resolve he had never wavered, and was not likely to do so now. Accordingly the man „of his word, of faith, and truth,” whom even the astute Farnese had at times half believed in, and who had received millions of Philip’s money, now thought it time to break with Philip.

He issued a manifesto, 3 in which he observed that the States-General of France had desired that Philip should be elected King of France, and carry out his design of a universal monarchy, as the only means of ensuring the safety of the Catholic religion and the pacification of the world. It was feared, however, said Mayenne, that the king might come to the same misfortunes which befell his father, who, when it was supposed that he was inspired only by private ambition, and by the hope of placing a hereditary universal crown in his family, had excited the animosity of the princes of the empire. „If a mere suspicion had caused so great a misfortune in the empire,” continued the man of his word, „what will the princes of all Europe do when they find his Majesty elected king of France, and grown by increase of power so formidable to the

world? Can it be doubted that they will fly to arms at once, and give all their support to the King of Navarre, heretic though he be? What motive had so many princes to traverse Philip’s designs in the Netherlands, but desire to destroy the enormous power which they feared? Therefore had the Queen of England, although refusing the sovereignty, defended the independence of the Netherlands these fifteen years.

„However desirable,” continued Mayenne, „that this universal monarchy, for which the house of Austria has so long been working, should be established, yet the king is too prudent not to see the difficulties in his way. Although he has conquered Portugal, he is prevented by the fleets of Holland and England from taking possession of the richest of the Portuguese possessions, the islands and the Indies. He will find in France insuperable objections to his election as king, for he could in this case well reproach the Leaguers with having been changed from Frenchmen into Spaniards. He must see that his case is hopeless in France, he who for thirty years has been in vain endeavouring to re-establish his authority in the Netherlands. It would be impossible in the present position of affairs to become either the king or the protector of France. The dignity of France allows it not.” 1

Mayenne then insisted on the necessity of a truce with the royalists or politicians, and, assembling the estates at the Louvre on the 4th July, he read a written paper declining for the moment to hold an election for king. 2

John Baptist Tassis, next day, replied by declaring that in this case Philip would send no more succours of men or money; for that the only effectual counter-poison to the pretended conversion of the prince of Béarne was the immediate election of a king.” 3

Thus did Mayenne escape from the

1 *Dé Thou*, xii. 10.

2 *MS. de Mesmes*, t. xi. 893, cited by *Capefigue*, vi. 268.

3 *Dé Thou*, xii. 13-24.

1 *Ibid.*

2 *Ibid.* 24.

3 *Ibid.*

snare in which the Spaniards thought to catch the man who, as they now knew, was changing every day, and was true to nothing save his own interests.

And now the great day had come. The conversion of Henry to the Roman faith, fixed long before for the 23rd July, 1593, formally took place at the time appointed. 1 From six in the morning till the stroke of noon did Henry listen to the exhortations and expoundings of the learned prelates and doctors whom he had convoked, the politic Archbishop of Bourges taking the lead in this long-expected instruction. After six mortal hours had come to an end, the king rose from his knees, somewhat wearied, but entirely instructed and convinced. He thanked the bishops for having taught him that of which he was before quite ignorant, and assured them that, after having invoked the light of the Holy Ghost upon his musings, he should think seriously over what they had just taught him, in order to come to a resolution salutary to himself and to the State. 2

Nothing could be more candid. Next day, at eight in the morning, there was a great show in the cathedral of Saint Denis, and the population of Paris, notwithstanding the prohibition of the League authorities, rushed thither in immense crowds to witness the ceremony of the reconciliation of the king. Henry went to the church, clothed as became a freshly purified heretic, in white satin doublet and hose, white silk stockings, and white silk shoes with white roses in them; but with a black hat and a black mantle. 3 There was a great procession with blare of trumpet and beat of drum. The streets were strewn with flowers.

As Henry entered the great portal of the church, he found the Archbishop of Bourges, seated in state, effulgent

in mitre and chasuble, and surrounded by other magnificent prelates in gorgeous attire.

„Who are you, and what do you want?” said the archbishop.

„I am the king,” meekly replied Henry, „and I demand to be received into the bosom of the Roman Catholic Church.”

„Do you wish it sincerely?” asked the prelate.

„I wish it with all my heart,” said the king. 1

Then throwing himself on his knees, the Béarne—great champion of the Huguenots—protested before God that he would live and die in the Catholic faith, and that he renounced all heresy. A passage was with difficulty opened through the crowd, and he was then led to the high altar, amid the acclamations of the people. Here he knelt devoutly and repeated his protestations. His unction and contrition were most impressive, and the people, of course, wept piteously. The king, during the progress of the ceremony, with hands clasped together and adoring the Eucharist with his eyes, or, as the Host was elevated, smiting himself thrice upon the breast, was a model of passionate devotion. 2

Afterwards he retired to a pavilion behind the altar, where the archbishop confessed and absolved him. Then the *Te Deum* sounded, and high mass was celebrated by the Bishop of Nantes. Then, amid acclamations and blessings, and with largess to the crowd, the king returned to the monastery of Saint Denis, where he dined amid a multitude of spectators, who thronged so thickly around him that his dinner-table was nearly upset. These were the very Parisians, who, but three years before,

1 Ibid. De Thou, *ubi sup.*

2 „La dévotion fut remarquée très grande en sa Maj., laquelle pendant la consecration et elevation de l'Eucharistie eut perpetuellement les mains jointes, les yeux adorant l'Eucharistie, ayant frappé sa poitrine trois fois tant à l'elevation de l'Eucharistie que du calice.”—Font. portefeuilles, *ubi sup.*

1 De Thou, xii. 30-35. 2 Ibid.

3 Fontanien portefeuilles, Nos. 416, 417, cited by Capefigue, vi. 325.



had been feeding on rats and dogs and dead men's bones, and the bodies of their own children, rather than open their gates to this same Prince of Béarn.

Now, although Mayenne had set strong guards at those gates, and had most strictly prohibited all egress, the city was emptied of its populace, which pressed in transports of adoration around the man so lately the object of their hate. Yet few could seriously believe that much change had been effected in the inner soul of him, whom the legate, and the Spaniard, and the holy father at Rome still continued to denounce as the vilest of heretics and the most infamous of impostors.

The comedy was admirably played out and was entirely successful. It may be supposed that the chief actor was, however, somewhat wearied. In private, he mocked at all this ecclesiastical mumery, and described himself as heartily sick of the business. „I arrived here last evening,” he wrote to the beautiful Gabrielle, „and was importuned with ‚God save you’ till bed-time. In regard to the Leaguers I am of the order of St. Thomas. I am beginning to-morrow morning to talk to the bishops, besides those I told you about yesterday. At this moment of writing I have a hundred of these importunates on my shoulders, who will make me hate Saint Denis as much as you hate Mantes. ’Tis to-morrow that I take the perilous leap. I kiss a million times the beautiful hands of my angel and the mouth of my dear mistress.”<sup>2</sup>

A truce—renewed at intervals—with the Leaguers lasted till the end of the year. The Duke of Nevers was sent on special mission to Rome to procure the holy father's consent to the great heretic's reconciliation to the Church, and he was instructed to make the king's submission in terms so wholesale and

so abject that—even some of the life-long papists of France were disgusted, while every honest Protestant in Europe shrank into himself for shame. But Clement, overawed by Philip and his ambassador, was deaf to all the representations of the French envoy. He protested that he would not believe in the sincerity of the Béarn's conversion unless an angel from Heaven should reveal it to him. So Nevers left Rome highly exasperated, and professing that he would rather have been sewn in a sack and tossed into the Tiber, than bear back such a message. The pope ordered the prelates who had accompanied Nevers to remain in Rome and be tried by the Inquisition for misprision of heresy, but the duke placed them by his side and marched out of the Porta del Popolo with them, threatening to kill any man who should attempt to enforce the command.<sup>2</sup>

Meantime it became necessary to follow up the St. Denis comedy with a still more exhilarating popular spectacle. The heretic had been purified, confessed, absolved. It was time for a consecration. But there was a difficulty. Although the fever of loyalty to the ancient house of Bourbon, now redeemed from its worship of the false gods, was spreading contagiously through the provinces, although all the white silk in Lyons had been cut into scarves and banners to celebrate the reconciliation of the candid king with mother Church; although

1 „Herewith enclosed,” wrote the English envoy, „your lordship shall receive a copy of the request which M. de Nevers presented to the pope on the king's behalf—by the sight whereof it will appear to your lo. how abjectly he doth therein debase the King's authority and dignity, wherewith the most superstitious Catholics here are so despised, as they promise to procure the same to be disavowed by the courts of parliament as derogating from the dignity of the Gallican Church.” Edmonds (who was secretary to Sir H. Umpton, and in his absence agent or chargé d'affaires) to Burghley, 30 Dec. 1593. (S. P. Office MS.) Compare De Thou, xii. 38, and Bor. B. xxxii. p. 151.

2 De Thou, xii. 83-94.

1 De Thou, xii. 35.

2 Mem. de M. de l'Estoile, MS. Cot. P. No. 30, cited by Capefigue, vi. 354.

that ancient city was ablaze with bonfires and illuminations, while its streets ran red; with blood no longer, but with wine; and although Madam League, so lately the object of fondest adoration, was now publicly burned in the effigy of a grizzly hag; 1 yet Paris still held for that decrepid beldame, and closed its gates to the Béarnese.

The city of Rheims, too, had not acknowledged the former Huguenot, and it was at Rheims, in the church of St. Rémy, that the Holy Bottle was preserved. With what chrism, by what prelate, should the consecration of Henry be performed? Five years before, the League had proposed in the estates of Blois to place among the fundamental laws of the kingdom that no king should be considered a legitimate sovereign whose head had not been anointed by the bishop at Rheims with oil from that holy bottle. But it was now decided that to ascribe a monopoly of sanctity to that prelate and to that bottle would be to make a schism in the Church. 2

Moreover it was discovered that there was a chrism in existence still more efficacious than the famous oil of St. Rémy. One hundred and twelve years before the baptism of Clovis, St. Martin had accidentally tumbled down stairs, and lay desperately bruised and at the point of death. But, according to Sulpicius Severus, an angel had straightway descended from heaven; and with a miraculous balsam had anointed the contusions of the saint, who next day felt no farther inconveniences from his fall. The balsam had ever since been preserved in the church of Marmoutier near Tours. Here, then, was the most potent of unguents brought directly from heaven. To mix a portion thereof with the chrism of consecration was clearly more judicious than to make use of the holy bottle, especially as the holy bottle was not within reach. The monks of Marmoutier consented to lend the sacred

phial containing the famous oil of St. Martin for the grand occasion of the royal consecration.

Accompanied by a strong military escort provided by Giles de Souvri, governor of Touraine, a deputation of friars brought the phial to Chartres, where the consecration was to take place. Prayers were offered up, without ceasing, in the monastery during their absence that no mishap should befall the sacred treasure. When the monks arrived at Chartres, four young barons of the first nobility were assigned to them as hostages for the safe restoration of the phial, which was then borne in triumph to the cathedral, the streets through which it was carried being covered with tapestry. There was a great ceremony, a splendid 26 Feb. consecration; six bishops, with 1594. mitres on their heads and in gala robes, officiating; after which the king knelt before the altar and took the customary oath. 1

Thus the champion of the fierce Huguenots, the well-beloved of the dead La Noue and the living Duplessis Mornay, the devoted knight of the heretic Queen Elizabeth, the sworn ally of the stout Dutch Calvinists, was pompously reconciled to that Rome which was the object of their hatred and their fear.

The admirably arranged spectacles of the instruction at St. Denis and the consecration at Chartres were followed on the day of the vernal equinox by a third and most conclusive ceremony.

A secret arrangement had been made with De Cossé-Brissac, gover- 21-22 Mar. nor of Paris, by the king, 1594. according to which the gates of Paris were at last to be opened to him. 2 The governor obtained a high price for his services—three hundred thousand livres in hard cash, thirty thousand a year for his life, and the truncheon of

1 De Thou, xii. 114.

2 Ibid. 120-129.

1 Ibid.

2 Ibid. 138-141.

marshal of France.<sup>1</sup> Thus purchased, Brissac made his preparations with remarkable secrecy and skill. Envoy Ybarra, who had scented something suspicious in the air, had gone straight to the governor for information, but the keen Spaniard was thrown out by the governor's ingenuous protestations of ignorance. The next morning, March 22nd, was stormy and rainy, and long before daylight Ybarra, still uneasy despite the statements of Brissac, was wandering about the streets of Paris when he became the involuntary witness of an extraordinary spectacle.<sup>2</sup>

Through the wind and the rain came trampling along the dark streets of the capital a body of four thousand troopers and lansquenettes. Many torch-bearers attended on the procession, whose flambeaux threw a lurid light upon the scene. There, surrounded by the swart and grizzly bearded visages of these strange men-at-arms, who were discharging their arquebuses, as they advanced upon any bystanders likely to oppose their progress; in the very midst of this sea of helmed heads, the envoy was enabled to recognise the martial figure of the Prince of Béarn. Armed to the teeth, with sword in hand and dagger at side, the hero of Ivry rode at last through the barriers which had so long kept him from his capital. „'Twas like enchantment," said Ybarra.<sup>3</sup> The first Bourbon entered the city through the same gate of which the last Valois had, five years before, so ignominiously fled. It was a midnight surprise, although not fully accomplished until near the dawn of day. It was not a triumphal entrance, nor did Henry come as the victorious standard bearer of a great principle. He had defeated the League in many battlefields, but the League still hissed defi-

ance at him from the very hearthstone of his ancestral palace. He had now crept, in order to conquer, even lower than the League itself; and casting off his Huguenot skin at last, he had soared over the heads of all men, the presiding genius of the holy Catholic Church.

Twenty-one years before, he had entered the same city on the conclusion of one of the truces which had varied the long monotony of the religious wars of France. The youthful son of Antony Bourbon and Joan of Albret had then appeared as the champion and the idol of the Huguenots. In the same year had come the fatal nuptials with the bride of St. Bartholomew, the first Catholic conversion of Henry and the massacre at which the world still shudders.

Now he was chief of the „Politicians," and sworn supporter of the Council of Trent. Earnest Huguenots were hanging their heads in despair.

He represented the principle of national unity against national dismemberment by domestic treason and foreign violence. Had that principle been his real inspiration, as it was in truth his sole support, history might judge him more leniently. Had he relied upon it entirely it might have been strong enough to restore him to the throne of his ancestors, without the famous religious apostasy with which his name is for ever associated. It is by no means certain that permanent religious toleration might not have been result of his mounting the throne, only when he could do so without renouncing the faith of his fathers. A day of civilization may come perhaps, sooner or later, when it will be of no earthly consequence to their fellow creatures to what creed, what Christian church, what religious dogma kings or humbler individuals may be partial; when the relations between man and his Maker shall be undefiled by political or social intrusion. But the day will never come when it can be otherwise than damaging to

<sup>1</sup> Capetigue, vii. 122.

<sup>2</sup> Ybarra to —, 28 March, 1594. (Arch. de Simancas, B. 79, <sup>222</sup> cited by Capetigue, vii. 161.)

<sup>3</sup> Ibid.



public morality and humiliating to human dignity to forswear principle for a price, and to make the most awful of mysteries the subject of political legerdemain and theatrical buffoonery.

The so-called conversion of the king marks an epoch in human history. It strengthened the Roman Church and gave it an indefinite renewal of life; but it sapped the foundations of religious faith. The appearance of Henry the Huguenot as the champion of the Council of Trent was of itself too biting an epigram not to be extensively destructive. Whether for good or ill, religion was fast ceasing to be the mainspring of political combinations, the motive of great wars and national convulsions. The age of religion was to be succeeded by the age of commerce.

But the king was now on his throne. All Paris was in rapture. There was *Te Deum* with high mass in Notre Dame, and the populace was howling itself hoarse with rapture in honour of him so lately the object of the general curse. Even the Sorbonne declared in favour of the reclaimed heretic, and the decision of those sages had vast influence with less enlightened mortals. There was nothing left for the Duke of Feria but to take himself off and make Latin orations in favour of the Infanta elsewhere, if fit audience elsewhere could be found. A week after the entrance of Henry, the Spanish garrison 28 March, accordingly was allowed to leave Paris with the honours of war.

„We marched out at 2 P.M.,” wrote the duke to his master, „with closed ranks, colours displayed, and drums beating. First came the Italians and then the Spaniards, in the midst of whom was myself on horseback, with the Walloons marching near me. The Prince of Béarne”—it was a solace to the duke’s heart, of which he never could be deprived, to call the king by that title—” was at a window over the gate of St.

Denis through which we took our departure. He was dressed in light grey, with a black hat surmounted by a great white feather. Our displayed standards rendered him no courteous salute as we passed.”<sup>1</sup>

Here was another solace!

Thus had the game been lost and won, but Philip as usual did not acknowledge himself beaten. Mayenne, too, continued to make the most fervent promises to all that was left of the confederates. He betook himself to Brussels, and by the king’s orders was courteously received by the Spanish authorities in the Netherlands. In the midst of the tempest now rapidly destroying all rational hopes, Philip still clung to Mayenne as to a spar in the shipwreck. For the king ever possessed the virtue, if it be one, of continuing to believe himself invincible and infallible, when he had been defeated in every quarter, and when his calculations had all proved ridiculous mistakes.

When his famous Armada had been shattered and sunk, have we not seen him peevishly requiring Alexander Farnese to construct a new one immediately and to proceed therewith to conquer England out of hand? Was it to be expected that he would renounce his conquest of France, although the legitimate king had entered his capital, had reconciled himself to the Church, and was on the point of obtaining forgiveness of the pope? If the Prince of Béarne had already destroyed the Holy League, why should not the Duke of Mayenne and Archduke Ernest make another for him, and so conquer France without further delay?

But although it was still possible to deceive the king, who in the universality of his deceptive powers was so prone to delude himself, it was difficult even for so accomplished an intriguer

<sup>1</sup> Feria to Philip, Arch. de Simancas (Paris), B. 78, <sup>62</sup> in Capefigue, vii. 161.

as Mayenne to hoodwink much longer the shrewd Spaniards who were playing so losing a game against him.

„Our affairs in France,” said Ybarra, „are in such condition that we are losing money and character there, and are likely to lose all the provinces here, if things are not soon taken up in a large and energetic manner. Money and troops are what is wanted on a great scale for France. The king’s agents are mightily discontented with Mayenne, and with reason; but they are obliged to dissimulate and to hold their tongues. We can send them no assistance from these regions, unless from down yonder you send us the cloth and the scissors to cut it with.” 1

And the archduke Ernest, although he invited Mayenne to confer with him at Brussels, under the impression that he could still keep him and the Duke of Guise from coming to an arrangement with Béarne, hardly felt more confidence in the man than did Feria of Ybarra. „Since the loss of Paris,” said Ernest, „I have had a letter from Mayenne, in which, deeply affected by that event, he makes me great offers, even to the last drop of his blood, vowing never to abandon the cause of the League. But of the intentions and inner mind of this man I find such vague information, that I don’t dare to expect more stability from him than may be founded upon his own interest.” 2

1 Ybarra to the Secretaries, 18 Jan. 1594. (Arch. de Simancas MS.) Charles Mansfeld, too, held the same language. „I have had a talk with Tassis,” he wrote to the king, „and we both agree that Mayenne has always been managing affairs for his own ends, cheating your Majesty, and this opinion I have always held.”

2 Ernest to Philip, 30 March, 1594. Ibid. The legate had at last informed Mayenne that „the actions of Navarre were not of men, but the works of God’s hand, and that the forces of Spain were not sufficient to prevent him, establishing himself absolute king of France, and so it would be better that he should be established by means of a general peace.” *Sumário de una relacion que hizo Ascanio Solferini*, 27 April, 1594.

And so Mayenne came to Brussels and passed three days with the archduke. „He avows himself ready to die in our cause,” said Ernest. „If your Majesty will give men and money enough, he will undertake so to deal with Béarne that he shall not think himself safe in his own house.” The archduke expressed his dissatisfaction to Mayenne that with the money he had already received, so little had been accomplished, but he still affected a confidence which he was far from feeling, „because,” said he, „it is known that Mayenne is already treating with Béarne. If he has not concluded those arrangements, it is because Béarne now offers him less money than before. 1 The amount of dissimulation, politely so-called, practised by the grandees of that age, to say nothing of their infinite capacity for pecuniary absorption, makes the brain reel and enlarges one’s ideas of the human faculties as exerted in certain directions. It is doubtful whether plain Hans Miller or Hans Baker could have risen to such a level. 2

(Arch. de Simancas MS.) Philip replied to the Archduke that Mayenne could scarcely be acquitted of evil intentions in regard to the loss of Paris, but that nevertheless it was necessary to effect confidence in him. The war would be carried on, and the king had so informed the pope. The salaries paid to personages in France before the loss of Paris would be continued. Philip to Ernest, 4 June, 1594. (Arch. de Simancas MS.)

1 *Relacion de cartas del Archiduque, para S. Md sobre las cosas de Francia*. (Arch. de Simancas MS.)

2 Even so late as the winter of this year, Mayenne wrote in a deeply injured tone to the archduke, expressing surprise that „pledges should be demanded of him, and suspicions entertained concerning him, after all the proofs he had given of his fidelity and constancy.” Mayenne to Ernest, Sept. 1, 1594. (Arch. de Simancas MS.) „He offers very magnificently to die for the cause,” said Ernest, „but his deeds resolve themselves into remote and general offers, and into begging for ready money in present payment for what he is to do for your MY in future.” Ernest to Philip, 6 Sept. 1594. Ibid. And to the very last moment Philip persisted in endeavouring to keep Mayenne about his hook by allowing him to nibble at very small bait. „You must try to keep

The Duke of Feria and the other Spanish envoys had long since thoroughly understood the character of Mayenne—that great broker between Philip, the Béarnese, and the League.

Feria wrote a despatch to the king, denouncing Mayenne as false, pernicious, ous to the cause of Spain and 1594. of catholicism, thoroughly self-seeking and vile, and as now most traitorous to the cause of the confederacy, engaged in surrendering its strong places to the enemy, and preparing to go over to the Prince of Béarne.

„If,” said he, „I were to recount all his base-tricks, I should go on till midnight, and perhaps till to-morrow morning.”<sup>1</sup>

This letter, being intercepted, was sent with great glee by Henry IV., not to the royal hands for which it was destined, but to the Duke of Mayenne. Great was the wrath of that injured personage as he read such libellous truths. He forthwith fulminated a scathing reply, adressed to Philip II., in which he denounced the Duke of Feria as „a dirty ignoramus, an impudent coward, an impostor, and a blind thief;” adding, after many other unsavoury epithets, „but I will do him an honour which he has not merited, proving him a liar with my sword; and I humbly pray your Majesty to grant me this favour and to pardon my just grief, which causes me to depart from the respect due to your Majesty when I speak of this impostor who has thus wickedly torn my reputation.”<sup>2</sup>

His invectives were, however, much stronger than his arguments in defence

of that tattered reputation. The defiance to mortal combat went for nothing; and, in the course of the next year, the injured Mayenne turned his back on Philip and the Spaniards, and concluded his bargain with the Prince of Béarne. He obtained good terms; the government of Burgundy, payment of his debts, and a hundred and twenty thousand crowns in hard cash.<sup>1</sup> It is not on record that the man of his word, of credit, and of truth, ever restored a penny of the vast sums which he had received from Philip to carry on the business of the League.

Subsequently the duke came one very hot summer's day to Monceaux to thank the king, as he expressed it, for „delivering him from Spanish arrogance and Italian wiles;” and having got with much difficulty upon his knees, was allowed to kiss the royal hand. Henry then insisted upon walking about with him through the park at a prodigious rate, to show him all the improvements, while the duke panted, groaned, and perspired in his vain efforts to keep pace with his new sovereign.

„If I keep this fat fellow walking about in the sun much longer,” whispered the king to De Béthune, who was third in the party, „I shall be sufficiently avenged for all the mischief he has done us.”

At last, when the duke was forced to admit himself to be on the point of expiring with fatigue, he was dismissed to the palace with orders to solace himself with a couple of bottles of excellent wine of Arbois, expressly provided for him by the king's direction. And this was all the punishment ever inflicted by the good-humoured monarch on the corpulent conspirator.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Capefigue vii. 333-5.

<sup>2</sup> *Memoires de Sully*, liv. viii. 454. This interview was in the spring of 1596, while Henry was occupied with the siege of La Fere. At the very same time, possibly on the self-same day, Mayenne was sending an emissary to Philip, begging to have his al-

him dependent on me,” he said to Ernest, „not giving him any more money than is necessary to prevent him from falling away entirely, for to content his appetite completely there is not a fortune in the world that would suffice.” Philip to Ernest, 2 Dec. 1594. *Ibid.* Compare paper of Diego de Pimental, 23 Nov. 1594. *Ibid.*

<sup>1</sup> Feria to Philip, Aug. 1594. MSS. de Colbert, vol. 38, in Capefigue, vii. 229.

<sup>2</sup> Capefigue, vii. 229, *seqq.*



The Duke of Guise made his arrangements with the ex-Huguenot on even better terms and at a still earlier day; 1 while Joyeuse and Mercœur stood out a good while and higgled hard for conditions. „These people put such a high price on themselves,” said one of Henry’s diplomatists, „that one loses almost more than one gains in buying them. They strip and plunder us even in our nakedness, and we are obliged, in order to conciliate such harpies, to employ all that we can scrape out of our substance and our blood. I think, however, that we ought to gain them by whatever means and at whatever price.” 2

Thus Henry IV., the man whom so many contemporary sages had for years been rebuking or ridiculing for his persistency in a hopeless attempt to save his country from dismemberment, to restore legitimate authority, and to resist the „holy confederacy” of domestic traitors, aided by foreign despots and sympathizers, was at last successful, and the fratricidal war in France was approaching its only possible conclusion.

But, alas! the hopes of those who loved the reformed Church as well as they loved their country were sadly blasted by the apostasy of their leader. From the most eminent leaders of the Huguenots there came a wail, which must have penetrated even to the well-steeled heart of the cheerful Gascon. „It will be difficult,” they said, „to

efface very soon from your memory the names of the men whom the sentiment of a common religion, association in the same perils and persecutions, a common joy in the same deliverance, and the long experience of so many faithful services, have engraved there with a pencil of diamond. The remembrance of these things pursues you and accompanies you everywhere; it interrupts your most important affairs, your most ardent pleasures, your most profound slumber, to represent to you, as in a picture, yourself to yourself: yourself not as you are to-day, but such as you were when, pursued to the death by the greatest princes of Europe, you went on conducting to the harbour of safety the little vessel against which so many tempests were beating.” 1

The States of the Dutch republic, where the affair of Henry’s conversion was as much a matter of domestic personal interest as it could be in France—for religion up to that epoch was the true frontier between nation and nation—debated the question most earnestly while it was yet doubtful. It was proposed to send a formal deputation to the king, in order to divert him, if possible, from the fatal step which he was about to take. After ripe deliberation, however, it was decided to leave the matter „in the hands of God Almighty, and to pray Him earnestly to guide the issue to His glory and the welfare of the Churches.” 2

lowance continued, and the king left it to his governor-general to decide whether to do so or not. Philip to Archduke Albert, 24 April, 1596. (Arch. de Simancas MS.)

1 Capefigue, vii. 321, 322.

2 „Je ne doute point que l’accommodement de M. de Mayenne ne soit fait et j’espère que celui de M. de Joyeuse se fera encore. M. de Mercœur se rend plus difficile. Ces gens-là se mettent à si haut prix qu’on perd presque plus qu’on ne gagne à les acheter. Ils nous dépouillent dans notre nudité mesme, et il faut employer pour reconciler ces harpies tout ce que nous pouvons tirer de notre substance et de notre sang. Je crois neantmoins que nous les devons gagner par quelque moyen et à quelque prix que ce puisse être.” Bongars. Lettres, pp. 331, 332.

1 Requête au Roy par ceux de la religion, 1593. Colbert MSS. vol. xxxi. *apud* Capefigue, vi. 317.

„Je plains et pleure au fond de mon ame la gehenne de S. Maj.,” wrote Duplessis Mornay, 11 Aug. 1593, to De Lomenie, „je vous prie de lui dire que s’il lui prend jamais envie de sortir de cette captivité et spirituelle et temporelle, je ne puis croistre de fidelité mais je doublerai de courage. . . . Ils ne lui donnent pas la paix de l’estat et lui ostent la paix de la conscience. . . . Ils ne lui rendent point son royaume, car c’est à Dieu et non au diable à le donner, et lui faut renoncer autant qu’en eulx est le royaume des cieux.” Mem. et Correspond. de Duplessis Mornay, iv. 511.

2 Bor, III. 706.

The Queen of England was, as might be supposed, beside herself with indignation, and in consequence of the great apostasy and of her chronic dissatisfaction with the manner in which her contingent of troops had been handled in France, she determined to withdraw every English soldier from the support of Henry's cause. The unfortunate French ambassador in London was at his wits' ends. He vowed that he could not sleep of nights, and that the gout and the cholic, to which he was always a martyr, were nothing to the anguish which had now come upon his soul and brain, such as he had never suffered since the bloody day of St. Bartholomew. 1

„Ah, my God!” said he to Burghley, „is it possible that her just choler has so suddenly passed over the great glory which she has acquired by so many benefits and liberalities?” 2 But he persuaded himself that her majesty would after all not persist in her fell resolution. To do so, he vowed, would only be boiling milk for the French papists, who would be sure to make the most of the occasion in order to precipitate the king into the abyss, to the border of which they had already brought him. He so dreaded the ire of the queen that he protested he was trembling all over merely to see the pen of his secretary wagging as he dictated his despatch. 3 Nevertheless it was his terrible duty to face her in her wrath, and he implored the lord treasurer to accompany him and to shield him at the approaching interview. „Protect me,” he cried, „by your wisdom from the ire of this great princess; for by the living God, when I see her enraged against any person

whatever, I wish myself in Calcutta, fearing her anger like death itself.” 1

When all was over, Henry sent De Morlans as special envoy to communicate the issue to the Governments of England and of Holland. But the queen, although no longer so violent, was less phlegmatic than the States-General, and refused to be comforted. She subsequently receded, however, from her determination to withdraw her troops from France.

„Ah! what grief; ah! what regrets; ah! what groans, have I felt in my soul,” she wrote, „at the sound of the news brought to me by Morlans! My God! Is it possible that any worldly respect can efface the terror of Divine wrath? Can we by reason even expect a good sequel to such iniquitous acts? He who has maintained and preserved you by His mercy, can you imagine that He permits you to walk alone in your utmost need? 'Tis bad to do evil that good may come of it. Meantime I shall not cease to put you in the first rank of my devotions, in order that the hands of Esau may not spoil the blessings of Jacob. As to your promises to me of friendship and fidelity, I confess to have dearly deserved them, nor do I repent, provided you do not change your Father—otherwise I shall be your bastard sister by the father's side—for I shall ever love a natural better than an adopted one. I desire that God may guide you in a straight road and a better path. Your most sincere sister in the old fashion. As to the new, I have nothing to do with it.

„ELIZABETH R.” 2

1 Beauvoir la Nocle to Burghley, 24 Aug. 1593. (S. P. Office MS.)

2 Bibl. de Roi, MSS. Colbert in fol. M. R. D. vol. xvi., fol. 329, *apud* Capifigue, vi. 352.

1 Beauvoir la Nocle to Burghley, 24 Aug. 1593. (S. P. Office MS.) 2 Ibid. 3 Ibid.

## CHAPTER XXX.

Prince Maurice lays siege to Gertruydenberg—Advantages of the new system of warfare—Progress of the besieging operations—Superiority of Maurice's manœuvres—Adventure of Count Philip of Nassau—Capitulation of Gertruydenberg—Mutiny among the Spanish troops—Attempt of Verdugo to retake Coeworden—Suspensions of treason in the English garrison at Ostend—Letter of Queen Elizabeth to Sir Edward Norris on the subject—Second attempt on Coeworden—Assault on Groningen by Maurice—Second adventure of Philip of Nassau—Narrow escape of Prince Maurice—Surrender of Groningen—Particulars of the siege—Question of religious toleration—Progress of the United Netherlands—Condition of the „obedient” Netherlands—Incompetency of Peter Mansfeld as Governor—Archduke Ernest, the successor of Farnese—Difficulties of his position—His unpopularity—Great achievements of the republicans—Triumphal entry of Ernest into Brussels and Antwerp—Magnificence of the spectacle—Disaffection of the Spanish troops—Great military rebellion—Philip's proposal to destroy the English fleet—His assassination plans—Plot to poison Queen Elizabeth—Conspiracies against Prince Maurice—Futile attempts at negotiation—Proposal of a marriage between Henry and the Infanta—Secret mission from Henry to the King of Spain—Special dispatch to England and the States—Henry obtains further aid from Queen Elizabeth and the States-Council—Anxiety of the Protestant countries to bring about a war with Spain—Aspect of affairs at the close of the year 1594.

WHILE Philip's world-empire seemed in one direction to be so rapidly fading into cloudland there were substantial possessions of the Spanish crown which had been neglected in Brabant and Friesland.

Two very important cities still held for the King of Spain within the territories of what could now be fairly considered the United Dutch Republic—St. Gertruydenberg and Groningen.

Early in the spring of 1593, Maurice had completed his preparations for a siege, and on the 24 March appeared before Gertruydenberg.

It was a stately, ancient city, important for its wealth, its strength, and especially for its position. For with-

out its possessions even the province of Holland could hardly consider itself mistress of its own little domains. It was seated on the ancient Meuse, swollen as it approached the sea almost to the dimension of a gulf, while from the south another stream, called the Donge, very brief in its course, but with considerable depth of water, came to mingle itself with the Meuse, exactly under the walls of the city.

The site of the place was so low that it was almost hidden and protected by its surrounding dykes. These afforded means of fortification, which had been well improved. Both by nature and art the city was one of the strongholds of the Netherlands.

Maurice had given the world a lesson in the beleaguering science at the siege of Steenwyk, such as had never before been dreamt of; but he was resolved that the operations before Gertruydenberg should constitute a masterpiece.

Nothing could be more beautiful as a production of military art, nothing, to the general reader, more insipid than its details.

On the land side, Hohenlo's headquarters were at Ramsdonck, a village about a German mile to the east of Gertruydenberg. Maurice himself was established on the west side of the city. Two bridges constructed across the Donge facilitated the communications between the two camps, while great quantities of planks and brush were laid down across the swampy roads to make them passable for waggon-trains and artillery. The first care of the young general, whose force was not more than twenty thousand men, was to protect himself rather than to assail the town.

I See, for the details of this remarkable siege, Meteren, xvi. 321, 322. Bor, III. 690-698. Reid, x. 198-205. Mulder's Duyck, 164-245, especially. Bentivoglio, P. III. lib. i. pp. 383-387. Coloma, vi. 119-122.



His lines extended many miles in a circuit around the place, and his forts, breastworks, and trenches were very numerous.

The river was made use of as a natural and almost impassable ditch of defence, and windmills were freely employed to pump water into the shallows in one direction, while in others the outer fields, in quarters whence a relieving force might be expected, were turned into lakes by the same machinery. Farther outside, a system of palisade work of caltrops and man-traps—sometimes in the slang of the day called Turkish ambassadors—made the country for miles around impenetrable or very disagreeable to cavalry. 1 In a shorter interval than would have seemed possible, the battlements and fortifications of the besieging army had risen like an exhalation out of the morass. The city of Gertruydenberg was encompassed by another city as extensive and apparently as impenetrable as itself. Then, for the first time in that age, men thoroughly learned the meaning of that potent implement the spade.

Three thousand pioneers worked night and day with pickaxe and shovel. The soldiers liked the business; for every man so employed received his ten stivers a day additional wages, punctually paid, and felt moreover that every stroke was bringing the work nearer to its conclusion.

The Spaniards no longer railed at Maurice as a hedger and ditcher. When he had succeeded in bringing a hundred great guns to bear upon the beleaguered city they likewise ceased to sneer at heavy artillery.

The Kartowen and Half Kartowen were no longer considered „espanta vellacos.”

Meantime, from all the country round, the peasants flocked within the lines. Nowhere in Europe were provisions so plentiful and cheap as in the Dutch

camp. Nowhere was a readier market for agricultural products, prompter payment, or more perfect security for the life and property of non-combatants. Not so much as a hen's egg was taken unlawfully. 1 The country people found themselves more at ease within Maurice's lines than in any other part of the provinces, obedient or revolted. They ploughed and sowed and reaped at their pleasure, and no more striking example was ever afforded of the humanizing effect of science upon the barbarism of war, than in this siege of Gertruydenberg. 2 Certainly it was the intention of the prince to take his city, and when he fought the enemy it was his object to kill; but, as compared with the bloody work which Alva, and Romero, and Requesens, and so many others had done in those doomed provinces, such war-making as this seemed almost like an institution for beneficent and charitable purposes.

Visitors from the neighbourhood, from other provinces, from foreign countries, came to witness the extraordinary spectacle, and foreign generals repaired to the camp of Maurice to take practical lessons in the new art of war. 3

Old Peter Ernest Mansfeld, who was nominal governor of the Spanish Netherlands since the death of Farnese, rubbed his eyes and stared aghast when the completeness of the preparations for reducing the city at last broke in upon his mind. Count Fuentes was the true

1 Duyck, 201.

2 Meteren, Bor, Reynd, *ubi sup.*

3 „Un des mes amis,” wrote Bongars, envoy of Henry IV, „qui est allé dans le camp des Hollandois par la seule curiosité de le voir, m'a écrit qu'il n'a jamais ni vu ni entendu parler d'une armée campée ou il parut plus de courage et en même temps plus de discipline. Il dit que les fortifications sont si élevées qu'elles égalent les ouvrages des anciens Romains et que tout s'y conduit avec tant d'ordre et de silence qu'on croirait plutôt voir l'état paisible d'une ville qui se conserve l'état par le soin de ses magistrats et par l'obéissance de ses citoyens qu'une troupe confuse de gens armés.”—Lettres, 65, p. 223.

1 Reynd, *ubi sup.*

and confidential regent however until the destined successor to Parma should arrive; but Fuentes, although he had considerable genius for assassination, as will hereafter appear, and was an experienced and able commander of the old-fashioned school, was no match for Maurice in the scientific combinations on which the new system was founded.

In vain did the superannuated Peter call aloud upon his son and governor, Count Charles, to assist him in this dire dilemma. That artillery general had gone with a handful of Germans, Walloons, and other obedient Netherlanders—too few to accomplish anything abroad, too many to be spared from the provinces—to besiege Noyon in France. 1 But what signified the winning or losing of such a place as Noyon at exactly the moment when the Prince of Béarné, assisted by the able generalship of the Archbishop of Bourges, had just executed those famous flanking movements in the churches of St. Denis and Chartres, by which the world-empire had been effectually shattered, and Philip and the Pope completely out-maneuvred.

Better that the five thousand fighters under Charles Mansfeld had been around Gertruydenberg. His aged father did what he could. As many men as could be spared from the garrison of Antwerp and its neighbourhood were collected, but the Spaniards were reluctant to march, except under old Mondragon. That hero, who had done much of the hardest work, and had fought in most of the battles of the century, was nearly as old as the century. Being now turned of ninety, he thought best to keep house in Antwerp Castle. Accordingly twelve thousand foot and three thousand horse took the field under the more youthful Peter Ernest. 2 But Peter Ernest, when

his son was not there to superintend his operations, was nothing but a testy octogenarian, while the two together were not equal to the little finger of Farnese, whom Philip would have displaced, had he not fortunately died.

„Nothing is to be expected out of this place but toads and poison,” wrote Ybarra in infinite disgust to the two secretaries of state at Madrid. „I have done my best to induce Fuentes to accept that which the patent secured him, and Count Peter is complaining that Fuentes showed him the patent so late only to play him a trick. There is a rascally pack of meddlers here, and the worst of them all are the women, whom I particularly give to the devil. There is no end to the squabbles as to who shall take the lead in relieving Gertruydenberg.” 1

Mansfeld at last came ponderously up in the neighbourhood of Turnhout. There was a brilliant little skirmish, in the neighbourhood of this place, in which a hundred and fifty Dutch cavalry under the famous brothers Bax defeated four hundred picked lancers of Spain and Italy. 2 But Mansfeld could get nothing but skirmishes. In vain he plunged about among the caltrops and man-traps. In vain he knocked at the fortifications of Hohenlo on the east and of Maurice on the west. He found them impracticable, impregnable, obdurate. It was Maurice's intention to take his town at as small sacrifice of life as possible. A trumpet was sent on some trifling business to Mansfeld, in reply to a communication made by that general to Maurice.

„Why does your master,” said the choleric veteran to the trumpeter, „why

13,000 foot and 2600 horse, besides the forces under Verdugo. (Arch. de Simancas MS.)

1 He had but 4300 foot and 800 horse. Charles Mansfeld to Fuentes, 5 April, 1593. (Arch. de Simancas MS.)

2 Relacion de la gente efectiva de S. M<sup>a</sup>. para el socorro de St Gertruydenberg. With levies expected, the number is stated at

1 Ybarra to Don Cristoval Mora and Don Juan Idiaquez, from Antwerp, 22 May, 1593. (Ibid.)

2 Bor, Meteren, Reynd, *ubi supra*. Duyck, 214, 215. Compare Coloma, Bentivoglio, *ubi sup*.

does Prince Maurice, being a lusty young commander as he is, not come out of his trenches into the open field and fight me like a man, where honour and fame await him?"

"Because my master," answered the trumpeter, "means to live to be a lusty old commander like your excellency, and sees no reason to-day to give you an advantage."

At this the bystanders laughed, rather at the expense on the veteran. 1

Meantime there were not many incidents within the lines or within the city to vary the monotony of the scientific siege.

On the land side, as has been seen, the city was enclosed and built out of human sight by another Gertruydenberg. On the wide estuary of the Meuse, a chain of war ships encircled the sea-front, in shape of a half moon, lying so close to each other that it was scarcely possible even for a messenger to swim out of a dark night.

The hardy adventurers who attempted that feat with tidings of despair were almost invariably captured.

This blockading fleet took regular part in the daily cannonade; while, on the other hand, the artillery practice from the land-batteries of Maurice and Hohenlo was more perfect than anything ever known before in the Netherlands or France.

And the result was that in the course of the cannonade, which lasted nearly ninety days, not more than four houses in the city escaped injury. The approaches were brought, every hour, nearer and nearer to the walls. With subterranean lines converging in the form of the letter Y, the prince had gradually burrowed his way beneath the principal bastion. 2

Hohenlo, representative of the older school of strategy, had on one occasion ventured to resist the authority of the

commander-in-chief. He had constructed a fort at Ramsdonck. Maurice then commanded the erection of another, fifteen hundred yards farther back. It was as much a part of his purpose to defend himself against the attempts of Mansfeld's relieving force, as to go forward against the city. Hohenlo objected that it would be impossible to sustain himself against a sudden attack in so isolated a position. Maurice insisted. In the midst of the altercation Hohenlo called to the men engaged in throwing up the new fortifications: "Here, you captains and soldiers," he cried, "you are delivered up here to be butchered. You may drop work and follow me to the old fort."

"And I swear to you," said Maurice quietly, "that the first man who moves from this spot shall be hanged."

No one moved. The fort was completed and held to the end; Hohenlo sulkily acquiescing in the superiority which this stripling—his former pupil—had at last vindicated over all old-fashioned men-at-arms. 1

From the same cause which was apt to render Hohenlo's services inefficient, the prince was apt to suffer inconvenience in the persons placed in still nearer relation to himself. Count Philip of Nassau, brother of the wise and valiant Lewis William, had already done much brilliant campaigning against the Spaniards both in France and the provinces. Unluckily, he was not only a desperate fighter but a mighty drinker, and one day, after a dinner-party and potent carouse at Colonel Brederode's quarters, he thought proper, in doublet and hose, without armour of any kind, to mount his horse, in order to take a solitary survey of the enemy's works. Not satisfied with this piece of reconnoitring—which he effected with much tipsy gravity, but probably without deriving any information likely to be of value

1 Meteren, *ubi sup.* 322.

2 Bor, Meteren, Reyd, Duyck, *ubi sup.*

1 Reyd, *ubi sup.* 203.



to the commanding general—he then proceeded to charge in person a distant battery. The deed was not commendable in a military point of view. A fire was opened upon him at long range so soon as he was discovered, and at the same time the sergeant-major of his regiment and an equerry of Prince Maurice started in pursuit, determined to bring him off if possible, before his life had been thus absurdly sacrificed. Fortunately for him they came to the rescue in time, pulled him from his horse, and succeeded in bringing him away unharmed. The sergeant-major, however, Sinisky by name, while thus occupied in preserving the count's life, was badly wounded in the leg by a musket-shot from the fort; which casualty was the only result of this after-dinner assault. 1

As the siege proceeded, and as the hopes of relief died away, great confusion began to reign within the city. The garrison, originally of a thousand veterans, besides burgher militia, had

1 June, been much diminished. Two 1593. commandants of the place, one after another, had lost their lives. On the 1st of June, Governor De Masieres, Captain Mongyn, the father-confessor of the garrison, and two soldiers, being on the top of the great church tower taking observations, were all brought down with one cannon-shot. 2 Thus the uses of artillery were again proved to be something more than to scare cowards.

The final result seemed to have been brought about almost by accident, if accident could be admitted as a factor

24 June, in such accurate calculations 1593. as those of Maurice On the 24th June Captains Haen and Bievry were relieving watch in the trenches near the great north ravelin of the town—a bulwark which had already been much undermined from below and weakened above. Being adventurous

officers, it occurred to them suddenly to scale the wall of the fort and reconnoitre what was going on in the town. It was hardly probable that they would come back alive from the expedition, but they nevertheless threw some planks across the ditch, and taking a few soldiers with them, climbed cautiously up. Somewhat to his own surprise, still more to that of the Spanish sentinels, Bievry in a few minutes found himself within the ravelin. He was closely followed by Captain Haen, Captain Kalf, and by half a company of soldiers. The alarm was given. There was a fierce hand-to-hand struggle. Sixteen of the bold stormers fell, and nine of the garrison of the fort. The rest fled into the city. The governor of the place, Captain Gysant, rushing to the rescue without staying to put on his armour, was killed. Count Solms, on the other hand, came from the besieging camp into the ravelin to investigate the sudden uproar. To his profound astonishment, he was met there, after a brief interval, by a deputation from the city, asking for terms of surrender. The envoys had already been for some little time looking in vain for a responsible person with whom to treat. When Maurice was informed of the propositions he thought it at first a trick: for he had known nothing of the little adventure of the three captains. Soon afterwards he came into a battery whither the deputies had been brought, and the terms of capitulation were soon agreed upon. 1

Next day the garrison were allowed to go out with side-arms and 25 June, personal baggage, and fifty 1593. waggons were lent them by the victor to bring their wounded men to Antwerp.

Thus was Gertruydenberg surrendered in the very face of Peter Mansfeld, who only became aware of the fact by the salvos of artillery fired in honour of the triumph, and by the blaze of

1 Duyck, 180. Compare Bor, Meteren, Reyd, *ubi sup.*

2 Duyck.

1 Duyck, 234, *seqq.* Meteren, Bor, Reyd, *ubi sup.*

illumination which broke forth over camp and city.

The sudden result was an illustration of the prince's perfect arrangements. When Maurice rode into the town, he found it strong enough and sufficiently well provisioned to have held out many a long day. But it had been demonstrated to the besieged that relief was impossible, and that the surrender on one day or another, after the siege operations should be brought to their close, was certain. The inexorable genius of the commander—skilled in a science which to the coarser war-makers of that age seemed almost superhuman—hovered above them like a fate. It was as well to succumb on the 24th June as to wait till the 24th July. 1

Moreover the great sustaining principle—resistance to the foreigner—which had inspired the deeds of daring, the wonders of endurance, in the Dutch cities beleaguered so remorselessly by the Spaniard twenty years earlier in the century, was wanting.

In surrendering to the born Netherlander—the heroic chieftain of the illustrious house of Nassau—these Nether-

landers were neither sullyng their flag nor injuring their country. Enough had been done for military honour in the gallant resistance, in which a large portion of the garrison had fallen. Nor was that religious superstition so active within the city which three years before had made miracles possible in Paris when a heretic sovereign was to be defied by his own subjects. It was known that even if the public ceremonies of the Catholic Church were likely to be suspended for a time after the surrender, at least the rights of individual conscience and private worship within individual households would be tolerated, and there was no papal legate with fiery eloquence persuading a city full of heroic dupes that it was more virtuous for men or women to eat their own children than to forego one high mass, or to wink at a single conventicle.

After all, it was no such bitter hardship for the citizens of Gertruydenberg to participate in the prosperity of the rising and thriving young republic, and to enjoy those municipal and national liberties which her sister cities had found so sweet.

Nothing could be calmer or more reasonable than such a triumph, nothing less humiliating or less disastrous than such a surrender.

The problem was solved, the demonstration was made. To open their gates to the soldiers of the Union was not to admit the hordes of a Spanish commander with the avenging furies of murder, pillage, rape, which ever followed in their train over the breach of a captured city.

To an enemy hated or dreaded to the uttermost mortal capacity, that well-fortified and opulent city might have held out for months, and only when the arms and the fraud of the foe with-out, and of famine within, had done their work, could it have bowed its head to the conqueror, and submitted to the ineffable tortures which would

1 Thus modestly did William Lewis, to whom so large a part of the glory of all these achievements belongs, express himself in a congratulatory letter to his cousin Maurice:—*J'estime de ne faire que mon devoir de congratuler V. E. d'une victoire si signalée, en ce qu'avez fait une preuve tant remarquable, que la conduite et travail en la guerre domine la force, dont ce siège peut estre nomme à droict la seconde Alexia et une grande restauration en partie de la vieille art et science militaire, laquelle a esté mocquée, voire n'a sceu estre comprise, ou pour le moins pratiquée des plus grands capitaines modernes; par où l'ennemi a ce coup plus perdu de sa reputation que reçu de dommage par les autres plusieurs belles et grandes victoires; tellement que si Messieurs les Etats seconde-roient en forces ce que la guerre a augmenté en experience à bon droit, se pourroit on promettre une bonne et heureuse issue de laquelle je prie Dieu de faire à ce pauvre Pays Bas une fois jouir, et à votre Exce, l'honneur en recompense de ses genereux et heroïque desseings et grands travaux de bientost triompher*—Groen van Prinsterer, Archives II. 8. i. 245.

be the necessary punishment of its courage.

Four thousand shots had been fired from the siege-guns upon the city, and three hundred upon the relieving force.

The besieging army numbered in all nine thousand one hundred and fifty men of all arms, and they lost during the eighty-five days' siege three hundred killed and four hundred wounded. 1

After the conclusion of these operations, and the thorough remodelling of the municipal government of the important city thus regained to the republic, Maurice occupied himself with recruiting and refreshing his somewhat exhausted little army. On the other hand, old Count Mansfeld, dissatisfied with the impotent conclusion to his attempts, retired to Brussels to be much taunted by the insolent Fuentes. He at least escaped very violent censure on the part of his son Charles, for that general, after his superfluous conquest of Noyon, while returning towards the Netherlands, far too tardily to succour Gertruydenberg, had been paralyzed in all his movements by a very extensive mutiny which broke out among the Spanish troops in the province of Artois. 2 The disorder went through all its regular forms. A town was taken, an Eletteo was appointed. The countryside was black-mailed or plundered, and the rebellion lasted some thirteen months. Before it was concluded there was another similar outbreak among the Italians, together with the Walloons and other obedient Netherlands in Hainault, who obliged the city of Mons to collect nine hundred florins a day for them. 3 The consequence of these military rebellions was to render the Spanish crown almost powerless during the whole year, within

the provinces nominally subject to its sway. The cause—as always—was the non-payment of these veterans' wages, year after year. It was impossible for Philip, with all the wealth of the Indies and Mexico pouring through the Danaid sieve of the Holy League in France, to find the necessary funds to save the bronzed and war-worn instruments of his crimes in the Netherlands from starving and from revolt.

Meantime there was much desultory campaigning in Friesland. Verdugo and Frederik van den Berg picked up a few cities and strong places which had thrown off their allegiance to the king—Auerzyl, Schlochteren, Win- September, schoten, Wedde, Ootmarzum 1593.

—and invested the much more important town of Coeworden, which Maurice had so recently reduced to the authority of the Union. Verdugo's force was insufficient, however, and he had neither munitions nor provisions for a long siege. Winter was coming on; and the States, aware that he would soon be obliged to retire from before the well-garrisoned and fortified place, thought it unnecessary to interfere with him. After a very brief demonstration, the Portuguese veteran was obliged to raise the siege. 1

There were also certain vague attempts made by the enemy to re-possession himself of those most important seaports which had been pledged to the English queen. On a previous page the anxiety has been indicated with which Sir Robert Sidney regarded the withdrawal of the English troops in the Netherlands for the sake of assisting the French king. This palpable breach of the treaty had necessarily weakened England's hold on the affections of the Netherlands, and awakened dark suspicions that treason might be impending at Flushing or Ostend. The suspicions were unjust—so far as the governors of those places were concerned—for Sidney and Norris

1 Duyck, 241. There were six hundred and fifty English and seven hundred German riders in Maurice's camp. The rest of his army were Netherlands.

2 Meteren, xvi. 323. Coloma, vi. 123 vo. Bor, III. 710.

3 Meteren, xvi. 323.

1 Bor, III. 714-718.



were as loyal as they were intelligent and brave; but the trust in their characters was not more implicit than it had been in that of Sir William Stanley before the commission of his crime. It was now believed that the enemy was preparing for a sudden assault upon Ostend, with the connivance, it was feared of a certain portion of the English garrison. The intelligence was at once conveyed to her Majesty's Government by Sir Edward Norris, and they determined to take a lesson from past experience. Norris was at once informed that in view of the attack which he apprehended, his garrison should be strengthened by five hundred men under Sir Conyers Clifford from certain companies in Flushing, and that other reinforcements should be sent from the English troops in Normandy. The governor was ordered to look well after his captains and soldiers, to remind them, in the queen's name, of their duty to herself and to the States, to bid all beware of sullyng the English name, to make close investigations into any possible intrigues of the garrison with the enemy, and, should any culprits be found, to bring them at once to condign punishment.<sup>1</sup>

The queen, too, determined that there should be no blighting of English honour, if she could prevent it by her warnings, indited with her own hand a characteristic letter to Sir Edward Norris, to accompany the more formal despatch of Lord Burghley. Thus it ran:—

„Ned!—Though you have some tainted sheep among your flock, let not that serve for excuse for the rest. We trust you are so carefully regarded as nought shall be left for your excuses, but either ye lack heart or want will; for of fear we will not make mention, as that our soul abhors, and we assure ourselves you will never discern suspicion of it.

<sup>1</sup> The Queen's minute to Sir Edward Norris, partly in Burghley's hand, Oct. 1593. (S. P. Office MS.)

Now or never let for the honour of us and our nation, each man be so much of bolder heart as their cause is good, and their honour must be according, remembering the old goodness of our God, who never yet made us fail His needful help, who ever bless you as I with my prince's hand beseech Him.”<sup>1</sup>

The warnings and preparations proved sufficiently effective, and the great schemes with which the new royal governor of the Netherlands was supposed to be full—a mere episode in which was the conquest of Ostend—seemed not so formidable as their shadows had indicated. There was, in the not very distant future, to be a siege of Ostend, which the world would not soon forget, but perhaps the place would not yield to sudden assault. Its resistance, on the contrary, might prove more protracted than was then thought possible. But the chronicle of events must not be anticipated. For the present, Ostend was safe. 2

Early in the following spring, Verdugo again appeared before Coeworden in force. It was obvious that the great April, city of Groningen, the mis-  
1594. tress of all the north-eastern provinces, would soon be attacked, and

<sup>1</sup> „A clause written in the letter to Sir Ed. Norris, with her Majesty's own hand.” (S. P. Office MS.)

<sup>2</sup> „It appears by those advertisements that come unto me out of the land,” wrote Sir Ed. Norris to Lord Burghley, „that the great expectation which was had of the coming of this new great governour is almost gone, who neither for peace nor war doth seem likely to perform that which he promised. . . . It appears that his intention was by all means to settle those parts in some sort of peace, truce, or quiet by the taking of Ostend, whilst he might employ his whole forces upon greater enterprises. I think he is now out of hope of any, for he finds no likelihood of peace, and as for the taking of this place (Ostend), which the people flattered themselves so much withal, methinks the hope of it is delayed; for the great works which were in hand at Newport and Bruges are laid aside, and all the workmen licensed to go home, but to be ready at a day's warning.”—Norris to Burghley, 6 March, 1594. (S. P. Office MS.)

Coeworden was the necessary base of any operations against the place. Fortunately for the States, William Lewis had in the preceding autumn occupied and fortified the only avenue through the Bourtange morass, so that when Verdugo sat down before Coeworden, it was possible for Maurice, by moving rapidly, to take the royal governor at a disadvantage. 1

Verdugo had eight thousand picked troops, including two thousand Walloon cavalry, troopers who must have been very formidable, if they were to be judged by the prowess of one of their captains, Gaucier by name. This obedient Netherlander was in the habit of boasting that he had slain four hundred and ten men with his own hand, including several prisoners and three preachers; 2 but the rest of those warriors were not so famed for their martial achievements.

The peril, however, was great, and Prince Maurice, trifling not a moment, threw himself with twelve thousand infantry, Germans, Frisians, Scotch, English, and Hollanders, and nearly two thousand horse, at once upon the road between the Vecht and the Bourtange

5 May. morass. On the 6th of May,

6 May. Verdugo found the States commander-in-chief entrenched and impregnable, squarely established upon his line of communications. He reconnoitred, called a council of war, and decided that to assail him were madness; to remain, destruction. On the night of the 6th of May, he broke up his camp and stole away in the darkness, without sound of drum or trumpet, leaving all his fortifications and burning all his huts. 3

Thus had Maurice, after showing the world how strong places were to be reduced, given a striking exhibition of the manner in which they were to be saved.

Coeworden, after thirty-one weeks' investment, was relieved.

The stadholder now marched upon Groningen. This city was one of the most splendid and opulent of all the Netherland towns. Certainly it should have been one of the most ancient in Europe, since it derived its name—according to that painstaking banker, Francis Guicciardini—, “from Grun, a Trojan gentleman,” who nevertheless, according to Munster, was “a Frenchman by birth.” “Both theories, however, might be true,” added the conscientious Florentine, “as the French have always claimed to be descended from the relics of Troy.” 1 A simpler-minded antiquary might have babbled of green fields, since *groenighe*, or greenness, was a sufficiently natural appellation for a town surrounded as was Groningen on the east and west by the greenest and fattest of pastures. In population it was only exceeded by Antwerp and Amsterdam. 2 Situate on the line where upper and nether Germany blend into one, the capital of a great province whose very name was synonymous with liberty, and whose hardy sons had done fierce battle with despotism in every age, so long as there had been human record of despotism and of battles, Groningen had fallen into the hands of the foreign foe, not through the prowess of the Spaniard but the treason of the Netherlander. The baseness of the brilliant, trusted, valiant, treacherous young Renneberg has been recorded on a previous page of these volumes. 3 For thirteen years long the republic had chafed at this acquisition of the hated enemy within its very heart. And now the day had come when a blow should be struck for its deliverance by the ablest soldier that had ever shown himself in those regions, one whom the commonwealth had watched over from his cradle.

1 Guicciardini, *in voce*.

2 Guicciardini, in 1585, says that no Netherland city exceeded it in population.

3 Rise of the Dutch Republic, vol. iii. part vi. chap. iii.

1 Bor, III. 794-798. Meteren, xvi. 328-330.

2 Meteren, Reid, xi. 231.

3 Ibid.

For in Groningen there was still a considerable party in favour of the Union, although the treason of Renneberg had hitherto prevented both city and province from incorporating themselves in the body politic of the United Netherlands. Within the precincts were five hundred of Verdugo's veterans under George Lanckema, stationed at a faubourg called Schuytendiess.<sup>1</sup> In the city there was, properly speaking, no garrison,<sup>2</sup> for the citizens in the last few years had come to value themselves on their fidelity to church and king, and to take a sorry pride in being false to all that was noble in their past. Their ancestors had wrested privilege after privilege at the sword's point from the mailed hands of dukes and emperors, until they were almost a self-governing republic; their courts of justice recognizing no appeal to higher powers, even under the despotic sway of Charles V. And now, under the reign of his son, and in the feebler days of that reign, the capital of the free Frisians—the men whom their ancient pagan statutes had once declared to be „free so long as the wind blew out of the clouds”—relied upon the trained bands of her burghers enured to arms and well-provided with all munitions of war to protect her, not against foreign tyranny nor domestic sedition, but against liberty and against law.

For the representative of the most ancient of the princely houses of Europe, a youth whose ancestors had been emperors when the forefathers of Philip, long descended as he was, were but country squires, was now knocking at their gates. Not as a conqueror and a despot, but as the elected first magistrate and commander-in-chief of the freest commonwealth in the world, Maurice of Nassau, at the head of fifteen thousand Netherlands, countrymen of their own, now summoned the inha-

bitants of the town and province to participate with their fellow-citizens in all the privileges and duties of the prosperous republic.

It seemed impossible that such an appeal could be resisted by force of arms. Rather it would seem that the very walls should have fallen at his feet at the first blast of the trumpet; but there was military honour, there was religious hatred, there was the obstinacy of party. More than all, there were half a dozen Jesuits within the town, and to those ablest of generals in times of civil war it was mainly owing that the siege of Groningen was protracted longer than under other circumstances would have been possible. 1

It is not my purpose to describe in  
20 May, detail the scientific operations  
24 July, during the sixty-five days be-  
1594. tween the 20th May and the

24th July. Again the commander-in-chief enlightened the world by an exhibition of a more artistic and humane style of warfare than previously to his appearance on the military stage had been known. But the daily phenomena of the Leaguer—although they have been minutely preserved by most competent eye-witnesses—are hardly entitled to a place except in special military histories, where, however, they should claim the foremost rank. 2.

The fortifications of the city were of the most splendid and substantial character known to the age. The ditches, the ravelins, the curtains, the towers were as thoroughly constructed as the defences of any place in Europe. It was therefore necessary that Maurice and his cousin Lewis should employ all their learning, all their skill, and their best artillery to reduce this great capital of the Eastern Netherlands. Again the

1 Meteren, *ubi sup.*

2 See, in particular, Journal von Duyck, ed. Mulder, 394-465, in which every daily incident of the siege is minutely and scientifically recorded. Bor, III. 826-835. Meteren, xvi: 330, *seqq.*

2 Ibid.



scientific coil of approaches wound itself around and around the doomed stronghold; again were constructed the galleries, the covered ways, the hidden mines, where soldiers, transformed to gnomes, burrowed and fought within the bowels of the earth; again that fatal letter Y advanced slowly under ground, stretching its deadly prongs nearer and nearer up to the walls; and again the system of defences against a relieving force was so perfectly established that Verdugo or Mansfeld, with what troops they could muster, seemed as powerless as the pewter soldiers with which Maurice in his boyhood—not yet so long passed away—was wont to puzzle over the problems which now practically engaged his early manhood. Again, too, strangely enough, it is recorded that Philip Nassau, at almost the same period of the siege as in that of Gertruydenberg, signalized himself by a

11 July, deed of drunken and super-  
1594. fluous daring. This time the dinner party was at the quarters of Count Solms, in honour of the Prince of Anhalt, where, after potations pottle deep, Count Philip rushed from the dinner-table to the breach, not yet thoroughly practicable, of the north ravelin, and, entirely without armour, mounted pike in hand to the assault, proposing to carry the fort by his own unaided exertions. Another officer, one Captain Vaillant, still more beside himself than was the count, inspired him to these deeds of valour by assuring him that the mine was to be sprung under the ravelin that afternoon, and that it was a plot on the part of the Holland boatmen to prevent the soldiers who had been working so hard and so long in the mines from taking part in the honours of the assault. The count was with difficulty brought off with a whole skin and put to bed. 1 Yet despite these disgraceful pranks there is no doubt that a better and braver officer

than he was hardly to be found even among the ten noble Nassaus who at that moment were fighting for the cause of Dutch liberty—fortunately with more sobriety than he at all times displayed.

On the following day, Prince Maurice, making a reconnaissance of the works with his usual calmness, yet with the habitual contempt of personal danger which made so singular a contrast with the cautious and painstaking characteristics of his strategy, very narrowly escaped death. A shot from the fort struck so hard upon the buckler under cover of which he was taking  
12 July.  
his observations as to fell

him to the ground. 1 Sir Francis Vere, who was with the prince under the same buckler, likewise measured his length in the trench, but both escaped serious injury. 2 Pauli, one of the States commissioners present in the camp, wrote to Barneveld that it was to be hoped that the accident might prove a warning to his Excellency. He had repeatedly remonstrated with him, he said, against his reckless exposure of himself to unnecessary danger, but he was so energetic and so full of courage that it was impossible to restrain him from being everywhere every day. 3

Three days later, the letter Y did its work. At ten o'clock of the night of the 15th July, Prince Mau- 15 July,  
rice ordered the mines to be 1594.  
sprung, when the north ravelin was blown into the air, and some forty of the garison with it. 4 Two of them came flying into the besiegers' camp, and, strange to say, one was alive and sound. 5 The catastrophe finished the sixty-five days' siege, the breach was no longer defensible, the obstinacy of the burghers was exhausted, and capitulation followed. In truth, there had

1 Bor, *ubi sup.* Duyck, 448. Meteren, 330,  
2 Bor, *ubi sup.* But Duyck makes no mention of Vere in this connection.

3 Bor, *ubi sup.*

4 Duyck, 452, 453. Bor. Meteren.

5 Meteren, 330.

1 Duyck, 448. Bor, III. 832.

been a subterranean intrigue going on for many weeks, which was almost as effective as the mine. A certain Jan te Boer had been going back and forth between camp and city, under various pretexts and safe-conducts, and it had at last appeared that the Jesuits and the five hundred of Verdugo's veterans were all that prevented Groningen from returning to the Union. There had been severe fighting within the city itself, for the Jesuits had procured the transfer of the veterans from the fau- 22 July, bourg to the town itself, and 1594.

the result of all these operations, political, military, and jesuitical, was that on 22nd July articles of surrender were finally agreed upon between Maurice and a deputation from the magistrates, the guilds, and commander Lanckema. 1

The city was to take its place thenceforth as a member of the Union. William Lewis, already stadholder of Friesland for the united States, was to be recognised as chief magistrate of the whole province, which was thus to retain all its ancient privileges, laws, and rights of self-government, while it exchanged its dependence on a distant, foreign, and decaying despotism for incorporation with a young and vigorous commonwealth.

It was arranged that no religion but the reformed religion, as then practised in the united republic, should be publicly exercised in the province, but that no man should be questioned as to his faith, or troubled in his conscience. Cloisters and ecclesiastical property were to remain *in statu quo*, until the States-General should come to a definite conclusion on these subjects. 2

Universal amnesty was proclaimed for all offences and quarrels. Every citizen or resident foreigner was free to remain in or to retire from the town or province, with full protection to his person and property, and it was expressly provided in the articles granted to Lanckema that his soldiers should depart with arms and baggage, leaving to Prince Maurice their colours only, while the prince furnished sufficient transportation for their women and their wounded. The property of Verdugo, royal stadholder of the province, was to be respected, and to remain in the city, or to be taken thence under safe conduct, as might be pre-

ed religion in the city, were reprehended by many. The king sensibly answered, said the envoy, that the townspeople had themselves been the cause of this, never having been willing to permit a church for the reformed faith. Now they were tripped up in the same way since they found themselves conquered. His Majesty added that your highnesses, when the Spaniards had been completely driven out of the country, would willingly re-open the Catholic churches in your provinces, if the others would do the same towards the reformed ones; asking me if it were not so. I answered yes, enlarging on the topic in such wise as I thought suited the occasion; and my language seemed to mitigate the said offence." Deventer, Gedenkstukken, ii. p. 32.

Here certainly seemed progress in the history of civilization. The French king and the republican envoy agreeing that Catholics and Protestants ought to have and were to have equal rights of public worship, showed an advance on the doctrine of Philip and of the German Protestant princes that the vassal was to have no opinion but his master's. Nevertheless the States-General were not pleased that their envoy should have answered the newly converted Henry so glibly on the great subject of protection to Catholics. He was asked by what authority he had given so categorical an answer, and he was directed in future to think twice, and ask for instructions in such emergencies. To promise public worship of a religion professed mainly in the Netherlands by the adherents of the Spanish king and the enemies of the States was pronounced altogether too rash. It was inferred, from the eagerness manifested on this occasion, that the French king would be easily induced to make war on those of the reformed religion in case they were not willing to submit themselves to his discretion, and the Queen of England was perpetually intimating such a suspicion to the States. Duyck, 475.

1 Bor. Meteren. Duyck, 456-464.

2 Art. VI. Meteren, 331. Bor, 835. The intelligence of the capture of Groningen excited great enthusiasm in the court of the French king, causing "the power of the States and the name of the prince to be extolled to heaven," according to Calvaert. "The entire suspension of Catholic worship, however, and the introduction of the reform-

ferred. 1 Ten thousand cannon-shot had been fired against the city. The cost of powder and shot consumed was estimated at a hundred thousand florins. Four hundred of the besiegers had been killed, and a much larger number wounded. The army had been further weakened by sickness and numerous desertions. Of the besieged three hundred soldiers in all were killed, and a few citizens.

Thirty-six cannon were taken, besides mortars, and it was said that eight hundred tons of powder, and plenty of other ammunition and provisions were found in the place. 2

On the 23rd July Maurice and William Lewis entered the city. Some of the soldiers were disappointed at the inexorable prohibition of pillage; but it was the purpose of Maurice as of the States-General, to place the sister province at one in the unsullied possession of the liberty and the order for which the struggle with Spain had been carried on so long. If the limitation of public religious worship seemed harsh, it should be remembered that Romanism in a city occupied by Spanish troops had come to mean unmitigated hostility to the republic. In the midst of civil war, the hour for that religious liberty which was the necessary issue of the great conflict had not yet struck. It was surely something gained for humanity that no man should be questioned at all as to his creed in countries where it was so recently the time-honoured practice to question him on the rack,

and to burn him if the answer was objectionable to the inquirer.

It was something that the holy Inquisition had been for ever suppressed in the land. It must be admitted, likewise, that the terms of surrender and the spectacle of re-established law and order which succeeded the capture of Groningen furnished a wholesome contrast to the scenes of ineffable horror that had been displayed whenever a Dutch town had fallen into the hands of Philip.

And thus the commonwealth of the United Netherlands, through the practical military genius and perseverance of Maurice and Lewis William, and the substantial statesmanship of Barneveld and his colleagues, had at last rounded itself into definite shape; while in all directions toward which men turned their eyes, world-empire, imposing and gorgeous as it had seemed for an interval, was vanishing before its votaries like a mirage. The republic, placed on the solid foundations of civil liberty, self-government, and reasonable law, was steadily consolidating itself.

No very prominent movements were undertaken by the forces of the Union during the remainder of the year. According to the agreements with Henry IV. it had been necessary to provide that monarch with considerable assistance to carry on his new campaigns, and it was therefore difficult for Maurice to begin for the moment upon the larger schemes which he had contemplated.

Meantime the condition of the obedient Netherlands demands a hasty glance.

On the death of brother Alexander the Capuchin, Fuentes produced a patent by which Peter Ernest Mansfeld was provisionally appointed governor, in case the post should become vacant. During the year which followed, that testy old campaigner had indulged himself in many petty feuds with all around him, but had effected, as we have seen, very little to maintain the king's autho-

1 Bor, Meteren, *ubi sup.*

2 Duyck, 464, 465. Yet Coloma, vi. 133, and *vo.* ascribes the loss of the city mainly to two causes—the want of powder, and the flatteries and vile persuasions of the wives of the burghers, any one of which artful women was equal, he says, to three dissembling men. As in every part of the Netherlands, he adds, women exercise great influence, even in the most grave affairs, so there is no doubt that in Groningen they are, and have always been, more powerful than elsewhere.



rity either in the obedient or the disobedient provinces.

His utter incompetency soon became most painfully apparent. His more than puerile dependence upon his son, and the more than paternal severity exercised over him by Count Charles, were made manifest to all the world. The son ruled the trembling but peevish old warrior with an iron rod, and endless was their wrangling with Fuentes and all the other Spaniards. Between the querulousness of the one and the ferocity of the other, poor Fuentes became sick of his life. „'Tis a diabolical genius, this Count Charles,” said Ybarra, „and so full of ambition that he insists on governing everybody just as he rules his father. As for me, until the archduke comes I am a fish out of water.”<sup>1</sup>

The true successor to Farnese was to be the Archduke Ernest, one of the many candidates for the hand of the Infanta, and for the throne of that department of the Spanish dominions which was commonly called France. Should Philip not appropriate the throne, without further scruple, in person, it was on the whole decided that his favourite nephew should be the satrap of that outlying district of the Spanish empire. In such case obedient France might be annexed to obedient Netherlands, and united under the sway of Archduke Ernest.

But these dreams had proved in the cold air of reality but midsummer madness. When the name of the archduke was presented to the estates as King Ernest I. of France, even the most unscrupulous and impassioned Leaguers of that country fairly hung their heads.<sup>2</sup> That a foreign prince, whose very name had never before been heard of by the

vast bulk of the French population, should be deliberately placed upon the throne of St. Louis and Hugh Capet was a humiliation hard to defend, profusely as Philip had scattered the Peruvian and Mexican dollars among the great ones of the nation, in order to accomplish his purpose.

So Archduke Ernest, early in the year 1594, came to Brussels, but January, he came as a gloomy, disap- 1594. pointed man. To be a bachelor-governor of the improverished, exhausted, half-rebellious, and utterly forlorn little remnant of the Spanish Netherlands, was a different position from that of husband of Clara Isabella and king of France, on which his imagination had been feeding so long.

For nearly the whole twelvemonth subsequent to the death of Farnese, the Spanish envoy to the Imperial court had been endeavouring to arrange for the departure of the archduke to his seat of government in the Netherlands. The prince himself was willing enough, but there were many obstacles on the part of the emperor and his advisers. „Especially there is one very great impossibility,” said San Clemente, „and that is the poverty of his Highness, which is so great that my own is not greater in my estate. So I don't see how he can stir a step without money. Here they'll not furnish him with a penny, and for himself he possesses nothing but debts.”<sup>1</sup> The emperor was so little pleased with the adventure that in truth, according to the same authority, he looked upon the new viceroy's embarrassments with considerable satisfaction, so that it was necessary for Philip to provide for his travelling expenses.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Ybarra to the Secretaries, 5 Oct. 1593. (Arch. de Simancas MS.)

<sup>2</sup> „Ils furent presque tous frappés d'horreur en considérant l'extrémité où etaient réduits les Français de penser choisir pour Roy un homme qu'ils ne savaient seulement qu'il fust au monde.”—Lettres de Bongars, 24 July, 1593, p. 235.

<sup>1</sup> „Una imposibilidad muy grande es su pobreza que está de manera que no es mayor la mía en mi estado, y así no sé yo como podrá dar un passo sin dinero, y de aquí no le socorreren con un real, ni el tiene sino deudas.”—G. de San Clemente to Fuentes, 14 March 1593. (Arch. de Simancas MS.)

<sup>2</sup> San Clemente to Fuentes, 2 May, 1593.

Ernest was next brother of the Emperor Rudolph, and as intensely devoted to the interests of the Roman Church as was that potentate himself, or even his uncle Philip.

He was gentle, weak, melancholy, addicted to pleasure, a martyr to the gout. He brought no soldiers to the provinces, for the emperor, threatened with another world-empire on his pagan flank, had no funds nor troops to send to the assistance of his Christian brother-in-law and uncle. Moreover, it may be imagined that Rudolph, despite the bonds of religion and consanguinity, was disposed to look coldly on the colossal projects of Philip.

So Ernest brought no troops, but he brought six hundred and seventy gentlemen, pages, and cooks, and five hundred and thirty-four horses, not to charge upon the rebellious Dutchmen withal, but to draw coaches and six. 1

There was trouble, enough prepared for the new governor at his arrival. The great Flemish and Walloon nobles were quarrelling fiercely with the Spaniards and among themselves for office and for precedence. Arschot and his brother Havré both desired the government of Flanders; so did Arenberg. All three, as well as other gentlemen, were scrambling for the major-domo's office in Ernest's palace. Havré wanted the finance department as well, but Ybarra, who was a financier, thought the public funds in his hands would be in a perilous condition, inasmuch as he was accounted the most covetous man in all the provinces. 2

So soon as the archduke was known to be approaching the capital there was a most ludicrous race run by all these grandees, in order to be the first to greet his Highness. While Mansfeld and Fuentes were squabbling, as usual, (Arch. de Simancas MS.) Same to same, 3 Aug. 1593. (Ibid.)

1 Bor. III. 782. Reynd. ix. 220.

2 Ybarra to —, 22 Nov. 1593. (Arch. de Simancas MS.)

Arschot got the start of both, and arrived at Treves. Then the decrepit Peter Ernest struggled as far as Luxembourg, while Fuentes posted on to Namur. 1 The archduke was much perplexed as to the arranging of all these personages on the day of his entrance into Brussels. In the council of state it was still worse. Arschot claimed the first place as duke and as senior member, \*Peter Ernest demanded it as late governor-general and because of his grey hairs. 2 Never was imperial highness more disturbed, never was clamour for loaves and fishes more deafening. The caustic financier—whose mind was just then occupied with the graver matter of assassination on a considerable scale—looked with profound contempt at the spectacle thus presented to him. „There has been the devil's own row,” said he, „between these counts about offices, and also about going out to receive the most serene archduke. I have had such work with them that by the salvation of my soul I swear if it were to last a fortnight longer I would go off afoot to Spain, even if I were sure of dying in jail after I got there. I have reconciled the two counts (Fuentes and Mansfeld) with each other a hundred times, and another hundred times they have fallen out again, and behaved themselves with such vulgarity that I blushed for them. 3 They are both to blame, but at any rate we have now got the archduke housed, and he will get us out of this embarrassment.”

The archduke came with rather a prejudice against the Spaniards—the

1 Papel sobre las precedencias. (Ibid.)

2 Ibid.

3 „Ha pasado aqui una baraunda del diablo entre estos senores Condes sobre la reformation y despues sobre el salir a recibir al Sermo Archiduque, y tanto trabajo mio, que por la salvacion de mi alma juro que si hubiera de durar esto 15 dias mas me fuera a pie a Espana aunque supiera morir en la carcel. Tuve los concertados cien vezes y otras ciento se han desconcertado y tratado por un termino tan vulgar que yo estoy corrido,” &c. (Arch. de Sim. MS.)

result doubtless of his disappointment in regard to France—and he manifested at first an extreme haughtiness to those of that nation with whom he came in contact. A Castilian noble of high rank, having audience with him on one occasion, replaced his hat after salutation, as he had been accustomed to do—according to the manner of grandees of Spain—during the government of Farnese. The hat was rudely struck from his head by the archduke's chamberlain, and he was himself ignominiously thrust out of the presence.<sup>1</sup> At another time an interview was granted to two Spanish gentlemen who had business to transact. They made their appearance in magnificent national costume, splendidly embroidered in gold. After a brief hearing they were dismissed, with appointment of another audience for a few days later. When they again presented themselves they found the archduke with his court-jester standing at his side, the buffoon being attired in a suit precisely similar to their own, which in the interval had been prepared by the court tailor.<sup>2</sup>

Such amenities as these did not increase the popularity of Ernest with the high-spirited Spaniards, nor was it palatable to them that it should be proposed to supersede the old fighting Portuguese, Verdugo, as governor and commander-in-chief for the king in Friesland, by Frederic van den Berg, a renegade Netherlander, unworthy cousin of the Nassaus, who had never shown either military or administrative genius.

Nor did he succeed in conciliating the Flemings or the Germans by these measures. In truth he was, almost without his own knowledge, under the controlling influence of Fuentes,<sup>3</sup> the

most unscrupulous and dangerous Spaniard of them all, while his every proceeding was closely watched not only by Diego and Stephen Ybarra, but even by Christoval de Moura, one of Philip's two secretaries of state who at this crisis made a visit to Brussels.<sup>1</sup>

These men were indignant at the imbecility of the course pursued in the obedient provinces. They knew that the incapacity of the Government to relieve the sieges of Gertruydenberg and Groningen had excited the contempt of Europe, and was producing a most damaging effect on Spanish authority throughout Christendom.<sup>2</sup> They were especially irritated at the presence of the arch-intriguer, Mayenne, in Brussels, even after all his double dealings had been so completely exposed that a blind man could have read them. Yet there was Mayenne, consorting with the archduke, and running up a great bill of sixteen thousand florins at the hotel, which the royal paymaster declined to settle for want of funds, notwithstanding Ernest's order to that effect,<sup>3</sup> and there was no possibility of inducing the vice-roy to arrest him, much as he had injured and defrauded the king.

How severely Ybarra and Feria denounced Mayenne has been seen; but remonstrances about this and other grave mistakes of administration were lost upon Ernest, or made almost impossible by his peculiar temper. „If I speak of these things to his Highness,” said Ybarra, „he will begin to cry, as he always does.”<sup>4</sup>

but none the less a great tyrant, and that therefore she had been sent, after the death of the Duke of Alva, to Portugal, and appointed lieutenant-General of the Cardinal of Austria, in order to carry out what had been left unfinished by the duke. She doubted not, she said, that he would attempt the same practices in the Netherlands, but she hoped that a Spanish governor would never be tolerated there.” Noel de Caron to the States-General, 10 Dec. 1592. (Hague Archives MS.) Compare Duyck, 465.

<sup>1</sup> Intercepted letters of San Clemente, in Bor. III. 852-855. <sup>2</sup> Ibid.

<sup>3</sup> Reyd, ix. 243.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid. 242.



Ybarra, however, thought it his duty secretly to give the king frequent information as to the blasted and forlorn condition of the provinces. „This sick man will die in our arms,” he said, „without our wishing to kill him.”<sup>1</sup> He also left no doubt in the royal mind as to the utter incompetency of the archduke for his office. Although he had much Christianity, amiability, and good intentions, he was so unused to business, so slow and so lazy, so easily persuaded by those around him, as to be always falling into errors. He was the servant of his own servants, particularly of those least disposed to the king’s service and most attentive to their own interests. He had endeavoured to make himself beloved by the natives of the country, while the very reverse of this had been the result. „As to his agility and the strength of his body,” said the Spaniard, as if he were thinking of certain allegories which were to mark the archduke’s triumphal entry, „they are so deficient as to leave him unfit for arms. I consider him incapable of accompanying an army to the field, and we find him so new to all such affairs as constitute government and the conduct of warlike business, that he could not steer his way without some one to enlighten and direct him.”<sup>2</sup>

It was sometimes complained of in those days—and the thought has even prolonged itself until later times—that those republicans of the United Netherlands had done and could do great things; but that, after all, there was no grandeur about them. Certainly they had done great things. It was something to fight the Ocean for ages, and patiently and firmly to shut him out from his own domain. It was something to extinguish the Spanish Inquisition—a

still more cruel and devouring enemy than the sea. It was something that the fugitive spirit of civil and religious liberty had found at last its most substantial and steadfast home upon those storm-washed shoals and shifting sandbanks. It was something to come to the rescue of England in her great agony and help to save her from invasion. It was something to do more than any nation but England, and as much as she, to assist Henry the Huguenot to the throne of his ancestors and to preserve the national unity of France which its own great ones had imperilled. It was something to found two magnificent universities, cherished abodes of science and of antique lore, in the midst of civil commotions and of resistance to foreign oppression. It was something, at the same period, to lay the foundation of a system of common schools—so cheap as to be nearly free—for rich and poor alike, which, in the words of one of the greatest benefactors to the young republic, „would be worth all the soldiers, arsenals, armouries, munitions, and alliances in the world.” It was something to make a revolution, as humane as it was effective, in military affairs, and to create an army whose camps were European academies. It was something to organize, as the same critical period, on the most skilful and liberal scale, and to carry out with unexampled daring, sagacity, and fortitude, great voyages of discovery to the polar regions, and to open new highways for commerce, new treasures for science. Many things of this nature had been done by the new commonwealth; but, alas! she did not drape herself melodramatically, nor stalk about with heroic wreath and cothurn. She was altogether without grandeur.

When Alva had gained his signal victories, and followed them up by those prodigious massacres which, but for his own and other irrefragable testimony, would seem too monstrous for belief,

<sup>1</sup> Ybarra to Philip, 21 June, 1594. (Arch. de Simancas MS.) „La enfermedad de esto cuerpo es muy aparejado para que se le muera en los brazos sin quererle matar,” &c.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*

he had erected a colossal statue to himself, attired in the most classical of costumes, and surrounded with the most mythological of attributes. Here was grandeur. But William the Silent, after he had saved the republic, for which he had laboured during his whole lifetime and was destined to pour out his heart's blood, went about among the brewers and burghers with unbuttoned doublet and woollen bargeman's waistcoat. It was justly objected to his clothes, by the euphuistic Fulke Greville, that mean-born student of the Inns of Court would have been ashamed to walk about London streets in them. 1

And now the engineering son of that shabbily-dressed personage had been giving the whole world lessons in the science of war, and was fairly perfecting the work which William and his great contemporaries had so well begun. But if all this had been merely doing great things without greatness, there was one man in the Netherlands who knew what grandeur was. He was not a citizen of the disobedient republic, however, but a loyal subject of the obedient provinces, and his name was John Baptist Houwaerts, an eminent schoolmaster of Brussels. He was still more eminent as a votary of what was called „Rhetoric” and as an arranger of triumphal processions and living pictures.

The arrival of Archduke Ernest at the seat of the provincial Government offered an opportunity, which had long been wanting, for a display of John Baptist's genius. The new viceroy was in so shattered a condition of health, so crippled with the gout, as to be quite unable to stand, and it required the services of several lackeys to lift him into and out of his carriage. 2 A few days of repose therefore were indispensable to him before he could make his „joyous entrance” into the capital.

But the day came at last, and the exhibition was a masterpiece.

It might have seemed that the abject condition of the Spanish provinces—desolate, mendicant, despairing—would render holiday-making impossible. But although almost every vestige of the ancient institutions had vanished from the obedient Netherlands as a reward for their obedience; although to civil and religious liberty, law, order, and a thriving commercial and manufacturing existence, such as had been rarely witnessed in the world, had succeeded the absolute tyranny of Jesuits, universal beggary, and a perennial military mutiny—setting Government at defiance and plundering the people—there was one faithful comforter who never deserted Belgica, and that was Rhetoric.

Neither the magnificence nor the pandantry of the spectacles by which the entry of the mild and inefficient Ernest into Brussels and Antwerp was now solemnized had ever been surpassed. The town councils, stimulated by hopes absolutely without foundation as to great results to follow the advent of the emperor's brother, had voted large sums and consumed many days in anxious deliberation upon the manner in which they should be expended so as most to redound to the honour of Ernest and the reputation of the country.

In place of the „bloody tragedies of burning, murdering, and ravishing,” of which the provinces had so long been the theatre, it was resolved that „Rhetoric's sweet comedies, amorous jests, and farces,” should gladden all eyes and hearts. 1 A stately procession of knights and burghers in historical and mythological costumes, followed by ships, dromedaries, elephants, whales,

1 Descriptio et Explicatio pegmatorum et spectaculorum quæ Bruxellæ exhibita fuere sub ingressum Sereni principis Ernesti, &c. Bruxellæ, 1593. (S. V.) Houwaert's Moralissatie op de Komst van de hooghebornen, machtigen en seer doorluchtigen Vorst Ernesto, &c. Bruessel, by Jan Monmaert, 1594.

1 Vol. I. of this work, p. 350. Brooke's Sidney, 16, *seqq.*

2 Reyd, ix. 220-222. Bor, III. 782.

giants, dragons, and other wonders of the sea and shore, escorted the archduke into the city. Every street and square was filled with triumphal arches, statues and platforms, on which the most ingenious and thoroughly classical living pictures were exhibited. There was hardly an eminent deity of Olympus, or hero of ancient history, that was not revived and made visible to mortal eyes in the person of Ernestus of Austria.

On a framework fifty-five feet high and thirty-three feet in breadth he was represented as Apollo hurling his darts at an enormous Python, under one of whose forepaws struggled an unfortunate burgher, while the other clutched a whole city; Tellus, meantime, with her tower on her head, kneeling anxious and imploring at the feet of her deliverer. On another stage Ernest assumed the shape of Perseus; Belgica that of the bound and despairing Andromeda. On a third, the interior of Etna was revealed, where Vulcan was seen urging his Cyclops to forge for Ernest their most tremendous thunderbolts with which to smite the foes of the provinces, those enemies being of course the English and Hollanders. Venus, the while, timidly presented an arrow to her husband, which he was requested to sharpen, in order that when the wars were over, Cupid therewith might pierce the heart of some beautiful virgin, whose charms should reward Ernest—fortunately for the female world, still a bachelor—for his victories and his toils. 1

The walls of every house were hung with classic emblems and inscribed with Latin verses. All the pedagogues of Brussels and Antwerp had been at work for months, determined to amaze the world with their dithyrambics and acrostics, and they had outdone themselves.

Moreover, in addition to all these theatrical spectacles and pompous processions—accompanied as they were by blazing tar-barrels, flying dragons, and

leagues of flaring torches—John Baptist, who had been director-in-chief of all the shows successively arranged to welcome Don John of Austria, Archduke Matthias, Francis of Alençon, and even William of Orange, into the capital, had prepared a feast of a specially intellectual character for the new governor-general.

The pedant, according to his own account, so soon as the approach of Ernest had been announced, fell straightway into a trance. 1 While he was in that condition, a beautiful female apparition floated before his eyes, and, on being questioned, announced her name to be Moralization. John Baptist begged her to inform him whether it were true, as had been stated, that Jupiter had just sent Mercury to the Netherlands. The phantom, correcting his mistake, observed that the king of gods and men had not sent Hermes but the Archduke Ernestus, beloved of the three Graces, favourite of the nine Muses, and, in addition to these advantages, nephew and brother-in-law of the King of Spain, to the relief of the suffering provinces. The Netherlands, it was true, for their religious infidelity, had justly incurred great disasters and misery; but benignant Jove, who, to the imagination of this excited Fleming, seemed to have been converted to Catholicism while still governing the universe, had now sent them in mercy a deliverer. The archduke would speedily relieve „bleeding Belgica” from her sufferings, bind up her wounds, and annihilate her enemies. The spirit further informed the poet that the forests of the Low Countries—so long infested by brigands, wood-beggars, and malefactors of all kinds—would thenceforth swarm with „nymphs, rabbits, hares, and animals of that nature.” 2

1 *Ibid.*

2 „In plaetse dat de bosschen plachten te sijne  
Vol knevelaers en roovers in alle quar-  
tieren

1 Houwaert's *Moralisatie*, &c. *ubi sup.*



A vision of the conquering Ernest, attended by „eight-and-twenty noble and pleasant females, marching two and two, half naked, each holding a torch in one hand and a laurel-wreath in the other,” now swept before the dreamer's eyes. 1 He naturally requested the „discreet spirit” to mention the names of this bevy of imperfectly attired ladies thronging so lovingly around the fortunate archduke, and was told that „they were the eight-and-twenty virtues which chiefly characterized his serene Highness.” 2 Prominent in this long list, and they were all faithfully enumerated, were Philosophy, Audacity, Acrimony, Virility, Equity, Piety, Velocity, and Alacrity. 3 The two last-mentioned qualities could hardly be attributed to the archduke in his decrepit condition, except in an intensely mythological sense. Certainly, they would have been highly useful virtues to him at that moment. The prince who had just taken Gertruydenberg, and was then besieging

Soo waren sy wederom ten selven termijn

Vol Nymphen, hasen, conijnen en gheleijcke Dieren.”

Houwaert's Moralisation, &c.

1 Ibid.

2 „Acht en twintig edel Nymphen playsant Sach ich voor den prince haervertoonen

Toen spraeck ick, O Vriendinne, wilt my noch bedien

De namen van die nymphen weirt gehonoreert,

Die ick voort, by, en achter Ernestum gesien,

En waarom dat sy hem hebben geconvoeyert?

Drom de Nympe heeft gerespondeert De agt en twintig Nymphen die met vreughden

Twee en twee tegader hebben gemarcheert

Dasyn des doorlugtighen Princen deughden,” &c. Ibid.

3 „En i dese deughtlijke Nymphen dit sijn genaempt

Philosophia en Intelligencia

Audacia en Magnanimitas unbeschaempt

Acrimonia en Virilitas

Securitas en Clementia

Firmitudo en Velocitas

Alacritas en Pietatis abundantia

Potentia en Opportunitas gheheesen.” &c. Ibid.

Groningen, was manifesting his share of audacity, velocity, and other good gifts on even a wider platform than that erected for Ernest by John Baptist Houwaerts; and there was an admirable opportunity for both to develop their respective characteristics for the world's judgment.

Meantime the impersonation of the gentle and very gouty invalid as Apollo, as Perseus, as the feather-heeled Mercury, was highly applauded by the burghers of Brussels.

And so the dreamer dreamed on, and the discreet nymph continued to discourse, until John Baptist, starting suddenly from his trance, beheld that it was all a truth and no vision. Ernest was really about to enter the Netherlands, and with the millennium. The pedant therefore proceeded to his desk, and straightway composed the very worst poem that had ever been written in any language, even Flemish.

There were thousands of lines in it, and not a line without a god or a goddess.

Mars, Nemesis, and Ate, Pluto, Rhadamanthus, and Minos, the Fates and the Furies, together with Charon, Calumnia, Bellona, and all such objectionable divinities, were requested to disappear for ever from the Low Countries; while in their stead were confidently invoked Jupiter, Apollo, Triptolemus, and, last but not least, Rhetorica. 1

Enough has been said of this raree-show to weary the reader's patience, but not more than enough to show the docile and enervated nature of this portion of a people who had lost everything for which men cherish their fatherland, but who could still find relief—after thirty years of horrible civil war—in painted pageantry, Latin versification, and the classical dictionary.

Yet there was nothing much more important achieved by the archduke in the brief period for which his admi-

1 Houwaert's Moralisation, &c.

nistration was destined to endure. Three phenomena chiefly marked his reign, but his own part in the three was rather a passive than an active one—mutiny, assassination, and negotiation—the two last attempted on a considerable scale but ending abortively.

It is impossible to exaggerate the misery of the obedient provinces at this epoch. The insane attempt of the King of Spain, with such utterly inadequate machinery, to conquer the world has been sufficiently dilated upon. The Spanish and Italian and Walloon soldiers were starving in Brabant and Flanders in order that Spanish gold might be poured into the bottomless pit of the Holy League in France. 1

The mutiny that had broken forth the preceding year in Artois and Hainault was now continued on a vast scale in Brabant. Never had that national institution—a Spanish mutiny—been more thoroughly organized, more completely carried out in all its details.

All that was left of the famous Spanish discipline and military science in this their period of rapid decay, seemed monopolized by the mutineers. Some two thousand choice troops (horse and foot), Italians and Spanish, took possession of two considerable cities, Sichen and Arschot, and ultimately concentrated themselves at Sichen, which they thoroughly fortified. Having chosen their Eletto and other officers they proceeded regularly to business. To the rallying point came disaffected troops of all nations from far and near. Never since the beginning of the great war had there been so extensive a military rebellion, nor one in which so many veteran officers, colonels, captains, and subalterns, took part. The army of Philip had at last grown more dangerous to himself than to the Hollanders.

The council at Brussels deliberated anxiously upon the course to be pursued, and it was decided at last to negotiate with instead of attacking them. But it

1 It is instructive to know the exact sums of money regularly expended by the King of Spain each month, at this period, in France and the Netherlands.

In Flanders and Friesland was an army of	23,952 men, costing per month	206,431 dols.
The army of France was estimated at	18,921	175,370 "

Total	42,873	
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Certain individuals, very few in number, maintained in France *		42,360 "
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Besides the above, all supplied from Spain, there were maintained by contributions, aids, and licenses in the provinces	6,715	38,239 "
Expenses of navy		10,958 "

Total per month	473,358 "
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Relacion de lo que monta la paga de los exercitos que su Magd. entretiene en Flandes, Brabant, Frisia, y Francia, 1593. (Arch. de Simancas MS.)

By another paper it appears that at this time were serving the King of Spain in France and the Netherlands—

German infantry—Soldiers	14,994
Officers	1,298
	16,292
Italian Infantry—Soldiers	3,397
Officers	423
	3,820

(Arch. de Simancas, Anno 1594, MS.)

\* These favoured personages were—

Duke of Mayenne	per month, 12,000 dols.
Duke of Guise	6,000 "
Balagny	7,200 "
Duke of Aumale	1,800 "
M. de Rosne	1,800 "
M. de St. Pol and his cavalry	9,960 "
Certain gentlemen in Picardy	2,400 "
Governor of La Fere	1,200 "

42,360 dols.

was soon found that the mutineers were as hard to deal with as were the republicans on the other side the border. They refused to hear of anything short of complete payment of the enormous arrears due to them, with thorough guarantees and hostages that any agreement made between themselves and the archduke should be punctually carried out. Meanwhile they ravaged the country far and near, and levied their contributions on towns and villages, up to the very walls of Brussels, and before the very eyes of the viceroy.

Moreover they entered into negotiation with Prince Maurice of Nassau, not offering to enlist under his flag, but asking for protection against the king in exchange for a pledge meanwhile not to serve his cause. At last the archduke plucked up a heart and sent some troops against the rebels, who had constructed two forts on the river Demer near the city of Sichem. In vain Velasco, commander of the expedition, endeavoured to cut off the supplies for these redoubts. The vigour and audacity of the rebel cavalry made the process impossible. Velasco then attempted to storm the lesser stronghold of the two, but was repulsed with the loss of two hundred killed. Among these were many officers, one of whom, Captain Porto Carrero, was a near relative of Fuentes. After a siege, Velasco, who was a marshal of the camp of considerable distinction, succeeded in driving the mutineers out of the forts; who, finding their position thus weakened, renewed their negotiations with Maurice. They at last obtained permission from the prince to remain under the protection of Gertruydenburg and Breda until they could ascertain what decision the archduke would take. More they did not ask of Maurice, nor did he require more of them.

The mutiny, thus described in a few lines, had occupied nearly a year, and had done much to paralyze for that

period all the royal operations in the Netherlands. In December the rebellious troops marched out of Sichem in perfect order, and came to Langstræet within the territory of the republic. 1

The archduke now finding himself fairly obliged to treat with them, sent an offer of the same terms which had been proposed to mutineers on previous occasions. At first they flatly refused to negotiate at all, but at last, with the permission of Maurice, who conducted himself throughout with scrupulous delicacy and made no attempts to induce them to violate their allegiance to the king, they received Count Belgioso, the envoy of the archduke. They held out for payment of all their arrears up to the last farthing, and insisted on a hostage of rank until the debt should be discharged. Full forgiveness of their rebellious proceedings was added as a matter of course. Their terms were accepted, and Francisco Padiglia was assigned as a hostage. They then established themselves, according to agreement, at Tirlemont, which they were allowed to fortify at the expense of the province and to hold until the money for their back wages could be scraped together. Meantime they received daily wages and rations from the Government at Brussels, including thirty stivers a day for each horseman, thirteen crowns a day for the Eletto, and ten crowns a day for each counsellor, making in all five hundred crowns a day. And here they remained, living exceedingly at their ease and enjoying a life of leisure for eighteen months, and until long after the death of the archduke, for it was not until the administration of Cardinal Albert that the funds, amounting to three hundred and sixty thousand crowns, could be collected. 2

These were the chief military exploits

1 Bentivoglio, P. 111. lib. i. 399, 400. Meteren, 340, 341. Coloma, vii. 150<sup>vo</sup>, *seqq.*

2 Bentivoglio, et al., *ubi sup.*



of the podagric Perseus in behalf of the Flemish Andromeda.

A very daring adventure was however proposed to the archduke. Philip calmly suggested that an expedition should be rapidly fitted out in Dunkirk, which should cross the channel, ascend the Thames as far as Rochester, and burn the English fleet. „I am informed by persons well acquainted with the English coast,” said the king, „that it would be an easy matter for a few quick-sailing vessels to accomplish this. Two or three thousand soldiers might be landed at Rochester who might burn or sink all the unarmed vessels they could find there, and the expedition could return and sail off again before the people of the country could collect in sufficient numbers to do them any damage.” The archduke was instructed to consult with Fuentes and Ybarra as to whether this little matter, thus parenthetically indicated, could be accomplished without too much risk and trouble. <sup>1</sup>

Certainly it would seem as if the king believed in the audacity, virility, velocity, alacrity, and the rest of the twenty-eight virtues of his governor-general, even more seriously than did John Baptist Houwaerts. The unfortunate archduke would have needed to be, in all earnestness, a mythological demigod to do the work required of him. With the best part of his army formally maintained by him in recognised mutiny, with the great cities of the Netherlands yielding themselves to the republic with hardly an attempt on the part of the royal forces to relieve them, and with the country which he was supposed to govern, the very centre of the obedient provinces, ruined, sacked, eaten up by the soldiers of Spain; villages, farmhouses, gentlemen's castles, churches plundered; the male population exposed to daily butchery, and the women

to outrages worse than death; <sup>1</sup> it seemed like the bitterest irony to propose that he should seize that moment to outwit the English and Dutch sea-kings who were perpetually cruising in the channel, and to undertake a „beard-singeing” expedition, such as even the dare-devil Drake would hardly have attempted.

Such madcap experiments might perhaps one day, in the distant future, be tried with reasonable success, but hardly at the beck of a Spanish king sitting in his easy chair a thousand miles off, nor indeed by the servants of any king whatever.

The plots of murder arranged in Brussels during this administration were on a far more extensive scale than were the military plans.

The Count of Fuentes, general superintendent of foreign affairs, was especially charged with the department of assassination. This office was no sinecure; for it involved much correspondence, and required great personal attention to minute details. Philip, a consummate artist in this branch of industry, had laid out a good deal of such work which he thought could best be carried out in and from the Netherlands. Es-

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<sup>1</sup> Such pictures are painted not only by republican contemporaries, but by the governors and grandees of the obedient provinces. „Como va arruinado,” wrote the royal governor of Hainault, Prince Chimay, to the king, „comido, saqueado, saquearan las aldeas, casas de gentiles hombres y iglesias, se matan los hombres, se desvirgen las mozas y mugeres y otros mil maldades que se cometen cada dia a mil pesar y sin que de ellas se ha hecho alguna justicia aunque me soy quejado y lamentado muchas veces”—Chimay to Philip, 17 March, 1594. (Arch. de Simancas MS.)

„As to getting a good deal of money out of the provinces here by gentleness and persuasion, according to your Majesty's suggestion,” wrote the archduke, „your Majesty must be undeceived. Nothing can be got from the provinces, because the whole patrimony thereof is consumed, the private fortunes are destroyed, and everything is in such a brittle condition that nothing whatever can be undertaken in these regions.” —Instruccion que el Archque Ernesto dio al Bon Max Dietrichstein, 12 April, 1594. (Ibid.)

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<sup>1</sup> Philip to Ernest, 19 Feb. 1594. (Arch. de Simancas MS.)

pecially it was desirable to take off, by poison or otherwise, Henry IV., Queen Elizabeth, Maurice of Nassau, Olden-Barneveld, St. Aldegonde, and other less conspicuous personages.

Henry's physician-in-chief, De la Riviere, was at that time mainly occupied with devising antidotes to poison, which he well knew was offered to his master on frequent occasions, and in the most insidious ways. Andrada, the famous Portuguese poisoner, amongst others is said, under direction of Fuentes and Ybarra, to have attempted his life by a nosegay of roses impregnated with so subtle a powder that its smell alone was relied upon to cause death, 1 and De la Riviere was doing his best to search for a famous Saxon drug, called fable-powder, as a counter poison. „The Turk alarms us, and well he may,” said a diplomatic agent of Henry, „but the Spaniard allows us not to think of the Turk. And what a strange manner is this to exercise one's enmities and vengeance by having recourse to such damnable artifices, after force and arms have not succeeded, and so attack the person of princes by poisonings and assassinations.” 2

A most elaborate attempt upon the life of Queen Elizabeth early in this year came near being successful. A certain Portuguese Jew, Dr. Lopez, had for some time been her physician-in-ordinary. He had first been received into her service on the recommendation of Don Antonio, the pretender, and had the reputation of great learning and skill. With this man Count Fuentes and Stephen Ybarra, chief of the financial department at Brussels, had a secret understanding. Their chief agent was Emanuel Andrada, who was also in close communication with Bernadino de Mendoza and other leading personages of the Spanish court. Two years previously, Philip, by the hands of Andrada, had

sent a very valuable ring of rubies and diamonds as a present to Lopez, and the doctor had bound himself to do any service for the King of Spain that might be required of him. Andrada accordingly wrote to Mendoza that he had gained over this eminent physician, but that as Lopez was poor and laden with debt, a high price would be required for his work. Hereupon Fuentes received orders from the King of Spain to give the Jew all that he could in reason demand, if he would undertake to poison the queen. 1

It now became necessary to handle the matter with great delicacy, and Fuentes and Ybarra entered accordingly into a correspondence, not with Lopez, but with a certain Ferrara de Gama. These letters were entrusted to one Emanuel Lewis de Tinoco, secretly informed of the plot, for delivery to Ferrara. Fuentes charged Tinoco to cause Ferrara to encourage Lopez to poison her Majesty of England, that they might all have „a merry Easter.” 2 Lopez was likewise requested to inform the King of Spain when he thought he could accomplish the task. The doctor ultimately agreed to do the deed for fifty thousand crowns, but as he had daughters and was an affectionate parent, he stipulated for a handsome provision in marriage for those young ladies. 3 The terms were accepted, but Lopez wished to be assured of the money first.

„Having once undertaken the work,” said Lord Burghley, if he it were, „he was so greedy to perform it that he would ask Ferrara every day, „When will the money come? I am ready to do the service if the answer were come out of Spain.” 4

1 Account of Dr. Lopez's treason—doubtless by Lord Burghley—in Murdin's *State Papers*, ii. 669-675. Meteren, xvi. 334, *seqq.* Reynd, ix. 247, 248.

2 Account of Dr. Lopez's treason, &c.

3 „And further to set him on, he was to be put in mind that he had daughters to marry, for whom the king would provide, and what great honours and rewards he should have.”—*Ibid.*

4 *Ibid.*

1 Meteren, xvi. 334.

2 Bongar's *Lettres*, p. 271.

But Philip, as has been often seen, was on principle averse to paying for work before it had been done. Some delay occurring, and the secret, thus confided to so many, having floated as it were imperceptibly into the air, Tinoco was arrested on suspicion before he had been able to deliver the letters of Fuentes and Ybarra to Ferrara, for Ferrara, too, had been imprisoned before the arrival of Tinoco. The whole correspondence was discovered, and both Ferrara and Tinoco confessed the plot. Lopez, when first arrested, denied his guilt very stoutly, but, being confronted with Ferrara, who told the whole story to his face in presence of the judges, he at last avowed the crime. 1

They were all condemned, executed, and quartered at London in the spring of 1594. The queen wished to send a special envoy to the archduke at Brussels, to complain that Secretary of State Cristoval de Moura, Count Fuentes, and Finance Minister Ybarra—all three then immediately about his person—were thus implicated in the plot against her life, to demand their punishment, or else, in case of refusal, to convict the king and the archduke as accomplices in the crime. 2 Safe conduct was requested for such an envoy, which was refused by Ernest as an insulting proposition both to his uncle and himself. The queen accordingly sent word to President Richardot by one of her council, that the whole story would be published, and this was accordingly done. 3

1 Account of Dr. Lopez's treason. Meteren, *Reyd*, *ubi sup.* 2 *Reyd*, 248.

3 *Ibid.* „But because by fame and hearsay,” says the writer of the account, no doubt Lord Burghley, „things take not always a true report, and I know the quality of those treasons are of the sort so heinous as all sorts of men desire to be truly informed of the same, I have set down a plain and short declaration of the treason of this perjured murdering traitor, without alleging proofs, which may be done hereafter at large, . . . and also that the practices were set at work, as manifestly appeared to authentic proof, by him who either in respect of his calling or of her Majesty's deserving, should least

Early in the spring of this same year, a certain Renickon, priest and schoolmaster of Namur, was summoned from his school to a private interview with Count Berlaymont. That nobleman very secretly informed the priest that the King of Spain wished to make use of him in an affair of great importance, and one which would be very profitable to himself. The pair then went together to Brussels, and proceeded straightway to the palace. They were secretly admitted to the apartments of the archduke, but the priest, meaning to follow his conductor into the private chamber, where he pretended to recognise the person of Ernest, was refused admittance. The door was, however, not entirely closed, and he heard, as he declared, the conversation between his Highness and Berlaymont, which was carried on partly in Latin and partly in Spanish. He heard them discussing the question—so he stated—of the recompense to be awarded for the business about to be undertaken, and after a brief conversation, distinctly understood the archduke to say, as the count was approaching the door, „I will satisfy him abundantly and with interest.” 1

Berlaymont then invited his clerical

of all others have consented to so unprincipally an act. Yet it is a strange thing to consider, that in so evident a matter, touching as virtuous and sovereign a princess as ever the world did enjoy, we are loath, in reverend regard of the name and title of royal and supreme dignity, to have him named, otherwise than cannot be avoided in the simple narration of the cause, and indeed, if I may utter my conceit, a greater indignity nor breach of honour never was given to that high degree, violated by the hands of him who should chiefly sustain that calling. I leave him to the judgment of God, King of kings, who taketh account of their doings. . . . What may be thought of them who use so high, so holy so reverent a thing (the profession of religion) to cloke ambition, revenge, and wicked practices? Truly the age wherein we are born shall endure hereafter note of reproach for this kind of impiety and profanation.” Most truly, O Lord High Treasurer! 1 *Bor*, III. 815, 817. *Reyd*, ix. 223-228. Meteren, xvi. 335. „Cumulate et largo foenore satisfaciam.”



guest to supper—so ran his statement—and, after that repast was finished, informed him that he was requested by the archduke to kill Prince Maurice of Nassau. For this piece of work he was to receive one hundred Philip-dollars in hand, and fifteen thousand more, which were lying ready for him, so soon as the deed should be done.

The schoolmaster at first objected to the enterprise, but ultimately yielded to the persuasions of the count. He was informed that Maurice was a friendly, familiar gentleman, and that there would be opportunities enough for carrying out the project if he took his time. He was to buy a good pair of pistols and remove to the Hague, where he was to set up a school, and wait for the arrival of his accomplices, of whom there were six. Berlaymont then caused to be summoned and introduced to the pedagogue a man whom he described as one of the six. The new comer, hearing that Renichon had agreed to the propositions made to him, hailed him cordially as comrade and promised to follow him very soon into Holland. Berlaymont then observed that there were several personages to be made away with, besides Prince Maurice—especially Barneveld and St. Aldegonde—and that the six assassins had, since the time of the Duke of Parma, been kept in the pay of the King of Spain as nobles, to be employed as occasion should serve.

His new comrade accompanied Renichon to the canal boat, conversing by the way, and informed him that they were both to be sent to Leyden in order to entice away and murder the young brother of Maurice, Frederic Henry, then at school at that place, even as Philip William, eldest of all the brothers, had been kidnapped five-and-twenty years before from the same town.

Renichon then disguised himself as a soldier, proceeded to Antwerp, where he called himself Michael de Triviere, and thence made his way to Breda,

provided with letters from Berlaymont. He was, however, arrested on suspicion not long after his arrival there, and upon trial the whole plot was discovered. Having unsuccessfully attempted to hang himself, he subsequently, without torture, made a full and minute confession, and was executed on the 3rd June, 1594. 1

Later in the year, one Pierre du Four, who had been a soldier both in the States and the French service, was engaged by General La Motte and Counsellor Assonleville to attempt the assassination of Prince Maurice. 2 La Motte took the man to the palace, and pretended at least to introduce him to the chamber of the archduke, who was said

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1 Bor, Reyd, Meteren, *ubi sup.* „I have been, with others of the council of state, twice or thrice at the examination of the prisoner. He declareth his coming to have been about an attempt against Breda (which is taken to be but a made and coloured thing), and withal to see if he could kill the Count Maurice—that Berlaymont was the mover and Ernestus privy to all, but as yet the truth of the practice and circumstances he openeth not flatly, which will be drawn from him ere he be left. Of profession he is a priest and born in Namur, having named six others employed about the same mischief, but the fellow is subtle and ready in his words to colour and answer anything, so that all is not to be credited that cometh from him.”—Gilpin to Burghley, 2 April 1594. (S. P. Office MS.)

The commissioner alluded to the forthcoming answer of the States-General in regard to the proposed negotiations for peace, in which these murderous attempts of the Spanish king and his representatives were to be hurled in his face with terrible emphasis, and spoke of them with the indignation of an honest Englishman:—„The States-General, not doubting but that the discovery of the said murder, when it shall be made known and published (whereby it may appear to the world what a most barbarous and abominable course the King of Spain and his do hold by practices against the persons of kings and princes), will not only strenghten and confirm the people here in their resolution to continue their defence and wars, but make all other potentates and countries dislike and detest such heathenish and wicked attempts and proceedings to the perpetual dishonour, reproach, and infamy of the author and dealers.”—*Ibid.*

2 Meteren, xvi. 335. Bor, III. 882, 883. Reyd, ix. 247.

to be lying ill in bed. Du Four was advised to enrol himself in the body-guard at the Hague, and to seek an opportunity when the prince went hunting, or was mounting his horse, or was coming from church, or at some such unguarded moment, to take a shot at him. „Will you do what I ask?” demanded from the bed the voice of him who was said to be Ernest, „will you kill this tyrant?” „I will,” replied the soldier. „Then my son,” was the parting benediction of the supposed archduke, „you will go straight to paradise.” 1

Afterwards he received good advice from Assonleville, and was assured that if he would come and hear a mass in the royal chapel next morning, that religious ceremony would make him invisible when he should make his attempt on the life of Maurice, and while he should be effecting his escape. 2 The poor wretch accordingly came next morning to chapel, where this miraculous mass was duly performed, and he then received a certain portion of his promised reward in ready money. He was also especially charged, in case he should be arrested, not to make a confession—as had been done by those previously employed in such work—as all complicity with him on part of his employers would certainly be denied. 3

The miserable dupe was arrested, convicted, executed; and of course the denial was duly made on the 17 Nov. part of the archduke, La 1594. Motte, and Assonleville. It was also announced, on behalf of Ernest, that some one else, fraudulently impersonating his Highness, had lain in the bed to which the culprit had been taken, and every one must hope that the statement was a true one. 4

Enough has been given to show the peculiar school of statesmanship accord-

ing to the precepts of which the internal concerns and foreign affairs of the obedient Netherlands were now administered. Poison and pistols in the hands of obscure priests and deserters were relied on to bring about great political triumphs, while the mutinous royal armies, entrenched and defiant, were extorting capitulations from their own generals and their own sovereign upon his own soil.

Such a record as this seems rather like the exaggeration of a diseased fancy, seeking to pander to a corrupt public taste, which feeds greedily upon horrors; but, unfortunately, it is derived from the register of high courts of justice, from diplomatic correspondence, and from the confessions, without torture or hope of free pardon, of criminals. For a crowned king and his high functionaries and generals to devote so much of their time, their energies, and their money to the murder of brother and sister sovereigns, and other illustrious personages, was not to make after ages in love with the monarchic and aristocratic system, at least as thus administered. Popular governments may be deficient in polish, but a system resting for its chief support upon bribery and murder cannot be considered lovely by any healthy mind. And this is one of the lessons to be derived from the history of Philip II. and of the Holy League.

But besides mutiny and assassination there were also some feeble attempts at negotiation to characterize the Ernestian epoch at Brussels. The subject hardly needs more than a passing allusion.

Two Flemish juris-consults, Otto Hertius and Jerome Comans, offered their services to the archduke in the peace-making department. Ernest accepted the proposition—although it was strongly opposed by Fuentes, who relied upon the more practical agency of Dr. Lopez, Andrada, Renichon, and the rest—and the peace-makers accordingly made their appearance at the Hague, under safe

1 Ibid. „Figliol mio, se farete quello che m'avete promesso d'ammazzar quel tyranno, andarete diritto in Paradiso.”

2 Bor, *ubi sup.*

3 Ibid.

4 Ibid.

conduct, and provided with very conciliatory letters from his Highness to the States-General.<sup>1</sup> In all ages and under all circumstances it is safe to enlarge, with whatever eloquence may be at command, upon the blessings of peace and upon the horrors of war; for the appeal is not difficult to make, and a response is certain in almost every human breast. But is another matter to descend from the general to the particular, and to demonstrate how the desirable may be attained and the horrible averted. The letters of Ernest were full of benignity and affection, breathing a most ardent desire that the miserable war, now a quarter of a century old, should be then and there terminated. But not one atom of concession was offered, no whisper breathed that the republic, if it should choose to lay down its victorious arms, and renounce its dearly gained independence, should share any different fate from that under which it saw the obedient provinces gasping before its eyes. To renounce religious and political liberty and self-government, and to submit unconditionally to the authority of Philip II. as administered by Ernest and Fuentes, was hardly to be expected as the result of the three years' campaigns of Maurice of Nassau.

The two doctors of law laid the affectionate commonplaces of the archduke before the States-General, each of them making, moreover, a long and flowery oration in which the same protestations of good will and hopes of future good-fellowship were distended to formidable dimensions by much windy rhetoric. The accusations which had been made against the Government of Brussels of complicity in certain projects of assassination were repelled with virtuous indignation.<sup>2</sup>

The answer of the States-General was wrathful and decided.<sup>3</sup> They informed

the Commissioners that they had taken up arms for a good cause and meant to retain them in their hands. They expressed their thanks for the expressions of good will which had been offered, but avowed their right to complain before God and the world of those who under pretext of peace were attempting to shed the innocent blood of Christians, and to procure the ruin and destruction of the Netherlands. To this end the state-council of Spain was more than ever devoted, being guilty of the most cruel and infamous proceedings and projects. They threw out a rapid and stinging summary of their wrongs; and denounced with scorn the various hollow attempts at negotiation during the preceding twenty-five years. Coming down to the famous years 1587 and 1588, they alluded in vehement terms to the fraudulent peace propositions which had been thrown as a veil over the Spanish invasion of England and the Armada; and they glanced at the mediation-projects of the emperor in 1591 at the desire of Spain, while armies were moving in force from Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands to crush the King of France, in order that Philip might establish his tyranny over all kings, princes, provinces, and republics. That the Spanish Government was secretly dealing with the emperor and other German potentates for the extension of his universal empire appeared from intercepted letters of the king—copies of which were communicated—from which it was sufficiently plain that the purpose of his Majesty was not to bestow peace and tranquillity upon the Netherlands. The names of Fuentes, Clemente, Ybarra, were sufficient in themselves to destroy any such illusion. They spoke in blunt terms of the attempt of Dr. Lopez to poison Queen Elizabeth, at the instigation of Count Fuentes, for fifty thousand crowns to be paid by the King of Spain: they charged upon the same Fuentes and

2 May.

<sup>1</sup> Bentivoglio, P. III. lib. i. p. 390. Bor, III. 810-812.

<sup>2</sup> Bor, III. 810-812.

<sup>3</sup> See the document in full in Bor. III. 813-815.



upon Ybarra that they had employed the same Andrada to murder the King of France with a nosegay of roses; and they alluded further to the revelations of Michael Renichon, who was to murder Maurice of Nassau and kidnap Frederic William, even as their father and brother had been already murdered and kidnapped.<sup>1</sup>

For such reasons the archduke might understand by what persons and what means the good people of the Netherlands were deceived, and how difficult it was for the States to forget such lessons, or to imagine anything honest in the present propositions.

The States declared themselves, on the contrary, more called upon than ever before to be upon the watch against the stealthy proceedings of the Spanish council of state—bearing in mind the late execrable attempts at assassination, and the open war which was still carried on against the King of France.

And although it was said that his Highness was displeased with such murderous and hostile proceedings, still it was necessary for the States to beware of the nefarious projects of the King of Spain and his council.<sup>2</sup>

After the conversion of Henry IV. to the Roman Church had been duly accomplished, that monarch 27 May, had sent a secret envoy to 1594.

Spain. The mission of this agent—De Varenne by name—excited intense anxiety and suspicion in England and Holland and among the Protestants of France and Germany. It was believed that Henry had not only made a proposition of a separate peace with Philip, but that he had formally but mysteri-

ously demanded the hand of the Infanta in marriage. Such a catastrophe as this seemed to the heated imaginations of the great body of Calvinists throughout Europe, who had so faithfully supported the King of Navarre up to the moment of his great apostasy, the most cruel and deadly treachery of all. That the princess with the many suitors should come to reign over France after all—not as the bride of her own father, not as the queen-consort of Ernest the Habsburger or of Guise the Lorrainer, but as the lawful wife of Henry the Huguenot—seemed almost too astounding for belief, even amid the chances and changes of that astonishing epoch. Yet Duplessis-Mornay avowed that the project was entertained, and that he had it from the very lips of the secret envoy who was to negotiate the marriage. „La Varenne is on his way to Spain,” wrote Duplessis to the Duke of Bouillon, „in company with a gentlemen of Don Bernardino de Mendoza, who brought the first overtures. He is to bring back the portrait of the Infanta. ’Tis said that the marriage is to be on condition that the Queen and the Netherlands are comprised in the peace, but you know that this cannot be satisfactorily arranged for those two parties. All this was once guess-work, but is now history.”<sup>1</sup>

That eminent diplomatist and soldier Mendoza had already on his return from France given the King of Spain to understand that there were no hopes of his obtaining the French crown either for himself or for his daughter, that all the money lavished on the chiefs of the League was thrown away, and that all their promises were idle wind. Mendoza in consequence had fallen into contempt at court, but Philip, observing apparently that there might

<sup>1</sup> Bor, III. 813-815.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid. The archduke, as might be supposed, was not pleased with the reply of the States, and characterised it as so arrogant and outrageous that he would not have allowed his Majesty's ears to be offended by it had not the States, like insolent people as they were, already caused it to be printed and published. Ernest to Philip, 4 Sept. 1594. Arch. de Simancas MS.)

<sup>1</sup> „Je le sais de la bouche du porteur, qui ne le m'osa deguiser, parceque je monstroi ne être adverti, . . . c'etait alors devination, maintenant histoire.”—Mem. et Corresp. iv. 563. 18 Sept. 1593.

have been something correct in his statements, had recently recalled him, and, notwithstanding his blindness and other infirmities, was disposed to make use of him in secret negotiations. Mendoza had accordingly sent a confidential agent to Henry IV. offering his good offices, now that the king had returned to the bosom of the Church.

This individual, whose name was Nuñez, was admitted by De Béthune (afterwards the famous Duc de Sully) to the presence of the king, but De Béthune, believing it probable that the Spaniard had been sent to assassinate Henry, held both the hands of the emissary during the whole interview, besides subjecting him to a strict personal visitation beforehand. Nuñez stated that he was authorized to propose to his Majesty a marriage with the Infanta Clara Isabella, and Henry, much to the discontent of De Béthune, listened eagerly to the suggestion, and promised to send a secret agent to Spain to confer on the subject with Mendoza.

The choice he made of La Varenne, whose real name was Guillaume Fouquet, for this mission was still more offensive to De Béthune. Fouquet had originally been a cook in the service of Madame Catherine, and was famous for his talent for larding poultry, but he had subsequently entered the household of Henry, where he had been employed in the most degrading service which one man can render to another. 1

On his appointment to his office of

1 „La Varenne,” said Madame Catherine on one occasion, „tu as plus gagné à porter les poulets de mon frere, qu'à piquer les miens.” *Mémoires de Sully*. Liv. vi. p. 296, note 6. He accumulated a large fortune in these dignified pursuits—having, according to Winwood, landed estates to the annual amount of sixty thousand francs a-year—and gave large dowries to his daughters, whom he married into noblest families; „which is the more remarkable,” adds Winwood, „considering the services wherein he is employed about the king, which is to be the Mezzano for his loves, the place from whence he came, which is out of the kitchen of Madame the king's sister.”—*Memorials*, i. 380.

secret diplomacy he assumed all the airs of an ambassador, while Henry took great pains to contradict the reports which were spread as to the true nature of this mission to Spain. 1

Duplessis was, in truth, not very far wrong in his conjectures, but, as might be supposed, Henry was most anxious to conceal these secret negotiations with his Catholic Majesty from the Huguenot chiefs whom he had so recently deserted. „This is all done without the knowledge of the Duke of Bouillon, said Calvaert, „or at least under a very close disguise, as he himself keenly feels and confesses to me.” 2 The envoy of the republic, as well as the leaders of the Protestant party in France, were resolved if possible to break off these dark and dangerous intrigues of which they so shrewdly suspected, and to substitute for them an open rupture of Henry with the King of Spain, and a formal declaration of war against him. None of the diplomatists or political personages engaged in these great affairs, in which the whole world was so deeply interested, manifested more sagacity and insight on this occasion than did the Dutch statesmen. We have seen that even Sir Edward Stafford was deceived up to a very late moment, as to the rumoured intentions of Henry to enter the Catholic Church. Envoy Edmonds was now equally and completely in the dark as to the mission of Varenne, and informed his Government that the only result of it was that the secret agent to Spain was favoured, through the kindness of Mendoza, with a distant view of Philip II.

1 *Mém. de Sully*, *ubi sup.*

2 Deventer. *Gedenkstukken*, &c. ii. 37. In this most valuable contribution to the history of the Netherlands and of Europe, the learned editor has been the first to give—so far as I am aware—the true history of this remarkable negotiation. The accounts by contemporary historians show the writers to have been kept as much in the dark as the English envoy was, an extract from whose private letter to Lord Burghley will be found in note 2, p. 216. Compare Bor, III, 759-763.

with his son and daughter at their devotions in the chapel of the Escorial. This was the tale generally recounted and believed after the agent's return from Spain, so that Varenne was somewhat laughed at as having gone to Spain on a fool's errand, and as having got nothing from Mendoza but a disavowal of his former propositions. But the shrewd Calvaert, who had entertained familiar relations with La Varenne, received from that personage after his return a very different account of his excursion to the Escorial from the one generally circulated. „Coming from Monceaux to Paris in his company,” wrote Calvaert in a secret dispatch to the States, „I had the whole story from him. The chief part of his negotiations with Don Bernardino de Mendoza was that if his Majesty (the French king) would abandon the Queen of England and your Highnesses (the States of the Netherlands), there were no conditions that would be refused the king, including the hand of the Infanta, together with a good recompense for the kingdom of Navarre. La Varenne maintained that the King of Spain had caused these negotiations to be entered upon at this time with him in the certain hope and intention of a definite conclusion, alleging to me many pertinent reasons, and among others that he, having been lodged at Madrid, through the adroitness of Don Bernardino, among all the agents of the League, and hearing all their secrets and negotiations, had never been discovered, but had always been supposed to be one of the League himself. He said also that he was well assured that the Infanta in her heart had an affection for the French king, and notwithstanding any resolutions that might be taken (to which I referred, meaning the projects for bestowing her on the house of Austria) that she with her father's consent or in case of his death would not fail to carry out this marriage. You may from all this, even

out of the proposal for compensation for the kingdom of Navarre (of which his Majesty also let out something to me inadvertently), collect the reasons why such feeble progress is made in so great an occasion as now presents itself for a declaration of war and an open alliance with your Highnesses. I shall not fail to watch these events, even in case of the progress of the said resolutions, notwithstanding the effects of which it is my opinion that this secret intrigue is not to be abandoned. To this end, besides the good intelligence which one gets by means of good friends, a continual and agreeable presentation of oneself to his Majesty, in order to see and hear everything, is necessary.”<sup>1</sup>

Certainly, here were reasons more than sufficient why Henry should be making but feeble preparations for open war in alliance with England and the republic against Philip, as such a step was hardly compatible with the abandonment of England and the republic and the espousal of Philip's daughter—projects which Henry's commissioner had just been discussing with Philip's agent at Madrid and the Escorial.

Truly it was well for the republican envoy to watch events as closely as possible, to make the most of intelligence from his good friends, and to present himself as frequently and as agreeable as possible to his Majesty that he might hear and see everything. There was much to see and to hear, and it needed adroitness and courage, not to slip or stumble in such dark ways where the very ground seemed often to be sliding from beneath the feet.

To avoid the catastrophe of an alliance between Henry, Philip, and the Pope against Holland and England; it was a pressing necessity for Holland and England to force Henry into open war against Philip. To this end the Dutch statesmen were bending all their energies. Meantime Elizabeth regarded the cam-

<sup>1</sup> Deventer, *ubi sup.*



paign in Artois and Hainault with little favour.

As he took leave on departing for France, La Varenne had requested Mendoza to write to King Henry, but the Spaniard excused himself—although professing the warmest friendship for his Majesty—on the ground of the impossibility of addressing him correctly. „If I call him here King of Navarre, I might as well put my head on the block at once,” he observed; „if I call him King of France, my master has not yet recognized him as such; if I call him anything else, he will himself be offended.” 1

And the vision of Philip in black on his knees, with his children about him, and a rapier at his side, passed with the contemporary world as the only phenomenon of this famous secret mission. 2

1 Bor, III. 759-763.

2 Ibid. Envoy Edmondes gave a detailed account of the matter, so far as he understood it, from Dieppe:—„Don Bernardino,” he says, „asked to hear what he (La Varenne) had in charge, to which the other made answer to have nothing, only to have brought eyes to see and ears to hear what he would propound. . . . Whereupon Bernardino made him answer that he was to avow nothing that his said servant had delivered, which he said to be in him a less shame than in Mons. de Mayne having disavowed a person of the quality of Mons de Villeroy. La Varenne therefore, seeing he could draw no other payment from him, prayed him, to the end his journey might not be to him altogether fruitless, to procure that he might have a sight of the king and the beauties of the Scoriall, his house, which he accordingly performed, causing him to be secretly brought into the chapel, where he saw the king at mass, of purpose attired in extraordinary demonstration of liveliness, wearing the sword and cape, which he had not before done in two years; with also the young prince and the Infanta in like colour, was brought another time to see him walking in the garden, but without speaking at all unto him. Being therein so satisfied, and therewith dismissed, Don Bernardino prayed him at this departure to excuse him to the king for not writing unto him, which he said he could not do in qualifying him as appertained without disproving the justness of his master's quarrel, and thereby incur peril; and to give him an undue title, that he was too much his servant, and only therefore to

But Henry, besides this demonstration towards Spain, lost no time in despatching a special minister to the republic and to England, who was instructed to make the most profuse, elaborate, and conciliatory explanations as to his recent conversion and as to his future intentions. 1 Never would he make peace, he said, with Spain without the full consent of the States and of England; the dearest object of his heart in making his peace with Rome having been to restore peace to his own distracted realm, to bring all Christians into one brotherhood, and to make a

let him know that so as the pope would speak in the king's favour, there is very good reason to make the King of Spain to understand to a union with him, and that is all the return he bringeth of his negotiation; but the king to cover the shame thereof doth pay himself with great contentment of the good service which by that occasion he hath otherwise done him, in discovering, by haunting unknown divers French there of the League, a dangerous enterprise upon Bordeaux, which having on his return declared to Marshal Matignon, he hath thereupon apprehended certain of the principal of the town conspirators therein,” &c. Edmondes to Burghley, 13 Nov. 1593. (S. P. Office MS.) Compare Bor, *ubi sup.*

La Varenne was subsequently sent to England to give a report—more or less ingenuous—of his Spanish mission to the queen. She at first refused to receive him on the ground that he had formerly used disrespectful language concerning herself, but she subsequently relented. He reported that he had found the king remarkably jolly (*gail-lard*) and healthy for his years, and had also seen the rest of the royal family. Don Bernardino, he said, who had given the king to understand, now that he was Catholic, that he could find means to reconcile him with the king his master, whereby he might maintain himself peaceably in his kingdom, had nevertheless professed ignorance of and such matter when he found that Varenne had no commission except to see and to hear. So the agent was fain—according to his public statement—to content himself with a distant view of the most catholic king at this devotions. Noel de Caron to the States-General, 4 Dec. 1593. (Hague Arch.) No one but Calvaert seems to have succeeded in pumping the secret envoy, but by Calvaert the States-General were enlightened, and put thoroughly on their guard as to the possible designs of Henry.

1 De Morians to the States-General, in Bor, III. 721-726. 26 Aug. 1593.

united attack upon the grand Turk—a vision which the cheerful monarch hardly intended should ever go beyond the ivory gate of dreams, but which furnished substance enough for several well-rounded periods in the orations of De Morlans.

That diplomatist, after making the strongest representations to Queen Elizabeth as to the faithful friendship of his master, and the necessity he was under of pecuniary and military assistance, had received generous promises of aid both in men and money—three thousand men besides the troops actually serving in Brittany—from that sagacious sovereign, notwithstanding the vehement language in which she had rebuked her royal brother's apostasy. <sup>1</sup> He now came for the same purpose to the Hague, where he made very eloquent harangues to the States-General, acknowledging that the republic had ever been the most upright, perfect, and undisguised friend to his master and to France in their darkest days and deepest affliction; that she had loved the king and kingdom for themselves, not merely hanging on to their prosperity, but, on the contrary, doing her best to produce that prosperity by her contributions in soldiers, ships, and subsidies. „The king,” said De Morlans, „is deeply grieved that he can prove his gratitude only in words for so many benefits conferred, which are absolutely without example, but he has commissioned me to declare that if God should ever give him the occasion, he will prove how highly he places your friendship.”

The envoy assured the States that all fears entertained by those of the reformed religion on account of the conversion of his Majesty were groundless. Nothing was farther from the king's thoughts than to injure those noble spirits with whom his soul had lived so long, and whom he so much loved and honoured. No man knew better

than the king did the character of those who professed *the Religion*, their virtue, valour, resolution, and patience in adversity. Their numbers had increased in war, their virtues had been purified by affliction, they had never changed their position, whether battles had been won or lost. Should ever an attempt be made to take up arms against them within his realms, and should there be but five hundred of them against ten thousand, the king, remembering their faithful and ancient services, would leave the greater number in order to die at the head of his old friends. He was determined that they should participate in all the honours of the kingdom, and with regard to a peace with Spain, he would have as much care for the interests of the United Provinces as for his own. But a peace was impossible with that monarch, whose object was to maintain his own realms in peace while he kept France in perpetual revolt against the king whom God had given her. The King of Spain had trembled at Henry's cradle, at his youth, at the bloom of his manhood, and knew that he had inflicted too much injury upon him ever to be on friendly terms with him. The envoy was instructed to say that his master never expected to be in amity with one who had ruined his house, confiscated his property, and caused so much misery to France; and he earnestly hoped—without presuming to dictate—that the States-General would in this critical emergency manifest their generosity. If the king were not assisted now, both king and kingdom would perish. If he were assisted, the succour would bear double fruit. <sup>1</sup>

The sentiments expressed on the part of Henry towards his faithful subjects of the Religion, the heretic Queen of England, and the stout Dutch Calvinists who had so long stood by him, were most noble. It was pity that, at the same moment, he was proposing to

<sup>1</sup> Bor, III. 719.

<sup>1</sup> Address of De Morlans, *ubi sup.*

espouse the Infanta, and to publish the Council of Trent.

The reply of the States-General to these propositions of the French envoy was favourable, and it was agreed that a force of three thousand foot and five hundred horse should be sent to the assistance of the king. Moreover, the state-paper drawn up on this occasion was conceived with so much sagacity and expressed with so much eloquence, as particularly to charm the English queen when it was communicated to her Majesty. She protested very loudly and vehemently to Noel de Caron, envoy from the provinces at London, that this response on the part of his Government to De Morlans was one of the wisest documents that she had ever seen. „In all their actions,” said she, „the States-General show their sagacity, and indeed, it is the wisest Government ever known among republics. I would show you,” she added to the gentlemen around her, „the whole of the paper if it were this moment at hand.”<sup>1</sup>

After some delays, it was agreed between the French Government and that of the United Provinces, that the king should divide his army into three parts, and renew the military operations against Spain with the expiration of the truce at the end of the year (1593).

One body, composed of the English contingent, together with three thousand French horse, three thousand Swiss, and four thousand French harquebusmen, were to be under his own immediate command, and were to act against the enemy wherever it should appear to his Majesty most advantageous. A second army was to expel the rebels and their foreign allies from Normandy and reduce Rouen to obedience. A third was to make a campaign in the provinces of Artois and Hainault, under the Duke of Bouillon (more commonly called the Viscount Turenne), in conjunction with the forces to be supplied

by the republic. „Any treaty of peace on our part with the King of Spain,” said the States-General,” is our certain ruin. This is an axiom. That monarch’s object is to incorporate into his own realms not only all the states and possessions of neighbouring kings, principalities, and powers, but *also all Christendom, aye, the whole world*, were it possible, We joyfully concur then in your Majesty’s resolution to carry on the war in Artois and Hainault, and agree to your suggestion of diversions on our part by sieges and succour by contingents.”<sup>1</sup>

Balagny, meantime, who had so long led an independent existence at Cambray, now agreed to recognise Henry’s authority, in consideration of sixty-seven thousand crowns yearly pension, and the dignity of Marshal of France.<sup>2</sup>

Towards the end of the year 1594, Buzanval, the regular French envoy at the Hague, began to insist more warmly than seemed becoming that the campaign in Artois and Hainault—so often the base of military operations on the part of Spain against France—should begin. Further achievements on the part of Maurice after the fall of Groningen, were therefore renounced for that year, and his troops went into garrison and winter quarters.<sup>3</sup> The States-General, who had also been sending supplies, troops, and ships to Brittany to assist the king, now, after soundly rebuking Buzanval for his intemperate language, entrusted their contingent for the proposed frontier campaign to Count Philip Nassau, who accordingly took the field toward the end of the year at the head of twenty-eight companies of foot and five squadrons of cavalry. He made his junction with Turenne-Bouillon, but the duke, although provided with a tremendous proclamation, was but in-

<sup>1</sup> Ibid.

<sup>2</sup> Buzanval to the States-General, 8 Dec. 1593, *apud*. Bor, III. 765, 766.

<sup>3</sup> Bor, 846-859.

<sup>1</sup> Bor, III. 726.



differently supplied with troops. The German levies, long-expected, were slow in moving, and on the whole it seemed that the operations might have been continued by Maurice with more effect, according to his original plan, than in this rather desultory fashion. 1 The late winter campaign on the border was feeble and a failure.

The bonds of alliance, however, were becoming very close between Henry and the republic. Despite the change in religion on the part of the king, and the pangs which it had occasioned in the hearts of leading Netherlands, there was still the traditional attraction between France and the States, which had been so remarkably manifested during the administration of William the Silent. The republic was more restive than ever under the imperious and exacting friendship of Elizabeth, and, feeling more and more its own strength, was making itself more and more liable to the charge of ingratitude, so constantly hurled in its face by the queen. And Henry, now that he felt himself really king of France, was not slow to manifest a similar ingratitude or an equal love of independence. Both monarch and republic, chafing under the protection of Elizabeth, were drawn into so close a union as to excite her anger and jealousy—sentiments which in succeeding years were to become yet more apparent. And now, while Henry still retained the chivalrous and flowery phraseology, so sweet to her ears, in his personal communications to the queen, his ministers were in the habit of using much plainer language. „Mr. de Sancy said to me,” wrote the Netherland minister in France, Calvaert, „that his Majesty and your Highnesses (the States-General) must without long delay conclude an alliance offensive and defensive. In regard to England, which perhaps might look askance at this matter, he told me it would be invited also by his Majesty

into the same alliance; but if, according to custom, it shilly-shallied, and without coming to deeds or to succour should put him off with words, he should in that case proceed with our alliance without England, not doubting that many other potentates In Italy and Germany would join in it likewise. He said too, that he, the day before the departure of the English ambassador, had said these words to him in the presence of his Majesty; namely, that England had entertained his Majesty sixteen months long with far-fetched and often-repeated questions and contents, that one had submitted to this sort of thing so long as his Majesty was only king of Mantes, Dieppe, and Louviers, but that his Majesty being now king of Paris, would be no longer a servant of those who should advise him to suffer it any longer or accept it as good payment; that England must treat his Majesty according to his quality, and with deeds, not words. He added that the ambassador had very anxiously made answer to these words, and had promised that when he got back to England he would so arrange that his Majesty should be fully satisfied, insisting to the last on the alliance then proposed.” 1

In Germany, meanwhile, there was much protocolling, and more hard drinking, at the Diet of Ratisbon. The Protestant princes did little for their cause against the new designs of Spain and the moribund League, while the Catholics did less to assist Philip. In

1 M. L. van Deventer—Gedenkstukken van Johan van Oldenbarnevelt en zijn Tyd, ii. 20, 21. (22 April, 1594.) De Sancy expressed himself in still stronger language a few weeks later: „Should England delay or interpose difficulties,” said he, „then the king will at once go into company with the States-General; aye, he will bring this alliance forward principally in consideration and respect for the States, whose authority he wishes to establish, . . . declaring with many words that your Highnesses are exactly the power in the whole world to which the King is under the greatest obligation, and in which he places his chief confidence.” Ibid. pp. 24, 25 (11 May, 1594.)

truth, the holy Roman Empire, threatened with a Turkish invasion, had neither power nor inclination to help the new universal empire of the west into existence. So the princes and grandees of Germany, while Amurath was knocking at the imperial gates, busied themselves with banqueting and other diplomatic work, but sent few reiters either to the east or west. 1

Philip's envoys were indignant at the apathy displayed towards the great Catholic cause, and felt humbled at the imbecility exhibited by Spain in its efforts against the Netherlands and France. San Clemente, who was attending the diet at Ratisbon, was shocked at the scenes he witnessed. „In less than three months,” said that temperate Spaniard, „they have drunk more than five million florins' worth of wine, at a time when the Turk has invaded the frontiers of Germany; and among those who have done the most of this consumption of wine, there is not one who is going to give any assistance on the frontier. In consequence of these disorders my purse is drained so low, that unless the king helps me I am ruined. You must tell our master that the reputation of his grandeur and

1 Bor, III. 852-854.

strength has never been so low as it is now in Germany. The events in France and those which followed in the Netherlands have thrown such impediments in the negotiations here, that not only our enemies make sport of Marquis Havré and myself, but even our friends—who are very few—dare not go to public feasts, weddings, and dinners, because they are obliged to apologize for us.” 1

Truly the world-empire was beginning to crumble. „The emperor has been desiring twenty times,” continued the envoy, „to get back to Prague from the Diet, but the people hold him fast like a steer. As I think over all that passes, I lose all judgment, for I have no money. nor influence, nor reputation. Meantime I see this rump of an empire keeping itself with difficulty upon its legs. 'Tis full of wrangling and discord about religion, and yet there is the Turk with two hundred thousand men besieging a place forty miles from Vienna, which is the last outpost. God grant it may last.” 2

Such was the aspect of the Christian world at the close of the year 1594.

1 Intercepted letters of San Clemente to Idiaquez, 30 Aug. 1594. *Apud Bor, ubi sup.*

2 *Ibid.*

## CHAPTER XXXI.

Formal declaration of war against Spain—Marriage Festivities—Death of Archduke Ernest—His year of government—Fuentes declared governor-general—Disaffection of the Duke of Arschot and Count Arenberg—Death of the Duke of Arschot—Fuentes besieges Le Catelet—The fortress of Ham, sold to the Spanish by De Gomeron, besieged and taken by the Duke of Bouillon—Execution of De Gomeron—Death of Colonel Verdugo—Siege of Dourlens by Fuentes—Death of La Motte—Death of Charles Mansfeld—Total defeat of the French—Murder of Admiral de Villars—Dourlens captured, and the garrison and citizens put to the sword—Military operations in eastern Netherlands and on the Rhine—Maurice lays siege to Groenlo—Mondragon hastening to its relief, Prince Maurice raises the siege—Skirmish between Maurice and Mondragon—Death of Philip

of Nassau—Death of Mondragon—Bombardment and surrender of Weerd Castle—Maurice retires into winter quarters—Campaign of Henry IV.—He besieges Dijon—Surrender of Dijon. Absolution granted to Henry by the Pope—Career of Balagny at Cambray—Progress of the siege—Capitulation of the town—Suicide of the Princess of Cambray, wife of Balagny.

THE year 1595 opened with a formal declaration of war by the King of France against the King of Spain. 1 17 Jan. It would be difficult to say 1595. for exactly how many years the war now declared had already been waged, but

1 Bor, IV. xxx. 2, *seqq.* De Thou, xii. lib. iii. pp. 342, *seqq.*

it was a considerable advantage for the United Netherlands that the manifesto had been at last regularly issued. And the manifesto was certainly not deficient in bitterness. Not often in Christian history has a monarch been solemnly and officially accused by a brother sovereign of suborning assassins against his life. Bribery, stratagem, and murder, were, however, so entirely the commonplace machinery of Philip's administration as to make an allusion to the late attempt of Châstel appear quite natural in Henry's declaration of war. The king further stigmatized in energetic language the long succession of intrigues by which the monarch of Spain, as chief of the Holy League, had been making war upon him by means of his own subjects, for the last half dozen years. Certainly there was hardly need of an elaborate statement of grievances. The deeds of Philip required no herald, unless Henry was prepared to abdicate his hardly-earned title to the throne of France.

Nevertheless the politic Gascon subsequently regretted the fierce style in which he had fulminated his challenge. He was accustomed to observe that no state paper required so much careful pondering as a declaration of war, 1 and that it was scarcely possible to draw up such a document without committing many errors in the phraseology. The man who never knew fear, despondency, nor resentment, was already instinctively acting on the principle that a king should deal with his enemy as if sure to become his friend, and with his friends as if they might easily change to foes. 2

The answer to the declaration was delayed for two months. When the reply came it of course breathed nothing but the most benignant sentiments in regard

7 March, to France, while it expressed  
1595. regret that it was necessary  
to carry fire and sword through that

country in order to avert the unutterable woe which the crimes of the heretic Prince of Béarne were bringing upon all mankind. 1

It was a solace to Philip to call the legitimate king by the title borne by him when heir presumptive, and to persist in denying to him that absolution which, as the whole world was aware, the Vicar of Christ was at that very moment in the most solemn manner about to bestow upon him.

More devoted to the welfare of France than were the French themselves, he was determined that a foreign prince—himself, his daughter, or one of his nephews—should supplant the descendant of St. Louis on the French throne. More catholic than the pope, he could not permit the heretic, whom his Holiness was just washing whiter than snow, to intrude himself into the society of Christian sovereigns.

The winter movements by Bouillon in Luxembourg, sustained by Philip Nassau campaigning with a meagre force on the French frontier, were not very brilliant. The Netherland regiments quartered at Ysoire, La Ferté, and in the neighbourhood accomplished very little, and their numbers were sadly thinned by dysentery. A sudden and successful stroke, too, by which that daring soldier Heraugiere, who had been the chief captor of Breda, obtained possession of the town and castle of Huy, produced no permanent advantage. This place, belonging to the Bishop of Liege, with its stone bridge over the Meuse, was an advantageous position from which to aid the operations of Bouillon in Luxembourg. Heraugiere was, however, not sufficiently reinforced, and Huy was a month later re-captured by La Motte. 2 The campaigning was languid during that winter in the United Netherlands, but the merry-making was energetic. The nuptials of Hohenlo with Mary,

Bor. De Thou, *ubi sup.*  
Sully, I lib. vii. p. 412.

1 Bor. De Thou, *ubi sup.*  
2 Bor. IV. 8, 10.



eldest daughter of William the Silent and own sister of the captive Philip William; of the Duke of Bouillon with Elizabeth, one of the daughters of the same illustrious prince by his third wife, Charlotte of Bourbon; and of Count Everard Solms, the famous general of the Zeeland troops, with Sabina, daughter of the unfortunate Lamoral Egmont, were celebrated with much pomp during the months of February and March. 1 The States of Holland and of Zeeland made magnificent presents of diamonds to the brides; the Countess Hohenlo receiving besides a yearly income of three thousand florins for the lives of herself and her husband. 2

In the midst of these merry marriage bells at the Hague a funeral knell was sounding in Brussels. On 20 Feb. the 20th February, the go- 1595. vernor-general of the obedient Netherlands, Archduke Ernest, breathed his last. His career had not been so illustrious as the promises of the Spanish king and the allegories of schoolmaster Houwaerts had led him to expect. He had not espoused the Infanta, nor been crowned King of France. He had not blasted the rebellious Netherlands with Cyclopean thunderbolts, nor unbound the Belgic Andromeda from the rock of doom. His brief year of government had really been as dismal as, according to the announcement of his sycophants, it should have been amazing. He had accomplished nothing, and all that was left him was to die at the age of forty-two, over head and ears in debt, a disappointed, melancholy man. He was very indolent, enormously fat, very chaste, very expensive, fond of fine liveries and fine clothes, so solemn and stately as never to be known to laugh, but utterly without capacity either as a statesman or a soldier. 3 He would have shone as a portly abbot ruling over peaceful friars, but he was not

born to ride a revolutionary whirlwind, nor to evoke order out of chaos. Past and Present were contending with each other in fierce elemental strife within his domain. A world was in dying agony, another world was coming, full-armed, into existence within the hand-breadth of time and of space where he played his little part, but he dreamed not of it. He passed away like a shadow, and was soon forgotten.

An effort was made, during the last illness of Ernest, to procure from him the appointment of the elector of Cologne as temporary successor to the government, but Count Fuentes was on the spot and was a man of action. He produced a power in the French language from Philip, with a blank for the name. This had been intended for the case of Peter Ernest Mansfeld's possible death during his provisional administration, and Fuentes now claimed the right of inserting his own name. 1

The dying Ernest consented, and upon his death Fuentes was declared governor-general until the king's further pleasure should be known.

Pedro de Guzman, Count of Fuentes, a Spaniard of the hard and antique type, was now in his sixty-fourth year. The pupil and near relative of the Duke of Alva, he was already as odious to the Netherlands as might have been inferred from such education and such kin. A dark, grizzled, baldish man, with high steep forehead, long, haggard, leathern visage, sweeping beard, and large, stern, commanding, menacing eyes, with his Brussels ruff of point lace and his Milan coat of proof, he was in personal appearance not unlike the terrible duke whom men never named without a shudder, although a quarter of a century had passed since he had ceased to curse the Netherlands with his presence. Elizabeth of England was

1 Bor. IV. 13. 2 Ibid.  
3 Ibid. 12. Coloma, viii. 162.

1 Diego de Ybarra to Philip, 19 Feb. 1595. Est. de Ybarra to the Secretaries, same date. (Arch. de Simancas MS.)

accustomed to sneer at Fuentes because he had retreated before Essex in that daring commander's famous foray into Portugal.<sup>1</sup> The queen called the Spanish general a timid old woman. If her gibe were true, it was fortunate for her, for Henry of France, and for the republic, that there were not many more such old women to come from Spain to take the place of the veteran chieftains who were destined to disappear so rapidly during this year in Flanders. He was a soldier of fortune, loved fighting, not only for the fighting's sake, but for the prize-money which was to be accumulated by campaigning, and he was wont to say that he meant to enter Paradise sword in hand.<sup>2</sup>

Meantime his appointment excited the wrath of the provincial magnates. The Duke of Arschot was beside himself with frenzy, and swore that he would never serve under Fuentes nor sit at his council-board. The duke's brother, Marquis Havré, and his son-in law, Count Arenberg, shared in the hatred, although they tried to mitigate the vehemence of its expression. But Arschot swore that no man had the right to take precedence of him in the council of state, and that the appointment of this or any Spaniard was a violation of the charters of the provinces and of the promises of his Majesty.<sup>3</sup> As if it were for the nobles of the obedient provinces to prate of charters and of oaths! Their brethren under the banner of the republic had been teaching Philip for a whole generation how they could deal with the privileges of freemen and with the perjury of tyrants. It was late in the day for the obedient Netherlands to remember their rights. Havré and Arenberg, dissembling their own wrath, were abused and insulted by the duke when they tried to pacify him.

They proposed a compromise, according to which Arschot should be allowed to preside in the council of state while Fuentes should content himself with the absolute control of the army. This would be putting a bit of fat in the duke's mouth, they said.<sup>1</sup> Fuentes would hear of no such arrangement. After much talk and daily attempts to pacify this great Netherlander, his relatives at last persuaded him to go home to his country place. He even promised Arenberg and his wife that he would go to Italy, in pursuance of a vow made to our lady of Loretto. Arenberg privately intimated to Stephen Ybarra that there was a certain oil, very apt to be efficacious in similar cases of irritation, which might be applied with prospect of success. If his father-in-law could only receive some ten thousand florins which he claimed as due to him from Government, this would do more to quiet him than a regiment of soldiers could. He also suggested that Fuentes should call upon the duke, while Secretary Ybarra should excuse himself by sickness for not having already paid his respects. This was done. Fuentes called. The duke returned the call, and the two conversed amicably about the death of the archduke, but entered into no political discussion.

Arschot then invited the whole council of state, except John Baptist Tassis, to a great dinner. He had prepared a paper to read to them in which he represented the great dangers likely to ensue from such an appointment as this of Fuentes, but declared that he washed his hands of the consequences, and that he had determined to leave a country where he was of so little account. He would then close his eyes and ears to everything that might occur, and thus escape the infamy of remaining in a country where so little account was made of him. He was urged to refrain

<sup>1</sup> Vol. 11. of this work, p. 527.

<sup>2</sup> Fruin. Tien Jaaren, &c. 192, note.

<sup>3</sup> Est. de Ybarra to Philip, 6 March, 1525. (Arch. de Simancas MS.)

<sup>1</sup> Ybarra to Philip, 6 March, 1595. (Arch. de Simancas MS.) „Una pella de sebo en la boca para acquietarle.”

from reading this paper and to invite Tassis. After a time he consented to suppress the document, but he manfully refused to bid the objectionable diplomatist to his banquet. 1

The dinner took place and passed off pleasantly enough. Arschot did not read his manifesto, but, as he warmed with wine, he talked a great deal of nonsense which, according to Stephen Ybarra, much resembled it, and he vowed that thenceforth he would be blind and dumb to all that might occur. 2 A few days later, he paid a visit to the new governor-general, and took a peaceful farewell of him. „Your Majesty knows very well what he is,” wrote Fuentes: „he is nothing but talk.” 3 Before leaving the country he sent a bitter complaint to Ybarra, to the effect that the king had entirely forgotten him, and imploring that financier’s influence to procure for him some gratuity from his Majesty. He was in such necessity, he said, that it was no longer possible for him to maintain his household. 4

And with this petition the grandee of the obedient provinces shook the dust from his shoes, and left his natal soil for ever. He died on the 11th December of the same year in Venice.

His son the Prince of Chimay, his brother, and son-in-law, and the other obedient nobles soon accommodated, themselves to the new administration, much as they had been inclined to bluster at first about their privileges. The governor soon reported that matters were proceeding very smoothly. 5 There was a general return to the former docility now that such a disciplinarian as Fuentes held the reins.

The opening scenes of the campaign between the Spanish governor and France

were, as usual, in Picardy. The Marquis of Varambon made a demonstration in the neighbourhood of Dourlens—a fortified town on the river Authie, lying in an open plain, very deep in that province—while Fuentes took the field with eight thousand men, and laid siege to Le Catelet. He had his eye, however, upon Ham. That important stronghold was in the hands of a certain nobleman called De Gomeron, who had been an energetic Leaguer, and was now disposed, for a handsome consideration, to sell himself to the King of Spain. In the auction of governors and generals then going on in every part of France it had been generally found that Henry’s money was more to be depended upon in the long run, although Philip’s bids were often very high, and, for a considerable period, the payments regular. Gomeron’s upset price for himself was twenty-five thousand crowns in cash, and a pension of eight-thousand a year. Upon these terms he agreed to receive a Spanish garrison into the town, and to cause the French in the citadel to be sworn into the service of the Spanish king. Fuentes agreed to the bargain and paid the adroit tradesman, who knew so well how to turn a penny for himself, a large portion of the twenty-five thousand crowns upon the nail.

De Gomeron was to proceed to Brussels to receive the residue. His brother-in-law, M. d’Orville, commanded in the citadel, and so soon as the Spanish troops had taken possession of the crown its governor claimed full payment of his services.

But difficulties awaited him in Brussels. He was informed that a French garrison could not be depended upon for securing the fortress, but that town and citadel must both be placed in Spanish hands. De Gomeron loudly protesting that this was not according to contract, was calmly assured, by command of Fuentes, that unless the citadel were at once evacuated and sur-

1 Ybarra to Philip, 6 March, 1595. (Arch. de Simancas MS.) 2 Ibid.

3 Fuentes to Philip, 28 March, 1595. (Arch. de Simancas MS.) „Es el que V. Magd. sabre, contentandose con hablar.”

4 Letters of Ybarra, *ubi sup.*

5 Ybarra to Philip, 16 March, 1595.



rendered, he would not receive the balance of his twenty-five thousand crowns, and that he should instantly lose his head. Here was more than De Gomeron had bargained for; but this particular branch of commerce in revolutionary times, although lucrative, has always its risks. De Gomeron, thus driven to the wall, sent a letter by a Spanish messenger to his brother-in-law, ordering him to surrender the fortress. D'Orville—who meantime had been making his little arrangements with the other party—protested that the note had been written under duress, and refused to comply with its directions.

Time was pressing, for the Duke of Bouillon and the Count of St. Pol lay with a considerable force in the neighbourhood, obviously menacing Ham.

Fuentes accordingly sent that distinguished soldier and historian, Don Carlos Coloma, with a detachment of soldiers to Brussels, with orders to bring Gomeron into camp. He was found seated at supper with his two young brothers, aged respectively sixteen and eighteen years, and was just putting a cherry into his mouth as Coloma entered the room. He remained absorbed in thought, trifling with the cherry without eating it, which Don Carlos set down as a proof of guilt. The three brothers were at once put in a coach, together with their sister, a nun of the age of twenty, and conveyed to the head-quarters of Fuentes, who lay before Le Catelet, but six leagues from Ham.

Meantime D'Orville had completed his negotiations with Bouillon, and had agreed to surrender the fortress so soon as the Spanish troops should be driven from the town. The duke knowing that there was no time to lose, came with three thousand men before the place. His summons to surrender was answered by a volley of cannon-shot from the town defences. An assault was made and repulsed, D'Humières, a most gallant officer and a favourite of King Henry,

being killed besides at least two hundred soldiers. The next attack was successful, the town was carried, and the Spanish garrison put to the sword.

D'Orville then, before giving up the citadel, demanded three hostages for the lives of his three brothers-in-law.

The hostages availed him little. Fuentes had already sent word to Gomeron's mother, that if the bargain were not fulfilled he would send her the heads of her three sons on three separate dishes. The distracted woman made her way to D'Orville, and fell at his feet with tears and entreaties. It was too late, and D'Orville, unable to bear her lamentations, suddenly rushed from the castle, and nearly fell into the hands of the Spaniards as he fled from the scene. Two of the four cuirassiers, who alone of the whole garrison accompanied him, were taken prisoners. The governor escaped to unknown regions. Madame de Gomeron then appeared before Fuentes, and tried in vain to soften him. De Gomeron was at once beheaded in the sight of the whole camp. The two younger sons were retained in prison, but ultimately set at liberty. 1 The town and citadel were thus permanently acquired by their lawful king, who was said to be more afflicted at the death of D'Humières than rejoiced at the capture of Ham.

Meantime Colonel Verdugo, royal governor of Friesland, whose occupation in those provinces, now so nearly recovered by the republic, was gone, had led a force of six thousand foot and twelve hundred horse across the French border, and was besieging La Ferté on the Cher. The siege was relieved by Bouillon on the 26th May, and the Spanish veteran was then ordered to take command in Burgundy. But 26 May, his days were numbered. He 1695. had been sick of dysentery in Luxembourg during the summer, but after

1 Bor, IV. 18, 19, 27. Meteren, 355, 356. De Thou, xii. 382, *seqq.* Coloma, 173.

apparent recovery died suddenly on the 2nd September, and of course was supposed to have been poisoned. 1 He was identified with the whole history of the Netherland wars. Born at Talavera de la Reyna, of noble parentage, as he asserted—although his mother was said to have sold dogs' meat, and he himself when a youth was a private soldier—he rose by steady conduct and hard fighting to considerable eminence in his profession. He was governor of Harlem after the famous siege, and exerted himself with some success to mitigate the ferocity of the Spaniards towards the Netherlanders at that epoch. He was marshal-general of the camp under Don John of Austria, and distinguished himself at the battle of Gemblours. He succeeded Count Renneberg as governor of Friesland and Groningen, and bore a manful part in most of the rough business that had been going on for a generation of mankind among those blood-stained wolds and morasses. He was often victorious, and quite as often soundly defeated; but he enjoyed campaigning, and was a glutton of work. He cared little for parade and ceremony, but was fond of recalling with pleasure the days when he was a soldier at four crowns a month, with an undivided fourth of one cloak, which he and three companions wore by turns on holidays. Although accused of having attempted to procure the assassination of William Lewis Nassau, he was not considered ill-natured, and he possessed much admiration for Prince Maurice. An iron-clad man, who had scarcely taken harness from his back all his life, he was a type of the Spanish commanders who had implanted international hatred deeply in the Netherland soul, and who, now that this result and no other had been accomplished, were rapidly passing away. He had been baptised Franco, and his family appellation of Verdugo meant executioner. Punning on these names

he was wont to say, that he was frank for all good people, but a hangman for heretics; and he acted up to his gibe. 1

Foiled at Ham, Fuentes had returned to the siege of Catelet, and had soon reduced the place. He then turned his attention again to Dourlens, and invested that city. During the preliminary operations, another veteran commander in these wars. Valentin Pardieu de la Motte, recently created Count of Everbecque by Philip, who had been for a long time general-in-chief of the artillery, and was one of the most famous and experienced officers in the Spanish service, went out one fine moonlight night to reconnoitre the enemy, and to superintend the erection of batteries. As he was usually rather careless of his personal safety, and rarely known to put on his armour when going for such purposes into the trenches, it was remarked with some surprise, on this occasion, that he ordered his page to bring his accoutrements, and that he armed himself *cap-a-pie* before leaving his quarters. Nevertheless, before he had reached the redoubt, a bullet from the town struck him between the fold of his morion and the edge of his buckler, and he fell dead without uttering a sound. 2

Here again was a great loss to the king's service. La Motte, of a noble family in Burgundy, had been educated in the old fierce traditions of the Spanish system of warfare in the Netherlands, and had been one of the very hardest instruments that the despot could use for his bloody work. He had commanded a company of horse at the famous battle of St. Quentin, and since that opening event in Philip's reign he had been unceasingly engaged in the Flemish wars. Alva made him a colonel of a Walloon regiment; the grand commander Requesens appointed him governor of Gravelines. On the whole he had been

1 Coloma, 168<sup>vo</sup>.

2 Bor, XII. 39. Meteren, 356. Coloma, 176.

tolerably faithful to his colours; having changed sides but twice. After the pacification of Ghent he swore allegiance to the States-General, and assisted in the bombardment of the citadel of that place. Soon afterwards he went over to Don John of Austria, and surrendered to him the town and fortress of Gravelines, of which he then continued governor in the name of the king. He was fortunate in the accumulation of office and of money, rather unlucky in his campaigning. He was often wounded in action, and usually defeated when commanding in chief. He lost an arm at the siege of Sluys, and had now lost his life almost by an accident. Although twice married he left no children to inherit his great estates; while the civil and military offices left vacant by his death were sufficient to satisfy the claims of five aspiring individuals. The Count of Varax succeeded him as general of artillery; but it was difficult to find a man to replace La Motte, possessing exactly the qualities which had made that warrior so valuable to his king. The type was rapidly disappearing, and most fortunately for humanity, if half the stories told of him by grave chroniclers, accustomed to discriminate between history and gossip, are to be believed. He had committed more than one cool homicide. Although not rejoicing in the same patronymic as his Spanish colleague of Friesland, he too was ready on occasion to perform hangman's work. When sergeant-major in Flanders, he had himself volunteered—so ran the chronicle—to do execution on a poor wretch found guilty of professing the faith of Calvin; and, with his own hands, had prepared a fire of straw, tied his victim to the stake, and burned him to cinders.<sup>1</sup> Another Netherlander for the same crime of heresy had been condemned to be torn to death by horses. No one could be found to carry out the sentence. The soldiers under La Motte's command

broke into mutiny rather than permit themselves to be used for such foul purposes; but the ardent young sergeant-major came forward, tied the culprit by the arms and legs to two horses, and himself whipped them to their work till it was duly accomplished. <sup>1</sup> Was it strange that in Philip's reign such energy should be rewarded by wealth, rank, and honour? Was not such a labourer in the vineyard worthy of his hire?

Still another eminent chieftain in the king's service disappeared at this time—one who, although unscrupulous and mischievous enough in his day, was however not stained by any suspicion of crimes like these. Count Charles Mansfeld, tired of governing his decrepit parent Peter Ernest, who, since the appointment of Fuentes, had lost all further change of governing the Netherlands, had now left Philip's service and gone to the Turkish wars. For Amurath III., who had died in the early days of the year, had been succeeded by a sultan as warlike as himself. Mahomet III., having strangled his nineteen brothers on his accession, handsomely buried them in cypress coffins by the side of their father, and having subsequently sacked and drowned ten infant princes posthumously born to Amurath,<sup>2</sup> was at leisure to carry the war through Transylvania and Hungary, up to the gates of Vienna, with renewed energy. The Turk, who could enforce the strenuous rules of despotism by which all secundogenitures and collateral claimants in the Ottoman family were thus provided for, was a foe to be dealt with seriously. The power of the Moslems at that day was a full match for the holy Roman Empire. The days were far distant when the grim Turk's head was to become a mockery and a show; and when a pagan empire, born of carnage

<sup>1</sup> Ibid.

<sup>2</sup> De Thou, XII. lib. cxiv. pp. 500 *seqq.*  
Compare Herrera, iii. 476, 477.

<sup>1</sup> Meteren, *ubi sup.*



and barbarism, was to be kept alive in Europe when it was ready to die, by the collective efforts of Christian princes. Charles Mansfeld had been received with great enthusiasm at the court of Rudolph, where he was created a prince of the Empire, and appointed to the chief command of the Imperial armies under the Archduke Matthias. But his warfare was over. At the siege of Gran he was stricken with sickness and removed to Comorn, where he lingered some weeks. There, on the 24th August, as he lay half-dozing on his couch, he was told that the siege was at last successful; upon which he called for a goblet of wine, drained it eagerly, and then lay resting his head on his hand, like one absorbed in thought. When they came to arouse him from his reverie they found that he was dead.<sup>1</sup> His father still remained superfluous in the Netherlands, hated and hated by Fuentes; but no longer able to give that governor so much annoyance as during his son's life-time the two had been able to create for Alexander Farnese. The octogenarian was past work and past mischief now; but there was one older soldier than he still left upon the stage, the grandest veteran in Philip's service, and now the last survivor, except the decrepit Peter Ernest, of the grim commanders of Alva's school. Christopher Mondragon—that miracle of human endurance, who had been an old man when the great duke arrived in the Netherlands—was still governor of Antwerp citadel, and men were to speak of him yet once more before he passed from the stage.

I return from this digression to the siege of Dourlens. The death of La Motte made no difference in the plans of Fuentes. He was determined to reduce the place preparatively to more important operations. Bouillon was disposed to relieve it, and to that end had as-

sembled a force of eight thousand men within the city of Amiens. By mid-summer the Spaniards had advanced with their mines and galleries close to the walls of the city. Meantime Admiral Villars, who had gained so much renown by defending Rouen against Henry IV., and who had subsequently made such an excellent bargain with that monarch before entering his service,<sup>1</sup> arrived

24 July, at Amiens. On the 24th July 1595. an expedition was sent from that city towards Dourlens. Bouillon and St. Pol commanded in person a force of six hundred picked cavalry. Villars and Sanseval each led half as many, and there was a supporting body of twelve hundred musketeers. This little army convoyed a train of wagons, containing ammunition and other supplies for the beleaguered town. But Fuentes, having sufficiently strengthened his works, sallied forth with two thousand infantry, and a flying squadron of Spanish horse, to intercept them. It was the eve of St. James, the patron saint of Spain, at the sound of whose name as a war-cry so many battle-fields had been won in the Netherlands, so many cities sacked, so many wholesale massacres perpetrated. Fuentes rode in the midst of his troops with the royal standard of Spain floating above him. On the other hand Villars, glittering in magnificent armour and mounted on a superbly caparisoned charger,<sup>2</sup> came on, with his three hundred troopers, as if about to ride a course in a tournament. The battle which ensued was one of the most bloody for the numbers

<sup>1</sup> He had been receiving six thousand per month from the king of Spain, but on reconciling himself with Henry after the surrender of Paris, he received a sum of three hundred thousand ducats, secured by estates in Normandy, and a yearly pension of thirty thousand ducats, together with the office of Admiral of France. For these considerations he had surrendered Rouen, Havre de Gran, and the castle of Pont de l'Arche.—Herrera, *Hist. gen. del Mundo*, iii. 423.

<sup>2</sup> „Muy vistoso y galan y en gallardo cavallo.” Coloma, 180.

<sup>1</sup> Bor, IV. 30. Meteren, 349vo. De Thou, vii. 523.

engaged, and the victory one of the most decisive recorded in this war. Villars charged prematurely, furiously, foolishly. He seemed jealous of Bouillon, and disposed to show the sovereign to whom he had so recently given his allegiance that an ancient Leaguer and Papist was a better soldier for his purpose than the most grizzled Huguenot in his army. On the other hand the friends of Villars accused the duke of faint-heartedness, or at least of an excessive desire to "save himself and his own command. The first impetuous onset of the admiral was successful, and he drove half-a-dozen companies of Spaniards before him. But he had ventured too far from his supports. Bouillon had only intended a feint, instead of a desperate charge; the Spaniards were rallied, and the day was saved by that cool and ready soldier, Carlos Coloma. In less than an hour the French were utterly defeated and cut to pieces. Bouillon escaped to Amiens with five hundred men; this was all that was left of the expedition. The horse of Villars was shot under him, and the admiral's leg was broken as he fell. He was then taken prisoner by two lieutenants of Carlos Coloma; but while these warriors were enjoying, by anticipation, the enormous ransom they should derive from so illustrious a captive, two other lieutenants in the service of Marshal de Rosnes came up and claimed their share in the prize. While the four were wrangling, the admiral called out to them in excellent Spanish not to dispute, for he had money enough to satisfy them all. Meantime the Spanish commissary-general of cavalry, Contreras, came up, rebuked this unseemly dispute before the enemy had been fairly routed, and, in order to arrange the quarrel impartially, ordered his page to despatch De Villars on the spot. The page, without a word, placed his arquebus to the admiral's forehead and shot him dead.

So perished a bold and brilliant soldier, and a most unscrupulous politician. Whether the cause of his murder was mere envy on the part of the commissary at having lost a splendid opportunity for prize-money, or hatred to an ancient Leaguer thus turned renegade, it is fruitless now to enquire. Villars would have paid two hundred thousand crowns for his ransom, so that the assassination was bad as a mercantile speculation; but it was pretended by the friends of Contreras that rescue was at hand. It is certain, however, that nothing was attempted by the French to redeem their total overthrow. Count Belin was wounded, and fell into the hands of Coloma. Sanseval was killed; and a long list of some of the most brilliant nobles in France was published by the Spaniards as having perished on that bloody field. This did not prevent a large number of these victims, however, from enjoying excellent health for many long years afterwards, although their deaths have been duly recorded in chronicle from that day to our own times. 1

But Villars and Sanseval were certainly slain, and Fuentes sent their bodies, with a courteous letter, to the

1 Bor, 1V. 28-30. Meteren, 356, *seqq.* Coloma, 180, *seqq.* Bentivoglio, 411, 412, 413. De Thou, xii. 403, *seqq.*

Count Lewis Nassau wrote to his brother John that besides the admiral (Villars), not more than three or at most four nobles of distinction perished. He also ascribes the defeat entirely to the foolhardiness of the French, who, according to his statement, charged up hill and through a narrow road, with a force of one thousand foot and three hundred cavalry, against the enemy's whole army, drawn up in battle array, and consisting of two thousand horse and ten thousand infantry, well provided with artillery. Certainly the result of such an encounter could hardly be doubtful, but Count Lewis was not in the battle, nor in France at the time, and the news received by him was probably inaccurate.

I have preferred to rely mainly on Carlos Coloma, who fought in the action, upon De Thou, and upon the Dutch chroniclers, Bor, Meteren, and others.

See Groen v. Prinsterer. (Archives II. Serie, i. 342.)

Duke of Nevers at Amiens, who honoured them with a stately funeral. 1

There was much censure cast on both Bouillon and Villars respectively by the antagonists of each chieftain; and the contest as to the cause of the defeat was almost as animated as the skirmish itself. Bouillon was censured for grudging a victory to the Catholics, and thus leaving the admiral to his fate. Yet it is certain that the Huguenot duke himself commanded a squadron composed almost entirely of papists. Villars, on the other hand, was censured for rashness, obstinacy, and greediness for distinction; yet it is probable that Fuentes might have been defeated had the charges of Bouillon been as determined and frequent as were those of his colleague. Savigny de Rosnes, too, the ancient Leaguer who commanded under Fuentes, was accused of not having sufficiently followed up the victory, because unwilling that his Spanish friends should entirely trample upon his own countrymen. Yet there is no doubt whatever that De Rosnes was as bitter an enemy to his own country as the most ferocious Spaniard of them all. It has rarely been found in civil war that the man who draws his sword against his fatherland, under the banner of the foreigner, is actuated by any lingering tenderness for the nation he betrays; and the renegade Frenchman was in truth the animating spirit of Fuentes during the whole of his brilliant campaign. The Spaniard's victories were, indeed, mainly attributable to the experience, the genius, and the rancour of De Rosnes. 1

But debates over a lost battle are apt to be barren. Meantime Fuentes, losing no time in controversy, advanced upon the city of Dourlens, was repulsed twice, and carried it on the third as-

sault, exactly one week after 31 July, the action just recounted. 1595.

The Spaniards and Leaguers, howling „Remember Ham!“ butchered without mercy the garrison and all the citizens, save a small number of prisoners likely to be lucrative. Six hundred of the townspeople and two thousand five hundred French soldiers were killed within a few hours. Well had Fuentes profited by the relationship and tuition of Alva!

The Count of Dinant and his brother De Ronsoy were both slain, and two or three hundred thousand florins were paid in ransom by those who escaped with life. The victims were all buried outside of the town in one vast trench, and the effluvia bred a fever which carried off most of the surviving inhabitants. Dourlens became for the time a desert. 2

Fuentes now received deputies with congratulations from the obedient provinces, especially from Hainault, Artois, and Lille. He was also strongly urged to attempt the immediate reduction of Cambray, to which end those envoys were empowered to offer contributions of four hundred and fifty thousand florins and a contingent of seven thousand infantry. Berlaymont, too, bishop of Tournay and archbishop of Cambray, was ready to advance forty thousand florins in the same cause.

Fuentes, in the highest possible spirits at his success, and having just been reinforced by Count Bucquoy with a fresh Walloon regiment of fifteen hundred foot and with eight hundred and fifty of the mutineers from Tirlemont and Chapelle, who were among the choicest of Spanish veterans, was not disposed to let the grass grow under his feet. Within four days after the sack of Dourlens he broke up his camp, and came before Cambray with an army of twelve thousand foot and nearly four thousand horse. But before narrating

1 Ibid.

2 De Thou, Bor, Coloma, Bentivoglio, *et al.* *Ubi supra*

1 Ibid.



the further movements of the vigorous new governor-general, it is necessary to glance at the military operations in the eastern part of the Netherlands and upon the Rhine.

The States-General had reclaimed to their authority nearly all that important region lying beyond the Yssel—the solid Frisian bulwark of the republic—but there were certain points nearer the line where Upper and Nether Germany almost blend into one, which yet acknowledged the name of the king. The city of Groenlo, or Grol, not a place of much interest or importance in itself,

14 July, but close to the frontier, and  
1595. to that destined land of debate, the duchies of Cleves, Juliers, and Berg, still retained its Spanish garrison. On the 14th July Prince Maurice of Nassau came before the city with six thousand infantry, some companies of cavalry, and sixteen pieces of artillery. He made his approaches in form, and

21 July, after a week's operations he  
1595. fired three volleys, according to his custom, and summoned the place to capitulate. 1 Governor Jan van Stirum replied stoutly that he would hold the place for God and the king to the last drop of his blood. Meantime there was hope of help from the outside.

Maurice was a vigorous young commander, but there was a man to be dealt with who had been called the „good old Mondragon” when the prince was in his cradle; and who still governed the citadel of Antwerp, and was still ready for an active campaign.

Christopher Mondragon was now ninety-two years old. Not often in the world's history has a man of that age been capable of personal participation in the joys of the battle-field, whatever natural reluctance veterans are apt to manifest at relinquishing high military control.

But Mondragon looked not with envy but with admiration on the growing

fame of the Nassau chieftain, and was disposed, before he himself left the stage, to match himself with the young champion.

So soon as he heard of the intended demonstration of Maurice against Grol, the ancient governor of Antwerp collected a little army by throwing together all the troops that could be spared from the various garrisons within his command. With two Spanish regiments, two thousand Swiss, the Walloon troops of De Grisons, and the Irish regiment of Stanley—in all seven thousand foot and thirteen hundred horse—Mondragon marched straight across Brabant and Gelderland to the Rhine. At Kaiserwerth he reviewed his forces, and announced his intention of immediately crossing the river. There was a murmur of disapprobation among officers and men at what they considered the foolhardy scheme of mad old Mondragon. But the general had not campaigned a generation before, at the age of sixty nine, in the bottom of the sea, and waded chin-deep for six hours long of an October night, in the face of a rising tide from the German Ocean and of an army of Zeelanders, to be frightened now at the summer aspect of the peaceful Rhine.

The wizened little old man, walking with difficulty by the aid of a staff, but armed in proof, with plumes waving gallantly from his iron headpiece, and with his rapier at his side, ordered a chair to be brought to the river's edge. Then calmly seating himself in the presence of his host, he stated that he should not rise from that chair until the last man had crossed the river, 1 Furthermore, he observed that it was not only his purpose to relieve the city of Grol, but to bring Maurice to an action, and to defeat him, unless he retired. The soldiers ceased to murmur, the pontoons were laid, the river was

passed, and on the 25th July, 25 July Maurice, hearing of the veter- 1595. an's approach, and not feeling safe in his position, raised the siege of the city. 1 Burning his camp and everything that could not be taken with him on his march, the prince came in perfect order to Borkelo, two Dutch miles from Grol. Here he occupied himself for some time in clearing the country of brigands who in the disguise of soldiers infested that region and made the little cities of Deutecom, Anholt, and Heerenberg unsafe. He ordered the inhabitants of these places to send out detachments to beat the bushes for his cavalry, while Hohenlo was ordered to hunt the heaths and wolds thoroughly with packs of bloodhounds until every man and beast to be found lurking in those wild regions should be extirpated. By these vigorous and cruel, but perhaps necessary, measures the brigands were at last extirpated, and honest people began to sleep in their beds. 2

On the 18th August Maurice took up a strong position at Bislich, not far from Wesel, where the River 18 August, Lippe empties itself into the 1595. Rhine. Mondragon, with his army strengthened by reinforcements from garrisons in Gelderland, and by four hundred men brought by Frederic van den Berg from Grol, had advanced to a place called Walston in den Ham, in the neighbourhood of Wesel. The Lippe flowed between the two hostile forces. Although he had broken up his siege, the prince was not disposed to renounce his whole campaign before trying conclusions with his veteran antagonist. He accordingly arranged an ambush with much skill, by means of which he hoped to bring on a general engagement and destroy Mondragon and his little army.

His cousin and favourite lieutenant, Philip Nassau, was entrusted with the

1 Sept. preliminaries. That adventu- 1595. rous commander, with a picked force of seven hundred cavalry, moved quietly from the camp on the evening of the 1st September. He took with him his two younger brothers, Ernest and Lewis Gunther, who, as has been seen, had received the promise of the eldest brother of the family, William Lewis, that they should be employed from time to time in any practical work that might be going forward. Besides these young gentlemen, several of the most famous English and Dutch commanders were on the expedition; the brothers Paul and Marcellus Bax, Captains Parker, Cutler, and Robert Vere, brother of Sir Francis, among the number.

Early in the morning of the 2nd September the force crossed the Lippe, 2 Sept. according to orders, keeping 1595. a pontoon across the stream to secure their retreat. They had instructions thus to feel the enemy at early dawn, and, as he was known to have foraging parties out every morning along the margin of the river, to make a sudden descent upon their pickets, and to capture those companies before they could effect their escape or be reinforced. Afterwards they were to retreat across the Lippe, followed, as it was hoped would be the case, by the troops of Mondragon, anxious to punish this piece of audacity. Meantime Maurice with five thousand infantry, the rest of his cavalry, and several pieces of artillery, awaited their coming, posted behind some hills in the neighbourhood of Wesel.

The plot of the young commander was an excellent one, but the ancient campaigner on the other side of the river had not come all the way from his comfortable quarters in Antwerp to be caught napping on that September morning. Mondragon had received accurate information from his scouts as to what was going on in the enemy's

1 Ibid; compare Bor, XII. 42.

2 Bor, IV. 43.

camp, and as to the exact position of Maurice. He was up long before day-break—„the good old Christopher”—and himself personally arranged a counter-ambush. In the fields lying a little back from the immediate neighbourhood of the Lippe he posted the mass of his cavalry, supported by a well-concealed force of infantry. The pickets on the stream and the foraging companies were left to do their usual work as if nothing were likely to happen.

Philip Nassau galloped cheerfully forward, according to the well-concerted plan, sending Cutler and Marcellus Bax with a handful of troopers to pounce upon the enemy's pickets. When those officers got to usual foraging ground they came upon a much larger cavalry force than they had looked for; and, suspecting something wrong, dashed back again to give information to Count Philip. That impatient commander, feeling sure of his game unless this foolish delay should give the foraging companies time to escape, ordered an immediate advance with his whole cavalry force. The sheriff of Zallant was ordered to lead the way. He objected that the pass, leading through a narrow lane and opening by a gate into an open field, was impassable for more than two troopers abreast, and that the enemy was in force beyond. Philip, scorning these words of caution, and exclaiming that seventy-five lancers were enough to put fifty carabineers to rout, put on his casque, drew his sword, and sending his brother Lewis to summon Kinski and Donek, dashed into the pass, accompanied by the two counts and a couple of other nobles. The sheriff, seeing this, followed him at full gallop, and after him came the troopers of Barchon, of Du Bois, and of Paul Bax, riding single file but in much disorder. When they had all entered inextricably into the lane, with the foremost of the lancers already passing through the gate, they discovered the

enemy's cavalry and infantry drawn up in force upon the watery, heathery pastures beyond. There was at once a scene of confusion. To use lances was impossible, while they were all struggling together through the narrow passage, offering themselves an easy prey to the enemy as they slowly emerged into the fields. The foremost defended themselves with sabre and pistol as well as they could. The hindmost did their best to escape, and rode for their lives to the other side of the river. All trampled upon each other and impeded each other's movements. There was a brief engagement, bloody, desperate, hand to hand, and many Spaniards fell before the entrapped Netherlands. But there could not be a moment's doubt as to the issue. Count Philip went down in the beginning of the action, shot through the body by an arquebus, discharged so close to him that his clothes were set on fire. As there was no water within reach the flames could be extinguished at last only by rolling him over and over, wounded as he was, among the sand and heather. Count Ernest Solms was desperately wounded at the same time. For a moment both gentlemen attempted to effect their escape by mounting on one horse, but both fell to the ground exhausted and were taken prisoners. Ernest Nassau was also captured. His young brother, Lewis Gunther, saved himself by swimming the river. Count Kinski was mortally wounded. Robert Vere, too, fell into the enemy's hands, and was afterwards murdered in cold blood. Marcellus Bax, who had returned to the field by a circuitous path, still under the delusion that he was about handsomely to cut off the retreat of the foraging companies, saved himself and a handful of cavalry by a rapid flight, so soon as he discovered the enemy drawn up in line of battle. Cutler and Parker were equally fortunate. There was less than a hundred of the States' troops



killed, and it is probable that a larger number of the Spaniards fell. But the loss of Philip Nassau, despite the debauched life and somewhat reckless valour of that soldier, was a very severe one to the army and to his family. He was conveyed to Rheinberg, where his wounds were dressed. As he lay dying he was courteously visited by Mondragon, and by many other Spanish officers, anxious to pay their respects to so distinguished and warlike a member of an illustrious house. He received them with dignity, and concealed his physical agony so as to respond to their conversation as became a Nassau. His cousin, Frederic van den Berg, who was among the visitors, indecently taunted him with his position; asking him what he had expected by serving the cause of the Beggars. Philip turned from him with impatience and bade him hold his peace. At midnight he died.

William of Orange and his three brethren had already laid down their lives for the republic, and now his eldest brother's son had died in the same cause. „He has carried the name of Nassau with honour into the grave,” said his brother, Lewis William, to their father. Ten others of the house, besides many collateral relations, were still in arms for their adopted country. Barely in history has a single noble race so entirely identified itself with a nation's record in its most heroic epoch as did that of Orange-Nassau with the liberation of Holland.

Young Ernest Solms, brother of Count Everard, lay in the same chamber with Philip Nassau, and died on the following day. Their bodies were sent by Mondragon with a courteous letter to Maurice at Bisslich. Ernest Nassau was subsequently ransomed for ten thousand florins. 2

1 Groen v. Prinsterer. (Archives I. 2nd series, 345.)

2 Bor, IV. 42-44. Meteren, 361<sup>vo</sup>. Reyd, xi. 271. Coloma, 192. Carnero, xi. xvi. p. 574, seqq. Bentivoglio, 422, 428. Duyck, 652-

This skirmish on the Lippe has no special significance in a military point of view, but it derives more than a passing interest, not only from the death of many a brave and distinguished soldier, but for the illustration of human vigour triumphing, both physically and mentally, over the infirmities of old age, given by the achievement of Christopher Mondragon. Alone he had planned his expedition across the country from Antwerp, alone he had insisted on crossing the Rhine, while younger soldiers hesitated; alone with his own active brain and busy hands, he had outwitted the famous young chieftain of the Netherlands, counteracted his subtle policy, and set the counter-ambush by which his choicest cavalry were cut to pieces, and one of his bravest generals slain. So far could the icy blood of ninety-two prevail against the vigour of twenty-eight.

The two armies lay over against each other; with the river between them, for some days longer, but it was obvious that nothing further would be attempted on either side. Mondragon had accomplished the object for which he had marched from Brabant. He had spoiled the autumn campaign of Maurice, and was now disposed to return before winter to his own quarters. He sent a trumpet accordingly to his antagonist, begging him, half in jest, to have more consideration for his infirmities than to keep him out in his old age in such foul weather, but to allow him the military honour of being last to break up camp. Should Maurice consent to move away, Mondragon was ready to pledge himself not to pursue him, and within three days to leave his own entrenchments.

The proposition was not granted, and very soon afterwards the Spaniard, deciding to retire, crossed the Rhine on the 11th October. 1595.

659; are chief authorities for the incidents of this skirmish.

Maurice made a slight attempt at pursuit, sending Count William Lewis with some cavalry, who succeeded in cutting off a few wagons. The army, however, returned safely, to be dispersed into various garrisons. 1

This was Mondragon's last feat of arms. Less than three months afterwards

3 Jan. in Antwerp citadel, as the  
1596. veteran was washing his hands previously to going to the dinner-table, he sat down and died. 2 Strange to say, this man—who had spent almost a century on the battle-field, who had been a soldier in nearly every war that had been waged in any part of Europe during that most belligerent age, who had come an old man to the Netherlands before Alva's arrival, and had ever since been constantly and personally engaged in the vast Flemish tragedy which had now lasted well nigh thirty years—had never himself lost a drop of blood. His battle-fields had been on land and water, on ice, in fire, and at the bottom of the sea, but he had never received a wound. Nay, more; he had been blown up in a fortress—the castle of Danvilliers in Luxembourg, of which he was governor—where all perished save his wife and himself, and, when they came to dig among the ruins, they excavated at last the ancient couple, protected by the framework of a window in the embrasure of which they had been seated, without a scratch or a bruise. 3 He was a Biscayan by descent, but born in Medina del Campo. A strict disciplinarian, very resolute and pertinacious, he had the good fortune to be beloved by his inferiors, his equals, and his superiors. He was called the father of his soldiers, the good Mondragon, and his name was unstained by any of those deeds of ferocity which make the chronicles of the time resemble

rather the history of wolves than of men. To a married daughter, mother of several children, he left a considerable fortune. 1

Maurice broke up his camp soon after the departure of his antagonist, and paused for a few days at Arnheim to give honourable burial to his cousin Philip and Count Solms. Meantime Sir Francis Vere was detached, with three regiments, which were to winter in Overysse, towards Weerd castle, situate at a league's distance from Ysselsburg, and defended by a garrison of twenty-six men under Captain Pruys. That doughty commandant, on being summoned to surrender, obstinately refused. Vere, according to Maurice's orders, then opened with his artillery against the place, which soon capitulated in great panic and confusion. The captain demanded the honours of war. Vere told him in reply that the honours of war were halts for the garrison who had dared to defend such a hovel against artillery. The twenty-six were accordingly ordered to draw black and white straws. This was done, and the twelve drawing white straws were immediately hanged; the thirteenth receiving his life on consenting to act as executioner for his comrades. The commandant was despatched first of all. The rope broke, but the English soldiers held him under the water of the ditch until he was drowned. The castle was then thoroughly sacked, the women being sent unharmed to Ysselsburg. 2

Maurice then shipped the remainder of his troops along the Rhine and Waal to their winter quarters and returned

1 Bor, IV. 167.

In the Ambras Museum in the Imperial Belvedere palace at Vienna may still be seen a black, battered, old iron corslet of Mondragon, with many an indentation; looking plain and practical enough among the holiday suits of steel inlaid with gold, which make this collection of old armour the most remarkable in the world.

2 Bor, IV. 47, 131.

1 Bor. Meteren. Reyd. Coloma. Carnero. Bentivoglio. Duyck. *Ubi sup.*

2 Bor, IV. 167.

3 Bor, IV. 167. Carnero, 378, 379.

to the Hague. It was the feeblest year's work yet done by the stadholder.

Meantime his great ally, the Huguenot-Catholic Prince of Béarne, was making a dashing, and, on the whole, successful campaign in the heart of his own kingdom. The constable of Castile, Don Ferdinando de Velasco, one of Spain's richest grandes and poorest generals, had been sent with an army of ten thousand men to take the field in Burgundy against the man with whom the great Farnese had been measuring swords so lately, and with not unmingled success, in Picardy, Biron, with a sudden sweep, took possession of Aussone, Autun, and Beaune, but on one adventurous day found himself so deeply engaged with a superior force of the enemy in the neighbourhood of Fontaine Française, or St. Seine, where France's great river takes its rise, as to be nearly cut off and captured. But Henry himself was already in the field, and by one of those mad, reckless impulses which made him so adorable as a soldier and yet so profoundly censurable as a commander-in-chief, he flung himself, like a young lieutenant, with a mere handful of cavalry, into the midst of the fight, and at the imminent peril of his own life succeeded in rescuing the marshal and getting off again unscathed. On other occasions Henry said he had fought for victory, but on that for dear life; and, even as in the famous and foolish skirmish at Aumale three years before, it was absence of enterprise or lack of cordiality on the part of his antagonists, that alone prevented a captive king from being exhibited as a trophy of triumph for the expiring League. 1

But the constable of Castile was not born to cheer the heart of his prudent master with such a magnificent spectacle. Velasco fell back to Gray and obstinately refused to stir from his entrenchments,

while Henry before his eyes laid siege 25 June, to Dijon. On the 28th June 1595, the capital of Burgundy surrendered to its sovereign, but no temptations could induce the constable to try the chance of a battle. 1 Henry's movements in the interior were more successful than were the operations nearer the frontier, but while the monarch was thus cheerfully fighting for his crown in France, his envoys were winning a still more decisive campaign for him in Rome.

D'Ossat and Perron had accomplished their diplomatic task with consummate ability, and, notwithstanding the efforts and the threats of the Spanish ambassador and the intrigues of his master, the absolution was granted. The pope arose early on the morning of the 5th August, and walked barefoot from his palace of Mount Cavallo to the church of Maria Maggiore, with his eyes fixed on the ground, weeping loudly and praying fervently. He celebrated mass in the church, and then returned as he went, saluting no one on the road and shutting himself up in his palace afterwards. The same ceremony was performed ten days later on the festival of our Lady's Ascension. In vain, however, had been the struggle on the part of his Holiness to procure from 15 August, the Ambassador the deposition of the crown of France in his hands, in order that the king might receive it back again as a free gift and concession from the chief pontiff. Such a triumph was not for Rome, nor could even the publication of the Council of Trent in France be conceded except with a saving clause „as to matters which could not be put into operation without troubling the repose of the kingdom.” And to obtain this clause the envoys declared „that they had been obliged to sweat blood and water.” 2

1 Bor, *ubi sup.*

2 Letters of D'Ossat, in Bor, IV. 107, *seqq.* De Thou, xii. 468-479, l. 118.

1 Bor, IV. 52, *seqq.* De Thou, xii. 359-364, *seqq.* I. 112. Péréfixe, 191, 192.



On the 17th day of September the absolution was proclaimed with great pomp and circumstance from the gallery of St. Peter's, the holy father seated on the highest throne of majesty, with his triple crown on his head, and all his cardinals and bishops about him in their most effulgent robes. 1

The silver trumpets were blown, while artillery roared from the castle of St. Angelo, and for two successive nights Rome was in a blaze of bonfires and illumination, in a whirl of bell-ringing, feasting, and singing of hosannahs. There had not been such a merry-making in the eternal city since the pope had celebrated solemn thanksgiving for the massacre of St. Bartholomew. The king was almost beside himself with rapture when the great news reached him, and he straightway wrote letters, overflowing with gratitude and religious enthusiasm, to the pontiff, and expressed his regret that military operations did not allow him to proceed at once to Rome in person to kiss the holy father's feet. 2

The narrative returns to Fuentes, who was left before the walls of Cambray.

That venerable ecclesiastical city, pleasantly seated amid gardens, orchards, and green pastures, watered by the winding Scheld, was well fortified after the old manner, but it was especially defended and dominated by a splendid pentagonal citadel built by Charles V. It was filled with fine churches, among which the magnificent cathedral was pre-eminent, and with many other stately edifices. The population was thrifty, active, and turbulent, like that of all those Flemish and Walloon cities which the spirit of mediæval industry had warmed for a time into vehement little republics.

But, as has already been depicted in

these pages, the Celtic element had been more apt to receive than consistent to retain the generous impress which had once been stamped on all the Netherlands. The Walloon provinces had fallen away from their Flemish sisters and seemed likely to accept a permanent yoke, while in the territory of the united States, as John Baptist Tassis was at that very moment pathetically observing in a private letter to Philip, „with the coming up of a new generation educated as heretics from childhood, who had never heard what the word king means, it was likely to happen at last that the king's memory being wholly forgotten, nothing would remain in the land but heresy alone.” 1 From this sad fate Cambray had been saved. Gravre d'Inchy had seventeen years before surrendered the city to the Duke of Alençon during that unlucky personage's brief and base career in the Netherlands, all that was left of his visit being the semi-sovereignty which the notorious Balagny had since that time enjoyed in the archiepiscopal city. This personage, a natural son of Monluc, Bishop of Valence, and nephew of the distinguished Marshal Monluc, was one of the most fortunate and the most ignoble of all the soldiers of fortune who had played their parts at this epoch in the Netherlands. A poor creature himself, he had a heroine for a wife. Renée, the sister of Bussy d'Amboise, had vowed to unite herself to a man who would avenge the assassination of her brother by the Count Montsoreau. 2 Balagny readily agreed to perform the deed, and accordingly espoused the high-born dame, but it does not appear that he ever wreaked her vengeance on the murderer. He had now governed Cambray until the citizens and the whole country-side were galled and exhausted by his grinding tyranny, his inordinate pride, and his infamous extortions. 3

1 Letters of D'Ossat, in Bor, IV. 107, *seqq.* De Thou, xii. 468-479, l. 113.

2 MS. Bethune. Bibl. Imp. No. 8967, fols. 10 and 20, cited in Capefigue, vii. 292, *seqq.* Feria to Philip, 17 Sept. 1585. Arch. de Simancas (Paris) b. 84, 20, cited by Capefigue, *ubi sup.*

1 Letter of Tassis, in Bor, IV. 126.

2 De Thou, xii. 414, 415. 3 Ibid.

His latest achievement had been to force upon his subjects a copper currency bearing the nominal value of silver, with the same blasting effects which such experiments in political economy are apt to produce on princes and peoples. He had been a Royalist, a Guisist, a Leaguer, a Dutch republican, by turns, and had betrayed all the parties, at whose expense he had alternately filled his coffers. During the past year he had made up his mind—like most of the conspicuous politicians and campaigners of France—that the moribund League was only fit to be trampled upon by its recent worshippers, and he had made accordingly one of the very best bargains with Henry IV. that had yet been made, even at that epoch of self-vending grandeens.

Henry, by treaty ratified in August, 1594, had created him Prince of Cambray and Marshal of France, so that the man who had been receiving up to that very moment a monthly subsidy of seven thousand two hundred dollars from the King of Spain was now gratified with a pension to about the same yearly amount by the King of France. 1 During the autumn Henry had visited Cambray, and the new prince had made wondrous exhibitions of loyalty to the sovereign whom he had done his best all his life to exclude from his kingdom. There had been a ceaseless round of tournaments, festivals, and masquerades 2 in the city in honour of the Huguenot chieftain, now changed into the most orthodox and most legitimate of monarchs, but it was not until mid-

summer of the present year that Balagny was called on to defend his old possessions and his new principality against a well-seasoned army and a vigorous commander. Meanwhile his new patron was so warmly occupied in other directions that it might be difficult for him to send assistance to the beleaguered city.

On the 14th August Fuentes began 14 August, his siege operations. Before 1595. the investment had been completed the young Prince of Rhetelois, only fifteen years of age, son of the Duke of Nevers, made his entrance into the city attended by thirty of his father's archers. De Vich, too, an experienced and faithful commander, succeeded in bringing four or five hundred dragoons through the enemy's lines. These meagre reinforcements were all that reached the place; for, although the States-General sent two or three thousand Scotchmen and Zeelanders, under Justinus of Nassau, to Henry, that he might be the better enabled to relieve this important frontier city, the king's movements were not sufficiently prompt to turn the force to good account. Balagny was left with a garrison of three thousand French and Walloons in the city, besides five hundred French in the fortress.

After six weeks steady drawing of parallels and digging of mines Fuentes 26 Sept. was ready to open his bat- 1595. teries. On the 26th September the news, very much exaggerated, of Mondragon's brilliant victory near Wesel, and of the deaths of Philip Nassau and Ernest Solms, reached the Spanish camp. Immense was the rejoicing. Triumphant salutes from eighty-seven cannon and many thousand muskets shook the earth and excited bewilderment and anxiety within the walls of the city. Almost immediately afterwards a tremendous cannonade was begun and so vigorously sustained that the burghers and part of the garrison, already half rebellious with hatred to Balagny, began loudly to murmur as the

1 De Thou, xii. 291, *seqq.* Seventy thousand crowns a year were to be paid according to agreement by Henry IV. to Balagny, to maintain city and citadel of Cambray, by treaty made 29 Nov. 1593, but ratified in August, 1594. Besides this, Balagny received property in France equal in value to twenty thousand livres a year, to reimburse him for expenses in fortifying and defending Cambray. The sums paid to him simultaneously by Philip II. for opposing Henry have been already mentioned.

2 De Thou, *ubi sup.*

balls came flying into their streets. A few days later an insurrection broke out. Three thousand citizens, with red flags flying, and armed to the teeth, were discovered at daylight drawn up in the market-place. Balagny <sup>2</sup> October, 1595, came down from the citadel and endeavoured to calm the tumult, but was received with execrations. They had been promised, shouted the insurgents, that every road about Cambray was to swarm with French soldiers under their formidable king, kicking the heads of the Spaniards <sup>1</sup> in all directions. And what had they got? a child with thirty archers sent by his father, and half a man at the head of four hundred dragoons. <sup>2</sup> To stand a siege under such circumstances against an army of fifteen thousand Spaniards, and to take Balagny's copper as if it were gold, was more than could be asked of respectable burghers.

The allusion to the young prince Rhetois and to De Vich, who had lost a leg in the wars, was received with much enthusiasm. Balagny, appalled at the fury of the people, whom he had so long been trampling upon while their docility lasted, shrank back before their scornful denunciations into the citadel.

But his wife was not appalled. This princess had from the beginning of the siege showed a courage and an energy worthy of her race. Night and day she had gone the rounds of the ramparts, encouraging and directing the efforts of the garrison. She had pointed batteries against the enemy's works, and, with her own hands, had fired the cannon. She now made her appearance in the market-place, after her husband had fled, and did her best to assuage the tumult, and to arouse the mutineers to a sense of duty or of shame. She plucked from her bosom whole handfuls of gold which

she threw among the bystanders, and she was followed by a number of carts filled with sacks of coin ready to be exchanged for the debased currency.

Expressing contempt for the progress made by the besieging army, and for the slight impression so far produced upon the defences of the city, she snatched a pike from a soldier and offered in person to lead the garrison to the breach. Her audience knew full well that this was no theatrical display, but that the princess was ready as the boldest warrior to lead a forlorn hope or to repel the bloodiest assault. Nor, from a military point of view, was their situation desperate. But their hatred and scorn for Balagny could not be overcome by any passing sentiment of admiration for his valiant though imperious wife. No one followed her to the breach. Exclaiming that she at least would never surrender, and that she would die a sovereign princess rather than live a subject, Renée de Balagny returned to the citadel.

The town soon afterwards capitulated, and, as the Spanish soldiers, on entering, observed the slight damage that had been caused by their batteries, they were most grateful to the faint-hearted or mutinous condition of the garrison by which they had been spared the expense of an assault.

Oct. 3-9, 1595. The citadel was now summoned to surrender, and Balagny agreed, in case he should not be relieved within six days, to accept what was considered honourable terms. It proved too late to expect succour from Henry, and Balagny, but lately a reigning prince, was fain to go forth on the appointed day and salute his conqueror. But the princess kept her vow. She had done her best to defend her dominions and to live a sovereign, and now there was nothing left her but to die. With bitter reproaches on her husband's pusillanimity, with tears and sobs of rage and shame, she refused food,

<sup>1</sup> Coloma, 195—, "Su rey formidable pisando las cabeças de los Españoles," &c. &c.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid.



spurned the idea of capitulation, and expired before the 9th of October. 1

On that day a procession moved out of the citadel gates. Balagny, with a son of eleven years of age, the Prince of Rhetelois, the Commander De Vich, and many other distinguished personages, all magnificently attired, came forth at the head of what remained of the garrison. The soldiers numbering thirteen hundred foot and two hundred and forty horse, marched with colours flying,

1 Bor, IV. 54-56. Bentivoglio, 416-421. De Thou, xii. 414-436. Coloma, 185-198, *et mult. al.*, for the siege of Cambray.

All the historians, French, Italian, Spanish, Flemish, give the same account of the conduct and death of the princess.

drums beating, bullet in mouth, and all the other recognised palliatives of military disaster. Last of all came a hearse, bearing the coffin of the Princess of Cambray. Fuentes saluted the living leaders of the procession, and the dead heroine, with stately courtesy, and ordered and escort as far as Peronne. 1

Balagny met with a cool reception from Henry at St. Quintin, but subsequently made his peace, and espoused the sister of the king's mistress, Gabrielle d'Estrees. 2 The body of Gavre d'Inchy, which had been buried for years, was dug up and thrown into a gutter. 3

1 Ibid.

2 De Thou, *ubi sup.*

3 Ibid.

## CHAPTER XXXII.

Archduke Cardinal Albert appointed governor of the Netherlands—Return of Philip William from captivity—His adherence to the King of Spain—Notice of the Marquis of Varambon, Count Varax, and other new officers—Henry's communications with Queen Elizabeth—Madame de Monceaux—Conversation of Henry with the English ambassador—Marseilles secured by the Duke of Guise—The fort of Rysbank taken by De Rosne—Calais in the hands of the Spanish—Assistance from England solicited by Henry—Unhandsome conditions proposed by Elizabeth—Annexation of Calais to the obedient provinces—Pirates of Dunkirk—Uneasiness of the Netherlands with regard to the designs of Elizabeth—Her protestations of sincerity—Expedition of Dutch and English forces to Spain—Attack on the Spanish war-ships—Victory of the allies—Flag of the Republic planted on the fortress of Cadiz—Capitulation of the city—Letter of Elizabeth to the Dutch Admiral—State of affairs in France—Proposition of the Duke of Montpensier for the division of the kingdom—Successes of the Cardinal Archduke in Normandy—He proceeds to Flanders—Siege and capture of Hulst—Projected alliance against Spain—Interview of De Sancy with Lord Burghley—Diplomatic conference at Greenwich—Formation of a league against Spain—Duplicity of the treaty—Affairs in Germany—Battle between the Emperor and the Grand Turk—Endeavour of Philip to counteract the influence of the league—His interference in the affairs of Germany—Secret intrigue of Henry with Spain—Philip's second attempt at the conquest of England.

ANOTHER governor-general arrived in the early days of the year 1596, to take charge of the obedient provinces. It had been rumoured for many months that Philip's choice was at last fixed upon the Archduke Cardinal Albert, Archbishop of Toledo, youngest of the three surviving brothers of the Emperor Rudolph, as the candidate for many honours. He was to espouse the Infanta, he was to govern the Netherlands, and, as it was supposed, there were wider and wilder schemes for the aggrandisement of this fortunate ecclesiastic brooding in the mind of Philip than yet had seen the light.

Meantime the cardinal's first care was to unfrock himself. He had also been obliged to lay down the most lucrative episcopate in Christendom, that of Toledo, the revenues of which amounted the enormous sum of three hundred thousand dollars a year. 1 Of this annual income, however, he prudently reserved to himself fifty thousand dollars, by contract with his destined successor.

1 Soranzo, *Relazione apud Barozzi et Berchet. Le Relazioni degli Ambasciatori Veneti*, i. 45.

The cardinal reached the Netherlands before the end of January. He brought with him three thousand Span- 29 Jan.  
ish infantry, and some com- 1596.  
panies of cavalry, while his personal baggage was transported on three hundred and fifty mules. 1 Of course there was a triumphal procession when, on the 11th February, the new 11 Feb.  
satrap entered the obedient 1596.  
Netherlands, and there was the usual amount of bell-ringing, cannon-firing, trumpet-blowing, with torchlight processions, blazing tar barrels, and bedizened platforms, where Allegory, in an advanced stage of lunacy, performed its wonderful antics. It was scarcely possible for human creatures to bestow more adulation, or to abase themselves more thoroughly, than the honest citizens of Brussels had so recently done in honour of the gentle, gouty Ernest, but they did their best. That mythological conqueror and demigod had sunk into an unhonoured grave, despite the loud hosannahs sung to him on his arrival in Belgica, and the same nobles, pedants, and burghers were now ready and happy to grovel at the feet of Albert. But as it proved impossible to surpass the glories of the holiday which had been culled out for his brother, so it would be superfluous now to recall the pageant which thus again delighted the capital.

But there was one personage who graced this joyous entrance whose presence excited perhaps more interest than did that of the archduke himself. The procession was headed by three grantees riding abreast. There was the duke of Aumale, pensionary of Philip, and one of the last of the Leaguers, who had just been condemned to death and executed in effigy at Paris, as a traitor to his king and country; there was the Prince of Chimay, now since the recent death of his father at Venice become Duke of Arschot; and between the two

rode a gentleman forty-two years of age, whose grave, melancholy features—although wearing a painful expression of habitual restraint and distrust—suggested, more than did those of the rest of his family, the physiognomy of William the Silent 1 to all who remembered that illustrious rebel.

It was the eldest son of the great founder of the Dutch republic. Philip William, Prince of Orange, had at last, after twenty-eight years of captivity in Spain, returned to the Netherlands, whence he had been kidnapped while a schoolboy at Louvain, by order of the Duke of Alva. Rarely has there been a more dreary fate, a more broken existence than his. His almost life-long confinement, not close nor cruel, but strict and inexorable, together with the devilish arts of the Jesuits, had produced nearly as blighting an effect upon his moral nature as a closer dungeon might have done on his physical constitution. Although under perpetual arrest in Madrid, he had been allowed to ride and to hunt, to go to mass, and to enjoy many of the pleasures of youth. But he had been always a prisoner, and his soul—a hopeless captive—could no longer be liberated now that the tyrant, in order to further his own secret purposes, had at last released his body from gaol. Although the eldest-born of his father, and the inheritor of the great estates of Orange and of Buren, he was no longer a Nassau, except in name. The change wrought by the pressure of the Spanish atmosphere was complete. All that was left of his youthful self was a passionate reference for his father's memory, strangely combined with a total indifference to all that his father held dear, all for which his father had laboured his whole lifetime, and for which his heart's blood had been shed. On being at last set free from bondage he had been taken to the Escorial, and permitted to kiss

1 Bor IV 167.

1 Fruin, 207, note.

the hand of the king—that hand still reeking with his father's murder. He had been well received by the Infante and the Infanta, and by the empress-mother, daughter of Charles V., while the artistic treasures of the palace and cloister were benignantly pointed out to him. It was also signified to him that he was to receive the order of the Golden Fleece; and to enter into possession of his paternal and maternal estates. And Philip William had accepted these conditions as if a born loyal subject of his Most Catholic Majesty.

Could better proof be wanting that in that age religion was the only fatherland, and that a true papist could sustain no injury at the hands of his Most Catholic Majesty? If to be kidnapped in boyhood, to be imprisoned during a whole generation of mankind, to be deprived of vast estates, and to be made orphan by the foulest of assassinations, could not engender resentment against the royal perpetrator of these crimes in the bosom of his victim, was it strange that Philip should deem himself something far more than man, and should placidly accept the worship rendered to him by inferior beings, as to the holy impersonation of Almighty Wrath?

Yet there is no doubt that the prince had a sincere respect for his father, and had bitterly sorrowed at his death. When a Spanish officer, playing chess with him in prison, had ventured to speak lightly of that father, Philip William had seized him bodily, thrown him from the window, and thus killed him on the spot.<sup>1</sup> And when on his arrival in Brussels it was suggested to him by President Richardot that it was the king's intention to reinstate him in the possession of his estates, but that a rent-charge of eighteen thousand florins a year was still to be paid from

them to the heirs of Balthazar Gerard, his father's assassin, he flamed into a violent rage, drew his poniard, and would have stabbed the president, had not the bystanders forcibly interfered. In consequence of this refusal—called magnanimous by contemporary writers—to accept his property under such conditions, the estates were detained from him for a considerable time longer. During the period of his captivity he had been allowed an income of fifteen thousand livres; but after his restoration his household, gentlemen, and servants alone cost him eighty thousand livres annually. It was supposed that the name of Orange-Nassau might now be of service to the king's designs in the Netherlands. Philip William had come by way of Rome, where he had been allowed to kiss the pope's feet, and had received many demonstrations of favour, and it was fondly thought that he would now prove an instrument with which king and pontiff might pipe back the rebellious republic to its ancient allegiance. But the Dutchmen and Frisians were deaf. They had tasted liberty too long, they had dealt too many hard blows on the head of regal and sacerdotal despotism, to be deceived by coarse artifices. Especially the king thought that something might be done with Count Hohenlo. That turbulent personage having recently married the full sister of Philip William, and being already at variance with Count Maurice, both for military and political causes, and on account of family and pecuniary disputes, might, it was thought, be purchased by the king, and perhaps a few towns and castles in the united Netherlands might be thrown into the bargain. In that huckstering age, when the loftiest and most vilant nobles of Europe were the most shameless sellers of themselves, the most cynical mendicants for alms and the most infinite absorbers of bribes in exchange for their

<sup>1</sup> De la Pise *in voce*. The anecdote has already been mentioned in the 'Rise of the Dutch Republic.'

<sup>1</sup> Ibid.



temporary fealty; when Mayenne, Mercœur, Guise, Villars, Egmont, and innumerable other possessors of ancient and illustrious names, alternately and even simultaneously drew pensions from both sides in the great European conflict, it was not wonderful that Philip should think that the boisterous Hohenlo might be bought as well as another. The prudent king, however, gave his usual order that nothing was to be paid beforehand, but that the service was to be rendered first, and the price received afterwards. 1

The cardinal applied himself to the task on his first arrival, but was soon obliged to report that he could make but little progress in the negotiation. 2

The king thought, too, that Heraugière, who had commanded the memorable expedition against Breda, and who was now governor of that stronghold, might be purchased, and he accordingly instructed the cardinal to make use of the Prince of Orange in the negotiations to be made for that purpose. The cardinal, in effect, received an offer from Heraugière in the course of a few months not only to surrender Breda, without previous recompense, but likewise to place Gertruydenberg, the governor of which city was his relative, in the king's possession. But the cardinal was afraid of a trick, for Heraugière was known to be as artful as he was brave, and there can be little doubt that the Netherlander was only disposed to lay an ambush for the governor-general. 3

And thus the son of William the Silent made his reappearance in the streets of Brussels, after twenty-eight years of imprisonment, riding in the procession of the new viceroy. The cardinal-arch-

duke came next, with Fuentes riding at his left hand. That vigorous soldier and politician soon afterwards left the Netherlands to assume the government of Milan.

There was a correspondence between the Prince of Orange and the States-General, in which the republican authorities, after expressing themselves towards him with great propriety and affectionate respect, gave him plainly but delicately to understand that his presence at that time in the United Provinces would neither be desirable, nor, without their passports, possible. 1 They were quite aware of the uses to which the king was hoping to turn their reverence for the memory and the family of the great martyr, and were determined to foil such idle projects on the threshold.

The Archduke Albert, born on 3rd of November, 1560, was now in his thirty-sixth year. A small, thin, pale-faced man, with fair hair and beard, commonplace features, and the hereditary underhanging Burgundian jaw prominently developed, he was not without a certain nobility of presence. His manners were distant to haughtiness and grave to solemnity. He spoke very little and very slowly. He had resided long in Spain, where he had been a favourite with his uncle—as much as any man could be a favourite with Philip—and he had carefully formed himself on that royal model. He looked upon the King of Spain as the greatest, wisest, and best of created beings, as the most illustrious specimen of kingscraft ever yet vouchsafed to the world. He did his best to look sombre and Spanish, to turn his visage into a mask, to conceal his thoughts and emotions, not only by the expression of his features by direct misstatements of his tongue, and in all things to present to the obedient Flemings as elaborate a reproduction of his great prototype as copy can ever recall

1 „Que en todas platicas semejantes ha de preceder el servicio a la recompensa que se ofreciere a trueco de el.”—Philip to Archduke Albert, 13 Jan. 1596. (Arch. de Sim. MS.)

2 Albert to Philip, 28 March. 1596. (Arch. de Simancas MS.)

3 Albert to Philip, 18 July, 1596. (Arch. de Simancas MS.)

1 Bor, IV. 163, 164, *seqq.*

inimitable original. Old men in the Netherlands, who remembered in how short a time Philip had succeeded, by the baleful effect of his personal presence, in lighting up a hatred which not the previous twenty years of his father's burnings, hangings, and butcheries in those provinces had been able to excite, and which forty subsequent years of bloodshed had not begun to allay, might well shake their heads when they saw this new representative of Spanish authority. It would have been wiser—so many astute politicians thought—for Albert to take the Emperor Charles for his model, who had always the power of making his tyranny acceptable to the Flemings, through the adroitness with which he seemed to be entirely a Fleming himself. 1

But Albert, although a German, valued himself on appearing like a Spaniard. He was industrious, regular in his habits, moderate in eating and drinking, fond of giving audiences on business. He spoke German, Spanish, and Latin, and understood French and Italian. He had at times been a student, and, especially, had some knowledge of mathematics. He was disposed to do his duty—so far as a man can do his duty, who imagines himself so entirely lifted above his fellow-creatures as to owe no obligation except to exact their obedience and to personify to them the will of the Almighty. To Philip and the Pope he was ever faithful. He was not without pretensions to military talents, but his gravity, slowness, and silence made him fitter to shine in the cabinet than in the field. Henry IV., who loved his jest, whether at his own expense or that of friend or foe, was wont to observe that there were three things which nobody would ever believe, and which yet were very true; that Queen Elizabeth deserved her title of the throned vestal, that he was himself a

good Catholic, and that Cardinal Albert was a good general. It is probable that the assertions were all equally accurate.

The new governor did not find a very able group of generals or statesmen assembled about him to assist in the difficult task which he had undertaken. There were plenty of fine gentlemen, with ancient names and lofty pretensions, but the working men in field or council had mostly disappeared. Mondragon, La Motte, Charles Mansfeld, Frank Verdugo were all dead. Fuentes was just taking his departure for Italy. Old Peter Ernest was a cipher; and his son's place was filled by the Marquis of Varambon, as principal commander in active military operations. This was a Burgundian of considerable military ability, but with an inordinate opinion of himself and of his family. „Accept the fact that his lineage is the highest possible, and that he has better connections than those of anybody else in the whole world, and he will be perfectly contented,” said a sharp, splenetic Spaniard in the cardinal's confidence. „'Tis a faithful and loyal cavalier, but full of impertinences.” 1 The brother of Varambon, Count Varax, had succeeded La Motte as general of artillery, and of his doings there was a tale ere long to be told. On the whole, the best soldier in the archduke's service for the moment was the Frenchman Savigny de Rosne, an ancient Leaguer, and a passionate hater of the Béarnese, of heretics, and of France as then constituted. He had once made a contract with Henry by which he bound himself to his service; but after occasioning a good deal of injury by his deceitful attitude, he had accepted a large amount of Spanish dollars, and had then thrown off the mask and proclaimed himself

1 Bentivoglio, *Relazione delle Provincie ubbedienti di Fiandra*. Soranzo, *Relazione*.

1 Relacion de los Señores de titulo y otras personas de qualidad que hay en estos estados; dióse a su Alt. en Valenciennes, 2 April, 1596. (Arch. de Simancas MS.)

the deadliest foe of his lawful sovereign. „He was foremost,” said Carlos Coloma, „among those who were successfully angled for by the Commander Moreo with golden hooks.”<sup>1</sup> Although prodigiously fat, [this renegade was an active and experienced campaigner, while his personal knowledge of his own country made his assistance of much value to those who were attempting its destruction.

The other great nobles, who were pressing themselves about the new viceroy with enthusiastic words of welcome were as like to give him embarrassment as support. All wanted office, emoluments, distinctions, nor could much dependence be placed on the ability or the character of any of them. The new duke of Arschot had in times past, as prince of Chimay, fought against the king, and had even imagined himself a Calvinist, while his wife was still a determined heretic. It is true that she was separated from her husband. He was a man of more quickness and acuteness than his father had been, but if possible more mischievous both to friend and foe; being subtle, restless, intriguing, fickle, ambitious, and deceitful. The Prince of Orange was considered a man of very ordinary intelligence, not more than half-witted, according to Queen Elizabeth,<sup>2</sup> and it was probable that the peculiar circumstances of his life would extinguish any influence that he might otherwise have attained with either party. He was likely to affect a neutral position, and, in times of civil war, to be neutral is to be nothing.

Arenberg, unlike the great general on the Catholic side who had made the name illustrious in the opening scenes of the mighty contest, was disposed to quiet obscurity so far as was compatible with his rank. Having inherited neither fortune nor talent with his ancient name,

he was chiefly occupied with providing for the wants of his numerous family. A good papist, well-inclined and docile, he was strongly recommended for the post of admiral, not because he had naval acquirements, but because he had a great many children. The Marquis of Havré, uncle to the Duke of Arschot, had played in his time many prominent parts in the long Netherland tragedy. Although older than he was when Requesens and Don John of Austria had been governors, he was not much wiser, being to the full as vociferous, as false, as insolent, as self-seeking, and as mischievous as in his youth. Alternately making appeals to popular passions in his capacity of high-born demagogue, or seeking crumbs of bounty as the supple slave of his sovereign, he was not more likely to acquire the confidence of the cardinal than he had done that of his predecessors.

The most important and opulent grandee of all the provinces was the Count de Ligne, who had become by marriage or inheritance Prince of Espinay, Seneschal of Hainault, and Viscount of Ghent. But it was only his enormous estates that gave him consideration, for he was not thought capable of either good or bad intentions. He had, however, in times past, succeeded in the chief object of his ambition, which was to keep out of trouble, and to preserve his estates from confiscation. His wife, who governed him, and had thus far guided him safely, hoped to do so to the end. The cardinal was informed that the Golden Fleece would be all-sufficient to keep him upon the right track.<sup>2</sup>

Of the Egmonts, one had died on the famous field of Ivry, another was an outlaw, and had been accused of participation in plots of assassination against William of Orange; the third was now about the archduke's court,

<sup>1</sup> Coloma, 229. Calvaert's letter, in *Deventer*, ii. 108.

<sup>2</sup> „Ende niet half wys.” Caron to States-General, in *Deventer*, ii. 121.

<sup>1</sup> *Relacion de los Señores, &c., ubi sup.*

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*



and was supposed to be as dull a man as Ligne, but likely to be serviceable so long as he could keep his elder brother out of his inheritance. Thus devoted to Church and King were the sons of the man whose head Philip had taken off on a senseless charge of treason. The two Counts Van den Berg—Frederic and Hermann—sons of the sister of William the Silent, were, on the whole, as brave, efficient, and trustworthy servants of the king and cardinal as were to be found in the obedient provinces.

The new governor had come well provided with funds, being supplied for the first three-quarters of the year with a monthly allowance of 1,100,000 florins. For reasons soon to appear, it was not probable that the States-General would be able very soon to make a vigorous campaign, and it was thought best for the cardinal to turn his immediate attention to France.

The negotiations for effecting an alliance offensive and defensive, between the three powers most interested in opposing the projects of Spain for universal empire, were not yet begun, and will be reserved for a subsequent chapter. Meantime there had been much informal discussion and diplomatic trifling between France and England for the purpose of bringing about a sincere co-operation of the two crowns against the Fifth Monarchy—as it was much the fashion to denominate Philip's proposed dominion.

Henry had suggested at different times to Sir Robert Sidney, during his frequent presence in France as special envoy for the queen, the necessity of such a step, but had not always found a hearty sympathy. But as the king began to cool in his hatred to Spain, after his declaration of war against that power, it seemed desirable to Elizabeth to fan his resentment afresh, and to revert to those propositions which had been so coolly

received when made. Sir Harry Umton, ambassador from her Majesty, was accordingly provided with especial letters on the subject from the queen's own hand, and presented them early in the year at Coucy (Feb. 13, 1596). No man in the world knew better the tone to adopt in his communications with Elizabeth than did the chivalrous king. No man knew better than he how impossible it was to invent terms of adulation too gross for her to accept as spontaneous and natural effusions of the heart. He received the letters from the hands of Sir Henry, read them with rapture, heaved a deep sigh, and exclaimed: „Ah! Mr. Ambassador, what shall I say to you? This letter of the queen, my sister, is full of sweetness and affection. I see that she loves me, while that I love her is not to be doubted. Yet your commission shows me the contrary, and this proceeds from her ministers. How else can these obligations stand with her professions of love? I am forced, as a king, to take a course which, as Henry, her loving brother, I could never adopt.”

They then walked out in the park, and the king fell into frivolous discourse, on purpose to keep the envoy from the important subject which had been discussed in the cabinet. Sir Henry brought him back to business, and insisted that there was no disagreement between her Majesty and her counsellors, all being anxious to do what she wished. The envoy, who shared in the prevailing suspicions that Henry was about to make a truce with Spain, vehemently protested against such a step, complaining that his ministers, whose minds were distempered with jealousy, were inducing him to sacrifice her friendship to a false and hollow reconciliation with Spain. Henry protested that his preference would be for England's amity, but regretted that the English delays were so great, and that such dangers were ever impending over his head as

to make it impossible for him, as a king, to follow the inclinations of his heart.

They then met Madame de Monceaux, the beautiful Gabrielle, who was invited to join in the walk, the king saying that she was no meddler in politics, but of a tractable spirit.

This remark, in Sir Henry's opinion, was just, for, said he to Burghley, she is thought incapable of affairs, and very simple. The duchess unmasked very graciously as the ambassador was presented; but, said the splenetic diplomatist, „I took no pleasure in it, nor held it any grace at all.” „She was attired in a plain satin gown,” he continued, „with a velvet hood to keep her from the weather, which became her very ill. In my opinion, she is altered very much for the worse, and was very grossly painted.” The three walked together discoursing of trifles, much to the annoyance of Umton. At last, a shower forced the lady into the house, and the king soon afterwards took the ambassador to his cabinet. „He asked me how I liked his mistress,” wrote Sir Henry to Burghley, „and I answered sparingly in her praise, and told him that if without offence I might speak it, I had the picture of a far more excellent mistress, and yet did her picture come far from the perfection of her beauty.”

„As you love me,” cried the king, „show it me, if you have it about you!”

„I made some difficulty,” continued Sir Henry, „yet upon his importunity I offered it to his view very secretly, still holding it in my hand. He beheld it with passion and admiration, saying that I was in the right.” „I give in,” said the king, „Je me rends.”

Then, protesting that he had never seen such beauty all his life, he kissed it reverently twice or thrice, Sir Henry still holding the miniature firmly in his hand.

The king then insisted upon seizing the picture, and there was a charming

struggle between the two, ending in his Majesty's triumph. He then told Sir Henry that he might take his leave of the portrait, for he would never give it up again for any treasure, and that to possess the favour of the original he would forsake all the world. He fell into many more such passionate and incoherent expressions of rhapsody, as of one suddenly smitten and spell-bound with hapless love, bitterly reproaching the ambassador for never having brought him any answers to the many affectionate letters which he had written to the queen, whose silence had made him so wretched. Sir Henry, perhaps somewhat confounded at being beaten at his own fantastic game, answered as well as he could, „but I found,” said he, „that the dumb picture did draw on more speech and affection from him than all my best arguments and eloquence. This was the effect of our conference, and, if infiniteness of vows and outward professions be a strong argument of inward affection, there is good likelihood of the king's continuance of amity with her Majesty; only I fear lest his necessities may inconsiderately draw him into some hazardous treaty with Spain, which I hope confidently it is yet in the power of her Majesty to prevent.”<sup>1</sup>

The king, while performing these apish tricks about the picture of a lady with beady black eyes, a hooked nose, black teeth, and a red wig, who was now in the sixty-fourth year of her age, knew very well that the whole scene would be at once repeated to the fair object of his passion by her faithful envoy; but what must have been the opinion entertained of Elizabeth by contemporary sovereigns and statesmen when such fantastic folly could be rehearsed and related every day in the year!

And the king knew, after all, and was destined very soon to acquire proof

<sup>1</sup> Sir Henry Umton to her Majesty, Coucy, 3 Feb. 1595-6.

of it which there was no gainsaying, that the beautiful Elizabeth had exactly as much affection for him as he had for her, and was as capable of sacrificing his interests for her own, or of taking advantage of his direct necessities as cynically and as remorselessly, as the King of Spain, or the Duke of Mayenne, or the Pope had ever done.

Henry had made considerable progress in re-establishing his authority over a large portion of the howling wilderness to which forty years of civil war had reduced his hereditary kingdom. There was still great danger, however, at its two opposite extremities. Calais, key to the Norman gate of France, was feebly held; while Marseilles, seated in such dangerous proximity to Spain on the one side, and to the Republic of Genoa, that alert vassal of Spain, on the other, was still in the possession of the League. A concerted action was undertaken by means of John Andrew Doria, with a Spanish fleet from Genoa on the outside and a well-organised conspiracy from within, to carry the city bodily over to Philip. Had it succeeded, this great Mediterranean seaport would have become as much a Spanish possession as Barcelona or Naples, and infinite might have been the damage to Henry's future prospects in consequence. But there was a man in Marseilles, Petrus Libertas by name, whose ancestors had gained this wholesome family appellation by a successful effort once made by them to rescue the little town of Calvi, in Corsica, from the tyranny of Genoa. Peter Liberty needed no prompting to vindicate, on a fitting occasion, his right to his patronymic. In conjunction with men in Marseilles who hated oppression, whether of kings, priests, or renegade republics, as much as he did, and with a secret and well-arranged understanding with the Duke of Guise, who was burning with ambition to render a signal benefit to the cause which he had just espoused,

this bold tribune of the people succeeded in stirring the population to mutiny at exactly the right moment, and in opening the gates of Marseilles to the Duke of Guise and his forces 17 Feb. before it was possible for the 1596.

Leaguers to admit the fleet of Doria into its harbour. Thus was the capital of Mediterranean France lost and won. 1 Guise gained great favour in Henry's eyes, and with reason; for the son of the great Balafré, who was himself the League, had now given the League the stroke of mercy. Peter Liberty became consul of Marseilles, and received a patent of nobility. It was difficult, however, for any diploma to confer anything more noble upon him than the name which he had inherited, and to which he had so well established his right.

But while Henry's cause had thus been so well served in the south, there was danger impending in the north. The king had been besieging, since autumn, the town of La Vère, an important military and strategic position, which had been Farnese's basis of operations during his memorable campaigns in France, and which had never since remained in the hands of the League.

The cardinal had taken the field with an army of fifteen thousand foot and three thousand horse, assembled at Valenciennes, and after hesitating some time whether or not he should attempt to relieve La Fère, he decided instead on a diversion. In the second week of April, De Rosne was detached at the head of four thousand men, and suddenly appeared before Calais. 2 The city had been long governed by De Gordan, but this wary and experienced commander had unfortunately been for two years dead. Still more unfortunately, it had been in his power to bequeath, not only his fortune, which was very large, but the government of Calais, considered the most valuable command

1 De Thou, xii. 613, *seqq.* I. 116. Bor. IV. 177-179.

2 De Thou, xii. 631.



in France, to his nephew, De Vidosan. He had, however, not bequeathed to him his administrative and military genius.

The fortress called the Risban, or Rysbank, which entirely governed the harbour, and the possession of which made Calais nearly impregnable, as inexhaustible supplies could thus be poured into it by sea, had fallen into comparative decay. De Gordan had been occupied in strengthening the work, but since his death the nephew had entirely neglected the task. On the land side, the bridge of Nivelet was the key to the place. The faubourg was held by two Dutch companies, under Captains Le Gros and Dominique, who undertook to prevent the entrance of the archduke's forces. Vidosan, however, ordered these faithful auxiliaries into the citadel.

De Rosne, acting with great promptness, seized both the bridge of Nivelet and the fort of Rysbank, by a sudden and well-concerted movement. This having been accomplished, the city was in his power, and, after sustaining a brief cannonade, it surrendered. Vidosan,

17 April, with his garrison, however, 1596. retired into the citadel, and it was agreed between himself and De Rosne that unless succour should be received from the French king before the expiration of six days, the citadel should also be evacuated.

Meantime Henry, who was at Boulogne, much disgusted at this unexpected disaster, had sent couriers to the Netherlands, demanding assistance of the States-General and of the stadholder. Maurice had speedily responded to the appeal. Proceeding himself to Zeeland, he had shipped fifteen companies of picked troops from Middelburg, together with a flotilla laden with munitions and provisions enough to withstand a siege of several weeks. When the arrangements were completed, he went himself on board of a ship of war to take command of the expedition in person. 1

1 Bor, IV. 188.

On the 17th of April he arrived with his succours off the harbour of Calais, and found to his infinite disappointment that the Rysbank fort was in the hands of the enemy. 1 As not a vessel could pass the bar without almost touching that fortress, the entrance to Calais was now impossible. 2 Had the incompetent Vidosan heeded the advice of his brave Dutch officers, the place might still have been saved, for it had surrendered in a panic on the very day when the fleet of Maurice arrived off the port.

Henry had lost no time in sending, also, to his English allies for succour. The possession of Calais by the Spaniards might well seem alarming to Elizabeth, who could not well forget that up to the time of her sister this important position had been for two centuries an English stronghold. The defeat of the Spanish husband of an English queen had torn from England the last trophies of the Black Prince, and now the prize had again fallen into the hands of Spain; but of Spain no longer in alliance, but at war, with England. Obviously it was most dangerous to the interests and to the safety of the English realm, that this threatening position, so near the gates of London, should be in the hands of the most powerful potentate in the world and the dire enemy of England. In response to Henry's appeal, the Earl of Essex was despatched with a force of six thousand men—raised by express command of the queen on Sunday when the people were all at church—to Dover, where shipping was in readiness to transport the troops at once across the Channel. At the same time, the politic queen and some of her counsellors thought the opening a good one to profit by the calamity of their dear ally. Certainly it was desirable to prevent Calais from falling into the grasp of Philip. But it was perhaps equally desirable, now that

1 Ibid.

2 Ibid.

the place without the assistance of Elizabeth could no longer be preserved by Henry, that Elizabeth, and not Henry, should henceforth be its possessor. To make this proposition as clear to the French king as it seemed to the English queen, Sir Robert Sidney was despatched in all haste to Boulogne, even while the guns of De Rosne were pointed at Calais citadel, and while Maurice's fleet, baffled by the cowardly surrender of the Risban, was on its retreat from the harbour.

At two o'clock in the afternoon of 21 April, the 21st of April, Sidney landed at Boulogne. Henry, who had been intensely impatient to hear from England, and who suspected that the delay was boding no good to his cause, went down to the strand to meet the envoy, with whom then and there he engaged instantly in the most animated discourse.

As there was little time to be lost, and as Sidney on getting out of the vessel found himself thus confronted with the soldier-king in person, he at once made the demand which he had been sent across the Channel to make. He requested the king to deliver up the town and citadel of Calais to the Queen of England as soon as, with her assistance, he should succeed in recovering the place. He assigned as her Majesty's reasons for this peremptory summons that she would on no other terms find it in her power to furnish the required succour. Her subjects, she said, would never consent to it except on these conditions. It was perhaps not very common with the queen to exhibit so much deference to the popular will, but on this occasion the supposed inclinations of the nation furnished her with an excellent pretext for carrying out her own. Sidney urged moreover that her Majesty felt certain of being obliged—in case she did not take Calais into her own safe keeping and protection—to come to the rescue

again within four or six months to prevent it once more from being besieged, conquered, and sacked by the enemy.

The king had feared some such proposition as this, and had intimated as much to the States' envoy, Calvaert, who had walked with him down to the strand, and had left him when the conference began. Henry was not easily thrown from his equanimity, nor wont to exhibit passion on any occasion least of all in his discussions with the ambassadors of England, but the cool and insolent egotism of this communication was too much for him.

He could never have believed, he said in reply, that after the repeated assurances of her Majesty's affection for him which he had received from the late Sir Henry Umton<sup>1</sup> in their recent negotiations, her Majesty would now so discourteously seek to make her profit out of his misery. He had come to Boulogne, he continued, on the pledge given by the Earl of Essex to assist him with seven or eight thousand men in the recovery of Calais. If this after all should fail him—although his own reputation would be more injured by the capture of the place thus before his eyes than if it had happened in his absence—he would rather a hundred times endure the loss of the place than have it succoured with such injurious and dishonourable conditions. After all, he said, the loss of Calais was substantially of more importance to the queen than to himself. To him the chief detriment would be in the breaking up of his easy and regular communications with his neighbours through this position, and especially with her Majesty. But as her affection for him was now proved to be so slender as to allow her to seek a profit from his misfortune and dishonour, it would be better for

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<sup>1</sup> Sir Henry Umton had died in France soon after the interview with Henry IV mentioned on a previous page of this volume. Meteren, 371.

him to dispense with her friendship altogether and to strengthen his connections with truer and more honourable friends. Should the worst come to the worst, he doubted not that he should be able, being what he was and much more than he was of old, to make a satisfactory arrangement with the King of Spain. He was ready to save Calais at the peril of his life, to conquer it in person, and not by the hands of any of his lieutenants; but having done so, he was not willing—at so great a loss of reputation without and at so much peril within—to deliver it to her Majesty or to any one else. He would far rather see it fall into the hands of the Spaniards.

Thus warmly and frankly did Henry denounce the unhandsome proposition made in the name of the queen, while, during his vehement expostulations, Sidney grew red with shame, and did not venture to look the king for one moment in the face.<sup>1</sup> He then sought to mitigate the effect of his demand by intimating, with much embarrassment of demeanour, that perhaps her Majesty would be satisfied with the possession of Calais for her own life-time, and—as this was at once plumply refused—by the suggestion of a pledge of it for the term of one year. But the king only grew the more indignant as the bargaining became more paltry, and he continued to heap bitter reproaches upon the queen, who, without having any children or known inheritor of her possessions, should nevertheless be so desirous of compassing his eternal disgrace and of exciting the discontent of his subjects for the sake of an evanescent gain for herself. At such a price, he avowed, he had no wish to purchase her Majesty's friendship.

After this explosion the conference

<sup>1</sup> „Deur dewelke S. M. den voors. Ambassadeur soo schaemroot maekte, dat hy (soo S. M. my gheseyt heeft) S. M. niet in't aensicht dorste te sien,” &c. &c. Calvaert's Despatch in Deventer, ii. 106.

became more amicable. The English envoy assured the king that there could be, at all events, no doubt of the arrival of Essex with eight thousand men on the following Thursday to assist in the relief of the citadel; notwithstanding the answer which he had received to the demand of her Majesty.

He furthermore expressed the strong desire which he felt that the king might be induced to make a personal visit to the queen at Dover, whither she would gladly come to receive him, so soon as Calais should have been saved. To this the king replied with gallantry, that it was one of the things in the world that he had most at heart. The envoy rejoined that her Majesty would consider such a visit a special honour and favour. She had said that she could leave this world more cheerfully, when God should ordain, after she had enjoyed two hours' conversation with his Majesty.

Sidney on taking his departure repeated the assurance that the troop under Essex would arrive before Calais by Thursday, and that they were fast marching to the English coast; forgetting, apparently, that, at the beginning of the interview, he had stated, according to the queen's instructions, that the troops had been forbidden to march until a favourable answer had been returned by the king to her proposal.

Henry then retired to his head-quarters for the purpose of drawing up information for his minister in England, De Sancy, who had not yet been received by the queen, and who had been kept in complete ignorance of this mission of Sidney and of its purport.

While the king was thus occupied, the English envoy was left in the company of Calvaert, who endeavoured, without much success, to obtain from him the result of the conference which had just taken place. Sidney was not to be pumped by the Dutch diplomatist, adroit as he unquestionably was; but, so soon as the queen's ambassador was



fairly afloat again on his homeward track—which was the case within three hours after his arrival at Boulogne—Calvaert received from the king a minute account of the whole conversation. 1

Henry expressed unbounded gratitude to the States-General of the republic for their prompt and liberal assistance, and he eagerly contrasted the conduct of Prince Maurice—sailing forth in person so chivalrously to his rescue—with the sharp bargainings and short-comings of the queen. He despatched a special messenger to convey his thanks to the prince, and he expressed his hope to Calvaert that the States might be willing that their troops should return to the besieged place under the command of Maurice, whose presence alone, as he loudly and publicly protested, was worth four thousand men.

But it was too late. The six days were rapidly passing away. The governor of Boulogne, Campagnolo, succeeded, by Henry's command, in bringing a small reinforcement of two or three hundred men into the citadel of Calais during the night of the 22nd of April. This devoted little band made their way, when the tide was low, along the flats which stretched between the fort of Rysbank and the sea. Sometimes wading up to the neck in water, sometimes swimming for their lives, and during a greater part of their perilous march clinging so close to the hostile fortress as almost to touch its guns, the gallant adventurers succeeded in getting into the citadel in time to be butchered with the rest of the garrison on the following day. For so soon as the handful of men had gained admittance to the gates—although otherwise the aspect of affairs was quite unchanged—the rash and weak De Vidosan proclaimed that the reinforcements stipulated in his conditional

capitulation having arrived, he should now resume hostilities. Whereupon he opened fire upon the town, and a sentry was killed. De Rosne, furious at what he considered a breach of faith, directed a severe cannonade against the not very formidable walls of the castle. During the artillery engagement which ensued, the Prince of Orange, who had accompanied De Rosne to the siege, had a very narrow escape. A cannon ball from the town took off the heads of two Spaniards standing near him, bespattering him with their blood and brains. He was urged to retire, but assured those about him that he came of too good a house to be afraid. His courage was commendable, but it seems not to have occurred to him that the place for his father's son was not at the side of the general who was doing the work of his father's murderer. While his brother Maurice with a fleet of twenty Dutch war-ships was attempting in vain to rescue Calais from the grasp of the Spanish king, Philip William of Nassau was looking on, a pleased and passive spectator of the desperate and unsuccessful efforts at defence. The assault was then ordered. 1 The first storm was repulsed, mainly by the Dutch companies, who fought in the breach until most of their numbers were killed or wounded, their captains Dominique and Le Gros having both fallen. The next attack was successful, the citadel was carried, and the whole garrison, with exception of what remained of the Hollanders and Zealanders, put to the sword. De Vidosan himself perished. Thus Calais was once more a Spanish city, and was re-annexed to the obedient provinces of Flanders. Of five thousand persons, soldiers and citizens, who had taken refuge in the castle, all were killed or reduced to captivity. 2

1 Meteren, 370. De la Pise.

1 Calvaert's Letter of 22 April, 1596, recounting this remarkable interview, is given at length in Van Deventer's valuable publication, ii. 105-110.

2 Bor, 1V. 143-188. De Thou, xii. 631-637. Meteren, 369, 370. Bentivoglio, 439, 440. Coloma, 211-217. Albert to Philip, 24 April, 1596. (Arch. de Simancas, MS.)

The conversion of this important naval position into a Spanish-Flemish station was almost as disastrous to the republic as it was mortifying to France and dangerous to England. The neighbouring Dunkirk had long been a nest of pirates, whence small, fast-sailing vessels issued, daily and nightly, to prey indiscriminately upon the commerce of all nations. These corsairs neither gave nor took quarter, and were in the habit, after they had plundered their prizes, of setting them adrift, with the sailors nailed to the deck or chained to the rigging; while the officers were held for ransom. In case the vessels themselves were wanted, the crews were indiscriminately tossed overboard; while, on the other hand, the buccaneers rarely hesitated to blow up their own ships when unable to escape from superior force. Capture was followed by speedy execution, and it was but recently that one of these freebooters having been brought into Rotterdam, the whole crew, forty-four in number, were hanged on the day of their arrival, while some five and twenty merchant-captains held for ransom by the pirates thus obtained their liberty. <sup>1</sup>

And now Calais was likely to become a second and more dangerous sea-robbers' cave than even Dunkirk had been.

Notwithstanding this unluckily beginning of the campaign for the three allies, it was determined to proceed with a considerable undertaking which had been arranged between England and the republic. For the time, therefore, the importunate demands of the queen for repayment by the States of her disbursements during the past ten years were suspended. It had, indeed, never been more difficult than at that moment for the republic to furnish extraordinary sums of money. The year 1595 had not been prosperous. Although the general advance in commerce, manufactures, and in every department of na-

tional development had been very remarkable, yet there had recently been, for exceptional causes, an apparent falling off; <sup>1</sup> while, on the other hand, there had been a bad harvest in the north of Europe. In Holland, where no grain was grown, and which yet was the granary of the world, the prices were trebled. One hundred and eight bushels (a last) of rye, which ordinarily was worth fifty florins, now sold for one hundred and fifty florins, and other objects of consumption were equally enhanced in value. <sup>2</sup> On the other hand, the expenses of the war were steadily increasing, and were fixed for this year at five millions of florins. The republic, and especially the States of Holland, never hesitated to tax heroically. The commonwealth had no income except that which the several provinces chose to impose upon themselves in order to fill the quota assigned to them by the States-General; but this defect in their political organization was not sensibly felt so long as the enthusiasm for the war continued in full force. The people of the Netherlands knew full well that there was no liberty for them without fighting, no fighting without an army, no army without wages, and no wages without taxation; and although by the end of the century the imposts had become so high that, in the language of that keen observer, Cardinal Bentivoglio, nuncio at Brussels, they could scarcely be imagined higher, yet, according to the same authority, they were laid unflinchingly and paid by the people without a murmur. <sup>3</sup> During this year and the next the States of Holland, whose proportion often amounted to fifty per cent. of the whole contribution of the United Provinces, and who ever set a wholesome example in taxation, raised the duty on imports and all internal taxes by one-eighth, and laid a fresh impost on such articles of luxury

<sup>1</sup> Bor, IV. 50, 129. Meteren, Reyd.

<sup>1</sup> Reyd, 300.

<sup>2</sup> Bor, IV. 152.

<sup>3</sup> Relazione delle Provincie Unite.

as velvets and satins, pleas and processes. Starch, too, became a source of considerable revenue. With the fast-rising prosperity of the country luxury had risen likewise, and, as in all ages and countries of the world of which there is record, woman's dress signalized itself by extravagant and very often tasteless conceptions. In a country where, before the doctrine of popular sovereignty had been broached in any part of the world by the most speculative theorists, very vigorous and practical examples of democracy had been afforded to Europe; in a country where, ages before the science of political economy had been dreamed of, lessons of free-trade on the largest scale had been taught to mankind by republican traders instinctively breaking in many directions through the nets by which monarchs and oligarchs, guilds and corporations, had hampered the movements of commerce; it was natural that fashion should instinctively rebel against restraint. The honest burgher's vrouw of Middelburg or Enckhuyzen claimed the right to make herself as grotesque as Queen Elizabeth in all her glory. Sumptuary laws were an unwholesome part of feudal tyranny, and, as such, were naturally dropping into oblivion on the free soil of the Netherlands. It was the complaint therefore of moralists that unproductive consumption was alarmingly increasing. Formerly starch had been made of the refuse parts of corn, but now the manufacturers of that article made use of the bloom of the wheat and consumed as much of it as would have fed great cities. In the little village of Wormer the starch-makers used between three and four thousand bushels a week. Thus a substantial gentlewoman in fashionable array might bear the food of a parish upon her ample bosom. A single manufacturer in Amsterdam required four hundred weekly bushels. Such was the demand for the stiffening of the vast ruffs, the wonderful head-gear, the

elaborate lace-work, stomachers and streamers, without which no lady who respected herself could possibly go abroad to make her daily purchases of eggs and poultry in the market-place.

„May God preserve us,” exclaimed a contemporary chronicler, unreasonably excited on the starch question, „from farther luxury and wantonness, and abuse of His blessings and good gifts, that the punishment of Jeroboam, which followed upon Solomon's fortunate reign and the gold-ships of Ophir, may not come upon us.”<sup>1</sup>

The States of Holland not confounding—as so often has been the case—the precepts of moral philosophy with those of political economy, did not, out of fear for the doom of Jeroboam, forbid the use of starch. They simply laid a tax of a stiver a pound on the commodity,<sup>2</sup> or about six per cent. ad valorem; and this was a more wholesome way of serving the State than by abridging the liberty of the people in the choice of personal attire. Meantime the preachers were left to thunder from their pulpits upon the sinfulness of starched ruffles and ornamental top-knots, and to threaten their fair hearers with the wrath to come, with as much success as usually attends such eloquence.

There had been uneasiness in the provinces in regard to the designs of the queen, especially since the States had expressed their inability to comply in full with her demands for repayment. Spanish emissaries had been busily circulating calumnious reports that her Majesty was on the eve of concluding a secret peace with Philip, and that it was her intention to deliver the cautionary towns to the king. The Government attached little credence to such statements, but it was natural that Envoy Caron should be anxious at their perpetual recurrence both in England and in the provinces. So, one day, he had a long conversation with the Earl

<sup>1</sup> Reyd, 351.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid.



of Essex on the subject; for it will be recollected that Lord Leicester had strenuously attempted at an earlier day to get complete possession, not only of the pledged cities but of Leyden also, in order to control the whole country. Essex was aflame with indignation at once, and expressed himself with his customary recklessness. He swore that if her Majesty were so far forsaken of God and so forgetful of her own glory, as through evil counsel to think of making any treaty with Spain, without the knowledge of the States-General and in order to cheat them, he would himself make the matter as public as it was possible to do, and would place himself in direct opposition to such a measure, so as to show the whole world that his heart and soul were foreign at least to any vile counsel of the kind that might have been given to his Sovereign. 1 Caron and Essex conversed much in this vein, and, although the envoy especially requested him not to do so, the earl, who was not distinguished for his powers of dissimulation, and who suspected Burleigh of again tampering, as he had often before tampered, with secret agents of Philip, went straight to the queen with the story. Next day, Essex invited Caron to dine and to go with him after dinner to the queen. This was done, and, so soon as the States' envoy was admitted to the royal presence, her Majesty at once opened the subject. She had heard, she said, that the reports in question had been spread through the provinces, and she expressed much indignation in regard to them. She swore very vehemently, as usual, and protested that she had better never have been born than prove so miserable a princess as these tales would make her. The histories of England, she said, should never describe her as guilty of such falsehood. She could find a more honourable and fitting

means of making peace than by delivering up cities and strongholds so sincerely and confidently placed in her hands. She hoped to restore them as faithfully as they had loyally been entrusted to her keeping. She begged Caron to acquaint the States-General with these asseverations; declaring that never since she had sent troops to the Netherlands had she lent her ear to those who had made such underhand propositions. She was aware that Cardinal Albert had propositions to make, and that he was desirous of inducing both the French king and herself to consent to a peace with Spain; but she promised the States' envoy solemnly before God to apprise him of any such overtures, so soon as they should be made known to herself. 1

Much more in this strain, with her usual vehemence and mighty oaths, did the great queen aver, and the republican envoy, to whom she was on this occasion very gracious, was fain to believe in her sincerity. Yet the remembrance of the amazing negotiations between the queen's ministers and the agents of Alexander Farnese, by which the invasion of the Armada had been masked, could not but have left an uneasy feeling in the mind of every Dutch statesman. „I trust in God,” said Caron, „that He may never so abandon her as to permit her to do the reverse of what she now protests with so much passion. Should it be otherwise—which God forbid—I should think that He would send such chastisement upon her and her people that other princes would see their fate therein as in a mirror, should they make and break such oaths and promises. I tell you these things as they occur, because, as I often feel uneasiness myself, I imagine that my friends on the other side the water may be subject to the same anxiety. Nevertheless, beat the bush as I may, I can obtain no better information than this which I am now sending you.” 2

1 Letter of Caron, 8 Dec. 1595, *apud* Bor, IV. 150, 151.

1 Letter of Caron, *ubi sup.* 2 *Ibid.*

It had been agreed that for a time the queen should desist from her demands for repayment—which, according to the Treaty of 1585, was to be made only after conclusion of peace between Spain and the provinces, but which Elizabeth was frequently urging on the ground that the States could now make that peace when they chose—and in return for such remission the republic promised to furnish twenty-four ships of war and four tenders for a naval expedition which was now projected against the Spanish coast. These war-ships were to be of four hundred, three hundred, and two hundred tons—eight of each dimension—and the estimated expense of their fitting out for five months was 512,796 florins. 1

Before the end of April, notwithstanding the disappointment occasioned in the Netherlands by the loss of Calais, which the States had so energetically striven to prevent, the fleet under Admiral John of Duvenwoord, Seigneur of Warmond, and Vice-Admirals Jan Gerbrantz and Cornelius Leusen, had arrived at Plymouth, ready to sail with their English allies. 2 There were three thousand sailors of Holland and Zeeland on board, the best mariners in the world, and two thousand two hundred picked veterans from the garrisons of the Netherlands. 3 These land-troops were English, but they belonged to the States' army, which was composed of Dutch, German, Walloon, Scotch, and Irish soldiers, and it was a liberal concession on the part of the republican Government to allow them to serve on the present expedition. By the terms of the treaty the queen had no more power to send these companies to invade Spain than to campaign against Tyr Owen in Ireland, while at a moment when the cardinal archduke had a stronger and better-appointed army in Flanders than had been seen for many years in the

provinces, it was a most hazardous experiment for the States to send so considerable a portion of their land and naval forces upon a distant adventure. It was also a serious blow to them to be deprived for the whole season of that valiant and experienced commander, Sir Francis Vere, the most valuable lieutenant, save Lewis William, that Maurice had at his disposition. Yet Vere was to take command of this contingent thus sent to the coast of Spain, at the very moment when the republican army ought to issue from their winter quarters and begin active operations in the field. The consequence of this diminution of their strength and drain upon their resources was that the States were unable to put an army in the field during the current year, or make any attempt at a campaign.

The queen wrote a warm letter of thanks to Admiral Warmond for the promptness and efficiency with which he had brought his fleet to the place of rendezvous, and now all was bustle and preparation in the English ports for the exciting expedition resolved upon. Never during Philip's life-time, nor for several years before his birth, had a hostile foot trod the soil of Spain, except during the brief landing at Corunna in 1590, and, although the king's beard had been well singed ten years previously by Sir Francis Drake, and although the coast of Portugal had still more recently been invaded by Essex and Vere, yet the present adventure was on a larger scale, and held out brighter prospects of success than any preceding expedition had done. In an age when the line between the land and sea service, between regular campaigners and volunteers, between public and private warfare, between chivalrous knights-errant and buccaneers, was not very distinctly drawn, there could be nothing more exciting to adventurous spirits, more tempting to the imagination of those who hated the Pope and Philip, who

1 Bor, IV. 148, 182.

2 Ibid. 191.

3 Ibid.

loved fighting, prize-money, and the queen, than a foray into Spain.

It was time to return the visit of the Armada. Some of the sea-kings were gone. Those magnificent freebooters, Drake and Hawkins, had just died in the West Indies, and doughty Sir Roger Williams had left the world in which he had battled so effectively, bequeathing to posterity a classic memorial of near a half century of hard fighting, written, one might almost imagine, in his demi-pique saddle. But that most genial, valiant, impracticable, reckless, fascinating hero of romance, the Earl of Essex—still a youth although a veteran in service—was in the spring-tide of favour and glory, and was to command the land-forces now assembled at Plymouth. That other corsair I—as the Spaniards called him—that other charming and heroic shape in England's chequered chronicle of chivalry and crime—famous in arts and arms, politics, science, literature, endowed with so many of the gifts by which men confer lustre on their age and country, whose name was already a part of England's eternal glory, whose tragic destiny was to be her undying shame—Raleigh, the soldier, sailor, scholar, statesman, poet, historian, geographical discoverer, planter of empires yet unborn—was also present, helping to organize the somewhat chaotic elements of which the chief Anglo-Dutch enterprise for this year against the Spanish world-dominion was compounded.

And, again, it is not superfluous to recall the comparatively slender materials, both in bulk and numbers, over which the vivid intelligence and restless energy of the two leading Protestant powers, the kingdom and the republic, disposed. Their contest against the overshadowing empire, which was so ob-

stinately striving to become the fifth-monarchy of history, was waged by land and naval forces, which in their aggregate numbers would scarce make a startling list of killed and wounded in a single modern battle; by ships such that a whole fleet of them might be swept out of existence with half-a-dozen modern broadsides; by weapons which would seem to modern eyes like clumsy toys for children. Such was the machinery by which the world was to be lost and won, less than three centuries ago. Could science, which even in that age had made gigantic strides out of the preceding darkness, have revealed its later miracles, and have presented its terrible powers to the despotism which was seeking to crush all Christendom beneath its feet, the possible result might have been most tragical to humanity. While there are few inventions in morals; the demon Intellect is ever at his work, knowing no fatigue and scorning contentment in his restless demands upon the infinite Unknown. Yet moral truth remains unchanged, gradually through the ages extending its influence, and it is only by conformity to its simple and eternal dictates that nations, like individuals, can preserve a healthful existence. In the unending warfare between right and wrong, between liberty and despotism, Evil has the advantage of rapidly assuming many shapes. It has been well said that constant vigilance is the price of liberty. The tendency of our own times, stimulated by scientific discoveries and their practical application, is to political consolidation, to the absorption of lesser communities in greater, just as disintegration was the leading characteristic of the darker ages. The scheme of Charlemagne to organize Europe into a single despotism was a brilliant failure because the forces which were driving human society into local and gradual reconstruction around various centres of crystallization were irresistible to any countervailing engi-

1 „Otro corsario llamado *Gualteral*,” says the historian Herrera, ingeniously fusing into one the Christian and family names of Sir Walter Raleigh, iii. 585.



which the emperor had at his disposal. The attempt of Philip, eight centuries later, at universal monarchy, was frivolous, although he could dispose of material agencies which in the hands of Charlemagne might have made the dreams of Charlemagne possible. It was frivolous because the rising instinct of the age was for religious, political, and commercial freedom in a far intenser degree than those who lived in that age were themselves aware. A considerable republic had been evolved as it were involuntarily out of the necessities of the time almost without self-consciousness that it was a republic, and even against the desire of many who were guiding its destinies. And it found itself in constant combination with two monarchs despotic at heart and of enigmatical or indifferent religious convictions, who yet reigned over peoples largely influenced by enthusiasm for freedom. Thus liberty was preserved for the world; but, as the law of human progress would seem to be ever by a spiral movement, it seems strange to the superficial observer not prone to generalizing, that Calvinism, which unquestionably was the hard receptacle in which the germ of human freedom was preserved in various countries and at different epochs, should have so often degenerated into tyranny. Yet notwithstanding the burning of Servetus at Geneva, and the hanging of Mary Dyer at Boston, it is certain that France, England, the Netherlands, and America, owe a large share of such political liberty as they have enjoyed to Calvinism. It may be possible for large masses of humanity to accept for ages the idea of one infallible Church, however tyrannical: but the idea once admitted that there may be many churches; that what is called the State can be separated from what is called the Church; the idea of infallibility and of authority soon becomes ridiculous—a mere fiction of political or fashionable quackery to

impose upon the uneducated or the unreflecting.

And now Essex, Raleigh and Howard, Vere, Warmond and Nassau were about to invade the shores of the despot who sat in his study plotting to annex England, Scotland, Ireland, France, the Dutch republic, and the German empire to the realms of Spain, Portugal, Naples, Milan, and the Eastern and Western Indies, over which he already reigned.

The fleet consisted of fifty-seven ships of war, of which twenty-four 13 Jan.  
were Dutch vessels under Ad- 1596.

miral Warmond, with three thousand sailors of Holland and Zeeland. Besides the sailors, there was a force of six thousand foot soldiers, including the English veterans from the Netherlands under Sir Francis Vere. There were also fifty transports laden with ammunition and stores. The expedition was under the joint command of Lord High Admiral Howard and of the Earl of Essex. Many noble and knightly volunteers, both from England and the republic, were on board, including, besides those already mentioned, Lord Thomas Howard, son of the Duke of Norfolk, Sir John Wingfield, who had commanded at Gertruydenberg, when it had been so treacherously surrendered to Farnese; Count Lewis Gunther of Nassau, who had so recently escaped from the disastrous fight with Mondragon in the Lippe, and was now continuing his education according to the plan laid down for him by his elder brother Lewis William; Nicolas Meetkerk, Peter Regesmortes, Don Christopher of Portugal, son of Don Antonio, and a host of other adventurers.

On the last day of June the expedition arrived off Cadiz. Next morning they found a splendid Spanish fleet in the harbour of that city, including four of the famous apostolic great galleons, St. Philip, St. Matthew, St. Thomas and St. Andrew, with twenty or thirty great war-ships besides, and fifty-seven

well-armed Indiamen, which were to be convoyed on their outward voyage, with a cargo estimated at twelve millions of ducats.

The St. Philip was the phenomenon of naval architecture of that day, larger and stronger than any ship before known.

1 July, She was two thousand tons 1596. burden, carried eighty-two bronze cannon, and had a crew of twelve hundred men. The other three apostles carried each fifty guns and four hundred men. The armament of the other war-ships varied from fifty-two to eighteen guns each. The presence of such a formidable force might have seemed a motive for discouragement, or at least of caution. On the contrary, the adventurers dashed at once upon their prey; thus finding a larger booty than they had dared to expect. There was but a brief engagement. At the outset a Dutch ship accidentally blew up, and gave much encouragement to the Spaniards. Their joy was but short-lived. Two of the great galleons were soon captured, the other two, the St. Philip and the St. Thomas, were run aground and burned. The rest of the war-ships were driven within the harbour, but were unable to prevent a landing of the enemy's forces. In the eagerness of the allies to seize the city, they unluckily allowed many of the Indiamen to effect their escape through the *puente del Zuazzo*, which had not been supposed a navigable passage for ships of such burthen. Nine hundred soldiers under Essex, and four hundred noble volunteers under Lewis Gunther of Nassau, now sprang on shore, and drove some eleven hundred Spanish skirmishers back within the gates of the city, or into a bastion recently raised to fortify the point when the troops had landed. Young Nassau stormed the bulwark sword in hand, carried it at the first assault, and planted his colours on its battlement. It was the flag of William the Silent; for the republican banner was composed of the family colours of

the founder of the new commonwealth. 1 The blazonry of the proscribed and assassinated rebel waved at last defiantly over one of the chief cities of Spain. Essex and Nassau and all the rest then entered the city. There was little fighting. Twenty-five English and Hollanders were killed, and about as many Spaniards. Essex knighted about fifty gentlemen, Englishmen and Hollanders, in the square of Cadiz for their gallantry. Among the number were Lewis Gunther of Nassau, Admiral Warmond, and Peter Regesmortes. Colonel Nicolas Meetkerke 2 was killed in the brief action, and Sir John Wingfield, who insisted upon prancing about on horseback without his armour, defying the townspeople and neglecting the urgent appeal of Sir Francis Vere, was also slain. The Spanish soldiers, discouraged by the defeat of the ships on which they had relied for protection of the town, retreated with a great portion of the inhabitants into the citadel. Next morning the citadel capitulated without striking a blow, although there were six thousand able-bodied, well-armed men within its walls. It was one of the most astonishing panics

ever recorded. The great fleet, 2 July. making a third of the king's navy, the city of Cadiz and its fortress, were surrendered to this audacious little force, which had only arrived off the harbour thirty-six hours before. The invaders had, however, committed a great mistake. They had routed, and, as it were, captured the Spanish galleons, but

1 Fruin, 357.

2 It will be observed that the officer mortally wounded at the taking of Cadiz, 2nd July, 1596, bears in the text the same name—Nicolas Meetkerke—with that of the Colonel killed at the capture of Deventer, 10th June, 1591 (*see* p. 101 of this vol., *note*). Meteren, B. xvi. and xviii., fol. 333, and 338, 389, and other contemporary authorities, state the fact without comment on the identity of name. It is possible, however, that the Meetkerke killed at Cadiz was one of the two remaining sons of the President of Flanders, and that his Christian name was Baldwin or Adolph.

they had not taken possession of them, such had been their eagerness to enter the city. It was now agreed that the fleet should be ransomed for two million ducats, but the proud Duke of Medina Sidonia, who had already witnessed the destruction of one mighty armada, preferred that these splendid ships too should perish rather than that they should pay tribute to the enemy. Scorning the capitulation of the commandant of the citadel, he ordered the fleet to be set on fire. Thirty-two ships, most of them vessels of war of the highest class, were burned with all their equipments. Twelve hundred cannon sank at once to the bottom of the Bay of Cadiz, besides arms for five or six thousand men. At least one-third of Philip's effective navy was thus destroyed.

The victors now sacked the city very thoroughly, but the results were disappointing. A large portion of the portable wealth of the inhabitants, their gold and their jewelry, had been so cunningly concealed that, although half a dozen persons were tortured till they should reveal hidden treasures, not more than five hundred thousand ducats worth of plunder was obtained. Another sum of equal amount having been levied upon the citizens, forty notable personages, among them eighteen ecclesiastical dignitaries, were carried off as hostages for its payment. The city was now set on fire by command of Essex in four different quarters. Especially the cathedral and other churches, the convents and the hospitals, were burned. It was perhaps not unnatural that both Englishmen and Hollanders should be disposed to wreak a barbarous vengeance on everything representative of the Church which they abhorred, and from which such endless misery had issued to the uttermost corners of their own countries. But it is at any rate refreshing to record amid these acts of pillage and destruction, in which, as must ever be the case, the innocent and the lowly were

made to suffer for the crimes of crowned and mitred culprits, that not many special acts of cruelty were committed upon individuals. No man was murdered in cold blood, no woman was outraged. 1 The beautiful city was left a desolate and blackened ruin, and a general levy of spoil was made for the benefit of the victors, but there was no infringement of the theory and practice of the laws of war as understood in that day or in later ages. It is even recorded that Essex ordered one of his soldiers, who was found stealing a woman's gown, to be hanged on the spot, but that, wearied by the intercession of an ecclesiastic of Cadiz, the canon Quesada, he consented at last to pardon the marauder. 2

It was the earnest desire of Essex to hold Cadiz instead of destroying it. With three thousand men, and with temporary supplies from the fleet, the place could be maintained against all comers; Holland and England together commanding the seas. Admiral Warmond and all the Netherlanders seconded the scheme, and offered at once to put ashore from their vessels food and munitions enough to serve two thousand men for two months. If the English admiral would do as much, the place might be afterwards supplied without limit and held till doomsday, a perpetual thorn in Philip's side. Sir Francis Vere was likewise warmly in favour of the project, but he stood alone. All the other Englishmen opposed it as hazardous, extravagant, and in direct contravention of the minute instructions of the queen. With a sigh or a curse for what he considered the superfluous caution of his royal mistress, and the exaggerated

1 This is the express testimony of the Spanish historian Herrera, whose evidence will hardly be disputed. Herrera, iii. 645.

2 The chief authorities consulted for this expedition are Bor, IV. 232-235. Meteren, 374-377. Reyd, 278-281. Herrera, iii. 632-645. De Thou, xii. 671-674, l. 116. Camden, 517-523. Fruin, 353-360.



docility of Lord High Admiral Howard, Essex was fain to content himself with the sack and the conflagration, and the allied fleet sailed away from Cadiz.

On their way towards Lisbon they anchored off Faro, and landed a force, chiefly of Netherlanders, who expeditiously burned and plundered the place. When they reached the neighbourhood of Lisbon, they received information that a great fleet of Indiamen, richly laden, were daily expected from the Flemish islands, as the Azores were then denominated. Again Essex was vehemently disposed to steer at once for that station, in order to grasp so tempting a prize; again he was strenuously supported by the Dutch admiral and Vere, and again Lord Howard peremptorily interdicted the plan. It was contrary to his instructions and to his ideas of duty, he said, to risk so valuable a portion of her Majesty's fleet on so doubtful a venture. His ships were not fitted for a winter's cruise, he urged. Thus, although it was the very heart of midsummer, the fleet was ordered to sail homeward. The usual result of a divided command was made manifest, and it proved in the sequel that, had they sailed for the islands, they would have pounced at exactly the right moment upon an unprotected fleet of merchantmen, with cargoes valued at seven millions of ducats. Essex, not being willing to undertake the foray to the Azores with the Dutch ships alone, was obliged to digest his spleen as best he could. Meantime the English fleet bore away for England, leaving Essex in his own ship, together with the two captured Spanish galleons, to his fate. That fate might have been a disastrous one, for his prizes were not fully manned, his own vessel was far from powerful, and there were many rovers and cruisers upon the seas. The Dutch admiral, with

14 Aug. all his ships, however, re-  
1596. mained in company, and  
savely convoyed him to Plymouth, where

they arrived only a day or two later than Howard and his fleet. 1 Warmond, who had been disposed to sail up the Thames in order to pay his respects to the queen, was informed that his presence would not be desirable, but rather an embarrassment. He, however, received the following letter from the hand of Elizabeth.

MONSIEUR. DUVENWOORD,—The report made to me by the generals of our fleet, just happily arrived from the coast of Spain, of the devoirs of those who have been partakers in so famous a victory, ascribes so much of it to the valour, skill, and readiness exhibited by yourself and our other friends from the Netherlands under your command, during the whole course of the expedition, as to fill our mind with special joy and satisfaction, and with a desire to impart these feelings to you. No other means presenting themselves at this moment than that of a letter (in some sense darkening the picture of the conceptions of our soul), we are willing to make use of it while waiting for means more effectual. Wishing thus to disburthen ourselves we find ourselves confused, not knowing where to begin, the greatness of each part exceeding the merit of the other. For the vigour and promptness with which my lords the States-General stepped into the enterprise, made us acknowledge that the good favour, which we have always borne the United Provinces and the proofs thereof which we have given in the benefits conferred by us upon them, had not been ill-bestowed. The valour, skill, and discipline manifested by you in this enterprise show that you and your whole nation are worthy the favour and protection of princes against those who wish to tyrannize over you. But the honourableness and the valour shown by you, Sir Admiral, towards our cousin the Earl of Essex on his return,

1 Bor, Meteren, Reyd, De Thou, *ubi sup.*

when he unfortunately was cut off from the fleet, and deep in the night was deprived of all support, when you kept company with him and gave him escort into the harbour of Plymouth, demonstrate on the one hand your foresight in providing thus by your pains and patience against all disasters, which through an accident falling upon one of the chiefs of our armada might have darkened the great victory; and on the other hand the fervour and fire of the affection which you bear us, increasing thus, through a double bond, the obligations we are owing you, which is so great in our hearts that we have felt bound to discharge a part of it by means of this writing, which we beg you to communicate to the whole company of our friends under your command; saying to them besides, that they may feel assured that even as we have before given proof of our goodwill to their fatherland, so henceforth—incited by their devoirs and merits—we are ready to extend our bounty and affection in all ways which may become a princess recompensing the virtues and gratitude of a nation so worthy as yours.

„ELIZABETH R.

„14th August, 1596.” 1

This letter was transmitted by the admiral to the States-General, who furnished him with a copy of it, but enrolled the original in their archives;

1 The letter, translated of course into Flemish, is given in full by Bor, IV. 235. Incredible as it may seem, Camden not only makes no allusion to this special and memorable service of the Dutch Admiral, and to the enthusiastic approbation bestowed upon him and his comrades by the queen, but he never once mentions him in his account, save that towards the end of a list of persons knighted after the taking of the city the name of John van Duvenvord appears. The English historian, indeed, carefully suppresses the share taken by the sailors and soldiers of the Dutch republic in the expedition; scarcely the faintest allusion being made to them from the beginning to the end of his narrative. The whole affair is represented as a purely English adventure and English triumph.

recording as it did, in the hand of the great English queen, so striking a testimony to the valour and the good conduct of Netherlanders. 1

The results of this expedition were considerable, for the king's navy was crippled, a great city was destroyed, and some millions of plunder had been obtained. But the permanent possession of Cadiz, which, in such case, Essex hoped to exchange for Calais, and the destruction of the fleet at the Azores—possible achievements both, and unwisely neglected—would have been far more profitable, at least to England. It was also matter of deep regret that there was much quarreling between the Netherlanders and the Englishmen as to their respective share of the spoils; the Netherlanders complaining loudly that they had been defrauded. Moreover the merchants of Middelburg, Amsterdam, and other commercial cities of Holland and Zeeland were, as it proved, the real owners of a large portion of the property destroyed or pillaged at Cadiz; so that a loss estimated as high as three hundred thousand florins fell upon those unfortunate traders through this triumph of the allies. 2

The internal consequences of the fall of Calais had threatened at the first moment to be as disastrous as the international results of that misfortune had already proved. The hour for the definite dismemberment and partition of the French kingdom, not by foreign conquerors but among its own self-seeking and disloyal grandees, seemed to have struck. The indomitable Henry, ever most buoyant when most pressed by misfortune, was on the way to his camp at la Fère, encouraging the faint-hearted, and providing as well as he could for the safety of the places most menaced, when he was met at St. Quentin by a solemn deputation of the principal nobles, military commanders, and provincial

1 Bor, *ubi sup.*

2 Bor, Meteren, Reyd, *ubi sup.*

governors of France. The Duke of Montpensier was spokesman of the assembly, and, in an harangue carefully prepared for the occasion, made an elaborate proposition to the king that the provinces, districts, cities, castles, and other strongholds throughout the kingdom should now be formally bestowed upon the actual governors and commanders thereof in perpetuity and as hereditary property, on condition of rendering a certain military service to the king and his descendants. It seemed so amazing that this temporary disaster to the national arms should be used as a pretext for parcelling out France, and converting a great empire into a number of insignificant duchies and petty principalities; that this movement should be made, not by the partisans of Spain, but by the adherents of the king; and that its leader should be his own near relative, a prince of the blood, and a possible successor to the crown, that Henry was struck absolutely dumb. Misinterpreting his silence, the duke proceeded very confidently with his well-concocted harangue; and was eloquently demonstrating that, under such a system, Henry, as principal feudal chief, would have greater military forces at his disposal whenever he chose to summon his faithful vassals to the field, than could be the case while the mere shadow of royal power or dignity was allowed to remain; when the king, finding at last a tongue, rebuked his cousin, not angrily, but with a grave melancholy which was more impressive than wrath.

He expressed his pity for the duke that designing intriguers should have thus taken advantage of his facility of character to cause him to enact a part so entirely unworthy a Frenchman, a gentleman, and a prince of the blood. He had himself, at the outset of his career, been much farther from the throne than Montpensier was at that moment; but at no period of his life would he have consented to disgrace

himself by attempting the dismemberment of the realm. So far from entering for a moment into the subject-matter of the duke's discourse, he gave him and all his colleagues distinctly to understand that he would rather die a thousand deaths than listen to suggestions which would cover his family and the royal dignity with infamy. 1

Rarely has political cynicism been displayed in more revolting shape than in this deliberate demonstration by the leading patricians and generals of France, to whom patriotism seemed an unimaginable idea. Thus signally was their greediness to convert a national disaster into personal profit rebuked by the king. Henry was no respecter of the People, which he regarded as something immeasurably below his feet. On the contrary, he was the most sublime self-seeker of them all; but his courage, his intelligent ambition, his breadth and strength of purpose, never permitted him to doubt that his own greatness was inseparable from the greatness of France. Thus he represented a distinct and wholesome principle—the national integrity of a great homogeneous people at a period when that integrity seemed, through domestic treason and foreign hatred, to be hopelessly lost. Hence it is not unnatural that he should hold his place in the national chronicle as Henry the Great.

Meantime, while the military events just recorded had been occurring in the southern peninsula, the progress of the archduke and his lieutenants in the north against the king and against the republic had been gratifying to the ambition of that martial ecclesiastic. Soon after the fall of Calais, De Rosne had seized the castles of 22-23 May. Guynes and Hames, while 1596. De Mexia laid siege to the important stronghold of Ardres. The garrison,

1 Sully, *Memoirs*, t. i, lib. vii. pp. 417, 418. Compare De Thou, t. xiii, lib. cxviii. p. 136.



commanded by Count Belin, was sufficiently numerous and well supplied to maintain the place until Henry, whose triumph at La Fère could hardly be much longer delayed, should come to its relief. To the king's infinite dissatisfaction, however, precisely as Don Alvario de Osorio was surrendering La Fère to him, after a seven months' siege, Andres was capitulating to De Mexia. The reproaches upon Belin for cowardice, imbecility, and bad faith were bitter and general. All his officers had vehemently protested against the surrender, and Henry at first talked of cutting off his head.<sup>1</sup> It was hardly probable, however—had the surrender been really the result of treachery—that the governor would have put himself, as he did at once, in the king's power; for the garrison marched out of Ardres with the commandant at their head, banners displayed, drums beating, matches lighted and bullet in mouth, twelve hundred fighting men strong, besides invalids. Belin was possessed of too much influence, and had the means of rendering too many pieces of service to the politic king, whose rancour against Spain was perhaps not really so intense as was commonly supposed, to meet with the condign punishment which might have been the fate of humbler knaves.

These successes having been obtained in Normandy, the cardinal with a force of nearly fifteen thousand men now took the field in Flanders; and, after hesitating for a time whether he should attack Breda, Bergen, Ostend, or Gertruydenberg,—and after making occasional feints in various directions,—came, towards the end of June, before Hulst. This rather insignificant place, with a population of but one thousand inhabitants, was defended by a strong garrison under command of that eminent and experienced officer, Count Everard

Solms. Its defences were made more complete by a system of sluices, through which the country around could be laid under water; and Maurice, whose capture of the town in the year 1591 had been one of his earliest military achievements, was disposed to hold it at all hazards. He came in person to inspect the fortifications, and appeared to be so eager on the subject, and so likely to encounter unnecessary hazards, that the States of Holland passed a resolution imploring him „that he would not in his heroic enthusiasm and laudable personal service, expose a life on which the country so much depended to manifest dangers.”<sup>1</sup> The place was soon thoroughly invested, and the usual series of minings and counter-minings, assaults, and sorties followed, in the course of which that courageous and corpulent renegade, De Rosne, had his head taken off by a cannon-ball, while his son, a lad of sixteen, was fighting by his side.<sup>2</sup> On the 16th August the cardinal formally demanded the surrender of the place, and received the magnanimous reply that Hulst would be defended to the death. This did not, however, prevent the opening of negotiations the very same day. All the officers, save one, united in urging Solms to capitulate; and Solms, for somewhat mysterious reasons, and, as was stated, in much confusion, gave his consent. The single malcontent was the well-named Matthew Held, whose family name meant Hero, and who had been one of the chief actors in the far-famed capture of Breda. He was soon afterwards killed in an unsuccessful attack made by Maurice upon Venlo.

Hulst capitulated on the 18th August.<sup>3</sup> The terms were honourable; but the indignation

<sup>1</sup> Van der Kemp. iii. 162.

<sup>2</sup> Bor, IV. 219. Bentivoglio, 440.

<sup>3</sup> For the siege and capture of Hulst, see Bor, IV. 213-230. Meteren, 380 *seqq.* Bentivoglio, 439, 440. Reynders, 285-287. Coloma, 225-229.

<sup>1</sup> So Justinus of Nassau wrote to Prince Maurice. Bor, IV, 194.

throughout the country against Count Solms was vere great. The States of Zeeland, of whose regiment he had been commander ever since the death of Sir Philip Sidney, dismissed him from their service, while a torrent of wrath flowed upon him from every part of the country. Members of the States-General refused to salute him in the streets; eminent personages turned their backs upon him, and for a time there was no one willing to listen to a word in his defence. The usual reaction in such cases followed; Maurice sustained the commander, who had doubtless committed a grave error, but who had often rendered honourable service to the republic, and the States-General gave him a command as important as that of which he had been relieved by the Zeeland States. It was mainly on account of the tempest thus created within the Netherlands, that an affair of such slight importance came to occupy so large a space in contemporary history. The defenders of Solms told wild stories about the losses of the besieging army. The cardinal, who was thought prodigal of blood, and who was often quoted as saying „his soldiers' lives belonged to God and their bodies to the king,"<sup>1</sup> I had sacrificed, it was ridiculously said, according to the statement of the Spaniards themselves, five thousand soldiers before the walls of Hulst.<sup>2</sup> It was very logically deduced therefrom that the capture of a few more towns of a thousand inhabitants each would cost him his whole army. People told each other, too, that the conqueror had refused a triumph which the burghers of Brussels wished to prepare for him on his entrance into the capital, and that he had administered the very proper rebuke that, if they had more money than they knew what to do with, they should expend it in aid of the wounded and of the

families of the fallen, rather than in velvets and satins and triumphal arches.<sup>1</sup> The humanity of the suggestion hardly tallied with the bloodthirstiness of which he was at the same time so unjustly accused—although it might well be doubted whether the commander-in-chief, even if he could witness unflinchingly the destruction of five thousand soldiers on the battle-field, would dare to confront a new demonstration of schoolmaster Houwaerts and his fellow-pedants.

The fact was, however, that the list of casualties in the cardinal's camp during the six weeks' siege amounted to six hundred, while the losses within the city were at least as many.<sup>2</sup> There was no attempt to relieve the place; for the States, as before observed, had been too much cramped by the strain upon their resources and by the removal of so many veterans for the expedition against Cadiz to be able to muster any considerable forces in the field during the whole of this year.

For a vast war in which the four leading powers of the earth were engaged, the events, to modern eyes, of the campaign of 1596 seem sufficiently meagre. Meantime, during all this campaigning by land and sea in the west, there had been great but profitless bloodshed in the east. With difficulty did the holy Roman Empire withstand the terrible, ever-renewed assaults of the unholy realm of Ottoman—then in the full flush of its power—but the two empires still counterbalanced each other, and contended with each other at the gates of Vienna.

As the fighting became more languid, however, in the western part of Christendom, the negotiations and intrigues grew only the more active. It was most desirable for the republic to effect, if possible, a formal alliance offensive and

<sup>1</sup> Reyd.

<sup>2</sup> Relacion de la presa de la villa de Hulst en Flandes, 17 Aug. 1596. There seems no reason why the cardinal in these private despatches should not have told the truth.

<sup>1</sup> Reyd, *ubi sup.*

<sup>2</sup> Bor, Meteren, Reyd, Coloma, *ubi sup.*, especially Reyd.

defensive with France and England against Spain. The diplomacy of the Netherlands had been very efficient in bringing about the declaration of war by Henry against Philip, by which the current year had opened, after Henry and Philip had been doing their best to destroy each other and each other's subjects during the half-dozen previous years. Elizabeth, too, although she had seen her shores invaded by Philip with the most tremendous armaments that had ever floated on the seas, and although she had herself just been sending fire and sword into the heart of Spain, had very recently made the observation <sup>1</sup> that she and Philip were not formally at war with each other. It seemed, therefore, desirable to the States-General that this very practical warfare should be as it were, reduced to a theorem. In this case the position of the republic to both powers and to Spain itself might perhaps be more accurately defined.

Calvaert, the States' envoy—to use his own words—haunted Henry like his perpetual shadow, and was ever doing his best to persuade him of the necessity of this alliance. <sup>2</sup> De Sancy, as we have seen, had just arrived in England, when the cool proposition of the queen to rescue Calais from Philip on condition of keeping it for herself had been brought to Boulogne by Sidney. Notwithstanding the indignation of the king, he had been induced directly afterwards to send an additional embassy to Elizabeth, with the Duke of Bouillon at its head; and he had insisted upon Calvaert's accompanying the mission. He had, as he frequently observed, <sup>3</sup> no secrets from the States-General; or from Calvaert, who had been negotiating upon these affairs for two years past and was so well acquainted with all their bearings. The Dutch envoy was reluctant to go,—for he was seriously

ill and very poor in purse,—but Henry urged the point so vehemently that Calvaert found himself on board ship within six hours of the making of the proposition. <sup>1</sup> The incident shows of how much account the republican diplomatist was held by so keen a judge of mankind as the Béarnese; but it will subsequently appear that the candour of the king towards the States-General and their representative was by no means without certain convenient limitations.

De Sancy had arrived just as—without his knowledge—Sidney had been despatched across the channel with the brief mission already mentioned. When he was presented to the queen, the next day, she excused herself for the propositions by which Henry had been so much enraged, by assuring the envoy that it had been her intention only to keep Calais out of the enemy's hand, so long as the king's forces were too much occupied at a distance to provide for its safety. As diplomatic conferences were about to begin in which—even more than in that age, at least, was usually the case—the object of the two conferring powers was to deceive each other, and at the same time still more decidedly to defraud other states, Sancy accepted the royal explanation, although Henry's special messenger, Loménie, had just brought him from the camp at Boulogne a minute account of the propositions of Sidney. <sup>2</sup>

The envoy had, immediately afterwards, an interview with Lord Burghley, and at once perceived that he was no friend to his master. Cecil observed that the queen had formerly been much bound to the king for religion's sake. As this tie no longer existed, there was nothing now to unite save the proximity of the two States to each other

<sup>1</sup> Calvert to the States-General, *apud* Deventer, ii. 118.

<sup>2</sup> See especially for these negotiations, De Thou, t. xii. lib. 116, p. 247, *seqq.* Compare Bor, IV. 253-257.

<sup>1</sup> „T welck haer Mag. pretendeerde tot noch niet gedaen te hebben.” Calvert to the States-General, *apud* Deventer, ii. 117.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid. 114.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid. 118.



and their ancient alliances, a bond purely of interest which existed only so long as princes found therein a special advantage.

De Sancy replied that the safety of the two crowns depended upon their close alliance against a very powerful foe who was equally menacing to them both. Cecil rejoined that he considered the Spaniards deserving of the very highest praise for having been able to plan so important an enterprise, and to have so well deceived the King of France by the promptness and the secrecy of their operations as to allow him to conceive no suspicion as to their designs.

To this not very friendly sarcasm the envoy, indignant that France should thus be insulted in her misfortunes, exclaimed that he prayed to God that the affairs of Englishmen might never be reduced to such a point as to induce the world to judge by the result merely, as to the sagacity of their counsels. He added that there were many passages through which to enter France, and that it was difficult to be present everywhere, in order to defend them all against the enemy.

A few days afterwards the Duke of

7 May, Bouillon arrived in London.

1596. He had seen Lord Essex at Dover as he passed, and had endeavoured without success to dissuade him from his expedition against the Spanish coast. The conferences opened on the 7th May, at Greenwich, between Burghley, Cobham, the Lord Chamberlain, and one or two other commissioners on the part of the queen; and Bouillon, Sancy, Du Vair, and Ancel, as plenipotentiaries of Henry.

There was the usual indispensable series of feints at the outset, as if it were impossible for statesmen to meet around a green table except as fencers in the field or pugilists in the ring.

„We have nothing to do,” said Burghley, „except to listen to such propositions as may be made on the

part of the king, and to repeat them to her Highness the queen.”

„You cannot be ignorant,” replied Bouillon, „of the purpose for which we have been sent hither by his Very Christian Majesty. You know very well that it is to conclude a league with England. 'Tis necessary, therefore, for the English to begin by declaring whether they are disposed to enter into such an alliance. This point once settled, the French can make their propositions, but it would be idle to dispute about the conditions of a treaty, if there is after all no treaty to be made.”

To this Cecil rejoined, that, if the king were reduced to the necessity of asking succour from the queen, and of begging for her alliance, it was necessary for them, on the other hand, to see what he was ready to do for the queen in return, and to learn what advantage she could expect from the league.

The duke said that the English statesmen were perfectly aware of the French intention of proposing a league against the common enemy of both nations, and that it would be unquestionably for the advantage of both to unite their forces for a vigorous attack upon Spain, in which case it would be more difficult for the Spanish to resist them than if each were acting separately. It was no secret that the Spaniards would rather attack England than France, because their war against England, being coloured by a religious motive, would be much less odious, and would even have a specious pretext. Moreover the conquest of England would give them an excellent vantage ground to recover what they had lost in the Netherlands. If, on the contrary, the enemy should throw himself with his whole force upon France, the king, who would perhaps lose many places at once, and might hardly be able to maintain himself single-handed against domestic treason and a concentrated effort on the part of Spain, would

probably find it necessary to make a peace with that power. Nothing could be more desirable for Spain than such a result, for she would then be free to attack England and Holland, undisturbed by any fear of France. This was a piece of advice, the duke said, which the king offered, in the most friendly spirit, and as a proof of his affection to her Majesty's earnest consideration.

Burghley replied that all this seemed to him no reason for making a league. „What more can the queen do,” he observed, „than she is already doing? She has invaded Spain by land and sea, she has sent troops to Spain, France, and the Netherlands; she has lent the king fifteen hundred thousand crowns in gold. In short, the envoys ought rather to be studying how to repay her Majesty for her former benefits than to be soliciting fresh assistance.” He added that the king was so much stronger by the recent gain of Marseilles as to be easily able to bear the loss of places of far less importance, while Ireland, on the contrary, was a constant danger to the queen. That country was already in a blaze, on account of the recent landing effected there by the Spaniards, and it was a very ancient proverb among the English, that to attack England it was necessary to take the road of Ireland.

Bouillon replied that in this war there was much difference between the position of France and that of England. The queen, notwithstanding hostilities, obtained her annual revenue as usual, while the king was cut off from his resources and obliged to ruin his kingdom in order to wage war. Sancy added, that it must be obvious to the English ministers that the peril of Holland was likewise the peril of England and of France, but that at the same time they could plainly see that the king, if not succoured, would be forced to a peace with Spain. All his counsellors were urging him to this, and it was the interest of all his neighbours to prevent

such a step. Moreover, the proposed league could not but be advantageous to the English: whether by restraining the Spaniards from entering England, or by facilitating a combined attack upon the common enemy. The queen might invade any portion of the Flemish coast at her pleasure, while the king's fleet could sail with troops from his ports to prevent any attack upon her realms.

At this Burghley turned to his colleagues and said, in English, „The French are acting according to the proverb; they wish to sell us the bear-skin before they have killed the bear.” 1

Sancy, who understood English, rejoined, „We have no bear-skin to sell, but we are giving you a very good and salutary piece of advice. It is for you to profit by it as you may.”

„Where are these ships of war, of which you were speaking?” asked Burghley.

„They are at Rochelle, at Bordeaux, and at St. Malo,” replied de Sancy.

„And these ports are not in the king's possession,” said the Lord Treasurer.

The discussion was growing warm. The Duke of Bouillon, in order to put an end to it, said that what England had most to fear was a descent by Spain upon her coasts, and that the true way to prevent this was to give occupation to Philip's army in Flanders. The soldiers in the fleet then preparing were raw levies with which he would not venture to assail her kingdom. The veterans in Flanders were the men on whom he relied for that purpose. Moreover the queen, who had great influence with the States-General, would procure from them a prohibition of all commerce between the provinces and Spain; all the Netherlanders would be lost to Philip, his armies would disperse of their own accord; the princes of Italy, to whom the power of Spain was a perpetual menace, would secretly

1 De Thou, 653. The historian, probably, according to Fruin, 346, took his account from the papers of Du Vair.

supply funds to the allied powers, and the Germans, declared enemies of Philip, would furnish troops.

Burghley asserted confidently that this could never be obtained from the Hollanders, who lived by commerce alone. Upon which Saucy, wearied by all these difficulties, interrupted the Lord Treasurer by exclaiming. „If the king is to expect neither an alliance nor any succour on your part, he will be very much obliged to the queen if she will be good enough to inform him of the decision taken by her, in order that he may, upon his side, take the steps most suitable to the present position of his affairs.”

The session then terminated. Two days afterwards, in another conference, Burghley offered three thousand men on the part of the queen, on condition that they should be raised at the king's expense, and that they should not leave England until they had received a month's pay in advance.

The Duke of Bouillon said this was far from being what had been expected of the generosity of her Majesty, that if the king had money he would find no difficulty in raising troops in Switzerland and Germany, and that there was a very great difference between hired princes and allies.<sup>1</sup> The English ministers having answered that this was all the queen could do, the duke and Sancy rose in much excitement, saying that they had then no further business than to ask for an audience of leave, and to return to France as fast as possible.

Before they bade farewell to the queen, however, the envoys sent a memoir to her Majesty, in which they set forth that the first proposition as to a league had been made by Sir Henry Umton, and that now, when the king had sent commissioners to treat concerning an alliance, already recommended by the

queen's ambassador in France, they had been received in such a way as to indicate a desire to mock them rather than to treat with them. They could not believe, they said, that it was her Majesty's desire to use such language as had been addressed to them, and they therefore implored her plainly to declare her intentions, in order that they might waste no more time unnecessarily, especially as the high offices with which their sovereign had honoured them did not allow them to remain for a long time absent from France.

The effect of this memoir upon the queen was, that fresh conferences were suggested, which took place at intervals between the 11th and the 26th of May. They were characterized by the same mutual complaints of overreachings and of shortcomings by which all the previous discussions had been distinguished. On the 17th May the French envoys even insisted on taking formal farewell of the queen, and were received by her Majesty for that purpose at a final audience. After they had left the presence—the preparations for their homeward journey being <sup>17 May.</sup> already made—the queen sent Sir Robert Cecil, Henry Brooke, son of Lord Cobham, and La Fontaine, minister of a French church in England, to say to them how very much mortified she was that the state of her affairs did not permit her to give the king as much assistance as he desired, and to express her wish to speak to them once more before their departure.

The result of the audience given accordingly to the envoys, two days later, was the communication of her decision to enter into the league proposed, but without definitely concluding the treaty until it should be ratified by the king.

On the 26th May articles were finally agreed upon, by which the <sup>26 May.</sup> king and queen agreed to defend each other's dominions, to unite

<sup>1</sup> „Beaucoup de différence entre des princes à gages et des alliés.”—De Thou, 655.



in attacking the common enemy, and to invite other princes and states equally interested with themselves in resisting the ambitious projects of Spain, to join in the league. It was arranged that an army should be put in the field as soon as possible, at the expense of the king and queen, and of such other powers as should associate themselves in the proposed alliance; that this army should invade the dominions of the Spanish monarch, that the king and queen were never, without each other's consent, to make peace or truce with Philip; that the queen should immediately raise four thousand infantry to serve six months of every year in Picardy and Normandy, with the condition that they were never to be sent to a distance of more than fifty leagues from Boulogne; that when the troubles of Ireland should be over the queen should be at liberty to add new troops to the four thousand men thus promised by her to the league; that the queen was to furnish to these four thousand men six months' pay in advance before they should leave England, and that the king should agree to repay the amount six months afterwards, sending meanwhile four nobles to England as hostages. If the dominions of the queen should be attacked it was stipulated that, at two months' notice, the king should raise four thousand men at the expense of the queen and send them to her assistance, and that they were to serve for six months at her charge, but were not to be sent to a distance of more than fifty leagues from the coasts of France. 1

The English were not willing that the States-General should be comprehended among the powers to be invited to join the league, because being under the protection of the Queen of England they were supposed to have no will but hers. 2 Burghley insisted accordingly that, in speaking of those who were thus to be asked, no mention was to

be made of peoples nor of states, for fear lest the States-General might be included under those terms. 1 The queen was, however, brought at last to yield the point, and consented, in order to satisfy the French envoys, that to the word princes should be added the general expression orders or estates. 2 The obstacle thus interposed to the formation of the league by the hatred of the queen and of the privileged classes of England to popular liberty, and by the secret desire entertained of regaining that sovereignty over the provinces which had been refused ten years before by Elizabeth, was at length set aside. The republic, which might have been stifled at its birth, was now a formidable fact, and could neither be annexed to the English dominions nor deprived of its existence as a new member of the European family.

It being no longer possible to gainsay the presence of the young commonwealth among the nations, the next best thing—so it was thought—was to defraud her in the treaty to which she was now invited to accede. This, as it will presently appear, the King of France and the Queen of England succeeded in doing very thoroughly, and they accomplished in notwithstanding the astuteness and the diligence of the States' envoy, who at Henry's urgent request had accompanied the French mission to England. Calvaert had been very active in bringing about the arrangement, to assist in which he had, as we have seen, risen from a sick bed and made the journey to England. „The proposition for an offensive and defensive alliance was agreed to by her Majesty's Council, but under intolerable and impracticable conditions,” said he, „and, as such, rejected by the duke and Sancy, so that they took leave of her Majesty. At last, after some negotiation in which, without boasting, I may say that I did

1 Bor. IV. 256. De Thou, *ubi sup.*

2 Ibid.

1 De Thou, 647-660, *seqq.* 2 Ibid. 660.

some service, it was again taken in hand, and at last, thank God, although with much difficulty, the league has been concluded." 1

When the task was finished the French envoys departed to obtain their master's ratification of the treaty. Elizabeth expressed herself warmly in regard to her royal brother, inviting him earnestly to pay her a visit, in which case she said she would gladly meet him half way; for a sight of him would be her only consolation in the midst of her adversity and annoyance. „He may see other princesses of a more lovely appearance," she added, „but he will never make a visit to a more faithful friend." 2

But the treaty thus concluded was for the public. The real agreement between France and England was made by the commissioners a few days later, and reduced the ostensible arrangement to a sham, a mere decoy to foreign nations, especially to the Dutch republic, to induce them to imitate England in joining the league, and to emulate her likewise in affording that substantial assistance to the league which in reality England was very far from giving.

„Two contracts were made," said Secretary of State Villeroy; „the one public, to give credit and reputation to the said league, *the other secret, which destroyed the effects and the promises of the first.* By the first, his Majesty was to be succoured by four thousand infantry, *which number was limited by the second contract to two thousand, who were to reside and to serve only in the cities of Boulogne and Montreuil,* assisted by an equal number of French, and not otherwise, and on condition of not being removed from those towns unless his Majesty should be personally present in Picardy with an army, in which case they might serve in Picardy but nowhere else." 3

An English garrison in a couple of French seaports, over against the English coast, would hardly have seemed a sufficient inducement to other princes and states to put large armies in the field to sustain the Protestant league, had they known that this was the meagre result of the protocolling and disputations that had been going on all the summer at Greenwich.

Nevertheless the decoy did its work. The envoys returned to France, and it was not until three months 26 Aug. later that the Duke of Bouillon 1596. again made his appearance in England, bringing the treaty duly ratified by Henry. The league was then solemnized, on the 26th August, by the queen with much pomp and ceremony. Three peers of the realm waited upon the French ambassador at his lodgings, and escorted him and his suite in seventeen royal coaches to the Tower. Seven splendid barges then conveyed them along the Thames to Greenwich. On the pier the ambassador was received by the Earl of Derby at the head of a great suite of nobles and high functionaries, and conducted to the palace of Nonesuch. 1

There was a religious ceremony in the royal chapel, where a special pavilion had been constructed. Standing within this sanctuary, the queen, with her hand on her breast, swore faithfully to maintain the league just concluded. She then gave her hand to the Duke of Bouillon, who held it in both his own, while psalms were sung and the

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den tachtigjarigen Oorlog,' is the first, so far as I know, that ever called public attention to the extraordinary perfidy of these transactions. See in particular, pp. 372-374.

Camden, however, alludes to the fact that „shortly after there was another treaty had, wherein it was agreed that this year no more than two thousand English should be sent over, which should serve only in Bologne and Monstreul, unless the king should come personally to Picardy, &c. (b. iv. p. 525). But the essence of this „other treaty" was, that it was kept secret from those most interested in knowing its existence.

1 Bor, IV. 256. 257.

1 Calvaert's Report, in Deventer, 117.

2 Ibid.

3 Fruin, in his masterly „Tien Jaren uit

organ resounded through the chapel. Afterwards there was a splendid banquet in the palace, the duke sitting in solitary grandeur at the royal table, being placed at a respectful distance from her Majesty, and the dishes being placed on the board by the highest nobles of the realm, who, upon their knees, served the queen with wine. No one save the ambassador sat at Elizabeth's table, but in the same hall was spread another, at which the Earl of Essex entertained many distinguished guests, young Count Lewis Gunther of Nassau among the number.

In the midsummer twilight the brilliantly decorated barges were again floating on the historic river, the gaily-coloured lanterns lighting the sweep of the oars, and the sound of lute and viol floating merrily across the water. As the ambassador came into the courtyard of his house, he found a crowd of several thousand people assembled, who shouted welcome to the representative of Henry, and invoked blessings on the head of Queen Elizabeth and of her royal brother of France. Meanwhile all the bells of London were ringing, artillery was thundering, and bonfires were blazing, until the night was half spent. 1

Such was the holiday-making by which the league between the great Protestant queen and the ex-chief of the Huguenots of France was celebrated within a year after the pope had received him, a repentant sinner, into the fold of the Church. Truly it might be said that religion was rapidly ceasing to be the line of demarcation among the nations, as had been the case for the two last generations of mankind.

The Duke of Bouillon soon afterwards departed for the Netherlands, where the regular envoy to the commonwealth, Paul Chonart Seigneur de Buzanval, had already been preparing the States-General for their en- 11 Sept.  
trance into the league. Of 1596.

course it was duly impressed upon those republicans that they should think themselves highly honoured by the privilege of associating themselves with so august an alliance. The queen wrote an earnest letter to the States urging them to join the league. „Especially should you do so,” she said, „on account of the reputation which you will thereby gain for your affairs with the people who are under you, seeing you thus sustained (besides the certainty which you have of our favour) by the friendship of other confederated princes, and particularly by that of the most Christian king.” 1

On the 31st October the articles of agreement under which the republic acceded to the new confederation were signed at the Hague. Of course it was not the exact counterpart of the famous Catholic association. Madam League, after struggling feebly for the past few years, a decrepit beldame, was at last dead and buried. But there had been a time when she was filled with exuberant and terrible life. She, at least, had known the object of her creation, and never, so long as life was in her, had she faltered in her dread purpose. To extirpate Protestantism, to murder Protestants, to burn, hang, butcher, bury them alive, to dethrone every Protestant sovereign in Europe, especially to assassinate the Queen of England, the Prince of Orange, with all his race, and Henry of Navarre, and to unite in the accomplishment of these simple purposes all the powers of Christendom under the universal monarchy of Philip of Spain—for all this, blood was shed in torrents, and the precious metals of the „Indies” squandered as fast as the poor savages, who were thus taking their first lessons in the doctrines of Jesus of Nazareth, could dig it from the mines. For this America had been summoned, as it were by almighty fiat, out of previous darkness, in order that



it might furnish money with which to massacre all the heretics of the earth. For this great purpose was the sublime discovery of the Genoese sailor to be turned to account. These aims were intelligible, and had in part been attained. William of Orange had fallen, and a patent of nobility, with a handsome fortune, had been bestowed upon his assassin. Elizabeth's life had been frequently attempted. So had those of Henry, of Maurice, of Olden-Barneveld. Divine providence might perhaps guide the hand of future murderers with greater accuracy, for even if Madam League were dead, her ghost still walked among the Jesuits and summoned them to complete the crimes left yet unfinished.

But what was the design of the new confederacy? It was not a Protestant league. Henry of Navarre could no longer be the chief of such an association, although it was to Protestant powers only that he could turn for assistance. It was to the commonwealth of the Netherlands, to the northern potentates and to the Calvinist and Lutheran princes of Germany, that the king and queen could alone appeal in their designs against Philip of Spain.

The position of Henry was essentially a false one from the beginning. He felt it to be so, and the ink was scarce dry with which he signed the new treaty before he was secretly casting about him to make peace with that power with which he was apparently summoning all the nations of the earth to do battle. Even the cautious Elizabeth was deceived by the crafty Béarnese, while both united to hoodwink the other states and princes.

On the 31st October, accordingly, 31 Oct. the States General agreed to 1596. go into the league with England and France „in order to resist the enterprises and ambitious designs of the King of Spain against all the princes and potentates of Christendom.” As the

queen had engaged—according to the public treaty or decoy—to furnish four thousand infantry to the league, the States now agreed to raise and pay for another four thousand, to be maintained in the king's service at a cost of four hundred and fifty thousand florins annually, to be paid by the month. The king promised, in case the Netherlands should be invaded by the enemy with the greater part of his force, that these four thousand soldiers should return to the Netherlands. The king further bound himself to carry on a sharp offensive war in Artois and Hainault. 1

The States-General would have liked a condition inserted in the treaty that no peace should be made with Spain by England or France without the consent of the provinces; but this was peremptorily refused.

Perhaps the republic had no special reason to be grateful for the grudging and almost contemptuous manner in which it had thus been virtually admitted into the community of sovereigns; but the men who directed its affairs were far too enlightened not to see how great a step was taken when their political position, now conceded to them, had been secured. In good faith they intended to carry out the provisions of the new treaty, and they immediately turned their attention to the vital matters of making new levies, and of imposing new taxes, by means of which they might render themselves useful to their new allies.

Meantime Ancel was deputed by Henry to visit the various courts of Germany and the north in order to obtain, if possible, new members for the league. 2 But Germany was difficult to rouse. The dissensions among Protestants were

1 Articles of agreement between the King and the States-General of the Netherlands, signed by Bouillon and Buzanval, 31 Oct. 1596, *apud* Bor, IV. 265-267.

2 See an account of Ancel's missions, speeches, and negotiations, in De Thou, xiii. 77-87, l. 118. Bor, IV. 289.

ever inviting the assaults of the Papists. Its multitude of sovereigns were passing their leisure moments in wrangling among themselves as usual on abstruse points of theology and devoting their serious hours to banqueting, deep drinking, and the pleasures of the chase. The jeremiads of old John of Nassau grew louder than ever, but his voice was of one crying in the wilderness. The wrath to come of that horrible Thirty Years' War, which he was not to witness, seemed to inspire all his prophetic diatribes. But there were few to heed them. Two great dangers seemed ever impending over Christendom, and it is difficult to decide which fate would have been the more terrible, the establishment of the universal monarchy of Philip II., or the conquest of Germany by the Grand Turk. But when Ancel and other emissaries sought to obtain succour against the danger from the south-west, he was answered by the clash of arms and the shrieks of horror which came daily from the south-east. 1

1 „J'ai cru de devoir ici sur la foi de ceux qui en ont été témoins oculaires, afin de donner par là une juste idée de la splendeur de l'Empire Ottoman, de ses richesses, de sa puissance et de la discipline exacte qui s'observe au dedans et au dehors, afin que nos peuples ne soient plus étonnés ni si indignés, si tandis que nos princes Chrétiens languissent dans l'oisiveté et dans une mollesse infame et travaillent sans cesse à se détruire les uns les autres par leurs haines ou par leurs jalousies, les Turcs dont les commentements ont été si peu de chose ont formé un si grand empire. Quand on fera réflexion sur la sévérité de leur discipline, sur leur éloignement du luxe et de tous les vices que traîne avec soi la mollesse, et qu'il n'y a point d'autre route parmi eux pour s'élever aux grands emplois, et faire de grandes fortunes, que les vertus militaires, leurs vastes progrès n'auront plus rien qui surprenne." Such are the admiring words of so enlightened a statesman and historian as Jacques Auguste de Thou, xii. 580, l. 115.

„Wol zu wünschen wehre," said old John of Nassau, „das man in Zeiten uff wachen und uff die wege gedenken wolte, wie nicht allein diesem bluthundt dem Türken sondern auch dem Pabst, welchen D. Luther seliger in seinem christlichen Gesang, ‚Erhalt uns Herr bei deinem Wort,‘ vor und den Turken nachsetzt, mit verleiung Göttlicher hülffe

In vain was it urged, and urged with truth, that the Alcoran was less cruel than the Inquisition, that the soil of Europe might be overrun by Turks and Tartars, and the crescent planted triumphantly in every village, with less disaster to the human race, and with better hope that the germs of civilization and the precepts of Christianity might survive the invasion, than if the systems of Philip, of Torquemada, and of Alva, should become the universal law. But the Turk was a frank enemy of Christianity, while Philip murdered Christians in the name of Christ. The distinction imposed upon the multitudes, with whom words were things. Moreover, the danger from the young and enterprising Mahomet seemed more appalling to the imagination than the menace, from which experience had taken something of its terrors, of the old and decrepit Philip.

The Ottoman empire, in its exact discipline, in its terrible concentration of purpose, in its contempt for all arts and sciences, and all human occupation save the trade of war and the pursuit of military dominion, offered a strong contrast to the distracted condition of the holy Roman empire, where an intellectual and industrious people, distracted by half a century of religious controversy and groaning under one of the most elaborately perverse of all the political systems ever invented by man, seemed to offer itself an easy prey to any conqueror. The Turkish power was in the fulness of its aggressive strength, and seemed far more formidable than it would have done had there been clearer perceptions of what constitutes the strength and the wealth of nations. Could the simple truth have been thoroughly comprehended that a realm

möge widerstanden, und viel jamer und ehendt und blut vergiessen, ja die verherung der ganzen Teutschen nation sambt andren christlichen Königreichen und Ländern vorkommen werden," &c., &c. Groen v. Prinsterer, Archives, I. 330 (2<sup>e</sup> serie).

founded upon such principles was the grossest of absurdities, the Eastern might have seemed less terrible than the Western danger.

But a great campaign, at no considerable distance from the walls of Vienna, had occupied the attention of Germany during the autumn. Mahomet had taken the field in person with a hundred thousand men, and the emperor's brother, Maximilian, in conjunction with the Prince of Transylvania, at the head of a force of equal magnitude, had gone forth to give him battle. Between the Theiss and the Danube, at Keveste, not far from the city of Erlau, 26 Oct. on the 26th October, the 1596.

terrible encounter on which the fate of Christendom seemed to hang at last took place, and Europe held its breath in awful suspense until its fate should be decided. When the result at last became known, a horrible blending of the comic and the tragic, such as has rarely been presented in history, startled the world. Seventy thousand human beings—Moslems and Christians—were lying dead or wounded on the banks of a nameless little stream which flows into the Theiss, and the commanders-in-chief of both armies were running away as fast as horses could carry them. Each army believed itself hopelessly defeated, and abandoning tents, baggage, artillery, ammunition, the remnants of each betook themselves to panic-stricken flight. Generalissimo Maximilian never looked behind him as he fled, until he had taken refuge in Kaschan, and had thence made his way, deeply mortified and despondent, to Vienna. The Prince of Transylvania retreated into the depths of his own principality. Mahomet, with his principal officers, shut himself up in Buda, after which he returned to Constantinople and abandoned himself for a time to a voluptuous ease, inconsistent with the Ottoman projects of conquering the world. The Turks, less prone to desperation

than the Christians, had been utterly overthrown in the early part of the action, but when the victors were, as usual, greedily bent upon plunder before the victory had been fairly secured, the tide of battle was turned by the famous Italian renegade Cicala. The Turks, too, had the good sense to send two days afterwards and recover their artillery, trains, and other property, which ever since the battle had been left at the mercy of the first comers.<sup>1</sup>

So ended the Turkish campaign of the year 1596.<sup>2</sup> Ancel, accordingly, fared ill in his negotiations in Germany. On the other hand Mendoza, Admiral of Arragon, had been industriously but secretly canvassing the same regions as the representative of the Spanish king.<sup>3</sup> It was important for Philip, who put more faith in the league of the three powers than Henry himself did, to lose no time in counteracting its influence. The condition of the holy Roman empire had for some time occupied his most serious thoughts. It seemed plain that Rudolph would never marry. Certainly he would never marry the Infanta, although he was very angry that his brother should aspire to the hand which he himself rejected. In case of his death without children, Philip thought it possible that there might be a Protestant revolution in Germany, and that the house of Habsburg might lose the imperial crown altogether. It was even said that the emperor was himself of that opinion, and preferred that the empire should end with his own life.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> De Thou, xii. 567-594, l. 115. Meteren, 388. Reyd, 297.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid.

<sup>3</sup> Bor, IV. 293.

<sup>4</sup> „Siendo comun opinion en Alemania que desea que con su muerte se acabe el imperio en estas partes.”—Relacion de lo que el Almirante de Aragon ha colegido su el tiempo que ha estado en Alemana y en la corte Cesarea tratando con personas prudentes cerca el nego de Rey de Romanos y sucesion a los estados electivos de Bohemia, Moravia, Silesia, y Ungria. (Arch de Sim, MS.)



Philip considered 1 that neither Matthias nor Maximilian was fit to succeed their brother, being both of them lukewarm in the Catholic faith. 2 In other words, he chose that his destined son-in-law, the Cardinal Albert, should supersede them, and he was anxious to have him appointed as soon as possible King of the Romans.

„His Holiness the Pope and the King of Spain,” said the Admiral of Arragon, „think it necessary to apply most stringent measures to the emperor to compel him to appoint a successor, because, in case of his death without one, the administration during the vacancy would fall to the elector palatine,—a most perverse Calvinistic heretic, and as great an enemy of the house of Austria and of our holy religion as the Turk himself—as sufficiently appears in those diabolical laws of his published in the palatinate a few months since. A vacancy is so dreadful, that in the north of Germany the world would come to an end; yet the emperor, being of rather a timid nature than otherwise, is inclined to quiet, and shrinks from the discussions and conflicts likely to be caused by an appointment. Therefore his Holiness and his Catholic Majesty, not choosing that we should all live in danger of the world's falling in ruins, have resolved to provide the remedy. They are to permit the electors to use the faculty which they possess of suspending the emperor and depriving him of his power; there being examples of this in other times against emperors who governed ill.” 3

The Admiral farther alluded to the great effort made two years before to elect the King of Denmark emperor, reminding Philip that in Hamburg they had erected triumphal arches, and made other preparations to receive him. This

year, he observed, the Protestants were renewing their schemes. On the occasion of the baptism of the child of the elector palatine, the English envoy being present, and Queen Elizabeth being godmother, they had agreed upon nine articles of faith much more hostile to the Catholic creed than anything ever yet professed. In case of the death of the emperor, this elector palatine would of course make much trouble, and the emperor should therefore be induced, by fair means if possible, on account of the great inconvenience of forcing him, but not without a hint of compulsion, to acquiesce in the necessary measures. Philip was represented as willing to assist the empire with considerable force against the Turk—as there could be no doubt that Hungary was in great danger—but in recompense it was necessary to elect a King of the Romans in all respects satisfactory to him. There were three objections to the election of Albert, whose recent victories and great abilities entitled him in Philip's opinion to the crown. Firstly, there was a doubt whether the kingdoms of Hungary and Bohemia were elective or hereditary, and it was very important that the King of the Romans should succeed to those two crowns, because the electors and other princes having fiefs within those kingdoms would be unwilling to swear fealty to two suzerains, and as Albert was younger than his brothers he could scarcely expect to take by inheritance.

Secondly, Albert had no property of his own, but the Admiral suggested that the emperor might be made to abandon to him the income of the Tyrol.

Thirdly, it was undesirable for Albert to leave the Netherlands at that juncture. Nevertheless, it was suggested by the easy-going Admiral, with the same tranquil insolence which marked all his proposed arrangements, that as Rudolph would retire from the government altogether, Albert, as king of the Romans

1 Admiral of Arragon to Philip, 17 Dec. 1596. (Arch. de Sim. MS.) 2 Ibid.

3 Relacion del Almirante de Arragon, &c., *ubi sup.*

and acting emperor, could very well take care of the Netherlands as part of his whole realm. Albert being moreover about to marry the Infanta, the handsome dowry which he would receive with her from the king would enable him to sustain his dignity. 1

Thus did Philip, who had been so industrious during the many past years in his endeavours to expel the heretic Queen of England and the Huguenot Henry from the realms of their ancestors, and to seat himself or his daughter, or one or another of his nephews, in their places, now busy himself with schemes to discrown Rudolph of Habsburg, and to place the ubiquitous Infanta and her future husband on his throne. Time would show the result.

Meantime, while the Protestant Ance and other agents of the new league against Philip were travelling about from one court of Europe to another to gain adherents to their cause, the great founder of the confederacy was already secretly intriguing for a peace with that monarch. The ink was scarce dry on the treaty to which he had affixed his signature before he was closeted with the agents of the Archduke Albert, and receiving affectionate messages and splendid presents from that military ecclesiastic.

In November, 1596, La Balvena, formerly a gentleman of the Count de la Fera, came to Rouen. Nov. 1596. He had a very secret interview with Henry IV. at three o'clock one morning, and soon afterwards at a very late hour in the night. The king asked him why the archduke was not willing to make a general peace, including England and Holland. Balvena replied that he had no authority to treat on that subject; it being well known, however, that the King of Spain would never consent to a peace with the rebels,

except on the ground of the exclusive maintenance of the Catholic religion. 1

He is taking the very course to destroy that religion, said Henry. The king then avowed himself in favour of peace for the sake of the poor afflicted people of all countries. He was not tired of arms, he said, which were so familiar to him, but his wish was to join in a general crusade against the Turk. This would be better for the Catholic religion than the present occupations of all parties. He avowed that the Queen of England was his very good friend, and said he had never yet broken his faith with her, and never would do so. She had sent him the Garter, and he had accepted it, as his brother Henry III. had done before him, and he would negotiate no peace which did not include her. 2 The not very distant future was to show how much these stout professions of sincerity were worth. Meantime Henry charged Balvena to keep their interviews a profound secret, especially from every one in France. The king expressed great anxiety lest the Huguenots should hear of it, and the agent observed that any suspicion of peace negotiations would make great disturbance among the heretics, as one of the conditions of the king's absolution by the pope was supposed to be that he should make war upon his Protestant subjects. On his return from Rouen the emissary made a visit to Monlevet, marshal of the camp to Henry IV. and a Calvinist. There was much conversa-

1 Relacion de lo que ha hecha la Balvena. November, 1596. (Arch. de Simancas MS.)

I am not quite sure as to the orthography of the name of this secret agent. Van Deventer, ii. 141-146, prints it Vulneve, but as the B and V in Spanish are nearly identical, I am inclined to prefer the name given in the text. It is, however, difficult to ascertain how obscure men were correctly called in days when grave historians could designate so illustrious a personage as Sir Walter Raleigh as Guateral.

2 2a Relacion que Balvena ha hecha á su Alteza volviendo de Francia. December, 1596. (Archives de Simancas MS.)

1 Relacion del Almirante, *ubi sup.* Letter of the Admiral, 17 Dec. 1596, last cited.

tion about peace, in the course of which Monlevet observed. „We are much afraid of you in negotiation, for we know that you Spaniards far surpass us in astuteness.”

„Nay,” said Balvena, „I will only repeat the words of the Emperor Charles V.—‘The Spaniards seem wise, and are madmen; the French seem madmen, and are wise.’”<sup>1</sup>

A few weeks later the archduke sent Balvena again to Rouen. He Dec. 1596. had another interview with the king, at which not only Villeroy and other Catholics were present, but Monlevet also. This proved a great obstacle to freedom of conversation. The result was the same as before. There were strong professions of a desire on the part of the king for a peace, but it was for a general peace; nothing further.

On the 4th December Balvena was sent for by the king before daylight, just as he was mounting his horse for the chase.

„Tell his Highness,” said Henry, „that I am all frankness, and incapable of dissimulation, and that I believe him too much a man of honour to wish to deceive me. Go tell him that I am most anxious for peace, and that I deeply regret the defeat that has been sustained against the Turk. Had I been there I would have come out dead or victorious. Let him arrange an agreement between us, so that *presto* he may see me there with my brave nobles, with infantry and with plenty of Switzers. Tell him that I am his friend. Begone. Be diligent.”<sup>2</sup>

On the last day but two of the year, 29 Dec. 1596. the archduke, having heard this faithful report of Henry’s affectionate sentiments, sent him a suit of splendid armour, such as was then made better in Antwerp than anywhere else, magnificently burnished of a blue

colour, according to an entirely new fashion. 1

With such secret courtesies between his most Catholic Majesty’s vicegerent and himself, was Henry’s league with the two Protestant powers accompanied.

Exactly at the same epoch Philip was again preparing an invasion of the queen’s dominions. An armada of a hundred and twenty-eight ships, with a force of fourteen thousand infantry and three thousand horse, had been assembled during the autumn of this year at Lisbon, notwithstanding the almost crushing blow that the English and Hollanders had dealt the king’s navy so recently at Cadiz.<sup>2</sup> This new expedition was intended for Ireland, where it was supposed that the Catholics would be easily roused. It was also hoped that the King of Scots might be induced to embrace this opportunity of wreaking vengeance on his mother’s destroyer. „He was on the watch the last time that my armada went forth against the English,” said Philip, „and he has now no reason to do the contrary, especially if he remembers that here is a chance to requite the cruelty which was practized on his mother.”<sup>3</sup>

The fleet sailed on the 5th October under the command of the 5 Oct. Count Santa Gadea. Its immediate destination was the coast of Ireland, where they were to find some favourable point for disembarking the troops. Having accomplished this, the ships, with the exception of a few light vessels, were to take their departure and pass the winter in Ferrol. In case the fleet should be forced by stress of weather on the English coast, the port of Milford Haven in Wales was to be seized, „because,” said Philip, „there are a great many Catholics there well affected

<sup>1</sup> „Los Espanoles parecen sabios y son locos, y los Franceses parecen locos y son sabios.”

<sup>2</sup> 2a Relacion, &c.

<sup>1</sup> Albert to Philip, 29 Dec. 1596. (Arch. de Simancas MS.) „Armas buenas de las que se labran en Anveres que son pabonadas de cierta labor nueva.” Compare Reynd, 290.

<sup>2</sup> Philip to Albert, 4 October 1596. (Arch. de Sim. MS.)

<sup>3</sup> Ibid.



to our cause, and who have a special enmity to the English." In case the English fleet should come forth to give battle, Philip sent directions that it was to be conquered at once, and that after the victory Milford Haven was to be firmly held. 1

This was easily said. But it was not fated that this expedition should be more triumphant than that of the unconquerable armada which had been so signally conquered eight years before. Scarcely had the fleet put to sea when it was overtaken by a tremendous storm, in which forty ships foundered with five thousand men. 2 The shattered remnants took refuge in Ferrol. There the ships were to refit, and in the spring the attempt was to be renewed. Thus it was ever with the King of Spain. There was a placid unconsciousness on his part of defeat which sycophants thought sublime. And such insensibility might have been sublimity had the monarch been in person on the deck of a frigate in the howling tempest, seeing ship after ship go down before his eyes, and exerting himself with tranquil energy and skill to encourage his followers, and to preserve what remained afloat from destruction. Certainly such exhibitions of human superiority to the elements are in the highest degree inspiring. His father had shown himself on more than one occasion the master of his fate. The King of France, too, bare-headed, in his iron corslet, leading a forlorn hope, and, by the personal

charm of his valour, changing fugitives into heroes and defeat into victory, had afforded many examples of sublime unconsciousness of disaster, such as must ever thrill the souls of mankind. But it is more difficult to be calm in battle and shipwreck than at the writing desk, nor is that the highest degree of fortitude which enables a monarch—himself in safety—to endure without flinching the destruction of his fellow creatures.

No sooner, however, was the remnant of the tempest-tost fleet safe in Ferrol than the king requested the cardinal to collect an army at Calais and forthwith to invade England. He asked his nephew whether he could not manage to send his troops across the channel in vessels of light draught, such as he already had at command, together with some others which might be furnished him from Spain. In this way he was directed to gain a foot-hold in England, and he was to state immediately whether he could accomplish this with his own resources, or should require the assistance of the fleet at Ferrol. The king further suggested that the enemy, encouraged by his success at Cadiz the previous summer, might be preparing a fresh expedition against Spain, in which case the invasion of England would be easier to accomplish.

Thus on the last day of 1596, Philip, whose fleet sent forth for the conquest of Ireland and England had been too crippled to prosecute the adventure, was proposing to his nephew to conquer England without any fleet at all. He had given the same advice to Alexander Farnese so soon as he heard of the destruction of the invincible armada.

1 Philip to Albert, 5 October, 1596. (Arch. de Simancas, MS.)

2 Same to same, 31 December, 1596. (Ibid.) Reyd, 297.

## CHAPTER XXXIII.

Struggle of the Netherlands against Spain—March to Turnhout—Retreat of the Spanish commander—Pursuit and attack—Demolition of the Spanish army—Surrender of the garrison of Turnhout—Improved military science—Moral effect of the battle—The campaign in France—Attack on Amiens by the Spaniards—Sack and burning of the city—De Rosny's plan for reorganization of the finances—Jobbery and speculation—Philip's repudiation of his debts—Effects of the measure—Renewal of persecution by the Jesuits—Contention between Turk and Christian—Envoy from the King of Poland to the Hague to plead for reconciliation with Philip—His subsequent presentation to Queen Elizabeth—Military events—Recovery of Amiens—Feeble operations of the confederate powers against Spain—Marriage of the Princess Emilia, sister of Maurice—Reduction of the castle and town of Alphen—Surrender of Rheinberg—Capitulation of Meurs—Surrender of Grol—Storming and taking of Brevoort—Capitulation of Enschede, Oostmarsum, Oldenzaal, and Lingen—Rebellion of the Spanish garrisons in Antwerp and Ghent—Progress of the peace movement between Henry and Philip—Relations of the three confederate powers—Henry's scheme for reconciliation with Spain—His acceptance of Philip's offer of peace announced to Elizabeth—Endeavours for a general peace.

THE old year had closed with an abortive attempt of Philip to fulfil his favourite dream—the conquest of England. The new year opened with a spirited effort of Prince Maurice to measure himself in the open field with the veteran legions of Spain.

Turnhout, in Brabant, was an open village—the largest in all the Netherlands—lying about twenty-five English miles in almost a direct line south from Gertruydenberg. It was nearly as far distant in an easterly direction from Antwerp, and was about five miles nearer Breda than it was to Gertruydenberg.

At this place the cardinal-archduke had gathered a considerable force, numbering at least four thousand of his best infantry, with several squadrons of cavalry, the whole under command of the general-in-chief of artillery, Count Varax. People in the neighbourhood

were growing uneasy, for it was uncertain in what direction it might be intended to use this formidable force. It was perhaps the cardinal's intention to make a sudden assault upon Breda, the governor of which seemed not inclined to carry out his proposition to transfer that important city to the king, or it was thought that he might take advantage of a hard frost and cross the frozen morasses and estuaries into the land of Ter Tholen, where he might overmaster some of the important strongholds of Zeeland.

Marcellus Bax, that boldest and most brilliant of Holland's cavalry officers, had come to Maurice early in January with an urgent suggestion that no time might be lost in making an attack upon the force at Turnhout, before they should succeed in doing any mischief. The prince pondered the proposition, for a little time, by himself, and then conferred very privately upon the subject with the state-council. On the 14th January it was agreed with that body that the enterprise should be attempted, but with the utmost secrecy. A week later the council sent an express messenger to Maurice urging him not to expose his own life to peril, but to apprise them as soon as possible as to the results of the adventure.

Meantime patents had been sent to the various garrisons for fifty companies  
22 Jan. of foot and sixteen squadrons  
1597. of horse. On the 22nd January Maurice came to Gertruydenberg, the place of rendezvous, attended by Sir Francis Vere and Count Solms. Colonel Kloetingen was already there with the transports of ammunition and a few pieces of artillery from Zeeland, and in the course of the day the whole infantry force had assembled. Nothing could have been managed with greater promptness or secrecy.

Next day, before dawn, the march began. The battalia was led by Van der Noot, with six companies of 23 Jan. 1597. Hollanders. Then came Vere, with eight companies of the reserve, Dockray with eight companies of Englishmen, Murray with eight companies of Scotch, and Kloetingen and La Corde with twelve companies of Dutch and Zeelanders. In front of the last troop under La Corde marched the commander of the artillery, with two demi-cannon and two field-pieces, followed by the ammunition and baggage trains. Hohenlo arrived just as the march was beginning, to whom the stadholder, notwithstanding their frequent differences, communicated his plans, and entrusted the general command of the cavalry. That force met the expedition at Osterhout, a league's distance from Gertruydenberg, and consisted of the best mounted companies, English and Dutch, from the garrisons of Breda, Bergen, Nymegen, and the Zutphen districts.

It was a dismal, drizzly, foggy morning; the weather changing to steady rain as the expedition advanced. There had been alternate frost and thaw for the few previous weeks, and had that condition of the atmosphere continued the adventure could not have been attempted. It had now turned completely to thaw. The roads were all under water, and the march was sufficiently difficult. Nevertheless, it was possible; so the stout Hollanders, Zeelanders, and Englishmen struggled on manfully, shoulder to shoulder, through the mist and the mire. By nightfall the expedition had reached Ravels, at less than a league's distance from Turnhout, having accomplished, under the circumstances, a very remarkable march of over twenty miles. A stream of water, the Neethe, one of the tributaries of the Scheld, separated Ravels from Turnhout, and was crossed by a stone bridge. It was an anxious moment. Maurice discovered by his scouts that he was almost within

cannon-shot of several of the most famous regiments in the Spanish army, lying fresh, securely posted, and capable of making an attack at any moment. He instantly threw forward Marcellus Bax with four squadrons of Bergen cavalry, who, jaded as they were by their day's work, were to watch the bridge that night, and to hold it against all comers and at every hazard.

The Spanish commander, on his part, had reconnoitred the advancing foe, for it was impossible for the movement to have been so secret or so swift over those inundated roads as to be shrouded to the last moment in complete mystery. It was naturally to be expected therefore that those splendid legions—the famous Neapolitan *tercio* of Trevico, the veteran troops of Sultz and Hachicourt, the picked Epirote and Spanish cavalry of Nicolas Basta and Guzman—would be hurled upon the wearied, benumbed, bemired soldiers of the republic, as they came slowly along after their long march through the cold winter's rain.

Varax took no such heroic resolution. Had he done so that January afternoon, the career of Maurice of Nassau might have been brought to a sudden close, despite the affectionate warning of the state-council. Certainly it was difficult for any commander to be placed in a more perilous position than that in which the stadholder found himself. He remained awake and afoot the whole night, perfecting his arrangements for the morning, and watching every indication of a possible advance on the part of the enemy. Marcellus Bax and his troopers remained at the bridge till morning, and were so near the Spaniards that they heard the voices of their pickets, and could even distinguish in the distance the various movements in their camp.

But no attack was made, and the little army of Maurice was allowed to sleep off its fatigue. With the dawn of



24 Jan. the 24th January, a recon-  
1597. noitring party, sent out from  
the republican camp, discovered that  
Varax, having no stomach for an en-  
counter, had given his enemies the slip.  
Long before daylight his baggage and  
ammunition trains had been sent off in  
a southerly direction, and his whole  
force had already left the village of  
Turnhout. It was the intention of the  
commander to take refuge in the forti-  
fied city of Herenthals, and there await  
the attack of Maurice. Accordingly,  
when the stadholder arrived on the fields  
beyond the immediate precincts of the  
village, he saw the last of the enemy's  
rearguard just disappearing from view.  
The situation was a very peculiar one.

The rain and thaw, following upon  
frosty weather, had converted the fenny  
country in many directions into a shal-  
low lake. The little river which flowed  
by the village had risen above its almost  
level banks, and could with difficulty  
be traversed at any point, while there  
was no permanent bridge, such as there  
was at Ravels. The retreating Spaniards  
had made their way through a narrow  
passage, where a roughly-constructed  
causeway of planks had enabled the in-  
fantry to cross the waters almost in  
single file, while the cavalry had floun-  
dered through as best they might. Those  
who were acquainted with the country  
reported that beyond this defile there  
was an upland heath, a league in extent,  
full of furze and thickets, where it would  
be easy enough for Varax to draw up  
his army in battle array, and conceal  
it from view, Maurice's scouts, too,  
brought information that the Spanish  
commander had left a force of musketeers  
to guard the passage at the farther end.

This looked very like an ambush.  
In the opinion of Hohenlo, of Solms,  
and of Sidney, an advance was not to  
be thought of; and if the adventure  
seemed perilous to such hardy and ex-  
perienced campaigners as these three,  
the stadholder might well hesitate. Never-

theless, Maurice had made up his mind.  
Sir Francis Vere and Marcellus Bax  
confirmed him in his determination, and  
spoke fiercely of the disgrace which  
would come upon the arms of the republic  
if now, after having made a day's  
march to meet the enemy, they should  
turn their backs upon him just as he  
was doing his best to escape.

On leave obtained from the prince,  
these two champions, the Englishman  
and the Hollander, spurred their horses  
through the narrow pass, with the  
waters up to the saddle-bow, at the  
head of a mere handful of troopers.  
not more than a dozen men in all. Two  
hundred musketeers followed, picking  
their way across the planks. As they  
emerged into the open country beyond,  
the Spanish soldiers guarding the pas-  
sage fled without firing a shot. Such  
was already the discouraging effect pro-  
duced upon veterans by the unexpected  
order given that morning to retreat.  
Vere and Bax sent word for all the  
cavalry to advance at once, and mean-  
time hovered about the rearguard of the  
retreating enemy, ready to charge upon  
him so soon as they should be strong  
enough.

Maurice lost no time in plunging  
with his whole mounted force through  
the watery defile; directing the infantry  
to follow as fast as practicable. When  
the commander-in-chief with his eight  
hundred horsemen, Englishmen, Zee-  
landers, Hollanders, and Germans came  
upon the heath, the position and pur-  
pose of the enemy were plainly visible.  
He was not drawn up in battle order,  
waiting to sweep down upon his rash  
assailants so soon as, after struggling  
through the difficult pass, they should  
be delivered into his hands. On the  
contrary, it was obvious at a glance  
that his object was still to escape. The  
heath of Tiel, on which Spaniards,  
Italians, Walloons, Germans, Dutchmen,  
English, Scotch, and Irishmen now all  
found themselves together, was a ridgy,

spongy expanse of country, bordered on one side by the swollen river, here flowing again through steeper banks which were overgrown with alders and pollard willows. Along the left of the Spanish army, as they moved in the direction of Herenthals, was a continuous fringe of scrub-oaks, intermixed with tall beeches, skirting the heath, and forming a leafless but almost impervious screen for the movements of small detachments of troops. Quite at the termination of the open space, these thickets, becoming closely crowded, overhung another extremely narrow passage, which formed the only outlet from the plain. Thus the heath of Tiel, upon that winter's morning, had but a single entrance and a single exit, each very dangerous or very fortunate for those capable of taking or neglecting the advantages offered by the position.

The whole force of Varax, at least five thousand strong, was advancing in close marching order towards the narrow passage by which only they could emerge from the heath. Should they reach this point in time, and thus effect their escape, it would be useless to attempt to follow them, for, as was the case with the first defile, it was not possible for two abreast to go through, while beyond was a swampy country in which military operations were impossible. Yet there remained less than half a league's space for the retreating soldiers to traverse, while not a single foot-soldier of Maurice's army had thus far made his appearance on the heath. All were still wallowing and struggling, single file, in the marshy entrance, through which only the cavalry had forced their way. Here was a dilemma. Should Maurice look calmly on while the enemy, whom he had made so painful a forced march to meet, moved off out of reach before his eyes? Yet certainly this was no slight triumph in itself. There sat the stadholder on his horse at the head of eight hundred

carabineers, and there marched four of Philip's best infantry regiments, garnished with some of his most renowned cavalry squadrons, anxious not to seek but to avoid a combat. First came the Germans of Count Sultz, the musketeers in front, and the spearsmen, of which the bulk of this and of all the regiments was composed, marching in closely serried squares, with the company standards waving over each. Next, arranged in the same manner, came the Walloon regiments of Hachicourt and of La Barlotte. Fourth and last came the famous Neapolitans of Marquis Treviso. The cavalry squadrons rode on the left of the infantry, and were commanded by Nicolas Basta, a man who had been trampling upon the Netherlands ever since the days of Alva, with whom he had first come to the country.

And these were the legions—these very men or their immediate predecessors—these Italians, Spaniards, Germans, and Walloons, who during so many terrible years had stormed and sacked almost every city of the Netherlands, and swept over the whole breadth of those little provinces as with the besom of destruction.

Both infantry and cavalry, that picked little army of Varax was of the very best that had shared in the devil's work which had been the chief industry practised for so long in the obedient Netherlands. Was it not madness for the stadholder, at the head of eight hundred horsemen, to assail such an army as this? Was it not to invoke upon his head the swift vengeance of Heaven? Nevertheless, the painstaking, cautious Maurice did not hesitate. He ordered Hohenlo, with all the Brabantine cavalry, to ride as rapidly as their horses could carry them along the edge of the plain, and behind the tangled woodland, by which the movement would be concealed. He was at all hazards to intercept the enemy's vanguard before it should reach the fatal pass. Vere and

Marcellus Bax meanwhile, supported now by Edmont with the Nymegen squadrons, were to threaten the Spanish rear. A company or two under Laurentz was kept by Maurice near his person in reserve.

The Spaniards steadily continued their march, but as they became aware of certain slight and indefinite movements on the left, their cavalry, changing their position, were transferred from the right to the left of the line of march, and now rode between the infantry and the belt of woods.

In a few minutes after the orders given to Hohenlo, that dashing soldier had circumvented the Spaniards, and emerged upon the plain between them and the entrance to the defile. The next instant the trumpets sounded a charge, and Hohenlo fell upon the foremost regiment, that of Sultz, while the rearguard, consisting of Trevico's Neapolitan regiment, was assailed by Du Bois, Donck, Rysoir, Marcellus Bax, and Sir Francis Vere. The effect seemed almost supernatural. The Spanish cavalry—those far-famed squadrons of Guzman and Basta—broke at the first onset and galloped off for the pass as if they had been riding a race. Most of them escaped through the hollow into the morass beyond. The musketeers of Sultz's regiment hardly fired a shot, and fell back in confusion upon the thickly clustered pikemen. The assailants, every one of them in complete armour, on powerful horses, and armed not with lances but with carbines, trampled over the panic-struck and struggling mass of leather-jerkined pikemen and shot them at arm's length. The charge upon Trevico's men at the same moment was just as decisive. In less time than it took afterwards to describe the scene those renowned veterans were broken into a helpless mass of dying, wounded, or fugitive creatures, incapable of striking a blow. Thus the Germans in the front and the Neapolitans in the rear

had been simultaneously shattered, and rolled together upon the two other regiments, those of Hachicourt and La Barlotte, which were placed between them. Nor did these troops offer any better resistance, but were paralysed and hurled out of existence like the rest. In less than an hour the Spanish army was demolished. Varax himself lay dead upon the field, too fortunate not to survive his disgrace. It was hardly more than daylight on that dull January morning; nine o'clock had scarce chimed from the old brick steeples of Turnhout, yet two thousand Spaniards had fallen before the blows of eight hundred Netherlanders, and there were five hundred prisoners beside. Of Maurice's army not more than nine or ten were slain. The story sounds like a wild legend. It was as if the arm of each Netherlander had been nerved by the memory of fifty years of outrage, as if the spectre of their half-century of crime had appalled the soul of every Spaniard. Like a thunderbolt, the son of William the Silent smote that army of Philip, and in an instant it lay blasted on the heath of Tiel. At least it could hardly be called sagacious generalship on the part of the stadholder. The chances were all against him, and if instead of Varax those legions had been commanded that morning by old Christopher Mondragon, there might perhaps have been another tale to tell. Even as it was, there had been a supreme moment when the Spanish disaster had nearly been changed to victory. The fight was almost done, when a small party of States' cavalry, who at the beginning of the action had followed the enemy's horse in its sudden retreat through the gap, came whirling back over the plain in wild confusion, pursued by about forty of the enemy's lancers. They swept by the spot where Maurice, with not more than ten horsemen around him, was directing and watching the battle, and in vain the prince threw himself in



front of them and strove to check their flight. They were panic-struck, and Maurice would himself have been swept off the field, had not Marcellus Bax and Edmont, with half a dozen heavy troopers, come to the rescue. A grave error had been committed by Parker, who, upon being ordered by Maurice to cause Louis Laurentz to charge, had himself charged with the whole reserve and left the stadholder almost alone upon the field. Thus the culprits—who after pursuing the Spanish cavalry through the pass had begun plundering the enemy's baggage until they were set upon by the handful left to guard it, and had become fugitives in their turn—might possibly have caused the loss of the day after the victory had been won, had there been a man on the Spanish side to take in the situation at a glance. But it is probable that the rout had been too absolute to allow of any such sudden turning to account of the serious errors of the victors. The cavalry, except this handful, had long disappeared, at least half the infantry lay dead or wounded on the field, while the remainder, throwing away pike and matchlock, were running helter-skelter for their lives.

Besides Prince Maurice himself, to whom the chief credit of the whole expedition justly belonged, nearly all the commanders engaged obtained great distinction by their skill and valour. Sir Francis Vere, as usual, was ever foremost in the thickest of the fray, and had a horse killed under him. Parker erred by too much readiness to engage, but bore himself manfully throughout the battle. Hohenlo, Solms, Sidney, Louis Laurentz, Du Bois, all displayed their usual prowess; but the real hero of the hour, the personal embodiment of the fortunate madness which prompted and won the battle, was undoubtedly Marcellus Bax. 1

1 I place together in one note the authorities used by me for this famous action.

Maurice remained on hour or two on the field of battle, and then, returning towards the village of Turnhout, summoned its stronghold. The garrison of sixty, under Captain Van der Delf, instantly surrendered. The victor allowed these troops to go off scot free, saying that there had been blood enough shed that day. Every standard borne by the Spaniards in the battle—thirty-eight in number—was taken, besides nearly all their arms. The banners were sent to the Hague to be hung up in the great hall of the castle. The dead body of Varax was sent to the archduks with a courteous letter, in which, however, a categorical explanation was demanded as to a statement in circulation that Albert had decided to give the soldiers of the republic no quarter. 1

Not an incident is mentioned that is not vouched for by one or more of the contemporary chroniclers or letter-writers cited, but I have not thought it necessary to encumber each paragraph with reference to a footnote. *Bor.* IV. 301-304. *Meteren*, 393, 394. *Bentivoglio*, 443, 444. *Reyd*, 302, *seqq.* *Carnero*, 402-407. *Coloma*, 237. *Albert to Philip*, 30 Jan. 1597. (*Arch. de Simancas MS.*) *Van der Kemp*, ii. 25-29, 167-171.

1 The letter of Maurice was as follows:—  
„SIR—I had intended to send the soldiers who were taken prisoners yesterday, and to manifest the same courtesy which I am accustomed to show towards those who fall into my hands. But as I have been apprised that your Highness has published an order, according to which military commanders are forbidden henceforth to give quarter to those of this side, I have desired first to have this doubt made clear to me, before I permit them to go free, in order that, having understood your Highness's intention on this point, I may conduct myself as I shall find most fitting. Herewith I humbly kiss the hands of your Highness, and pray God to give you long and healthy life.

„*Turnhout*, 25 January, 1597.”

The archduke thus replied:—

„COUNT—I have received your letter, and can do no otherwise than praise the courtesy which you have manifested towards the dead body of the late Count Varax, and signify to you the thanks which you deserve, and which I render you from my heart. Touching the other point you will not find that I have thus far resolved on keeping no quarter, and I hope never to have occasion for such a determination, inasmuch as to do so is against my nature. And, inasmuch as in this conjuncture you use the courtesy

No answer being immediately returned, Maurice ordered the five hundred prisoners to be hanged or drowned unless ransomed within twenty days, and this horrible decree appears from official documents to be consistent with the military usages of the period. The arrival of the letter from the cardinal-archduke, who levied the money for the ransom on the villages of Brabant, I prevented, however, the execution of the menace, which could hardly have been seriously intended. 2

Within a week from the time of his departure from the Hague to engage in this daring adventure, the stadholder had returned to that little capital, having achieved a complete success. The enthusiastic demonstrations throughout the land on account of so signal a victory can easily be imagined. Nothing like this had ever before been recorded in the archives of the young commonwealth. There had been glorious defences of beleaguered cities, where scenes of heroic endurance and self-sacrifice had been enacted, such as never can be forgotten so long as the history of human liberty shall endure, but a victory won in the open field over the most famous legions of Spain and against overwhelming numbers, was an achievement entirely without example. It is beyond all doubt that the force under Varax was at least four times as large as that portion of the States' army which alone was engaged; for Maurice had not a foot-soldier on the field until the battle was over, save the handful of musketeers who had followed Vere and Bax at the beginning of the action.

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towards me which you signify in your letter, I shall take care to do the same when occasions present themselves. And herewith I pray the Creator to have you in his holy keeping.

„Your good friend,  
„ALBERT, Cardinal.

„Brussels, 28 Jan. 1597.”

1 Meteren, b. xix. 394.

2 Ibid. Van der Kemp, 28; 171, who cites Resol. St. Gen. 18 May, 1599, for an example.

Therefore it is that this remarkable action merits a much more attentive consideration than it might deserve, regarded purely as a military exploit. To the military student a mere cavalry affair, fought out upon an obscure Brabantine heath between a party of Dutch carabineers and Spanish pikemen, may seem of little account—a subject fitted by picturesque costume and animated action for the pencil of a Wouvermanns or a Terburg, but conveying little instruction. As illustrating a period of transition in which heavy armoured troopers—each one a human iron-clad fortress moving at speed and furnished with the most formidable portable artillery then known—could overcome the resistance of almost any number of foot soldiers in light marching gear and armed with the antiquated pike, the affair may be worthy of a moment's attention; and for this improvement—itsself now a obsolete as the slings and cataphracts of Roman legions—the world was indebted to Maurice. But the shock of mighty armies, the manœuvring of vast masses in one magnificent combination, by which the fate of empires, the happiness or the misery of the peoples for generations, may perhaps be decided in a few hours, undoubtedly require a higher constructive genius than could be displayed in any such hand-to-hand encounter as that of Turnhout, scientifically managed as it unquestionably was. The true and abiding interest of the battle is derived from its moral effect, from its influence on the people of the Netherlands. And this could scarcely be exaggerated. The nation was electrified, transformed in an instant. Who now should henceforth dare to say that one Spanish fighting-man was equal to five or ten Hollanders? At last the days of Jemmingen and Mooker-heath needed no longer to be remembered by every patriot with a shudder of shame. Here at least in the open field a Spanish army, after in vain refusing a combat

and endeavouring to escape, had literally bitten the dust before one fourth of its own number. And this effect was a permanent one. Thenceforth for foreign powers to talk of mediation between the republic and the ancient master, to suggest schemes of reconciliation and of a return to obedience, was to offer gratuitous and trivial insult, and we shall very soon have occasion to mark the simple eloquence with which the thirty-eight Spanish standards of Turnhout, hung up in the old hall of the Hague, were made to reply to the pompous rhetoric of an interfering ambassador.

This brief episode was not immediately followed by other military events of importance in the provinces during what remained of the winter. Very early in the spring, however, it was probable that the campaign might open simultaneously in France and on the frontiers of Flanders. Of all the cities in the north of France there was none, after Rouen, so important, so populous, so wealthy as Amiens. Situate in fertile fields, within three days march of Paris, with no intervening forests or other impediments of a physical nature to free communication, it was the key to the gates of the capital. It had no garrison, for the population numbered fifteen thousand men able to bear arms, and the inhabitants valued themselves on the prowess of their trained militiamen, five thousand of whom they boasted to be able to bring into the field at an hour's notice—and they were perfectly loyal to Henry.

One morning in March there came a party of peasants, fifteen or twenty in number, laden with sacks of <sup>11</sup> March, chestnuts and walnuts, to the northernmost gate of the town. They offered them for sale, as usual, to the soldiers at the guard-house, and chaffered and jested—as boors and soldiers are wont to do—over their wares. It so happened that in the course of the bargaining one of the bags became untied,

and its contents, much to the dissatisfaction of the proprietor, were emptied on the ground. There was a scramble for the walnuts, and much shouting, kicking, and squabbling ensued, growing almost into a quarrel between the burgher-soldiers and the peasants. As the altercation was at its height a heavy wagon, laden with long planks, came towards the gate for the use of carpenters and architects within the town. The portcullis was drawn up to admit this lumbering vehicle, but in the confusion caused by the chance medley going on at the guard-house, the gate dropped again before the wagon had fairly got through the passage, and remained resting upon the timber with which it was piled.

At that instant a shrill whistle was heard, and as if by magic the twenty chestnut-selling peasants were suddenly transformed to Spanish and Walloon soldiers armed to the teeth, who were presently reinforced by as many more of their comrades, who sprang from beneath the plank-work by which the real contents of the wagon had thus been screened. Captain Dognano, his brother the sergeant-major, Captain d'Arco, and other officers of a Walloon regiment stationed in Dourlans, were the leaders of the little party, and while they were busily occupied in putting the soldiers of the watch, thus taken unawares, to death, the master-spirit of the whole adventure suddenly made his appearance and entered the city at the head of fifteen hundred men. This was an extremely small, yellow, dried up, energetic Spanish captain, 1 with a long red beard, Hernan Tello de Porto Carrero by name, governor of the neighbouring city of Dourlans, who had conceived this plan for obtaining possession of Amiens. Having sent these disguised soldiers on before him, he had passed the night with his men in ambush until the signal should sound. The burghers of the town



were mostly in church; none were dreaming of an attack, as men rarely do—for otherwise how should they ever be surprised—and in half an hour Amiens was the property of Philip of Spain. There were not very many lives lost, for the resistance was small, but great numbers were tortured for ransom and few women escaped outrage. The sack was famous, for the city was rich and the captors were few in number, so that each soldier had two or three houses to plunder for his own profit.

When the work was done, the faubourgs were all destroyed, for it was the intention of the conquerors to occupy the place, which would be a most convenient basis of operations for any attack upon Paris, and it was desirable to contract the limits to be defended. Fifteen hundred houses, many of them beautiful villas surrounded with orchards and pleasure gardens, were soon in flames, and afterwards razed to the ground. The governor of the place, Count St. Pol, managed to effect his escape. His place was now supplied by the Marquis of Montenegro, an Italian in the service of the Spanish king. Such was the fate of Amiens in the month of March, 1597; 1 such the result of the refusal by the citizens to accept the garrison urged upon them by Henry.

It would be impossible to exaggerate the consternation produced throughout France by this astounding and altogether unlooked for event. „It seemed,” said President De Thou, „as if it had extinguished in a moment the royal majesty and the French name.” A few nights later than the date of this occurrence, Maximilian de Bethune 2 (afterwards Duke of Sully, but then called Marquis de Rosny) was asleep in his bed in Paris. He had returned, at past two o’clock in the morning, from a

magnificent ball given by the Constable of France. The capital had been uncommonly brilliant during the winter with banquets and dances, tournaments and masquerades, as if to cast a lurid glare over the unutterable misery of the people and the complete desolation of the country; but this entertainment—given by Montmorency in honour of a fair dame with whom he supposed himself desperately in love, the young bride of a very ancient courtier—surpassed in splendour every festival that had been heard of for years. De Bethune had hardly lost himself in slumber when he was startled by Beringen, who, on drawing his curtains in this dead hour of the night, presented such a ghastly visage that the faithful friend of Henry instantly imagined some personal disaster to his well-beloved sovereign. „Is the King dead?” he cried. 1

Being re-assured as to this point and told to hasten to the Louvre, Rosny instantly complied with the command. When he reached the palace he was admitted at once to the royal bed-chamber, where he found the king in the most unsophisticated of costumes, striding up and down the room, with his hands clasped together behind his head, and with an expression of agony upon his face. Many courtiers were assembled there, stuck all of them like images against the wall, staring before them in helpless perplexity. 2

Henry rushed forward as Rosny entered, and wringing him by the hand, exclaimed, „Ah, my friend, what a misfortune, Amiens is taken!”

„Very well,” replied the financier, with unperturbed visage; „I have just completed a plan which will restore to your Majesty not only Amiens but many other places.”

The king drew a great sigh of relief and asked for his project. Rosny, saying that he would instantly go and fetch his papers, left the apartment for an

1 Bor, IV. 314, 315. Meteren, 395, 396. Bentivoglio, 447. Coloma, 238-262. De Thou, xiii. 103-109, 118. Albert to Philip, 14 March, 1597. (Arch. de Simancas MS.)

2 De Thou, *ubi sup.* 109.

1 Sully, *Mémoires*, i. 484, *seqq.* 2 Ibid.

interval, in order to give vent to the horrible agitation which he had been enduring and so bravely concealing ever since the fatal words had been spoken. That a city so important, the key to Paris, without a moment's warning, without the semblance of a siege, should thus fall into the hands of the enemy, was a blow as directly to the heart of De Bethune as it could have been to any other of Henry's adherents. But while they had been distracting the king by unavailing curses or wailings, Henry, who had received the intelligence just as he was getting into bed, had sent for support and consolation to the tried friend of years, and he now reproachfully contrasted their pusillanimity with De Rosny's fortitude.

A great plan for reorganising the finances of the kingdom was that very night submitted by Rosny to the king, and it was wrought upon day by day thereafter until it was carried into effect.

It must be confessed that the crudities and immoralities which the project revealed do not inspire the political student of modern days with so high a conception of the financial genius of the great minister as his calm and heroic deportment on trying occasions, whether on the battle-field or in the council-chamber, does of his natural authority over his fellow-men. The scheme was devised to put money in the king's coffers, which at that moment were completely empty. Its chief features were to create a great many new offices in the various courts of justice and tribunals of administration, all to be disposed of by sale to the highest bidder; to extort a considerable loan from the chief courtiers and from the richest burghers in the principal towns; to compel all the leading speculators—whose name in the public service was legion—to disgorge a portion of their ill-gotten gains, on being released from prosecution; and to increase the tax upon salt. <sup>1</sup>

Such a project hardly seems a masterpiece of ethics or political economy, but it was hailed with rapture by the needy monarch. At once there was wild excitement amongst the jobbers and speculators in places. The creation of an indefinite number of new judgeships and magistracies, to be disposed of at auction, was a tempting opportunity even in that age of corruption. One of the most notorious traders in the judicial ermine, limping Robin de Tours by name, at once made a private visit to Madame de Rosny and offered seventy-two thousand crowns for the exclusive right to distribute these new offices. If this could be managed to his satisfaction, he promised to give her a diamond worth two thousand crowns, and another, worth six thousand, to her husband. The wife of the great minister, who did not comprehend the whole amount of the insult, presented Robin to her husband. She was enlightened, however, as to the barefaced iniquity of the offer, when she heard De Bethune's indignant reply, and saw the jobber limp away, crest-fallen and amazed. That a financier or a magistrate should decline a bribe or interfere with the private sale of places, which were after all objects of merchandise, was to him incomprehensible. The industrious Robin, accordingly, recovering from his discomfiture, went straightway to the chancellor, and concluded the same bargain in the council chamber which had been rejected by De Bethune, with the slight difference that the distribution of the places was assigned to the speculator for seventy-five thousand instead of seventy-two thousand crowns. It was with great difficulty that De Bethune, who went at once to the king with complaints and insinuations as to the cleanness of the chancellor's hands, was able to cancel the operation. <sup>1</sup> The day was fast approaching when the universal impoverishment of the great nobles and land-

<sup>1</sup> Sully, *Mémoires*, i. lib. ix. p. 485, *seqq.*

<sup>1</sup> Sully, *Mémoires*, i. lib. ix. p. 490.

holders—the result of the long, hideous, senseless massacres called the wars of religion—was to open the way for the labouring classes to acquire a property in the soil. Thus that famous fowl in every pot was to make its appearance, which vulgar tradition ascribes to the bounty of a king who hated everything like popular rights, and loved nothing but his own glory and his own amusement. It was not until the days of his grandchildren and great-grandchildren that Privilege could renew those horrible outrages on the People, which were to be avenged by a dread series of wars, massacres, and crimes, compared to which even the religious conflicts of the sixteenth century grow pale.

Meantime De Bethune comforted his master with these financial plans, and assured him in the spirit of prophecy that the King of Spain, now tottering as it was thought to his grave, would soon be glad to make a favourable peace with France, even if he felt obliged to restore not only Amiens but every other city or stronghold that he had ever conquered in that kingdom. Time would soon show whether this prediction were correct or delusive; but while the secret negotiations between Henry and the Pope were vigorously proceeding for that peace with Spain which the world in general and the commonwealth of the Netherlands in particular thought to be farthest from the warlike king's wishes, it was necessary to set about the siege of Amiens.

Henry assembled a force of some twelve or fifteen thousand men for that purpose, while the cardinal-archduke, upon his part, did his best to put an army in the field in order to relieve the threatened city so recently acquired by a coarse but successful artifice.

But Albert was in even a worse plight than that in which his great antagonist found himself. When he had first arrived in the provinces, his exchequer was overflowing, and he was

even supposed to devote a considerable portion of the military funds to defray the expenses of his magnificent house-keeping at Brussels.<sup>1</sup> But those halcyon days were over. A gigantic fraud, just perpetrated by Philip, had descended like a thunderbolt upon the provinces and upon all commercial Europe, and had utterly blasted the unfortunate viceroy. In the latter days of the preceding year the king had issued a general repudiation of his debts.

He did it solemnly, too, and with great religious unction, for it was a peculiarity of this remarkable sovereign that he was ever wont to accomplish his darkest crimes, whether murders or stratagems, as if they were acts of virtue. Perhaps he really believed them to be such, for a man, before whom, so many millions of his fellow worms had been writhing for half a century in the dust, might well imagine himself a deity.

So the king, on the 20th November, 1596, had publicly revoked all the assignments, mortgages, and other deeds by which the royal domains, revenues, taxes, and other public property had been transferred or pledged for moneys already advanced to merchants, bankers, and other companies or individuals, and formally took them again into his own possession, on the ground that his exertions in carrying on this long war to save Christianity from destruction had reduced him to beggary, while the money-lenders, by charging him exorbitant interest, had all grown rich at his expense.<sup>2</sup>

1 „Non possiede l'amore di quei popoli quanto bisognerebbe, oltrechè ha nome di non favorir molto la soldatesca e di gettar gran parte di denaro che devorebbe esser distribuito alle milizie in quelli della sua propria casa e nel sostentar la prodria albagia. De che nasce poi che si veggono tante sollevazioni e le cose di quella guerra prendono sempre peggior piega.”—Soranzo, *Relazione*, before cited, p. 168.

2 „Whereas it has come to our knowledge,” so ran this famous proclamation of repudiation in its principal paragraphs, „that notwithstanding all which our royal incomes



This was perfectly simple. There was no attempt to disguise the villany from this monarchy and from without have yielded; together with the assistance rendered to us by his Holiness to maintain the war against the English, and to protect the Catholic religion, and with the steady burthens borne for this object by the subjects and vassals of the crown, according to their ancient and great fidelity; and, besides the great abundance of the gold and silver produced by our Indies; likewise all that has come from the sums furnished by the farmers of our finances and revenues, we find ourselves now so wholly exhausted and ruined, and our royal inherited estates so diminished, and as it were reduced to nothing, that, although the foremost cause of this ruin is the great and incredible expense which we have sustained and are still enduring for the protection of Christendom, of our kingdom and domains; other chief causes are the grievous damages, discounts, and interest which have been forced upon us, and which at present obtain in the finances, bills of exchange, and other obligations, which have been made and taken up in our name, since we could not escape the same in order to be able to provide for our so entirely necessary and pressing necessities. Thus all our domains, taxes, revenues, and all ordinary and extraordinary resources stand, burthened and covered with obligations in the hands of merchants. And what is most oppressive, our affairs are come to extremities through our having no means by which we might help ourselves, nor do we know of any other resources that we can make use of. And now the said merchants, who hitherto have given on bills of exchange such monies as were necessary to provide for the protection of our royal state and to carry on the war which we are waging for these righteous and special reasons, refuse to do this any longer, and make difficulties in further dealing with us, seeing that they have in their own hands and power all the royal revenues by means of the said pledges, certificates, and transfers, and hereby such embarrassments arise, that if they are not provided against, it would be enough to put in hazard all that which God the Lord has so highly commanded us to perform, namely, the protection and maintenance of the Catholic Church, of our subjects and vassals, and all those who dwell under our government. . . .

„Therefore to put an end to such financiering and unhallowed practices with bills of exchange which have been introduced and have spread abroad among so many people, who in order to follow such pursuits have abandoned agriculture, cattle-raising, and mechanical works, and embarked in trade, finding therein gain and profit to the disservice of the Lord God and of us, with great injury to our kingdom, . . . and which have brought great masses of coin and species to flow out of India (i. e. America) into the

of the transaction. The massare of so many Millions of Protestants, the gigantic but puerile attempts to subjugate the Dutch republic, and to annex France, England, and the German empire to his hereditary dominions, had been attended with more expense than Philip had calculated upon. The enormous wealth which a long series of marriages, inheritances, conquests, and maritime discoveries had heaped upon Spain had been exhausted by the insane ambition of the king to exterminate heresy throughout the world, and to make himself the sovereign of one undivided,

kingdoms and lands of the rebels and foes of Christianity and of us, enabling them to keep everything in commotion, so that we are compelled to increase our armaments and our forces, and to incur more expenses. We have now given command to devise some means of restoring order, and of accomplishing in the best possible way that which we are so highly and legally bound to do, whereupon hang the protection of Christendom and the security of our realms; and we have found no other remedy than to call in and to disburthen our royal incomes, liberating the same from the unjust damage put upon them through this financiering and bills of exchange, which we have suffered and are continuing to suffer at the time we made such contracts, in order to avoid still greater embarrassments that would have arisen had there been want of provision for our military affairs. . . . Having decided to cancel and annihilate all the aforesaid interests and impositions, we shall afterwards mediate upon ways and means by which may be paid to the merchants and traders what may seem to us properly due to them in regard to these contracts, transfers, and assignments. . . . Accordingly we suspend and declare suspended all such assignments made by us in any manner whatsoever since Sept. 1, 1675, and Dec. 1, 1677, unto this date, to the said merchants and traders, whether of taxes, gifts, domains, rents, or any other property or revenues whatsoever, on account of such bills of exchange or other advances. And we order the monies coming from such pledged property to be henceforth paid into our royal treasury, for the support of our own necessities, declaring from this day forth all payments otherwise made to be null and void.

„20 November, 1596.”

Bor, III. 318, 319. Herrera, iii. 711, seqq. Compare Reynd, 301, 302. Meteren, 388-391. It was found necessary after the expiration of a year to revoke these orders, as the usual consequences of repudiation followed.

universal, catholic monarchy. All the gold and silver of America had not sufficed for this purpose, and he had seen, with an ever-rising indignation, those very precious metal which, in his exclusive property, flowing speedily into the coffers of the merchants of Europe, especially those of the hated commonwealth of rebellious Netherlands.

Therefore he solemnly renounced all his contracts, and took God to witness that it was to serve His Divine will. 1 How else could he hope to continue his massacre of the Protestants?

The effect of the promulgation of this measure was instantaneous. Two millions and a half of bills of exchange sold by the Cardinal Albert, came back in one day protested. The chief merchants and bankers of Europe suspended payment. Their creditors became bankrupt. At the Frankfort fair there were more failures in one day than there had ever been in all the years since Frankfort existed. 2 In Genoa alone a million dollars of interest were confiscated. 3 It was no better in Antwerp; but Antwerp was already ruined. There was a general howl of indignation and despair upon every exchange, in every counting-room, in every palace, in every cottage of Christendom. Such a tremendous repudiation of national debts was never heard of before. There had been debasements of the currency, petty frauds by kings upon their unfortunate peoples, but such crime as this had never been conceived by human heart before.

The archduke was fain to pawn his jewelry, his plate, his furniture, to support the daily expenses of his household. Meantime he was to set an army in the field to relieve a city, beleaguered by the most warlike monarch in Christendom. Fortunately for him, that prince was in very similar straits, for the pressure upon the pub-

lic swindlers and the auction sales of judicial ermine throughout his kingdom were not as rapidly productive as had been hoped.

It was precisely at this moment, too, that an incident of another nature occurred in Antwerp, which did not tend to make the believers in the possibility of religious or political freedom more in love with the system of Spain and Rome. Those blood-dripping edicts against heresy in the Netherlands, of which enough has been said in previous volumes of this history, and which had caused the deaths by axe, faggot, halter, or burial alive, of at least fifty thousand human creatures—however historical scepticism may shut its eyes to evidence—had now been dormant for twenty years. Their activity had ceased with the pacification of Ghent; but the devilish spirit which had inspired them still lived in the persons of the Jesuits, and there were now more Jesuits in the obedient provinces than there had been for years. We have seen that Champagny's remedy for the ill the country was enduring was „more Jesuits.” And this, too, was Albert's recipe. Always more Jesuits. 1 And now the time had come when the Jesuits thought that they might step openly with their works into the daylight again. Of late years they had shrouded themselves in comparative mystery, but from their seminaries and colleges had gone forth a plentiful company of assassins against Elizabeth and Henry, Nassau, Barneveld, and others who, whether avowedly or involuntarily, were prominent in the party of human progress. Some important murders had already been accomplished, and the prospect was fair that still others might follow, if the Jesuits persevered. Meantime those ecclesiastics thought that a wholesome example might be set to humbler heretics by the spectacle of a public execution.

1 Bor, Herrera, *ubi sup.*

2 Bor, Reyd, *ubi sup.*

3 Ibid.

1 Albert to Philip, 3 May, 1596. (Arch. de Simancas MS.)

Two maiden ladies lived on the north rampart of Antwerp. They had formerly professed the Protestant religion, and had been thrown into prison for that crime; but the fear of further persecution, human weakness, or perhaps sincere conviction, had caused them to renounce the error of their ways, and they now went to mass. But they had a maid-servant, forty years of age, Anna van den Hove by name, who was staunch in that reformed faith in which she had been born and bred. The Jesuits denounced this maid-servant to the civil authority, and claimed her condemnation and execution under the edicts of 1540, decrees which every one had supposed as obsolete as the statues of Draco, which they had so entirely put to shame.

The sentence having been obtained from the docile and priest-ridden magistrates, Anna van den Hove was brought to Brussels and informed that she was at once to be buried alive. At the same time, the Jesuits told her that by converting herself to the Church she might escape punishment. 1

When King Henry IV. was summoned to renounce that same Huguenot faith of which he was the political embodiment and the military champion, the candid man answered by the simple demand to be instructed. When the proper moment came, the instruction was accomplished by an archbishop with the rapidity of magic. Half an hour undid the word of half a life-time. Thus expeditiously could religious conversion be effected when an earthly crown was its guerdon. The poor serving-maid was less open to conviction. In her simple fanaticism she too talked of a crown, and saw it descending from heaven on her poor forlorn head as the reward, not of apostasy, but of steadfastness. She asked her tormentors how they could expect her to abandon her religion for fear of death. She had read her

Bible every day, she said, and had found nothing there of the pope or purgatory, masses, invocation of saints, or the absolution of sins except through the blood of the blessed Redeemer. She interfered with no one who thought differently; she quarrelled with no one's religious belief. She had prayed for enlightenment from Him, if she were in error, and the result was that she felt strengthened in her simplicity, and resolved to do nothing against her conscience. Rather than add this sin to the manifold ones committed by her, she preferred she said, to die the death. So Anna van den Hove was led, one fine midsummer morning, to the hay-field outside of Brussels, between two Jesuits, followed by a number of a peculiar kind of monks called love-brothers. Those holy men goaded her as she went, telling her that she was the devil's carrion, and calling on her to repent at the last moment, and thus save her life and escape eternal damnation beside. But the poor soul had no ear for them, and cried out that, like Stephen, she saw the heavens opening, and the angels stooping down to conduct her far away from the power of the evil one. When they came to the hay-field they found the pit already dug, and the maid-servant was ordered to descend into it. The executioner then covered her with earth up to the waist, and a last summons was made to her to renounce her errors. She refused, and then the earth was piled upon her, and the hangman jumped upon the grave till it was flattened and firm. 1

Of all the religious murders done in that hideous sixteenth century in the Netherlands, the burial of the Antwerp servant-maid was the last and the worst. The worst, because it was a cynical and deliberate attempt to revive the demon whose thirst for blood had been at last allayed, and who had sunk into repose. And it was a spasmodic revival only,

1 Bor, IV. 334, 335. Meteren, 400.

1 Bor, Meteren, *ubi sup.*



for, in the provinces at least, that demon had finished his work.

Still, on the eastern borders of what was called civilization, Turk and Christian were contending for the mastery. The great battle of Kovesd had decided nothing, and the crescent still shone over the fortified and most important Hungarian stronghold of Raab, within arm's length of Vienna. How rapidly might that fatal and menacing emblem fill its horns, should it once be planted on the walls of the Imperial capital! It was not wonderful that a sincere impatience should be felt by all the frontier States for the termination of the insurrection of the Netherlands. Would that rebellious and heretical republic only consent to go out of existence, again bow its stubborn knee to Philip and the Pope, what a magnificent campaign might be made against Mahomet! The King of Spain was the only potentate at all comparable in power to the grand Turk. The King of France, most warlike of men, desired nothing better, as he avowed, than to lead his brave nobles into Hungary to smite the unbelievers. Even Prince Maurice, it was fondly hoped, might be induced to accept a high command in the united armies of Christendom, and seek for glory by campaigning, in alliance with Philip, Rudolph, and Henry against the Ottoman, rather than against his natural sovereign. Such were the sagacity, the insight, the power of forecasting the future possessed in those days by monarchs, statesmen, and diplomatists who were imagining that they held the world's destiny in their hands.

There was this summer a solemn embassy from the emperor to the States-General, proposing mediation, referring in the usual conventional phraseology to the right of kings to command, and to the duty of the people to submit, and urging the gentle-mindedness and readiness to forgive which characterised the sovereign of the Netherlands and of Spain.

And the statesmen of the republic had answered as they always did, showing with courteous language, irresistible logic, and at unmerciful length, that there never had been kings in the Netherlands at all, and that the gentle-mindedness of Philip had been exhibited in the massacre of a hundred thousand Netherlanders in various sieges and battles, and in the murder, under the Duke of Alva alone, of twenty thousand human beings by the hangman. 1

They liked not such divine right nor such gentle-mindedness. They recognised no duty on their part to consent to such a system. Even the friendly king of Denmark sent a legation for a similar purpose, which was respectfully but very decidedly allowed to return as it came; 2 but the most persistent in schemes of interference for the purpose of putting an end to the effusion of blood in the Netherlands was Sigismund of Poland. This monarch, who occupied two very incompatible positions, being sovereign at once of fanatically Protestant Sweden and of orthodox Poland, and who was, moreover, son-in-law of Archduke Charles of Styria—whose other daughter was soon to be espoused by the Prince of Spain—was personally and geographically interested in liberating Philip from the inconvenience of his Netherland war. Only thus could he hope to bring the Spanish power to the rescue of Christendom against the Turk. Troubles enough were in store for Sigismund in his hereditary northern realms, and he was to learn that his intermarriage with the great Catholic and Imperial house did not enable him to trample out Protestantism in those hardy Scandinavian and Flemish regions where it had taken secure root. Meantime he despatched, in solemn mission to the republic and to the heretic queen, a diplomatist whose name and whose oratorical efforts have by caprice of history been allowed to endure to our times

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1 Bor, IV. 358.

2 Ibid. 376.

Paul Dialyn was solemnly received at the Hague on 21st July. 1 21 July, A pragmatical fop, attired in 1597. a long, magnificent Polish robe, covered with diamonds and other jewels, he was yet recognised by some of those present as having been several years before a student at Leyden under a different name, and with far less gorgeous surroundings. 2 He took up his position in the council-chamber, in the presence of the stadholder and the leading members of the States-General, and pronounced a long Latin oration, in the manner, as it was said, of a monk delivering a sermon from the pulpit. He kept his eyes steadily fixed on the ceiling, never once looking at the men whom he was addressing, and speaking in a loud, nasal, dictatorial tone, not at all agreeable to the audience. He dwelt in terms of extravagant eulogy on the benignity and gentleness of the King of Spain—qualities in which he asserted that no prince on earth could be compared to him—and he said this to the very face of Maurice of Nassau. That the benignant and gentle king had caused the stadholder's father to be assassinated, and that he had rewarded the murderer's family with a patent of nobility, and with an ample revenue taken from the murdered man's property, appeared of no account to the envoy in the full sweep of his rhetoric. Yet the reminiscence caused a shudder of disgust in all who heard him.

He then stated the wish of his master the Polish king to be that, in consideration of the present state of Europe in regard to the Turk, the provinces might reconcile themselves to their natural master, who was the most powerful monarch in Christendom, and the only one able to make head against the common foe. They were solemnly warned of the enormous power and resources of the great king, with whom it was

hopeless for them to protract a struggle sure to end at last in their uttermost destruction. It was for kings to issue commands, he said, and for the people to obey; but Philip was full of sweetness, and would accord them full forgiveness for their manifold sins against him. The wish to come to the rescue of Christendom, in this extreme peril from the Turk, was with him paramount to all other considerations. 1

Such, in brief, was the substance of the long Latin harangue by which it was thought possible to induce those sturdy republicans and Calvinists to renounce their vigorous national existence and to fall on their knees before the most Catholic king. This was understood to be mediation, statesmanship, diplomacy, in deference to which the world was to pause and the course of events to flow backwards. Truly, despots and their lackeys were destined to learn some rude lessons from that vigorous little commonwealth in the North Sea, before it should have accomplished its mission on earth.

The States-General dissembled their disgust, however, for it was not desirable to make open enemies of Sigismund or Rudolph. They refused to accept a copy of the oration, but they promised to send him a categorical answer to it in writing. Meantime the envoy had the honour of walking about the castle with the stadholder, and, in the course of their promenade, Maurice pointed to the thirty-eight standards taken at the battle of Turnhout, which hung from the cedarn rafters of the ancient banquetting hall. 2 The mute eloquence of those tattered banners seemed a not illogical reply to the diplomatic Paul's rhetoric in regard to the hopelessness of a contest with Spanish armies.

Next, Van der Werken—pensionary of Leyden, and a classical scholar—waited upon the envoy with 23 July, a Latin reply to his harangue, 1597.

1 Bor, IV. 332-334. Reyd, 304-305.

2 Reyd, *ubi sup.*

1 Bor, *ubi sup.*

2 Ibid.

together with a courteous letter for Sigismund. Both documents were scathing denunciations of the policy pursued by the King of Spain and by all his aiders and abettors, and a distinct but polished refusal to listen to a single word in favour of mediation or of peace.

Paul Dialyn then received a courteous permission to leave the territory of the republic, and was subsequently forwarded in a States' vessel of war to England.

His reception, about a month later, by Queen Elizabeth is an event on which all English historians are fond of dwelling. The pedant, on being presented to that imperious and accomplished sovereign, deported himself with the same ludicrous arrogance which had characterised him at the Hague. His Latin oration, which had been duly drawn up for him by the Chancellor of Sweden, was quite as impertinent as his harangue to the States-General had been, and was delivered with the same conceited air. The queen replied on the instant in the same tongue. She was somewhat in a passion, but spoke with majestic moderation. 1

„Oh, how I have been deceived!” she exclaimed. „I expected an ambassador, and behold a herald! In all my life I never heard of such an oration. Your boldness and unadvised temerity I cannot sufficiently admire. But if the king your master has given you any such thing in charge—which I much doubt—I believe it is because, being but a young man, and lately advanced to the crown, not by ordinary succession of blood, but by election, he understandeth not yet the way of such affairs.” And so on for several minutes longer.

Never did envoy receive such a setting down from sovereign.

„God's death, my lords,” said the queen to her ministers, as she concluded, „I have been enforced this day

to scour up my old Latin that hath lain long in rusting. 1

This combination of ready wit, high spirit, and good Latin, justly excited the enthusiasm of the queen's subjects, and endeared her still more to every English heart. It may, however, be doubted whether the famous reply was in reality so entirely extemporaneous as it has usually been considered. The States-General had lost no time in forwarding to England a minute account of the proceedings of Paul Dialyn at the Hague, together with a sketch of his harangue and of the reply on behalf of the States. 2 Her Majesty and her counsellors therefore, knowing that the same envoy was on his way to England with a similar errand, may be supposed to have had leisure to prepare the famous impromptu. Moreover, it is difficult to understand, on the presumption that these classic utterances were purely extemporaneous, how they have kept their place in all chronicles and histories from that day to the present, without change of a word in the text. Surely there was no stenographer present to take down the queen's words as they fell from her lips.

The military events of the year did not testify to a much more successful activity on the part of the new league in the field than it had displayed in the sphere of diplomacy. In vain did the envoy of the republic urge Henry and his counsellors to follow up the crushing blow dealt to the cardinal at Turnhout by vigorous operations in conjunction with the States' forces in Artois and Hainault. 3 For Amiens had meantime been taken, and it was now necessary for the king to employ all his energy and all his resources to recover that important city. So much damage to the cause of the republic and of the new league had the little yellow Spanish

1 Camden, 536, 537, *Bor.* IV. 350. Wright, *Queen Elizabeth and her Times*, ii. 480.

1 Wright, *ubi sup.*

2 *Bor.* *ubi sup.*

3 Calvaert to the States-General, in *Deventer*, ii. 141, *seqq.*



captain inflicted in an hour, with his bags of chestnuts and walnuts. The siege of Amiens lasted nearly six months, and was the main event of the campaign, so far as Henry was concerned. It is true—as the reader has already seen, and as will soon be more clearly developed—that Henry's heart had been fixed on peace, from the moment that he consented in conjunction with the republic to declare war, and that he had entered into secret and separate negotiations for that purpose with the agents of Philip so soon as he had bound himself by solemn covenant with Elizabeth to have no negotiations whatever with him except with her full knowledge and consent.

The siege of Amiens, however, was considered a military masterpiece, and its whole progress showed the revolution which the stadholder of Holland had already effected in European warfare. Henry IV. beleaguered Amiens as if he were a pupil of Maurice, and contemporaries were enthusiastic over the science, the patience, the inventive ingenuity which were at last crowned with success. The heroic Hernan Tello de Porto Carrero was killed in a sortie during the defence of the place which he had so gallantly won, and when the city was surrendered to the king on the

19 Sept. 19th of September it was 1597. stipulated in the first article of the capitulation that the tomb, epitaph, and trophies, by which his memory was honoured in the principal church, should not be disturbed, and that his body might be removed whenever and whither it seemed good to his sovereign. In vain the cardinal had taken the field with an army of eighteen thousand foot and fifteen hundred light cavalry. The king had learned so well to entrench himself and to moderate his ardour for inopportune pitched battles, that the relieving force could find no occasion to effect its purpose. The archduke retired. He came to Amiens like a soldier, said Henry, but he went back

like a priest. Moreover, he was obliged to renounce, besides the city, a most tempting prize which he thought that he had secured within the city. Alexander Farnese, in his last French campaign, had procured and sent to his uncle the foot of St. Philip and the head of St. Lawrence; but what was Albert's delight when he learned that in Amiens cathedral there was a large piece of the head of John the Baptist! „There will be a great scandal about it in this kingdom,” he wrote to Philip, „if I undertake to transport it out of the country, but I will try to contrive it as your Majesty desires.”<sup>1</sup>

But the military events of the year prevented the cardinal from gratifying the king in regard to these choice curiosities.

After the reduction of the city, Henry went a considerable distance with his army towards the frontier of Flanders, in order to return, as he said, his cousin's visit.<sup>2</sup> But the recovery of Amiens had placed too winning a card in the secret game which he was then playing to allow him to push his nominal adversary to extremities.

The result, suspected very early in the year by the statesmen of the republic, was already very plainly foreshadowing itself as the winter advanced.

Nor had the other two members of the league effected much in the field. Again an expedition had been fitted forth under Essex against the Spanish coast to return the compliment which Philip had intended with the unlucky

<sup>1</sup> Albert to Philip, 14 March, 1597. Same to same, 16 Aug. 1597. (Arch. de Sim. MS.) „Es cosa cierta que está en Amiens gran parte de la cabeza de San Juan Baptista. Aun podría causar en aquel Reyno algun scandalo el tratar de un traslacion, pero procurare que se guie como mas convenga conforme a lo que V. Magd. me manda,” &c. &c.

<sup>2</sup> For the siege of Amiens, see De Thou, xiii. 109-126. Meteren, 396. Bentivoglio, 458, seqq. Carnero, 407. seqq., and especially Coloma, 238-271. Albert to Philip, 30 Sept. 1597. (Arch. de Simancas MS.)

armada under Santa Gadea; and again Sir Francis Vere, with two thousand veterans from the Netherlands, and the Dutch admirals, with ten ships of war and a large number of tenders and transports, had faithfully taken part in the adventure.

The fleet was tempest-tossed for ten days, during which it reached the threatened coast and was blown off again. It returned at last into the English ports, having accomplished nothing, and having expended superfluously a considerable amount of money and trouble. Essex, with a few of the vessels, subsequently made a cruise towards the Azores, but, beyond the capture of a Spanish merchantman or two, gained no glory and inflicted no damage. 1

Nothing could be feebler than the military operations of the three confederated powers ever since they had so solemnly confederated themselves.

Sick at heart with the political intrigues of his allies, which had brought a paralysis upon his arms which the blows of the enemy could hardly have effected, Maurice took the field in August for an autumnal campaign on the eastern frontier of the republic. Foiled in his efforts for a combined attack by the whole force of the league upon Philip's power in the west, he thought it at least expedient to liberate the Rhine, to secure the important provinces of Zutphen, Gelderland, and Overysel from attack, and to provide against the dangerous intrigues and concealed warfare carried on by Spain in the territories of the mad Duke of Juliers, Cleves and Berg. For the seeds of the Thirty Years' War of Germany were already sown broadcast in those fatal duchies, and it was the determination of the agents of Spain to acquire the mastery of that most eligible military position, that excellent *sedes belli*, whenever Protestantism was to be assailed

in England, the Netherlands, or Germany.

Meantime the Hispaniolated counsellors of Duke John had strangled—as it was strongly suspected—his duchess, who having gone to bed in perfect health one evening was found dead in her bed next morning, with an ugly mark on her throat; 1 and it was now the purpose of these statesmen to find a new bride for their insane sovereign in the ever ready and ever orthodox house of Lorraine. 2 And the Protestant brothers-in-law and nephews and nieces were making every possible combination in order to check such dark designs, and to save these important territories from the ubiquitous power of Spain.

The stadholder had also family troubles at this period. His sister Emilia had conceived a desperate passion for Don Emmanuel, the pauper son of the forlorn pretender to Portugal, Don Antonio, who had at last departed this life. Maurice was indignant that a Catholic, an outcast, and, as it was supposed, a bastard, should dare to mate with the daughter of William of Orange-Nassau; and there were many scenes of tenderness, reproaches, recriminations, and *hysterica passio*, in which not only the lovers, the stadholder and his family, but also the high and mighty States-General, were obliged to enact their parts. The chronicles are filled with the incidents, which, however, never turned to tragedy, nor even to romance, but ended, without a catastrophe, in a rather insipid marriage. The Princess Emilia remained true both to her religion and her husband during a somewhat obscure wedded life. and after her death Don Emmanuel found means to reconcile himself with the King of Spain and to espouse, in second nuptials, a Spanish lady. 3

On the 4th August, Maurice arrived

1 Reynd, 319.

2 Ibid.

3 Bor., IV. 322-324. Van der Keup, ii. 36-40, 182-194.

4 Aug. at Arnheim with a force of  
1597. seven thousand foot and twelve hundred horse. Hohenlo was with him, and William Lewis, and there was yet another of the illustrious house of Nassau in the camp, Frederick Henry, a boy in his thirteenth year, the youngest born of William the Silent, the grandson of Admiral de Coligny, now about, in this his first campaign, to take the first step in a long and noble career. 1

Having reduced the town and castle of Alphen, the stadholder came before Rheinberg, which he very expeditiously invested. During a preliminary skirmish, William Lewis received a wound in the leg, while during the brief siege Maurice had a narrow escape from death, a cannon-ball passing through his tent and over his head as he lay taking a brief repose upon his couch. 2

On the 19th, Rheinberg, the key to  
19 Aug. that portion of the river,  
1597. surrendered. On the 31st the stadholder opened his batteries upon the city of Meurs, which capitulated on the 2nd of September; the commandant, Andrew Miranda, stipulating that he should carry off an old fifty pounder, the only piece of cannon in the place. Maurice gave his permission with a laugh, begging Miranda not to batter down any cities with his big gun. 3

On the 8th September the stadholder threw a bridge over the Rhine, and crossing that river and the Lippe, came on the 11th before Grol. There was no Christopher Mondragon now in his path to check his progress and spoil his campaign, so that in seventeen days the city, being completely surrounded with galleries and covered ways up to its walls, surrendered. Count van Stirum, royal governor of the place, dined with the stadholder on that day, and the garrison, from twelve hundred to fifteen hundred strong, together with such of

the townsfolk as chose to be subjects of Philip rather than citizens of the republic, were permitted to depart in peace. 1

On the 9th October the town and castle of Brevoort were taken by storm and the town was burned. 2

On the 18th October, Maurice having summoned Enschede, the commandant requested permission to examine the artillery by which it was proposed to reduce the city. Leave being granted, two captains were deputed accordingly as inspectors, who reported that resistance was useless. The place accordingly capitulated at once. 3

Here, again, was an improvement on the heroic practice of Alva and Romero.

On the 21st and 22nd October, Ootmarsum and Oldenzaal were taken, and on the 28th the little army came before Lingen. This important city surrendered after a fortnight's siege.

Thus closed a sagacious, business-like, three-months' campaign, in the course of which the stadholder, although with a slender force, had by means of his excellent organization and his profound practical science, achieved very considerable results. He had taken nine strongly-fortified cities and five castles, opened the navigation of the Rhine, and strengthened the whole eastern bulwarks of the republic. 4 He was censured by the superficial critics of the old school for his humanity towards the conquered garrisons. At least it was thought quite superfluous to let these Spanish soldiers go scot free. Five thousand veterans had thus been liberated to swell the ranks of the cardinal's army, but the result soon proved the policy of Maurice to be, in many ways, wholesome. The great repudiation by Philip, and the consequent bankruptcy

1 Bor, IV. 349. Meteren, 411-417.

2 Ibid.

3 Letter of Maurice, in Van der Kemp, ii. 180.

4 Bor, IV, 345-368. Van der Kemp, ii. 31-35, 177, *seqq.* Meteren, *ubi sup.*

1 Van der Kemp, ii. 31-32.

2 Bor, IV. 345. Van der Kemp, *ibid.* 32.

3 Reyd, xiv. 312.



of Albert, converted large numbers of the royal troops into mutineers, and these garrisons from the eastern frontier were glad to join in the game.

After the successful siege of Hulst in the previous year the cardinal had reduced the formidable mutiny which had organized itself at Tirlemont and Chapelle in the days of his luckless predecessor. Those rebels had been paid off and had mainly returned to Italy and other lands to spend their money. But soon a new rebellion in all the customary forms established itself in Antwerp citadel during the temporary absence of Mexia, the governor, and great was the misery of the unhappy burghers thus placed at the mercy of the guns of that famous pentagon. They were obliged to furnish large sums to the whole garrison, paying every common footsoldier twelve stivers a day and the officers in proportion, while the great Eletto demanded, beside his salary, a coach and six, a state bed with satin curtains and fine linen, and the materials for banqueting sumptuously every day. 1 At the slightest demur to these demands the bombardment from the citadel would begin, and the accurate artillery practice of those experienced cannoneers soon convinced the loyal citizens of the propriety of the arrangement. 2 The example spread. The garrison of Ghent broke into open revolt, and a general military rebellion lasted for more than a year.

While the loyal cities of the obedient provinces were thus enjoying the fruits of their loyalty and obedience, the rebellious capital of the republic was receiving its stadholder with exuberant demonstrations of gratitude. The year begun with the signal victory of Turnhout, had worthily terminated, so far as military events were concerned, with the autumnal campaign on the Rhine, and great were the rejoicings throughout the little commonwealth.

Thus, with diminished resources; had the republic been doing its share of the work which the anti-Spanish league had been called into existence to accomplish. But, as already intimated, this league was a mere fraud upon the Netherlands, which their statesmen were not slow in discovering. Of course it was the object of Philip and of the pope to destroy this formidable triple alliance as soon as formed, and they found potent assistance, not only in Henry's counsellors, but in the bosom of that crafty monarch himself. Clement hated Philip as much as he feared him, so that the prospect both of obtaining Henry as a counterpoise to his own most oppressive and most Catholic protector, and of breaking up the great convert's alliance with the heretic queen and the rebellious republic, was a most tempting one to his Holiness. Therefore he employed, indefatigably, the matchless powers of intrigue possessed by Rome to effect this great purpose. As for Elizabeth, she was weary of the war, most anxious to be reimbursed her advances to the States, and profoundly jealous of the rising commercial and naval greatness of the new commonwealth. If the league therefore proved impotent from the beginning, certainly it was not the fault of the United Netherlands. We have seen how much the king deplored, in intimate conversation with De Bethune, 1 his formal declaration of war against France which the Dutch diplomatists had induced him to make; and indeed nothing can be more certain than that this public declaration of war, and this solemn formation of the triple alliance against Philip, were instantly accompanied on Henry's part by secret peace negotiations with Philip's agents. Villeroy told Envoy Calvaert that as for himself he always trembled when he thought on what he had done, in seconding the will of his Majesty in that

1 *Antea*, *Vide* Sully, *Mémoires* I. viii. 412. Van Deventer, ii. 142.

1 Bor, IV. 468.

2 *Ibid.*

declaration at the instance of the States-General, of which measure so many losses and such bitter fruits had been the result. 1 He complained, too, of the little assistance or co-operation yielded by England. 2 Calvaert replied that he had nothing to say in defence of England, 3 but that certainly the king could have no cause to censure the States. The republic, however, had good ground, he said, to complain that nothing had been done by France, that all favourable occasions had been neglected, and that there was a perpetual change of counsels. The envoy especially, and justly, reproached the royal government for having taken no advantage of the opportunity offered by the victory of Turnhout, in which the republic had utterly defeated the principal forces of the common enemy. He bluntly remarked, too, that the mysterious comings and goings of Balvena had naturally excited suspicions in the Netherlands, and that it would be better that all such practices should be at once abandoned. They did his Majesty no service, and it was no wonder that they caused uneasiness to his allies. Villeroy replied that the king had good reasons to give satisfaction to those who were yearning for peace. 4

As Henry himself was yearning in this regard as much as any of his subjects, it was natural enough that he should listen to Balvena and all other informal negotiators whom Cardinal Albert might send from Brussels or Clement from Rome. It will be recollected that Henry's parting words to Balvena at Rouen had been: „Tell the archduke that I am very much his friend. Let him arrange a peace. Be gone. Be diligent.” 5

But the king's reply to Calvaert, when, after the interview with Villeroy,

that envoy was admitted to the royal dressing-room for private conversation and took the occasion to remonstrate with his Majesty on these intrigues with the Spanish agent, was that he should send off Balvena in such fashion that it would take from the cardinal-archduke all hope of troubling him with any further propositions. 1

It has been seen, too, with what an outbreak of wrath the proposition, made by Elizabeth through Robert Sydney, that she should succour Calais on condition of keeping it for herself, had been received by Henry. At a somewhat later moment, when Calais had passed entirely into the possession of Spain, the queen offered to lay siege to that city with twelve thousand men, but with the understanding that the success was to be entirely for her own profit. Again the king had expressed great astonishment and indignation at the proposition. 2

Nevertheless, after Amiens had been lost, Henry had sent Fonquerolles on a special mission to England, 3 asking Elizabeth's assistance in the siege for its recovery, and offering that she should keep Calais as a pledge for expenses thus incurred, on the same terms as those on which she held the Brill and Flushing in the Netherlands. This proposal, however, to make a considerable campaign in Picardy, and to be indemnified by Henry for her trouble with the pledge of a city which was not his property, did not seem tempting to Elizabeth. The mission of Fonquerolles was fruitless, as might have been supposed. 4 Nothing certainly in the queen's attitude, up to that moment, could induce the supposition that she would help to reduce Amiens for the sake of the privilege of conquering Calais if she could.

1 Calvaert's letter, in Deventer, ii. 141-146.

2 Ibid.

3 Ibid. „Dat ick England daer liet.”

4 Calvaert's letter, in Deventer ii. 141-146.

5 *Antea*.

1 Caron to the States, in Deventer, *ubi sup.*

2 Ibid.

3 Instructions for Fonquerolles, in Prevost Paradol, Elizabeth et Henry IV.

4 Calvaert to States-General, in Deventer, ii. 47.

So soon as her refusal was made certain, Henry dropped the mask. Buzanval, the regular French envoy at the Hague—even while amazing the States by rebukes for their short-comings in the field and by demands for immediate co-operation in the king's campaign, when the king was doing nothing but besiege Amiens—astonished the republican statesmen still further by telling them that his master was listening seriously to the pope's secret offers. 1

His Holiness had assured the king, through the legate at Paris, that he could easily bring about a peace between him and Philip, if Henry would agree to make it alone, and he would so manage it that the king's name should not be mixed up with the negotiations, and that he should not appear as seeking for peace. It was to be considered however—so Henry's envoy intimated both at Greenwich and the Hague—that if the king should accept the pope's intervention he would be obliged to exclude from a share in it the queen and all others not of the Catholic religion, and it was feared that the same necessity which had compelled him to listen to these overtures would force him still further in the same path. He dreaded lest, between peace and war, he might fall into a position in which the law would be dictated to him either by the enemy or by those who had undertaken to help him out of danger.

Much more information to this effect did Buzanval communicate to the States on the authority of a private letter from the king, telling him of the ill-success of the mission of Fonquerolles. 2 That diplomatist had brought back nothing from England, it appeared, save excuses, general phrases, and many references to the troubles in Ireland and to the danger of a new Spanish Armada.

It was now for the first time, moreover,

that the States learned how they had been duped both by England and France in the matter of the League. To their surprise they were informed that while they were themselves furnishing four thousand men, according to the contract signed by the three powers, the queen had in reality only agreed to contribute two thousand soldiers, and these only for four months' service, within a very strict territorial limit, and under promise of immediate reimbursement of the expenses thus incurred. 1

These facts, together with the avowal that their magnanimous ally had all along been secretly treating for peace with the common enemy, did not make a cheerful impression upon those plain-spoken republicans, nor was it much consolation to them to receive the assurance that „after the king's death his affection and gratitude towards the States would be found deeply engraved upon his heart.” 2

The result of such a future autopsy might seem a matter of comparative indifference, since meantime the present effect to the republic of those deep emotions was a treacherous desertion. Calvaert, too, who had so long haunted the king like his perpetual shadow, and who had believed him—at least so far as the Netherlands were concerned—to be almost without guile, 3 had been destined after all to a rude awakening. Sick and suffering, he did not cease, so long as life was in him, to warn the States-General of the dangers impending over them from the secret negotiations which their royal ally was doing his best to conceal from them,

1 Bor, *ubi sup.* Vide *Antea*.

2 Bor, *ubi sup.*

3 „Deurdien, S. M.,” wrote Calvaert in June, 1596, „(Sonder jactantie gesproken) binnen den tyt ick by hem geweest ben, my luttel particulariteiten verborgen heeft, seggende dikmael met expresse woorden, en soo ick gelooove sonder flicie (*die in hem cleyn is*) [!] dat hy niet begeerde de kennis syner handelngen desen oorlog raakende, aen U. M. E. te onttrecken.” Calvaert to the States-General, Deventer, ii. 118.

1 Bor, IV. 324, 325.

2 An abstract of the letter is given by Bor, *ubi up.*



and as to which he had for a time succeeded so dexterously in hoodwinking their envoy himself. But the honest and energetic agent of the republic did not live to see the consummation of these manœuvres of Henry and the pope. He died in Paris during the month of June of this year. 1

Certainly the efforts of Spanish and Papal diplomacy had not been unsuccessful in bringing about a dissolution of the bonds of amity by which the three powers seemed so lately to be

June, 1597. drawing themselves very closely together. The republic and Henry IV. were now on a most uncomfortable footing towards each other. On the other hand, the queen was in a very ill humour with the States and very angry with Henry. Especially the persistent manner in which the Hollanders carried on trade with Spain, and were at the same time making fortunes for themselves and feeding the enemy, while Englishmen, on pain of death, were debarred from participation in such traffic, excited great and general indignation in England. In vain was it represented that this trade, if prohibited to the commonwealth, would fall into the hands of neutral powers, and that Spain would derive her supplies from the Baltic and other regions as regularly as ever, while the republic, whose whole life was in her foreign commerce, would not only become incapable of carrying on the war but would perish of inanition. The English statesmen threatened to declare all such trade contraband, and vessels engaging in it lawful prize to English cruisers. 2

Burghley declared, with much excitement, to Caron, that he, as well as all the council, considered the conduct of the Hollanders so unjustifiable as to make them regret that their princess had

ever embarked with a State which chose to aid its own enemies in the destruction of itself and its allies. Such conduct was so monstrous that those who were told of it would hardly believe it. 1

The Dutch envoy observed that there were thirty thousand sailors engaged in his trade, and he asked the Lord Treasurer whether he proposed that these people should all starve or be driven into the service of the enemy. Burghley rejoined that the Hollanders had the whole world beside to pursue their traffic in, that they did indeed trade over the whole world, and had thereby become so extraordinarily, monstrously rich that there was no believing it. 2

Caron declared his sincere wish that this was true, but said, on the contrary, that he knew too well what extreme trouble and labour the States-General had in providing for the expenses of the war and in extracting the necessary funds from the various communities. This would hardly be the case were such great wealth in the land as was imagined. But still the English counsellors protested that they would stop this trading with the enemy at every hazard. 3

On the question of peace or war itself the republican diplomatists were often baffled as to the true intentions of the English Government. „As the queen is fine and false,” said Marquis Havré, observing and aiding in the various intrigues which were weaving at Brussels, „and her council much the same, she is practising towards the Hollanders a double stratagem. On the one hand she induces them to incline to a general peace. On the other, her adherents, ten or twelve in number of those who govern Holland and have credit with the people, insist that the true interest of the State is in a continuation of the war.” 4

1 Van Deventer, ii. 148.

2 „Ende voor vrybuyt doen verklaren alle sulcke schepen,” &c.—Caron to the States-General, 24 Sept. 1597, in Deventer, 157-161.

1 Caron's despatch, last cited. 2 Ibid.

3 Ibid.

4 Deventer, 169, from the Belgian Archives. Havré to Archduke Albert.

But Havré, adept in diplomatic chicanery as he undoubtedly was, would have found it difficult to find any man of intelligence or influence in that rebellious commonwealth, of which he was once a servant; who had any doubt on that subject. It needed no English argument to persuade Olden-Barneveld, and the other statesmen who guided the destiny of the republic, that peace would be destruction. Moreover, there is no question that both the queen and Burghley would have been truly grateful had the States-General been willing to make peace and return to the allegiance which they had long since spurned.

Nevertheless it is difficult to say whether there were at this moment more of animosity in Elizabeth's mind towards her backsliding ally, with whom she had so recently and so pompously sworn an eternal friendship, or towards her ancient enemy. Although she longed for peace, she hardly saw her way to it, for she felt that the secret movements of Henry had in a manner barred the path. She confessed to the States' envoy that it was as easy for her to make black white as to make peace with Spain.<sup>1</sup> To this Caron cordially assented, saying with much energy, „There is as much chance for your Majesty and for us to make peace, during the life of the present King of Spain, as to find redemption in hell.”<sup>2</sup>

To the Danish ambassadors, who had come to England with proposals of mediation, the queen had replied that the King of Spain had attacked her dominions many times, and had very often attempted her assassination; <sup>3</sup> that after long patience she had begun to defend herself, and had been willing to show him that she had the courage and the means, not only to maintain herself against his assaults, but also to invade

his realms; that, therefore, she was not disposed to speak first, nor to lay down any conditions. Yet, if she saw that the King of Spain had any remorse for his former offences against her, and wished to make atonement for them, she was willing to declare that her heart was not so alienated from peace, but that she could listen to propositions on the subject.<sup>1</sup>

She said, too, that such a peace must be a general one, including both the King of France and the States of the Netherlands, for with these powers she had but lately made an offensive and defensive league against the King of Spain, from which she protested that for no consideration in the world would she ever swerve one jot.

Certainly these were words of Christian charity and good faith, but such professions are the common staple of orations and documents for public consumption. As the accounts became more and more minute, however, of Henry's intrigues with Albert, Philip, and Clement, the queen grew more angry.

She told Caron that she was quite aware that the king had long <sup>16 Nov.</sup> been in communication with <sup>1597.</sup> the cardinal's emissaries, and that he had even sent some of his principal counsellors to confer with the cardinal himself at Arras, in direct violation of the stipulations of the league. She expressed her amazement at the king's conduct; for she knew very well, she said, that the league had hardly been confirmed and sworn to, before he was treating with secret agents sent to him by the cardinal. „And now,” she continued, „they propose to send an ambassador to inform me of the whole proceeding, and to ask my advice and consent in regard to negotiations which they have, perchance, entirely concluded.”

She further informed the republican envoy that the king had recently been

<sup>1</sup> Caron to the States-General, Sept. 1597. Deventer ii. 153-156.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid.

<sup>3</sup> „Ende seer dickmael naer haer lyf ende leven heeft doen staen.”—Caron to States-General, 24 Sept. 1597. Deventer, ii. 159.

<sup>1</sup> Ibid.

taking the ground in these dealings with the common enemy; that the two kingdoms of France and England must first be provided for; that when the basis between these powers and Spain had been arranged, it would be time to make arrangements for the States, and that it would probably be found advisable to obtain a truce of three or four years between them and Spain, in which interval the government of the provinces might remain on its actual footing. During this armistice the King of Spain was to withdraw all Spanish troops from the Netherlands, in consequence of which measure all distrust would by degrees vanish, and the community, becoming more and more encouraged, would in time recognise the king for their sovereign once more. 1

This, according to the information received by Elizabeth from her resident minister in France, was Henry's scheme for carrying out the principles of the offensive and defensive league, which only the year before he had so solemnly concluded with the Dutch republic. Instead of assisting that commonwealth in waging her war of independence against Spain, he would endeavour to make it easy for her to return peacefully to her ancient thralldom. 2

The queen asked Caron what he thought of the project. How could that diplomatist reply but with polite scorn? Not a year of such armistice would elapse, he said, before the Spanish partisans would have it all their own way in the Netherlands, and the King of Spain would be master of the whole country. Again and again he repeated that peace, so long as Philip lived, was an impossibility for the States. No doubt that monarch would gladly consent to the proposed truce, for it would be indeed strange if by means of it he could not so establish himself in the provinces as to easily overthrow the sovereigns who

were thus helping him to so advantageous a position. 1

The queen listened patiently to a long and earnest remonstrance in this vein made by the envoy, and assured him that not even to gain another kingdom would she be the cause of the return of the provinces to the dominion of Spain. She would do her best to dissuade the king from his peace negotiations; but she would listen to De Maise, the new special envoy from Henry, and would then faithfully report to Caron, by word of mouth, the substance of the conversation. The States-General did not deserve to be deceived, nor would she be a party to any deception, unless she were first cheated herself. „I feel indeed,” she added, „that matters are not always managed as they should be by your Government, and that you have not always treated princes, especially myself, as we deserve to be treated. Nevertheless, your State is not a monarchy, and so we must take all things into consideration, and weigh its faults against its many perfections.” 2

With this philosophical—and in the mouth of Elizabeth Tudor, surely very liberal—reflection, the queen terminated the interview with the republican envoy.

Meantime the conferences with the special ambassador of France proceeded. For, so soon as Henry had completed all his arrangements, and taken his decision to accept the very profitable peace offered to him by Spain, he assumed that air of frankness which so well became him, and candidly avowed his intention of doing what he had already done. Herault de Maise arrived

1 Ibid.

2 „Ick bevinde wel (seide sy) dat het niet al recht soo 't behoorde in hunne regeeringe toegaet, en dat sy niet altyt de Princen immers niet my tracteren soo wy wel in hun regart verdient hebben; doch hnn staet is oock geen monarchie, en daarom wy moeten alles consideren en de fauten met vele perfectien die sy hebben tegen elkander laeten gemoeten. Caron's Despatch, last cited.

1 Caron to States-General, 19 Nov. 1597. Deventer, ii. 161-164

2 Ibid.



in England not long before the time when the peace-commissioners were about assembling at Vervins. He was instructed to inform her Majesty that he had done his best to bring about a general alliance of the European powers from which alone the league concluded between England, France, and the Netherlands would have derived substantial strength. 1

But as nothing was to be hoped for from Germany, as England offered but little assistance, and as France was exhausted by her perpetual conflicts, it had become necessary for the king to negotiate for a peace. He now wished to prove, therefore, to the queen, as to a sister to whom he was under such obligations, that the interests of England were as dear to him as those of France.

The proof of these generous sentiments, did not, however seem so clear as could be wished, and there were very stormy debates, so soon as the ambassador found himself in conference with her Majesty's counsellors. The English statesmen bitterly reproached the French for having thus lightly thrown away the alliance between the two countries, and they insisted upon the duty of the king to fulfil his solemn engagements.

The reply was very frank and very decided. Kings, said De Maisse, never make treaties except with the tacit condition to embrace every thing that may be useful to them, and carefully to avoid every thing prejudicial to their interests. 2

The corollary from this convenient and sweeping maxim was simple enough. The king could not be expected by his allies to reject an offered peace which was very profitable, nor to continue a war which was very detrimental. All that they could expect was that he should communicate his intentions to them, and this he was now very cheer-

fully doing. Such in brief were the statements of De Maisse. 1

The English were indignant. They also said a stout word for the provinces, although it has been made sufficiently clear that they did not love that upstart republic. But the French ambassador replied that his master really meant secretly to assist the States in carrying on the war until they should make an arrangement. 2 He should send them very powerful succours for this purpose, and he expected confidently that England would assist him in this line of conduct. 3 Thus Henry was secretly pledging himself to make underhand but substantial war against Spain, with which power he was at that instant concluding peace, while at the same time he was abandoning his warlike league with the queen and the republic, in order to effect that very pacification. Truly the morality of the governing powers of the earth was not entirely according to the apostolic standard.

The interviews between the queen and the new ambassador were, of course, on his part, more courteous in tone than those with the counsellors, but mainly to the same effect. De Maisse stated that the Spanish king had offered to restore every place that he held in France, including Calais, Brittany, and the Marquisate of Saluces, and as he likewise manifested a willingness to come to favourable terms with her Majesty and with the States, it was obviously the duty of Henry to make these matters know to her Majesty, in whose hands was thus placed the decision between peace or continuation of the war. 4 The queen asked what was the authority for

1 Ibid.

2 Ibid.

3 „Qu'en faisant la paix avec les Espagnols il ne laisseroit pas de fournir secrettement aux Etats-Généraux de puissans secours jusqu'à ce que leur accommodement fût fait, et qu'il souhaitoit se joindre avec l'Angleterre pour les aider et les soutenir, soit en paix, soit en guerre.”—De Thou, *ubi sup.*

4 Caron to the States-General; 10 December, 1597 (O. S.), in Deventer, ii 165-163.

1 De Thou, xiii. 206, *seqq.* l. 120.

2 Ibid.

the supposition that England was to be included by Spain in the pacification. De Maise quoted President Richardot. In that case, the queen remarked, it was time for her to prepare for a third Spanish armada. When a former envoy from France had alluded to Richardot as expressing the same friendly sentiments on the part of his sovereign and himself, she had replied by referring to the sham negotiations of Bourbourg, by which the famous invasion of 1588 had been veiled, and she had intimated her expectation that another Spanish fleet would soon be at her throat. And within three weeks of the utterance of her prophecy the second armada, under Santa Gadea, had issued from Spain to assail her realms. Now then, as Richardot was again cited as a peace negotiator, it was time to look for a third invasion. It was an impertinence for Secretary of State Villeroy to send her word about Richardot. It was not an impertinence in King Henry, who understood war-matters better than he did affairs of state, in which kings were generally governed by their counsellors and secretaries, but it was very strange that Villeroy should be made quiet with a simple declaration of Richardot. 1

The queen protested that she would never consent to a peace with Spain, except with the knowledge and consent of the States. De Maise replied that the king was of the same mind, upon which her Majesty remarked that in that case he had better have apprised her and the States of his intentions before treating alone and secretly with the enemy. The envoy denied that the king had been treating. He had only been listening to what the King of Spain had to propose, and suggesting his own wishes and intentions. The queen rejoined that this was treating if anything was, and certainly her Majesty was in the right if the term has any meaning at all.

Elizabeth further reproachfully observed, that although the king talked about continuing the war, he seemed really tired of that dangerous pursuit, in which he had exercised himself so many long years, and that he was probably beginning to find a quiet and agreeable life more to his taste. She expressed the hope, however, that he would acquit himself honourably towards herself and her allies, and keep the oaths which he had so solemnly sworn before God.

Such was the substance of the queen's conversations with De Maise, as she herself subsequently reported them to the States' envoy. 1

The republican statesmen had certainly cause enough to suspect Henry's intentions, but they did not implicitly trust Elizabeth. They feared that both king and queen were heartily sick of the war, and disposed to abandon the league, while each was bent on securing better terms than the other in any negotiations for peace. Barneveld—on the whole the most sagacious of the men then guiding the affairs of Europe, although he could dispose of but comparatively slender resources, and was merely the chief minister of a scarcely born little commonwealth of some three million souls—was doing his best to save the league and to divert Henry from thoughts of peace. Feeling that the queen, notwithstanding her professions to Caron and others, would have gladly entered into negotiations with Philip, had she found the door as wide open as Henry had found it, he did his best to prevent both his allies from proceeding farther in that direction. He promised the French envoy at the Hague that not only would the republic continue to furnish the four thousand soldiers as stipulated in the league, but that if Henry would recommence active operations, a States' army of nine thousand foot and two thousand horse should

1 Caron to the States-General, 10 December, 1597 (O.S.), in *Deventer*, ii. 165-168.

1 Caron's despatch, last cited.

at once take the field on the Flemish frontier of France, and aid in the campaign to the full extent of their resources. 1 If the king were disposed to undertake the siege of Calais, the Advocate engaged that he should be likewise energetically assisted in that enterprise. 2 Nor was it suggested in case the important maritime stronghold were recovered that it should be transferred, not to the sovereign of France, but to the dominions of the republic. That was the queen's method of assisting an ally, but it was not the practice of the States. Buzanval, who was quite aware of his master's decision to conclude peace, suggested Henry's notion of a preliminary and general truce for six months. But of course Barneveld rejected the idea with horror. He felt, as every intelligent statesman of the commonwealth could not but feel, that an armistice would be a death-blow. It would be better, he said, for the States to lose one or two towns than to make a truce, for there were so many people in the commonwealth sure to be dazzled by the false show of a pacification, that they would be likely, after getting into the suburbs, to wish to enter the heart of the city. „If,” said the Advocate, „the French and the English know what they are doing when they are facilitating the Spanish dominion in the provinces, they would prefer to lose a third of their own kingdoms to seeing the Spaniard absolute master here. 3

It was determined, in this grave position of affairs, to send a special mission both to France and to England with the Advocate as its chief. Henry made no objections to this step, but, on the contrary, affected much impatience for the arrival of the envoys, and ascribed the delay to the intrigues of Elizabeth. He sent word to Prince Maurice and to Barneveld that he

suspected the queen of endeavouring to get before him in negotiating with Spain in order to obtain Calais for herself. 1 And, in truth, Elizabeth very soon afterwards informed Barneveld that she might really have had Calais, and have got the better of the king in these secret transactions. 2

Meantime, while the special mission to France and England was getting ready to depart, an amateur diplomatist appeared in Brussels, and made a feeble effort to effect a reconciliation between the republic and the cardinal. 1598.

This was a certain Van der Meulen, an Antwerp merchant, who, for religious reasons, had emigrated to Leyden, and who was now invited by the cardinal-archduke to Brussels to confer with his counsellors as to the possibility of the rebellious States accepting his authority. 3 For, as will soon be indicated, Philip had recently resolved on a most important step. He was about to transfer the sovereignty of all the Netherlands to his daughter Isabella and her destined husband, Cardinal Albert. It would obviously, therefore, be an excessively advantageous arrangement for those new sovereigns if the rebellious States would join hands with the obedient provinces, accept the dominion of Albert and Isabella, and give up their attempt to establish a republican government. Accordingly the cardinal had intimated that the States would be allowed the practice of their religion, while the military and civil functionaries might retain office. He even suggested that he would appoint Maurice of Nassau his stadholder for the northern provinces, unless he should prefer a high position in the Imperial armies. 4 Such was the general admiration felt in Spain and elsewhere for the military talents of the prince, that

1 Letters of Buzanval, cited by Deventer, ii. 164, 165. 2 Ibid. 3 Ibid.

1 Verhaal van Olden-Barneveld, in Deventer, ii. 171. 2 Ibid. 3 Bor, IV. 468. 4 Ibid.



he would probably be appointed commander-in-chief of the forces against Mahomet. I Van der Meulen duly reported all these ingenious schemes to the States, but the sturdy republicans only laughed at them. They saw clearly enough through such slight attempts to sow discord in their commonwealth, and to send their great chieftain to Turkey.

A most affectionate letter, written by the cardinal-archduke to the States-General, inviting them to except his sovereignty, and another from the obedient provinces to the united States of the same purport, remained unanswered. 2

But the Antwerp merchant, in his interviews with the crafty politicians who surrounded the cardinal, was able at least to obtain some insight into the opinions prevalent at Brussels; and these were undoubtedly to the effect that both England and France were willing enough to abandon the cause

1 Bor, IV. 468.

2 Ibid.

of the Netherlands, provided only that they could obtain satisfactory arrangements for themselves.

Van der Meulen remarked to Richardot that in all their talk about a general peace nothing had been said of the Queen of England, to whom the States were under so great obligations, and without whom they would never enter into any negotiations.

Richardot replied that the queen had very sagaciously provided for the safety of her own kingdom, and had kept up the fire everywhere else in order to shelter herself. There was more difficulty for this lady, he said, than for any of the rest. She had shown herself very obstinate, and had done them a great deal of mischief. They knew very well that the King of France did not love her. Nevertheless, as they had resolved upon a general peace, they were willing to treat with her as well as with the others. 1

1 Verhaal van Van der Meulen, cited by Deventer, ii. 173.

## CHAPTER XXXIV.

Mission of the States to Henry to prevent the consummation of peace with Spain—Proposal of Henry to elevate Prince Maurice to the sovereignty of the States—Embarkation of the States envoys for England—Their interview with Queen Elizabeth—Return of the envoys from England—Demand of Elizabeth for repayment of her advances to the republic—Second embassy to England—Final arrangement between the Queen and the States.

THE great Advocate was now to start on his journey in order to make a supreme effort both with Henry and with Elizabeth to prevent the consummation of this fatal peace. Admiral Justinus of Nassau, natural son of William the Silent, was associated with Barneveld in the mission, a brave fighting man, a staunch patriot, and a sagacious counsellor; but the Advocate on this occasion, as in other vital emergencies of the commonwealth, was all in all.

The instructions of the envoys were simple. They were to summon the king to fulfil his solemnly sworn covenants with the league. The States-General had never doubted, they said, that so soon as the enemy had begun to feel the effects of that league he would endeavour to make a composition with one or other of the parties in order to separate them, and to break up that united strength which otherwise he could never resist. The king was accordingly called upon to continue the war against the common enemy, and the States-General offered, over and above the four hundred and fifty thousand florins promised by them for the support of the four thousand infantry for the year 1598, to bring their whole military power, horse and foot, into the field to sustain his Majesty in the war,

whether separately or in conjunction, whether in the siege of cities or in open campaigns. 1 Certainly they could hardly offer fairer terms than those.

Henry had complained, and not unreasonably, that Elizabeth had made no offers of assistance for carrying on the war either to Fonquerolles or to Hurault de Maisse; but he certainly could make no reproach of that nature against the republic, nor assign their lukewarmness as an excuse for his desertion.

The envoys were ready to take their departure for France on the last day of January.

It might be a curious subject to consider how far historical events are modified and the world's destiny affected by the different material agencies which man at various epochs has had at his disposal. The human creature in his passions and ambitions, his sensual or sordid desires, his emotional and moral nature, undergoes less change than might be hoped from age to age. The tyrant, the patriot, the demagogue; the voluptuary, the peasant, the trader, the intriguing politician, the hair-splitting diplomatist, the self-sacrificing martyr, the self-seeking courtier, present essentially one type in the twelfth, the sixteenth, the nineteenth, or any other century. The human tragi-comedy seems ever to repeat itself with the same bustle, with the same excitement for immediate interests, for the development of the instant plot or passing episode, as if the universe began and ended with each generation—as in reality it would appear to do for the great multitude of the actors. There seems but a change of masks, of costume, of phraseology, combined with a noisy but eternal monotony. Yet while men are produced and are whirled away again in endless succession, Man remains, and to all appearance is perpetual and immortal even on this earth. Whatever science acquires, man inherits. Whatever stead-

fastness is gained for great moral truths which change not through the ages—however they may be thought, in dark or falsely brilliant epochs, to resolve themselves into elemental vapour—gives man a securer foothold in his onward and upward progress. The great, continuous history of that progress is not made up of the reigns of kings or the lives of politicians, with whose names history has often found it convenient to mark its epochs. These are but mile-stones on the turnpike. Human progress is over a vast field, and it is only at considerable intervals that a retrospective view enables us to discern whether the movement has been slow or rapid, onward or retrograde.

The record of our race is essentially unwritten. What we call history is but made up of a few scattered fragments, while it is scarcely given to human intelligence to comprehend the great whole. Yet it is strange to reflect upon the leisurely manner in which great affairs were conducted in the period with which we are now occupied, as compared with the fever and whirl of our own times, in which the stupendous powers of steam and electricity are ever ready to serve the most sublime or the most vulgar purposes of mankind. Whether there were ever a critical moment in which a rapid change might have been effected in royal or national councils, had telegraphic wires and express trains been at the command of Henry, or Burghley, or Barneveld, or the Cardinal Albert, need not and cannot be decided. It is almost diverting, however, to see how closely the intrigues of cabinets, the movements of armies, the plans of patriots, were once dependent on those natural elements over which man has now gained almost despotic control.

Here was the republic intensely eager to prevent, with all speed, the consummation of a treaty between its ally and its enemy—a step which it was

1 Instructions, &c., in Deventer, ii. 177-181.

feared might be fatal to its national existence, and concerning which there seemed a momentary hesitation. Yet Barneveld and Justinus of Nassau, although ready on the last day of January, were not able to sail from the Brill to Dieppe until the 18th March, on account of a persistent southwest wind.

After forty-six days of waiting, the envoys, accompanied by Buzanfal, Hen-18 March, ry's resident at the Hague, 1598. were at last, on the 18th March, enabled to set sail with a favourable breeze. As it was necessary for travellers in that day to provide themselves with every possible material for their journey—carriages, horses, hosts of servants, and beds, fortunate enough if they found roads and occasionally food—Barneveld and Nassau were furnished with three ships of war, while another legation on its way to England had embarked in two other vessels of the same class. A fleet of forty or fifty merchantmen sailed under their convoy. Departing from the Brill in this imposing manner, they sailed by Calais, varying the monotony of the voyage by a trifling sea-fight with some cruisers from that Spanish port, neither side receiving any damage. 1

Landing at Dieppe on the morning of the 20th, the envoys were received with much ceremony at the city gates by the governor of the place, who conducted them in a stately manner to a house called the king's mansion, which he politely placed at their disposal.

1 The journey and the whole progress of the negotiations have been minutely described by Olden-Barneveld, in his Report to the States-General, made 5 June, 1598.

„Verhaal van ons Justinus ende Johan van Olden-Barneveldt van het besoeigne gevallen in onse Legatie aan de Con. Mat. van Vranckryck gedaen in den jaere 1598 (Minuut van Olden-Barneveldt).”

Of this very important MS., long unpublished, I possess a copy, taken from the original in the royal Archives of the Hague. Subsequently, however, it has been printed, for the first time, I believe, by Deventer, in his valuable collection, No. cxi. vol. ii. pp. 176-245.

„As we learned, however,” says Barneveld, with grave simplicity, „that there was no furniture whatever in that royal abode, we thanked his Excellency, and declared that we would rather go to a tavern.”

After three days of repose and preparation in Dieppe they started 23 March, at dawn on their journey to 1598. Rouen, where they arrived at sundown.

On the next morning but one they set off again on their travels, and slept that night at Lou-<sup>25 March,</sup> vriers. Another long day's journey brought them to Evreux. On the 27th they came to Dreux, on the 28th to Chartres, and on the 29th to Chateaudun. On the 30th, having started an hour before sunrise, they were enabled after a toilsome journey to reach Blois at an hour after dark. Exhausted with fatigue, they reposed in that city for a day, and on the 1st April proceeded, partly by the river Loire and partly by the road, as far as Tours. Here they were visited by nobody, said Barneveld, but fiddlers and drummers, and were execrably lodged. Nevertheless they thought the town in other respects agreeable, and apparently beginning to struggle out of the general desolation of France. On the 2nd April they slept at Langeais, and on the night of the 3rd reached Saumur, where they were disappointed at the absence of the illustrious Duplessis Mornay, then governor of that city. A glance at any map of France will show the course of the journey taken by the travellers, which, after very hard work and great fatigue, had thus brought them from Dieppe to Saumur in about as much time as is now consumed by an average voyage from Europe to America. In their whole journey from Holland to Saumur, inclusive of the waiting upon the wind and other enforced delays, more than two months had been consumed. Twenty-four hours would suffice at present for the excursion.



At Saumur they received letters informing them that the king was „expecting them with great devotion at Angiers.” A despatch from Cecil, who was already with Henry, also apprised them that he found „matters entirely arranged for a peace.” This would be very easily accomplished, he said, for France and England, but the great difficulty was for the Netherlands. He had come to France principally for the sake of managing affairs for the advantage of the States, but he begged the envoys not to demean themselves as if entirely bent on war. 1

They arrived at Angiers next day before dark, and were met at a league's distance from the gates by the governor of the castle, attended by young Prince Frederic Henry of Nassau, followed by a long train of nobles and mounted troops. Welcomed in this stately manner on behalf of the king, the envoys were escorted to the lodgings provided for them in the city. The same evening they waited on the widowed princess of Orange, Louisa of Coligny, then residing temporarily with her son in Angiers, and were informed by her that the king's mind was irrevocably fixed on peace. She communicated, however, the advice of her stepson in law, the Duke of Bouillon, that they should openly express their determination to continue the war, notwithstanding that both their Majesties of England and France wished to negotiate. Thus the counsels of Bouillon to the envoys were distinctly opposed to those of Cecil, and it was well known to them that the duke was himself sincerely anxious that the king should refuse the pacific offers of Spain.

Next morning, 5th April, they were received at the gates of the castle by the governor of Anjou and the commandant of the citadel of Angiers, attended by a splendid retinue, and were conducted to the king, who was walking

in the garden of the fortress. Henry received them with great demonstrations of respect, assuring them that he considered the States-General the best and most faithful friends that he possessed in the world, and that he had always been assisted by them in time of his utmost need with resoluteness and affection.

The approach of the English ambassador, accompanied by the Chancellor of France and several other persons, soon brought the interview to a termination. Barneveld then presented several gentlemen attached to the mission, especially his son and Hugo Grotius, then a lad of fifteen, but who had already gained such distinction at Leyden that Scaliger, Pontanus, Heinsius, Dousa, and other professors, foretold that he would become more famous than Erasmus. They were all very cordially received by the king, who subsequently bestowed especial marks of his consideration upon the youthful Grotius.

The same day the betrothal of Monsieur Cæsar with the daughter of the Duke of Mercœur was celebrated, and there was afterwards much dancing and banqueting at the castle. It was obvious enough to the envoys that the matter of peace and war was decided. The general of the Franciscans, sent by the pope, had been flitting very busily for many months between Rome, Madrid, Brussels, and Paris, and there could be little doubt that every detail of the negotiations between France and Spain had been arranged while Olden-Barneveld and his colleague had been waiting for the head-wind to blow itself out at the Brill.

Nevertheless no treaty had as yet been signed, and it was the business of the republican diplomatists to prevent the signature if possible. They felt, however, that they were endeavouring to cause water to run up hill. Villeroy, De Maisse, and

1 Verhaal, &c.

Buzanval came to them to recount, by the king's order, everything that had taken place. This favour was, however, the less highly appreciated by them, as they felt that the whole world was in a very short time to be taken as well into the royal confidence.

These French politicians stated that the king, after receiving the most liberal offers of peace on the part of Spain, had communicated all the facts to the queen, and had proposed, notwithstanding these most profitable overtures, to continue the war as long as her Majesty and the States-General would assist him in it. De Maise had been informed, however, by the queen that she had no means to assist the king withal, and was, on the contrary, very well disposed to make peace. 1 The lord treasurer had avowed the same opinions as his sovereign, had declared himself to be a man of peace, and had exclaimed that peace once made he would sing „Nunc dimitte servum tuum Domine.” 2 Thereupon, at the suggestion of the legate, negotiations had begun at Vervins, and although nothing was absolutely concluded, yet Sir Robert Cecil, having just been sent as special ambassador from the queen, had brought no propositions whatever of assistance in carrying on the war, but plenty of excuses about armadas, Irish rebellions, and the want of funds. There was nothing in all this, they said, but want of good will. The queen had done nothing and would do nothing for the league herself, nor would she solicit for it the adherence of other kings and princes. The king, by making peace, could restore his kingdom to prosperity, relieve the distress of his subjects, and get back all his lost cities—Calais, Ardres, Dourlens, Blavet, and many more—without any expense of treasure or of blood.

Certainly there was cogency in this reasoning from the point of view of

the French king, but it would have been as well to state, when he was so pompously making a league for offensive and defensive war, that his real interests and his real purposes were peace. Much excellent diplomacy, much ringing of bells, firing of artillery, and singing of anthems in royal chapels, and much disappointment to honest Dutchmen, might have thus been saved. It is also instructive to observe the difference between the accounts of De Maise's negotiations in England given by that diplomatist himself, and those rendered by the queen to the States' envoy.

Of course the objurgations of the Hollanders that the king, in a very fallacious hope of temporary gain to himself, was about to break his solemn promises to his allies and leave them to their fate, drew but few tears down the iron cheeks of such practised diplomatists as Villeroy and his friends.

The envoys visited De Rosny, who assured them that he was very much their friend, but gave them to understand that there was not the slightest possibility of inducing the king to break off the negotiations.

Before taking final leave of his Majesty they concluded, by advice of the Princess of Orange and of Buzanval, to make the presents which they had brought with them from the States-General. Accordingly they sent, through the hands of the princess, four pieces of damask linen and two pieces of fine linen to the king's sister, Madame Catherine, two pieces of linen to Villeroy, and two to the beautiful Gabrielle. The two remaining pieces were bestowed upon Buzanval for his pains in accompanying them on the journey and on their arrival at court. 1

The incident shows the high esteem in which the Netherland fabrics were held at that period.

There was a solemn conference at

1 Verhaal, &c., 199.

2 Ibid.

1 Verhaal, &c., 201.

last between the leading counsellors of the king, the chancellor, the Dukes of Espernon and Bouillon, Count Schomberg, and De Sancy, Plessis, Buzanval, Maisse, the Dutch envoys, and the English ambassador and commissioner Herbert. Cecil presided, and Barneveld once more went over the whole ground, resuming with his usual vigour all the arguments by which the king's interest and honour were proved to require him to desist from the peace negotiations. And the orator had as much success as is usual with those who argue against a foregone conclusion. Everyone had made up his mind. Everyone knew that peace was made. It is unnecessary, therefore, to repeat the familiar train of reasoning. It is superfluous to say that the conference was barren. On the same evening Villeroy called on the States' envoys, and informed them plainly, on the part of the king, that his Majesty had fully made up his mind.

On the 23rd April—three mortal weeks having thus been wasted in diplomatic trifling—Barneveld was admitted to his Majesty's dressing-room. The advocate at the king's request came without his colleague, and was attended only by his son. No other persons were present in the chamber, save Buzanval and Beringen. The king on this occasion confirmed what had so recently been stated by Villeroy. He had thoroughly pondered, he said, all the arguments used by the States to dissuade him from the negotiation, and had found them of much weight. The necessities of his kingdom, however, compelled him to accept a period of repose. He would not, however, in the slightest degree urge the States to join in the treaty. He desired their security, and would aid in maintaining it. What had most vexed him was that the Protestants with great injustice accused him of intending to make war upon them. But innumerable and amazing reports were flying abroad, both among his own subjects,

the English, and the enemies' spies, as to these secret conferences. He then said, that he would tell the Duke of Bouillon to speak with Sir Robert Cecil concerning a subject which now for the first time he would mention privately to Olden-Barneveld.

The king then made a remarkable and unexpected suggestion. Alluding to the constitution of the Netherlands, he remarked that a popular government in such emergencies as those then existing was subject to more danger than monarchies were, and he asked the Advocate if he thought there was no disposition to elect a prince. <sup>1</sup>

Barneveld replied that the general inclination was rather for a good republic. The government, however, he said, was not of the people, but aristocratic, and the state was administered according to laws and charters by the principal inhabitants, whether nobles or magistrates of cities. Since the death of the late Prince of Orange, and the offer made to the King of France, and subsequently to the Queen of England, of the sovereignty, there had been no more talk on that subject, and to discuss again so delicate a matter might cause divisions and other difficulties in the State. <sup>2</sup>

Henry then spoke of Prince Maurice, and asked whether, if he should be supported by the Queen of England and the King of France, it would not be possible to confer the sovereignty upon him.

Here certainly was an astounding question to be discharged like a pistol-shot full in the face of a republican minister.

The answer of the Advocate was sufficiently adroit if not excessively sincere.

If your Majesty, said he, together with her Majesty the queen, think the plan expedient, and are both willing

<sup>1</sup> Verhaal, &c., 218, and Toespraak van Olden-Barneveld tot Elizabeth. Deventer, ii. 246.

<sup>2</sup> Toespraak, &c. Deventer, ii. 246.



on this footing to continue the war, to rescue all the Netherlands from the hands of the Spaniards and their adherents, and thus render the States eternally obliged to the sovereigns and kingdoms of France and England, my lords the States-General would probably be willing to accept this advice. 1

But the king replied by repeating that repose was indispensable to him. 2

Without inquiring for the present whether the project of elevating Maurice to the sovereignty of the Netherlands, at the expense of the republican constitution, was in harmony or not with the private opinions of Barneveld at that period, it must be admitted that the condition he thus suggested was a very safe one to offer. He had thoroughly satisfied himself during the period in which he had been baffled by the south-west gales at the Brill and by the still more persistent headwinds which he had found prevailing at the French court, that it was hopeless to strive for that much-desired haven, a general war. The admiral and himself might as well have endeavoured to persuade Mahomet III. and Sigismund of Poland to join the States in a campaign against Cardinal Albert, as to hope for the same good offices from Elizabeth and Henry.

Having received exactly the answer which he expected, he secretly communicated, next day, to Cecil the proposition thus made by the king. Subsequently he narrated the whole conversation to the Queen of England.

On the 27th April both Barneveld and Nassau were admitted to the royal dressing-room in 27 April. Nantes citadel for a final audience. Here, after the usual common-places concerning his affection for the Netherlands, and the bitter necessity which compelled him to desert the alliance, Henry again referred to his suggestion in regard to Prince Maurice; urging a change from a republican to a monarchical form

of government as the best means of preserving the State.

The envoys thanked the king for all the honours conferred upon them, but declared themselves grieved to the heart by his refusal to grant their request. The course pursued by his Majesty, they said, would be found very hard of digestion by the States, both in regard to the whole force of the enemy which would now come upon their throats, and because of the bad example thus set for other powers.

They then took leave, with the usual exchange of compliments. At their departure his Majesty personally conducted them through various apartments until they came to the chamber of his mistress, the Duchess of Beaufort, then lying in childbed. Here he drew wide open the bed-curtains, and bade them kiss the lady. They complied, and begging the duchess to use her influence in their behalf, respectfully bade her farewell. She promised not to forget their request, and thanked them for the presents of damask and fine linen.

Such was the result of the mission of the great Advocate and his colleague to Henry IV., from which so much had been hoped; and for anything useful accomplished, after such an expenditure of time, money, and eloquence, the whole transaction might have begun and ended in this touching interview with the beautiful Gabrielle.

On the 19th of May the envoys embarked at Dieppe for England, and on 25 May. the 25th were safely lodged with the resident minister of the republic, Noel de Caron, at the village of Clapham. 1

Having so ill-succeeded in their attempts to prevent the treaty between France and Spain, they were now engaged in what seemed also a forlorn hope, the preservation of their offensive and defensive alliance with England. They were well aware that many of the

1 Ibid.

2 Ibid.

1 Verhaal, &amp;c., 233.

leading counsellors of Elizabeth, especially Burghley and Buckhurst, were determined upon peace. They knew that the queen was also heartily weary of the war and of the pugnacious little commonwealth which had caused her so much expense. But she knew, too, that Henry, having now secured the repose of his own kingdom, was anything but desirous that his deserted allies should enjoy the same advantage. The king did not cease to assure the States that he would secretly give them assistance in their warfare against his new ally, while Secretary of State Villeroy, as they knew, would place every possible impediment in the way of the queen's negotiations with Spain. 1

Elizabeth, on her part, was vexed with everybody. What the States most feared was that she might, in her anger or her avarice, make use of the cautionary towns in her negotiations with Philip. At any rate, said Francis Aerssens, then States' minister in France, she will bring us to the brink of the precipice, that we may then throw ourselves into her arms in despair. 2

The queen was in truth resolved to conclude a peace if a peace could be made. If not, she was determined to make as good a bargain with the States as possible, in regard to the long outstanding account of her advances. Certainly it was not unreasonable that she should wish to see her exchequer reimbursed by people who, as she believed, were rolling in wealth, the fruit of a contraband commerce which she denied to her own subjects, and who were in honour bound to pay their debts to her now, if they wished her aid to be continued. Her subjects were impoverished and panting for peace, and although, as she remarked, „their sense of duty restrained them from the slightest disobedience to her absolute commands,” still she could not forgive

herself for thus exposing them to perpetual danger. 1

She preferred on the whole, however, that the commonwealth should consent to its own dissolution; for she thought it unreasonable that—after this war of thirty years, during fifteen of which she had herself actively assisted them—these republican Calvinists should refuse to return to the dominion of their old tyrant and the pope. To Barneveld, Maurice of Nassau, and the States-General this did not seem a very logical termination to so much hard fighting.

Accordingly, when on the 26th of May the two envoys fell on 26 May, their knees—as the custom 1598.

was—before the great queen, and had been raised by her to their feet again, they found her Majesty in marvellously ill-humour. Olden-Barneveld recounted to her the results of their mission to France, and said that from beginning to end it had been obvious that there could be no other issue. The king was indifferent, he had said, whether the States preferred peace or war, but in making his treaty he knew that he had secured a profit for himself, inflicted damage on his enemy, and done no harm to his friends. 2

Her Majesty then interrupted the speaker by violent invectives against the French king for his treachery. She had written with her own hand, she said, to tell him that she never had believed him capable of doing what secretaries and other servants had reported concerning him, but which had now proved true.

Then she became very abusive to the Dutch envoys, telling them that they were quite unjustifiable in not following Sir Robert Cecil's advice, and

1 „Et nonobstant ce sa Mat. le peust dire avecq un singulier contentement que leur devoir les retient de la moindre desobeissance contre ses absolutes commandements,” &c. &c.—Proposition by Vere and Gilpin to the States-General, 29 June, 1598, in Deventer, ii. 259, *seqq.*

2 Verhaal, &c., before cited, 234.

1 Aerssens to Olden-Barneveld, 29 May, 1598, in Deventer, 248 250.

2 Ibid.

in not engaging with him at once in peace negotiations; at least so far as to discover what the enemy's intentions might be. She added, pettishly, that if Prince Maurice and other functionaries were left in the enjoyment of their offices, and if the Spaniards were sent out of the country, there seemed no reason why such terms should not be accepted.

Barneveld replied that such accommodation was of course impossible, unless they accepted their ancient sovereign as prince. Then came the eternal two points—obedience to God, which meant submission to the pope, and obedience to the king, that was to say, subjection to his despotic authority. Thus the Christian religion would be ruined throughout the provinces, and the whole land be made a bridge and a ladder for Spanish ambition.

The queen here broke forth into mighty oaths, interrupting the envoy's discourse, protesting over and over again by the living God that she would not and could not give the States any further assistance; that she would leave them to their fate; that her aid rendered in their war had lasted much longer than the siege of Troy did, and swearing that she had been a fool to help them and the King of France as she had done, for it was nothing but evil passions that kept the States so obstinate. 1

The envoy endeavoured to soothe her, urging that as she had gained the reputation over the whole world of administering her affairs with admirable, yea with almost divine wisdom, she should now make use of that sagacity

1 „Haere Mat. interrompeerde ons mit exclamatie ende protestatie repeterende dickwils, par le Dieu vivant, dat sy niet en wilde nochte en konde den Staten vorder assisteren, dat sy henselven wilden verlaten, dat sy langer haer assistentie hadde gedaen als het oorloge van Troien hadde geduurt, seggende dat sy sot was geweest doende sulcke assistentie aen ons ende den Coninck van Vrancryck dat het niet dan passien en waeren die de Staten dus obstinaet hielden.”  
—Verhaal, &c., 236.

in the present very difficult matter. She ought to believe that it was not evil passion, nor ambition, nor obstinacy that prevented the States from joining in these negotiations, but the determination to maintain their national existence, the Christian religion, and their ancient liberties and laws. They did not pretend, he said, to be wiser than great monarchs, or their counsellors, but the difference between their form of government and a monarchy must be their excuse.

Monarchs, when they made treaties, remained masters, and could protect their realms and their subjects from danger. The States-General could not accept a prince without placing themselves under his absolute authority, and the Netherlands would never subject themselves to their deadly enemy, whom they had long ago solemnly renounced. 1

Surely these remarks of the Advocate should have seemed entirely unanswerable. Surely there was no politician in Europe so ignorant as not to know that any treaty of peace between Philip and the States meant their unconditional subjugation and the complete abolition of the Protestant religion. Least of all did the Queen of England require information on this great matter of state. It was cruel trifling therefore, it was inhuman insolence on her part, to suggest anything like a return of the States to the dominion of Spain.

But her desire for peace and her determination to get back her money overpowered at that time all other considerations,

The States wished to govern themselves, she said; why then could they not make arrangements against all dangers, and why could they not lay down conditions under which the king would not really be their master; especially if France and England should guarantee them against any infraction of their rights. By the living God! by the living

1 Ibid. 237.



God! by the living God! she swore over and over again as her anger arose, she would never more have anything to do with such people; and she deeply regretted having thrown away her money and the lives of her subjects in so stupid a manner. 1

Again the grave and experienced envoy of the republic strove with calm and earnest words to stay the torrent of her wrath; representing that her money and her pains had by no means been wasted, that the enemy had been brought to shame and his finances to confusion; and urging her, without paying any heed to the course pursued by the King of France, to allow the republic to make levies of troops, at its own expense, within her kingdom.

But her Majesty was obdurate. „How am I to defend myself?” she cried; „how are the affairs of Ireland to be provided for? how am I ever to get back my money? who is to pay the garrisons of Brill and Flushing?” And with this she left the apartment, saying that her counsellors would confer with the envoys. 2

From the beginning to the end of the interview the queen was in a very evil temper, and took no pains to conceal her dissatisfaction with all the world.

Now there is no doubt whatever that the subsidies furnished by England to the common cause were very considerable, amounting in fourteen years, according to the queen's calculation, to nearly fourteen hundred thousand pounds sterling. But in her interviews with the republican statesmen she was too prone to forget that it *was* a common cause, to forget that the man who had over and over again attempted her assassination, who had repeatedly attempted the invasion of her realms with the whole strength of the most powerful military organization in the world, whose dearest wish on earth was still to accomplish her dethrone-

ment and murder, to extirpate from England the religion professed by the majority of living Englishmen, and to place upon her vacant throne a Spanish, German, or Italian prince, was as much her enemy as he was the foe of his ancient subjects in the Netherlands. At that very epoch Philip was occupied in reminding the pope that the two had always agreed as to the justice of the claims of the Infanta Isabella to the English crown, and calling on his Holiness to sustain those pretensions, now that she had been obliged, in consequence of the treaty with the Prince of Béarne, to renounce her right to reign over France. 1

Certainly it was fair enough for the queen and her counsellors to stand out for an equitable arrangement of the debt; but there was much to dispute in the figures. When was ever an account of fifteen years' standing adjusted, whether between nations or individuals, without much wrangling? Meantime her Majesty held excellent security in two thriving and most important Netherland cities. But had the States consented to re-establish the Spanish authority over the whole of their little Protestant republic, was there an English child so ignorant of arithmetic or of history as not to see how vast would be the peril, and how incalculable the expense, thus caused to England?

Yet besides the Cecils and the lord high admiral, other less influential counsellors of the crown—even the upright

1 „Y aqui sera bien que acordeis a Su Santd. asimismo lo que mas de una vez os ha dicho de quanto desenha encaminar la sucesion de la Infanta mi hija a Ynglaterra quedando reyno por si y allanando para ello los impedimentos de Francia y aun procurando su ayuda en consideracion de remitir les desta parte los grandes derechos de la Infanta y tambien los mios a la recompensa de los excesivos gastos hechos en su beneficio y vereis si por aqui podreis inclinar al papa a que trata de desunir a franceses de ingleses, acordando a los franceses que los ingleses son sus antiquos enemigos,” &c. &c.—Philip to Duke of Sesa, his envoy at Rome, 16 March. 1597. (Arch. de Sim. MS.)

1 Verhaal, &amp;c., 227.

2 Ibid.

and accomplished Buckhurst, who had so often proved his friendship for the States—were in favour of negotiation. There were many conferences with meagre results. The Englishmen urged that the time had come for the States to repay the queen's advances, to relieve her from future subsidies, to assume the payment of the garrisons in the cautionary towns, and to furnish a force in defence of England when attacked. Such was the condition of the kingdom, they said—being, as it was, entirely without fortified cities—that a single battle would imperil the whole realm, so that it was necessary to keep the enemy out of it altogether. <sup>1</sup>

These arguments were not unreasonable, but the inference was surely illogical. The special envoys from the republic had not been instructed to treat about the debt. This had been the subject of perpetual negotiation. It was discussed almost every day by the queen's commissioners at the Hague and by the States' resident minister at London. Olden-Barneveld and the admiral had been sent forth by the States in what in those days was considered great haste to prevent a conclusion of a treaty between their two allies and the common enemy. They had been too late in France, and now, on arriving in England, they found that government steadily drifting towards what seemed the hopeless shipwreck of a general peace.

What must have been the grief of Olden-Barneveld when he heard from the lips of the enlightened Buckhurst that the treaty of 1585 had been arranged to expire—according to the original limitation—with a peace, and that as the States could now make peace and did not choose to do so, her Majesty must be considered as relieved from her contract of alliance, and as justified in demanding repayment of her advances! <sup>2</sup>

To this perfidious suggestion what could the States' envoy reply but that

as a peace such as the treaty of 1585 presupposed—to wit, with security for the Protestant religion and for the laws and liberties of the provinces—was impossible, should the States now treat with the king or the cardinal?

The envoys had but one more interview with the queen, in which she was more benignant in manner but quite as peremptory in her demands. Let the States either thoroughly satisfy her as to past claims and present necessities, or let them be prepared for her immediate negotiation with the enemy. Should she decide to treat, she would not be unmindful of their interests, she said, nor deliver them over into the enemy's hands. She repeated, however, the absurd opinion that there were means enough of making Philip nominal sovereign of all the Netherlands, without allowing him to exercise any authority over them. As if the most Catholic and most absolute monarch that ever breathed could be tied down by the cobwebs of constitutional or treaty stipulations; as if the previous forty years could be effaced from the record of history.

She asked, too, in case the rumours of the intended transfer of the Netherlands to the cardinal or the Infanta should prove true, with she doubted, whether this arrangement would make any difference in the sentiments of the States.

Barneveld replied that the transfer was still uncertain, but that they had no more confidence in the cardinal or the Infanta than in the King of Spain himself.

On taking leave of the queen the envoys waited upon Lord Burghley, whom they found sitting in an armchair in his bedchamber, suffering from the gout and with a very fierce countenance. <sup>1</sup> He made no secret of his opinions in favour of negotiation, said

<sup>1</sup> Verhaal, &c. 239.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid.

<sup>1</sup> „Toonende een fier Gelaat.”—Verhaal, &c., 243.

that the contracts made by monarchs should always be interpreted reasonably, and pronounced a warm eulogy on the course pursued by the King of France. It was his Majesty's duty, he said, to seize the best opportunity for restoring repose to his subjects and his realms, and it was the duty of other sovereigns to do the same.

The envoys replied that they were not disposed at that moment to sit in judgment upon the king's actions. They would content themselves with remarking that in their opinion even kings and princes were bound by their contracts, oaths, and pledges before God and man; and with this wholesome sentiment they took leave of the lord high treasurer.

They left London immediately, on 31 May, the last day of May, without 1598. passports or despatches of recall, and embarked at Gravesend in the midst of a gale of wind.

Lord Essex, the sincere friend of the republic, was both surprised and disturbed at their sudden departure, and sent a special courier after them to express his regrets at the unsatisfactory termination to their mission. „My mistress knows very well,” said he, „that she is an absolute princess, and that, when her ministers have done their extreme duty, she wills what she wills.” 2

The negotiations between England and Spain were deferred, however, for a brief space, and a special message was despatched to the Hague as to the arrangement of the debt. „Peace at once

with Philip,” said the queen, „or else full satisfaction of my demands.”

Now it was close dealing between such very thrifty and acute bargainers as the queen and the Netherland republic.

Two years before, the States had offered to pay twenty thousand pounds a year on her Majesty's birthday so long as the war should last, and after a peace, eighty thousand pounds annually for four years. 1 The queen, on her part, fixed the sum total of the debt at nearly a million and a half sterling, and required instant payment of at least one hundred thousand pounds on account, besides provision for a considerable annual refunding, assumption by the States of the whole cost of the garrisons in the cautionary towns, and assurance of assistance in case of an attack upon England. 2 Thus there was a whole ocean between the disputants.

Vere and Gilpin were protocolling and marshalling accounts at the Hague, and conducting themselves with much arrogance and bitterness, while, meantime, Barneveld had hardly had time to set his foot on his native shores before he was sent back again to England at the head of another solemn legation. One more effort was to be made to arrange this financial problem and to defeat the English peace party.

The offer of the year 1596 just alluded to was renewed and instantly rejected. Naturally enough, the Dutch envoys were disposed, in the exhausting warfare which was so steadily draining their finances, to pay down as little as possible on the nail, while providing for what they considered a liberal annual sinking fund.

The English, on the contrary, were for a good round sum in actual cash, and held the threatened negotiation with Spain over the heads of the unfortunate envoys like a whip.

1 „Wy seyden dat ons niet toe en stonde van de actie van den Coninck te oordelen maer dat wy meinden dat oock Coningen ende Prinsen aen haer contracten, beloften ende eeden voor Godt ende de werelt verbonden waren; daarmedewy van den voorschr. Heere Groote Tresorier syn gescheyden.”—*Verhaal*, &c., 244.

2 Essex to Nassau and Olden-Barneveld, 22 May, 1598. (O.S.)

„Et que ma maitresse scait bien qu'elle est princesse absolue, et que quant ses ministres ont fait leur extreme devoyer elle veult ce qu'elle veult.”—*Deventer*, iii 247.

1 Agreement in Bor, IV. 245.

2 Meteren, 406. *Deventer*, ii. 253.



So the queen's counsellors and the republican envoys travelled again and again over the well-worn path. On the 29th June, Buckhurst

29 June.

took Olden-Barneveld into his cabinet and opened his heart to him, not as a servant of her Majesty, he said, but as a private Englishman. 1 He was entirely for peace. Now that peace was offered to her Majesty, a continuation of the war was unrighteous, and the Lord God's blessing could not be upon it. Without God's blessing no resistance could be made by the queen nor by the States to the enemy, who was ten times more powerful than her Majesty in kingdoms, provinces, number of subjects, and money. He had the pope, the emperor, the Dukes of Savoy and Lorraine, and the republic of Genoa, for his allies. He feared that the war might come upon England, and that they might be fated on one single day to win or lose all. The queen possessed no mines, and was obliged to carry on the war by taxing her people. The king had ever-flowing fountains in his mines; the queen nothing but a stagnant pool, which, when all the water was pumped out, must in the end be dry. He concluded, therefore, that as her Majesty had no allies but the Netherlands, peace was best for England, and advisable for the provinces. Arrangements could easily be made to limit the absolute authority of Spain. 2

This highly figurative view of the subject—more becoming to the author of *Ferrex* and *Porrex* than to so experienced a statesman as Sackville had become since his dramatic days—did not much impress Barneveld. He answered that, although the King of Spain was unquestionably very powerful, the Lord God was still stronger; that England and the Netherlands together could maintain the empire of the seas, which

was of the utmost importance, especially for England; but that if the republic were to make her submission to Spain, and become incorporate with that power, the control of the seas was lost for ever to England. 1

The Advocate added the unanswerable argument that to admit Philip as sovereign, and then to attempt a limitation of his despotism, was a foolish dream.

Buckhurst repeated that the republic was the only ally of England, that there was no confidence to be placed by her in any other power, and that for himself he was, as always, very much the friend of the States.

Olden-Barneveld might well have prayed, however, to be delivered from such friends. To thrust one's head into the lion's mouth, while one's friends urge moderation on the noble animal, can never be considered a cheerful or prudent proceeding.

At last, after all offers had been rejected which the envoys had ventured to make, Elizabeth sent for Olden-Barneveld and Caron and demanded their ultimatum within twenty-four hours. Should it prove unsatisfactory, she would at once make peace with Spain. 2

On the 1st August the envoys accordingly proposed to Cecil and the other ministers to pay thirty thousand pounds a year, instead of twenty thousand, so long as the war should last, but they claimed the right of redeeming the cautionary towns at one hundred thousand pounds each. This seemed admissible, and Cecil and his colleagues pronounced the affair arranged. But they had reckoned without the queen after all.

Elizabeth sent for Caron as soon as she heard of the agreement, flew into a great rage, refused the terms, swore that she would instantly make peace with Spain, and thundered loudly against her ministers.

1 Conference between Olden-Barneveld and Buckhurst, in Deventer, ii. 264-266.

2 Conference, &c., *ubi sup.*

1 *Ibid.*

2 Minutes of Olden-Barneveld. Deventer, ii. 267, 268.

„They were great beasts,” she said, „if they had stated that she would not treat with the enemy. She had merely intended to defer the negotiations.”<sup>1</sup>

So the whole business was to be done over again. At last the sum claimed by the queen, fourteen hundred thousand pounds, was reduced by agreement to eight hundred thousand, and one-half of this the envoys undertook on the States to refund in annual payments of thirty thousand pounds, while the remaining four hundred thousand should

1 „Sy waren groote beesten, indien sy ons geseit hadden dat sy niet met den viand tracteren soude; sy wilde de handelinghe slechts differeren.”—*Verhaal van Duivenoorde Ouden-Barnevelt*, enz., cited by *Deventer*, ii, 268.

be provided for by some subsequent arrangement. All attempts, however, to obtain a promise from the queen to restore the cautionary towns to the republic in case of a peace between Spain and England remained futile. 1

That was to be a bone of contention for many years.

It was further agreed by the treaty, which was definitely signed on the 16th August, that, in case Eng- 16 Aug.  
land were invaded by the 1598.  
common enemy, the States should send to the queen's assistance at least thirty ships of war, besides five thousand infantry and five squadrons of horse, 2

1 *Verhaal*, &c. last cited.

2 *Treaty*, *apud Bor*, IV. 476-478.

## CHAPTER XXXV.

Negotiations between France and Spain—Conclusion of the treaty of peace—Purchase of the allegiance of the French nobles—Transfer of the Netherlands to Albert and Isabella—Marriage of the Infante and the Infanta—Illness of Philip II.—Horrible nature of his malady—His last hours and death—Review of his reign—Extent of the Spanish dominions—Causes of the greatness of Spain, and of its downfall—Philip's wars and their expenses—The Crown revenues of Spain—Character of the people—Their inordinate self-esteem—Consequent deficiency of labour—Ecclesiastical Government—Revenues of the Church—Characteristics of the Spanish clergy—Foreign commerce of Spain—Governmental system of Philip II.—Founded on the popular ignorance and superstition—Extinction of liberty in Spain—The Holy Inquisition—The work and character of Philip.

WHILE the utterly barren conferences had been going on at Angiers and Nantes between Henry IV. and the republican envoys, the negotiations had been proceeding at Vervins.

President Richardot on behalf of Spain, and Secretary of State Villeroy as commissioner of Henry, were the chief negotiators. 1

1 *Relacion del Presidente Richardot*, April, 1598. (*Arch. de Simancas MS.*)

Two old acquaintances, two ancient Leaguers, two bitter haters of Protestants and rebels, two thorough adepts in diplomatic chicane, they went into this contest like gladiators two thoroughly understood and respected each other's skill.

Richardot was recognised by all as the sharpest and most unscrupulous politician in the obedient Netherlands. Villeroy had conducted every intrigue of France during a whole generation of mankind. They scarcely did more than measure swords and test each other's objects, before arriving at a conviction as to the inevitable result of the encounter.

It was obvious at once to Villeroy that Philip was determined to make peace with France in order that the triple alliance might be broken up. It was also known to the French diplomatist that the Spanish king was ready for almost every concession to Henry in order that this object might be accomplished.

All that Richardot hoped to save out of the various conquests made by Spain over France was Calais.

But Villeroy told him that it was

useless to say a word on that subject. His king insisted on the restoration of the place. Otherwise he would make no peace. It was enough, he said, that his Majesty said nothing about Navarre.

Richardot urged that at the time when the English had conquered Calais it had belonged to Artois, not to France. It was no more than equitable, then, that it should be retained by its original proprietor.

The general of the Franciscans, who acted as a kind of umpire in the transactions, then took each negotiator separately aside and whispered in his ear. 1

Villeroy shook his head, and said he had given his ultimatum. Richardot acknowledged that he had something in reserve, upon which the monk said that it was time to make it known.

Accordingly—the two being all ears—Richardot observed that what he was about to state he said with fear and trembling. He knew not what the King of Spain would think of his proposition, but he would, nevertheless, utter the suggestion that Calais should be handed over to the pope. 2

His Holiness would keep the city in pledge until the war with the rebels was over, and then there would be leisure enough to make definite arrangements on the subject.

Now Villeroy was too experienced a practitioner to be imposed upon by this ingenious artifice. Moreover, he happened to have an intercepted letter in his possession in which Philip told the cardinal that Calais was to be given up if the French made its restitution a *sine quâ non*. So Villeroy did make it a *sine quâ non*, and the conferences soon after terminated in an agreement on the part of Spain to surrender all its conquests in France. 3

Certainly no more profitable peace than this could have been made by the French king under such circumstances,

and Philip at the last moment had consented to pay a heavy price for bringing discord between the three friends. The treaty was signed at Vervins on the 2nd May, and contained thirty-five articles. Its basis was that of the treaty of Câteau Cambresis of 1559. Restitution of all places conquered by either party within the dominions of the other since the day of that treaty was stipulated. Henry recovered Calais, Ardres, Doullens, Blavet, and many other places, and gave up the country of Charolois. Prisoners were to be surrendered on both sides without ransom, and such of those captives of war as had been enslaved at the galleys should be set free.

The pope, the emperor, all his cousins, and those electors, states, and cities under their obedience or control, the Duke of Savoy, the King of Poland and Sweden, the Kings of Denmark and Scotland, the Dukes of Lorraine and Tuscany, the Doge of Venice, the republic of Genoa, and many lesser states and potentates, were included in the treaty. The famous Edict of Nantes in favour of the Protestant subjects of the French king was drawn up and signed in the city of which it bears the name at about the same time with these negotiations. Its publication was however, deferred until after the departure of the legate from France in the following year. 1

The treaty of Câteau Cambresis had been pronounced the most disgraceful and disastrous one that had ever been ratified by a French monarch; and surely Henry had now wiped away that disgrace and repaired that disaster. It was natural enough that he should congratulate himself on the rewards which he had gathered by deserting his allies.

He had now sufficient occupation for a time in devising ways and means, with the aid of the indefatigable Béthune,

1 Relazion, &c. (Arch. de Sim. MS.)

2 Ibid.

3 Ibid.

1 Treaty, *apud* Bor, 1V. 445-450. De Thou, xiii. 208, *seqq.*, l. 120.



to pay the prodigious sums with which he had purchased the allegiance of the great nobles and lesser gentlemen of France. Thirty-two millions of livres were not sufficient to satisfy the claims of these patriots, most of whom had been drawing enormous pensions from the King of Spain up to the very moment, or beyond it, when they consented to acknowledge the sovereign of their own country. Scarcely a great name in the golden book of France but was recorded among these bills of sale.

Mayenne, Lorraine, Guise, Nemours, Mercœur, Montpensier, Joyeuse, Epernon, Brissac, D'Arlincourt, Balagny, Rochefort, Villeroi, Villars, Montespan, Leviston, Beauvillars, and countless others, figured in the great financier's terrible account-book, from Mayenne, set down at the cool amount of three and a half millions, to Beauvoir or Beauvillars at the more modest price of a hundred and sixty thousand livres. „I should appal my readers,” said De Béthune, „if I should show to them that this sum makes but a very small part of the amounts demanded from the royal treasury, either by Frenchmen or by strangers, as pay and pension, and yet the total was thirty-two millions.”<sup>1</sup>

And now the most Catholic king, having brought himself at last to exchange the grasp of friendship with the great ex-heretic, and to recognize the Prince of Béarn as the legitimate successor of St. Louis, to prevent which consummation he had squandered so many thousands of lives, so many millions of treasure, and brought ruin to so many prosperous countries, prepared himself for another step which he had long hesitated to take.

He resolved to transfer the Netherlands to his daughter Isabella and to the Cardinal Archduke Albert, who, as the king had now decided, was to espouse the Infanta.

The deed of cession was signed at

1 Sully, *Mémoires*, lib. x. 560.

Madrid on the 6th May, 1598. 6 May,  
It was accompanied by a let- 1598.  
ter of the same date from the Prince Philip, heir apparent to the crown.

On the 30th May the Infanta executed a procuration by which she gave absolute authority to her future husband to rule over the provinces of the Netherlands, Burgundy, and Charolois, and to receive the oaths of the estates and of public functionaries.<sup>1</sup>

It was all very systematically done. No transfer of real estate, no *donatio inter vivos* of mansions and messuages, parks and farms, herds and flocks, could have been effected in a more business-like manner than the gift thus made by the most prudent king to his beloved daughter.

The quit-claim of the brother was perfectly regular.

So also was the power of attorney, by which the Infanta authorised the middle-aged ecclesiastic whom she was about to espouse to take possession in her name of the very desirable property which she had thus acquired.

In certainly never occurred, either to the giver or the receivers, that the few millions of Netherlands, male and female, inhabiting these provinces in the North Sea, were entitled to any voice or opinion as to the transfer of themselves and their native land to a young lady living in a remote country. For such was the blasphemous system

<sup>1</sup> See all the deeds and documents in Bor, IV, 361-466. Compare Herrera, iii. 766-770.

Very elaborate provisions were made in regard to the children and grandchildren to spring from this marriage, but it was generally understood at the time that no issue was to be expected. The incapacity of the cardinal seems to have been revealed by an indiscretion of the General of Franciscans—diplomatist and father confessor—and was supported by much collateral evidence. Hence all these careful stipulations were a solemn jest, like much of the diplomatic work of this reign. See letter of F. d'Aerssens to States-General, 27 May, 1599, in *Lettres et Negotiations de Buzanval et d'Aerssens*, par G. G. Vrede, Leide, 1846, p. 190. But compare Soranzo, *Relazione*, before cited, p. 169.

of Europe at that day. Property had rights. Kings, from whom all property emanated, were enfeoffed directly from the Almighty; they bestowed certain privileges on their vassals, but man had no rights at all. He was property, like the ox or the ass, like the glebe which he watered with the sweat of his brow.

The obedient Netherlands acquiesced obediently in these new arrangements. They wondered only that the king should be willing thus to take from his crown its choicest jewels—for it is often the vanity of colonies and dependencies to consider themselves gems.

The republican Netherlanders only laughed at these arrangements, and treated the invitation to transfer themselves to the new sovereigns of the provinces with silent contempt. 1

The cardinal-archduke left Brussels 14 Sept. in September, having accom-  
1598. plished the work committed to him by the power of attorney, and having left Cardinal Andrew of Austria, bishop of Constantia, son of the Archduke Ferdinand, to administer affairs during his absence. Francis de Mendoza, Admiral of Arragon, was entrusted with the supreme military command for the same interval.

The double marriage of the Infante of Spain with the Archduchess Margaret of Austria, and of the unfrocked Cardinal Albert of Austria with the Infanta Clara Eugenia Isabella, was celebrated by proxy, with immense pomp, at Ferrara, the pope himself officiating with the triple crown upon his head. 2

Meantime, Philip II., who had been of delicate constitution all his life, and who had of late years been a confirmed valetudinarian, had been rapidly failing ever since the transfer of the Netherlands in May. Longing to be once more in his favourite retirement of the Escorial, he undertook the journey towards the beginning of June, and was carried thither from Madrid in a litter borne

by servants, accomplishing the journey of seven leagues in six days.

When he reached the palace cloister, he was unable to stand. The gout, his life-long companion, had of late so tortured him in the hands and feet that the mere touch of a linen sheet was painful to him. By the middle of July a low fever had attacked him, which rapidly reduced his strength. Moreover, a new and terrible symptom of the utter disintegration of his physical constitution had presented itself. Imposthumes, from which he had suffered on the breast and at the joints, had been opened after the usual ripening applications, and the result was not the hoped relief, but swarms of vermin, innumerable in quantities, and impossible to extirpate, which were thus generated and reproduced in the monarch's blood and flesh.

The details of the fearful disorder may have attraction for the pathologist, but have no especial interest for the general reader. Let it suffice that no torture ever invented by Torquemada or Peter Titelman to serve the vengeance of Philip and his ancestors or the pope against the heretics of Italy or Flanders, could exceed in acuteness the agonies which the most Catholic king was now called upon to endure. And not one of the long line of martyrs, who by decree of Charles or Philip had been strangled, beheaded, burned, or buried alive, ever faced a death of lingering torment with more perfect fortitude, or was sustained by more ecstatic visions of heavenly mercy, than was now the case with the great monarch of Spain.

That the grave-worms should do their office before soul and body were parted, was a torment such as the imagination of Dante might have invented for the lowest depths of his „Inferno.” 1

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1 A great English poet has indeed expressed the horrible thought:  
„It is as if the dead could feel  
They icy worm about them steal.”—BYRON.

1 Bor, IV. 467.

2 Bor, IV. 470-472.

On the 22nd July, the king asked Dr. Mercado if his sickness was likely to have a fatal termination. The physician, not having the courage at once to give the only possible reply, found means to evade the question. On the 1st August his Majesty's confessor, father Diego de Yepes, after consultation with Mercado, announced to Philip that the only issue to his malady was death. Already he had been lying for ten days on his back, a mass of sores and corruption, scarcely able to move, and requiring four men to turn him in his bed.

He expressed the greatest satisfaction at the sincerity which had now been used, and in the gentlest and most benignant manner signified his thanks to them for thus removing all doubts from his mind, and for giving him information which it was of so much importance for his eternal welfare to possess.

His first thought was to request the papal nuncio, Gaetano, to despatch a special courier to Rome to request the pope's benediction. This was done, and it was destined that the blessing of his holiness should arrive in time.

He next prepared himself to make a general confession, which lasted three days, father Diego having drawn up at his request a full and searching interrogatory. The confession may have been made the more simple, however, by the statement which he made to the priest, and subsequently repeated to the Infante his son, that in all his life he had never consciously done wrong to any one. If he had ever committed an act of injustice, it was unwittingly, or because he had been deceived in the circumstances. This internal conviction of general righteousness was of great advantage to him in the midst of his terrible sufferings, and accounted in great degree for the gentleness, thoughtfulness for others, and perfect benignity, which, according to the unanimous tes-

timony of many witnesses, characterised his conduct during this whole sickness.

After he had completed his long general confession, the sacrament of the Lord's Supper was administered to him. Subsequently, the same rites were more briefly performed every few days.

His sufferings were horrible, but no saint could have manifested in them more gentle resignation or angelic patience. He moralized on the condition to which the greatest princes might thus be brought at last by the hand of God, and bade the prince observe well his father's present condition, in order that, when he too should be laid thus low, he might likewise be sustained by a conscience void of offence. He constantly thanked his assistants and nurses for their care, insisted upon their reposing themselves after their daily fatigues, and ordered others to relieve them in their task.

He derived infinite consolation from the many relics of saints, of which, as has been seen, he had made plentiful provision during his long reign. Especially a bone of St. Alban, presented to him by Clement VIII., in view of his present straits, was of great service. With this relic, and with the arm of St. Vincent of Ferrara, and the knee-bone of St. Sebastian, he daily rubbed his sores, keeping the sacred talismans ever in his sight on the altar, which was not far from his bed. He was much pleased when the priests and other bystanders assured him that the remains of these holy men would be of special efficacy to him, because he had cherished and worshipped them in times when misbelievers and heretics had treated them with disrespect.

On a sideboard in his chamber a human skull was placed and upon this skull—in ghastly mockery of royalty, in truth, yet doubtless in the conviction that such an exhibition showed the superiority of anointed kings even over death—he ordered his servants to place



a golden crown. 1 And thus, during the whole of his long illness, the Antic held his state, while the poor mortal representative of absolute power lay living still, but slowly mouldering away.

With perfect composure, and with that minute attention to details which had characterised the king all his lifetime, and was now more evident than ever, he caused the provisions for his funeral obsequies to be read aloud one day by Juan Ruys de Velasco, in order that his children, his ministers, and the great officers of state who were daily in attendance upon him, might thoroughly learn their lesson before the time came for performing the ceremony.

„Having governed my kingdom for forty years,” said he, „I now give it back, in the seventy-first year of my age, to God Almighty, to whom it belongs, recommending my soul into his blessed hands, that His Divine Majesty may do what he pleases therewith.”

He then directed that after his body should have been kept as long as the laws prescribed, it should be buried thus:—

The officiating bishop was to head the procession, bearing the crucifix, and followed by the clergy.

The Adelantado was to come next, trailing the royal standard along the ground. Then the Duke of Novara was to appear, bearing the crown on an open salver, covered with a black cloth, while the Marquis of Avillaer carried the sword of state.

The coffin was to be borne by eight principal grandees, clad in mourning habiliments, and holding lighted torches.

The heir apparent was to follow, attended by Don Garcia de Loyasa, who had just been consecrated, in the place of Cardinal Albert, as Archbishop of Toledo.

The body was to be brought to the church, and placed in the stately tomb already prepared for its reception. „Mass

being performed,” said the king, „the prelate shall place me in the grave which shall be my last house until I go to my eternal dwelling. Then the prince third king of my name, shall go into the cloister of St. Jerome at Madrid, where he shall keep nine days’ mourning. My daughter, and her aunt—my sister, the ex-empress—shall for the same purpose go to the convent of the grey sisters.” 1

The king then charged his successor to hold the Infanta in special affection and consideration; „for,” said he, „she has been my mirror, yea, the light of my eyes.” He also ordered that the Marquis of Mondejar be taken from prison and set free, on condition never to show himself at Court. The wife of Antonio Perez was also to be released from prison, in order that she might be immured in a cloister, her property being bestowed upon her daughters.

As this unfortunate lady’s only crime consisted in her husband’s intrigue with the king’s mistress, Princess Eboli, in which she could scarcely be considered an accomplice, this permission to exchange one form of incarceration for another did not seem an act of very great benignity.

Philip further provided that thirty thousand masses should be said for his soul, five hundred slaves liberated from the galleys, and five hundred maidens provided with marriage portions.

After these elaborate instructions had been read, the king ordered a certain casket to be brought to him and opened in his presence. From this he took forth a diamond of great price and gave it to the Infanta, saying that it had belonged to her mother, Isabella of France. He asked the prince if he consented to the gift. The prince answered in the affirmative.

He next took from the coffer a written document, which he handed to his

1 Bor, IV. 473.

1 Bor, IV. 473-474.

son, saying, „Herein you will learn how to govern your kingdoms.”

Then he produced a scourge, which he said was the instrument with which his father, the emperor, had been in the habit of chastising himself during his retreat at the monastery of Juste. He told the by-standers to observe the imperial blood by which the lash was still slightly stained.

As the days wore on he felt himself steadily sinking, and asked to receive extreme unction. As he had never seen that rite performed he chose to rehearse it beforehand, and told Ruys Velasco, who was in constant attendance upon him, to go for minute instructions on the subject to the Archbishop of Toledo. The sacrament having been duly administered, the king subsequently, on the 1st September, desired to receive it once more. The archbishop, fearing that the dying monarch's strength would be insufficient for the repetition of the function, informed him that the regulations of the Church required in such cases only a compliance with certain trifling forms, as the ceremony had been already once thoroughly carried out. But the king expressed himself as quite determined that the sacrament should be repeated in all its parts; that he should once more be anointed—to use the phrase of brother Francis Neyen—with the oil which holy athletes require in their wrestle with death.

This was accordingly done in the presence of his son and daughter, and of his chief secretaries, Christopher de Moura and John de Idiaquez, besides the Counts Chinchon, Fuensalido, and several other conspicuous personages. He was especially desirous that his son should be present, in order that, when he too should come to die, he might not find himself, like his father, in ignorance of the manner in which this last sacrament was to be performed.

When it was finished he described himself as infinitely consoled, and as

having derived even more happiness from the rite than he had dared to anticipate.

Thenceforth he protested that he would talk no more of the world's affairs. He had finished with all things below, and for the days or hours still remaining to him he would keep his heart exclusively fixed upon Heaven. Day by day as he lay on his couch of unutterable and almost unexampled misery, his confessors and others read to him from religious works, while with perfect gentleness he would insist that one reader should relieve another, that none might be fatigued.

On the 11th September he dictated these words to Chris- 11 Sept.  
topher de Moura, who was to take them to Diego de Yepes, the confessor:—

„Father Confessor, you are in the place of God, and I protest thus before His presence that I will do all that you declare necessary for my salvation. Thus upon you will be the responsibility for my omissions, because I am ready to do all.”

Finding that the last hour was approaching, he informed Don Fernando de Toledo where he could find some candles of our lady of Montserrat, one of which he desired to keep in his hand at the supreme moment. He also directed Ruys de Velasco to take from a special shrine—which he had indicated to him six years before—a crucifix which the emperor his father had held upon his death-bed. All this was accomplished according to his wish.

He had already made arrangements for his funeral procession, and had subsequently provided all the details of his agony. It was now necessary to give orders as to the particulars of his burial.

He knew that decomposition had made such progress even while he was still living as to render embalming impossible. He accordingly instructed Don Christopher to see his body wrapped in a shroud just as it lay, and to cause

it to be placed in a well-soldered metallic coffin already provided. The coffin of state, in which the leaden one was to be enclosed, was then brought into the chamber by his command, that he might see if it was entirely to his taste. Having examined it, he ordered that it should be lined with white satin and ornamented with gold nails and lace-work. He also described a particular brocade of black and gold, to be found in the jewel-room, which he desired for the pall.

Next morning he complained to Don Christopher that the Sacrament of the Lord's Supper had not been administered to him for several days. It was urged that his strength was deemed insufficient, and that, as he had received that rite already four times during his illness, and extreme unction twice, it was thought that the additional fatigue might be spared him. But as the king insisted, the sacrament was once more performed and prayers were read. He said with great fervour many times, „Pater, non mea voluntas, sed tua fiat.” He listened, too, with much devotion, to the Psalm, „As the hart panteth for the water-brooks;” and he spoke faintly at long intervals of the Magdalen, of the prodigal son, and of the paralytic.

When these devotional exercises had been concluded, father Diego expressed the hope to him that he might then pass away, for it would be a misfortune by temporary convalescence to fall from the exaltation of piety which he had then reached. The remark was heard by Philip with an expression of entire satisfaction.

That day both the Infanta and the prince came for the last time to his bedside to receive his blessing. He tenderly expressed his regret to his daughter that he had not been permitted to witness her marriage, but charged her never to omit any exertion to augment and sustain the holy Roman Catholic

religion in the Netherlands. It was in the interest of that holy Church alone that he had endowed her with those provinces, and he now urged it upon her with his dying breath to impress upon her future husband these his commands to both.

His two children took leave of him with tears and sobs. As the prince left the chamber he asked Don Christopher who it was that held the key of the treasury.

The secretary replied, „It is I, Sir.” The prince demanded that he should give it into his hands. But Don Christopher excused himself, saying that it had been entrusted to him by the king, and that without his consent he could not part with it. Then the prince returned to the king's chamber, followed by the secretary, who narrated to the dying monarch what had taken place.

„You have done wrong,” said Philip; whereupon Don Christopher, bowing to the earth, presented the key to the prince.

The king then feebly begged those about his bedside to repeat the dying words of our Saviour on the cross, in order that he might hear them and repeat them in his heart as his soul was taking flight.

His father's crucifix was then placed in his hands, and he said distinctly, „I die like a good Catholic, in faith and obedience to the holy Roman Church.” Soon after these last words had been spoken, a paroxysm, followed by faintness, came over him, and he lay entirely still.

They had covered his face with a cloth, thinking that he had already expired, when he suddenly started, with great energy, opened his eyes, seized the crucifix again from the hand of Don Fernando de Toledo, kissed it, and fell back again into agony.

The archbishop and the other priests expressed the opinion that he must have had, not a paroxysm, but a celestial



vision, for human powers would not have enabled him to arouse himself so quickly and so vigorously as he had done at that crisis.

He did not speak again, but lay unconsciously dying for some  
13 Sept. hours, and breathed his last at five in the morning of Sunday the 13th September. 1

His obsequies were celebrated according to the directions which he had so minutely given.

These volumes will have been written in vain if it be now necessary to recall to my readers the leading events in the history of the men who had thus left the world where, almost invisible himself, he had so long played a leading part. It may not be entirely useless, however, to throw a parting glance at a character which it has been one of the main objects of this work, throughout its whole course, to pourtray. My theme has been the reign of Philip II. because, as the less is included in the greater, the whole of that reign, with the exception of a few episodes, is included in the vast movement out of which the Republic of the United Netherlands was born and the assailed independence of France and England consolidated. The result of Philip's efforts to establish a universal monarchy was to hasten the decline of the empire which he had inherited, by aggravating the evils which had long made that downfall inevitable.

It is from no abstract hatred to monarchy that I have dwelt with emphasis upon the crimes of this king, and upon the vices of the despotic system, as illustrated during his lifetime. It is not probable that the military-monarchical system—founded upon conquests

achieved by barbarians and pirates of a distant epoch over an effete civilization and over antique institutions of intolerable profligacy—will soon come to an end in the older world. And it is the business of Europeans so to deal with the institutions of their inheritance or their choice as to ensure their steady melioration and to provide for the highest interests of the people. It matters comparatively little by what name a government is called, so long as the intellectual and moral development of mankind, and the maintenance of justice among individuals, are its leading principles. A government, like an individual, may remain far below its ideal; but, without an ideal, governments and individuals are a like contemptible. It is tyranny only—whether individual or popular—that utters its feeble sneers at the ideologists, as if mankind were brutes to whom instincts were all in all and ideas nothing. Where intellect and justice are enslaved by that unholy trinity—Force, Dogma, and Ignorance—the tendency of governments, and of those subjected to them, must of necessity be retrograde and downward.

There can be little doubt to those who observe the movements of mankind during the course of the fourteen centuries since the fall of the Roman Empire—a mere fragment of human history—that its progress, however concealed or impeded, and whether for weal or woe, is towards democracy; for it is the tendency of science to liberate and to equalize the physical and even the intellectual forces of humanity. A horse and a suit of armour would now hardly enable the fortunate possessor of such advantages to conquer a kingdom, nor can wealth and learning be monopolised in these latter days by a favoured few. Yet veneration for a crown and a privileged church—as if without them and without their close connection with each other law and religion were impossible—makes hereditary authority sacred to

1 The last illness of Philip is described with every minute detail, derived from narratives of eye-witnesses, by Bor, IV. 472-474; and by Herrera, iii. 774-778. Compare also the *Relazione* of F. Soranzo already cited, 150-153.

great masses of mankind in the old world. The obligation is the more stringent, therefore, on men thus set apart as it were by primordial selection for ruling and instructing their fellow-creatures, to keep their edicts and their practice in harmony with divine justice. For these rules cannot be violated with impunity during a long succession of years, and it is usually left for a comparatively innocent generation to atone for the sins of their forefathers. If history does not teach this it teaches nothing, and as the rules of morality, whether for individuals or for nations, are simple and devoid of mystery, there is the less excuse for governments which habitually and cynically violate the eternal law.

Among self-evident truths not one is more indisputable than that which, in the immortal words of our Declaration of Independence, asserts the right of every human being to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness: but the only happiness that can be recognised by a true statesman as the birthright of mankind is that which comes from intellectual and moral development, and from the subjugation of the brutal instincts.

A system according to which clowns remain clowns through all the ages, unless when extraordinary genius or fortunate accident enables an exceptional individual to overleap the barrier of caste, necessarily retards the result to which the philosopher looks forward with perfect faith.

For us, whose business it is to deal with, and, so far as human fallibility will permit, to improve our inevitable form of government—which may degenerate into the most intolerable of polities unless we are ever mindful that it is yet in its rudimental condition; that, although an immense step has been taken in the right direction by the abolition of caste, the divorce of Church and State, and the limitation of intrusion by either on the domain of the

individual, it is yet only a step from which, without eternal vigilance, a falling back is very easy, and that here, more than in other lands, ignorance of the scientific and moral truths on which national happiness and prosperity depend, deserves bitter denunciation—for us it is wholesome to confirm our faith in democracy, and to justify our hope that the People will prove itself equal to the awful responsibility of self-government by an occasional study of the miseries which the opposite system is capable of producing. It is for this reason that the reign of the sovereign whose closing moments have just been recorded is especially worthy of a minute examination, and I still invite a parting glance at the spectacle thus presented, before the curtain falls.

The Spanish monarchy, in the reign of Philip II. was not only the most considerable empire then existing, but probably the most powerful and extensive empire that had ever been known. Certainly never before had so great an agglomeration of distinct and separate sovereignties been the result of accident. For it was owing to a series of accidents—in the common acceptance of that term—that Philip governed so mighty a realm. According to the principle that vast tracts of the earth's surface, with the human beings feeding upon them, were transferable in fee-simple from one man or woman to another by marriage, inheritance, or gift, a heterogeneous collection of kingdoms, principalities, provinces, and wildernesses had been consolidated, without geographical continuity, into an artificial union—the populations differing from each other as much as human beings can differ, in race, language, institutions, and historical traditions, and resembling each other in little, save in being the property alike of the same fortunate individual.

Thus the dozen kingdoms of Spain, the seventeen provinces of the Nether-

lands, the kingdom of the two Sicilies, the duchy of Milan, and certain fortresses and districts of Tuscany, in Europe; the kingdom of Barbary, the coast of Guinea, and an indefinite and unmeasured expanse of other territory, in Africa; the controlling outposts and cities all along the coast of the two Indian peninsulas, with as much of the country as it seemed good to occupy, the straits and the great archipelagos, so far as they had been visited by Europeans, in Asia; Peru, Brazil, Mexico, the Antilles—the whole recently-discovered fourth quarter of the world in short, from the „Land of Fire” in the South to the frozen regions of the North—as much territory as the Spanish and Portuguese sea-captains could circumnavigate and the pope in the plenitude of his power and his generosity, could bestow on his fortunate son, in America; all this enormous proportion of the habitable globe was the private property of Philip, who was the son of Charles, who was the son of Joanna, who was the daughter of Isabella, whose husband was Ferdinand. By what seems to us the most whimsical of political arrangements, the Papuan islander, the Calabrian peasant, the Amsterdam merchant, the semi-civilized Aztec, the Moor of Barbary, the Castilian grandee, the roving Comanche, the Guinea negro, the Indian Brahmin, found themselves—could they but have known it—fellow-citizens of one commonwealth. Statutes of family descent, aided by fraud, force, and chicane, had annexed the various European sovereignties to the crown of Spain; the genius of a Genoese sailor had given to it the New World, and more recently the conquest of Portugal, torn from hands not strong enough to defend the national independence, had vested in the same sovereignty those Oriental possessions which were due to the enterprise of Vasco de Gama, his comrades and successors. The voyager, setting forth from the straits of Gibralt-

tar, circumnavigating the African headlands and Cape Comorin, and sailing through the Molucca channel and past the isles which bore the name of Philip in the Eastern sea, gave the hand at last to his adventurous comrade, who, starting from the same point, and following westward in the track of Magellanus and under the Southern Cross, coasted the shore of Patagonia, and threaded his path through unmapped and unnumbered clusters of islands in the Western Pacific; and during the spanning of the earth's whole circumference not an inch of land or water was traversed that was not the domain of Philip.

For the sea, too, was his, as well as the dry land.

From Borneo to California the great ocean was but a Spanish lake, as much the king's private property as his fishponds at the Escorial with their carp and perch. No subjects but his dared to navigate those sacred waters. Not a common highway of the world's commerce, but a private path for the gratification of one human being's vanity, had thus been laid out by the bold navigators of the sixteenth century.

It was for the Dutch rebels to try conclusions upon this point, as they had done upon so many others, with the master of the land and sea. The opening scenes therefore in the great career of maritime adventure and discovery by which these republicans were to make themselves famous will soon engage the reader's attention.

Thus the causes of what is called the greatness of Spain are not far to seek. Spain was not a nation, but a temporary and factitious conjunction of several nations, which it was impossible to fuse into a permanent whole, but over whose united resources a single monarch for a time disposed. And the very concentration of these vast and unlimited powers, fortuitous as it was, in this single hand, inspiring the in-



dividual, not unnaturally, with a consciousness of superhuman grandeur, impelled him to those frantic and puerile efforts to achieve the impossible which resulted in the downfall of Spain. The man who inherited so much material greatness believed himself capable of destroying the invisible but omnipotent spirit of religious and political liberty in the Netherlands, of trampling out the national existence of France and of England, and of annexing those realms to his empire. It has been my task to relate, with much minuteness, how miserably his efforts failed.

But his resources were great. All Italy was in his hands, with the single exception of the Venetian republic; for the Grand Duke of Florence and the so-called republic of Genoa were little more than his vassals, the pope was generally his other self, and the Duke of Savoy was his son-in-law. Thus his armies, numbering usually a hundred thousand men, were supplied from the best possible sources. The Italians were esteemed the best soldiers for siege, assault, light skirmishing. The German heavy troopers and arquebuseers were the most effective for open yield work, and these were to be purchased at reasonable prices and to indefinite amount from any of the three or four hundred petty sovereigns to whom what was called Germany belonged. The Sicilian and Neapolitan, the Milanese light horse, belonged exclusively to Philip, and were used, year after year, for more than a generation of mankind, to fight battles in which they had no more interest than had their fellow-subjects in the Moluccas or in Mexico, but which constituted for them personally as lucrative a trade on the whole as was afforded them at that day by any branch of industry.

Silk, corn, wine, and oil were furnished in profusion from these favoured regions, not that the inhabitants might enjoy life, and, by accumulating wealth,

increase the stock of human comforts and contribute to intellectual and scientific advancement, but in order that the proprietor of the soil might feed those eternal armies ever swarming from the south to scatter desolation over the plains of France, Burgundy, Flanders, and Holland, and to make the crown of Spain and the office of the Holy Inquisition supreme over the world. From Naples and Sicily were derived in great plenty the best materials and conveniences for ship-building and marine equipment. The galleys and the galley-slaves furnished by these subject realms formed the principal part of the royal navy. From distant regions, a commerce which in Philip's days had become oceanic supplied the crown with as much revenue as could be expected in a period of gross ignorance as to the causes of the true grandeur and the true wealth of nations. Especially from the mines of Mexico came an annual average of ten or twelve millions of precious metals, of which the king took twenty-five per cent. for himself.

It would be difficult and almost superfluous to indicate the various resources placed in the hands of this one personage, who thus controlled so large a portion of the earth. All that breathed or grew belonged to him, and most steadily was the stream of blood and treasure poured through the sieve of his perpetual war. His system was essentially a gigantic and perpetual levy of contributions in kind, and it is only in this vague and unsatisfactory manner that the revenues of his empire can be stated. A despot really keeps no accounts, nor need to do so, for he is responsible to no man for the way in which he husbands or squanders his own. Moreover, the science of statistics had not a beginning of existence in those days, and the most common facts can hardly be obtained even by approximation. The usual standard of value, the commodity which we call money—gold or silver

—is well known to be at best a fallacious guide for estimating the comparative wealth of individuals or of nations at widely different epochs. The dollar of Philip's day was essentially the same bit of silver that it is in our time in Spain, Naples, Rome, or America, but even should an elaborate calculation be made as to the quantity of beef or bread or broadcloth to be obtained for that bit of silver in this or that place in the middle of the sixteenth century, the result, as compared with prices now prevalent, would show many remarkable discrepancies. Thus a bushel of wheat at Antwerp during Philip's reign might cost a quarter of a dollar in average years, and there have been seasons in our own time when two bushels of wheat could have been bought for a quarter of a dollar in Illinois. Yet if, notwithstanding this, we should allow a tenfold value in exchange to the dollar of Philip's day, we should be surprised at the meagreness of his revenues, of his expenditures, and of the debts which at the close of his career brought him to bankruptcy; were the sums estimated in coin.

Thus his income was estimated by careful contemporary statesmen at what seemed to them the prodigious annual amount of sixteen millions of dollars. He carried on a vast war without interruption during the whole of his forty-three years' reign against the most wealthy and military nations of Christendom not recognizing his authority, and in so doing he is said to have expended a sum total of seven hundred millions of dollars—a statement which made men's hair stand on their heads. Yet the American republic, during its civil war to repress the insurrection of the slaveholders, has spent nominally as large a sum as this every year; and the British Empire in time of profound peace, spends half as much annually. And even if we should allow sixteen millions to have represented the value of

a hundred and sixty millions—a purely arbitrary supposition—as compared with our times, what are a hundred and sixty millions of dollars, or thirty-three millions of pounds sterling, as the whole net revenue of the greatest empire that had ever existed in the world, when compared with the accumulated treasures over which civilized and industrious countries can now dispose? Thus the power of levying men and materials in kind constituted the chief part of the royal power, and, in truth, very little revenue in money was obtained from Milan or Naples or from any of the outlying European possessions of the crown.

Eight millions a year were estimated as the revenue from the eight kingdoms incorporated under the general name of Castile, while not more than six hundred thousand came from the three kingdoms which constituted Arragon.<sup>1</sup> The chief sources of money receipts were a tax of ten per cent. upon sales, paid by the seller, called *Alcavala*, and the *Almoxarifalga* or tariff upon both imports and exports. Besides these imposts he obtained about eight hundred thousand dollars a year by selling to his subjects the privilege of eating eggs upon fast days, according to the permission granted him by the pope in the bull called the *Cruzada*.<sup>2</sup> He received another annual million from the *Sussidio* and the *Excusado*. The first was a permission originally given by the popes to levy six hundred thousand dollars a year upon ecclesiastical property for equipment of a hundred war-galleys against the Saracens, but which had more recently established itself as a regular tax to pay for naval hostilities against Dutch and English heretics—a still more malignant species of unbelievers in the orthodox eyes of the period. The *Excusado* was the right accorded to the king always to select from the Church possessions a single benefice and

<sup>1</sup> Soranzo.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*

to appropriate its fruits—a levy commuted generally for four hundred thousand dollars a year. Besides these regular sources of income, large but irregular amounts of money were picked up by his Majesty in small sums, through monks sent about the country simply as beggars, under no special license, to collect alms from rich and poor for sustaining the war against the infidels of England and Holland. A certain Jesuit, father Sicily by name, had been industrious enough at one period in preaching this crusade to accumulate more than a million and a half, so that a facetious courtier advised his sovereign to style himself thenceforth king, not of the two, but of the three Sicilies, in honour of the industrious priest.

It is worthy of remark that at different periods during Philip's reign, and especially towards its close, the whole of his regular revenue was pledged to pay the interest on his debts, save only the *Sussidio* and the *Cruzada*. Thus the master of the greatest empire of the earth had at times no income at his disposal except the alms he could solicit from his poorest subjects to maintain his warfare against foreign miscreants, the levy on the Church for war-galleys, and the proceeds of his permission to eat on Fridays.<sup>1</sup> This sounds like an epigram, but it is a plain, incontestable fact.

Thus the revenues of his foreign dominions being nearly consumed by their necessary expenses, the measure of his positive wealth was to be found in the riches of Spain. But Spain at that day was not an opulent country. It was impossible that it should be rich, for nearly every law, according to which the prosperity of a country becomes progressive, was habitually violated. It is difficult to state even by approximation the amount of its population, but the kingdoms united under the crown of

Castile were estimated by contemporaries to contain eight millions, while the kingdom of Portugal, together with those annexed to Arragon and the other provinces of the realm, must have numbered half as many. Here was a populous nation in a favoured land but the foundation of all wealth was sapped by a perverted moral sentiment.

Labour was esteemed dishonourable. The Spaniard, from highest to lowest, was proud, ignorant, and lazy. For a people endowed by nature with many noble qualities—courage, temperance, frugality, endurance, quickness of perception, a high sense of honour, a reverence for law—the course of the national history had proved as ingeniously bad a system of general education as could well be invented.

The eternal contests, century after century, upon the soil of Spain between the crescent and the cross, and the remembrance of the ancient days in which Oriental valour and genius had almost extirpated Germanic institutions and Christian faith from the peninsula, had inspired one great portion of the masses with a hatred, amounting almost to insanity, towards every form of religion except the Church of Rome, towards every race of mankind except the Goths and Vandals. Innate reverence for established authority had expanded into an intensity of religious emotion and into a fanaticism of loyalty which caused the anointed monarch leading true believers against infidels to be accepted as a god. The highest industrial and scientific civilization that had been exhibited upon Spanish territory was that of Moors and Jews. When in the course of time those races had been subjugated, massacred, or driven into exile, not only was Spain deprived of its highest intellectual culture and its most productive labour, but intelligence, science, and industry were accounted degrading, because the mark of inferior and detested peoples.

The sentiment of self-esteem, always

<sup>1</sup> Soranzo. Compare *Rise of Dutch Republic*, vol. i. pt. ii. c. iii.



a national characteristic, assumed an almost ludicrous shape. Not a ragged Biscayan muleteer, not a swineherd of Estremadura, that did not imagine himself a nobleman because he was not of African descent. Not a half-starved ignorant brigand, gaining his living on the highways and byways by pilfering or assassination, that did not kneel on the church pavement and listen to orisons in an ancient tongue, of which he understood not a syllable, with a sentiment of Christian self-complacency to which Godfrey of Bouillon might have been a stranger. Especially those born towards the northern frontier, and therefore farthest removed from Moorish contamination, were proudest of the purity of their race. To be an Asturian or a Gallician, however bronzed by sun and wind, was to be furnished with positive proof against suspicion of Moorish blood; but the sentiment was universal throughout the peninsula. 1

It followed as a matter of course that labour of any kind was an im-

1 La gente bassa e minuta fa numero ed e poverissimo essendo tutta priva d'industria e di questa si serve quando bisogna per soldati. E poveri ancora nel loro grado chiamar si possono quelli che sono fra li principi e gli artefici perchè vogliono vivere con fasto, sono superbi assai hanno poche entrate e non le governano stimano vergogna il far esercizio che possa aver apparenza di mercanzia onde essendo senza industria e senza roba e volendo spendere e grandeggiare la fanno male assai perchè sdegnano li minori e dalli maggiori non vogliono essere superati però si vede quasi tutta la Spagna assai mendica e piena di povera gente fuor che dove abita la Corte, le Metropoli dei regni dove si riducono le Signori e si esercitano le arti ed in Siviglia per il commercio dell' Indie. . . . Li Biscaylini si stimano nobili d'incontaminata discendenza sopra tutti li popoli di Spagna perchè essendo di sito direttamente opposte all' Africa di dove entrarono i Mori e lontani da quelle parti delle Spagna dove vivono li Marani che sono li più in Portogallo professano che non siano entrati nel loro paese mai queste infezioni e ne vanno altieri e gloriosi assai. Li regni di Granata, Valenza, ed Andalusia, all' incontro sono tutti pieni di Moreschi, le altre parti della Spagna sono contaminate ed infette pur di questi Moreschi e de Marani ancora," &c. &c.—Soranzo.

peachment against this gentility of descent. To work was the province of Moors, Jews, and other heretics; of the Marani or accursed, miscreants and descendants of miscreants; of the Sanbeniti or infamous, wretches whose ancestors had been convicted by the Holy Inquisition of listening, however secretly, to the Holy Scriptures as expounded by other lips than those of Roman priests. And it is a remarkable illustration of this degradation of labour and of its results, that in the reign of Philip twenty-five thousand individuals of these dishonoured and comparatively industrious classes, then computed at four millions in number in the Castilian kingdoms alone, had united in a society which made a formal offer to the king to pay him two thousand dollars a head if the name and privileges of hidalgo could be conferred upon them. 1 Thus an inconsiderable number of this vilest and most abject of the population—oppressed by taxation which was levied exclusively upon the low, and from which not only the great nobles but mechanics and other hidalgos were exempt—had been able to earn and to lay by enough to offer the monarch fifty millions of dollars to purchase themselves out of semi-slavery into manhood, and yet found their offer rejected by an almost insolvent king. Nothing could exceed the idleness and the frivolity of the upper classes, as depicted by contemporary and not unfriendly observers. The nobles were as idle and as ignorant as their inferiors. They were not given to tournaments nor to the delights of the chase and table, but were fond of brilliant festivities, dancing, gambling, masquerading, love-making, and pompous exhibitions of equipage, furniture, and dress. These diversions—together with the baiting of bulls and the burning of Protestants—made up their simple round of pleasures. When they went to the wars they scorned all positions but that

1 Soranzo.

of general, whether by land or sea, and as war is a trade which requires an apprenticeship, it is unnecessary to observe that these grandees were rarely able to command, having never learned to obey. The poorer Spaniards were most honourably employed perhaps—so far as their own mental development was concerned—when they were sent with pike and arquebus to fight heretics in France and Flanders. They became brave and indomitable soldiers when exported to the seat of war, and thus afforded proof—by strenuously doing the hardest physical work that human beings can be called upon to perform, campaigning year after year amid the ineffable deprivations, dangers, and sufferings which are the soldier's lot—that it was from no want of industry or capacity that the lower masses of Spaniards in that age were the idle, listless, dice-playing, begging, filching vagabonds into which cruel history and horrible institutions had converted them at home.

It is only necessary to recall these well-known facts to understand why one great element of production—human labour—was but meagrely supplied. It had been the deliberate policy of the Government for ages to extirpate the industrious classes, and now that a great portion of Moors and Jews were exiles and outcasts, it was impossible to supply their place by native workmen. Even the mechanics, who condescended to work with their hands in the towns, looked down alike upon those who toiled in the field and upon those who attempted to grow rich by traffic. A locksmith or a wheelwright who could prove four descents of western blood called himself a son of somebody—a *hidalgo* 1

1 „Gli Idalghi sono per il piu gli artefici che godono il privilegio di questo titolo, o per grazia ottenuta dal re . . . ovvero per discendenza e per natura, e questi sono persone nate di buon sangue e di padri benemeriti dalla corona che s' hanno acquistato questo titolo con alcuna fazione in servizio del Re. Di questo nome d' Idalgo per natura

—and despised the farmer and the merchant. And those very artisans were careful not to injure themselves by excessive industry, although not reluctant by exorbitant prices to acquire in one or two days what might seem a fair remuneration for a week, and to impress upon their customers that it was rather by way of favour that they were willing to serve them at all.

Labour being thus deficient, it is obvious that there could hardly have been a great accumulation, according to modern ideas, of capital. That other chief element of national wealth, which is the result of generations of labour and of abstinence, was accordingly not abundant. And even those accretions of capital, which in the course of centuries had been inevitable, were as clumsily and inadequately diffused as the most exquisite human perverseness could desire. If the object of civil and political institutions had been to produce the greatest ill to the greatest number, that object had been as nearly attained at last in Spain as human imperfection permits; the efforts of government and of custom coming powerfully to the aid of the historical evils already indicated.

It is superfluous to say that the land belonged not to those who lived upon it—but subject to the pre-eminent right of the crown—to a small selection of the human species. Moderate holdings, small farms, peasant proprietorships, were unknown. Any kind of terrestrial possession, in short, was as far beyond the reach of those men who held themselves so haughtily and esteemed them-

non possono godere se non quelli, che nascono per lo meno in quattro gradi di padre e di madre che non sieno stati ne Moreschi nè Marani a differenza delli Cristiani nuovi che non hanno questo candor di nascimento discendendo da persone infette da questa macchia. . . . Gli artefici sono comodi e vivono tutti molto lautamente trattano con gran sprezzatura, lavorano poco e per poterlo fare si fanno pagare le fatture quello che non può credere, volendo, con la fatica che essi possono fare in un giorno vivere e godere tutta una settimana.”—Soranzo.

selves so inordinately, as were the mountains in the moon.

The great nobles—and of real grandees of Spain there were but forty-nine, 1 although the number of titled families was much larger—owned all the country, except that vast portion of it which had reposed for ages in the dead-hand of the Church. The law of primogeniture, strictly enforced, tended with every generation to narrow the basis of society. Nearly every great estate was an entail, passing from eldest son to eldest son, until these were exhausted, in which case a daughter transferred the family possessions to a new house. Thus the capital of the country—meagre at best in comparison with what it might have been, had industry been honoured instead of being despised, had the most intelligent and most diligent classes been cherished rather than hunted to death or into obscure dens like vermin—was concentrated in very few hands. Not only was the accumulation less than it should have been, but the slenderness of its diffusion had nearly amounted to absolute stagnation. The few possessors of capital wasted their revenues in unproductive consumption. The millions of the needy never dreamed of the possibility of deriving benefit from the capital of the rich, nor would have condescended to employ it, nor known how to employ it, had its use in any form been vouchsafed to them. The surface of Spain, save only around the few royal residence, exhibited no splendour of architecture, whether in town or country, no wonders of agricultural or horticultural skill, no monuments of engineering and constructive genius in roads, bridges, docks, warehouses, and other ornamental and useful fabrics, or in any of the thousand ways in which man facilitates intercourse among his kind and subdues nature to his will. 2

Yet it can never be too often repeated that is only the Spaniard of the sixteenth century, such as extraneous circumstances had made him, that is here depicted; that he, even like his posterity and his ancestors, had been endowed by Nature with some of her noblest gifts. Acuteness of intellect, wealth of imagination, heroic qualities of heart, and hand, and brain, rarely surpassed in any race, and manifested on a thousand battle-fields, and in the triumphs of a magnificent and most original literature, had not been able to save a whole nation from the disasters and the degradation which the mere words Philip II. and the Holy Inquisition suggest to every educated mind.

Nor is it necessary for my purpose to measure exactly the space which separated Spain from the other leading monarchies of the day. That the standard of civilization was a vastly higher one in England, Holland, or even France—torn as they all were with perpetual civil war—no thinker will probably deny; but as it is rather my purpose at this moment to exhibit the evils which may spring from a perfectly bad monarchical system, as administered by a perfectly bad king, I prefer not to wander at present from the country which was ruled for almost half a century by Philip II.

Besides the concentration of a great part of the capital of the country in a very small number of titled families, still another immense portion of the

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magnificenza di edificii nè per bellezza di strade, nè per grandezza di piazza nè per esquisitezza di altri ornamenti molto conspicui nè troppo riguardevoli," &c., &c. . . „non si ha in Spagna cognizione d'architettura, perciò non si veggono belle fabbriche, nè per le terre nè per le ville, non giardini, non vigne, non altra cosa di delizia nè di magnificenza fuori che nelle fabbriche reali; non s'intendono di fortificazioni e quelli che non la vanno a imparare fuori di là non intendono la disciplina militare, perciò non hanno nel paese ne ingegneri nè buoni capitani."—Soranzo.

1 Soranzo.

2 „Le città . . . non riescono nè per



national wealth belonged, as already intimated, to the Church.

There were eleven archbishops, at the head of whom stood the Archbishop of Toledo, with the enormous annual revenue of three hundred thousand dollars. Next to him came the Archbishop of Seville, with one hundred and fifty thousand dollars yearly, while the income of the others varied from fifty thousand to twenty thousand dollars respectively. 1

There were sixty-two bishops, with annual incomes ranging from fifty thousand to six thousand dollars. The churches, also, of these various episcopates were as richly endowed as the great hierarchs themselves. 2 But without fatiguing the reader with minute details, it is sufficient to say that one-third of the whole annual income of Spain and Portugal belonged to the ecclesiastical body. 3 In return for this enormous proportion of the earth's fruits, thus placed by the caprice of destiny at their disposal, these holy men did very little work in the world. They fed their flocks neither with bread nor with spiritual food. They taught little, preached little, dispensed little in charity. Very few of the swarming millions of naked and hungry throughout the land were clothed or nourished out of these prodigious revenues of the Church. The constant and avowed care of those prelates was to increase their worldly possessions, to build up the fortunes of their respective families, to grow richer and richer at the expense of the people whom for centuries they had fleeced. Of gross crime, of public ostentatious immorality, such as had made the Roman priesthood of that and preceding ages loathsome in the sight of man and God, the Spanish Church-dignitaries were innocent. Avarice, greediness, and laziness were their characteristics. It is almost superfluous to say that, while the ecclesiastical princes were rolling

in this almost fabulous wealth, the subordinate clergy, the mob of working priests, were needy, half-starved mendicants. 1

From this rapid survey of the condition of the peninsula it will seem less surprising than it might do at first glance that the revenue of the greatest monarch of the world was rated at the small amount—even after due allowance for the difference of general values between the sixteenth and nineteenth centuries—of sixteen millions of dollars. The King of Spain was powerful and redoubtable at home and abroad, because accident had placed the control of a variety of separate realms in his single hand. At the same time Spain was poor and weak, because she had lived for centuries in violation of the principles on which the wealth and strength of nations depend. Moreover, every one of those subject and violently annexed nations hated Spain with undying fervour, 2 while an infernal policy—

1 „Non si esercitano questi Prelati per lo più nelle opere più come dovrebbero non sono molto elemosinarij e non attendono a fare il loro ufficio pastorale con quelle carità che sarebbe forse lor debito, poco insegnano poco riprendono poco dispensano e poco pascono le loro pecore nè col pane nè colla parola attendono all' utilità propria ed arricchire loro stessi e le lor famiglie, ed accumulare ed a far bene alle lor case di quello che loro avanza delle ricchezze del re, sebbene per dire il vero nel resto sone per lo più di buoni costumi nè si sente occasione di scandalo per la vita che menano e contentandosi del solo gusto di arricchire nel restante vivono con termine di grand' esempio: ed in somme in queste entrate ecclesiastiche che toccano al clero che parlerò poi di quelle che sono del re si fa conto che sia compreso il terzo delle entrate di quei regni, ma oltre li prelati e li beneficiati delle lor chiese il resto del clero e mendico e bisognoso.”—Soranzo.

These are the words, not of a democrat or Protestant, but of a devoted Papist and a most haughty aristocrat—the Venetian ambassador.

2 This dominion of the barbarians stinks in every one's nostrils: „A ognuno puzza questo barbaro dominio,” was the energetic expression of Macchiavelli, even before Philip was born, and certainly the tyranny did not grow sweeter during his reign.

1 Soranzo.

2 Ibid.

3 Ibid.

the leading characteristics of which were to sow dissensions among the nobles, to confiscate their property on all convenient occasions, and to bestow it upon Spaniards and other foreigners; to keep the discontented masses in poverty, but to deprive them of the power or disposition to unite with their superiors in rank in demonstrations against the crown—had sufficed to suppress any extensive revolt in the various Italian states united under Philip's sceptre. Still more intense than the hatred of the Italians was the animosity which was glowing in every Portuguese breast against the Spanish sway; while even the Arragonese were only held in subjection by terror, which, indeed, in one form or another, was the leading instrument of Philip's government.

It is hardly necessary to enlarge upon the regulations of Spain's foreign commerce; for it will be enough to repeat the phrase that in her eyes the great ocean from east to west was a Spanish lake, sacred to the ships of the king's subjects alone. With such a simple code of navigation coming in aid of the other causes which impoverished the land, it may be believed that the maritime traffic of the country would dwindle into the same exiguous proportions which characterised her general industry.

Moreover, it should never be forgotten that, although the various kingdoms of Spain were politically conjoined by their personal union under one despot, they were commercially distinct. A line of custom-houses separated each province from the rest, and made the various inhabitants of the peninsula practically strangers to each other. Thus there was less traffic between Castile, Biscay, and Arragon than there was between any one of them and remote foreign nations. The Biscayans, for example, could even import and export commodities to and from remote countries by sea, free of duty, while their

merchandise to and from Castile was crushed by imposts. As this ingenious perversity of positive arrangements came to increase the negative inconveniences caused by the almost total absence of tolerable roads, canals, bridges, and other means of intercommunication, it may be imagined that internal traffic—the very life-blood of every prosperous nation—was very nearly stagnant in Spain. As an inevitable result, the most thriving branch of national industry was that of the professional smuggler, who, in the pursuit of his vocation, did his best to aid Government in sapping the wealth of the nation. <sup>1</sup>

The whole accumulated capital of Spain, together with the land—in the general sense which includes not only the soil but the immovable property of a country—being thus exclusively owned by the crown, the church, and a very small number of patrician families, while the supply of labour—owing to the special causes which had converted the masses of the people into paupers ashamed to work but not unwilling to beg or to rob—was incredibly small, it is obvious that, so long as the same causes continued in operation, the downfall of the country was a logical result from which there was no escape. Nothing but a general revolution of mind and hand against the prevalent system, nothing but some great destructive but regenerating catastrophe, could redeem the people.

And it is the condition of the people which ought always to be the prominent subject of interest to those who study the records of the Past. It is only by such study that we can derive instruction from history, and enable ourselves, however dimly and feebly, to cast the horoscope of younger nations. Human history, so far as it has been written, is at best a mere fragment; for the few centuries or year-thousands of which

<sup>1</sup> See Lafuente, *His. Gen de Espana*, t. xv. p. 148.

there is definite record are as nothing compared to the millions of unnumbered years during which man has perhaps walked the earth. It may be as practicable therefore to derive instruction from a minute examination in detail of a very limited period of time and space, and thus to deduce general rules for the infinite future, during which our species may be destined to inhabit this planet, as by a more extensive survey, which must however be at best a limited one. Men die, but Man is immortal, and it would be a sufficiently forlorn prospect for humanity if we were not able to discover causes in operation which would ultimately render the system of Philip II. impossible in any part of the globe. Certainly, were it otherwise, the study of human history would be the most wearisome and unprofitable of all conceivable occupations. The festivities of courts, the magnificence of an aristocracy, the sayings and doings of monarchs and their servants, the dynastic wars, the solemn treaties, the Ossa upon Pelion of diplomatic and legislative rubbish by which, in the course of centuries, a few individuals or combinations of individuals have been able to obstruct the march of humanity, and have essayed to suspend the operation of elemental laws—all this contains but little solid food for grown human beings. The condition of the brave and quick-witted Spanish people in the latter half of the sixteenth century gives more matter for reflection and possible instruction.

That science is the hope of the world, that ignorance is the real enslaver of mankind, and therefore the natural ally of every form of despotism, may be assumed as an axiom, and it was certainly the ignorance and superstition of the people upon which the Philippian policy was founded.

A vast mass, entirely uneducated, half fed, half clothed, unemployed, and reposing upon a still lower and

denser stratum—the millions namely of the „Accursed,” of the Africans, and last and vilest of all, the „blessed” descendants of Spanish protestants whom the Holy Office had branded with perpetual infamy<sup>1</sup> because it had burned their progenitors—this was the People; and it was these paupers and outcasts, nearly the whole nation, that payed all the imposts of which the public revenue was composed. The great nobles, priests, and even the *hidalgos*, were exempt from taxation.<sup>2</sup> Need more be said to indicate the inevitable ruin of both government and people?

And it was over such a people, and with institutions like these, that Philip II. was permitted to rule during forty-three years. His power was absolute.<sup>3</sup> With this single phrase one might as well dismiss any attempt at specification. He made war or peace at will with foreign nations. He had power of life and death over all his subjects. He had unlimited control of their worldly goods. As he claimed supreme jurisdiction over their religious opinions also, he was master of their minds, bodies, and estates. As a matter of course, he nominated and removed at will every executive functionary, every judge, every magistrate, every military or civil officer; and moreover, he not only selected, according to the license tacitly conceded to him by the pontiff, every archbishop, bishop, and other Church dignitary, but, through his great influence at Rome, he named most of the cardinals, and thus controlled the election of the

1 „Segnati e notati di perpetua infamia—vivono quindi disperati et arrabbiatissimi.”

2 Soranzo.

3 „Ha assoluto imperio sopra le vite e facoltà delli sudditi, è libero padron della pace e della guerra, ha piena potestà sopra le leggi, sopra la giustizia e sopra le grazie, ha la nominatione di tutti i benefici ecclesiastici, delle tre ordini di cavalleria, . . . crea li Presidenti li Vicere, li Luogotenenti, Governatori, Capitani, i Generali degli eserciti e delle armate, e per la grande autorità che tiene con i Pontefici si può dire che faccia ancora i Cardinali.”—Soranzo.



popes. The whole machinery of society, political, ecclesiastical, military, was in his single hand. There was a show of provincial privilege here and there in different parts of Spain, but it was but the phantom of that ancient municipal liberty which it had been the especial care of his father and his great-grandfather to destroy. Most patiently did Philip, by his steady inactivity, bring about the decay of the last ruins of free institutions in the peninsula. The councils and legislative assemblies were convoked and then wearied out in waiting for that royal assent to their propositions and transactions, which was deferred intentionally, year after year, and never given. Thus the time of the deputies was consumed in accomplishing infinite nothing, until the moment arrived when the monarch, without any violent stroke of state, could feel safe in issuing decrees and pragmatic edicts; thus reducing the ancient legislative and consultative bodies to nullity, and substituting the will of an individual for a constitutional fabric. 1 To criticise the expenses of government or to attempt interference with the increase of taxation became a sorry farce. The forms remained in certain provinces after the life had long since fled. Only in Arragon had the ancient privileges seemed to defy the absolute authority of the monarch; and it was reserved for Antonio Perez to be the cause of their final extirpation. The grinning skulls of the Chief Justice of that kingdom and of the boldest and noblest advocates and defenders of the national liberties, exposed for years in the marketplace with the record of their death-sentence attached, informed the Spaniards, in language which the most ignorant could read, that the crime of defending a remnant of human freedom and constitutional law was sure to draw down condign punishment. 2 It was

the last time in that age that even the ghost of extinct liberty was destined to revisit the soil of Spain. It mattered not that the immediate cause for pursuing Perez was his successful amour with the king's mistress, nor that the crime of which he was formally accused was the deadly offence of Calvinism, rather than his intrigue with the Eboli and his assassination of Escovedo; for it was in the natural and simple sequence of events that the last vestige of law or freedom should be obliterated wherever Philip could vindicate his sway. It must be admitted, too, that the king seized this occasion to strike a decisive blow with a promptness very different from his usual artistic sluggishness. Rarely has a more terrible epigram been spoken by man than the royal words which constituted the whole trial and sentence of the Chief Justice of Arragon, for the crime of defending the law of his country: „You will take John of Lanuza, and you will have his head cut off.” This was the end of the magistrate and of the constitution which he had defended. 1

His power was unlimited. A man endowed with genius and virtue, and possessing the advantages of a consummate education, could have perhaps done little more than attempt to mitigate the general misery, and to remove some of its causes. For it is one of the most pernicious dogmas of the despotic system, and the one which the candid student of history soonest discovers to be false, that the masses of mankind are to look

queste loro licenze furono in gran parte levate e per il resto assai mortificati dal re passato troncando molte teste dei principali e facendole anco poner in publica mostra con le iscrizioni appresso dei loro delitti a perpetuo terrore dei posteri, estirpando li capi, piantando cittadelle, introducendo guardie e aggrandendo l' autorità all' Ufficio della Inquisizione che fu uno dei maggiori morsi per domarli con che si potesse frenare la loro ferocia.” &c. &c.—Soranzo, *Relazione*, 1597-1602. Barozzi and Berchet. *Relazioni*, &c., Ser. i. vol. i.

1 „Prendereis a don Juan de Lauuza, y hareisle luego cortar la cabeza.” See Lafuente, xv. 131, 132.

1 Lafuente, xv. 151.

2 „E sebbene questa loro prerogativa e

to any individual, however exalted by birth or intellect, for their redemption. Woe to the world if the nations are never to learn that their fate is and ought to be in their own hands; that their institutions, whether liberal or despotic, are the result of the national biography and of the national character, not the work of a few individuals whose names have been preserved by capricious Accident as heroes and legislators. Yet there is no doubt that, while comparatively powerless for good, the individual despot is capable of almost infinite mischief. There have been few men known to history who have been able to accomplish by their own exertions so vast an amount of evil as the king who had just died. If Philip possessed a single virtue it has eluded the conscientious research of the writer of these pages. If there are vices—as possibly there are—from which he was exempt, it is because it is not permitted to human nature to attain perfection even in evil. The only plausible explanation—for palliation there is none—of his infamous career is that the man really believed himself not a king but a god. He was placed so high above his fellow-creatures as, in good faith perhaps, to believe himself incapable of doing wrong; so that, whether indulging his passions or enforcing throughout the world his religious and political dogmas, he was ever conscious of embodying divine inspirations and elemental laws. When providing for the assassination of a monarch, or commanding the massacre of a townful of Protestants; when trampling on every oath by which a human being can bind himself; when laying desolate with fire and sword, during more than a generation, the provinces which he had inherited as his private property, or in carefully maintaining the flames of civil war in foreign kingdoms which he hoped to acquire; while maintaining over all Christendom a gigantic system of bribery,

corruption, and espionage, keeping the noblest names of England and Scotland on his pension-lists of traitors, and impoverishing his exchequer with the wages of iniquity paid in France to men of all degrees, from princes of blood like Guise and Mayenne down to the obscurest of country squires, he ever felt that these base or bloody deeds were not crimes, but the simple will of the godhead of which he was a portion. He never doubted that the extraordinary theological system which spent his life in enforcing with fire and sword was right, for it was a part of himself. The Holy Inquisition, thoroughly established as it was in his ancestral Spain, was a portion of the regular working machinery by which his absolute kingship and his superhuman will expressed themselves. A tribunal which performed its functions with a celerity, certainly, and invisibility resembling the attributes of Omnipotence; which, like the pestilence, entered palace or hovel at will, and which smote the wretch guilty or suspected of heresy with a precision against which no human ingenuity or sympathy could guard—such an institution could not but be dear to his heart. It was inevitable that the extension and perpetuation of what he deemed its blessings throughout his dominions should be his settled purpose. Spain was governed by an established terrorism. It is a mistake to suppose that Philip was essentially beloved in his native land, or that his religious and political system was heartily accepted because consonant to the national character. On the contrary, as has been shown, a very large proportion of the inhabitants were either secretly false to the Catholic faith, or descended at least from those who had expiated their hostility to it with their lives. But the Grand Inquisitor was almost as awful a personage as the king or the pope. His familiars were in every village and at every fireside, and from their fangs there was no es-

cape. Millions of Spaniards would have rebelled against the crown or accepted the reformed religion, had they not been perfectly certain of being burned or hanged at the slightest movement in such a direction. 1 The popular force in the course of the political combinations of centuries seemed at last to have been eliminated. The nobles, exempt from taxation, which crushed the people to the earth, were the enemies rather than the chieftains and champions of the lower classes in any possible struggle with a crown to which they were united by ties of interest as well as of affec-

1 „Però così questi come li Marani e li Moreschi tratti da quella disperazione che suole anco negli animi vili ed abbiatti eccitare spiriti di furore e d'ardire sariano inclinati ad ogni sollevazione e ribellione sempre che loro se ne presentasse opportuna occasione; ma tanto gli uni come gli altri convengono stare quieti per le ragioni che ho detto e di più perchè avendo il re tutti i grandi e tutto il clero ch'è poderosissimo in tutto affetto dipendente dalla Maestà Sua e col severissimo rigore della giustizia e dell'ufficio della Inquisizione che è come dire a suo luogo di tremenda autorità in tutta la Spagna, lasciando spuntare cosa per piccola che sia e tiene i popoli non solo a freno ma in perpetuo terrore privi di poter per alcuna via macchinare o tentare novità di alcuna sorte.” . . . „Per non lasciar infettare il paese di questo diabolico morbo d'eresie, con tutto che il pericolo sia stato sempre e sia tuttavia grandissimo per la vicinità della Francia, per la diversità dei popoli della Spagna, perciocchè li Moreschi e li Marani abbracciarono prontamente ogni occasione che lor si presentasse di sollevazione, apririano volentieri l'adito e si fariano facilmente compagni a chi volesse tentar commozione in quei regni per qualunque cagione si volesse, e quella della religione sarebbe la più facile. . . . La facilità che tengono li Spagnuoli nel credere ciò che loro viene affermato, che nasce da ignoranza aprirebbe la strada a chi volesse seminarvi nuove opinioni molto facile. . . . La gran quantità di beni ecclesiastici, che vi sono alletteria molti che avessero pensiero d'introdurvi novità e sedizioni a spessassarne la Chiesa per impadronirsene. . . . in somma si può dire che il rigore così grande di questo officio (Inquisizione) mantiene il rito della vera religione in Spagna che senza questo si può grandemente temere che par tanti Moreschi e Marani che sono sparsi per il paese si vedriano per questo rispetto di religione dei movimenti e delle commozioni importanti.”

tion, while the great churchmen, too, were the immediate dependants and of course the firm supporters of the king. Thus the people, without natural leaders, without organisation, and themselves divided into two mutually hostile sections, were opposed by every force in the State. Crown, nobility, and clergy; all the wealth and all that there was of learning, were banded together to suppress the democratic principle. 1 But even this would hardly have sufficed to extinguish every spark of liberty, had it not been for the potent machinery of the Inquisition; nor could that perfection of terrorism have become an established institution but for the extraordinary mixture of pride and superstition of which the national character had been, in the course of the national history, compounded. The Spanish portion of the people hated the nobles, whose petty exactions and oppressions were always visible; but they had a reverential fear of the unseen monarch, as the representative both of the great unsullied Christian nation to which the meanest individual was proud to belong, and of the God of wrath who had decreed the extermination of all unbe-

1 „Perciocchè de' principi non più temere che non hanna alcuna autorità con li popoli non fortezze per ritirarsi, non seguito non obbedienza de' loro vassalli, non buona intelligenza fra loro, non stimati dalla plebe, odiati dai proprii sudditi, che sone tiranneggiati da loro, in mal concetto della gente minuta per la durezza che usano nei pagamenti, oltre che questi fanno una particular professione di sostenere con la loro fedeltà la grandezza della corona e stimano questa esser propria e particular gloria della nazione Spagnuola e di loro medesimi sopra tutti; perciocchè quell'alterezza d'animo che fa sì che sdegnarebbero d'esser soggetti ad altro principe che al re di Spagna opera in modo che umiliandoli a questo, reputano che sia lor grandezza sostenendo quella corona viver soggetti al maggior re del mondo o che altri che un principe tale non sia degno di dominarli. Li popoli poi non hanno nè capi nè modo di far macchinazione non tengono appoggio di principi forestieri non vi è persona che non giusta pretenzione potesse eccitar gli altri, non v'essendo alcuno di sangue regio che potesse ragionevolmente pretendere.”—Soranzo.



lievers. The „accursed” portion of the people were sufficiently disloyal at heart, but were too much crushed by oppression and contempt to imagine themselves men. As to the Netherlanders, they did not fight originally for independence. It was not until after a quarter of a century of fighting that they ever thought of renouncing their allegiance to Philip. They fought to protect themselves against being taxed by the king without the consent of those constitutional assemblies which he had sworn to maintain, and to save themselves and their children from being burned alive if they dared to read the Bible. Independence followed after nearly a half-century of fighting, but it would never have been obtained or perhaps demanded, had those grievances of the people been redressed.

Of this perfect despotism Philip was thus the sole administrator. Certainly he looked upon his mission with seriousness, and was industrious in performing his royal functions. But this earnestness and seriousness were, in truth, his darkest vices; for the most frivolous voluptuary that ever wore a crown would never have compassed a thousandth part of the evil which was Philip's life-work. It was because he was a believer in himself, and in what he called his religion, that he was enabled to perpetrate such a long catalogue of crimes. When an humble malefactor is brought before an ordinary court of justice, it is not often, in any age or country, that he escapes the pillory or the gallows because, from his own point of view, his actions, instead of being criminal, have been commendable, and because the multitude and continuity of his offences prove him to have been sincere. And because anointed monarchs are amenable to no human tribunal, save to that terrible assize which the People, bursting its chain from time to time in the course of the ages, sets up for the trial of its oppressors, and

which is called Revolution, it is the more important for the great interests of humanity that before the judgment-seat of History a crown should be no protection to its wearer. There is no plea to the jurisdiction of history, if history be true to itself.

As for the royal criminal called Philip II., his life is his arraignment, and these volumes will have been written in vain if a specification is now required.

Homicide such as was hardly ever compassed before by one human being was committed by Philip when in the famous edict of 1568 he sentenced every man, woman, and child in the Netherlands to death. That the whole of this population, three millions or more, were not positively destroyed was because no human energy could suffice to execute the diabolical decree. But Alva, toiling hard, accomplished much of this murderous work. By the aid of the „Council of Blood,” and of the sheriffs and executioners of the Holy Inquisition, he was able sometimes to put eight hundred human beings to death in a single week for the crimes of Protestantism or of opulence, and at the end of half-a-dozen years he could boast of having strangled, drowned, burned, or beheaded somewhat more than eighteen thousand of his fellow-creatures. These were some of the non-combatant victims; for of the tens of thousands who perished during his administration alone, in siege and battle, no statistical record has been preserved.

In face of such wholesale crimes, of these forty years of bloodshed, it is superfluous to refer to such isolated misdeeds as his repeated attempts to procure the assassination of the Prince of Orange, crowned at last by the success of Balthasar Gerard, nor to his persistent efforts to poison the Queen of England; for the enunciation of all these murders or attempts at murder would require a repetition of the story which it has

been one of the main purposes of these volumes to recite.

For indeed it seems like mere railing to specify his crimes. Their very magnitude and unbroken continuity, together with their impunity, give them almost the appearance of inevitable phenomena. The horrible monotony of his career stupifies the mind until it is ready to accept the principle of evil as the fundamental law of the world.

His robberies, like his murders, were colossal. The vast system of confiscation set up in the Netherlands was sufficient to reduce unnumbered innocent families to beggary, although powerless to break the spirit of civil and religious liberty or to pay the expenses of subjugating a people. Not often in the world's history have so many thousand individuals been plundered by a foreign tyrant for no crime, save that they were rich enough to be worth robbing. For it can never be too often repeated that those confiscations and extortions were perpetrated upon Catholics as well as Protestants, monarchists as well as rebels; the possession of property making proof of orthodoxy or of loyalty well-nigh impossible.

Falsehood was the great basis of the king's character, which perhaps derives its chief importance, as a political and psychological study, from this very fact. It has been shown throughout the whole course of this history, by the evidence of his most secret correspondence, that he was false, most of all, to those to whom he gave what he called his heart. Granvelle, Alva, Don John, Alexander Farnese, all those, in short, who were deepest in his confidence experienced in succession his entire perfidy, while each in turn was sacrificed to his master's sleepless suspicion. The pope himself was often as much the dupe of the Catholic monarch's faithlessness as the vilest heretic had ever been. Could the great schoolmaster of iniquity for the sovereigns and politicians of the south

have lived to witness the practice of the monarch who had most laid to heart the precepts of the „Prince,” he would have felt that he had not written in vain, and that his great paragon of successful falsehood, Ferdinand of Aragon, had been surpassed by the great grandson. For the ideal perfection of perfidy, foreshadowed by the philosopher who died in the year of Philip's birth, was thoroughly embodied at last by this potentate. Certainly Nicholas Macchiavelli could have hoped for no more docile pupil. That all men are vile, that they are liars, scoundrels, poltroons, and idiots alike—ever ready to deceive and yet easily to be duped, and that he only is fit to be king who excels his kind in the arts of deception; 1 by this great maxim of the Florentine, Philip was ever guided. And those wellknown texts of hypocrisy, strewn by the same hand, had surely not fallen on stony ground when received into Philip's royal soul.

„Often it is necessary, in order to maintain power, to act contrary to faith, contrary to charity, contrary to humanity, contrary to religion. . . . A prince ought therefore to have great care that from his mouth nothing should

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1 „Perchè degli uomini si può dir questo generalmente che sieno ingrati, volubili, simulatori, fuggitori de' pericoli, cupidi di guadagno; e mentre fai lor bene sone tutti tuoi, ti offeriscono il sangue, la roba, la vita, ed i figli come di sopra dissi, quando il bene è discosto, ma quando ti si appressa si revoltano, e quel Principe che si è tutto fondato in su le parole loro, trovandosi nudo d'altri preparamenti rovina.” . . . „Non può un signor prudente ne debbe osservare la fede quando tale osservanzia gli torni contro e che sono spente le cagioni che la feciono promettere.

„E se gli uomini fossero tutti buoni questo precetto non saria buono, ma perchè son tristi e non l'osserverebbono a te, tu ancora non l'hai da osservare a loro . . . Ma e necessario questa natura (di volpe) saperla ben colorire ed essere gran simulatore e dissimulatore, e sono tanto semplici gli uomini e tanto obbediscono alle necessità presenti, che colui che inganna troverà sempre chi si lascerà ingannare.”—Il Principe, cap. xvii. xviii.

ever come that is not filled with those five qualities, and that to see and hear him he should appear all piety, all faith, all integrity, all humanity, all religion. And nothing is more necessary than to seem to have this last-mentioned quality . . . . . Every one sees what you seem, few perceive what you are." 1

Surely this hand-book of cant had been Philip's *vade mecum* through his life's pilgrimage.

It is at least a consolation to reflect that a career controlled by such principles came to an ignominious close. Had the mental capacity of this sovereign been equal to his criminal intent, even greater woe might have befallen the world. But his intellect was less than mediocre. His passion for the bureau, his slavery to routine, his puerile ambition personally to superintend details which could have been a thousand times better administered by subordinates, proclaimed every day the narrowness of his mind. His diligence in reading, writing, and commenting upon despatches may excite admiration only where there has been no opportunity of judging of his labours by personal inspection. Those familiar with the dreary displays of his penmanship must admit that such work could have been at least as well done by a copying clerk of average capacity. His ministers were men of respectable ability, but he imagined himself, as he advanced in life, far superior to any counsellor that he could possibly select, and was accustomed to consider himself the first statesman in the world.

His reign was a thorough and disgraceful failure. Its opening scene was the treaty of Câteau Cambresis, by which a triumph over France had been achieved for him by the able generals and statesmen of his father, so humiliating and complete as to make every

French soldier or politician gnash his teeth. Its conclusion was the treaty of Virvins with the same power, by which the tables were completely turned, and which was as utterly disgraceful to Spain as that of Câteau Cambresis had been to France. He had spent his life in fighting with the spirit of the age—that invincible power of which he had not the faintest conception—while the utter want of adaptation of his means to his ends often bordered, not on the ludicrous, but the insane.

He attempted to reduce the free Netherlands to slavery and to papacy. Before his death they had expanded into an independent republic, with a policy founded upon religious toleration and the rights of man. He had endeavoured all his life to exclude the Béarnese from his heritage and to place himself or his daughter on the vacant throne; before his death Henry IV. was the most powerful and popular sovereign that had ever reigned in France. He had sought to invade and to conquer England, and to dethrone and assassinate its queen. But the queen outwitted, outgeneralled, and outlived him: English soldiers and sailors, assisted by their Dutch comrades in arms, accomplished on the shores of Spain what the Invincible Armada had in vain essayed against England and Holland; while England, following thenceforth the opposite system to that of absolutism and the Inquisition, became, after centuries of struggles towards the right, the most powerful, prosperous, and enlightened kingdom in the world.

His exchequer, so full when he ascended the throne as to excite the awe of contemporary financiers, was reduced before his death to a net income of some four millions of dollars. His armies, which had been the wonder of the age in the earlier period of his reign for discipline, courage, and every quality on which military efficiency depends, were in his later years a horde of



starving, rebellious brigands, more formidable to their commanders than to the foe. Mutiny was the only organised military institution that was left in his dominions, while the Spanish Inquisition, which it was the fell purpose of his life from youth upwards to establish over the world, became a loathsome and impossible nuisance everywhere but in its natal soil.

If there be such a thing as historical evidence, then is Philip II. convicted before the tribunal of impartial posterity of every crime charged in his indictment. He lived seventy-one years and three months, he reigned forty-three years. He endured the martyrdom of his last illness with the heroism of a saint, and died in the certainty of immortal bliss as the reward of his life of evil.

## CHAPTER XXXVI.

**Commercial prospects of Holland—Travels of John Huygen van Linschoten—Their effect on the trade and prosperity of the Netherlands—Progress of nautical and geographical science—Maritime exploration—Fantastic notions respecting the polar regions—State of nautical science—First arctic expedition—Success of the voyagers—Failure of the second expedition—Third attempt to discover the north-east passage—Discovery of Spitzbergen—Scientific results of the voyage—Adventures in the frozen regions—Death of William Barendz—Return of the voyagers to Amsterdam—Southern expedition against the Spanish power—Disasters attendant upon it—Extent of Dutch discovery**

DURING a great portion of Philip's reign the Netherlands, despite their rebellion, had been permitted to trade with Spain. A spectacle had thus been presented of a vigorous traffic between two mighty belligerents, who derived from their intercourse with each other the means of more thoroughly carrying on their mutual hostilities. The war fed their commerce fed their war. The great maritime discoveries at the close of the fifteenth century had enured quite as much to the benefit of the Flemings and Hollanders as to that of the Spaniards and Portuguese, to whom they were originally due. Antwerp and subsequently Amsterdam had thriven on the great revolution of the Indian trade which Vasco de Gama's voyage around the Cape had effected. The nations of the Baltic and of farthest Ind now ex-

changed their products on a more extensive scale and with a wider sweep across the earth than when the mistress of the Adriatic alone held the keys of Asiatic commerce. The haughty but intelligent oligarchy of shopkeepers, which had grown so rich and attained so eminent a political position from its magnificent monopoly, already saw the sources of its grandeur drying up before its eyes, now that the world's trade—for the first time in human history—had become oceanic.

In Holland, long since denuded of forests, were great markets of timber, whither shipbuilders and architects came from all parts of the world to gather the utensils for their craft. There, too, where scarcely a pebble had been deposited in the course of the geological transformations of our planet, were great artificial quarries of granite, and marble, and basalt. Wheat was almost as rare a product of the soil as cinnamon, yet the granaries of Christendom, and the Oriental magazines of spices and drugs, were found chiefly on that barren spot of earth. There was the great international mart where the Osterling, the Turk, the Hindoo, the Atlantic and the Mediterranean traders stored their wares and negotiated their exchanges; while the curious and highly-prized products of Netherland skill—broadcloths, tapestries,

brocades, laces, substantial fustians, magnificent damasks, finest linens—increased the mass of visible wealth piled mountains high upon that extraordinary soil which produced nothing and teemed with everything

After the incorporation of Portugal with Spain, however, many obstacles were thrown in the way of the trade from the Netherlands to Lisbon and the Spanish ports. Loud and bitter were the railings uttered, as we know, by the English sovereign and her statesmen against the nefarious traffic which the Dutch republic persisted in carrying on with the common enemy. But it is very certain that although the Spanish armadas would have found it comparatively difficult to equip themselves without the tar and the timber, the cordage, the stores, and the biscuits furnished by the Hollanders, the rebellious commonwealth, if excluded from the world's commerce, in which it had learned to play so controlling a part, must have ceased to exist. For without foreign navigation the independent republic was an inconceivable idea. Not only would it have been incapable of continuing the struggle with the greatest monarch in the world, but it might as well have buried itself once and for ever beneath the waves from which it had scarcely emerged. Commerce and Holland were simply synonymous terms. Its morsel of territory was but the wharf to which the republic was occasionally moored; its home was in every ocean and over all the world. Nowhere had there ever existed before so large a proportion of population that was essentially maritime. They were born sailors—men and women alike—and numerous were the children who had never set foot on the shore. At the period now treated of the republic had three times as many ships and sailors as any one nation in the world. Compared with modern times, and especially with the gigantic commercial strides of the two

great Anglo-Saxon families, the statistics both of population and of maritime commerce in that famous and most vigorous epoch would seem sufficiently meagre. Yet there is no doubt that in the relative estimate of forces then in activity it would be difficult to exaggerate the naval power of the young commonwealth. When therefore, towards the close of Philip II.'s reign, it became necessary to renounce the carrying trade with Spain and Portugal, by which the communication with India and China was effected, or else to submit to the confiscation of Dutch ships in Spanish ports, and the confinement of Dutch sailors in the dungeons of the Inquisition, a more serious dilemma was presented to the statesmen of the Netherlands than they had ever been called upon to solve.

For the splendid fiction of the Spanish lake was still a formidable fact. Not only were the Portuguese and Spaniards almost the only direct traders to the distant East, but even had no obstacles been interposed by Government, the exclusive possession of information as to the course of trade, the pre-eminent practical knowledge acquired by long experience of that dangerous highway around the world at a time when oceanic navigation was still in its infancy, would have given a monopoly of the traffic to the descendants of the bold discoverers who first opened the great path to the world's commerce.

The Hollanders as a nation had never been engaged in the direct trade around the Cape of Good Hope. Fortunately however at this crisis in their commercial destiny there was a single Hollander who had thoroughly learned the lesson which it was so necessary that all his countrymen should now be taught. Few men of that period deserve a more kindly and more honourable remembrance by posterity for their contributions to science and the progress of civilization than John Huygen van Lin-

schoten, son of a plain burgher of West Friesland. Having always felt a strong impulse to study foreign history and distant nations and customs, he resolved at the early age of seventeen „to absent himself from his fatherland, and from the conversation of friends and relatives,” in order to gratify this inclination for self-improvement. After a residence of two years in Lisbon he departed for India in the suite of the Archbishop of Goa, and remained in the East for nearly thirteen years. Diligently examining all the strange phenomena which came under his observation and patiently according the results of his researches day by day and year by year, he amassed a fund of information which he modestly intended for the entertainment of his friends when he should return to his native country. It was his wish that „without stirring from their firesides or countinghouses” they might participate with him in the gratification and instruction to be derived from looking upon a world then so strange, and for Europeans still so new. He described the manners and customs, the laws, the religions, the social and political institutions, of the ancient races who dwelt in either peninsula of India. He studied the natural history, the botany, the geography of all the regions which he visited. Especially the products which formed the material of a great traffic; the system of culture, the means of transportation, and the course of commerce, were examined by him with minuteness, accuracy, and breadth of vision. He was neither a trader nor a sailor, but a man of letters, a scientific and professional traveller. But it was obvious when he returned, rich with the spoils of oriental study during thirteen years of life, that the results of his researches were worthy of a wider circulation than that which he had originally contemplated. His work was given to the public in the year 1596, and was studied

with avidity not only by men of science but by merchants and seafarers. He also added to the record of his Indian experiences a practical manual for navigators. He described the course of the voyage from Lisbon to the East, the currents, the tradewinds and monsoons, the harbours; the islands, the shoals, the sunken rocks and dangerous quicksands, and he accompanied his work with various maps and charts, both general and special, of land and water, rarely delineated before his day, as well as by various astronomical and mathematical calculations. Already a countryman of his own, Wagenaar of Zeeland, had laid the mariners of the world under special obligation by a manuel which came into such universal use that for centuries afterwards the sailors of England and of other countries called their indispensable vade-mecum a *Wagenaar*. But in that text-book but little information was afforded to eastern voyagers, because, before the enterprise of Linschoten, little was known of the Orient except to the Portuguese and Spaniards, by whom nothing was communicated.

The work of Linschoten was a source of wealth, both from the scientific treasures which it diffused among an active and intelligent people, and the impulse which it gave to that direct trade between the Netherlands and the East which had been so long deferred, and which now came to relieve the commerce of the republic, and therefore the republic itself, from the danger of positive annihilation.

It is not necessary for my purpose to describe in detail the series of voyages by way of the Cape of Good Hope which, beginning with the adventures of the brothers Houtman at this period, and with the circumnavigation of the world by Olivier van Noord, made the Dutch for a long time the leading Christian nation in those golden regions, and which carried the United Nether-



lands to the highest point of prosperity and power. The Spanish monopoly of the Indian and the Pacific Ocean was effectually disposed of, but the road was not a new road, nor did any striking discoveries at this immediate epoch illustrate the enterprise of Holland in the East. In the age just opening the homely names most dear to the young republic were to be inscribed on capes, islands, and promontories, seas, bays, and continents. There was soon to be a „Staten Island” both in the frozen circles of the northern and of the southern pole, as well as in that favoured region where now the mighty current of a world-wide commerce flows through the gates of that great metropolis of the western world, once called New Amsterdam. Those well-beloved words, Orange and Nassau, Maurice and William, intermingled with the names of many an ancient town and village, or with the simple patronymics of hardy navigators or honoured statesmen, were to make the vernacular of the new commonwealth a familiar sound in the remotest corners of the earth; while a fifth continent, discovered by the enterprise of Hollanders, was soon to be fitly baptized with the name of the fatherland. Posterity has been neither just nor grateful, and those early names which Dutch genius and enterprise wrote upon so many prominent points of the earth’s surface, then seen for the first time by European eyes, are no longer known.

The impulse given to the foreign trade of the Netherlands by the publication of Linschoten’s work was destined to be a lasting one. Meantime this most indefatigable and enterprising voyager—one of those men who had done nothing in his own estimation so long as aught remained to do—was deeply pondering the possibility of a shorter road to the opulent kingdoms of Cathay and of China than the one which the genius of De Gama had opened to his sovereigns.

Geography as a science was manifesting the highest activity at that period, but was still in a rudimentary state. To the Hollanders especially much of the progress already made by it was owing. The maps of the world by Mercator of Leyden, published on a large scale together with many astronomical and geographical charts, delineations of exploration, and other scientific works, at the magnificent printing establishment of William Blaeuw, in Amsterdam, the friend and pupil of Tycho Brahe, and the first in that line of typographers who made the name famous, constituted an epoch in cosmography. Another ardent student of geography lived in Amsterdam, Peter Plancius by name, a Calvinist preacher, and one of the most zealous and intolerant of his cloth. In an age and a country which had not yet thoroughly learned the lesson taught by hundreds of thousands of murders committed by an orthodox Church, he was one of those who considered the substitution of a new dogma and a new hierarchy, a new orthodoxy and a new church, in place of the old ones, a satisfactory result for fifty years of perpetual bloodshed. Neither Torquemada nor Peter Titelman could have more thoroughly abhorred a Jew or a Calvinist than Peter Plancius detested a Lutheran, or any other of the unclean tribe of remonstrants. That the intolerance of himself and his comrades was confined to fiery words, and was not manifested in the actual burning alive of the heterodox, was a mark of the advance made by the mass of mankind in despite of bigotry. It was at any rate a solace to those who believed in human progress, even in matters of conscience, that no other ecclesiastical establishment was ever likely to imitate the matchless machinery for the extermination of heretical vermin which the Church of Rome had found in the Spanish Inquisition. The blasts of denunciation from the pulpit of Plancius have long

since mingled with empty air and been forgotten, but his services in the cause of nautical enterprise and geographical science, which formed, as it were, a relaxation to what he deemed the more serious pursuits of theology, will endear his name for ever to the lovers of civilization.

Plancius and Dr. Francis Maalzoen—the enlightened pensionary of Enkhuizen—had studied long and earnestly the history and aspects of the oceanic trade, which had been unfolding itself then for a whole century, but was still comparatively new, while Barneveld, ever ready to assist in the advancement of science, and to foster that commerce which was the life of the commonwealth, was most favourably disposed towards projects of maritime exploration. For hitherto, although the Hollanders had been among the hardiest and the foremost in the art of navigation, they had contributed but little to actual discovery. A Genoese had led the way to America, while one Portuguese mariner had been the first to double the southern cape of Africa, and another, at the opposite side of the world, had opened what was then supposed the only passage through the vast continent which, according to ideas then prevalent, extended from the Southern Pole to Greenland, and from Java to Patagonia. But it was easier to follow in the wake of Columbus, Gama, or Magellan, than to strike out new pathways by the aid of scientific deduction and audacious enterprise. At a not distant day many errors, disseminated by the boldest of Portuguese navigators, were to be corrected by the splendid discoveries of sailors sent forth by the Dutch republic, and a rich harvest in consequence was to be reaped both by science and commerce. It is true, too, that the Netherlands claimed to have led the way to the great voyages of Columbus by their discovery of the Azores. Joshua van den Berg, a merchant of Bruges, it was vigorously maintained,

had landed in that archipelago in the year 1545. He had found there, however, no vestiges of the human race, save that upon the principal island, in the midst of the solitude, was seen—so ran the tale—a colossal statue of a man on horseback, wrapped in a cloak, holding the reins of his steed in his left hand, and solemnly extending his right arm to the west. This gigantic and solitary apparition on a rock in the ocean was supposed to indicate the existence of a new world, and the direction in which it was to be sought, but it is probable that the ship-wrecked Fleming was quite innocent of any such magnificent visions. The original designation of the Flemish Islands, derived from their first colonization by Netherlands, was changed to Azores by Portuguese mariners, amazed at the myriads of hawks which they found there. But if the Netherlands had never been able to make higher claims as discoverers than the accidental and dubious landing upon an unknown shore of a tempest-tost mariner, their position in the records of geographical exploration would not be so eminent as it certainly is.

Meantime the eyes of Linschoten, Plancius, Maalzoen, Barneveld, and of many other ardent philosophers and patriots, were turned anxiously towards the regions of the North Pole. Two centuries later—and still more recently in our own day and generation—what heart has not thrilled with sympathy and with pride at the story of the magnificent exploits, the heroism, the contempt of danger and of suffering which have characterized the great navigators whose names are so familiar to the world; especially the arctic explorers of England and of our own country? The true chivalry of an advanced epoch—recognising that there can be no sublimer vocation for men of action than to extend the boundary of human knowledge in the face of perils and obstacles more

formidable and more mysterious than those encountered by the knights of old in the cause of the Lord's sepulchre or the holy grail—they have thus embodied in a form which will ever awaken enthusiasm in imaginative natures, the loftiest impulses of our latter civilization. To win the favour of that noblest of mistresses, Science; to take authoritative possession, in her name, of the whole domain of humanity; to open new pathways to commerce; to elevate and enlarge the human intellect, and to multiply indefinitely the sum of human enjoyments; to bring the inhabitants of the earth into closer and more friendly communication, so that, after some yet unimagined inventions and discoveries, and after the lapse of many years, which in the sight of the Omnipotent are but as one day, the human race may from one pacific family, instead of being broken up, as are the most enlightened of peoples now, into warring tribes of internecine savages, prating of the advancement of civilization while coveting each other's possessions, intriguing against each other's interests, and thoroughly in earnest when cutting each other's throats; this is truly to be the pioneers of a possible civilization, compared to which our present culture may seem but a poor barbarism. If the triumphs and joys of the battle-field have been esteemed among the noblest themes for poet, painter, or chronicler, alike in the mists of antiquity and in the full glare of later days, surely a still more encouraging spectacle for those who believe in the world's progress is the exhibition of almost infinite valour, skill, and endurance in the cause of science and humanity.

It was believed by the Dutch cosmographers that some ten thousand miles of voyaging might be saved, could the passage to what were then called the kingdoms of Cathay be effected by way of the north. It must be remembered that there were no maps of the unknown

regions lying beyond the northern headlands of Sweden. Delineations of continents, islands, straits, rivers, and seas, over which every modern schoolboy pores, were not attempted even by the hand of fancy. It was perhaps easier at the end of the sixteenth century than it is now, to admit the possibility of a practical path to China and India across the pole; for delusions as to climate and geographical configuration then prevalent have long since been dispelled. While, therefore, at least as much heroism was required then as now to launch into those unknown seas, in hope to solve the dread mystery of the North, there was even a firmer hope than can ever be cherished again of deriving an immediate and tangible benefit from the enterprise. Plancius and Maalzoen, the States-General and Prince Maurice, were convinced that the true road to Cathay would be found by sailing north-east. Linschoten, the man who knew India and the beaten paths to India better than any other living Christian, was so firmly convinced of the truth of this theory, that he volunteered to take the lead in the first expedition. Many were the fantastic dreams in which even the wisest thinkers of the age indulged as to the polar regions. Four straits or channels, pierced by a magic hand, led; it was thought, from the interior of Muscovy towards the arctic seas. According to some speculators, however, those seas enclosed a polar continent where perpetual summer and unbroken daylight reigned, and whose inhabitants, having attained a high degree of culture, lived in the practice of every virtue and in the enjoyment of every blessing. Others peopled these mysterious regions with horrible savages, having hoofs of horses and heads of dogs, and with no clothing save their own long ears coiled closely around their limbs and bodies; while it was deemed almost certain that a race of headless men, with eyes in their breasts, were



the most enlightened among those distant tribes. Instead of constant sunshine, it was believed by such theorists that the wretched inhabitants of that accursed zone were immersed in almost incessant fogs or tempests, that the whole population died every winter and were only recalled to temporary existence by the advent of a tardy and evanescent spring. No doubt was felt that the voyager in those latitudes would have to encounter volcanoes of fire and mountains of ice, together with land and sea monsters more ferocious than the eye of man had ever beheld; but it was universally admitted that an opening, either by strait or sea, into the desired Indian haven would reveal itself at last.

The instruments of navigation too were but rude and defective compared to the beautiful machinery with which modern art and science now assist their votaries along the dangerous path of discovery. The small yet unwieldy, awkward, and to the modern mind, most grotesque vessels in which such audacious deeds were performed in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries awaken perpetual astonishment. A ship of a hundred tons burden; built up like a tower, both at stem and stern, and presenting in its broad bulbous prow, its width of beam in proportion to its length, its depression amidships, and in other sins against symmetry, as much opposition to progress over the waves as could well be imagined, was the vehicle in which those indomitable Dutchmen circumnavigated the globe and confronted the arctic terrors of either pole. An astrolabe—such as Martin Beheim had invented for the Portuguese, a clumsy astronomical ring of three feet in circumference—was still the chief machine used for ascertaining the latitude, and on shipboard a most defective one. There were no logarithms, no means of determining at sea the variations of the magnetic needle, no system of dead reckoning by throwing the log and

chronicling the courses traversed. The firearms with which the sailors were to do battle with the unknown enemies that might beset their path were rude and clumsy to handle. The art of compressing and condensing provisions was unknown. They had no tea nor coffee to refresh the nervous system in its terrible trials; but there was one deficiency which perhaps supplied the place of many positive luxuries. Those Hollanders drank no ardent spirits. They had beer and wine in reasonable quantities, but no mention is ever made in the journals of their famous voyages of any more potent liquor; and on this circumstance doubtless the absence of mutinous or disorderly demonstrations, under the most trying circumstances, may in a great degree be attributed.

Thus, these navigators were but slenderly provided with the appliances with which hazardous voyages have been smoothed by modern art; but they had iron hearts, faith in themselves, in their commanders, in their republic, and in the Omnipotent; perfect discipline and unbroken cheerfulness amid toil, suffering, and danger. No chapter of history utters a more beautiful homily on devotion to duty as the true guiding principle of human conduct than the artless narratives which have been preserved of many of these maritime enterprises. It is for these noble lessons that they deserve to be kept in perpetual memory.

And in no individual of that day were those excellent qualities more thoroughly embodied than in William Barendz, pilot and burgher of Amsterdam. It was partly under his charge that the first little expedition set forth on the 5th of June, 1594, towards those unknown arctic seas which no keel from Christendom had ever ploughed, and to those fabulous regions where the foot of civilized men had never trod. Maalzoen, Plancius, and Balthasar Moucheron, merchant of Middelburg, were the chief directors of the enterprise; but there

was a difference of opinion between them. The pensionary was firm in the faith that the true path to China would be found by steering through the passage which was known to exist between the land of Nova Zembla and the northern coasts of Muscovy, inhabited by the savage tribes called Samoyedes. It was believed that, after passing those straits, the shores of the great continent would be found to trend in a south-easterly direction, and that along that coast it would accordingly be easy to make the desired voyage to the eastern ports of China. Plancius on the contrary, indicated as the most promising passage the outside course, between the northern coast of Nova Zembla and the pole. Three ships and a fishing yacht were provided by the cities of Enkhuizen, Amsterdam, and by the province of Zeeland respectively. Linschoten was principal commissioner on board the Enkhuizen vessel, having with him an experienced mariner, Brandt Ysbrantz by name, as skipper. Barendz, with the Amsterdam ship and the yacht, soon parted company with the others, and steered, according to the counsels of Plancius and his own convictions, for the open seas of the north. And in that memorable summer, for the first time in the world's history, the whole desolate region of Nova Zembla was visited, investigated, and thoroughly mapped out. Barendz sailed as far as latitude 77°, and to the extreme north-eastern point of the island. In a tremendous storm off a cape, which he ironically christened Consolation-hook (*Troosthoek*), his ship, drifting under barepoles amid ice and mist and tempest, was nearly dashed to pieces; but he reached at last the cluster of barren islets beyond the utmost verge of Nova Zembla, to which he hastened to affix the cherished appellation of Orange. This, however, was the limit of his voyage. His ship was ill-provisioned, and the weather had been severe beyond

expectation. He turned back on the 1st of August, resolving to repeat his experiment early in the following year.

Meantime Linschoten, with the ships *Swan* and *Mercury*, had entered the passage which they called the Straits of Nassau, but which are now known to all the world as the Waigats. They were informed by the Samoyedes of the coast that, after penetrating the narrow channel, they would find themselves in a broad and open sea. Subsequent discoveries showed the correctness of the statement, but it was not permitted to the adventurers on this occasion to proceed so far. The strait was already filled with ice-drift, and their vessels were brought to a standstill, after about a hundred and fifty English miles of progress beyond the Waigats; for the whole sea of Tartary, converted into a mass of ice-mountains and islands, and lashed into violent agitation by a north-easterly storm, seemed driving down upon the doomed voyagers. It was obvious that the sunny clime of Cathay was not thus to be reached, at least upon that occasion. With difficulty they succeeded in extricating themselves from the dangers surrounding them, and emerged at last from the Waigats.

On the 15th of August, in latitude 69° 15', they met the ship of Barendz and returned in company to Holland, reaching Amsterdam on the 16th of September. Barendz had found the seas and coasts visited by him destitute of human inhabitants, but swarming with polar bears, with seals, with a terrible kind of monsters, then seen for the first time, as large as oxen, with almost human faces and with two long tusks protruding from each grim and grotesque visage. These mighty beasts, subsequently known as walruses or sea-horses, were found sometimes in swarms of two hundred at a time, basking in the arctic sun, and seemed equally at home on land, in the sea, and on icebergs. When aware of the approach of

their human visitors, they would slide off an iceblock into the water, holding their cubs in their arms, and ducking up and down in the sea as if in sport. Then tossing the young ones away, they would rush upon the boats and endeavour to sink the strangers, whom they instinctively recognised as their natural enemies. Many were the severe combats recorded by the diarist of that voyage of Barendz with the walruses and the bears.

The chief result of this first expedition was the geographical investigation made, and, with unquestionable right, these earliest arctic pilgrims bestowed the names of their choice upon the regions first visited by themselves. According to the unfailing and universal impulse on such occasions, the names dear to the fatherland were naturally selected. The straits were called Nassau, the island at its mouth became States or Staten Island; the northern coast of Tartary received the familiar appellations of New Holland, New Friesland, New Walcheren; while the two rivers, beyond which Linschoten did not advance, were designated Swan and Mercury respectively, after his two ships. Barendz, on his part, had duly baptized every creek, bay, islet, and headland of Nova Zembla, and assuredly Christian mariner had never taken the latitude of  $77^{\circ}$  before. Yet the antiquary, who compares the maps soon afterwards published by William Blaeuw with the charts now in familiar use, will observe with indignation the injustice with which the early geographical records have been defaced, and the names rightfully bestowed upon those terrible deserts by their earliest discoverers rudely torn away. The islands of Orange can still be recognized, and this is almost the only vestige left of the whole nomenclature. But where are Cape Nassau, William's Island, Admiralty Island, Cape Plancius, Black-hook, Crosshook, Bear's-hook, Ice-hook, Consolation-hook; Cape

Desire, the Straits of Nassau, Maurice Island, Staten Island, Enkhuizen Island, and many other similar appellations?

The sanguine Linschoten, on his return, gave so glowing an account of the expedition that Prince Maurice and Olden-Barneveld, and prominent members of the States-General, were infected with his enthusiasm. He considered the north-east passage to China discovered and the problem solved. It would only be necessary to fit out another expedition on a larger scale the next year, provide it with a cargo or merchandize suitable for the China market, and initiate the direct polar-oriental trade without further delay. It seems amazing that so incomplete an attempt to overcome such formidable obstacles should have been considered a decided success. Yet there is no doubt of the genuineness of the conviction by which Linschoten was actuated. The calmer Barendz, and his friend and comrade Gerrit de Veer, were of opinion that the philosopher had made „rather a free representation” of the enterprise of 1594 and of the prospects for the future.

Nevertheless, the general Government, acting on Linschoten's suggestion, furnished a fleet of seven ships: two from Enkhuizen, two from Zeeland, two from Amsterdam, and a yacht which was to be despatched homeward with the news, so soon as the expedition should have passed through the straits of Nassau, forced its way through the frozen gulf of Tartary, doubled Cape Tabin, and turned southward on its direct course to China. The sublime credulity which accepted Linschoten's hasty solution of the polar enigma as conclusive was fairly matched by the sedateness with which the authorities made the preparations for the new voyage. So deliberately were the broadcloths, linens, tapestries, and other assorted articles for this first great speculation to Cathay, *via* the North Pole, stowed on board the fleet, that



nearly half the summer had passed before anchor was weighed in the Meuse. The pompous expedition was thus predestined to an almost ridiculous failure. Yet it was in the hands of great men, both on shore and sea. Maurice, Barneveld, and Maalzoom had personally interested themselves in the details of its outfitting, Linschoten sailed as chief commissioner, the calm and intrepid Barendz was upper pilot of the whole fleet, and a man who was afterwards destined to achieve an immortal name in the naval history of his country, Jacob Heemskerck, was supercargo of the Amsterdam ship. In obedience to the plans of Linschoten and of Maalzoom, the passage by way of the Waigats was of course attempted. A landing was effected on the coast of Tartary. Whatever geographical information could be obtained from such a source, was imparted by the wandering Samoyedes. On the 2nd of September a party went ashore on Staten Island and occupied themselves in gathering some glistening pebbles with much gravity as a „kind of diamonds, very plentiful upon the island.” While two of the men were thus especially engaged in a deep hollow, one of them found himself suddenly twitched from behind. „What are you pulling at me for, mate?” he said impatiently to his comrade as he supposed. But his companion was a large, long, lean, white bear, and in another instant the head of the unfortunate diamond-gatherer was off and the bear was sucking his blood. The other man escaped to his friends, and together a party of twenty charged upon the beast. Another of the combatants was killed and half devoured by the hungry monster before a fortunate bullet struck him in the head. But even then the bear maintained his grip upon his two victims, and it was not until his brains were fairly beaten out with the butt—end of a snaphance by the boldest of the party that they were enabled to secure the

bodies of their comrades and give them a hurried kind of Christian burial. They flayed the bear and took away his hide with them, and this, together with an ample supply of the diamonds of Staten Island, was the only merchandise obtained upon the voyage for which such magnificent preparations had been made. For, by the middle of September, it had become obviously hopeless to attempt the passage of the frozen sea that season, and the expedition returned, having accomplished nothing. It reached Amsterdam upon the 18th of November, 1595.

The authorities, intensely disappointed at this almost ridiculous result, refused to furnish direct assistance to any farther attempts at arctic explorations. The States-General however offered a reward of twenty-five thousand florins to any navigators who might succeed in discovering the northern passage, with a proportionate sum to those whose efforts in that direction might be deemed commendable, even if not crowned with success.

Stimulated by the spirit of adventure and the love of science far more than by the hope of gaining a pecuniary prize, the undaunted Barendz, who was firm in the faith that a pathway existed by the north of Nova Zembla and across the pole to farthest Ind, determined to renew the attempt the following summer.

The city of Amsterdam accordingly, early in the year 1596, fitted out two ships. Select crews of entirely unmarried men volunteered for the enterprise. John Cornelisz van der Ryp, an experienced sea-captain, was placed in charge of one of the vessels, William Barends was upper pilot of the other, and Heemskerck, „the man who ever steered his way through ice or iron,”<sup>1</sup> was skipper and supercargo.

The ships sailed from the Vlie on the 18th May. The opinions of Peter

<sup>1</sup> Inscription on his tombstone.

Plancius prevailed in this expedition at last; the main object of both Ryp and Barendz being to avoid the fatal, narrow, ice-clogged Waigats. Although identical in this determination, their views as to the configuration of the land and sea, and as to the proper course to be steered, were conflicting. They however sailed in company mainly in a N.E. by N. direction, although Barendz would have steered much more to the east.

On the 5th June the watch on deck saw, as they supposed, immense flocks of white swans swimming towards the ships, and covering the sea as far as the eye could reach. All hands came up to look at the amazing spectacle, but the more experienced soon perceived that the myriads of swans were simply infinite fields of ice, through which however they were able to steer their course without much impediment, getting into clear sea beyond about midnight, at which hour the sun was one degree above the horizon.

Proceeding northwards two days more they were again surrounded by ice, and, finding the „water green as grass, they believed themselves to be near Greenland.” On the 9th June they discovered an island in latitude, according to their observation,  $74^{\circ} 30'$ , which seemed about five miles long. In this neighbourhood they remained four days, having on one occasion a „great fight which lasted four glasses” with a polar bear, and making a desperate attempt to capture him in order to bring him as a show to Holland. The effort not being successful, they were obliged to take his life to save their own; but in what manner they intended, had they secured him alive, to provide for such a passenger in the long voyage across the North Pole to China, and thence back to Amsterdam, did not appear. The attempt illustrated the calmness, however, of those hardy navigators. They left the island on the 13th June, having baptised it Bear Island in memory of

their vanquished foe, a name which was subsequently exchanged for the insipid appellation of Cherry Island, in honour of a comfortable London merchant who seven years afterwards sent a ship to those arctic regions.

Six days later they saw land again, took the sun, and found their latitude

21 June,  $80^{\circ} 11'$ . Certainly no men 1596. had ever been within less

than ten degrees of the pole before. On the longest day of the year they landed on this newly discovered country, which they at first fancied to be a part of Greenland. They found its surface covered with eternal snow, broken into mighty glaciers, jagged with precipitous ice-peaks; and to this land of almost perpetual winter, where the mercury freezes during ten months in the year, and where the sun remains four months beneath the horizon, they subsequently gave the appropriate and vernacular name of Spitzbergen. Combats with the sole denizens of these hideous abodes, the polar bears, on the floating ice, on the water, or on land, were constantly occurring, and were the only events to disturb the monotony of that perpetual icy sunshine, where no night came to relieve the almost maddening glare. They rowed up a wide inlet on the western coast, and came upon great numbers of wild geese sitting on their eggs. They proved to be the same geese that were in the habit of visiting Holland in vast flocks every summer, and it had never before been discovered where they laid and hatched their eggs. „Therefore,” says the diarist of the expedition, „some voyagers have not scrupled to state that the eggs grow on trees in Scotland, and that such of the fruits of those trees as fall into the water become goslings, while those which drop on the ground burst in pieces and come to nothing. We now see that quite the contrary is the case,” continues De Veer, with perfect seriousness, „nor is it to be wondered at, for nobody has ever

been until now where those birds lay their eggs. No man, so far as known, ever reached the latitude of eighty degrees before. This land was hitherto unknown."

The scientific results of this ever-memorable voyage might be deemed sufficiently meagre were the fact that the eggs of wild geese did not grow on trees its only recorded discovery. But the investigations made into the dread mysteries of the north, and the actual problems solved, were many, while the simplicity of the narrator marks the infantine character of the epoch in regard to natural history. When so illustrious a mind as Grotius was inclined to believe in a race of arctic men whose heads grew beneath their shoulders, the ingenuous mariner of Amsterdam may be forgiven for his earnestness in combating the popular theory concerning goslings.

On the 23rd June they went ashore again, and occupied themselves, as well as the constant attacks of the bears would permit, in observing the variation of the needle, which they ascertained to be sixteen degrees. On the same day, the ice closing around in almost infinite masses, they made haste to extricate themselves from the land and bore southwards again, making Bear Island once more on the 1st July. Here Cornelius Ryp parted company with Heemskerk and Barendz, having announced his intention to sail northward again beyond latitude 80° in search of the coveted passage. Barendz, retaining his opinion that the true inlet to the circumpolar sea, if it existed, would be found N.E. of Nova Zembla, steered in that direction. On the 13th July they found themselves by observation in latitude 73°, and considered themselves in the neighbourhood of Sir Hugh Willoughby's land. Four days later they were in Lomms' Bay, a harbour of Nova Zembla, so called by them from the multitude of lomms frequenting it, a bird to which

they gave the whimsical name of arctic parrots. On the 20th July the ice obstructed their voyage, covering the sea in all directions with floating mountains and valleys, so that they came to an anchor off an islet where on a former voyage the Hollanders had erected the precious emblem of Christian faith, and baptised the dreary solitude Cross Island. But these pilgrims, as they now approached the spot, found no worshippers there, while, as if in horrible mockery of their piety, two enormous white bears had reared themselves in an erect posture, in order the better to survey their visitors, directly at the foot of the cross. The party which had just landed were unarmed, and were for making off as fast as possible to their boats. But Skipper Heemskerk, feeling that this would be death to all of them, said simply, „The first man that runs shall have this boat-hook off mine if he hides. Let us remain together and face them off." It was done. The party moved slowly towards their boats, Heemskerk bringing up the rear, and fairly staring the polar monsters out of countenance, who remained grimly regarding them, and ramping about the cross.

The sailors got into their boat with much deliberation, and escaped to the ship, „glad enough," said De Veer, „that they were alive to tell the story, and that they had got out of the cat-dance so fortunately."

Next day they took the sun, and found their latitude 76° 15', and the variation of the needle 21 July. twenty-six degrees.

For seventeen days more they were tossing about in mist and raging snow-storms, and amidst tremendous icebergs, some of them rising in steeples and pinnacles to a hundred feet above the sea; some grounded and stationary, others drifting fearfully around in all directions, threatening to crush them at any moment, or to close in about them and imprison them for ever. They



made fast by their bower anchor on the evening of 7th August to a vast iceberg which was aground, but just as they had eaten their supper there was a horrible groaning, bursting, and shrieking all around them, an indefinite succession of awful sounds which made their hair stand on end, and then the iceberg split beneath the water into more than four hundred pieces with a crash „such as no words could describe.” They escaped any serious damage, and made their way to a vast steeped and towered block like a floating cathedral, where they again came to anchor.

On the 15th August they reached the isles of Orange, on the extreme north-eastern verge of Nova Zembla. Here a party going ashore climbed to the top of a rising ground, and to their infinite delight beheld an open sea, entirely free from ice, stretching to the S.E. and E.S.E. as far as eye could reach. At last the game was won; the passage to Cathay was discovered. Full of joy, they pulled back in their boat to the ship, „not knowing how to get there quick enough to tell William Barendz.” Alas! they were not aware of the action of that mighty ocean river, the Gulf-stream, which was sweeping around those regions with its warm dissolving current.

Three days later they returned baffled in their sanguine efforts to sail through the open sea. The ice had returned upon them, setting southwardly in obedience to the same impulse which for a moment had driven it away, and they found themselves imprisoned again near the „Hook of Desire.”

On the 25th August they had given up all the high hopes by which they had been so lately inspired, and, as the stream was again driving the ice from the land, they trusted to sail southward and westward back towards the Waigats. Having pass-

ed by Nova Zembla, and found no opening into the seas beyond, they were disposed in the rapidly waning summer to effect their retreat by the south side of the island, and so through the Straits of Nassau home. In vain. The catastrophe was upon them. As they struggled slowly past the „Ice-haven,” the floating mountains and glaciers, impelled by the mighty current, once more gathered around and forced them back to that horrible harbour. During the remaining days of August the ship struggled, almost like a living creature, with the perils that beset her; now rearing in the air, her bows propped upon mighty blocks, till she absolutely sat erect upon her stern, now lying prostrate on her side, and anon righting again as the ice-masses would for a moment float away and leave her breathing space and room to move in. A blinding snow-storm was raging the while, the ice was cracking and groaning in all directions, and the ship was shrieking, so that the medley of awful sights and sounds was beyond the power of language. „’Twas enough to make the hair stand on end,” said Gerrit de Veer, „to witness the hideous spectacle.”

But the agony was soon over. By the 1st September the ship was hard and fast. The ice was as immovable as the dry land, and she would not move again that year, even if she ever floated. Those pilgrims from the little republic were to spend the winter in their arctic harbour. Resigning themselves without a murmur to their inevitable fate, they set about their arrangements with perfect good humour and discipline. Most fortunately a great quantity of drift wood, masses of timber, and great trees torn away with their roots from distant shores, lay strewn along the coast, swept thither by the wandering currents. At once they resolved to build a house in which they might shelter themselves from the wild beasts, and from their still more cruel

enemy the cold. So, thanking God for the providential and unexpected supply of building material and fuel, they lost no time in making sheds, in hauling timber, and in dragging supplies from the ship before the dayless winter should descend upon them.

Six weeks of steady cheerful labour

1 Sept. to succeeded. Tremendous snow-

12 Oct. storms, accompanied by hurricanes of wind, often filled the atmosphere to suffocation, so that no human being could move a ship's length without perishing; while, did any of their number venture forth, as the tempest subsided, it was often to find himself almost in the arms of a polar bear before the dangerous snow-white form could be distinguished moving sluggishly through the white chaos.

For those hungry companions never left them so long as the sun remained above the horizon, swarming like insects and birds in tropical lands. When the sailors put their meat-tubs for a moment out upon the ice a bear's intrusive muzzle would forthwith be inserted to inspect the contents. Maddened by hunger, and their keen scent excited by the salted provisions and by the living flesh and blood of these intruders upon their ancient solitary domains, they would often attempt to effect their entrance into the ship.

On one such occasion, when Heemskerck and two companions were the whole garrison, the rest being at a distance sledding wood, the future hero of Gibraltar was near furnishing a meal to his Nova Zembla enemies. It was only by tossing sticks and stones and marling-spikes across the ice, which the bears would instantly turn and pursue, like dogs at play with children, that the assault could be diverted until a fortunate shot was made.

Several were thus killed in the course of the winter, and one in particular was disembowelled and set frozen upon his legs near their house, where he

remained month after month with a mass of snow and ice accumulated upon him, until he had grown into a fantastic and gigantic apparition, still wearing the semblance of their mortal foe.

By the beginning of October the weather became so intensely cold that it was almost impossible to work. The carpenter died before the house was half completed. To dig a grave was impossible, but they laid him in a cleft of the ice, and he was soon covered with the snow. Meantime the sixteen that were left went on as they best might with their task, and on October 2nd they had a house-raising. The framework was set up, and, in order to comply with the national usage in such cases, they planted, instead of the May-pole with its fluttering streamers, a gigantic icicle before their new residence. Ten days later they moved into the house and slept there for the first time, while a bear, 12 Oct  
profiting by their absence, passed the night in the deserted ship.

On the 4th November the sun rose no more, but the moon at first shone day and night, until they were once in great perplexity to know whether it were midday or midnight. It proved to be exactly noon. The bears disappeared with the sun, but white foxes swarmed in their stead, and all day and night were heard scrambling over their roof. These were caught daily in traps and furnished them food, besides furs for raiment. The cold became appalling, and they looked in each other's faces sometimes in speechless amazement. It was obvious that the extreme limit of human endurance had been reached. Their clothes were frozen stiff. Their shoes were like iron, so that they were obliged to array themselves from head to foot in the skins of the wild foxes. The clocks stopped. The beer became solid. The Spanish wine froze, and had to be melted in saucepans. The smoke in the house blinded them. Fire did

not warm them, and their garments were often in a blaze while their bodies were half frozen. All through the month of December an almost perpetual snow-deluge fell from the clouds. For days together they were unable to emerge, and it was then only by most vigorous labour that they could succeed in digging a passage out of their buried house. On the night of the 7th December sudden death had nearly put an end to the sufferings of the whole party. Having brought a quantity of seacoal from the ship, they had made a great fire, and after the smoke was exhausted, they had stopped up the chimney and every crevice of the house. Each man then turned into his bunk for the night, „all rejoicing much in the warmth and prattling a long time with each other.” At last an unaccustomed giddiness and faintness came over them, of which they could not guess the cause, but fortunately one of the party had the instinct, before he lost consciousness, to open the chimney, while another forced open the door and fell in a swoon upon the snow. Their dread enemy thus came to their relief, and saved their lives.

As the year drew to a close, the frost and the perpetual snow-tempest became, if that were possible, still more frightful. Their Christmas was not a merry one, and for the first few days of the new year, it was impossible for them to move from the house. On the 25th January, the snow-storms having somewhat abated, they once more dug themselves as it were out of their living grave, and spent the whole day in hauling wood from the shore. As their hour-glasses informed them that night was approaching, they bethought themselves that it was Twelfth Night, or Three Kings' Eve. So they all respectfully proposed to Skipper Heemskerck, that, in the midst of their sorrow, they might for once have a little diversion. A twelfth-night feast was forthwith ordained. A scanty portion of the wine

yet remaining to them was produced. Two pounds weight of flour, which they had brought to make paste with for cartridges, was baked into pancakes with a little oil, and a single hard biscuit was served out to each man to be sopped in his meagre allowance of wine. „We were as happy,” says Gerrit de Veer, with simple pathos, „as if we were having a splendid banquet at home. We imagined ourselves in the fatherland with all our friends, so much did we enjoy our repast.”

That nothing might be omitted, lots were drawn for king, and the choice fell on the gunner, who was forthwith proclaimed monarch of Nova Zembla. Certainly no men could have exhibited more undaunted cheerfulness amid bears and foxes, icebergs and cold—such as Christians had never conceived of before—than did those early arctic pilgrims. Nor did Barendz neglect any opportunity of studying the heavens. A meridian was drawn near the house, on which the compass was placed, and observations of various stars were constantly made, despite the cold, with extraordinary minuteness. The latitude, from concurrent measurement of the Giant, the Bull, Orion, Aldebaran, and other constellations—in the absence of the sun—was ascertained to be a little above seventy-six degrees, and the variations of the needle were accurately noted.

On the 24th January it was clear weather and comparatively mild, so that Heemskerck, with de Veer and another, walked to the strand. To their infinite delight and surprise they again saw the disk of the sun on the edge of the horizon, and they all hastened back with the glad tidings. But Barendz shook his head. Many days must elapse, he said, before the declination of the sun should be once more  $14^{\circ}$ , at which point in the latitude of  $76^{\circ}$  they had lost sight of the luminary on the 4th November, and at which only it could again be visible. This, according to his



calculations, would be on the 10th February. Two days of mirky and stormy atmosphere succeeded, and those who had wagered in support of the opinion of Barendz were inclined to triumph over those who believed in the observation of Heemskerck. On the 17th January there was, however, no mistake. The sky was bright, and the whole disk of the sun was most distinctly seen by all, although none were able to explain the phenomenon, and Barendz least of all. They had kept accurate diaries ever since their imprisonment, and although the clocks sometimes had stopped, the hour-glasses had regularly noted the lapse of time. Moreover, Barendz knew from the Ephemerides for 1589 to 1600, published by Dr. Joseph Scala in Venice, a copy of which work he had brought with him, that on the 24th January, 1597, the moon would be seen at one o'clock A.M. at Venice, in conjunction with Jupiter. He accordingly took as good an observation as could be done with the naked eye, and found that conjunction at six o'clock A.M. of the same day, the two bodies appearing in the same vertical line in the sign of Taurus. The date was thus satisfactorily established, and a calculation of the longitude of the house was deduced with an accuracy which in those circumstances was certainly commendable. Nevertheless, as the facts and the theory of refraction were not thoroughly understood, nor Tycho Brahe's tables of refraction generally known, pilot Barendz could not be expected to be wiser than his generation.

The startling discovery that in the latitude of  $76^{\circ}$  the sun re-appeared on the 24th January, instead of the 10th February, was destined to awaken commotion throughout the whole scientific world, and has perhaps hardly yet been completely explained.

But the daylight brought no mitigation of their sufferings. The merciless cold continued without abatement, and

the sun seemed to mock their misery. The foxes disappeared, and the ice-bears in their stead swarmed around the house, and clambered at night over the roof. Again they constantly fought with them for their lives. Daily the grave question was renewed whether the men should feed on the bears or the bears on the men. On one occasion their dead enemy proved more dangerous to them than in life, for three of their number, who had fed on bear's liver, were nearly poisoned to death. Had they perished, none of the whole party would have ever left Nova Zembla. „It seemed,” said the diarist, „that the beasts had smelt out that we meant to go away, and had just begun to have a taste for us.”

And thus the days wore on. The hour-glass and the almanac told them that winter had given place to spring, but nature still lay in cold obstruction. One of their number, who had long been ill, died. They hollowed a grave for him in the frozen snow, performing a rude burial service, and singing a psalm; but the cold had nearly made them all corpses before the ceremony was done.

At last, on the 17th April, some of them climbing over the icebergs to the shore found much open sea. They also saw a small bird diving in the water, and looked upon it as a halcyon and harbinger of better fortunes. The open weather continuing, they began to hanker for the fatherland. So they brought the matter, „not mutinously but modestly and reasonably, before William Barendz, that he might suggest it to Heemskerck, for they were all willing to submit to his better judgment.” It was determined to wait through the month of May. Should they then be obliged to abandon the ship they were to make the voyage in the two open boats, which had been carefully stowed away beneath the snow. It was soon obvious that the ship was hard and fast, and that she would never float again, except

perhaps as a portion of the icebergs in which she had so long been imbedded, when they should be swept of from the shore.

As they now set to work repairing and making ready the frail skiffs which were now their only hope, and supplying them with provisions and even with merchandize from the ship, the ravages made by the terrible winter upon the strength of the men became painfully apparent. But Heemskerk encouraged them to persevere; „for,” said he, „if the boats are not got soon under way we must be content to make our graves here as burghers of Nova Zembla.”

On the 14th June they launched the boats, and „trusting themselves to God,” embarked once more upon the arctic sea. Barendz, who was too ill to walk, together with Claas Anderson, also sick unto death, were dragged to the strand on sleds, and tenderly placed on board.

Barendz had, however, despite his illness, drawn up a triple record of their voyage; one copy being fastened to the chimney of their deserted house, and one being placed in each of the boats. Their voyage was full of danger as they slowly retraced their way along the track by which they reached the memorable Ice Haven, once more doubting the Cape of Desire, and heading for the Point of Consolation—landmarks on their desolate progress, whose nomenclature suggests the immortal apologue so familiar to Anglo-Saxon ears.

Off the Ice-hook, both boats came alongside each other, and Skipper

Heemskerk called out to William Barendz to ask how it was with him.

„All right, mate,” replied Barendz, cheerfully; „I hope to be on my legs again before we reach the Wardhuis.” Then he begged De Veer to lift him up, that he might look upon the Ice-hook once more. The icebergs crowded around them, drifting this way and that, impelled by mighty currents and tossing

on an agitated sea. There was „a hideous groaning and bursting and driving of the ice, and it seemed every moment as if the boats were to be dashed into a hundred pieces.” It was plain that their voyage would now be finished for ever, were it not possible for some one of their number to get upon the solid ice beyond and make fast a line. „But who is to bell the cat?” said Gerrit de Veer, who soon, however, volunteered himself, being the lightest of all. Leaping from one floating block to another at the imminent risk of being swept off into space, he at last reached a stationary island, and fastened his rope. Thus they warped themselves once more into the open sea.

On the 20th June, William Barends 20 June, lay in the boat studying carefully 1597. fully the charts which they had made of the land and ocean discovered in their voyage. Tossing about in an open skiff upon a polar sea, too weak to sit upright, reduced by the unexampled sufferings of that horrible winter almost to a shadow, he still preserved his cheerfulness, and maintained that he would yet, with God’s help, perform his destined task. In his next attempt he would steer north-east from the North Cape, he said, and so discover the passage.

While he was „thus prattling,” the boatswain of the other boat came on board, and said that Claas Anderson would hold out but little longer.

„Then,” said William Barendz, „methinks I too shall last but a little while. Gerrit, give me to drink.” When he had drunk, he turned his eyes on De Veer and suddenly breathed his last.

Great was the dismay of his companions, for they had been deceived by the dauntless energy of the man, thus holding tenaciously to his great purpose, unbaffled by danger and disappointment, even to the last instant of life. He was their chief pilot and guide, „in whom next to God they trusted.”

And thus the hero, who for vivid intelligence, courage, and perseverance amid every obstacle, is fit to be classed among the noblest of maritime adventurers, had ended his career. Nor was it unmeet that the man who had led those three great although unsuccessful enterprises towards the North Pole, should be laid at last to rest—like the soldier dying in a lost battle—upon the field of his glorious labours.

Nearly six weeks longer they struggled amid tempestuous seas. Hugging the shore, ever in danger of being dashed to atoms by the ice, pursued by their never failing enemies the bears, and

often sailing through enormous  
28 July. herds of walruses, which at times gave chase to the boats, they at last reached the Schanshoek on the 28th July.

Here they met with some Russian fishermen, who recognised Heemskerk and De Veer, having seen them on their previous voyage. Most refreshing it was to see other human faces again, after thirteen months' separation from mankind, while the honest Muscovites expressed compassion for the forlorn and emaciated condition of their former acquaintance. Furnished by them with food and wine, the Hollanders sailed in company with the Russians as far as the Waigats.

On the 18th August they made Can- denoes, at the mouth of the White Sea, and doubling that cape stood boldly across the gulf for Kildin. Landing on the coast they were informed by the Laps that there were vessels from Holland at Kola.

On the 25th August one of the party, guided by a Lap, set forth  
on foot for that place. Four 25 Aug. days later the guide was seen returning without their comrade; but their natural suspicion was at once disarmed as the good-humoured savage straightway produced a letter which he handed to Heemskerk.

Breaking the seal, the skipper found that his correspondent expressed great surprise at the arrival of the voyagers as he had supposed them all to be long since dead. Therefore he was the more delighted with their coming, and promised to be with them soon, bringing with him plenty of food and drink.

The letter was signed—

„By me, JAN CORNELISZ RYP.”

The occurrence was certainly dramatic, but, as one might think, sufficiently void of mystery. Yet, astounding to relate, they all fell to pondering who this John Ryp might be who seemed so friendly and sympathetic. It was shrewdly suggested by some that it might perhaps be the sea-captain who had parted company with them off Bear Island fourteen months before in order to sail north by way of Spitzbergen. As his christian name and surname were signed in full to the letter, the conception did not seem entirely unnatural, yet it was rejected on the ground that they had far more reasons to believe that he had perished than he for accepting their deaths as certain. One might imagine it to have been an every day occurrence for Hollanders to receive letters by a Lapland penny postman in those desolate regions. At last Heemskerk bethought himself that among his papers were several letters from their old comrade, and, on comparison, the handwriting was found the same as that of the epistle just received. This deliberate avoidance of any hasty jumping at conclusions certainly inspires confidence in the general accuracy of the adventurers, and we have the better right to believe that on the 24th January the sun's disk was really seen by them in the ice-harbour—a fact long disputed by the learned world—when the careful weighing of evidence on the less important matter of Ryp's letter is taken into account.

Meantime while they were slowly ad-



hitting the identity of their friend and correspondent, honest John Cornelius typ himself arrived—no fantastic fly-way Hollander, but in full flesh and blood, laden with provisions, and greeting them heartily.

He had not pursued his Spitzbergen researches of the previous year, but he was now on a trading voyage in a stout vessel, and he conveyed them all by way of the Ward-huis, where he took on a cargo, back to the fatherland.

They dropped anchor in the Meuse on the 29th October, and on the 1st November arrived at Amsterdam. Here, attired in their robes and caps of white ox-skin which they had worn while citizens of Nova Zembla, they were straightway brought before the magistrates to give an account of their adventures.

They had been absent seventeen months, they had spent a whole autumn, winter, and spring—nearly ten months—under the latitude of  $76^{\circ}$  in a frozen desert, where no human beings had ever dwelt before, and they had penetrated beyond  $80^{\circ}$  north—a farther stride towards the pole than had ever been hazarded. They had made accurate geographical, astronomical, and meteorological observations of the regions visited. They had carefully measured latitudes and longitudes and noted the variations of the magnet. They had thoroughly mapped out, described, and designated every cape, island, hook, and inlet of those undiscovered countries, and more than all, they had given a living example of courage, endurance, patience under hardship, perfect discipline, fidelity to duty, and trust in God, sufficient to inspire noble natures with emulation so long as history can read moral lessons from mankind.

No farther attempt was made to discover the north-eastern passage. The enthusiasm of Barendz had died with him, and it may be said that the stern negation by which this supreme attempt to solve the mystery of the pole was

met was its best practical result. Certainly all visions of a circumpolar sea blessed with a gentle atmosphere and eternal tranquillity, and offering a smooth and easy passage for the world's commerce between Europe and Asia, had been for ever dispelled.

The memorable enterprise of Barendz and Heemskerk has been thought worthy of a minute description because it was a voyage of discovery, and because, however barren of immediate practical results it may seem to superficial eyes, it forms a great landmark in the history of human progress and the advancement of science.

Contemporaneously with these voyages towards the North Pole, the enlightened magistrates of the Netherland municipalities, aided by eminent private citizens, fitted out expeditions in the opposite direction. It was determined to measure strength with the lord of the land and seas, the great potentate against whom these republicans had been so long in rebellion, in every known region of the globe. Both from the newly discovered western world, and from the ancient abodes of oriental civilization, Spanish monopoly had long been furnishing the treasure to support Spanish tyranny, and it was the dearest object of Netherland ambition to confront their enemy in both those regions, and to clip both those overshadowing wings of his commerce at once.

The intelligence, enthusiasm, and tenacity in wrestling against immense obstacles manifested by the young republic at this great expanding era of the world's history can hardly be exaggerated. It was fitting that the little commonwealth, which was foremost among the nations in its hatred of tyranny, its love of maritime adventure, and its aptitude for foreign trade, should take the lead in the great commercial movements which characterized the close of the sixteenth and the commencement of the seventeenth centuries.

While Barendz and Heemskerck were attempting to force the frozen gates which were then supposed to guard the northern highway of commerce, fleets were fitting out in Holland to storm the Southern Pole, or at least to take advantage of the pathways already opened by the genius and enterprise of the earlier navigators of the century. Linschoten had taught his countrymen the value of the technical details of the Indian trade as then understood. The voyages of the brothers Houtmann, 1595-1600, the first Dutch expeditions to reach the East by doubling the Cape of Good Hope, were undertaken according to his precepts, and directed by the practical knowledge obtained by the Houtmanns during a residence in Portugal, but were not signalized by important discoveries. They are chiefly memorable as having laid the foundation of the vast trade out of which the republic was to derive so much material power, while at the same time they mark the slight beginnings of that mighty monopoly, the Dutch East India Company, which was to teach such tremendous lessons in commercial restriction to a still more colossal English corporation, that mercantile tyrant only in our own days overthrown.

At the same time and at the other side of the world seven ships, fitted out from Holland by private enterprise, were forcing their way to the South Sea through the terrible strait between Patagonia and Fire Land, then supposed the only path around the globe. For the tortuous mountain channel, filled with whirlpools and reefs, and the home of perpetual tempest, which had been discovered in the early part of the century by Magellan, was deemed the sole opening pierced by nature through the mighty southern circumpolar continent. A few years later a daring Hollander was to demonstrate the futility of this theory, and to give his own name to a broader pathway, while the

stormy headland of South America, around which the great current of universal commerce was thenceforth to sweep, was baptized by the name of the tranquil town in West Friesland where most of his ship's company were born.

Meantime the seven ships under command of Jacob Mahu, Simon de Cordes and Sebald de Weerdt, were contending with the dangers of the older route. The expedition sailed from Holland in June, 1598, but already the custom was forming itself of directing those navigators of almost unknown seas by explicit instructions from those who remained on shore, and who had never navigated the ocean at all. The consequence on this occasion was that the voyagers towards the Straits of Magellan spent a whole summer on the coast of Africa, amid pestiferous heats and distracting calms, and reached 6 April, the straits only in April of 1599. the following year. Admiral Mahu and a large proportion of the crew had meantime perished of fevers contracted by following the course marked out for them by their employers, and thus diminished in numbers, half-stripped of provisions, and enfeebled by the exhausting atmosphere of the tropics, the survivors were ill prepared to confront the antarctic ordeal which they were approaching. Five months longer the fleet, under command of Admiral de Cordes, who had succeeded to the command struggled in those straits, where, as if in the home of *Æolus*, all the winds of heaven seemed holding revel; but indifference to danger, discipline, and devotion to duty marked the conduct of the adventurers, even as those qualities had just been distinguishing their countrymen at the other pole. They gathered no gold, they conquered no kingdoms, they made few discoveries, they destroyed no fleets, yet they were the first pioneers on a path on which thereafter were to be many such achievements by the republic.

At least one heroic incident, which marked their departure from the straits, serves to be held in perpetual remembrance. Admiral de Cordes raised on the shore, at the western mouth of the channel, a rude memorial with an inscription that the Netherlands were the first to effect this dangerous passage with a fleet of heavy ships. On the following day, in commemoration of the event, he founded an order of knighthood. The chief officers of the squadron were the knights-commanders, and the most deserving of the crew were the knights-brethren. The members of the fraternity made solemn oath to De Cordes, as general, and to each other, that, by no danger, no necessity, nor by the fear of death, would they ever be moved to undertake anything prejudicial to their honour, to the welfare of the fatherland, or to the success of the enterprise in which they were engaged; pledging themselves to stake their lives in order, consistently with honour, to inflict every possible damage on the hereditary enemy, and to plant the banner of Holland in all those territories whence the King of Spain gathered the treasures with which he had carried on this perpetual war against the Netherlands."

Thus was instituted on the desolate shores of Fire Land the order of Knights of the Unchained Lion, with such rude solemnities as were possible in those solitudes. The harbour where the fleet was anchored was called the Chevaliers' Bay, but it would be in vain to look in modern maps for that heroic appellation. Patagonia and Tierra del Fuego know the honest knights of the Unchained Lion no more; yet to an unsophisticated mind no stately brotherhood of sovereigns and patricians seems more thoroughly inspired with the spirit of Christian chivalry than were those weather-beaten adventurers. The reefs and whirlwinds of unknown seas, polar cold, Patagonian giants, Spanish cruisers, a

thousand real or fabulous dangers environed them. Their provisions were already running near exhaustion, and they were feeding on raw seal-flesh, on snails and mussels, and on whatever the barren rocks and niggard seas would supply, to save them from absolutely perishing, but they held their resolve to maintain their honour unsullied, to be true to each other and to the republic, and to circumnavigate the globe to seek the proud enemy of their fatherland on every sea, and to do battle with him in every corner of the earth. The world had already seen, and was still to see, how nobly Netherlands could keep their own. Meantime disaster on disaster descended on this unfortunate expedition. One ship after another melted away and was seen no more. Of all the seven, only one, that of Sebald de Weerdt, ever returned to the shores of Holland. Another reached Japan, and although the crew fell into hostile hands, the great trade with that Oriental empire was begun. In a third—the *Blyde Boodschaft*, or *Good News*—Dirk Gerrit sailed nearer the South Pole than man had ever been before, and discovered, as he believed, a portion of the southern continent, which he called, with reason good, *Gerrit's Land*. The name in course of time faded from maps and charts, the existence of the country was disputed, until more than two centuries later the accuracy of the Dutch commander was recognised. The re-discovered land however no longer bears his name, but has been baptized South Shetland.

Thus before the sixteenth century had closed, the navigators of Holland had reached almost the extreme verge of human discovery at either pole. 1

1 The chief authorities consulted for the account of these early voyages are:—

Bor, III. b. xxxi. pp. 866-873, and IV. b. xxxiv. pp. 337-344.

Begin ende Voortgang van de Vereen. Nederl. geotroyeerde Oost Ind. Compagnie (1646) 1 Deel (*passim*) with the Original Diaries and Histories, especially 1-53.



## CHAPTER XXXVII.

## Military Operations in the Netherlands—

Designs of the Spanish Commander—Siege of Orsoy—Advance upon Rheinberg—Murder of the Count of Broeck and his garrison—Capture of Rees and Emmerich—Outrages of the Spanish soldiers in the peaceful provinces—Inglorious attempt to avenge the hostilities—State of trade in the Provinces—Naval expedition under Van der Does—Arrival of Albert and Isabella at Brussels—Military operations of Prince Maurice—Negotiation between London and Brussels—Henry's determination to enact the Council of Trent—His projected marriage—Queen Elizabeth and Envoy Caron—Peace proposals of Spain to Elizabeth—Conferences at Gertruydenberg—Uncertain state of affairs.

THE military operations in the Netherlands during the whole year 1598 were on a comparatively small-scale and languidly conducted. The States were exhausted by the demands made upon the treasury, and baffled by the disingenuous policy of their allies. The cardinal-archduke, on the other hand, was occupied with the great events of his marriage, of his father-in-law's death, and of his own succession in conjunction with his wife to the sovereignty of the provinces.

In the autumn, however, the Admiral of Arragon, who, as has been stated, was chief military commander during the absence of Albert, collected an army of twenty-five thousand foot and two thousand cavalry, crossed the Meuse at Roermond, and made his appearance before a small town called Orsoy, on the Rhine. It was his intention to invade the duchies of Cleves, Juliers, and

Berg, taking advantage of the supposed madness of the duke, and of the Spanish inclinations of his chief counsellors, who constituted a kind of regency. By obtaining possession of these important provinces—wedged as they were between the territory of the republic, the obedient Netherlands, and Germany—an excellent military position would be gained for making war upon the rebellious districts from the east, for crushing Protestantism in the duchies, for holding important passages of the Rhine, and for circumventing the designs of the Protestant sons-in-law and daughters of the old Duke of Cleves. Of course, it was the determination of Maurice and the States-General to frustrate these operations. German and Dutch Protestantism gave battle on this neutral ground to the omnipotent tyranny of the papacy and Spain.

Unfortunately, Maurice had but a very slender force that autumn at his command. Fifteen hundred horse and six thousand infantry were all his effective troops, and with these he took the field to defend the borders of the republic, and to out-manceuvre, so far as it might lie in his power, the admiral with his far-reaching and entirely unscrupulous designs.

With six thousand Spanish veterans, two thousand Italians, and many Walloon and German regiments under Bucquoy, Hachincourt, La Bourlotte, Stanley, and Frederic van den Berg, the admiral had reached the frontiers of the mad duke's territory. Orsoy was garrisoned by a small company of „cocks' feathers," or country squires, and their followers.

Presenting himself in person before the walls of the town, with a priest at his right hand and a hangman holding a bundle of halts Sept. 1-8. at the other, he desired to

Grotii Hist. lib. iv. 326, *seqq.* and v. 383, *seqq.*  
G. Moll, *Verhandeling over eenige Vroegere Zetogten der Nederlanders*, Amsterdam, 1825, pp. 14-119, *et passim*.

Bennet en Van Wijk, *Verhandeling over de Nederlandsche Ontdekkingen*, Utrecht, 1827, *passim*.

Van Kampen's *Gesch. der Ned.* I. 572, *seqq.* Compare *Gesch. der Nederlanders buiten Europa*, Harlem, 1831, by the same author.

Le Petit, *La Grande Chronique*, ii. 651, *seqq.* and 698, *seqq.*

Van Meteren also gives good summaries, especially in b. xxlii.

be informed whether the governor would prefer to surrender or to hang with his whole garrison. The cock-feathers surrendered. 1

The admiral garrisoned and fortified Orsoy as a basis and advanced upon Rheinberg, first surprising the Count of Broeck in his castle, who was at once murdered in cold blood with his little garrison.

He took Burik on the 11th October, Rheinberg on the 15th of the same month, and compounded with Wesel for a hundred and twenty thousand florins. Leaving garrisons in these and a few other captured places, he crossed the Lippe, came to Borhold, and ravaged the whole country side. His troops being clamorous for pay were only too eager to levy black-mail on this neutral territory. The submission of the authorities to this treatment brought upon them a reproach of violation of neutrality by the States-General; the Governments of Munster and of the duchies being informed that, if they aided and abetted the one belligerent, they must expect to be treated as enemies by the other. 2

The admiral took Rees on the 30th October, and Emmerich on the 2nd November—two principal cities of Cleves. On the 8th November he crossed into the territory of the republic and captured Deutekom, after a very short siege. Maurice, by precaution, occupied Sevenaer in Cleves. The prince—whose difficult task was to follow up and observe an enemy by whom he was outnumbered nearly four to one, to harass him by skirmishes, to make forays on his communications, to seize important points before he could reach them, to impose upon him by an appearance of far greater force than the republican army could actually boast, to protect the cities of the frontier like Zutphen, Lochem, and Doesburg, and to prevent

him from attempting an invasion of the United Provinces in force, by crossing any of the rivers, either in the autumn or after the winter's ice had made them passable for the Spanish army—succeeded admirably in all his strategy. The admiral never ventured to attack him, for fear of risking a defeat of his whole army by an antagonist whom he ought to have swallowed at a mouthful, relinquished all designs upon the republic, passed into Munster, Cleves, and Berg, and during the whole horrible winter converted those peaceful provinces into a hell. No outrage which even a Spanish army could inflict was spared the miserable inhabitants. Cities and villages were sacked and burned, the whole country was placed under the law of blackmail. The places of worship, mainly Protestant, were all converted at a blow of the sword into Catholic churches. Men were hanged, butchered, tossed in sport from the tops of steeples, burnt, and buried alive. Women of every rank were subjected by thousands to outrage too foul and too cruel for any but fiends or Spanish soldiers to imagine. 1

Such was the lot of thousands of innocent men and women at the hands of Philip's soldiers in a country at peace with Philip, at the very moment when that monarch was protesting with a seraphic smile on his expiring lips that he had never in his whole life done injury to a single human being.

In vain did the victims call aloud upon their sovereign, the Emperor Rudolf. The Spaniards laughed the feeble imperial mandates to scorn, and spurned the word neutrality. „Oh, poor Roman Empire!” cried John Fontanus, „how art thou fallen! Thy protector has become thy despoiler, and, although thy members see this and know it, they sleep through it all. One day they may have a terrible awakening from their slumbers. . . . The Admiral of Arragon has entirely changed the charac-

1 Meteren, 399-404.

2 Bor, IV. 482-496. Meteren, 399, 404.

1 Bor, Meteren, *ubi sup.*

ter of the war, recognizes no neutrality, saying that there must be but one God, one pope, and one king, and that they who object to this arrangement must be extirpated with fire and sword, let them be where they may." 1

The admiral, at least, thoroughly respected the claims of the dead Philip to universal monarchy.

Maurice gained as much credit by the defensive strategy through which he saved the republic from the horrors thus afflicting its neighbours, as he had ever done by his most brilliant victories. Queen Elizabeth was enchanted with the prowess of the prince, and with the sagacious administration of those republican magistrates whom she never failed to respect, even when most inclined to quarrel with them. „Never before was it written or heard of,” said the queen, „that so great an extent of country could be defended with so few troops, that an invasion of so superior a hostile force could be prevented, especially as it appeared that all the streams and rivers were frozen.” This, she added, was owing to the wise and far-seeing counsels of the States-General, and to the faithful diligence of their military commander, who now, as she declared, deserved the title of the first captain of all Christendom. 2

A period of languor and exhaustion succeeded. The armies of the States had dwindled to an effective force of scarcely four or five thousand men, while the new levies came in but slowly. The taxation, on the other hand, was very severe. The quotas for the provinces had risen to the amount of five million eight hundred thousand florins for the year 1599, against an income of four millions six hundred thousand, and this deficit went on increasing, notwithstanding a new tax of one-half

per cent, on the capital of all estates above three thousand florins in value, and another of two and a half per cent. on all sales of real property. 1 The finances of the obedient provinces were in a still worse condition, and during the absence of the cardinal-archduke an almost universal mutiny, occasioned by the inability of the exchequer to provide payment for the troops, establisheid itself throughout Flanders and Brabant. There was much recrimination on the subject of the invasion of the Rhenish duchies, and a war of pamphlets and manifestos between the archduke's Government and the States-General succeeded to those active military operations by which so much misery had been inflicted on the unfortunate inhabitants of that border land. There was a slight attempt on the part of the Princes of Brunswick, Hesse and Brandenburg to counteract and to punish the hostilities of the Spanish troops committed upon German soil. An army—very slowly organized, against the wishes of the emperor, the bishops, and the Catholic party—took the field, and made a feeble demonstration upon Rheinsberg and upon Rees entirely without result, and then disbanded itself ingloriously. 2

Meantime the admiral had withdrawn from German territory, and was amusing himself with a variety of blows aimed at vital points of the republic. An excursion into the Isle of Bommel was not crowned with much success. The assault on the city was repulsed. The fortress of Crevecoeur was, however, taken, and the fort of St. Andrew constructed—in spite of the attempts of the States to frustrate the design—at a point commanding the course of both the Waal and the Meuse. Having placed a considerable garrison in each of those strongholds, the admiral discontinued

1 Groen. v. Prinsterer, Archives, I. 407 (2 Ser.)

2 Caron to the States-General. Van der Kemp, ii. 199.

1 Wagenaar, ix. 39.

2 Ibid. 39-72. Bor. IV. 522, *seqq.*, 591, 908. Meteren, b. xxi.



his labours and went into winter-quarters. 1

The States-General for political reasons were urgent that Prince Maurice should undertake some important enterprise, but the stadholder, sustained by the opinion of his cousin Lewis William, resisted the pressure. The armies of the Commonwealth were still too slender in numbers and too widely scattered for active service on a large scale, and the season for active campaigning was wisely suffered to pass without making any attempt of magnitude during the year.

The trade of the provinces, moreover, was very much hampered, and their revenues sadly diminished by the severe prohibitions which had succeeded to the remarkable indulgence hitherto accorded to foreign commerce. Edicts in the name of the King of Spain and of the Archdukes Albert and Isabella, forbidding all intercourse between the rebellious provinces and the obedient Netherlands or any of the Spanish possessions, were met by countervailing decrees of the States-General. Free trade with its enemies and with all the world, by means of which the commonwealth had prospered in spite of perpetual war, was now for a season destroyed, and the immediate results were at once visible in its diminished resources. To employ a portion of the maritime energies of the Hollanders and Zeelanders, thus temporarily deprived of a sufficient field, a naval expedition of seventy-five war vessels under Admiral van der Does was fitted out, but met with very trifling success. They attacked and plundered the settlements and forts of the Canary Islands, inflicted much damage on the inhabitants, sailed thence to the Isle of St. Thomas, near the equator, where the towns and villages were sacked and burned, and where a contagious sickness broke out in the fleet, sweeping off in a very brief period a large proportion of the crew. The admiral himself fell

a victim to the disease and was buried on the island. The fleet put to sea again under Admiral Storm van Wena, but the sickness pursued the adventurers on their voyage towards Brazil, one thousand of them dying at sea in fifteen days. At Brazil they accomplished nothing, and, on their homeward voyage, not only the new commander succumbed to the same contagion, but the mortality continued to so extraordinary an extent that, on the arrival of the expedition late in the winter in Holland, there were but two captains left alive, and, in many of the vessels, not more than six sound men to each. 1 Nothing could be more wretched than this termination of a great and expensive voyage, which had occasioned such high hopes throughout the provinces; nothing more dismal than the political atmosphere which surrounded the republic during the months which immediately ensued. It was obvious to Barneveld and the other leading personages, in whose hands was the administration of affairs, that a great military success was absolutely indispensable, if the treacherous cry of peace, when peace was really impossible, should not become universal and fatal.

Meantime affairs were not much more cheerful in the obedient provinces. Archduke Albert arrived with his bride in the early days of September, 1599, at Brussels, and was received with great pomp and enthusiastic rejoicings. When are pomp and enthusiasm not to be obtained by imperial personages, at brief notice and in vast quantities, if managers understand their business? After all, it may be doubted whether the theatrical display was as splendid as that which marked the beginning of the Ernestian era. Schoolmaster Houwaerts had surpassed himself on that occasion, and was no longer capable of deifying the new sovereign as thoroughly as he had deified his brother.

1 Bor, Meteren, Wagenaar, *ubi sup.* See letters of Buzanyal in Vreede, *passim*.

1 Wagenaar, Bor, Meteren, *ubi sup.*

Much real discontent followed close upon the fictitious enthusiasm. The obedient provinces were poor and forlorn, and men murmured loudly at the enormous extravagance of their new master's housekeeping. There were one hundred and fifty mules, and as many horses in their sovereign's stables, while the expense of feeding the cooks, lackeys, pages, and fine gentlemen who swelled the retinue of the great household, was estimated, without wages or salaries, at two thousand florins a day. 1 Albert had wished to be called a king, 2 but had been unable to obtain the gratification of his wish. He had aspired to be emperor, and he was at least sufficiently imperial in his ideas of expense. 3 The murmurers were loftily rebuked for their complaints, and reminded of the duty of obedient provinces to contribute at least as much for the defence of their masters as the rebels did in maintenance of their rebellion. The provincial estates were summoned accordingly to pay roundly for the expenses of the war as well as of the court, and to enable the new sovereigns to suppress the military mutiny, which amid the enthusiasm greeting their arrival was the one prominent and formidable fact.

The archduke was now thirty nine years of age, the Infanta Isabella six years younger. She was esteemed majestically beautiful by her courtiers, and Cardinal Bentivoglio, himself a man of splendid intellect, pronounced her a woman of genius, who had grown to be a prodigy of wisdom, under the tuition of her father, the most sagacious statesman of the age. 4 In attachment to the Roman faith and ritual, in superhuman loftiness of demeanour, and in hatred of heretics, she was at least a worthy child of that sainted sover-

eign. 1 In a moral point of view she was his superior. The archdukes—so Albert and Isabella were always designated—were a singularly attached couple, and their household, if extravagant and imperial, was harmonious. They loved each other—so it was believed—as sincerely as they abhorred heretics and rebels, but it does not appear that they had a very warm affection for their Flemish subjects. Every characteristic of their court was Spanish. Spanish costume, Spanish manners, the Spanish tongue, were almost exclusively predominant, and although the festivals, dances, banquets, and tournaments, were all very magnificent, the prevailing expression of the Brabantine capital resembled that of a Spanish convent, 2 so severely correct, so stately, and so grim, was the demeanour of the court.

The earliest military operations of the stadholder in the first year of the new century were successful.

Partly by menace, but more 1600.  
effectually by judicious negotiation. Maurice recovered Crevecoeur, and obtained the surrender of St. Andrew, the fort which the admiral had built the preceding year in honour of Albert's uncle. That ecclesiastic, with whom Mendoza had wrangled most bitterly during the whole interval of Albert's absence, had already taken his departure for Rome, where he soon afterwards died. 3 The garrisons of the forts, being mostly Walloon soldiers, forsook the Spanish service for that of the States, and were banded together in a legion some twelve hundred strong, which became known as the „New Beggars,” and were placed under the nominal command of Frederick Henry of Nassau.

1 „Die Infantin aus Hispanien,” wrote Fontanus, „weis nit dan von hängen, brennen, morden und wütten zu sprechen; man musz irer Majestät auff den knien sitzen dienen, auch die Staten der Provincken welches ihnen gar ungen thut.”—Groen v. Prinsterer, Archives, II. 8 (2 Ser.)

2 Bentivoglio, *ubi sup.*

3 Wagenaar, ix. 64.

1 Bor, IV. 578.

2 Albert to Philip, 20 April, 1598. (Arch. de Simancas MS.) Same to same, 13 July, 1598. (Ibid.)

3 Ibid.

4 Relazione delle prov<sup>e</sup>. ubb<sup>te</sup>. 57, 58.

youngest child of William the Silent. The next military event of the year was a mad combat, undertaken by formal cartel, between Breauté, a young Norman noble in the service of the republic, and twenty comrades, with an equal number of Flemish warriors from the obedient provinces, under Grobbendonck. About one half of the whole number were killed, including the leaders, but the encounter, although exciting much interest at the time, had of course no permanent importance. 1

There was much negotiation, informal, and secret, between Brussels and London during this and a portion of the following year. Elizabeth, naturally enough, was weary of the war, but she felt after all, as did the Government of France, that a peace between the United Netherlands and Spain, would be for its result the restoration of the authority of his most Catholic Majesty over all the provinces. The statesmen of France and England, like most of the politicians of Europe, had but slender belief in the possibility of a popular government, and doubted therefore the continued existence of the newly-organized republic. 2 Therefore they really deprecated the idea of a peace which should include the States,

notwithstanding that from time to time the queen or some of her counsellors had so vehemently reproached the Netherlanders with their unwillingness to negotiate. „At the first recognition that these people should make of the mere shadow of a prince,” said Buzanval, the keenly observing and experienced French envoy at the Hague, „they lose the form they have. All the blood of the body would flow to the head, and the game would be who should best play the valet. . . . . The house of Nassau would lose its credit within a month in case of peace.” 1 As such statesmen could not imagine a republic, they ever dreaded the restoration in the United Provinces of the subverted authority of Spain.

France and England were jealous of each other, and both were jealous of Spain. Therefore even if the republican element, the strength and endurance of which was so little suspected, had been as trifling a factor in the problem as was supposed, still it would have been difficult for any one of these powers to absorb the United Netherlands. As for France, she hardly coveted their possession. „We ought not to flatter ourselves,” said Buzanval, „that these maritime peoples will cast themselves one day into our nets, nor do I know that it would be advisable to pull in the net if they should throw themselves in.” 2

Henry was full of political schemes and dreams at this moment—as much as his passion for Mademoiselle d’Entraigues, who had so soon supplanted the image of the dead Gabrielle in his heart, would permit. He was very well disposed to obtain possession of the Spanish Netherlands, 3 whenever he

1 Wagenaar, ix. 39-72. Bor, IV. 522-603. Leteren, book xxi.

2 „Da tutte queste ragioni dunque si può giudicare che non sia per conservarsi nello stato presente questa nuova repubblica ma che più tosto sia per mancare in breve e che finalmente sia per ridursi sotto il governo d’un solo.”—Bentivoglio, *Relazione delle Provincie Unite*, lib. iii. cap. vii. p. 50. The continued existence of the „new republic” for two centuries after these remarks were made is an additional proof of the danger of prophesying. „Ceux qui sondent le connaisseur à quoy ce mene,” wrote Grassens from Paris, „desirent changement en l’estat du gouvernement populaire et election d’un souverain. Combien peu connoissans nos nécessités, nos desseins, nos maux! En tel predicament sommes nous en cette cour.”

3 Mars, 1600, Lettres, in Valck. (Archives of the Hague MS.) Compare Instructions of James I to Spencer and Winwood; Winwood’s Memorials, II. 329-335, especially p. 333.

1 Lettres et Negotiations de Buzanval, par le Professeur Vreede. Leyde, 1846, p. 200.

2 Ibid.

3 Nor would it seem that the project, although much feared by the English queen, was at all distasteful to the Netherland statesmen. „M’ayant souvent dit et redit Bar-



should see his way to such an acquisition, and was even indulging in visions of the imperial crown.

He was therefore already, and for the time at least, the most intense of papists. 1 He was determined to sacrifice the Huguenot chiefs, and introduce the Council of Trent, in order, as he told Duplessis, that all might be Christians. If he still retained any remembrance of the ancient friendship between himself and the heretic republic, it was not likely to exhibit itself, notwithstanding his promises and his pecuniary liabilities to her, in anything more solid than words. „I repeat it,” said the Dutch envoy at Paris; „this court cares

nefend,” wrote Buzanval, „quesi le roy vouloit repeter les droits qu'il pretend sur les dites provinces, que les Etats des Provinces Unies luy ayderoient pour un tel effect de toute leur force, ne pretendant iceux etats pour tout butin que l'assurance de cette coste de mer, et certes si cela estoit, ils pourront donner sauvement et a leur aise avec une bonne et étroite alliance qu'ils esperoient faire avec la France qui les maintiendrait contre toute autre force estrangere de quelque costé qu'elle peut arriver. M. le P. Maurice me parlant de Dunkerque le jour de son parlement, j'euy fis demande s'il la pourroit maintenir apres l'avoir conquise, il me dit que malaisément sans y tenir toujours une armée. Je le pressay davantage et jusques la qu'il vint a me dire Je crois que les etats feroient bien en un tel cas de la mettre en mains du roy;’ je lui dis que je ne pensois pas que nous voulussions rompre notre jeusne pour si peu de chose, Si faut il, dit il, ou que cette ville nous mange ou que nous la mangions si nous la tenons une fois,” &c.—Buzanval to Villeroy, 25 June, 1600. (MS. in Royal Library at the Hague.)

1 „Aussy sommes nous en temps icy que les affaires se couvent et attendent leur forme par la force. La desunion de ceux de la religion est projetée, le Concile de Trente en cette consideration en bon terme pour sa verification, le Sr du Plessis sacrifié au pape, les Jesuites sur le retour, l'empire promis au roy et son mariage arrêté pour le mois de Septembre.”—Aerssens to Valck, 19 May, 1600, MS.

„Sa Majesté ces jours passes dit a bon escient à M. de Bouillon sur ces doléances pour l'Assemblée contre ces forcées conversions que comme roy il doit desirer qu'une religion en son royaume et à M. du Plessis alleguant les inconveniens du Concile (de Trent) sy faut il (fit il) qu'enfin nous soions tous Chrétiens.”—Aerssens to Valck, 10 April, 1600. (Hague Archives MS.)

nothing for us, for all its cabals tend to close union with Rome, whence we can expect nothing but foul weather. The king alone has any memory of our past services.” 1 But imperturbable and self-confident as ever, Henry troubled himself little with fears in regard to the papal supremacy, even when his Parliament professed great anxiety in regard to the consequences of the Council of Trent, if not under him yet under his successors. „I will so bridle the popes,” said he, cheerfully, „that they will never pass my restrictions. My children will be still more virtuous and valiant than I. If I have none then the devil take the hindmost. Nevertheless I choose that the council shall be enacted. I desire it more ardently than I pressed the edict for the Protestants.” 2 Such being the royal humour at the moment, it may well be believed that Duplessis Mornay would find but little sunshine from on high on the occasion of his famous but forgotten conferences with Du Perron, now archbishop of Evreux, before the king and all the court of Fontainebleau. It was natural enough that to please the king the king's old Huguenot friend should be convicted of false citations from the fathers; but it would seem strange, were the motives unknown, that Henry should have been so intensely interested in this most arid and dismal of theological controversies. Yet those who had known and observed the king closely for thirty years, declared that he had never manifested so much passion, neither on the eve of battles nor of amorous assignations, as he then did for the demolition of Duplessis and his deductions. He had promised the Nuncius that the Huguenots should be utterly confounded, and with him the whole fraternity, „for,” said the king, „he has wickedly and impu-

1 Aerssens to Valck, *ubi sup.*

2 Same to same, 6 May, 1600. (Hague Archives MS.) „Sauve qui peut,” &c.

stoutly written against the pope, to whom I owe as much as I do to God." 1

These were not times in which the Hollanders, battling as stoutly against pain and the pope as they had done during the years when the republic stood shoulder to shoulder with Henry the Huguenot, could hope for aid and comfort from their ancient ally.

It is very characteristic of that age of dissimulation and of reckless political juggling, that the very moment when Henry's marriage with Marie de Medicis was already arranged, and when that princess was soon expected in Lyons, a ball at the king's court was busy with an absurd project to marry their sovereign to the Infanta of Spain. It is true that the Infanta was already the wife of the cardinal-archduke, but it was thought possible—for reasons divulged through the indiscretions or inventions of the father confessor—to obtain the pope's dispensation on the ground of the nullity of the marriage. 2 Thus there were politicians at the French court seriously occupied in an attempt to deprive the archduke of his wife,

of his Netherland provinces, and of the crown of the holy Roman empire, 1 which he still hoped to inherit. 2 Yet the ink was scarcely dry with which Henry had signed the treaty of amity with Madrid and Brussels.

The Queen of England, on the other hand—although often listening to secret agents from Brussels and Madrid who offered peace, and although perfectly aware that the great object of Spain in securing peace with England was to be able to swoop down at once upon the republic, thus deprived of any allies— 3 was beside herself with rage, whenever she suspected, with or without reason, that Brussels or Madrid had been sending peace emissaries to the republic.

„Before I could get into the room," said Caron, on one such occasion, „she called out, „Have you not always told me that the States never could, would, or should treat for peace with the enemy? Yet now it is plain enough that they have proceeded only too far in negotiations." And she then swore a big oath that if the States were to deceive her she meant to take such vengeance that men should talk of it for ever and ever." It was a long time before the envoy could induce her to listen to a single word, although the perfect sincerity of the States in their attitude to

1 Same to same, 9 May, 1600. (Hague Archives MS.) Compare De Thou (who was one of the Catholic umpires at the conference), t. xiii. pp. 445-449, l. 123.

2 „Vous sçavez si je vous dis," wrote Aerssens, minister of the Dutch republic in France, to Valcke, „que le secret en est d'un pretend encor de faire espouser l'Infante d'Espagne au roy, qui à cette occasion se haste point vers Lyon et a rejetté la venue de la Florentine jusqu'en Octobre, obligeant à la compagnie de sa sœur. Le plus vrai est que le roy prend ceci pour pretext. Car il pense totalement à M<sup>lle</sup>. d'Anagnin à laquelle il a donné seconde promesse en cas de masle. Cependant on a sceu le bon point que l'Infante ayant conféré avec sa dame d'honneur s'estait plaint de l'incapacité de l'archiduc aux parties fondamentales du mariage. Sur quoy elle projetait une dispense à Rome, mediation par le roy, durant le séjour de Madame la Duchesse de Beaufort en ceste cour, qui ne s'en est épargnée au rapport. Ce que je dis est vrai sur la caballe, mais j'ignore la verité du dict et quand tout seroit ainsi on s'aveugle trop au desir de croire que le Roy d'Espagne pufist ceste alliance," &c.—Aerssens to Valck, 12 June, 1600. (Hague Archives MS.)

1 „Le Comte de Manderscheid a parlé assez franchement à Monsieur le Prince Maurice, comme il m'a dit, des indispositions ordinaires de la cervelle de l'Empereur, du peu de contentement que les princes soit catholiques soit protestants commencent à avoir de luy et du desir qu'ils ont de se transférer l'empire à une autre maison que celle de Autriche. . . . Cela nous doit faire un peu lever les oreilles en nous rendant capable de grandes choses," &c.—Buzanval to Villeroy, 25 June, 1600. (Lettres de Buzanval in the Royal Library of the Hague MS.)

2 „L'archiduc. . . . qui touche déjà du doigt à l'élection du Roy des Romains."—Vreede, Negotiations de Buzanval, p. 281.

3 „Cette paix l'Angleterre vers laquelle ny l'Espagne ny Bruxelles ne daigneroient pas tourner les yeux si ce n'estoit pour l'esperance qu'on leur donne que par cette ouverture ils entreront dans ces Provinces Unies,"—Buzanval to Villeroy, 14 Nov. 1600. Vreede, Negotiations de Buzanval, p. 315.

the queen and to Spain was unquestionable, 1 and her ill-humour on the subject continued long after it had been demonstrated how much she had been deceived.

Yet it was impossible in the nature of things for the States to play her false, even if no reliance were to be placed on their sagacity and their honour. Even the recent naval expedition of the republic against the distant possessions of Spain—which in its result had caused so much disappointment to the States, and cost them so many lives, including that of the noble admiral whom every sailor in the Netherlands adored 2—had been of immense advantage to England. The queen acknowledged that the Dutch navy had averted the storm which threatened to descend upon her kingdom out of Spain, the Spanish ships destined for the coast of Ireland having been dispersed and drawn to the other side of the world by these demonstrations of her ally. For this she vowed that she would be eternally grateful, and she said as much in „letters full of sugar and honey”—according to the French envoy—which she sent to the States by Sir Francis Vere. 3 She protested, in short, that she had been better and more promptly served in her necessities by the Netherlands than by her own subjects. 4

1 Caron to the States, 25 July, 1600. (Archives of the Hague MS.)

2 „Van der Does . . . adré de cette race de matelots comme un saint.”—Négociations du Buzanval, p. 139.

3 Ibid., pp. 331, 332.

4 Ibid. „Ayant iceulx navires pris l'isle de la grande Canarie avecq la ville et chasteaux d' Mecq. La cour d'Espagne en apprint la nouvelle au mois de Juillet avecq avis que les notres s'y fortifioient la quelle fit changer au conseil d'Espagne la dite resolution et trouver bon de conserver le leur a empêcher la dite fortification et chasser nos navires de la mer et par ainsi a remectre leur premier dessein pour l'an prochain. Sur quoy il fut commandé au dit Adelantado de se transporter avec le plus forte de la flotte vers la grande Canarie comme aussi sur la fin du mois d'Augst il a cinglé vers la avecq environ cinquante navires de guerre.” &c.—States-General to the Queen, 17 Oct. 1599. (Archives of the Hague MS.)

All this sugar and honey however did not make the mission of Envoy Edmonds less bitter to the States. They heard that he was going about through half the cities of the obedient Netherlands in a sort of triumphal procession, and it was the general opinion of the politicians and financiers of the continent that peace between Spain and England was as good as made. Naturally therefore, notwithstanding the exuberant expressions of gratitude on the part of Elizabeth, the republican Government were anxious to know what all this parleying meant. They could not believe that people would make a raree-show of the English envoy except for sufficient reason. 1 Caron accordingly presented himself before the queen, with respectful inquiries on the subject. He 26 Jan. found her in appearance very 1600. angry, not with him, but with Edmonds from whom she had received no advices „I don't know what they are doing with him,” said her Majesty. „I hear from others that they are ringing the church bells wherever he goes, and that they have carried him through a great many more places than was necessary. I suppose that they think him a monster and they are carrying him about to exhibit him. All this is done,” she continued, „to throw dust in the eyes of the poor people, and to put it into their heads that the Queen of England is suing for peace, which is very wide of the mark.” 2

1 Aerssens to Valck, 10 April, 1600. (MS. before cited.)

2 „Berondt wel dat sy toornig was dat sy van hem niet verstaen hadde seggend ick en weet niet wat zy daer met hem mogen maken. Ick verstaet door andere dat men die clocken geluydt heeft daer hy gepasseert is ende dat men hem door meer plaetsen gevoert heeft dan daer hy passeren moeste. Ick meene seyde H. M. dat sy meenen dat het een monster is ende dat sy hem willen dragen te thoonen, twelck al gedaen word soosy seyde omme het arme Volck te verblinden ende henlieden wys te maken dat de Coninginne van Engelhandt hem te payse dede versconcken 't welck soosy seyde verre van huys was,” &c.—Caron to States-



She further observed that, as the agents of the Spanish Government had been perpetually sending to her, she had been inclined once for all to learn what they had to say. Thus she should make manifest to all the world that she was not averse to a treaty such as might procure a secure peace for herself and for Christendom; otherwise not.

It subsequently appeared that what they had to say was that if the queen could give up to the Spanish Government the cautionary towns which she held as a pledge for her advances to the republic, forbid all traffic and intercourse between her subjects and the Netherlanders, and thenceforth never allow an Englishman to serve in or with the armies of the States, a peace might be made. 1

Surely it needed no great magnanimity on the queen's part to spurn such insulting proposals, the offer of which showed her capable, in the opinion of Verreycken, the man who made them, of sinking into the very depths of dishonour. And she did spurn them. Surely, for the ally, the protectress, the grateful friend of the republic, to give its chief supports to its arch-enemy, to shut the narrow seas against its ships, so that they never more could sail westward, and to abandon its whole population to their fate, would be a deed of treachery such as history, full of human baseness, has rarely been obliged to record.

Before these propositions had been

made by Verreycken Elizabeth protested that, should he offer them, she would send him home with such an answer that people should talk of it for some time to come. „Before I consent to a single one of those points,” said the queen, „I wish myself taken from this world. Until now I have been a princess of my word, who would rather die than so falsely deceive such good people as the States.” 1 And she made those protestations with such expression and attitude that the Dutch envoy believed her incapable at that moment of dissimulation. 2

Nevertheless her indignation did not carry her so far as to induce her to break off the negotiations. The answer of which mankind was to talk in time to come was simply that she would not send her commissioners to treat for peace unless the Spanish Government should recede from the three points thus offered by Verreycken. 3 This certainly was not a very blasting reply, and the Spanish agents were so far from losing heart in consequence that the informal conferences continued for a long time, much to the discomfort of the Netherlanders.

For more than an hour and a half on one occasion of an uncommonly hot afternoon in April did Noel de Caron argue with her Majesty against these ill-boding negotiations, and ever and anon, oppressed by the heat of the weather and the argument, did the queen wander from one room of the palace to the other in search of cool air, still bidding the envoy follow her footsteps. „We are travelling about like pilgrims,” said Elizabeth, „but what is life but a pilgrimage?”

Yet notwithstanding this long promenade and these moral reflections, Caron could really not make out at the

1 Caron to the States, 22 Feb. 1600. (Archives of the Hague MS.) 2 Ibid.

3 Same to same, 12 April, 1600.—MS. before cited.

end of the interview whether or no she intended to send her commissioners. At last he asked her the question bluntly.

„Hallo! Hallo!” she replied. „I have only spoken to my servant once, and I must obtain more information and think over the matter before I decide. Be assured however that I shall always keep you informed of the progress of the negotiations, and do you inform the States that they may build upon me as upon a rock.” 1

After the envoy had taken his leave, the queen said to him in Latin, „*Modica fidei quare dubitasti?*” 2 Caron had however so nearly got out of the door that he did not hear this admonition.

This the queen perceived, and calling him by name repeated, „*O Caron! modica fidei quare dubitasti?*” adding the injunction that he should remember this *dictum*, for he well knew what she meant by it. 3

Thus terminated the interview, while the negotiations with Spain, not for lack of good-will on her part, and despite the positive assertions to the contrary of Buzanval and other foreign

agents, were destined to come to nothing.

At a little later period, at the time of certain informal and secret conferences at Gertruydenberg, the queen threatened the envoy with her severest displeasure, should the States dare to treat with Spain without her permission. „Her Majesty called out to me,” said Caron, „as soon as I entered the room that I had always assured her that the States neither would nor could make peace with the enemy. Yet it was now looking very differently, she continued swearing with a mighty oath that the States should cheat her in that way, she meant to revenge herself in such fashion that men would talk of it through all eternity. 1

The French Government was in a similar state of alarm in consequence of the Gertruydenberg conferences. 2

The envoy of the archdukes, Marquis d’Havre, reported on the other hand that all attempts to negotiate had proved fruitless, that Olden-Barneveld, who spoke for all his colleagues, was swollen with pride, and made it but too manifest that the States had no intention to submit to any foreign jurisdiction but were resolved to maintain themselves in the form of a republic. 3

1 Caron to States-General, 12 April, 1600.—MS. before cited. „Maer zy antwoorde my terstondt hola, hola, ick en hebbe mynen dienaar noch maer eens gesproken ende my daerop noch anders informeren ende beraden, doch zyt versekert dat ick altyts in ’t naerder progres sal doen verstaen ende versekert oock de Staten dat zy op my mogen gronden als op een rocdien henlieden nemen en sal failleren.”

2 Ibid.

3 Ibid.

1 Caron’s Despatch, in Van Deventer ii. 289.

2 Caron’s Despatches, in Van Deventer ii. 289. Aerssens’ Despatch.

3 Caron’s Despatches, in Van Deventer ii. 289. Havré to the Archduke.

## CHAPTER XXXVIII.

Military events—Aggressive movement of the Netherlands—State of the Archduke’s provinces—Mutiny of the Spanish forces—Proposed invasion of Flanders by the States-General—Disembarkation of the troops on the Spanish coasts—Capture of Oudenburg and other places—Surprise of Nieupoort—Conduct of the Archduke—Oudenburg and the other forts re-taken—Dilemma of the States’ army—Attack of the Archduke on Count Ernest’s cavalry—Panic and total overthrow of the advance-guard of the States’ army—Battle of Nieu-

port—Details of the action—Defeat of the Spanish army—Results of the whole expedition.

THE effect produced in the republic by the defensive and uneventful campaigning of the year 1599 had naturally been depressing. There was murmuring at the vast amount of taxation, especially at the new imposition of one half per cent, upon all property, and

to-and-a-half per cent. on all sales, which seemed to produce so few results. The successful protection of the Isle of Bommel and the judicious purchase of the two forts of Crevecoeur and St. Andrew, early in the following year, together with their garrisons, were not military events of the first magnitude, and were hardly enough to efface the gratification felt at the fact that the enemy had been able so lately to conduct one of those strongholds within the territory of the commonwealth.

It was now secretly determined to attempt an aggressive movement on a considerable scale, and to carry the war once for all into the heart of the obedient provinces. It was from Flanders that the Spanish armies drew a great portion of their supplies. It was by the forts erected on the coast of Flanders in the neighbourhood of Ostend that this important possession of the States was rendered nearly valueless. It was by privateers swarming from the ports of Flanders, especially from Nieuport and Dunkirk, that the foreign trade of the Republic was crippled, and its intercommunications by river and estuary rendered unsafe. Dunkirk was simply a pirates' cave, a station from which an annual tax was levied upon the commerce of the Netherlands, almost sufficient, had it been paid to the national treasury instead of to the foreign freebooters, to support the expenses of a considerable army.

On the other hand the condition of the archdukes seemed deplorable. Never had mutiny existed before in so well-organised and definite a form even in the Spanish Netherlands.

Besides those branches of the „Italian republic,” which had been established in the two fortresses of Crevecoeur and St. Andrew, and which had already sold themselves to the States, other organizations quite as formidable existed in various other portions of the obedient provinces. Especially at Diest

and Thionville the rebellious Spaniards and Italians were numbered by thousands, all veterans, well armed, fortified in strong cities, and supplying themselves with perfect regularity by contributions levied upon the peasantry, obeying their Eletto and other officers with exemplary promptness, and paying no more heed to the edicts or the solicitations of the archduke than if he had been the Duke of Muscovy.

The opportunity seemed tempting to strike a great blow. How could Albert and Isabella, with an empty exchequer and a mutinous army, hope either to defend their soil from attack or to aim a counter blow at the republic, even if the republic for a season should be deprived of a portion of its defenders?

The reasoning was plausible, the prize tempting. The States-General, who habitually discountenanced rashness, and were wont to impose superfluous restraints upon the valiant but discreet Lewis William, and upon the deeply pondering but energetic Maurice, were now grown as ardent as they had hitherto been hesitating. In the early days of June it was determined in secret session to organize a great force in Holland and Zeeland, and to embark suddenly for Nieuport, to carry that important position by surprise or assault, and from that basis to redeem Dunkirk. The possession of these two cities, besides that of Ostend, which had always been retained by the Republic, would ensure the complete subjugation of Flanders. The trifling force of two thousand men under Rivas—all that the archduke then had in that province—and the sconces and earthworks which had been constructed around Ostend to impede the movements and obstruct the supplies of the garrison, would be utterly powerless to prevent the consummation of the plan. Flanders once subjugated, it would not be long before the Spaniards were swept from the obedient Netherlands as thoroughly as



they had been from the domains of the commonwealth, and all the seventeen provinces, trampling out every vestige of a hated foreign tyranny, would soon take their natural place as states of a free, prosperous, and powerful union.

But Maurice of Nassau did not share the convictions of the States-General. The unwonted ardour of Barneveld did not inflame his imagination. He urged that the enterprise was inexcusably rash; that its execution would require the whole army of the States, except the slender garrisons absolutely necessary to protect important places from surprise; that a defeat would not be simply disaster, but annihilation; that retreat without absolute triumph would be impossible, and that amid such circumstances the archduke, in spite of his poverty and the rebellious condition of his troops, would doubtless assemble a sufficient force to dispute with reasonable prospects of victory, this invasion of his territory.

Sir Francis Vere, too, was most decidedly opposed to the plan. He pointed out with great clearness its dangerous and possibly fatal character; assuring the States that, within a fortnight after the expedition had begun, the archduke would follow upon their heels with an army fully able to cope with the best which they could put into the field. But besides this experienced and able campaigner, who so thoroughly shared the opinions of Prince Maurice, every military man in the provinces of any consideration was opposed to the scheme. Especially Lewis William, than whom no more sagacious military critic or accomplished strategist existed in Europe, denounced it with energy and even with indignation. It was, in the opinion of the young stadholder in Friesland, to suspend the existence of the whole commonwealth upon a silken thread. Even success, he prophesied, would bring no permanent fruits, while the consequences of an overthrow were fearful

to contemplate. The immediate adherent and most trusted counsellors of William Lewis were even more unmeasured in their denunciations than he was himself. „'Tis all the work of Barneveld and the long-gowns,” cried Everard van Reyd. „We are led into a sack from which there is no extrication. We are marching to the Caudine Forks.”

Certainly it is no small indication of the vast influence and the indomitable resolution of Barneveld that he never faltered in this storm of indignation. The Advocate had made up his mind to invade Flanders and to capture Nieuport, and the decree accordingly went forth, despite all opposition. The States-General were sovereign, and the Advocate and the States-General were one.

It was also entirely characteristic of Maurice that he should submit his judgment on this great emergency to that of Olden-Barneveld. It was difficult for him to resist the influence of the great intellect to which he had always willingly deferred in affairs of state, and from which, even in military matters, it was hardly possible for him to escape. Yet in military matters Maurice was a consummate professor, and the Advocate in comparison but a school-boy.

The ascendancy of Barneveld was the less wholesome, therefore, and it might have been better had the stadholder manifested more resolution. But Maurice had not a resolute character. Thorough soldier as he was, he was singularly vacillating, at times almost infirm of purpose, but never before in his career had this want of decision manifested itself in so striking a manner. 1

1 „Un gleich wie seiner Exc. manheit und gute ordnung zu loben ist,” says, with some bitterness, that devoted adherent of the Nassaus, Van Reid, „so können sie mit allerdings entschuldigt werden das sie sich lieber uf importunitet kriegsonerfarnner leut in solche extremitet gestellet als mit Fabio dieselbe Verachten wollen und das er nit geantwort: *malo prudens hostis me metuat quam stultus cives laudent.*”—Groen v. Prinst., Archives II. Serie ii. 15.

Accordingly the States-General, or other words John of Olden-Barneveld, proposed to invade Flanders, and lay siege to Nieuport. 1 The States-General were sovereign, and Maurice bowed to their authority. After the matter had been entirely decided upon the state-council was consulted, and the state-council attempted no opposition to the project. The preparations were made with matchless energy and extraordinary secrecy. Lewis William, who meanwhile was to defend the eastern frontier of the republic against any possible attack, sent all the troops that it was possible to spare, but he sent them with a heavy heart. His forebodings were dismal. It seemed to him that all was about to be staked upon a single cast of the dice. Moreover it was painful to him while the terrible game was playing to be merely a looker-on and a prophet of evil from a distance, forbidden to contribute by his personal skill and experience to a fortunate result. Hohenlohe was appointed to protect the southern border, and was excluded from participation in the great expedition. As to the enemy, such rumours as might come to them from day to day of mysterious military preparations on the part of the rebels only served to excite suspicion in other directions. The archduke was uneasy in regard to the Rhine and the Gueldrian quarter, but never dreamt of a hostile descent upon the Flemish coast.

Meantime, on the 19th June, Maurice of Nassau made his appearance at

Castle Rammekens, not far from Flushing, at the mouth of the Scheld, to superintend the great movement. So large a fleet as was there assembled had never before been seen or heard of in Christendom. Of war-ships, transports, and flat-bottomed barges there were at least thirteen hundred. Many eye-witnesses, who counted however with their imaginations, declared that there were in all at least three thousand vessels, and the statement has been reproduced by grave and trustworthy chroniclers. As the number of troops to be embarked upon the enterprise certainly did not exceed fourteen thousand, this would have been an allowance of one vessel to every five soldiers, besides the army munitions and provisions—a hardly reasonable arrangement.

Twelve thousand infantry and sixteen hundred cavalry, the consummate flower of the States' army, all well-paid, well-clad, well-armed, well-disciplined veterans, had been collected in this place of rendezvous and were ready to embark. It would be unjust to compare the dimensions of this force and the preparations for ensuring the success of the enterprise with the vast expeditions and gigantic armaments of later times, especially with the tremendous exhibitions of military and naval energy with which our own civil war has made us familiar. Maurice was an adept in all that science and art had as yet bequeathed to humanity for the purpose of human destruction, but the number of his troops was small compared to the mighty hosts which the world since those days had seen embattled. War, as a trade, was then less easily learned. It was a guild in which apprenticeship was difficult, and in which enrolment was usually for life. A little republic of scarce three million souls, which could keep always on foot a regular well-appointed army of twenty-five thousand men and a navy of one or two hundred heavily armed cruisers, was

1 „Le Prince Maurice n'a pas manqué de montrer un plus assuré chemin pour jeter la guerre dans le dit pays de Flandres et y prendre un pied qui les pourroit conduire ou à peu au but tant désiré. Mais ces Messieurs, comme ennuyez de vivre en l'état certain auquel ils se voyent réduits par les apprehensions et d'Angleterre et de notre rance mesme, ayment mieux hazarder ce coup de dé, cependant ils se voyent de belles forces en main et celles de leur ennemi affoiblies," &c.—Buzanval to Villeroy, 8 June, 1605. (Royal Library of the Hague S.)

both a marvel and a formidable element in the general polity of the world. The lesson to be derived both in military and political philosophy from the famous campaign of Nieuport does not depend for its value on the numbers of the ships or soldiers engaged in the undertaking. Otherwise, and had it been merely a military expedition like a thousand others which have been made and forgotten, it would not now deserve more than a momentary attention. But the circumstances were such as to make the issue of the impending battle one of the most important in human history. It was entirely possible that an overwhelming defeat of the republican forces on this foreign expedition would bring with it an absolute destruction of the republic, and place Spain once more in possession of the heretic „islands,” from which basis she would menace the very existence of England more seriously than she had ever done before. Who could measure the consequences to Christendom of such a catastrophe?

The distance from the place where the fleet and army were assembled to Nieuport—the objective point of the enterprise—was but thirty-five miles as the crow flies. And the crow can scarcely fly in a straighter line than that described by the coast along which the ships were to shape their course. And here it is again impossible not to reflect upon the change which physical science has brought over the conduct of human affairs. We have seen in a former chapter a most important embassy sent forth from the States for the purpose of preventing the consummation of a peace between their ally and their enemy. Celerity was a vital element in the success of such a mission; for the secret negotiations which it was intended to impede were supposed to be near their termination. Yet months were consumed in a journey which in our day would have been accomplished in twenty-four hours. And now in this great mi-

litary expedition the essential and immediate purpose was to surprise a small town almost within sight from the station at which the army was ready to embark. Such a midsummer voyage in this epoch of steam-tugs and transports would require but a few hours. Yet two days long the fleet lay at anchor while a gentle breeze blew persistently from the south-west. As there seemed but little hope that the wind would become more favourable, and as the possibility of surprise grew fainter with every day's delay, it was decided to make a landing upon the nearest point of Flemish coast placed by circumstances within their reach. Count Ernest of Nassau, with the advance-guard, was accordingly despatched on the 21st June to the neighbourhood of the Sas of Ghent, where he seized a weakly guarded fort, called Philippine, and made thorough preparations for the arrival of the whole army. On the following day the rest of the troops made their appearance, and in the course of 22 June. five hours were safely disembarked.

The army, which consisted of Zealanders, Frisians, Hollanders, Walloons, Germans, English, and Scotch, was divided into three corps. The advance was under the command of Count Ernest, the battalia under that of Count George Everard Solms, while the rear-guard during the march was entrusted to that experienced soldier Sir Francis Vere. Besides Prince Maurice, there were three other members of the house of Nassau serving in the expedition—his half-brother Frederic Henry, then a lad of sixteen, and the two brothers of the Frisian stadholder, Ernest and Lewis Gunther, whom Lewis William had been so faithfully educating in the arts of peace and war both by precept and example. Lewis Gunther, still a mere youth, but who had been the first to scale the fort of Cadiz, and to plant on its height the orange banner of the murdered rebel, and whose gallantry



During the whole expedition had called forth the special commendations of Queen Elizabeth—expressed in energetic and affectionate terms to his father—now commanded all the cavalry. Certainly if the doctrine of primordial selection could ever be accepted among human creatures, the race of Nassau at that day might have seemed destined to be chiefs of the Netherland soil. Old Johan of Nassau, valiant and energetic as ever in the cause of the religious reformation of Germany and the liberation of Holland, still watched from his retirement the progress of the momentous event. Four of his brethren, including the great founder of the republic, had already laid down their lives for the sacred cause. His son Philip had already fallen under the banner in the fight of Bislich, and three other sons were serving the republic day and night, by sea and land, with word, and pen, and purse, energetically, conscientiously, and honourably. Of the stout hearts and quick intellects upon which the safety of the commonwealth then depended, none was more efficient or true than the accomplished soldier and statesman Lewis William. Thoroughly disapproving of the present invasion of Flanders, he was exerting himself, now that it had been decided upon by his sovereigns the States-General, with the same loyalty as that of Maurice, to bring it to a favourable issue, although not personally engaged in the adventure.

So soon as the troops had been landed, the vessels were sent off as expeditiously as possible, that none might fall into the enemy's hands; the transports under a strong convoy of war-ships having been directed to proceed as fast as the wind would permit in the direction of Nieuport. The march then began. On the 23rd they advanced a league and halted for the night at Assenede. The next day brought them three leagues further to a place called Eckerloo. On the 25th they marched to Male, a distance of

three leagues and a half, passing close to the walls of Bruges, in which they had indulged faint hopes of exciting an insurrection, but obtained nothing but a feeble cannonade from the fortifications which did no damage except the killing of one muleteer. The next night was passed at Jabbeke, four leagues from Male, and on the 27th, after marching another league, they came before the fort of Oudenburg.

This important post on the road which the enemy would necessarily traverse in coming from the interior to the coast was easily captured and then strongly garrisoned. Maurice with the main army spent the two following days at the fortress, completing his arrangements. Solms was sent forward to seize the sconces and redoubts of the enemy around Ostend, at Breedene, Snaaskerk, Plas-sendaal, and other points, and especially to occupy the important fort called St. Albert, which was in the downs at about a league from that city. All this work was thoroughly accomplished; little or no resistance having been made to the occupation of these various places. Meantime the States-General, who at the special request of Maurice were to accompany the expedition in order to observe the progress of events for which they were entirely responsible, and to aid the army when necessary by their advice and co-operation, had assembled to the number of thirteen in Ostend. Solms having strengthened the garrison of that place then took up his march along the beach to Nieuport. During the progress of the army through Holland and Zeeland towards its place of embarkation there had been nothing but dismal prognostics, with expressions of muttered indignation, wherever the soldiers passed. It seemed to the country people, and to the inhabitants of every town and village, that their defenders were going to certain destruction; that the existence of the commonwealth was hanging by a thread soon to be snapped

asunder. As the forces subsequently marched from the Sas of Ghent towards the Flemish coast there was no rising of the people in their favour, and although Maurice had issued distinct orders that the peasantry were to be dealt with gently and justly, yet they found neither peasants nor villagers to deal with at all. The whole population on their line of march had betaken themselves to the woods, except the village sexton of Jabbeke and his wife, who were too old to run. Lurking in the thickets and marshes, the peasants fell upon all stragglers from the army and murdered them without mercy—so difficult is it in times of civil war to make human brains pervious to the light of reason. The stadholder and his soldiers came to liberate their brethren of the same race, and speaking the same language, from abject submission to a foreign despotism. The Flemings had but to speak a word, to lift a finger, and all the Netherlands, self-governed, would coalesce into one independent confederation of States, strong enough to defy all the despots of Europe. Alas! the benighted victims of superstition hugged their chains, and preferred the tyranny under which their kindred had been tortured, burned, and buried alive for half a century long, to the possibility of a single Calvinistic conventicle being opened in any village of obedient Flanders. So these excellent children of Philip and the pope, whose language was as unintelligible to them as it was to Peruvians or Iroquois, lay in wait for the men who spoke their own mother tongue, and whose veins were filled with their own blood, and murdered them as a sacred act of duty. Retaliation followed as a matter of course, so that the invasion of Flanders, in this early stage of its progress, seemed not likely to call forth very fraternal feelings between the two families of Netherlands.

The army was in the main admirably

well supplied, but there was a deficiency of drink. The water as they advanced became brackish and intolerably bad, and there was a great difficulty in procuring any substitute. At Male three cows were given for a pot of beer, and more of that refreshment might have been sold at the same price, had there been any sellers.

On the 30th June Maurice marched from Oudenburg, intending to strike a point called Niewendam—a fort in the neighbourhood of Nieuport—and so to march along the walls of that city and take up his position immediately in its front. He found the ground, however, so marshy and impracticable as he advanced, that he was obliged to counter-march, and to spend that night on the downs between forts Isabella and St. Albert.

On the 1st July he resumed his march, and passing a bridge over a small stream at a place called Leffingen laying down a road as <sup>1 July.</sup> he went with sods and sand, and throwing bridges over streams and swamps, he arrived in the forenoon before Nieuport. The fleet had reached the roadstead the same morning.

This was a strong, well-built, and well-fortified little city, situate half-a-league from the sea-coast on low, plashy ground. At high-water it was a seaport, for a stream or creek of very insignificant dimensions was then sufficiently filled by the tide to admit vessels of considerable burthen. This haven was immediately taken possession of by the stadholder, and two-thirds of his army were thrown across to the western side of the water, the troops remaining on the Ostend side being by a change of arrangement now under command of Count Ernest.

Thus the army which had come to surprise Nieuport had, after accomplishing a distance of nearly forty miles in thirteen days, at last arrived before that place. Yet there was no more

expeditions or energetic commander in Christendom than Maurice, nor troops better trained in marching and fighting than his well-disciplined army.

It is now necessary to cast a glance towards the interior of Flanders, in order to observe how the archduke conducted himself in this emergency. So soon as the news of the landing of the states' army at the port of Ghent reached the sovereign's ears, he awoke from the delusion that danger was impending on his eastern border, and lost no time in assembling such troops as could be mustered from far and near to protect the western frontier. Especially he despatched messengers well charged with promises, to confer with the authorities of the „Italian Republic” of Diest and Thionville. He appealed to them in behalf of the holy Catholic religion, he sought to arouse their loyalty to himself and the Infanta Isabella—daughter of the great and good Philip II., once foremost of earthly potentates, and now eminent among the saints of heaven—by whose fiat he and his wife had now become legitimate sovereigns of all the Netherlands. And these mutineers responded with unexpected docility. Eight hundred foot soldiers and six hundred cavalry men came forth at the first summons, making but on conditions in addition to the stipulated payment when payment should be possible—that they should be commanded by their own chosen officers, and that they should be placed in the first rank in the impending conflict. The example spread. Other detachments of mutineers in various strongholds, preventing the battle from afar, came in with offers to serve in the campaign on similar terms. Before the last week of June the archduke had a considerable army on foot. On the 29th of June, 1600, of that month, accompanied by the Infanta, he reviewed a force of ten thousand foot and nearly two thousand cavalry in the immediate vicinity

of Ghent. He addressed them in a few stirring words, reminding them of their duty to the Church and to himself, and assuring them—as commanders of every nation and every age are wont to assure their troops at the eve of every engagement—that the cause in which they were going forth to battle was the most sacred and inspiring for which human creatures could possibly lay down their lives. Isabella, magnificently attired, and mounted on a white palfrey, galloped along the lines, and likewise made an harangue. She spoke to the soldiers as „her lions,” promised them boundless rewards in this world and the next, as the result of the great victory which they were now about to gain over the infidels; while as to their wages, she vowed that, rather than they should remain unpaid, she would sacrifice all her personal effects, even to the plate from which she ate her daily bread, and to the jewels which she wore in her ears.

Thousands of hoarse voices greeted the eloquence of the archdukes with rude acclamations, while the discharge of arquebus and volleys of cannon testified to the martial ardour with which the troops were inspired; none being more enthusiastic than the late mutineers. The army marched at once, under many experienced leaders—Villars, Zapena, and Avalos among the most conspicuous. The command of the artillery was entrusted to Velasco; the marshal-general of the camp was Frederic van den Berg, in place of the superannuated Peter Ernest; while the Admiral of Arragon, Francisco de Mendoza, „terror of Germany and of Christendom,” a little man with flowing locks, long hooked nose, and a sinister glance from his evil black eyes, was general of the cavalry. The admiral had not displayed very extraordinary genius in his recent campaigning in the Rhenish duchies, but his cruelty had certainly been conspicuous. Not even Alva could have ac-



completed more murders and other outrages in the same space of time than had been perpetrated by the Spanish troops during the infamous winter of 1598-9. The assassination of Count Broek at his own castle had made more stir than a thousand other homicides of nameless wretches at the same period had done, because the victim had been a man of rank and large possessions, but it now remained to be seen whether Mendoza was to gain fresh laurels of any kind in the battle which was probably impending.

On the 1st of July the archdukes came before Oudenburg. Not a soul within that fortress nor in Ostend dreamed of an enemy within twenty miles of them, nor had it been supposed possible that a Spanish army could take the field for many weeks to come. The States-General at Ostend were complacently waiting for the first bulletin from Maurice announcing his capture of Nieuport and his advance upon Dunkirk, according to the program so succinctly drawn up for him, and meantime were holding meetings and drawing up comfortable protocols with great regularity. Colonel Piron, on his part, who had been left with several companies of veterans to hold Oudenburg and the other forts, and to protect the rear of the invading army, was accomplishing that object by permitting a large portion of his force to be absent on foraging parties and general marauding. When the enemy came before Oudenburg they met with no resistance. The fort was surrendered at once, and with it fell the lesser sconces of Breedene, Snaaskerk, and Plassendaal—all but the more considerable fort St. Albert. The archduke, not thinking it advisable to delay his march by the reduction of this position, and having possession of all the other fortifications around Ostend, determined to push forward next morning at daybreak. He had granted favourable terms of surrender to the various

garrisons, which, however, did not prevent them from being nearly every man of them immediately butchered in cold blood.

Thus were these strong and well-manned redoubts, by which Prince Maurice had hoped to impede for many days the march of a Spanish army—should a Spanish army indeed be able to take the field at all—already swept off in an hour. Great was the dismay in Ostend when Colonel Piron and a few stragglers brought the heavy news of discomfiture and massacre to the high and mighty States-General in solemn meeting assembled.

Meanwhile, the States' army before Nieuport, not dreaming of any pending interruption to their labours, proceeded in a steady but leisurely manner to invest the city. Maurice occupied himself in tracing the lines of encampment and entrenchment, and ordered a permanent bridge to be begun across the narrowest part of the creek, in order that the two parts of his army might not be so dangerously divided from each other as they now were, at high water, by the whole breadth and depth of the harbour. Evening came on before much had been accomplished on this first day of the siege. It was scarcely dusk when a messenger, much exhausted and terrified, made his appearance at Count Ernest's tent. He was a straggler who had made his escape from Oudenburg and he brought the astounding intelligence that the archduke had already possession of that position and of all the other forts. Ernest instantly jumped into a boat and had himself rowed, together with the messenger, to the head-quarters of Prince Maurice on the other side of the river. The news was as unexpected as it was alarming. Here was the enemy, who was supposed incapable of mischief for weeks to come, already in the field, and planted directly on their communications with Ostend. Retreat, if retreat were desired, was

already impossible, and as to surprising the garrison of Nieupoort and to obtaining that stronghold as a basis for further aggressive operations, it is very certain that if any man in Flanders was more surprised than another at that moment, it was Prince Maurice himself. He was too good a soldier not to see at a glance that if the news brought by the straggler were true, the whole expedition was already a failure, and that, instead of a short siege and an easy victory, a great battle was to be fought upon the sands of Nieupoort, in which defeat was destruction of the whole army of the republic, and very possibly of the republic itself.

The stadholder hesitated. He was prone in great emergencies to hesitate at first, but immovable when his resolution was taken. Vere, who was asleep in his tent, was sent for and consulted. Most of the generals were inclined to believe that the demonstrations at Oudenburg, which had been so successful, were merely a bravado of Rivas, the commander of the permanent troops in that district, which were comparatively insignificant in numbers. Vere thought otherwise. He maintained that the archduke was already in force within a few hours' march of them, as he had always supposed would be the case. His opinion was not shared by the rest, and he went back to his truckle-bed, feeling that a brief repose was necessary for the heavy work which would soon be upon him. At midnight the Englishman was again called from his slumbers. Another messenger, sent directly from the States-General at Ostend, had made his way to the stadholder. This time there was no possibility of error, for Colonel Piron had sent the accord with the garrison commanders of the forts which had been so shamefully violated, and which bore the signature of the archduke.

It was now perfectly obvious that a pitched battle was to be fought before

another sunset, and most anxious were the deliberations in that brief midsummer's night. The dilemma was as grave as one as commander-in-chief had ever to solve in a few hours. A portentous change had come over the prospects of the commonwealth since the arrival of these despatches. But a few hours before, and never had its destiny seemed so secure, its attitude more imposing. The little republic, which Spain had been endeavouring forty years long to subjugate, had already swept every Spanish soldier out of its territory, had repeatedly carried fire and sword into Spain itself, and even into its distant dependencies, and at that moment—after effecting in a masterly manner the landing of a great army in the very face of the man who claimed to be sovereign of all the Netherlands, and after marching at ease through the heart of his territory—was preparing a movement, with every prospect of success, which should render the hold of that sovereign on any portion of Netherland soil as uncertain and shifting as the sands on which the States' army was now encamped.

The son of the proscribed and murdered rebel stood at the head of as powerful and well-disciplined an army as had ever been drawn up in line of battle on that blood-stained soil. The daughter of the man who had so long oppressed the provinces might soon be a fugitive from the land over which she had so recently been endowed with perpetual sovereignty. And now in an instant these visions were fading like a mirage.

The archduke, whom poverty and mutiny were to render powerless against invasion, was following close up upon the heels of the triumphant army of the stadholder. A decision was immediately necessary. The siege of Nieupoort was over before it had begun. Surprise had failed, assault for the moment was impossible, the manner how best to confront the advancing foe the only question.

Vere advised that the whole army should at once be concentrated and led without delay against the archduke before he should make further progress. 1 The advice involved an outrageous impossibility, and it seems incredible that it could have been given in good faith; still more amazing that its rejection by Maurice should have been bitterly censured. Two-thirds of the army lay on the other side of the harbour, and it was high water at about three o'clock. While they were deliberating, the sea was rising, and, so soon as day break should make any evolutions possible, they would be utterly prohibited during several hours by the inexorable tide. More time would be consumed by the attempt to construct temporary bridges (for of course little progress had been made in the stone bridge hardly begun) or to make use of boats than in waiting for the falling of the water, and, should the enemy make his appearance while they were engaged in such confusing efforts, the army would be hopelessly lost.

Maurice, against the express advice of Vere, decided to send his cousin Ernest, with the main portion of the force established on the right bank of the harbour, in search of the archduke, for the purpose of holding him in check long enough to enable the rest of the army to cross the water when the tide should serve. The enemy, it was now clear, would advance by precisely the path over which the States' army had marched that morning. Ernest was accordingly instructed to move with the greatest expedition in order to seize the bridge at Leffingen before the archduke should reach the deep, dangerous, and marshy river, over which it was the sole passage to the downs. Two thousand infantry, being the Scotch regiment of Edmonds and the Zealanders of Van der Noot, four squadrons of Dutch cavalry, and

two pieces of artillery, composed the force with which Ernest set forth at a little before dawn on his hazardous but heroic enterprise.

With a handful of troops he was to make head against an army, and the youth accepted the task in the cheerful spirit of self-sacrifice which characterized his house. Marching as rapidly as the difficult ground would permit, he had the disappointment, on approaching the fatal point at about eight o'clock, to see the bridge at Leffingen in the possession of the enemy. Maurice had sent off a messenger early that morning with a letter marked post haste (*cito, cito*) to Ostend, ordering up some four hundred cavalry-men then stationed in that city under Piron and Bruges, to move up to the support of Ernest, and to destroy the bridge and dams at Leffingen before the enemy should arrive. That letter, which might have been so effective, was delivered, as it subsequently appeared, exactly ten days after it was written. 1 The States, of their own authority, had endeavoured to send out those riders towards the scene of action, but it was with great difficulty that they could be got into the saddle at all, and they positively refused to go further than St. Albert fort. What course should he now pursue? He had been sent to cut the archduke's road. He had failed. Had he remained in his original encampment his force would have been annihilated by the overwhelming numbers of the enemy so soon as they reached the right bank of Nieuport haven, while Maurice could have only looked hopelessly on from the opposite shore. At least nothing worse than absolute destruction could befall him now. Should he accept a combat of six or eight to one the struggle would be hopeless, but the longer it was protracted the better it would be for his main army, engaged at that very moment as he knew in crossing

1 See the note on Sir Francis Vere at the end of this chapter.

1 Duyck, ii. 662.



the haven with the ebbing tide. Should he retreat, it might be possible for him to escape into Fort Albert or even Ostend, but to do so would be to purchase his own safety and that of his command at the probable sacrifice of the chief army of the republic. Ernest hesitated but an instant. Coming within carbine-shot of the stream, where he met his cavalry which had been sent forward at full speed, in the vain hope of seizing or destroying the bridge before it should be too late, he took up a position behind a dyke, upon which he placed his two field-pieces, and formed his troops in line of battle exactly across the enemy's path. On the right he placed the regiment of Scots. On the left was Van der Noot's Zeeland Infantry, garnished with four companies of riders under Risoir, which stood near St. Mary's church. The passage from the stream to the downs was not more than a hundred yards wide, being skirted on both sides by a swamp. Here Ernest with his two thousand men awaited the onset of the archduke's army. He was perfectly aware that it was a mere question of time, but he was sure that his preparations must interpose a delay to the advance of the Spaniards. should his troops, as he felt confident, behave themselves as they had always done, and that the delay would be of inestimable value to his friends at the haven of Nieuport.

The archduke paused; for he, too, could not be certain, on observing the resolute front thus presented to him, that he was not about to engage the whole of the States' army. The doubt was but of short duration, however, and the onset was made. Ernest's artillery fired four volleys into the advancing battalions with such effect as to stagger them for a moment, but they soon afterwards poured over the dyke in overwhelming numbers, easily capturing the cannon. The attack began upon Ernest's left, and Risoir's cavalry,

thinking that they should be cut off from all possibility of retreat into Fort St. Albert, turned their backs in the most disgraceful manner, without even waiting for the assault. Galloping around the infantry on the left they infected the Zeelanders with their own cowardice. Scarcely a moment passed before Van der Noot's whole regiment was running away as fast as the troopers, while the Scots on the right hesitated nor for an instant to follow their example. Even before the expected battle had begun, one of those hideous and unaccountable panics which sometimes break out like a moral pestilence to destroy all the virtue of an army, and to sweep away the best-considered schemes of a general, had spread through Ernest's entire force. So soon as the demi-cannon had discharged their fourth volley, Scots, Zeelanders, Walloons, pikemen, musketeers, and troopers, possessed by the demon of cowardice, were running like a herd of swine to throw themselves into the sea. Had they even kept the line of the downs in the direction of the fort many of them might have saved their lives, although none could have escaped disgrace. But the Scots, in an ecstasy of fear, throwing away their arms as they fled, ran through the waters behind the dyke, skimmed over the sands at full speed, and never paused till such as survived the sabre and musket of their swift pursuers had literally drowned themselves in the ocean. Almost every man of them was slain or drowned. All the captains—Stuart, Barclay, Murray, Kilpatrick, Michael, Nesbit—with the rest of the company officers, doing their best to rally the fugitives, were killed. The Zeelanders, more cautious in the midst of their panic, or perhaps knowing better the nature of the country, were more successful in saving their necks. Not more than a hundred and fifty of Van der Noot's regiment were killed, while such of the cavalry of Bruges and Piron as had come

to the neighbourhood of Fort Albert, not caring to trust themselves to the shelter of that redoubt, now fled as fast as their horses' legs would carry them, and never pulled bridle till they found themselves in Ostend. And so beside themselves with panic were these fugitives, and so virulent was its contagion, that it was difficult to prevent the men who had remained in the fort from joining in the flight towards Ostend. Many of them indeed threw themselves over the walls and were sabred by the enemy when they might have been safe within the fortifications. Had these cavalry companies of Bruges and Piron been even tolerably self-possessed, had they concentrated themselves in the fort instead of yielding to the delirium which prompted them to participate in their comrades' flight, they would have had it entirely in their power, by making an attack, or even the semblance of an attack, by means of a sudden sally from the fort, to have saved, not the battle indeed, but a large number of lives. But the panic was hopeless and universal, and countless fugitives scrambling by the fort were shot in a leisurely manner by a comparative few of the enemy as easily as the rabbits which swarmed in those sands were often knocked down in multitudes by half-a-dozen sportsmen.

And thus a band of patriots, who were not cowards by nature, and who had often played the part of men, had horribly disgraced themselves, and were endangering the very existence of their country, already by mistaken councils brought within the jaws of death. The glory of Thermopylæ might have hung for ever over that bridge of Leffingen. It was now a pass of infamy, perhaps of fatal disaster. The sands were covered with weapons—sabre, pike, and arquebus—thrown away by almost every soldier as he fled to save the life which after all was sacrificed. The artillery, all the standards and colours, all the baggage and ammunition, everything was lost.

No viler panic, no more complete defeat was ever recorded. Such at half-past eight in the morning was that memorable Sunday of the 2nd July, 1600, with the fate of the Dutch republic—the festival of the Visitation of the Virgin Mary, always thought of happy augury for Spanish arms.

Thus began the long-expected battle of Nieuport. At least a thousand of the choicest troops of the stadholder were slain, while the Spanish had hardly lost a man. 1

The archduke had annihilated his enemy, 2 had taken his artillery and thirty flags. In great exultation he des-

1 There can be no doubt whatever as to the rout of Leffingen. There was no fight at all. The journal of Antony Duyck and the accounts of Meteren, Bor, and other chroniclers entirely agree with the most boastful narratives of the Spaniards. Everard van Reydt to be sure stoutly maintains that the troops of Ernest fought to the uttermost ("zum euszersten gefochten"), and that hardly a whole spear was found in the hands of any of the dead on the field. Nor a broken one either, he might have added. It is a pity that the army had not been as staunch as the secretary and chronicler. But Reydt was not on the field nor near it, and there is not a word in Ernest's private letters to conflict with the minute and unvarnished statements of Duyck. See also the excellent note of Captain Mulder on p. 668, 669, part ii. of his admirable edition of Duyck's journal.

The confessor of the archduke, Fray Iniga de Brizuelas, was as enthusiastic on his side as the privy counsellor of Lewis William. The troops of the archduke, he says, attacked Ernest and in one moment killed 1800 to 2000 men without losing a man themselves—,"Elles mirent à mort en un moment 1800 à 2000 hommes s'emparèrent de ~~deux~~ pieces d'artillerie et de plusieurs drapeaux, sans avoir subi aucune perte . . . . On esperait généralement que ce jour mettrait fin aux guerres de Flandre." (1)

Substance d'une lettre écrite de Bruges le 13 Juillet, 1600, par Fray J. de Brizuelas à un seigneur de la cour à Madrid et reposant en copie aux fol. 45-48 du vol. II. 49 (Varias Consultas en tiempo de los reyes Austriacos) appartenant à la Bibliothèque Nat<sup>le</sup> à Madrid. MS. kindly communicated to me by M. Gachard.

2, "Qui fut si vivement chargée qu'elle y demeura toute" are the words of the archduke writing on the 4th July from Ghent to his council of state. (MS. Archives of Belgium.)

patched a messenger to the Infanta at Ghent, informing her that he had entirely defeated the advance-guard of the States' army, and that his next bulletin would announce his complete triumph and the utter overthrow of Maurice, who had now no means of escape. He stated also that he would very soon send the rebel stadholder himself to her as a prisoner. The Infanta, much pleased with the promise, observed to her attendants that she was curious to see how Nassau would conduct himself when he should be brought a captive into her presence. As to the Catholic troops, they were informed by the archduke that after the complete victory which they were that day to achieve, not a man should be left alive save Maurice and his brother Frederic Henry. These should be spared to grace the conqueror's triumph, but all else should be put to the sword.<sup>1</sup>

Meantime artillery thundered, bonfires blazed, and bells rang their merriest peals in Ghent, Bruges, and the other obedient cities as the news of the great victory spread through the land.

When the fight was done the archduke called a council of war. It was a grave question whether the army should at once advance in order to complete the destruction of the enemy that day, or pause for an interval that the troops fatigued with hard marching and with the victorious combat in which they had just been engaged, should recover their full strength. That the stadholder was completely in their power was certain. The road to Ostend was barred, and Nieuport would hold him at bay, now that the relieving army was close upon his heels. All that was necessary in order to annihilate his whole force was that they should entrench themselves for the night on the road which he must cross. He would then be obliged to assault their works with troops in-

ferior in number to theirs and fatigued by the march. Should he remain where he was he would soon be starved into submission, and would be obliged to surrender his whole army. On the other hand, by advancing now, in the intolerable heat of a July sun over the burning and glaring sands, the troops already wearied would arrive on the field of battle utterly exhausted, and would be obliged to attack an enemy freshly and cheerfully awaiting them on ground of his own selection.

Moreover it was absolutely certain that Fort Albert would not hold an hour if resolutely assaulted in the midst of the panic of Ernest's defeat, and, with its capture, the annihilation of Maurice was certain.

Meantime the three thousand men under Velasco, who had been detached to protect the rear, would arrive to reinforce the archduke's main army, should he pause until the next day.

These arguments, which had much logic in them, were strongly urged by Zapena, a veteran marshal of the camp who had seen much service, and whose counsels were usually received with deference. But on this occasion commanders and soldiers were hot for following up their victory. They cared nothing for the numbers of the enemy, they cried, „The more infidels the greater glory in destroying them.”<sup>1</sup> Delay might after all cause the loss of the prize, it was eagerly shouted. The archduke ought to pray that the sun might stand still for him that morning, as for Joshua in the vale of Ajalon. The foe seeing himself entrapped, with destruction awaiting him, was now skulking towards his ships, which still offered him the means of escape. Should they give him time he would profit by their negligence, and next morning when they reached Nieuport the birds would be flown. Especially the leaders of the

<sup>1</sup> Le Petit on the authority of prisoners. De la Pise.

<sup>1</sup> „Quato mas Moros tanto mas ganancias.”  
—De la Pise.



mutineers of Diest and Thionville were hoarse with indignation at the proposed delay. They had not left their brethren, they shouted, nor rallied to the archduke's banner in order to sit down and dig in the sand like ploughmen. There was triumph for the Holy Church, there was the utter overthrow of the heretic army, there was rich booty to be gathered, all these things were within their reach if they now advanced and smote the rebels while, confused and panic-stricken, they were endeavouring to embark in their ships.

While these vehement debates were at the hottest, sails were descried in the offing; for the archduke's forces already stood upon the edge of the downs. First one ship, then another and another, moved steadily along the coast, returning from Nieuport in the direction of Ostend.

This was more than could be borne. It was obvious that the rebels were already making their escape, and it was urged upon the cardinal that probably Prince Maurice and the other chieftains were on board one of those very vessels, and were giving him the slip. With great expedition it would still be possible to overtake them before the main body could embark, and the attack might yet be made at the most favourable moment. Those white sails gleaming in the distance were more eloquent than Zapena or any other advocate of delay, and the order was given to advance. And it was exactly at this period that it lay still within the power of the States' cavalry at Ostend to partially redeem their character and to render very effective service. Had four or five hundred resolute troopers hung upon the rear of the Spanish army now, as it moved towards Nieuport, they might, by judiciously skirmishing, advancing and retreating according to circumstances, have caused much confusion, and certainly have so harassed the archduke as to compel the detachment of a very considerable force

of his own cavalry to protect himself against such assaults. But the terror was an enduring one. Those horsemen remained paralyzed and helpless, and it was impossible for the States, with all their commands or entreaties, to induce them to mount and ride even a half mile beyond the city gates.

While these events had been occurring in the neighbourhood of Ostend, Maurice had not been idle at Nieuport. No sooner had Ernest been despatched on his desperate errand than his brother Lewis Gunther was ordered by the stadholder to get on horseback and ride through the quarters of the army. On the previous afternoon there had been so little thought of an enemy that large foraging parties had gone out from camp in all directions, and had not returned. Lewis gave notice that a great battle was to be expected on the morrow, instead of the tranquil commencement of a leisurely siege, and that therefore no soul was henceforth to leave the camp, while a troop of horse was despatched at the first gleam of daylight to skir the country in search of all the stragglers. Maurice had no thought of retreating, and his first care was to bring his army across the haven. The arrangements were soon completed, but it was necessary to wait until nearly low water. Soon after eight o'clock Count Lewis began to cross with eight squadrons of cavalry, and partly swimming, partly wading, effected the passage in safety. The advanced guard of infantry, under Sir Francis Vere—consisting of two thousand six hundred Englishmen, and two thousand eight hundred Frisians, with some companies of horse, followed by the battalia under Solms, and the rearguard under Tempel—then slowly and with difficulty moved along the same dangerous path with the water as high as their armpits, and often rising nearly over their heads. Had the archduke not been detained near the bridge of Ieffingen by Ernest's

Scotchmen and Zeelanders during three or four precious hours that morning; had he arrived, as he otherwise might have done, just as the States' army—horse, foot, and artillery—was floundering through that treacherous tide, it would have fared ill for the stadholder and the republic. But the devotion of Ernest had at last prevented the attack of the archduke until Maurice and his men stood on dry land.

Dripping from head to foot, but safe and sound, the army had at last reached the beach at Nieuport. Vere had refused his soldiers permission to denude themselves in crossing of their shoes and outer garments. There was no time for that, he said, and they would either earn new clothes for themselves that day, or never need doublet and hose again any more in the world. Some hours had elapsed before the tedious and difficult crossing of infantry, cavalry, and munition trains had been accomplished.

Lewis Gunther, with eight squadrons of picked cavalry, including his own company, Maurice's own, Frederic Henry's own, with Batenburg's arquebusmen, and other veterans, was first to place himself in battle order on the beach. His squadrons in iron corslet and morion, and armed with lances, carbines, and sabres, stretched across from the water to the downs. He had not been long stationed there when he observed that far away in the direction of Ostend the beach was growing black with troops. He believed them at first to be his brother Ernest and his forces returning victorious from their hazardous expedition, but he was soon deceived. A couple of troopers from Ostend came spurring full gallop along the strand, and almost breathless with dismay, announced that it was the whole army of the archduke advancing in line of battle. They were instantly sent to the rear, without being allowed to speak further, in order that they might deliver

their message in private to the commander-in-chief. And most terrible were the tidings to which Maurice now listened in very secret audience. Ernest was utterly defeated, his command cut to pieces, the triumphant foe advancing rapidly, and already in full sight. The stadholder heard the tale without flinching, and having quietly ordered the messengers upon their lives not to open their lips on the subject to living soul, sent them securely guarded in a boat on board one of the warships in the offing. With perfect cheerfulness he then continued his preparations, consulting with Vere, on whom he mainly relied for the marshalling of the army in the coming conflict. Undecided as he had sometimes shown himself, he was resolute now. He called no council of war, for he knew not how much might be known or suspected of the disaster already sustained, and he had fully made up his mind as to the course to be pursued. He had indeed taken a supreme resolution. Entirely out of his own breast, without advising with any man, he calmly gave directions that every warship, transport, barge, or wherry should put to sea at once. As the tide had now been long on the flood, the few vessels that had been aground within the harbour were got afloat, and the whole vast, almost innumerable armada, was soon standing out to sea. No more heroic decision was ever taken by fighting man.

Sir Francis gave advice that entrenchments should be thrown up on the north-east, and that instead of advancing towards the enemy they should await his coming, and refuse the battle that day if possible. The Englishmen, not aware of the catastrophe at Lefingen, which Maurice had locked up in his own breast, was now informed by the stadholder that there were to be no entrenchments that day but those of pike and arquebus. It was not the fault of Maurice that the fate of the commonwealth had been suspended on a

silken thread that morning, but he knew that but one of two issues was possible. They must fight their way through the enemy back to Ostend, or perish, every man of them. The possibility of surrender did not enter his mind, and he felt that it was better to hasten the action before the news of Ernest's disaster should arrive to chill the ardour of the troops. 1

Meantime Lewis Gunther and his cavalry had been sitting motionless upon their horses on the beach. The enemy was already in full view, and the young general, most desirous to engage in a preliminary skirmish, sent repeated messages to the stadholder for permission to advance. Presently Sir Francis Vere rode to the front, to whom he eagerly urged his request that the infantry of the vanguard might be brought up at once to support him. 2 On the contrary the English general advised that the cavalry should fall back to the infantry, in order to avoid a premature movement. Lewis strongly objected to this arrangement, on the ground that the mere semblance of retreat, thus upon the eve of battle, would discourage all the troops. But he was over-ruled, for Maurice had expressly enjoined upon his cousin that morning to defer in all things to the orders of Vere. These eight squadrons of horse accordingly shifted their position, and were now placed close to the edge of the sea, on the left flank of the vanguard, which Vere had drawn up across the beach and in the downs. On the edge of the downs, on the narrow slip of hard sand above high-water mark, and on Vere's right, Maurice had placed a battery of six demi-cannon.

Behind the advance was the battalia, or centre, under command of that famous fighter, George Everard Solms, consisting of Germans, Swiss, French,

and Walloons. The „New Beggars,” as the Walloons were called, who had so recently surrendered the forts of Creve cœur and St. Andrew, and gone over from the archduke's service to the army of the States, were included in this division, and were as eager to do credit to their new chief as were the mutineers in the archduke's army to merit the approbation of their sovereign.

The rearguard under Tempel was made up, like the other divisions, of the blended nationalities of German, Briton, Hollander, and Walloon, and like the others, was garnished at each flank with heavy cavalry.

The Spanish army, after coming nearly within cannon-shot of their adversary, paused. It was plain that the States troops were not in so great a panic as the more sanguine advisers of the archduke had hoped. They were not cowering among the shipping, preparing to escape. Still less had any portion of them already effected their retreat in those vessels, a few of which had so excited the enemy's ardour when they came in sight. It was obvious that a great struggle, in which the forces were very evenly balanced, was now to be fought out upon those sands. It was a splendid tournament,—a great duel for life and death between the champions of the Papacy and of Protestantism, of the Republic and of absolutism, that was to be fought out that midsummer's day. The lists were closed. The trumpet signal for the fray would soon be blown.

The archduke, in Milanese armour on a wonderfully beautiful snow-white Spanish stallion, moved in the centre of his army. He wore no helmet, that his men might the more readily recognize him as he rode gallantly to and fro, marshalling, encouraging, exhorting the troops. Never before had he manifested such decided military talent, combined with unquestionable personal valour, as he had done since this campaign began. Friend and foe agreed that

1 That Maurice concealed from Vere the news of the defeat at Leffingen is expressly stated by Antony Duyck.

2 See note on Vere.



day that Albert fought like a lion. He was at first well seconded by Mendoza, who led the van, and by Villars, La Bourlotte, Avalos, Zapena, and many other officers of note. The mutinous Spanish and Italian cavalry, combined with a few choice squadrons of Walloon and German horse, were placed in front and on the flanks. They were under the special supervision of the admiral, who marshalled their squadrons and directed their charging, although mounted on hackney himself, and not intending to participate in the action. Then came the battalia and rear, crowding very closely upon each other.

Face to face with them stood the republican host, drawn up in great solid squares of infantry, their standards waving above each closely planted lump of pikemen, with the musketeers ringing their skirts, while the iron-clad ponderous cavalry of Count Lewis and Marcellus Bax, in black casque and pikelet, were in front, restlessly expecting the signal for the onset. The volunteers of high rank who were then serving on the staff of the stadholder—the Duke of Holstein, the Prince of Anhalt, two young Counts Solms, and others—had been invited and even urged to abandon the field while there was yet time for setting them on board the fleet. Especially it was thought desirable that young Frederic Henry, a mere boy, on whom the hopes of the Orange-Nassau house would rest if Maurice fell in the conflict, should be spared the fate which seemed hanging over the Commonwealth and her defenders. But the son of William the Silent implored his brother with clasped hands not to send him from his side at that moment, so that Maurice granted his prayer, and caused him to be provided with a complete suit of armour. Thus in company with young Coligny—a lad of his own age, and like himself a grandson of the great admiral—the youth who was one day to play so noble a part on the

stage of the world's affairs was now to be engaged in his first great passage of arms. No one left the field but Sir Robert Sidney, who had come over from Ostend, from irrepressible curiosity to witness the arrangements, but who would obviously have been guilty of unpardonable negligence had he been absent at such a crisis from the important post of which he was governor for the queen, 1

The arena of the conflict seemed elaborately prepared by the hand of nature. The hard, level, sandy beach, swept clean and smooth by the ceaseless action of the tides, stretched out far as the eye could reach in one long, bold, monotonous line. Like the whole coast of Flanders and of Holland, it seemed drawn by a geometrical rule, not a cape, cove, or estuary breaking the perfect straightness of the design. On the right, just beyond high-water mark, the downs, fantastically heaped together like a mimic mountain chain, or like tempestuous ocean-waves suddenly changed to sand, rolled wild and confused, but still in regularly parallel course with the line of the beach. They seemed a barrier thrown up to protect the land from being bitten quite away by the ever-restless and encroaching sea. Beyond the downs, which were seven hundred yards in width, extended a level tract of those green fertile meadows, artificially drained, which are so characteristic a feature of the Netherland landscapes, the stream which ran from Ostend towards the town of Nieupoort flowing sluggishly

1 Duyck, however, with much injustice, as it would seem, accuses Sidney (whom he calls „Philip Sidney”!) of cowardice; stating that he paid a large sum to obtain a vessel in which to make his escape, and that he was obliged to hear many insulting observations on his flight. „De heere Philips (sic) Sidnei tsij uyt vrese ofte anders ontvont hem van daer ende geraeckte met groote moeite ende naer veel schampere woorden hem bij eenigen gegeven t'scheeps selfs met presentatie van geld ende voer doen wech, niet dervende in den slach blijven.”—*Journal*, ii. 667.

through them. It was a bright warm midsummer day. The waves of the German Ocean came lazily rolling in upon the crisp yellow sand, the surf breaking with its monotonous music at the very feet of the armies. A gentle south-west breeze was blowing, just filling the sails of more than a thousand ships in the offing, which moved languidly along the sparkling sea. It was an atmosphere better befitting a tranquil holiday than the scene of carnage which seemed approaching.

Maurice of Nassau, in complete armour, rapier in hand, with the orange-plumes waving from his helmet and the orange-scarf across his breast, rode through the lines, briefly addressing his soldiers with martial energy. Pointing to the harbour of Nieuport behind them, now again impassable with the flood, to the ocean on the left where rode the fleet, carrying with it all hope of escape by sea, and to the army of the archduke in front, almost within cannon-range, he simply observed that they had no possible choice between victory and death. They must either utterly overthrow the Spanish army, he said, or drink all the waters of the Sea. Either drowning or butchery was their doom if they were conquered, for no quarter was to be expected from their unscrupulous and insolent foe. He was there to share their fate, to conquer or to perish with them, and from their tried valour and from the God of battles he hoped a more magnificent victory than had ever before been achieved in this almost perpetual war for independence. The troops, perfectly enthusiastic, replied with a shout that they were ready to live or die with their chieftain, and eagerly demanded to be led upon the foe. Whether from hope or from desperation, they were confident and cheerful. Some doubt was felt as to the Walloons, who had so lately transferred themselves from the archduke's army, but their commander, Marquette, made

them all lift up their hands, and swear solemnly to live or die that day at the feet of Prince Maurice.

Two hours long those two armies had stood looking each other in the face. It was near two o'clock when the archduke at last gave the signal to advance. The tide was again almost at the full. Maurice stood firm, awaiting the assault the enemy slowly coming nearer, and the rising tide as steadily lapping away all that was left of the hard beach which fringed the rugged downs. Count Lewis chafed with impatience as it became each moment more evident that there would be no beach left for cavalry fighting, while in the downs the manœuvring of horse was entirely impossible. Meantime, by command of Vere all those sandy hillocks and steeps had been thickly sown with musketeers and pikemen. Arquebus-men and carabineers were planted in every hollow, while on the highest and most advantageous elevation two pieces of cannon had been placed by the express direction of Maurice. It seemed obvious that the battle would, after all, be transferred to the downs. Not long before the action began, a private of the enemy's cavalry was taken, apparently with his own consent, in a very trifling preliminary skirmish. He bragged loudly of the immense force of the archduke, of the great victory already gained over Ernest with the utter annihilation of his forces, and of the impending destruction of the whole States' army. Strange to say, this was the first intimation received by Count Lewis of that grave disaster, although it had been for some hours known to Maurice. The prisoner was at once gagged, that he might spread his disheartening news no further, but as he persisted by signs and gestures in attempting to convey the information which he had evidently been sent forward to impart, he was shot by command

1 Letters of Lewis Gunther cited at end of the chapter.

of the stadholder, and so told no further tales. 1

The enemy had now come very close, and it was the desire of Count Lewis that a couple of companies of horse, in accordance with the commands of Maurice, should charge the cavalry in front, and that after a brief skirmish they should retreat as if panic-stricken behind the advance column, thus decoying the Spanish vanguard in hot pursuit towards the battery upon the edge of the downs. 2 The cannon were then suddenly to open upon them, and during the confusion sure to be created in their ranks, the musketeers, ambushed among the hollows, were to attack them in flank, while the cavalry in one mass should then make a concentrated charge in front. It seemed certain that the effect of this movement would be to hurl the whole of the enemy's advance, horse and foot, back upon his battalia, and thus to break up his army in irretrievable rout. The plan was a sensible one, but it was not ingeniously executed. Before the handful of cavalry had time to make the proposed feint the cannoniers, being unduly excited, and by express command of Sir Francis Vere, fired a volley into the advancing columns of the archduke. 3 This precipitated the action; almost in an instant changed its whole character, and defeated the original plan of the republican leader. The enemy's cavalry broke at the first discharge from the battery; and wheeled in considerable disorder, but without panic, quite into and across the downs. The whole army of the archduke, which had already been veering in the same direction, as it advanced, both because the tide was so steadily devouring the even surface of the sands, and because the position of a large portion of the States' forces among the hillocks ex-

posed him to an attack in flank, was now rapidly transferred to the downs. It was necessary for that portion of Maurice's army which still stood on what remained of the beach to follow this movement. A rapid change of front was then undertaken, and—thanks to the careful system of wheeling, marching, and counter-marching in which the army had been educated by William Lewis and Maurice—was executed with less confusion than might have been expected.

But very few companies of infantry now remained on the strip of beach still bare of the waves, and in the immediate vicinity of the artillery planted high and dry beyond their reach.

The scene was transformed as if by magic, and the battle was now to be fought out in those shifting, uneven hills and hollows, where every soldier stood mid-leg deep in the dry and burning sand. Fortunately for the States' army, the wind was in its back, blowing both sand and smoke into the faces of its antagonists, while the already westering sun glared fiercely in their eyes. Maurice had skilfully made use of the great advantage which accident had given him that day, and his very refusal to advance and to bring on a premature struggle thus stood him in stead in a variety of ways. Lewis Gunther was now ordered, with Marcellus Bax and six squadrons of horse, to take position within the belt of pasture-land on the right of the downs. When he arrived there the van of the archduke's infantry had already charged the States' advance under Vere, while just behind and on the side of the musketeers and pikemen a large portion of the enemy's cavalry was standing stock still on the green. Without waiting for instructions, Lewis ordered a charge. It was brilliantly successful. Unheeding a warm salutation in flank from the musketeers as they rode by them, and notwithstanding that they were obliged to take several ditches as

1 H. Wyts, in Bor, IV. Byvoeg, v. Auth. takken. Compare Van Wyn op Wagenaar, v. 37-47.

2 See note on Vere.

3 Ibid.



they charged, they routed the enemy's cavalry at the first onset, and drove them into panic-stricken flight. Some fled for protection quite to the rear of their infantry, others were hotly pursued across the meadows till they took refuge under the walls of Nieupoort. The very success of the attack was nearly fatal however to Count Lewis; for, unable to restrain the ardour of his troopers in the chase, he found himself cut off from the army with only ten horsemen to support him, and completely enveloped by the enemy. Fortunately Prince Maurice had foreseen the danger, and had ordered all the cavalry to the meadows so soon as the charge was made. Captain Kloet, with a fresh company of mounted carabineers, marked the little squad of States cavalry career-ing about in the midst of the Catholics, recognized their leader by the orange-plumes on his casque, and dashed forward to the rescue. Lewis again found himself at the head of his cavalry, but was obliged to wait a long time for the return of the stragglers.

While this brilliant diversion had been enacting as it were on the fringe of the battle, its real bustle and business had been going on in the downs. Just as Lewis made his charge in the pastures, the infantry of the archduke and the advance-guard of the republicans met in deadly shock. More than an hour long they contended with varying success. Musketeers, pikemen, arquebusmen, swordsmen, charged, sabred, or shot each other from the various hollows or heights of vantage, plunging knee-deep in the sand, torn and impeded by the prickly broom-plant which grew profusely over the whole surface, and fighting breast to breast and hand to hand in a vast series of individual encounters. Thrice were the Spaniards repulsed in what for a moment seemed absolute rout, thrice they rallied and drove their assailants at push of pike far beyond their original position; and

again the conquered republicans recovered their energy and smote their adversaries as if the contest were just begun. The tide of battle ebbed and flowed like the waves of the sea, but it would be mere pedantry to affect any technical explanation of its various changes. It was a hot struggle of twenty thousand men, pent up in a narrow space, where the very nature of the ground had made artistic evolutions nearly impracticable. The advance, the battalia, even the rearguard on both sides were mixed together pell-mell, and the downs were soon covered at every step with the dead and dying—Briton, Hollander, Spaniard, Italian, Frisian, Frenchman, Walloon, fighting and falling together, and hotly contesting every inch of those barren sands.

It seemed, said one who fought there, as if the last day of the world had come.

Political and religious hatred, pride of race, remembrance of a half-century of wrongs, hope, fury, and despair; these were the real elements contending with each other that summer's day. It was a mere trial of ferocity and endurance, not more scientific than a fight between packs of wolves and of bloodhounds.

No doubt the brunt of the conflict fell upon Vere with his Englishmen and Frisians, for this advance-guard made up nearly one-half of the States'.

1 „Car à raison de la situation du pays, la science et dextérité en laquelle nous presumions d'exceder nostre enemy (qui estoit la prompte et agile motion de nos bataillons, nous fust entierement rendue infructueuse.” —Vere, *La Bataille de Nieupoort*.

„Aussi est il impossible d'observer aucun ordre, sinon par troupes, vu que la bataille s'est donnée aux dunes où il faict si inegal que tous ont ete pel et mesle, l'arriere-garde ast este aussitost aux mains que l'avant-garde en la bataille.”—Ernest Casimir to William Lewis, 20 July, 1600. Groen v. Prinsterer, *Archives*, II. 36.

„Car s'estant les deux armées fort furieusement attaquées il y a esté combattu plus de deux heures main a main et pesle-mesle doubteusement de la victoire,” &c. &c.—Letter of the States-General to Queen Elizabeth, 3 July, 1600. (*Hague Archives MS.*)

army actually engaged. And most nobly, indefatigably, did the hardy veteran discharge his duty. Having personally superintended almost all the arrangements in the morning, he fought all day in the front, doing the work both of a field-marshal and a corporal. He was twice wounded, shot each time through the same leg, yet still fought on as if it were some one else's blood and not his own that was flowing from „those four holes in his flesh.”<sup>1</sup> He complained that he was not sufficiently seconded, and that the reserves were not brought up rapidly enough to his support. He was manifestly unjust, for although it could not be doubted that the English and the Frisians did their best, it was equally certain that every part of the army was as staunch as the vanguard. It may be safely asserted that it would not have benefited the cause of the States, had every man been thrown into the fight at one and the same moment.

During this „bloody bit,” as Vere called it, between the infantry on both sides, the little battery of two field pieces planted on the highest hillock of the downs had been very effective. Meanwhile, while the desperate and decisive struggle had been going on, Lewis further, in the meadow, had again rallied all the cavalry, which, at the first stage of the action, had been dispersed in pursuit of the enemy's horse. Gathering them together in a mass, he besought Prince Maurice to order him to charge. The stadholder bade him pause yet a little longer. The aspect of the infantry fight was not yet, in his opinion, sufficiently favourable. Again and again Lewis sent fresh entreaties, and at last received the desired permission. Placing three picked squadrons in front, the young general made a furious assault upon the Catholic cavalry, which had again rallied and was drawn up very close to the musketeers. Fortune was

not so kind to him as at the earlier stage of the combat. The charge was received with dauntless front by the Spanish and Italian horse, while at the same moment the infantry poured a severe fire into their assailants. The advancing squadrons faltered, wheeled back upon the companies following them, and the whole mass of the republican cavalry broke into wild and disorderly retreat. At the same moment the archduke, observing his advantage, threw in his last reserves of infantry, and again there was a desperate charge upon Vere's wearied troops, as decisive as the counter charge of Lewis's cavalry had been unsuccessful. The English and Frisians, sorely tried during those hours of fighting with superior numbers in the intolerable heat, broke at last and turned their backs upon the foe. Some of them fled panic-stricken quite across the downs and threw themselves into the sea, but the mass retreated in a comparatively orderly manner, being driven from one down to another, and seeking a last refuge behind the battery placed on the high-water line of the beach. In the confusion and panic Sir Francis Vere went down at last. His horse, killed by a stray shot, fell with and upon him, and the heroic Englishman would then and there have finished his career—for he would hardly have found quarter from the Spaniards—had not Sir Robert Drury, riding by in the tumult, observed him as he lay almost exhausted in the sand. By his exertion and that of his servant Higham, Vere was rescued from his perilous situation, placed on the crupper of Sir Robert's horse, and so borne off the field.

The current of the retreating and pursuing hosts swept by the spot where Maurice sat on horseback, watching and directing the battle. His bravest and best general, the veteran Vere, had fallen; his cousin Lewis was now as utterly overthrown as his brother Ernest had been but a few hours before at the

<sup>1</sup> His own expression.

fatal bridge of Leffingen; the whole army, the only army, of the States was defeated, broken, panic-struck; the Spanish shouts of victory rang on every side. Plainly the day was lost, and with it the republic. In the blackest hour that the Netherland commonwealth had ever known, the fortitude of the stadholder did not desert him. Immovable as a rock in the torrent he stemmed the flight of his troops. Three squadrons of reserved cavalry, Balen's own, Vere's own, and Cecil's, were all that was left him, and at the head of these he essayed an advance. He seemed the only man on the field not frightened; and menacing, conjuring, persuading the fugitives for the love of fatherland, of himself and his house, of their own honour, not to disgrace and destroy themselves for ever; urging that all was not yet lost, and beseeching them at least to take despair for their master, and rather to die like men on the field than to drown like dogs in the sea, he succeeded in rallying a portion of those nearest him. 1 The enemy paused in their mad pursuit, impressed even more than were the States' troops by the dauntless bearing of the prince. It was one of those supreme moments in battle and in history which are sometimes permitted to influence the course of events during a long future. The archduke and his generals committed a grave error in pausing for an instant in their career. Very soon it was too late to repair the fault, for the quick and correct eye of the stadholder saw the point to which the whole battle was tending, and he threw his handful of reserved cavalry, with such of the fugitives as had rallied, straight towards the battery on the beach.

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1 „Je vous assure que la victoire courut alors grand hazard, car au meme instant toute nostre infanterie se reistroit aussi le grand pas . . . . . nostre cavallerie fuioit jusqu'à son Exce lequel estoit lors la seule occasion de la victoire," &c.—Letters of Lewis Gunther.

It was arranged that Balen should charge on the strand, Horace Vere through the upper downs, and Cecil along the margin of the beach. Balen rode slowly through the heavy sand, keeping his horses well in wind, and at the moment he touched the beach, rushed with fury upon the enemy's foot near the battery. The moment was most opportune, for the last shot had been fired from the guns, and they had just been nearly abandoned in despair. The onset of Balen was successful: the Spanish infantry, thus suddenly attacked, were broken, and many were killed and taken. Cecil and Vere were equally fortunate, so that the retreating English and Frisians began to hold firm again. It was the very crisis of the battle, which up to that instant seemed wholly lost by the republic, so universal was the overthrow and the flight. Some hundred and fifty Frisian pikemen now rallied from their sullen retreat, and drove the enemy off one hillock or dune.

Foiled in their attempt to intercept the backward movement of the States' army and to seize this vital point and the artillery with it, the Spaniards hesitated and were somewhat discouraged. Some Zeeland sailors, who had stuck like wax to those demi-cannon during the whole conflict, now promptly obeyed orders to open yet once more upon the victorious foe. At the first volley the Spaniards were staggered, and the sailors with a lively shout of „Ian—fall on," inspired the defeated army with a portion of their own cheerfulness. 1 Others vehemently shouted victory without any reason whatever. At that instant Maurice ordered a last charge by those few cavalry squadrons, while the enemy was faltering under the play of the artillery. It was a forlorn hope yet such was the shifting fortune of that memorable day that the charge decided the battle. The

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1 „Sonder fundament nochtans"—Duyck ii. 676.



whole line of the enemy broke, the conquered became the victors, the fugitives quickly rallying and shouting victory almost before they had turned their faces to the foe, became in their turn the pursuers. 1 The Catholic army could no longer be brought to a stand, but fled wildly in every direction, and were shot and stabbed by the republicans as they fled. The Admiral of Arragon fell with his hackney in this last charge. Unwounded, but struggling to extricate himself from his horse that had been killed, he was quickly surrounded by the enemy.

Two Spaniards, Mendo and Villalobos by name, who had recently deserted to the States, came up at the moment and recognised the fallen admiral. They had reason to recognise him, for both had been in his service, and one of them, who was once in immediate household attendance upon him, bore the mark of a wound which he had received from his insolent master. „Admiral, look at this,” cried Villalobos, pointing to the scar on his face. 2 The admiral looked and knew his old servants, and gave his scarf to the one and the hanger of his sword-belt to the other, as token that he was their prisoner. Thus his life was saved for heavy ransom, of which those who had actually captured him would receive a very trifling portion. The great prisoner was carried to the rear, where he immediately asked for food and drink, and fell to with an appetite, while the

pursuit and slaughter went on in all directions. 1

The archduke, too, whose personal conduct throughout the day was admirable, had been slightly wounded by a halberd stroke on the ear. This was at an earlier stage of the action, and he had subsequently mounted another horse, exchanging his splendid armour for a plain black harness, over which he wore a shabby scarf. In the confusion of the rout he was hard beset. „Surrender, scoundrell!” cried a Walloon pikeman, seizing his horse by the bridle. But a certain Flemish Captain Kabbeljaw recognising his sovereign and rushing to his rescue, slew his assailant and four others with his own hand. 2 He was at last himself killed, but Albert escaped, and, accompanied by the Duke of Aumale, who was also slightly wounded, by Colonel La Bourlotte, and half a dozen troopers, rode for his life in the direction of Bruges. When they reached the fatal bridge of Leffingen, over which the archduke had marched so triumphantly but a few hours before to annihilate Count Ernest's division, he was nearly taken prisoner. A few soldiers, collected from the scattered garrisons, had occupied the position, but knowing nothing of the result of the action in the downs, took to their heels and fled as the little party of cavaliers advanced. Had the commander at Ostend or the States-General promptly sent out a company or two so soon as the news of the victory reached them, to seize this vital point the doom of the archduke would have been sealed. Nothing then could have saved him from capture. Fortunately escaping this danger, he now pushed on, and never pulled bridle till he reached Bruges. Thence without pausing he was conveyed to Ghent, where he presented himself to the Infanta. He was not accompanied by the captive Maurice of Nassau, and the curiosity of the princess to know how that warrior

1 „Et jà la victoire estait comme nostre et on canon en nostre pouvoir mais nostre avallierie estant chargée de celle de dudit enemy se vint sauver en notre arriere-garde e que voyant je le fis retourner et chargerent l'ennemy assez prochement. De quoy l'apercevant retourna pour la seconde fois et eux quy derechef se vindrent sauver en notre arriere-garde et rompre la plus grande partie d'icelle qui causa quel'infanterie perdit courage de passer oultre et pouruivre ce qu'elle avoit gagné avec tant d'honneur et lors commença la retraite,” &c.—  
IS. Letter of Albert before cited.

2 De la Pise. Meteren.

1 Meteren.

2 *ibid.*

would demean himself as a prisoner was not destined on this occasion to be gratified.

Isabella bore the disappointment and the bitter intelligence of the defeat with a stoicism worthy of her departed father. She had already had intimations that the day was going against her army, and had successively received tidings that her husband was killed, was dangerously wounded, was a prisoner; and she was now almost relieved to receive him, utterly defeated, but still safe and sound.

Meantime the mad chase continued along the beach and through the downs. Never was a rout more absolute than that of Albert's army. Never had so brilliant a victory been achieved by Hollander or Spaniard upon that great battle-ground of Europa—the Netherlands. 1

1 „Prometo a V. S.ª,” wrote the archduke to the Duke of Lorraine, „que no creo me pudiera consolar jamas desta disgracia interesando tanto el servicio de su Magestad en ella si no me huviera costado sangre pero asi como ha sido poca la derramara de muy buena gana toda como lo baré y la tengo ofrecido al servicio de su Magestad siempre que sea menester.”—Letter to Duke of Lorraine, Bibl. Nat. Madrid, kindly communicated to me by Mons. Gachard.

„L'archiduc a montré ce jour-là une grande valeur, c'est avec beaucoup de peine qu'on l'a déterminé à se retirer du champ de bataille.”—Letter of Fray Inigo de Brizuelas before cited.

„S. A. en personne combattant comme ung lion.”—Extraits des procès-verbaux des Etats-Generaux de 1600. (MS. Archives of Belgium.)

„A quoy respondant, le greffier declaira que les Etats estoient marris de ladite disgrâce mais tres contens et joyeux de connoître la vaillandise de leur prince mesmes qu'il n'avoit esparagné sa personne propre et de mettre sa vie en hazard pour la defence de son pays et peuple,” &c.—*Ibid.*

The defeat was mainly attributed in the obedient provinces to the bad conduct of the lately mutinous cavalry. („Causée principalement par les chevaucheurs amutinez,” said Nicholas Dubois, deputy of Tournay, to his constituents in a letter from Brussels of 4th July. MS. Archives of Belgium.) Consolation was also sought in the ridiculous assumption that the loss of the States' army was greater than that of the archduke's forces

Maurice, to whom the chief credit of the victory was unquestionably due had been firm and impassive during the various aspects of the battle, never losing his self-command when affairs seemed blackest. So soon, however as the triumph, after wavering so long, was decided in his favour—the veteran legions of Spain and Italy, the picked troops of Christendom, all flying at last before his troops—the stadholder was fairly melted. Dismounting from his horse, he threw himself on his knees in the sand, and with streaming eyes and uplifted hands, exclaimed, „O God, what are we human creatures to whom Thou hast brought such honour, and to whom Thou hast vouchsafed such a victory!” 1

The slaughter went on until nightfall, but the wearied conquerors were then obliged to desist from the pursuit. Three thousand Spaniards were slain and about six hundred prisoners were taken. 2 The loss of the States' army, including the affair in the morning at Leffingen, was about two thousand killed. Maurice was censured for not following up his victory more closely, but the criticism seems unjust. The night which followed the warm summer's day was singularly black and cloudy, the army was exhausted, the distance for the enemy to traverse before they found themselves safe within their own territory was not great. In such circumstances the stadholder might well deem himself sufficiently triumphant to have plucked a splendid victory out of the very jaws of death. All the

1 „O Godt, wie zijn wy menschen dien ghy sulcken eere ghedaen ende Overwinninghe ghegheven hebt.”—Letter of Uytenbogaert, in P. Fleming, *Belegeringe van Oostende*. S' Gravenhage, 1621.

2 Count Ernest puts the loss of the archduke at 4000 killed on the battle-field and 1000 on the retreat. Maurice estimates his enemy's loss at more than 5000. Groen v. Prinsterer, *Archives II.* s. ii. 15, 18, 19. Duyck says 8000 were killed on the field—as ascertained by counting—besides those who were drowned and slain in the retreat. The archduke's confessor says that 1000 Spaniards were killed. (MS. letter before cited.)

artillery of the archduke—seven pieces besides the two captured from Ernest in the morning—one hundred and twenty standards, and a long list of distinguished prisoners, including the Admiral Zapena and many other officers of note, were the trophies of the conqueror. Maurice passed the night on the battle-field; the admiral supping with him in his tent. Next morning he went to Ostend, where a great thanksgiving was held, Uytenbogart preaching an eloquent sermon on the 116th Psalm. Afterwards there was a dinner at the house of the States-General, in honour of the stadholder, to which the Admiral of Arragon was likewise bidden. That arrogant but discomfited personage was obliged to listen to many a rough martial joke at his disaster as they sat at table, but he bore the brunt of the encounter with much fortitude.

„Monsieur the Admiral of Arragon,” said the stadholder in French, „is more fortunate than many of his army. He has been desiring these four years to see Holland. Now he will make his entrance there without striking a blow.”<sup>1</sup> The gibe was perhaps deficient in delicacy towards a fallen foe, but a man who had passed a whole winter in murdering his prisoners in cold blood might be satisfied if he were stung only by a sharp sarcasm or two, when he had himself become a captive.

Others asked him demurely what he thought of these awkward apprentices of Holland and Zeeland, who were good enough at fighting behind dykes and ramparts of cities, but who never ventured to face a Spanish army in the open field. Mendoza sustained himself with equanimity however, and found plenty of answers. He discussed the battle

with coolness, blamed the archduke for throwing the whole of his force prematurely into the contest, and applauded the prudence of Maurice in keeping his reserves in hand. He ascribed a great share of the result to the States' artillery, which had been well placed upon wooden platforms and well served, while the archduke's cannon, sinking in the sands, had been of comparatively little use. Especially he expressed a warm admiration for the heroism of Maurice in sending away his ships, and in thus leaving himself and his soldiers no alternative but death or triumph.

While they still sat at a table many of the standards taken from the enemy were brought in and exhibited; the stadholder and others amusing themselves with reading the inscriptions and devices emblazoned upon them.

And thus on the 2nd July, 1600, the army of the States-General, led by Maurice of Nassau, had utterly defeated Albert of Austria. 1 Strange to say—on another 2nd July, three centuries and two years before, a former Albert of Austria had overthrown the Emperor Adolphus of Nassau, who had then lost both crown and life in the memorable battle of Worms. The imperial shade of Maurice's ancestor had been signally appeased.

In Ostend, as may well be imagined, ineffable joy had succeeded to the horrible gloom in which the day had been passed, ever since the tidings had been received of Ernest's overthrow.

Those very cavalry men, who had remained all day cowering behind the walls of the city, seeing by the clouds

<sup>1</sup> „Monsieur l'Admirante d'Arragon a este plus heureux que pas un de son armee, car il a fort desiré plus de quatre années continuellement de voir la Hollande, maintenant il y entrera sans coup ferir.”—Letter of Uytenbogart, who sat at the table and heard Maurice make the remark.

<sup>1</sup> „Enfin l'affaire vint aux mains et fut combattu bien furieusement de deux costés l'espace de deux heures. Enfin Dieu par sa grace voulut que la victoire demeura de non costé.” Such were the simple words in which Maurice announced to this cousin Lewis William his victory in the most important battle that had been fought for half a century. Not even General Ulysses Grant could be more modest in the hour of immense triumph.



of dust which marked the track of the fugitives that the battle had been won by the comrades whom they had so basely deserted in the morning, had been eager enough to join in the pursuit. It was with difficulty that the States, who had been unable to drive them out of the town while the fight was impending or going on, could keep enough of them within the walls to guard the city against possible accident, now that the work was done. Even had they taken the field a few hours earlier, without participating in action, or risking their own lives, they might have secured the pass of Leffingen, and made the capture of the archduke or his destruction inevitable.

The city, which had seemed deserted, swarmed with the garrison and with the lately trembling burghers, for it seemed to all as if they had been born again. Even the soldiers on the battle-field had embraced each other like comrades who had met in another world. „Blessed be His holy name,” said the stadholder’s chaplain, „for His right hand has led us into hell and brought us forth again. I know not,” he continued, „if I am awake or if I dream, when I think how God has in one moment raised us from the dead.”<sup>1</sup>

Lewis Gunther, whose services had been so conspicuous, was well rewarded. „I hope,” said that general, writing to his brother Lewis William, „that this day’s work will not have been useless to me, both for what I have learned in it and for another thing. His excellency has done me the honour to give me the admiral for my prisoner.”<sup>2</sup> And equally characteristic was the reply of the religious and thrifty stadholder in Friesland.

„I thank God,” he said, „for his singular grace in that He has been pleased to make use of your person as the in-

strument of so renowned and signal a victory, for which, as you have derived therefrom not mediocre praise, and acquired a great reputation, it should be now your duty to humble yourself before God, and to acknowledge that it is He alone who has thus honoured you. . . . You should reverence Him the more, that while others are admonished of their duty by misfortunes and miseries, the good God invites you to His love by benefits and honours. . . . I am very glad, too, that his Excellency has given you the admiral for your prisoner, both because of the benefit to you, and because it is a mark of your merit on that day. Knowing the state of our affairs, you will now be able to free your patrimony from encumbrances, when otherwise you would have been in danger of remaining embarrassed and in the power of others. It will therefore be a perpetual honour to you that you, the youngest of us all, have been able by your merits to do more to raise up our house out of its difficulties than your predecessors or I myself have been able to do.”<sup>1</sup>

The beautiful white horse which the archduke had ridden during the battle fell into the hands of Lewis Gunther, and was presented by him to Prince Maurice, who had expressed great admiration of the charger. It was a Spanish horse, for which the archduke had lately paid eleven hundred crowns.<sup>2</sup> A white hackney of the Infanta had also been taken, and became the property of Count Ernest.<sup>3</sup>

The news of the great battle spread with unexampled rapidity, not only through the Netherlands but to neighbouring countries. On the night of the 7th July (N. S.) five days after the event Envoy Caron, in England, received intimations of the favourable news from

<sup>1</sup> Letter of Uytenbogart.

<sup>2</sup> Lewis Gunther to Lewis William, 20 July, 1600. (Groen v. Prinsterer Archives, II. 23.)

<sup>1</sup> Lewis William to Lewis Gunther, July, 1600. *Ibid.* 42, 43.

<sup>2</sup> Letters last cited.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*

the French ambassador, who had received a letter from the Governor of Calais. Next morning, very early, he waited on Sir Robert Cecil at Greenwich, and was admitted to his chamber, although the secretary was not yet out of bed. He, too, had heard of the battle, but Richardot had informed the English ambassador in Paris that the victory had been gained, not by the stadholder, but by the archduke. While they were talking, a despatch-bearer arrived with letters from Vere to Cecil, and from the States-General to Caron, dated on the 3rd July. There could no longer be any doubt on the subject, and the envoy of the republic had now full details of the glorious triumph which the Spanish agent in Paris had endeavoured for a time to distort into defeat.

While the two were conversing, the queen, who had heard of Caron's presence in the palace, sent down for the latest intelligence. Cecil made notes of the most important points in the despatches to be forthwith conveyed to her Majesty. The queen, not satisfied however, sent for Caron himself. That diplomatist, who had just ridden down from London in foul weather, was accordingly obliged to present himself—booted and spurred and splashed with mud and from head to foot—before her Majesty. <sup>1</sup> Elizabeth received him with such extraordinary manifestations of delight at the tidings that he was absolutely amazed, and she insisted upon his reading the whole of the letter just received from Olden-Barneveld, her Majesty listening very patiently as he translated it out of Dutch into French. She then expressed unbounded admiration of the States-General and of Prince Maurice. The sagacious administration of the States' government is so full of good

order and policy," she said, „as to far surpass in its wisdom the intelligence of all kings and potentates." „We kings," she said, „understand nothing of such affairs in comparison, but require, all of us, to go to school to the States-General." She continued to speak in terms of warm approbation of the secrecy and discretion with which the invasion of Flanders had been conducted, and protested that she thanked God on both knees for vouchsafing such a splendid victory to the United Provinces. <sup>1</sup>

Yet after all, her Majesty, as mankind in general, both wise and simple, are apt to do, had judged only according to the result, and the immediate result. No doubt John of Barneveld was second to no living statesman in breadth of view and adroitness of handling, yet the invasion of Flanders, which was purely his work, was unquestionably a grave mistake, and might easily have proved a fatal one. That the deadly peril was escaped was due, not to his

<sup>1</sup> Caron to States-General, in Deventer, ii. 290-293.

The French king, too, was much pleased with the result of the battle. So soon as he received the news he sent for the States' envoy, and amused himself by reading him only the earlier despatches, which related the success of the archduke at the forts and at Leffingen. Having sufficiently teased him, he then showed him the whole account. The satisfaction manifested by Henry naturally much scandalized the high Catholic party, with whom the king was most desirous of being on good terms.—Aerssens to States-General, 13 July, 1600. (Archives of the Hague MS.)

And in his confidential letters to Valck the envoy expressed himself in similar terms, saying that his own despatches having accidentally been delayed, the king almost gave him a fever by concealing the good news, and telling him of the reverses sustained by the States' troops at the beginning of the day, and adding that his Majesty, although making a great effort, had found it very difficult to dissemble his delight, „car tous ne prennent cette victoire de meme biais aucuns l'estimant prejudiciable, en tant qu'elle peut ayder a fonder solidement la religion, les autres s'en rejouissent comme d'un escheqecq et affoiblissement a l'Espagne," &c.—MS. before cited, 20 July, 1600.

<sup>1</sup> „Hoewel ick daertoe niet gereet was, want ick daer te peerde was gekomen gants uil en beslyect door 't quade weder," &c.—Caron to the States-General, in Deventer, ii. 290-293.

prudence, but to the heroism of Maurice, the gallantry of Vere, Count Lewis Gunther, and the forces under them, and the noble self-devotion of Ernest. And even, despite the exertions of these brave men, it seems certain that victory would have been impossible had the archduke possessed that true appreciation of a situation which marks the consummate general. Surely the Lord seemed to have delivered the enemy into his hands that morning. Maurice was shut in between Nieuport on one side and the archduke's army on the other, planted as it was on the only road of retreat. Had Albert entrenched himself, Maurice must either have attacked at great disadvantage or attempted embarkation in the face of his enemy. To stay indefinitely where he was would have proved an impossibility, and amid the confusion necessary to the shipping of his army, how could he have protected himself by six demi-cannon placed on the sea-beach?

That Maurice was able to extricate himself from the horrible dilemma in which he had been placed, through no fault of his own, and to convert imminent disaster into magnificent victory, will always redound to his reputation as a great military chief. And this was all the fruit of the expedition, planned, as Elizabeth thought, with so much secrecy and discretion. Three days after the battle the stadholder came again before Nieuport, only to find the garrison strengthened meantime by La Bourlotte to three thousand men. A rainy week succeeded, and Maurice then announced to the States-General the necessity of abandoning an enterprise, a successful issue to which was in his opinion impossible. The States-General, grown more modest in military matters, testified their willingness to be governed by his better judgment, and left Ostend for the Hague on the 18th July. Maurice, after a little skirmishing with some of the forts around that city, in one

of which the archduke's general La Bourlotte was killed, decided to close the campaign, and he returned with his whole army on the last days of July into Holland. 1

1 The chief authorities used by me for the campaign of Nieuport are the following:—Bentivoglio, P. III. lib. vi. pp. 496-500; Carnero, lib. xiv. cap. vii. 472-481; Metereus, 437-442; Reynders, B. xvii. 427-433; Bor, IV. 603-700; De la Pise, 681-687; Sir Francis Vere, *La Bataille de Nieupoort*, apud Bor. *Voyages de Van Authent Stukken*, iv.; Wagenaer, ix. 76-88; Van Wyn op Wagen, ix. 37-47; Grotius, *Histor.* ix. 552-573; Van der Kemp, ii. 62-82 and 251-286; Philippe Fleming; *Belegeringe van Oostende* ('s Gravenhage, 1621), pp. 27-52; Henry Haestens, *La Nouvelle Troie, ou Memorable Histoire du Siege d'Ostende*. Leyden, Elzevir, 1615, pp. 1-69; Groen v. Prinsterer, *Archives*, &c. II. 14-43 (2nd series); MS. *Letters of States-General, of Queen Elizabeth, and of Envoy Noel de Caron, in the Royal Archives of the Hague*; De Thou, t. xiii. lib. 124, pp. 467-481; *Le Petit, Grande Chronique*, vol. ii. pp. 762-766; Camden's *Elizabeth*, 590-593; MS. *Letters of Buzanval to Villeroi in the Royal Library of the Hague*, especially 4 July, 20 July, 5 August, 17 August, 1600; Antony Duyck *Journal*, ii. 661-681.

No one censured more sharply the policy of the expedition, nor reduced its results more pitilessly, than did the French envoy: „Croyez que ces Messrs,” said he, „avoient bien joué leur état a un coup de dé et que le P. Maurice avoit fait paroistre sa prudence avant de partir de ce lieu en remontrant aux Etats les accidents de cette entreprise et sa suite infaillible et forcée d'une bataille. Il a bien montré sa resolution quand il a fallu boire la lie de ces indigestes conseils.” And again:—„La suite de cette bataille a été plus desavantageuse aux victorieux qu'aux vaincus qui se sont relevez avec plus de vigueur que les autres n'ont poursuivi leur pointe.”—And once more:—„C'est un éclair qui a passé qui a plus donné de lustre aux vainqueurs que fait du mal aux vaincus. On droit qu'elle auroit tout épuisé la vertu et vigueur de l'un et fait surgir la force de l'autre. Mais à la vérité les fondemens de cette entreprise de Flandres étoient si mal jetés comme vous avez peu voir par celles que je vous ai escrits lorsqu'elle fait résoudre qu'il se faut peu estonner si ils ont eu si peu d'issue et de suite. . . . car on fait ici beaucoup plus de plaintes du peu de suite de cette victoire qu'il ne m'en écrit de Bruxelles,” &c. &c. As to the numbers engaged in the battle, Duyck puts the archduke's force at 10,000 foot and 1600 horse, including the detachment of 2000 or 3000 under Velasco, which was not in the action. More than a third of those engaged were killed. Maurice had at first 198 companies of foot and 25 companies of horse, but, with



The expedition was an absolute failure, but the stadholder had gained a great victory. The effect produced at home and abroad by this triumphant measuring of the republican forces, horse, foot, and artillery, in a pitched battle, and on so conspicuous an arena, with the picked veterans of Spain and Italy, was perhaps worth the cost, but no other benefit was derived from the invasion of Flanders.

deduction of the detachments to strengthen the forts, his force was not more than 10,000 foot and 1200 horse (including the troops of Ernest destroyed before nine o'clock).

The most healthy moral to be drawn from this brief but memorable campaign is that the wisest statesmen are prone to blunder in affairs of war, success in which seems to require a special education and a distinct genius. Alternation between hope and despair, between culpable audacity and exaggerated prudence, are but too apt to mark the warlike counsels of politicians who have not been bred soldiers. This at least, had been eminently the case with Barneveld and his colleagues of the States-General.

#### NOTE ON VERE.

I HAVE endeavoured in the account of this campaign to reconcile discrepancies where it was possible to reconcile them. I have studied carefully the narratives given by the most prominent actors in the battle; but, in regard to Sir Francis Vere, I am bound to say that, after much consideration, I have rejected his statements wherever they conflict with those of Maurice, Lewis Gunther, and Ernest of Nassau.

The mutual contradictions are often so direct as to make it impossible for both parties to be partly right and partly incorrect, and, as all were prominently engaged in the transactions, and all men of courage and distinction, it is absolutely necessary at times to decide between them.

The narrative of Vere was a publication; a party pamphlet in an age of pamphleteering. It is marked throughout by spleen, inordinate personal and national self-esteem, undisguised hostility to the Nassaus and the Hollanders, and wounded pride of opinion. It shows occasional looseness or recklessness of assertion which would have been almost impossible, had Maurice or his cousins been likely to engage in a controversy concerning the Nieuport expedition.

It is not agreeable to come to this

conclusion in regard to a man of unquestionable talent, high character, and experience, who fought on that memorable day with splendid valour. I shall therefore give a few extracts from his narrative, and place them here and there in juxtaposition with passages from the correspondence of the Nassaus, in order to justify my opinion.

It must be borne in mind that these latter documents have remained in the family archives of Orange-Nassau for two centuries and a half, never having seen the light till they were edited by the learned and accomplished Groen van Prinsterer. The controversy with Vere is therefore an all unconscious one on the part of those buried warriors, but the examination of such samples of conflicting testimony may give the general reader a conception of the difficulty besetting the path of modern historians wishing to be conscientious and disinterested.

Sir Francis says, *without giving any dates*, that the army reached and crossed the haven of Nieuport on a certain morning, that they encamped and occupied *two or three days* in arranging their quarters, and in entrenching themselves in the most advantageous places for their own safety, and for the siege

of the city; *making a bridge of stone* at the narrowest part of the harbour, to enable their troops and trains to cross and recross whenever necessary.

Now if there be two dates perfectly established in history by the concurrent testimony of despatches, resolutions of Assembly, contemporary chronicles,—Dutch, Spanish, Italian, or French,—and private letters of the chief personages engaged in the transactions, it is that Maurice's army came before Nieuport on the morning of the 1st July, crossing the harbour in the course of the same day, and that the battle was fought on the 2nd July. 1

What could Vere mean then by talking of two or three days in the trenches and of a stone bridge? Yet these are his words:—„Le matin de bonne heure nous marchames vers Nieuport et a la basse marée traversames la riviere du coste ou elle faist le Havre de la ville, et ainsy nous campasmes mettans deux ou trois jours à faire les quartiers, et à nous retrancher es lieux les plus avantageux pour notre sureté, et le siege de ville, *faisans un pont de pierre* au plus estroit du Havre pour y faire passer et repasser en tout temps nostre chariage et nos troupes, quand besoin en seroit.”

On the intelligence received in the night of the arrival of the enemy at Oudenburg, Vere advised instantly crossing the harbour and marching against

him with the whole army. Maurice decided, however, to send the detachment under Ernest, to the great dissatisfaction of Sir Francis.

Vere then states that the army was ordered to *cross the haven at dawn of day, at the first low tide.*

„Le reste de l'armée fut commandé de marcher vers la riviere afin de la passer à l'aube du jour à la première basse marée.”

Now it is certain that on the 2nd of July it was exactly *high tide* at 3 A.M. or *about dawn of day.*

Count Lewis Gunther states expressly in his letter, often cited, that he was first to cross with the cavalry, when the tide was out, at about 8 A.M. It is also manifest by every account given of the battle, that it was high tide again at or after 3 P.M., which compelled the transferring of the fight from the submerged beach to the downs and to the pastures beyond.

In these statements Vere is so manifestly contradicted, not only by the accounts given by all contemporaries and eye-witnesses, but by other passages in his own narrative, that one has in general a right to prefer the assertions of other actors in the battle to his, if there is no other way of arriving at a clear understanding of the affair.

Thus he says that at the beginning of the action he wished the advanced cavalry under Lewis Gunther to approach the enemy, and that „the young lord” refused. The account of the young lord is the exact reverse of these assertions. I shall here give in juxtaposition the text of Vere and of the private letter of Lewis, observing that this letter—not written for publication, and never published, so far as I know, till two hundred and fifty years after it was written for the private information of the writer's brother—gives by far the most intelligible and succinct account of the battle to be met with anywhere.

1 „Je partoy droit devers Nieuport et m'y campoy le premier de ce mois de juillet et devant bien estre encores campé je fus adverti la même nuit que l'ennemi s'estoit approché d'Ostende,” &c. &c., says Maurice of Nassau. Letter to Count Lewis William, written 2nd July, evening after the battle. Groen van Prinsterer. Archives, II. 16, 17. Compare Bor, Meteren, Fleming, Haestens, De Thou, Bentivoglio, original documents in Van der Kemp, vol. ii. Archives de la Maison d'Orange-Nassau, *passim*, et mult. al. „Et le tems ne voulant permettre que le pont qui estoit commencé à faire outre le dit havre s'acheva,” &c. Letter of Lewis Gunther to Lewis William.

LEWIS GUNTHER.

VERE.

„J'en avoy envoié advertir son Ex<sup>ce</sup> que je m'estoy mis là en ordre et que je n'en bougeroy sans son expres commandement, le supliant de haster le passage de l'infanterie . . . . Monsieur Veer vint assitot me trouver et jugeoit que je m'estois trop avancé, trouvant necessaire qu'on se resteroit plus pres de l'infanterie dont l'avant garde estoit presquee. Je craignois fort que ceste retraicte ne nous eust causé de confusion, l'ennemy nous estant si proche, et qu'elle eut refroidi le courage de nos soldats. Ce que me fit le prier qu'il avançast plustot l'infanterie jusques derriere ma troupe: ce que pourroit apporter le confort aux nostres et de l'etonnement à l'ennemy duquel l'infanterie n'estoit encor arrivé ny mise en ordre. Je denouray encor a la mesme place une heure, y aiant esté desja bien davantage usques à ce que son Ex<sup>ce</sup>. y vint en personne. Il fut conclu que je me retirerois et me planterois à l'aisle gauche des Anglois . . . . Il fust résolu alors que j'enveroieroy deux companies seulement bien pres d'eux pour leur faire pendre l'envie de se resoudre a les venir charger et que les notres s'enfuiaient derriere ma troupe donnassent occasion aux ennemis de les poursuivre la furie desquels nostre canon appaisant un peu et nos musquetiers qui estoient bien avancés dans ces dunes, a demy en embuscade, lesrottant de costé, et après nostre cavallerie les chargeant en face, indubitablement nous eut des lors este ouvert le chemin de la victoire, car on les eut acilement renversez dans leur infanterie, la confusion de laquelle n'eut sçeu estre que bien grande: mais la haste de nos canonniers nous fit perdre les effects de ceste belle resolution, a cause que la voyant si belle donnerent feu devant qu'on eut envoié ces compaignies et avec la premiere volée les mit-on en desordre n'ils quittarent le strang et se cacharent aux dunes pour n'estre offensez du canon.”

„L'ennemy approchant de plus en plus, et la cavallerie sortant a la teste de leurs troupes en une distance competente pour pouvoir estre attirée au combat, j'avoy grand envie de voir la cavallerie de l'avantgarde approcher d'elle et avec quelques gens d'eslite et bien montes battre leurs carbina et escarmoucheurs jusques à dessus leur gros, en intention que s'ils eussent este recharges de retirer en haste avec la dite avantgarde de chevaux entre la mer et l'avantgarde d'infanterie, et après les avoir tirez arriere de leur infanterie sous la mercy de nostre canon, avoir engagé le reste de nos chevaux a charger et suivre resolutement. *Mais le jeusne seigneur ne peut trouver bon cest advis, n'ayant pas eu agreable le pouvoir que le comte Maurice m'avoit donné par dessus sa charge et partant ne l'executa pas choississant plustot comme l'ennemy avançoit tout bellement de reculer de mesme vers l'infanterie.* Ce mien conseil ne parvenant a autre meilleur effect et desja la cavallerie estant venue sous la portee de nostre canon, *je proposai qu'il le falloist descharger,* qui fut trouvé bon et si bien effectné qu'il faisoit escarter leurs troupes et fuir en desordre pour se sauver dedans les dunes, chose qui sans doute, nous eust donné la victoire si nostre cavallerie eust ete preste et volontaire a se prevaloir de l'occasion offerte.”



Thus Lewis says most distinctly that he approved of the „beautiful resolution” as he calls it, which he rejected, according to Vere, from jealousy, and that the cause why it was not carried out was the premature cannonnade, which Vere says that he himself ordered!

These extracts will be sufficient to show the impossibility of making both accounts agree in regard to many momentous points.

When did two accounts of the same battle ever resemble each other? It must be confessed that modesty was not a leading characteristic of Sir Francis Vere. According to the whole tenor of his narrative he was himself not only a great part, but the whole of the events he describes; the victory of Nieuport was entirely due to his arrangements, and to the personal valour of himself and of the 1600 English soldiers: Prince Maurice filling hardly a subordinate part in superintendence of the battle, Count Lewis Gunther being dismissed with a single sneer, and no other name but Vere's own and that of his brother Horace being even mentioned. He admits that he did not participate in the final and conclusive charge, being then disabled, but observes that having satisfied himself that his directions would be carried out, and that nothing else was left but to pursue the enemy, he thought it time to have his wounds dressed.

„There was no loss worth speaking of,” he says, „except that of the English, 600 of whom were killed. I should not venture to attribute,” he observes, „the whole honour of the victory to the poor English troop of 1600 men, but I leave the judgment thereof to those who can decide with less suspicion of partiality. I will merely affirm that the English left nothing to do for the rest of the army but to follow the chase, and that one has never before heard that with so small a number in

an indifferent position, where the only advantage was the choice and the good use which could be made of it, without the use of spade or other instrument of fortification, an army so large and so victorious as that of the archduke could have been resisted in such a continued struggle and so thoroughly defeated.”

Certainly the defeat of an army of 10,000 veterans in the open field by 1600 men is a phenomenon rarely witnessed, and one must be forgiven for not accepting as gospel truth the account of the leader of the 1600, when it is directly contradicted by every other statement on record.

In Vere's advanced guard—nearly half the whole army—there were 2600 Englishmen and 2800 Frisians, besides several squadrons of cavalry, according to his own statement in another part of his narrative.

How, therefore, the whole battle should have been fought by a mere portion of the English contingent it is difficult to comprehend.

Vere makes no allusion to the combat of Leffingen, which was an essential part of the battle; to the heroic self-sacrifice of Ernest and his division, by which alone the rest of the army were enabled to gain the victory; nor has he a word for the repeated charges of cavalry by which the infantry fight was protected.

Lewis Gunther on the contrary, whose account is as modest as it is clear, gives full credit to the splendid achievements of the infantry under Vere, but in describing the cavalry combats, he mentions the loss in the six cavalry

companies under his immediate command as 171 killed and wounded,

while Ernest's loss has never been placed at less than 1000.

## CHAPTER XXXVI.

Effects of the Nieuport campaign—The general and the statesman—The roman empire and the Turk—Disgraceful proceedings of the mutinous soldiers in Hungary—The Dunkirk pirates—Siege of Ostend by the Archduke—Attack on Reinberg by Prince Maurice—Siege and capitulation of Meurs—Attempt on Bois-le Duc—Concentration of the war at Ostend—Account of the belligerents—Details of the siege—Feigned offer of Sir Francis Vere to capitulate—Arrival of reinforcements from the States—Attack and overthrow of the besiegers.

THE Nieuport campaign had exhausted for the time both belligerents. The victor had saved the republic from impending annihilation, but was incapable of further efforts during the summer. The conquered cardinal-archduke, remaining essentially in the same position as before, consoled himself with the agreeable fiction that the States, notwithstanding their triumph, had in reality suffered the most in the great battle. Meantime both parties did their best to repair damages and to recruit their armies.

The States—or in other words Barneveld, who was the States—had learned a lesson. Time was to show whether it would be a profitable one, or whether Maurice, who was the preceptor of Europe in the art of war, would continue to be a docile pupil of the great Advocate even in military affairs. It is probable that the alienation between the statesman and the general, which was to widen as time advanced, may be dated from the day of Nieuport.

Fables have even been told which indicated the popular belief in an intensity of resentment on the part of the prince, which certainly did not exist all long afterwards.

„Ah, scoundrel!” the stadholder was said to have exclaimed, giving the Ad-

vocate a box on the ear as he came to wish him joy of his great victory, „you sold us, but God prevented your making the transfer.”<sup>1</sup>

History would disdain even an allusion to such figments—quite as disgraceful, certainly, to Maurice as to Barneveld—did they not point the moral and foreshadow some of the vast but distant results of events which had already taken place, and had they not been so generally repeated that it is a duty for the lover of truth to put his foot upon the calumny, even at the risk for a passing moment of reviving it.

The condition of the war in Flanders had established a temporary equilibrium among the western powers—France and England discussing, intriguing, and combining in secret with each other, against each other, and in spite of each other, in regard to the great conflict—while Spain and the cardinal-archduke on the one side, and the republic on the other, prepared themselves for another encounter in the blood-stained arena.

Meantime, on the opposite verge of what was called European civilization; the perpetual war between the Roman Empire and the Grand Turk had for the moment been brought into a nearly similar equation. Notwithstanding the vast amount of gunpowder exploded during so many wearisome years, the problem of the Crescent and the Cross was not much nearer a solution in the East than was that of mass and conventicle in the West. War was the normal and natural condition of mankind. This fact, at least, seemed to

<sup>1</sup> See Van der Kemp. ii. 88 and 298, 299. The learned historian of course denounces the tale as a falsehood.

have been acquired and added to the mass of human knowledge.

From the prolific womb of Germany came forth, to swell impartially the Protestant and Catholic hosts, vast swarms of human creatures. Sold by their masters at as high prices as could be agreed upon beforehand, and receiving for themselves five stivers a day, irregularly paid, until the carrion-crow rendered them the last service, they found at times more demand for their labour in the great European market than they could fully supply. There were not Germans enough every year for the consumption of the Turk, and the pope, and the emperor, and the republic, and the Catholic king, and the Christian king, with both ends of Europe ablaze at once. So it happened that the Duke of Mercœur and other heroes of the League, having effected their reconciliation with the Béarnese, and for a handsome price paid down on the nail having acknowledged him to be their legitimate and Catholic sovereign, now turned their temporary attention to the Turk. The sweepings of the League—Frenchmen, Walloons, Germans, Italians, Spaniards—were tossed into Hungary, because for a season the war had become languid in Flanders. And the warriors grown grey in the religious wars of France astonished the pagans on the Danube by a variety of crimes and cruelties such as Christians only could imagine. Thus, while the forces of the Sultan were besieging Buda, a detachment of these ancient Leaguers lay in Pappa, a fortified town not far from Raab, which Archduke Maximilian had taken by storm two years before. Finding their existence monotonous and payments unpunctual, they rose upon the governor, Michael Maroti, and then entered into a treaty with the Turkish commander outside the walls. Bringing all the principal citizens of the town, their wives and children, and all their moveable pro-

perty into the market-place, they offered to sell the lot, including the governor for a hundred thousand rix-dollars. The bargain was struck, and the Turk, paying him all his cash on hand and giving hostages for the remainder, carried off six hundred of the men and women promising soon to return, and completed the transaction. 1 Meantime the imperial general, Schwartzenberg, came before the place, urging the mutineers with promises of speedy payment, and with appeals to their sense of shame, to abstain from the disgraceful work. He might as well have preached to the wild swine swarming in the adjacent forests. Siege thereupon was laid to the place. In a sortie the brave Schwartzenberg was killed, but Colonitz coming up in force the mutineers were locked up in the town which they had seized, and the Turk never came to their relief. Famine drove them at last to choose between surrender and a desperate attempt to cut their way out. They took the bolder course, and were all either killed or captured. And now—the mutineers having given the Turk this lesson in Christian honour towards captives—their comrades and the rest of the imperial forces showed them the latest and most approved Christian method of treating mutineers. Several hundred of the prisoners were distributed among the different nationalities composing the army to be dealt with at pleasure. The honest Germans were the most straightforward of all towards their portion of the prisoners, for they shot them down at once, without an instant's hesitation. But the Lorrainers, the remainder of the French troops, the Walloons, and especially the Hungarians—whose countrymen and women had been sold into captivity—all vied with each other in the invention of cruelties at which the soul sickens, and which the pen almost refuses to depict. 2

1 Meteren, fol. 447.

2 Meteren, *ubi sup.*



These operations and diversions had no sensible effect upon the progress of the war, which crept on with the same monotonous and sluggish cruelty as ever; but the incidents narrated paint the course of civilization more vividly than the detailed accounts of siege and battle, mining and countermining, assaults and ambuscades can do, of which the history books are full. The leaguers of Buda and of other cities and fortresses in Hungary went their course, and it was destined to remain for a still longer season doubtful whether Cross or Crescent should ultimately wave over the whole territory of Eastern Europe, and whether the vigorous Moslem, believing in himself, his mission, his discipline, and his resources, should ultimately absorb what was left of the ancient Roman Empire.

Meantime such of the Walloons, Lorraines, Germans, and Frenchmen as had grown wearied of the fighting on the Danube and the Theiss might have recourse for variety to the perpetual carnage on the Meuse, the Rhine, and the Scheld. If there was not bloodshed enough for all, it was surely not the fault of Mahonet, nor Clement, nor Philip.

During the remainder of the year not much was done in the field by the forces of the stadholder or the cardinal, but there was immense damage done to the Dutch shipping by the famous privateersman, Van der Waecken, with his squadron of twelve or fourteen armed cruisers. In vain had the States exerted themselves to destroy that robbers' cave, Dunkirk. Shiploads of granite had been brought from Norway, and stone fleets had been sunk in the channel, but the insatiable quicksands had swallowed them as fast as they could be deposited, the tide rolled as freely as before, and the bold pirates sailed forth as gaily as ever to prey upon the defenceless trading vessels and herring-smacks of the States. For it

was only upon non-combatants that Admiral Van der Waecken made war, and the fishermen especially, who mainly belonged to the Memnonite religion, with its doctrines of non-resistance 1—not a very comfortable practice in that sanguinary age—were his constant victims. And his cruelties might have almost served as a model to the Christian warriors on the Turkish frontier. After each vessel had been rifled of everything worth possessing, and then scuttled, the admiral would order the crews to be thrown overboard at once, or, if he chanced to be in a merry mood, would cause them to be fastened to the cabin floor, or nailed crosswise to the deck, and would then sail away, leaving ship and sailors to sink at leisure. 2 The States gave chase as well as they could to the miscreant—a Dutchman born, and with a crew mainly composed of renegade Netherlanders and other outcasts, preying for base lucre on their defenceless countrymen—and their cruisers were occasionally fortunate enough to capture and bring in one of the pirate ships. In such cases, short shrift was granted, and the buccaneers were hanged without mercy, thirty-eight having been executed in one morning at Rotterdam. The admiral with most of his vessels escaped, however, to the coast of Spain, where his crews during the autumn mainly contrived to desert, and where he himself died in the winter, whether of malady, remorse, or disappointment at not being rewarded by a high position in the Spanish navy, has not been satisfactorily decided. 3

The war was in its old age. The leaf of a new century had been turned, and men in middle life had never known what the word Peace meant. Perhaps

1 "Ergo imbelles hominum genus et est perisquis piscatorum ea religio quae nefas ducit vim armis propellere," &c. &c.—Grotii Hist. ix. 575.—Compare Meteren, fol. 445.

2 Meteren, Grotius, *ubi sup.*

3 "Interiit morbo an quia Hispanis fastiditus," says Grotius, *ubi sup.*

they could hardly imagine such a condition. This is easily said, but it is difficult really to picture to ourselves the moral constitution of a race of mankind which had been born and had grown up, marrying and giving in marriage, dying and burying their dead, and so passing on from the cradle towards the grave, accepting the eternal clang of arms, and the constant participation by themselves and those nearest to them in the dangers, privations, and horrors of siege and battle-field as the commonplaces of life. At least, those Netherlands knew what fighting for independence of a foreign tyrant meant. They must have hated Spain very thoroughly, and believed in the right of man to worship God according to the dictates of his conscience, and to govern himself upon his own soil, however meagre, very earnestly, or they would hardly have spent their blood and treasure, year after year, with such mercantile regularity when it was always in their power to make peace by giving up the object for which they had been fighting.

Yet the war, although in its old age, was not fallen into decrepitude. The most considerable and the most sanguinary pitched battle of what then were modern times had just been fought, and the combatants were preparing themselves for a fresh wrestle, as if the conflict had only begun. And now—although the great leaguers of Harlem, Leyden, and Antwerp, as well as the more recent masterpieces of Prince Maurice in Gelderland and Friesland, were still fresh in men's memory—there was to be a siege, which for endurance, pertinacity, valour, and bloodshed on both sides, had not yet been foreshadowed, far less equalled, upon the fatal Netherland soil.

That place of fashionable resort, where the fine folk of Europe now bathe, and flirt, and prattle politics or scandal so cheerfully during the summer solstice

—cool and comfortable Ostend—was throughout the sixteenth century as obscure a fishing village as could be found in Christendom. Nothing had ever happened there, nobody had ever lived there, and it was not until a much later period that the famous oyster, now identified with its name, had been brought to its bay to be educated. It was known for nothing except for claiming to have invented the pickling of herrings, which was not at all the fact. Towards the latter part of the century, however, the poor little open village had been fortified to such purpose as to enable it to beat off the great Alexander Farnese, when he had made an impromptu effort to seize it in the year 1583, after his successful enterprise against Dunkirk and Nieuport, and subsequent preparations had fortunately been made against any further attempt. For in the opening period of the new century thousands and tens of thousands were to come to those yellow sands, not for a midsummer holiday, but to join hands in one of the most enduring struggles that history had yet recorded, and on which the attention of Europe was for a long time to be steadily fixed.

Ostend—East-end—was the only possession of the republic in Flanders. Having been at last thoroughly fortified according to the principles of the age, it was a place whence much damage was inflicted upon the enemy, and whence forays upon the obedient Flemings could very successfully be conducted. Being in the hands of so enterprising a naval power, it controlled the coast, while the cardinal-archduke on the other side fondly hoped that its possession would give him supremacy on the sea. The States of Flanders declared it to be a thorn in the Belgian lion's foot, and called urgently upon their sovereign to remove the annoyance.

1 La Nouvelle Troie, ou Memorable Histoire du Siege d'Ostende, par Henry Haestens. Leyde, 1615, pp. 79, 80.

They offered Albert 300,000 florins a month so long as the siege should last, besides an extraordinary sum of 300,000, of which one-third was to be paid when the place should be invested, one-third when the breach had been made, and one-third after the town had been taken. 1 It was obvious that, although they thought the extraction of the thorn might prove troublesome, the process would be accomplished within a reasonable time. The cardinal-archduke, on his part, was as anxious as the „members” of Flanders. Asking how long the Duke of Parma had been in taking Antwerp, and being told „eighteen months,” he replied that, if necessary, he was willing to employ eighteen years in reducing Ostend. 2

The town thus about to assume so much importance in the world's eye had about three thousand inhabitants within its lowly, thatch-roofed houses. It fronted directly upon the sea-coast and stretched backwards in a southerly direction, having the sandy downs on the right and left, and a swampy, pongy soil on the inner verge, where it communicated with the land. Its northern part, small and scarcely inhabited, was lashed by the ocean, and exposed to perpetual danger from its storms and floodtides, but was partially protected from these encroachments by

a dyke stretching along the coast on the west. Here had hitherto been the harbour formed by the mouth of the river Iperleda as it mingled with the sea, but this entrance had become so choked with sand as to be almost useless at low water. This circumstance would have rendered the labours of the archduke comparatively easy, and much discouraged the States, had there not fortunately been a new harbour

which had formed itself on the eastern side exactly at the period of threatened danger. The dwarf mountain range of dunes which encircled the town on its eastern side had been purposely levelled, lest the higher summits should offer positions of vantage to a besieging foe. In consequence of this operation, the sea had burst over the land and swept completely around the place, almost converting it into an island, while at high water there opened a wide and profound gulf which with the ebb left an excellent channel quite deep enough even for the ships of war of those days. The next care of the States authorities was to pierce their fortifications on this side at a convenient point, thus creating a safe and snug haven within the walls for the fleets of transports which were soon to arrive by open sea, laden with soldiers and munitions.

The whole place was about half an hour's walk in circumference. It was surrounded with a regular counterscarp, bastions, and casemates, while the proximity of the ocean and the humid nature of the soil ensured it a net-work of fosses and canal on every side. On the left or western side, where the old harbour had once been, and which was the most vulnerable by nature, was a series of strong ravelins, the most conspicuous of which were called the Sand Hill, the Porcupine, and Hell's Mouth. Beyond these, towards the south-west, were some detached fortifications, resting for support, however, upon the place itself, called the Polder, the Square, and the South Square. On the east side, which was almost inaccessible, as it would seem, by such siege machinery as then existed, was a work called the Spanish half-moon, situate on the new harbour called the Guele or Gullet.

Towards the west and south-west, externally, upon the territory of Flanders—not an inch of which belonged to the republic, save the sea-beaten corner in which nestled the little town

1 Haestens, 99. Philip Fleming. Oostende. oermaerde gheweldige, lanckduyryge ende loedighe Belegeringhe, etc. beschreven door Philippe Fleming. 's Gravenhage, 1621, p. 62.

2 Angeli Gallucci di Bello Belgico, Romæ, 1771. Pars Altera, p. 184.



—eighteen fortresses had been constructed by the archduke as a protection against hostile incursions from the place. Of these, the most considerable were St. Albert, often mentioned during the Nieuport campaign, St. Isabella, St. Clara, and Great-Thirst.<sup>1</sup>

On the 5th July, 1601, the archduke came before the town, and formally began the siege.

He established his headquarters in the fort which bore the name of his patron saint. Frederick van den Berg meanwhile occupied fort Bredené on the eastern side, with the intention, if possible, of getting possession of the Gullet, or at least of rendering the entrance to that harbour impossible by means of his hostile demonstrations. Under Van den Berg was Count Bucquoy-Longueval, a Walloon officer of much energy and experience, now general-in-chief of artillery in the archduke's army.

The numbers with which Albert took the field at first have not been accurately stated, but it is probable that his object was to keep as many as twenty thousand constantly engaged in the siege, and that in this regard he was generally successful.

Within the town were fifty-nine companies of infantry, to which were soon added twenty-three more under command of young Chatillon, grandson of the great Coligny. It was „an *olla podrida* of nationalities,” according to the diarist of the siege. English, Scotch, Dutch, Flemings, Frenchmen, Germans, mixed in about equal proportions.<sup>2</sup> Commander-in-chief at the outset was Sir Francis Vere, who established himself by the middle of July in the place, sent thither by order of the States-General. It had been the desire of that assembly that the stadholder should make another foray in Flanders

for the purpose of driving off the archduke before he should have time to complete his preliminary operations. But for that year at least Maurice was resolved not to renounce his own scheme in deference to those so much more ignorant than himself of the art of war, even if Barneveld and his subordinates on their part had not learned a requisite lesson of modesty.

So the prince, instead of risking another Nieuport campaign, took the field with a small but well-appointed force, about ten thousand men in all, marched to the Rhine, and, early in June, laid siege to Rhein-<sup>10 June,</sup> berg.<sup>1</sup> It was his purpose to leave the archduke for the time to break his teeth against the walls of Ostend, while he would himself protect the eastern frontier, over which came regular reinforcements and supplies for the Catholic armies. His works were laid out with his customary precision and neatness. But, standing as usual, like a professor at his blackboard, demonstrating his proposition to the town, he was disturbed in his calculations by the abstraction from his little army of two thousand English troops ordered by the States-General to march to the defence of Ostend. The most mathematical but most obedient of princes, annoyed but not disconcerted, sent off the troops but continued his demonstration.

„By this specimen,” cried the French envoy with enthusiasm, „judge of the energy of this little commonwealth. They are besieging Berg with an army of twelve thousand men, a place beyond the frontier, and five days' march from the Hague. They are defending another important place, besieged by the principal forces of the archdukes, and there is good chance of success at both points. They are doing all this too with such a train of equipages of artillery, of munitions, of barks, of ships of war,

<sup>1</sup> Fleming, Haestens, Guicciardini *in voce*. Bentivoglio, P. III. lib. vi. 505, 506. Meteren, 454, 455.

<sup>2</sup> Meteren, Bentivoglio, *ubi sup.* Fleming, 74, *segg.*

<sup>1</sup> Meteren, 454. Grotius, x. 580-582. Vander Kemp, ii. 94, 95, and notes.

that I hardly know of a monarch in the world who would not be troubled to furnish such a force of warlike machinery." 1

By the middle of July he sprang a mine under the fortifications, doing much damage and sending into the air a considerable portion of the garrison. Two of the soldiers were blown into his own camp, and one of them, strangely enough, was but slightly injured. Coming as he did through the air at cannon-ball speed, he was of course able to bring the freshest intelligence from the interior of the town. His news as to the condition of the siege confirmed the theory

30 July, of the stadholder. He persisted in his operations for three weeks longer, and the place was then surrendered. 2 The same terms—moderate and honourable—were given to the garrison and the burghers as in all Maurice's victories. Those who liked to stay were at liberty to do so, accepting the prohibition of public worship according to the Roman ritual, but guaranteed against inquisition into household or conscience. The garrison went out with the honours of war, and thus the place, whose military value caused it to change hands almost as frequently as a counter in a game, was once more in possession of the republic.

6 August, In the course of the following week Maurice laid siege to the city of Meurs, a little farther up the Rhine, which immediately capitulated. 3 Thus the keys to the debatable land of Cleves and Juliers, the scene of the Admiral of Arragon's recent barbarities, were now held by the stadholder.

These achievements were followed by an unsuccessful attempt upon Bois-le-Duc in the course of November. The place would have fallen notwithstanding

the slenderness of the besieging army had not a sudden and severe frost caused the prudent prince to raise the siege. Feeling that his cousin Frederic van den Berg, who had been despatched from before Ostend to command the relieving force near Bois-le-Duc, might take advantage of the prematurely frozen canals and rivers to make an

November, incursion into Holland, he left his city just as his works had been sufficiently advanced to ensure possession of the prize, and hastened to protect the heart of the republic from possible danger. 1

Nothing further was accomplished by Maurice that year, but meantime something had been doing within and around Ostend.

For now the siege of Ostend became the war, and was likely to continue to be the war for a long time to come; all other military operations being to a certain degree suspended, as if by general consent of both belligerents, or rendered subsidiary to the main design. So long as this little place should be beleaguered it was the purpose of the States, and of Maurice, acting in harmony with those authorities, to concentrate their resources so as to strengthen the grip with which the only scrap of Flanders was held by the republic. And as time wore on the supposed necessities of the wealthy province, which, in political importance, made up a full half of the archduke's dominions, together with self-esteem and an exaggerated idea of military honour, made that prelate more and more determined to effect his purpose.

So upon those barren sands was opened a great academy in which the science and the art of war were to be taught by the most skilful practitioners to all Europe; for no general, corporal, artilleryman, barber-surgeon, or engineer, would be deemed to know his trade if he had not fought at Ostend; and thither

1 Buzanval to Villeroy, 24 July, 1601, cited by Van Deventer, ii. 294.

2 Meteren, Grotius, Van der Kemp, *ubi sup.*

3 Ibid.

1 Meteren, 457; Van der Kemp, 96 97, and notes.

resorted month after month warriors of every rank, from men of royal or of noblest blood to adventurers of lowlier degree, whose only fortune was buckled at their sides. From every land, of every religion, of every race, they poured into the town or into the besiegers' trenches. Habsburg and Holstein; Northumberland, Vere and Westmoreland; Fairfax and Stuart; Bourbon, Chatillon, and Lorraine; Bentivoglio, Farnese, Spinola, Grimaldi, Arragon, Toledo, Avila, Berlaymont, Bucquoy, Nassau, Orange, Solms—such were the historic names of a few only of the pupils or professors in that sanguinary highschool, mingled with the plainer but well-known patronymics of the Baxes, Meetkerkes, Van Loons, Marquettes, Van der Meers, and Barendrechts, whose bearers were fighting, as they long had fought, for all that men most dearly prize on earth, and not to win honour or to take doctors' degrees in blood. Papist, Calvinist, Lutheran, Turk, Jew, and Moor, European, Asiatic, African, all came to dance in that long carnival of death; and every incident, every detail throughout the weary siege could if necessary be reproduced; for so profound and general was the attention excited throughout Christendom by these extensive operations, and so new and astonishing were many of the inventions and machines employed—most of them now as familiar as gunpowder or as antiquated as a catapult—that contemporaries have been most bountiful in their records for the benefit of posterity, feeling sure of a gratitude which perhaps has not been rendered to their shades.

Especially the indefatigable Philip Fleming—auditor and secretary of Ostend before and during the siege, bravest, most conscientious, and most ingenious of clerks—has chronicled faithfully in his diary almost every cannon-shot that was fired, house that was set on fire, officer that was killed, and has portrayed each new machine that was in-

vented or imagined by native or foreign genius. For the adepts or pretenders who swarmed to town or camp from every corner of the earth, bringing in their hands or brains to be disposed of by either belligerents infallible recipes for terminating the siege at a single blow, if only their theories could be understood and their pockets be filled, were as prolific and as sanguine as in every age.<sup>1</sup> But it would be as wearisome, and in regard to the history of human culture as superfluous, to dilate upon the technics of Targone and Giustini, and the other engineers, Italian and Flemish, who amazed mankind at this period by their successes, still more by their failures, or to describe every assault, sortie, and repulse, every excavation, explosion, and cannonade, as to disinter the details of the siege of Nineveh or of Troy. But there is one kind of enginry which never loses its value or its interest, and which remains the same in every age—the machinery by which stout hearts act directly upon willing hands—and vast were the results now depending on its employment around Ostend.

On the outside and at a distance the war was superintended of course by the stadholder and commander-in-chief, while his cousin William Lewis, certainly inferior to no living man in the science of war, and whose studies in military literature, both ancient and modern, during the brief intervals of his active campaigning, were probably more profound than those of any contemporary, was always alert and anxious to assist with his counsels or to mount and ride to the fray.

In the town Sir Francis Vere commanded. Few shapes are more familiar to the student of those times than this veteran campaigner, the offshoot of a time-honoured race. A man of handsome, weather-beaten, battle-bronzed visage,

<sup>1</sup> Bentivoglio, Meteren, Fleming, Haestens, Gallucci, Grotius, *loc. cit. et passim, et mult. al.*



with massive forehead, broad intelligent eyes, a high straight nose, close-clipped hair, and a great brown beard like a spade; captious, irascible, but most resolute, he seemed, in his gold inlaid Milan corslet and ruff of point-lace, the very image of a partizan chieftain; one of the noblest relics of a race of fighters slowly passing off the world's stage.

An efficient colonel, he was not a general to be relied upon in great affairs either in council or the field. He hated the Nassaus, and the Nassaus certainly did not admire him, while his inordinate self-esteem, both personal and national, and his want of true sympathy for the cause in which he fought, were the frequent source of trouble and danger to the republic.

Of the seven or eight thousand soldiers in the town when the siege began, at least two thousand were English. The queen, too intelligent, despite her shrewishness to the States, not to be faithful to the cause in which her own interests were quite as much involved as theirs, had promised Envoy Caron that although he was obliged to maintain twenty thousand men in Ireland to keep down the rebels, directly leagued as they were with Spain and the archdukes, the republic might depend upon five thousand soldiers from England. 1 Detachment after detachment, the soldiers came as fast as the London prisons could be swept and the queen's press-gang perform its office. It may be imagined that the native land of those warriors was considerably benefited by the grant to the republic of the right to make and pay for these levies. But they had all red uniforms, and were as fit as other men to dig trenches, to defend them, and to fill them afterwards, and none could fight more manfully or plunder friend and foe with greater cheerfulness or impartiality than did those islanders. 2

The problem which the archduke had set himself to solve was not an easy one. He was to reduce a town, which he could invest and had already succeeded very thoroughly in investing on the land side, but which was open to the whole world by sea; while the besieged on their part could not only rely upon their own Government and people, who were more at home on the ocean than was any nation in the world, but upon their alliance with England, a State hardly inferior in maritime resources to the republic itself.

On the western side, which was the weakest, his progress was from the beginning the more encouraging, and his batteries were soon able to make some impression upon the outer works, and even to do considerable damage to the interior of the town. In the course of a few months he had fifty siege-guns in position, and had constructed a practicable road all around the place, connecting his own fortifications on the west and south with those of Bucquoy on the east. 1

Albert's leading thought however was to cut off the supplies. The freaks of nature, as already observed, combined with his own exertions, had effectually disposed of the western harbour as a means of ingress. The tide ebbed and flowed through the narrow channel, but it was clogged with sand and nearly dry at low water. Moreover, by an invention then considered very remarkable, a foundation was laid for the besiegers' forts and batteries by sinking large and deep baskets of wickerwork, twenty feet in length, and filled with bricks and sand. within this abandoned harbour. These clumsy machines were called sausages, 2 and were the delight

Engelsche soldaten die in Engeland gheprest waren ende uyt alle de ghevanghenisse gheleucht, ghecleet met roode casacken," &c. &c. p. 58.

1 Bentivoglio, P. III. 505-509. Meteren, 455, 460. Grotii Hist. lib. x. Fleming, *passim* for year 1601.

2 Ibid.

1 Wagenaar, ix. 111.

2 Fleming, *passim*, especially 53, 58, 101.

3. g. „Arriveerden dien dach duysent nieuwe

of the camp and of all Europe. The works thus established on the dry side crept slowly on towards the walls, and some demi-cannon were soon placed upon them, but the besieged, not liking these encroachments, took the resolution to cut the sea-dyke along the coast which had originally protected the old harbour. Thus the sea, when the tides were high and winds boisterous, was free to break in upon the archduke's works, and would often swallow sausages, men, and cannon, far more rapidly than it was possible to place them there. Yet still those human ants toiled on, patiently restoring what the elements so easily destroyed; and still, despite the sea, the cannonade, and the occasional sorties of the garrison, the danger came nearer and nearer. Buequoy on the other side was pursuing the same system, but his task was immeasurably more difficult. The Gullet, or new eastern entrance, was a whirlpool at high tide, deep, broad, and swift as a mill-race. Yet along its outer verge he too laid his sausages, protecting his men at their work as well as he could with gabions, and essayed to build a dyke of wicker-work upon which he might place a platform for artillery to prevent the ingress of the republican ships.

And his soldiers were kept steadily at work, exposed all the time to the guns of the Spanish half-moon from which the besieged never ceased to cannonade those industrious pioneers. It was a bloody business. Night and day the men were knee-deep in the trenches delving in mud and sand, falling every instant into the graves which they were thus digging for themselves, while ever and anon the sea would rise in its wrath and sweep them with their works away. Yet the victims were soon replaced by others, for had not the cardinal archduke sworn to extract the thorn from the Belgic lion's paw even if he should be eighteen years about it, and would military honour permit him to break his vow? It was a piteous sight, even

for the besieged, to see human life so profusely squandered. It is a terrible reflection, too, that those Spaniards, Walloons, Italians, confronted death so eagerly, not from motives of honour, religion; discipline, not inspired by any kind of faith or fanaticism, but because the men who were employed in this horrible sausage-making and dyke-building were promised five stivers a day instead of two. 1

And there was always an ample supply of volunteers for the service so long as the five stivers were paid.

But despite all Buequoy's exertions the east harbour remained as free as ever. The cool, wary Dutch skippers brought in their cargoes as regularly as if there had been no siege at all. Ostend was rapidly acquiring greater commercial importance, and was more full of bustle and business than had ever been dreamed of in that quiet nook since the days of Robert the Frisian, who had built the old church of Ostend as one of the thirty which he erected in honour of St. Peter, five hundred years before. 2

For the States did not neglect their favourite little city. Fleets of transports arrived day after day, week after week, laden with every necessary and even luxury for the use of the garrison. It was perhaps the cheapest place in all the Netherlands, so great was the abundance. Capons, hares, partridges, and butcher's meat were plentiful as blackberries, and good French claret was but two stivers the quart. 3 Certainly the prospect was not promising of starving the town into a surrender.

But besides all this digging and draining there was an almost daily cannonade. Her Royal Highness the Infanta was perpetually in camp by the side of her well-beloved Albert, making her appearance there in great state, with eighteen coaches full of ladies of

1 Bentivoglio, *ubi sup.*

2 Haestens, 81.

3 Fleming

honour, and always manifesting much impatience if she did not hear the guns. 1

She would frequently touch off a forty-pounder with her own serene fingers in order to encourage the artillerymen, and great was the enthusiasm which such condescension excited. 2

Assaults, sorties, repulses, ambuscades were also of daily occurrence, and often with very sanguinary results; but it would be almost as idle now to give the details of every encounter that occurred, as to describe the besieging of a snow-fort by schoolboys.

It is impossible not to reflect that a couple of Parrots and a *Monitor* or two would have terminated the siege in half an hour in favour of either party, and levelled the town or the besiegers' works as if they had been of pasteboard.

Bucquoy's dyke was within a thousand yards of the harbour's entrance, yet the guns on his platform never sank a ship nor killed a man on board, 3 while the archduke's batteries were even nearer their mark. Yet it was the most prodigious siege of modern days. Fifty great guns were in position around the place, and their balls weighed from ten to forty pounds apiece. It was generally agreed that no such artillery practice had ever occurred before in the world. 4

For the first six months, and generally throughout the siege, there were fired on an average a thousand of such shots *a day*. 5 In the sieges of the American civil war there were sometimes three thousand shots *an hour*, and from guns compared to which in calibre and power those cannon and demi-cannon were but children's toys. 6

Certainly the human arm was of the same length then as now, a pike-thrust

was as effective as the stab of the most improved bayonet, and when it came, as it was always the purpose to do, to the close embrace of foemen, the work was done as thoroughly as it could be in this second half of the nineteenth century. Nevertheless it is impossible not to hope that such progress in science must at last render long wars impossible. The Dutch war of independence had already lasted nearly forty years. Had the civil war in America upon the territory of half a continent been waged with the Ostend machinery it might have lasted two centuries. Something then may have been gained for humanity by giving war such preter-human attributes as to make its demands of gold and blood too exhaustive to become chronic.

Yet the loss of human life during that summer and winter was sufficiently wholesale as compared with the meagre results. Blood flowed in torrents, for no man could be more free of his soldiers' lives than was the cardinal-archduke, hurling them as he did on the enemy's works before the pretence of a practical breach had been effected, and before a reasonable chance existed of purchasing an advantage at such a price. Five hundred were killed outright in half-an-hour's assault on an impregnable position one autumn evening, and lay piled in heaps beneath the Sand Hill fort—many youthful gallants from Spain and Italy among them, noble volun-

August, 1601. tears recognised by their perfumed gloves and golden chains, and whose pockets were worth rifling. 1 The Dutch surgeons, too, sallied forth in strength after such an encounter, and brought in great bags filled with human fat, 2 esteemed the sovereignest remedy in the world for wounds and disease.

Leaders were killed on both sides. Catrici, chief of the Italian artillery, and Braccamonte, commander of a famous

1 Haestens, 147.

2 Ibid.

1 Meteren, 496. 2 Ibid. 455vo, 460.

3 Fleming.

4 Meteren, 455vo.

5 Ibid.

6 I have been informed that at the siege of Fort Fisher two hundred and forty shots were counted in three consecutive minutes—at the rate therefore of forty-eight hundred shots an hour—while at Ostend there was an average of eight shots per hour.



Sicilian legion, with many less known captains, lost their lives before the town. The noble young Chatillon, grandson of Coligny, who had distinguished himself at Nieupoort, fell in the Porcupine fort, his head carried off by a cannon-ball, which destroyed another officer at his side, and just grazed the ear of the distinguished Colonel Uchtenbroek. Sir Francis Vere, too, was wounded in the head by a fragment of iron, and was obliged to leave the town for six weeks till his wound should heal.

The unfortunate inhabitants—men, women, and children—were of course exposed to perpetual danger, and very many killed. Their houses were often burned to the ground, in which cases the English auxiliaries were indefatigable, not in rendering assistance, but in taking possession of such household goods as the flames had spared. Nor did they always wait for such opportunities, but were apt, at the death of an eminent burgher, to constitute themselves at once universal legatees. Thus, while honest Bartholomew Tysen, a worthy citizen grocer, was standing one autumn morning at his own door, a stray cannon-ball took off his head, and scarcely had he been put in a coffin before his house was sacked from garret to cellar and all the costly spices, drugs, and other valuable merchandize of his warehouse—the chief magazine in the town—together with all his household furniture, appropriated by those London warriors. Bartholomew's friends and relatives appealed to Sir Francis Vere for justice, but were calmly informed by that general that Ostend was like a stranded ship, on its beam-ends on a beach, and that it was impossible not to consider it at the mercy of the wreckers.<sup>1</sup> So with this highly figurative view of the situation from the lips of the governor of the place and the commander-in-chief of the English as well as the Dutch garrison, they were fain to go home

and bury their dead, finding when they returned that another cannon-ball had carried away poor Bartholomew's coffin-lid.<sup>1</sup> Thus was never non-combatant and grocer, alive or dead, more out of suits with fortune than this citizen of Ostend; and such were the laws of war, as understood by one of the most eminent of English practitioners in the beginning of the seventeenth century. It is true, however, that Vere subsequently hanged a soldier for stealing fifty pounds of powder and another for uttering counterfeit money, but robberies upon the citizens were unavenged.

Nor did the deaths by shot or sword stroke make up the chief sum of mortality. As usual, the murrainlike pestilence, which swept off its daily victims both within and without the town, was more effective than any direct agency of man. By the month of December the number of the garrison had been reduced to less than three thousand, while it is probable that the archduke had no more than eight thousand effective men left in his whole army.

It was a black and desolate scene. The wild waves of the German ocean lashed by the wintry gales, would often sweep over the painfully-constructed works of besieger and besieged and destroy in an hour the labour of many weeks. The Porcupine—a small but vitally-important ravelin lying out in the counterscarp between the old town and the new, guarding the sluices by which the water for the town moats and canals was controlled, and preventing the pioneers of the enemy from undermining the western wall—was so damaged by the sea as to be growing almost untenable. Indefatigably had the besiegers attempted with wicker-work and timber and palisades to strengthen this precious little fort, but they had found, even as Bucquoy and the archduke on their part had learned, that the North Sea in winter was not to be dammed by bul-

<sup>1</sup> Fleming, 58.

<sup>1</sup> Ibid.

ushes. Moreover, in a bold and successful assault the besiegers had succeeded in setting fire to the inflammable materials heaped about the ravelin to such effect that the fire burned for days, notwithstanding the flooding of the works at each high tide. 1 The men, working day and night, scorching in the flames, yet freezing knee deep in the icy slush of the trenches and perpetually under fire of the hostile batteries, became daily more and more exhausted, notwithstanding their determination to hold the place. Christmas drew nigh, and a most gloomy festival it was like to be; for it seemed as if the beleaguered garrison had been forgotten by the States. Weeks had passed away without a single company being sent to repair the hideous gaps made daily in the ranks of those defenders of a forlorn hope. It was no longer possible to hold the external works; the square, the Polder, and the other forts in the south-west which Vere had constructed with so much care and where on 28 Dec. he had thus far kept his headquarters. On Sunday morning, 3rd December, he reluctantly gave orders that they should be abandoned on the following day and the whole garrison concentrated within the town. 2 The clouds were gathering darkly over the head of the gallant Vere; for no sooner had he arrived at this determination than he learned from a deserting soldier that the archduke had fixed upon that very Sunday evening for a general assault upon the place. It was hopeless for the garrison to attempt to hold these outer forts, for they required a far larger number of soldiers than could be spared from the attenuated little army. Left with those forts in the hands of the enemy there would be nothing left but to make the best and speediest terms that might be obtained. The situation

was desperate. Sir Francis called his principal officers together, announced his resolve not to submit to the humiliation of a surrender after all their efforts, if there was a possibility of escape from their dilemma, reminded them that reinforcements might be expected to arrive at any moment, and that with even a few hundred additional soldiers the outer works might still be manned and the city saved. The officers, English, Dutch, and French, listened respectfully to his remarks, but, without any suggestions on their own part, called on him as their Alexander to untie the Gordian knot. 1 Alexander solved it, not with the sword, but with a trick which he hoped might prove sharper than a sword. He announced his intention of proposing at once to treat, and to protract the negotiations as long as possible, until the wished for sails should be discerned in the offing, when he would at once break faith with them, resume hostilities, and so make fools of the besiegers.

This was a device worthy of a modern Alexander whose surname was Farnese. Even in that loose age such cynical trifling with the sacredness of trumpets of truce and offers of capitulation were deemed far from creditable among soldiers and statesmen, yet the council of war highly applauded 2 the scheme, and importuned the general to carry it at once into effect.

When it came, however, to selecting the hostages necessary for the proposed negotiations, they became less ardent and were all disposed to recede. At last, after much discussion, the matter

1 Fleming, *ubi sup.* It is expressly stated by Fleming that there was a regular council of war on this subject, so that Meteren, Grotius, and, after them, Wagenaar and others, are mistaken in saying that Vere was alone responsible for the stratagem. Bentivoglio does not seem aware that it was a trick. See Meteren, 455-460. Bentivoglio, P. III. 505-559. Grot. Hist. lib. x.

2 Fleming, 178. „Die van de vergaderinge sijne intenie ghehoort hebbende wert by haer lieder hoochlich ghelaudeert,” &c.

1 Meteren, Bentivoglio, Grotius, *ubi sup.* ending, 172.

2 Fleming, 171-188. Meteren, 460.

was settled, and before nightfall a drummer was set upon the external parapet of the Porcupine, who forthwith began to beat vigorously for a parley. The rattle was a welcome sound in the ears of the weary besiegers, just drawn up in column for a desperate assault, and the tidings were at once communicated to the archduke in Fort St. Albert. That prince manifested at first some unwillingness to forego the glory of the attack, from which he confidently expected a crowning victory, but yielding to the representations of his chief generals that it was better to have his town without further bloodshed, he consented to treat. Hostages were expeditiously appointed on both sides, and Captains Ogle and Fairfax were sent that same Sunday. 23 Dec. 1601. evening to the headquarters of the besieging army. It was at once agreed as a preliminary that the empty outer works of the place should remain unmolested. The English officers were received with much courtesy. The archduke lifted his hat as they were presented, asked them of what nation they were, and then inquired whether they were authorized to agree upon terms of capitulation. They answered in the negative; adding, that the whole business would be in the hands of commissioners to be immediately sent by his Highness, as it was supposed, into the town. Albert then expressed the hope that there was no fraudulent intention in the proposition just made to negotiate. The officers professed themselves entirely ignorant of any contemplated deception; although Captain Ogle had been one of the council, had heard every syllable of Vere's stratagem, and had heartily approved of the whole plot. The Englishmen were then committed to the care of a Spanish nobleman of the archduke's staff, and were treated with perfect politeness and hospitality. 1

1 Meteren, Bentivoglio, Grotius, *ubi sup.*; but Fleming, 170-188, is by far the best

Meanwhile no time was lost in despatching hostages, who should be at the same time commissioners, to Ostend. The quartermaster-general of the army, Don Matteo Antonio, and Matteo Serano, governor of Sluys, but serving among the besiegers, were selected for this important business as personages of ability, discretion, and distinction. 1

They reached the town, coming in of course from the western side, as expeditiously as possible, but after nightfall. Before they arrived at headquarters there suddenly arose, from some unknown cause, a great alarm and beating to arms on the opposite or eastern side of the city. They were entirely innocent of any participation in this uproar and ignorant of its cause, but when they reached the presence of Sir Francis Vere they found that warrior in a towering passion. There was cheating going on, he exclaimed. The Spaniards, he cried, were taking advantage, by dishonourable stratagem, of these negotiations, and were about to assault the town.

Astounded, indignant, but utterly embarrassed, the grave Spaniards knew not how to reply. They were still more amazed when the general, rising to a still higher degree of exasperation, absolutely declined to exchange another word with them, but ordered Captains Carpenter and St. Hillaire, by whom they had been escorted to his quarters, to conduct them out of the town again by the same road which had brought them there. There was nothing for it but to comply, and to smother their resentment at such extraordinary treatment as best they could. 2 When they got to the old harbour on the western side the tide had risen so high that it was impossible to cross. Nobody knew better than Vere, when he gave the order, that this would be the case; so that when the escorting officers returned to state the fact, he simply ordered

authority, his diary recording every minute incident. 1 Fleming. 2 Ibid.



hem to take the Spaniards back by the Gullet or eastern side. The strangers were not very young men, and being much fatigued with wandering to and fro in the darkness over the muddy roads, they begged permission to remain all night in Ostend, if it were only in the guardhouse. But Vere was inexorable, after the duplicity which he affected to have discovered on the part of the enemy. To the quartermaster-general and the governor of Sluys, much to the detriment of their dignity, were forced once more to tramp through the muddy streets. And obeying their secret instructions, the escort led them round and round through the most miry and filthy parts of the town, so that sinking knee-deep at every step into sloughs and quicksands, and plunging about through the mist and sleet of a dreary December's night, they at last reached the precincts of the Spanish half-moon in the Gullet, bedraggled from head to foot and in a most dismal and exhausted condition.

"Ah, the villainous town of Ostend!" exclaimed Serrano, ruefully contemplating his muddy boots and imploring at least a pipe of tobacco. He was informed, however, that no such medical rugs were kept in the fort,<sup>2</sup> but that draught of good English ale was such at their service.<sup>3</sup> The beer was brought in four foaming flagons, and, little refreshed by this hospitality, the Spaniards were put in a boat and rowed under the guns of the fort across the Gullet and delivered to their own entries on the outposts of Bucquoy's trenchments. By this time it was midnight, so that it was necessary for them to remain for the night in the

eastern encampment before reporting themselves at Fort St. Albert.

Thus far Vere's comedy had been eminently successful, and by taking advantage of the accidental alarm and so adroitly lashing himself into a fictitious frenzy, the general had gained nearly twenty-four additional hours of precious time on which he had not reckoned.

Next morning, after Serrano and Antonio had reported to the archduke, it was decided, notwithstanding the very inhospitable treatment which they had received, that those commissioners should return to their labours. Ogle and Fairfax still remained as hostages in camp, and of course professed entire ignorance of these extraordinary proceedings, attributing them to some inex-

Monday,  
24 Dec. plicable misunderstanding. So  
1601.

on Monday, 24th December, the quartermaster and the governor again repaired to Ostend with orders to bring about the capitulation of the place as soon as possible. The same sergeant-major was again appointed by Vere to escort the strangers, and on asking by what way he should bring them in was informed by Sir Francis that it would never do to allow those gentlemen, whose feet were accustomed to the soft sand of the sea-beach and downs, to bruise themselves upon the hard paving-stones of Ostend, but that the softest and muddiest road must be carefully selected for them.<sup>1</sup> These reasons accordingly were stated with perfect gravity to the two Spaniards, who in spite of their solemn remonstrances, were made to repeat a portion of their experiences and to accept it as an act of special courtesy from the English general.<sup>2</sup> Thus so much time had been spent in preliminaries and so much more upon the road that the short winter's day was drawing to a close before they were again introduced to the presence of Vere.

They found that fiery personage on this occasion all smiles and blandishments.

<sup>1</sup> Ibid. 181. „Ah la mechante ville d'Oostende," &c

<sup>2</sup> Ibid. „Gelijk t'selfe quartier beter met er dan met medicinale drooghen." It is interesting to know that two centuries and half ago a pipe of tobacco was considered medicine by Dutchmen.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid.

<sup>1</sup> Fleming, 182.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid.

The Spaniards were received with most dignified courtesy, to which they gravely responded; and the general then proceeded to make excuses for the misunderstanding of the preceding day with its uncomfortable consequences. Thereupon arose much animated discussion as to the causes and the nature of the alarm on the east side which had created such excitement. Much time was ingeniously consumed in this utterly superfluous discussion; but at last the commissioners of the archduke insisted on making allusion to the business which had brought them to the town. „What terms of negotiation do you propose?” they asked Sir Francis. „His Highness has only to withdraw from before Ostend,” coolly replied the general, „and leave us, his poor neighbours, in peace and quietness. This would be the most satisfactory negotiation possible and the one most easily made.”

Serrano and Antonio found it difficult to see the matter in that cheerful light, and assured Sir Francis that they had not been commissioned by the archduke to treat for his own withdrawal but for the surrender of the town. Hereupon high words and fierce discussion very naturally arose, and at last, when a good deal of time had been spent in the sharp encounter of wits, Vere proposed an adjournment of the discussion until after supper; politely expressing the hope that the Spanish gentlemen would be his guests.

The conversation had been from the beginning in French, as Vere, although a master of the Spanish language, was desirous that the rest of the company present should understand everything said at the interview. <sup>1</sup>

The invitation to table was graciously accepted, and the Christmas eve passed off more merrily than the preceding night had done, so far as Vere's two guests were concerned. Several distinguished officers were present at the festive

board: Captain Montesquieu de Roquette Sir Horace Vere, Captains St. Hilaire Meetkerke, De Ryck, and others among them. <sup>1</sup> As it was strict fast for the Catholics that evening—while on the other hand the English, still reckoning according to the old style, would not keep Christmas until ten days later—the banquet consisted mainly of eggs and fish, and the like meagre articles, in compliment to the guests. It was, however, as well furnished as could be expected in a beleaguered town, out of whose harbour a winter gale had been for many weeks blowing and preventing all ingress. There was, at least, no lack of excellent Bordeaux wine, while the servants waiting upon the table did not fail to observe that Governor Serrano was not in all respects a model of the temperance usually characteristic of his race. They carefully counted and afterwards related with admiration, not unmingled with horror, that the veteran Spaniard drank fifty-two goblets of claret, and was emptying his glass as fast as filled, although by no means neglecting the beer, the quality of which he had tested the night before at the half-moon. <sup>2</sup> Yet there seemed to be no perceptible effect produced upon him, save perhaps that he grew a shade more grave and dignified with each succeeding draught. <sup>3</sup> For while the banquet proceeded in this very genial manner business was by no means neglected; the negotiations for the surrender of the city <sup>4</sup> being conducted on both sides with a fuddled solemnity very edifying for the attendants to contemplate.

Vere complained that the archduke was unreasonable, for he claimed nothing less from his antagonists than their all. The commissioners replied that all was no more than his own property. It certainly could not be thought unjust of him to demand his own, and all Flanders was his by legal donation from

<sup>1</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>2</sup> Fleming, 183.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>1</sup> Fleming, 170-188.

his Majesty of Spain. Vere replied that he had never studied jurisprudence, and was not versed at all in that science, but he had always heard in England that possession was nine points of the law. Now it so happened that they, and not his Highness, were in possession of Ostend, and it would be unreasonable to expect them to make a present of it to any one. The besiegers, he urged, had gained much honour by their steady persistence amid so many dangers, difficulties, and losses; but winter had come, the weather was very bad, not a step of progress had been made, and he was bold enough to express his opinion that it would be far more sensible on the part of his Highness, after such deeds of valour, to withdraw his diminished forces out of the freezing and pestilential swamps before Ostend and go into comfortable winter-quarters at Ghent or Bruges. Enough had been done for glory, and it must certainly now be manifest that he had no chance of taking the city.

Serrano retorted that it was no secret to the besiegers that the garrison had dwindled to a handful; that it was quite impossible for them to defend their outer works any longer; that with the loss of the external boulevard the defence of the place would be impossible, and that, on the contrary, it was for the republicans to resign themselves to their fate. They, too, had done enough for glory, and had nothing for it but to retire into the centre of their ruined little nest, where they must burrow until the enemy should have leisure to entirely unearth them, which would be a piece of work very easily and rapidly accomplished. 1

This was called negotiation; and thus the winter's evening wore away, until the Spaniards, heavy with fatigue and wine, were without much difficulty persuaded to seek the couches prepared for them. 2

Next day the concourse of people around the city was wonderful to behold. The rumour of Christmas, 1601, had spread through the provinces, and was on the wing to all foreign countries, that Ostend had capitulated, and that the commissioners were at that moment arranging the details. The cardinal-archduke, in complete Milanese armour, with a splendid feather-bush waving from his casque and surrounded by his brilliant body-guard, galloped to and fro outside the entrenchments, expecting every moment a deputation to come forth, bearing the keys of the town. The Infanta too, magnificent in ruff and farthingale and brocaded petticoat, and attended by a cavalcade of ladies of honour in gorgeous attire, pranced impatiently about, awaiting the dramatic termination of a leaguer which was becoming wearisome to besieger and besieged. 1 Not even on the famous second of July of the previous year, when that princess was pleasing herself with imaginations as to the deportment of Maurice of Nassau as a captive, had her soul been so full of anticipated triumph as on this Christmas morning.

Such a festive scene as was now presented in the neighbourhood of Ostend had not been exhibited for many a long year in Flanders. From the whole country side came the peasants and burghers, men, women, and children, in holiday attire. It was like a kermis or provincial fair. 2 Three thousand people at least were roaming about in all directions, gazing with wonder at the fortifications of the besieging army, so soon to be superfluous, sliding, skating, waltzing on the ice, admiring jugglers, dancing bears, puppet shows and merry-go-rounds, singing, and carousing upon herrings, sausages, waffles, with mighty draughts of Flemish ale, manifesting their exuberant joy that the thorn was nearly extracted from the lion's paw,

1 Fleming, 181, *seqq.*

2 Ibid.

1 Ibid. *ubi sup.* Compare Bentivoglio, Meteren. Grotius, *ubi sup.* 2 Fleming.



and awaiting with delight a blessed relief from that operation.<sup>1</sup> Never was a merrier Christmas morning in Flanders. There should be an end now to the forays through the country of those red-coated English pikemen, those hard-riding, hard-drinking troopers of Germany and Holland, with the French and Scotch arquebus men, and terrible Zeeland sailors, who had for years swept out of Ostend, at any convenient opportunity, to harry the whole province. And great was the joy in Flanders.

Meantime within the city a different scene was enacting. Those dignified Spaniards—governor Serrano and Don Matteo Antonio—having slept off their carouse, were prepared after breakfast next morning to resume the interrupted negotiations. But affairs were now to take an unexpected turn. In the night the wind had changed, and in the course of the forenoon three Dutch vessels of war were descried in the offing, and soon calmly sailed into the mouth of the Gullet. The news was at once brought to Vere's headquarters. That general's plans had been crowned with success even sooner than he expected. There was no further object in continuing the comedy of negotiation, for the ships now arriving seemed crowded with troops. Sir Francis accordingly threw off the mask, and assuring his guests with extreme politeness that it had given him great pleasure to make the acquaintance of such distinguished personages, he thanked them cordially for their visit, but regretted that it would be no longer in his power to entertain any propositions of a specific nature. The necessary reinforcements, which he had been so long expecting, had at last reached him, and it would not yet be necessary for him to retire into his ruined nest. Military honour therefore would not allow him to detain them any longer. Should he ever be so hard pressed again he felt sure that so magnanimous a prince

as his Highness would extend to him all due clemency and consideration.

The Spaniards, digesting as they be could the sauce of contunely with whic the gross treachery of the transactio was now seasoned, solemnly withdrew disdaining to express their spleen i words of idle menace.

They were escorted back through the lines, and at once made their report at head-quarters. The festival had been dismally interrupted before it was well begun. The vessels were soon observed by friend and foe making their way triumphantly up to the town, where they soon dropped anchor at the wharve of the inner Gullet, having only a couple of sailors wounded, despite all the furious discharges of Bucquoy's batteries. The holiday makers dispersed, much discomfited, the English hostages returned to the town, and the archduke shut himself up, growling and furious. His generals and counsellors, who had recommended the abandonment of his carefully prepared assault, and acceptance of the perfidious propositions to negotiate, by which so much golden time had been squandered, were for several days excluded from his presence.<sup>2</sup>

Meantime the army, disappointed and discontented, half-starved, unpaid, passed their days and nights as before, in the sloppy trenches, while deep and earnest were the complaints and the curses which succeeded to the momentary exultation of Christmas eve. The soldiers were more than ever embittered against their august commander-in-chief, for they had just enjoyed a signal opportunity of comparing the luxury and comfortable magnificence of his Highness and the Infanta, and of contrasting it with their own misery. Moreover, it had long been exciting much indignation in the ranks that veteran generals and colonels, in whom all men had confidence, had been

<sup>1</sup> Fleming.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid. Compare Bentivoglio, Meteren, Grotius, *ubi sup.*, et mult. al.

<sup>1</sup> Fleming.

in great numbers superseded in order to make place for court favourites, utterly without experience or talent. 1 Thus the veterans; murmuring in the wet trenches. The archduke meanwhile, in his sullen retirement, brooded over a tragedy to follow the very successful comedy of his antagonist.

It was not long delayed. The assault which had been postponed in the latter days of December was to be renewed before the end of the first week of the new year. Vere, through scouts and deserters, was aware of the impending storm, and had made his arrangements in accordance with the very minute information which he had thus received. The reinforcements, so opportunely sent by the States, were not numerous—only six hundred in all—but they were an earnest of fresh comrades to follow. Meantime they sufficed to fill the gaps in the ranks, and to enable Vere to keep possession of the external line of fortifications, including the all-important Porcupine. Moreover, during the fictitious negotiations, while the general had thus been holding—as he expressed it—the wolf by both ears, the labour of repairing damages in dyke, moat, and wall had not been for an instant neglected.

The morning of the 7th January, 7 Jan. 1602, opened with a vigorous cannonade from all the archduke's batteries, east, west, and south. Auditor Fleming, counsellor and secretary of the city, aide-de-camp and right hand of the commander-in-chief, a grim, grizzled, leathern-faced man of fifty, steady under fire as a veteran arquebuseer, ready with his pen as a counting-house clerk, and as fertile in resource as the most experienced campaigner, was ever at the general's side. At his suggestion several houses had

been demolished, to furnish materials in wood and iron to stop the gaps as soon as made. Especially about the Sand Hill fort and the Porcupine a plentiful supply was collected, no time having been lost in throwing up stockades, palisades, and every other possible obstruction to the expected assailants. Knowing perfectly well where the brunt of the battle was to be, Vere had placed his brother Sir Horace at the head of twelve picked companies of diverse nations in the Sand Hill. Four of the very best companies of the garrison were stationed in the Porcupine, and ten more of the choicest in Fort Hell's Mouth, under Colonel Meetkerke. It must be recollected that the first of these three works was the key to the fortifications of the old or outer town. The other two were very near it, and were the principal redoubts which defended the most exposed and vulnerable portion of the new town on the western side. The Sand Hill, as its name imported, was the only existing relic within the city's verge of the chain of downs once encircling the whole place. It had however been cannonaded so steadily during the six months' siege as to have become almost iron clad—a mass of metal gradually accumulated from the enemy's guns. With the curtain extending from it towards east and west it protected the old town quite up to the little ancient brick church, one of the only two in Ostend. 1

All day long the cannon thundered—a bombardment such as had never before been dreamed of in those days, two thousand shots having been distinctly counted by the burghers. There was but languid response from the besieged, who were reserving their strength. At last, to the brief winter's day succeeded a pitch-dark evening. It was dead low

1 Fleming gives more than one scurrilous etter found in the pockets of dead Spanish soldiers, in which very opprobrious terms are applied to the sovereign of the obedient Netherlands. See in particular p. 164.

1 Fleming's Diary, pp. 187-199, is by far the best authority for this assault. He gives many plans, diagrams, and pictures. Compare Grot. Hist. lib. xi. 595-597. Meteren 460<sup>vo</sup>. Bentivoglio, 510. Wagenaar, ix. 114, 115.

tide at seven. At that hour the drums suddenly beat alarm along the whole line of fortifications from the Gullet on the east to the old harbour on the west, while through the mirky atmosphere sounded the trumpets of the assault, the shouts of the Spanish and Italian commanders, and the fierce responsive yells of their troops. Sir Francis having visited every portion of the works, and satisfied himself that every man in the garrison was under arms, and that all his arrangements had been fulfilled, now sat on horseback, motionless as a statue, within the Sand Hill. Among the many serious and fictitious attacks now making he waited calmly for the one great assault, even allowing some of the enemy to scale the distant counterscarp of the external works towards the south, which he had by design left insufficiently guarded. It was but a brief suspense, for in a few moments two thousand men had rushed through the bed of the old harbour, out of which the tide had ebbcd, and were vigorously assailing the Sand Hill and the whole length of its curtain. The impenetrable darkness made it impossible to count, but the noise and the surging fury of the advance rendered it obvious that the critical moment had arrived. Suddenly a vivid illumination burst forth. Great pine torches, piles of tar-barrels, and heaps of other inflammable material, which had been carefully arranged in Fort Porcupine, were now all at once lighted by Vere's command. <sup>1</sup> As the lurid blaze flashed far and wide there started out of the gloom not only the long lines of yellow-jerkined pikemen and arquebuseers, with their storm-hoods and scaling ladders, rushing swiftly towards the forts, but beyond the broken seadyke the reserved masses supporting the attack, drawn up in solid clumps of spears, with their gay standards waving above them, and with a strong force of cavalry in iron

corslet and morion stationed in the rear to urge on the infantry and prevent their faltering in the night's work, became visible—phantom-like but perfectly distinct.

At least four thousand men were engaged in this chief attack, and the light now permitted the besieged to direct their fire from cannon, demi-cannon, culverin, and snaphance, with fatal effect. The assailants, thinned, straggling, but undismayed, closed up their ranks, and still came fiercely on. Never had Spaniards, Walloons, or Italians, manifested greater contempt of death than on this occasion. They knew that the archduke and the infanta were waiting breathlessly in Fort St. Albert for the news of that victory of which the feigned negotiations had defrauded them at Christmas, and they felt perfectly confident of ending both the siege and the forty years' war this January night. But they had reckoned without their wily English host. As they came nearer—van and at last reserve—they dropped in great heaps under the steady fire of the musketry—as Philip Fleming, looking on, exclaimed—like apples when the autumn wind blows through the orchard. And as the foremost still pressed nearer and nearer, striving to clamber up the shattered counterscarp and through every practicable breach, the English, Hollanders, and Zeelanders, met them in the gap, not only at push of pike but with their long daggers and with flaming pitch-hoops, and hurled them down to instant death.

And thus around the Sand Hill, the Porcupine, and Hell's Mouth, the battle raged nearly two hours long, without an inch of ground being gained by the assailants. The dead and dying were piled beneath the walls, while still the reserves, goaded up to the mark by the cavalry, mounted upon the bodies of their fallen comrades, and strove to plant their ladders. <sup>1</sup> But now the tide

<sup>1</sup> Fleming, *ubi sup.*

<sup>1</sup> Ibid.



was on the flood, the harbour was filling, and cool Auditor Fleming, whom nothing escaped, quietly asked the general's permission to open the western sluice. It was obvious, he observed, that the fury of the attack was over, and that the enemy would soon be effecting a retreat before the water should have risen too high. He even pointed out many stragglers attempting to escape through the already deepening shallows. Vere's consent was at once given, the flood-gate was opened, and the assailants—such as still survived—panic-struck in a moment, rushed wildly back through the old hardbour towards their camp. It was too late. The waters were out, and the contending currents whirled the fugitives up and down through the submerged land, and beyond the broken dyke, until great numbers of them were miserably drowned in the haven, while others were washed out to sea. Horses and riders were borne off towards the Zeeland coast, and several of their corpses were picked up days afterwards in the neighbourhood of Flushing. <sup>1</sup>

Meantime those who had effected a lodgment in the Polder, the Square, and the other southern forts, found, after the chief assault had failed, that they had gained nothing by their temporary triumph but the certainty of being butchered. Retreat was impossible, and no quarter was given. Count Imbec,

a noble of great wealth, offered his weight in gold for his ransom," <sup>1</sup> but was killed by a private soldier, who preferred his blood, or doubted his solvency. Durango, marshal of the camp, Don Alvarez de Suarez, and Don Matteo Antonio, sergeant-major and quartermaster general, whose adventures as a hostage within the town on Christmas-eve have so recently been related, were also slain.

On the eastern side Bucquoy's attack was an entire failure: His arrangements

Jan. 7. were too slowly made, and before he could bring his men to the assault the water was so high in the Gullet that they refused to lay their pontoons and march to certain death. Only at lowest ebb, and with most exquisite skill in fording, would it have been possible to effect anything like an earnest demonstration or a surprise. Moreover some of the garrison, giving themselves out as deserters, stole out of the Spanish Half-moon, which had been purposely almost denuded of its defenders, towards the enemy's entrenchments, and offered to lead a body of Spaniards into that ravelin. Bucquoy fell into the trap, so that the detachment, after a victory as easily effected as that in the southern forts, found themselves when the fight was over not the captors but the caught. A few attempted to escape and were driven into the sea; the rest were massacred.

Fifteen hundred of the enemy's dead were counted and registered by Auditor Fleming. <sup>2</sup> The whole number of the slain and drowned was reckoned as high as two thousand, which was at least a quarter of the whole besieging army. And so ended this winter night's assault, by which the archduke had fondly hoped to avenge himself for Vere's perfidy, and to terminate the war at a blow.

<sup>1</sup> The historians Bentivoglio, Grotius, and many others give Vere, as a matter of course, the credit of this feat. But these are the words of Auditor Fleming himself, a man whom I should judge incapable of falsehood: —, "Hebbe my vervordert den Generael te bidden dat hy my gheliefde te authoriseren de West Sluyse te doen openen hem remonstrerende gelijk den Vyand sijn voornemen tot ghenen goeden effecte conde gebrengen als oock dat sijn volck van den furieusen aenval begosten den moet te verliesen, haer lieder retractive wederom door die onde West haven soude moeten nemen ende dat alsdan die spoellinghe vant water haer lieder inde Zee soude drijven waer over den voornoemden Generael my gheauthoriseert heeft die sluyzen te doen openen."—pp. 195, 196.

<sup>1</sup> Haestens, 199.

<sup>2</sup> Fleming, 197.

Only sixty of the garrison were killed, and Sir Horace Vere was wounded. 1

The winter now set in with severe sleet, and snow, and rain, and furious tempests lashing the sea over the works of besieger and besieged, and for weeks together paralyzing all efforts of either army. Eight weary months the siege had lasted; the men in town and hostile camp, exposed to the inclemency of the wintry trenches, sinking faster before the pestilence which now swept impartially through all ranks than the soldiers of the archduke had fallen at Nieupoort, or in the recent assault on the Sand Hill. Of seven thousand hardly three thousand now remained in the garrison. 2

Yet still the weary sausage making and wooden castle building went on

1 Fleming, 187-199. Compare Bentivoglio, Grotius, Meteren, Wagenaar, *ubi sup.*

2 Grotius, xi. 590.

along the Gullet and around the old town. The Bredené dyke crept on inch by inch, but the steady ships of the republic came and went unharmed by the batteries with which Bucquoy hoped to shut up the New Harbour. The archduke's works were pushed up nearer on the west, but, as yet, not one practical advantage had been gained, and the siege had scarcely advanced a hair's breadth since the 5th of July of the preceding year, when the armies had first sat down before the place.

The stormy month of March had come, and Vere, being called to service in the field for the coming season, transferred the command at Ostend to Frederic van Dorp, a rugged, hard-headed, ill-favoured, stout-hearted Zealand colonel, with the face of a bulldog, and with the tenacious grip of one. 1

1 Fleming, 212, 215.

## CHAPTER XL.

Protraction of the siege of Ostend—Spanish invasion of Ireland—Prince Maurice again on the march—Siege of Grave—State of the archduke's army—Formidable mutiny—State of Europe—Portuguese expedition to Java—Foundation there of the first Batavian trading settlement—Exploits of Jacob Heemskerck—Capture of a Lisbon carrack—Progress of Dutch commerce—Oriental and Germanic republics—Commercial embassy from the King of Atsigen in Sumatra to the Netherlands—Surrender of Grave—Privateer work of Frederic Spinola—Destruction of Spinola's fleet by English and Dutch cruisers—Continuation of the siege of Ostend—Fearful hurricane and its effects—The attack—Capture of external forts—Encounter between Spinola and a Dutch squadron—Execution of prisoners by the archduke—Philip Fleming and his diary—Continuation of operations before Ostend—Spanish Veterans still mutinous—Their capital besieged by Van den Berg—Maurice marches to their relief—Convention between the prince and the mutineers—Great commercial progress of the Dutch—Opposition to international commerce—Organization of the Universal East India Company.

It would be desirable to concentrate the chief events of the siege of Ostend

so that they might be presented to the reader's view in a single mass. But this is impossible. The siege was essentially the war—as already observed—and it was bidding fair to protract itself to such an extent that a respect for chronology requires the attention to be directed for a moment to other topics.

The invasion of Ireland under Aquil, so pompously heralded as almost to suggest another grand armada, had sailed in the beginning of the winter, and an army of six thousand men had been landed at Kinsale. Rarely had there been a better opportunity for the Celt to strike for his independence. Shane Mac Neil had an army on foot with which he felt confident of exterminating the Saxon oppressor, even without the assistance of his peninsular allies, while the queen's army, severely drawn upon as it had been for the exigencies of Vere and the States, might be supposed un-

able to cope with so formidable a combination. Yet Montjoy made short work of Aquila and Tyrone. The invaders, shut up in their meagre conquest, became the besieged instead of the assailants. Tyrone made a feeble attempt to relieve his Spanish allies, but was soon driven into his swamps, the peasants would not rise, in spite of proclamations and golden mountains of promise, and Aquila was soon glad enough to sign a capitulation by which he saved a portion of his army. He then returned, in transports January, 1602, provided by the English general, a much discomfited man, to Spain, instead of converting Ireland into a province of the universal empire. 1 He had not rescued Hibernia, as he stoutly proclaimed at the outset his intention of doing, from the jaws of the evil demon. 2

The States, not much wiser after the experience of Nieuport, were again desirous that Maurice should march into Flanders, relieve Ostend, and sweep the archduke into the sea. As for Vere, he proposed that a great army of cavalry and infantry should be sent into Ostend, while another force equally powerful should take the field as soon as the season permitted. Where the men were to be levied, and whence the funds for putting such formidable hosts in motion were to be derived, it was not easy to say. „Tis astonishing,” said Lewis William, „that the evils already suffered cannot open his eyes; but after all, 'tis no marvel. An old and good colonel, as I hold him to be, must go to school before he can become a general, and we must beware of committing any second folly, govern ourselves according to our means and the art of war, and leave the rest to God.” 3

Prince Maurice, however, yielding as usual to the persuasions or impor-

tunities of those less sagacious than himself, and being also much influenced by the advice of the English queen and the French king, after reviewing the most splendid army that even 12 June, he had ever equipped and set 1602.

in the field, crossed the Waal at Nymegen, and the Meuse at Mook, and then, moving leisurely along Meuse-side by way of Sambeck, Blitterswyck, and Maasyk, came past St. Truyden to the neighbourhood of Thienen, in Brabant. 1 Here he stood, in the heart of the enemy's country, and within a day's march of Brussels. The sanguine portion of his countrymen and the more easily alarmed of the enemy already thought it would be an easy military promenade for the stadholder to march through Brabant and Flanders to the coast, defeat the Catholic forces before Ostend, raise the weary siege of that place, dictate peace to the archduke, and return in triumph to the Hague, before the end of the summer.

But the experienced Maurice too well knew the emptiness of such dreams. He had a splendid army—eighteen thousand foot and five thousand horse—of which Lewis William commanded the battalia, Vere the right, and Count Ernest the left, with a train of two thousand baggage wagons, and a considerable force of sutlers and camp-followers. He moved so deliberately, and with such excellent discipline, that his two wings could with ease be expanded for black-mail or forage over a considerable extent of country, and again folded together in case of sudden military necessity. But he had no intention of marching through Brussels, Ghent, and Bruges, to the Flemish coast. His old antagonist, the Admiral of Arragon, lay near Thienen in an entrenched camp, with a force of at least fifteen thousand men, while the arch-

1 Meteren, 458, *seqq.* Grot. x. 593.

2 Grotius, *ubi sup.*

3 Groen v. Prinsterer. Archives, 2nd Series, ii. 111.

1 Meteren, 469, *seqq.* Van der Kemp, ii. 98, 99, and notes. Bentivoglio, P. III. 517. Wagenaar, ix. 119, *seqq.*



duke, leaving Rivas in command before Ostend, hovered in the neighbourhood of Brussels, with as many troops as could be spared from the various Flemish garrisons, ready to support the admiral. 1

But Maurice tempted the admiral in vain with the chances of a general action. That warrior, remembering perhaps too distinctly his disasters at Nieuport, or feeling conscious that his military genius was more fitly displayed in burning towns and villages in neutral territory, robbing the peasantry, plundering gentlemen's castles and murdering the proprietors, than it was like to be in a pitched battle with the first general of the age, remained sullenly within his entrenchments. His position was too strong and his force far too numerous to warrant an attack by the stadholder upon his works. After satisfying himself, therefore, that there was no chance of an encounter in Brabant except at immense disadvantage, Maurice rapidly

18 July, countermarched towards the 1602. lower Meuse, and on the 18th July laid siege to Grave. The position and importance of this city have been thoroughly set before the reader in a former volume. 2 It is only necessary, therefore, to recall the fact that, besides being a vital possession for the republic, the place was in law the private property of the Orange family, having been a portion of the estate of Count de Buren, afterwards redeemed on payment of a considerable sum of money by his son-in-law, William the Silent, confirmed to him at the pacification of Ghent, and only lost to his children by the disgraceful conduct of Captain Hamart, which had cost that officer his head. Maurice was determined at least that the place should not now slip through his fingers, and that the present siege should be a masterpiece. His forts, of which he had

nearly fifty, were each regularly furnished with moat, drawbridge, and bulwark. His counterscarp and parapet, his galleries, covered ways, and mines, were as elaborate, massive, and artistically finished as if he were building a city instead of besieging one. Buzanva the French envoy, amazed at the spectacle, protested that his works „were rather worthy of the grand Emperor of the Turks than of a little commonwealth, which only existed through the disorder of its enemies and the assistance of its friends;” but he admitted the utility of the stadholder's proceedings to be very obvious. 1

While the prince calmly sat before Grave, awaiting the inexorable hour for burghers and garrison to surrender, the great Francis Mendoza, Admiral of Aragon, had been completing the arrangements for his exchange. A prisoner after the Nieuport battle, he had been assigned by Maurice, as will be recollected, to his cousin, young Lewis Gunther, whose brilliant services as commander of the cavalry had so much contributed to the victory. The amount of ransom for so eminent a captive could not fail to be large, and accordingly the thrifty Lewis William had congratulated his brother on being able, although so young, thus to repair the fortunes of the family by his military industry to a greater extent than had yet been accomplished by any of the race. Subsequently, the admiral had been released on parole, the sum of his ransom having been fixed at nearly one hundred thousand Flemish crowns. By an agreement now made by the States, with consent of the Nassau family, the prisoner was definitely released, on condition of effecting the exchange of all prisoners of the republic now held in durance by Spain in any part of the world. 2 This was in lieu of the hundred thousand crowns which were to

1 Same authorities last cited.

2 See vol. II. of this work, chap. ix.

1 Groen v. Prinsterer. Archives, ii. 153.

2 Meteren, 449vo, 470. Grotius, xi. 528, 599.

be put into the impoverished coffers of Lewis Gunther. It may be imagined, as the hapless prisoners afterwards poured in—not only from the peninsula, but from more distant regions, whither they had been sent by their cruel taskmasters, some to relate their sufferings in the horrible dungeons of Spain, where they had long been expiating the crime of defending their fatherland, others to relate their experiences as chained galley-slaves in the naval service of their bitterest enemies, many with shorn heads and long beards like Turks, many with crippled limbs, worn out with chains and blows, and the squalor of disease and filth<sup>1</sup>—that the hatred for Spain and Rome did not glow any less fiercely within the republic, nor the hereditary love for the Nassaus, to whose generosity these poor victims were indebted for their deliverance, become fainter, in consequence of these revelations. It was at first vehemently disputed by many that the admiral could be exchanged as a prisoner of war, in respect to the manifold murders and other crimes which would seem to authorize his trial and chastisement by the tribunals of the republic. But it was decided by the States that the sacred ægis of military law must be held to protect even so bloodstained a criminal as he, and his release was accordingly effected.<sup>2</sup> Not long afterwards he took his departure for Spain, where his reception was not enthusiastic.

From this epoch is to be dated a considerable reform in the laws regulating the exchange of prisoner of war.<sup>3</sup>

While Maurice was occupied with the siege of Grave, and thus not only menacing an important position, but spreading danger and dismay over all Brabant and Flanders, it was necessary for the archduke to detach so large a

portion of his armies to observe his indefatigable and scientific enemy, as to much weaken the vigour of the operations before Ostend. Moreover, the execrable administration of his finances, and the dismal delays and sufferings of that siege, had brought about another mutiny—on the whole, the most extensive, formidable, and methodical of all that had hitherto occurred in the Spanish armies.<sup>1</sup>

By midsummer, at least three thousand five hundred veterans, including a thousand of excellent cavalry, the very best soldiers in the service, had seized the city of Hoogstraaten. Here they established themselves securely, and strengthened the fortifications; levying contributions in corn, cattle, and every other necessary, besides wine, beer, and pocket-money, from the whole country round with exemplary regularity. As usual, disorder assumed the forms of absolute order. Anarchy became the best organized of governments, and it would have been difficult to find in the world—outside the Dutch commonwealth—a single community where justice appeared to be so promptly administered as in this temporary republic, founded upon rebellion and theft.

For, although a brotherhood of thieves, it rigorously punished such of its citizens as robbed for their own, not for the public good. The immense booty swept daily from the granges, castles, and villages of Flanders was divided with the simplicity of early Christians, while the success and steadiness of the operations paralyzed their sovereign, and was of considerable advantage to the States.

Albert endeavoured in vain to negotiate with the rebels. Nuncius Frangipani went to them in person, but was received with calm derision. Pious exhortations might turn the keys of Paradise, but gold alone, he was informed, would

<sup>1</sup> Grotius, *ubi sup.*

<sup>2</sup> „Non visum Ordinibus in captivum belli ure munitum judicia exercere.”—Grotius, *ubi sup.*

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>1</sup> Bentivoglio, iii. 517. Meteren, 470-472. Grotius, xi. 604-606.

unlock the gates of Hoogstraaten. In an evil hour the cardinal-archduke was tempted to try the effect of sacerdotal thunder. The ex-archbishop of Toledo could not doubt that the terrors of the Church would make those brown veterans tremble who could confront so tranquilly the spring-tides of the North Sea, and the batteries of Vere and Nasseau. So he launched a manifesto, as highly spiced as a pamphlet of Marnix, and as severe as a sentence of Torquemada. Entirely against the advice of the States-General of the obedient provinces, he denounced the mutineers as outlaws and accursed. He called on persons of every degree to kill any of them in any way, at any time, or in any place, promising that the slayer of a private soldier should receive a reward of ten crowns for each head brought in, while for a subaltern officer's head one hundred crowns were offered, for that of a superior officer two hundred, and for that of the Eletto or chief magistrate, five hundred crowns. Should the slayer be himself a member of the mutiny, his crime of rebellion was to be forgiven, and the price of murder duly paid. All judges, magistrates, and provost-m Marshals were ordered to make inventories of the goods, movable and immovable, of the mutineers, and of the clothing and other articles belonging to their wives and children, all which property was to be brought in and deposited in the hands of the proper functionaries of the archduke's camp, in order that it might be duly incorporated into the domains of his Highness. 1

The mutineers were not frightened. The ban was an anachronism. If those Spaniards and Italians had learned nothing by their much campaigning in the land of Calvinism, they had at least unlearned their faith in bell, book, and candle. It happened, too, that among their numbers were to be found

pamphleteers as ready and as unscrupulous as the scribes of the archduke.

So there soon came forth and was published to the world, in the name of the Eletto and council of Hoogstraaten, a formal answer to the ban. 1

„If scolding and cursing be payment,” said the magistrates of the mutiny, „then we might give a receipt in full for our wages. The ban is sufficient in this respect; but as these curses give no food for our bellies nor clothes for our backs, not preventing us, therefore, who have been fighting so long for the honour and welfare of the archdukes from starving with cold and hunger, we think a reply necessary in order to make manifest how much reason these archdukes have for thundering forth all this choler and fury, by which women and children may be frightened, but at which no soldier will feel alarm.

„When it is stated,” continued the mutineers, „that we have deserted our banners just as an attempt was making by the archduke to relieve Grave, we can only reply that the assertion proves how impossible it is to practise arithmetic with disturbed brains. Passion is a bad schoolmistress for the memory, but, as good friends, we will recall to the recollection of your Highness that it was not your Highness, but the Admiral of Arragon, that commanded the relieving force before that city.

„’Tis very true that we summon your Highnesses, and levy upon your provinces, in order to obtain means of living; for in what other quarter should we make application. Your Highnesses give us nothing except promises; but soldiers are not chameleons, to live on such air. According to every principle of law, creditors have a lien on the property of their debtors,

„As to condemning to death as traitors and scoundrels those who don't desire to be killed, and who have the means of killing such as attempt to execute

1 „Om alle de selve te doen incorporeren aen onse Domeynen.”—Met. 471.

1 Meteren (470-472) gives the text.



the sentence, this is hardly in accordance with the extraordinary wisdom which has always characterized your Highnesses.

„As to the confiscation of our goods, both movable and immovable, we would simply make this observation:—

„Our movable goods are our swords alone, and they can only be moved by ourselves. They are our immovable goods as well; for should any one but ourselves undertake to move them, we assure your Highnesses that they will prove too heavy to be handled.

„As to the official register and deposit ordained of the money, clothing, and other property belonging to ourselves, our wives and children, the work may be done without clerks of inventory. Certainly, if the domains of your Highnesses have no other sources of revenue than the proceeds of this confiscation, wherewith to feed the ostrich-like digestions of those about you, 'tis to be feared that ere long they will be in the same condition as were ours, when we were obliged to come together in Hoogstraaten to devise means to keep ourselves, our wives, and children alive. And at that time we were an unbreeched people, like the Indians—saving your highnesses' reverence—and the climate here is too cold for such costume. Your highnesses, and your relatives the Emperor and King of Spain, will hardly make your royal heads greasy with the oil of such property as we possess. It will also be a remarkable spectacle after you have stripped our wives and children stark naked for the benefit of our treasury, to see them sent in that condition, within three days afterwards, out of the country, as the ban ordains.

„You order the ban to be executed against our children and our children's children, but your Highness never learned this in the Bible, when you were an archbishop, and when you expounded, or ought to have expounded, the Holy Scriptures to your flock. What theology teaches your Highness

to vent your wrath upon the innocent?

„Whenever the cause of discontent is taken away, the soldiers will become obedient and cheerful. All kings and princes may mirror themselves in the bad government of your Highness, and may see how they fare who try to carry on a war, while with their own hands they cut the sinews of war. The great leaders of old—Cyrus, Alexander, Scipio, Cæsar—were accustomed, not to starve, but to enrich their soldiers. What did Alexander, when in an arid desert they brought him a helmet full of water? He threw it on the sand, saying that there was only enough for him, but not enough for his army.

„Your Highnesses have set ten crowns, and one hundred, and five hundred crowns upon our heads, but never could find five hundred mites nor ten mites to keep our souls and bodies together.

„Yet you have found means to live yourselves with pomp and luxury, far exceeding that of the great Emperor Charles, and much surpassing the magnificence of your Highnesses' brothers, the emperor and the king.”<sup>1</sup>

Thus, and much more, the magistrates of the „Italian republic”—answering their master's denunciations of vengeance, both in this world and the next, with a humorous scorn very refreshing in that age of the world to contemplate. The expanding influence of the Dutch commonwealth was already making itself felt even in the ranks of its most determined foes.

The mutineers had also made an agreement with the States-General, by which they had secured permission, in case of need, to retire within the territory of the republic. Maurice had written to them from his camp before Grave, and at first they were disposed to treat him with as little courtesy as they had shown the Nuncios; for they put the prince's letter on a staff, and

<sup>1</sup> Meteren, *ubi sup.*

fired at it as a mark, assuring the trumpeter who brought it that they would serve him in the same manner should he venture thither again. 1 Very soon afterwards, however, the Eletto and council, reproving the folly of their subordinates, opened negotiations with the stadholder, who, with the consent of the States, gave them preliminary permission to take refuge under the guns of Bergen-op-Zoom, should they by chance be hard pressed. 2

Thus throughout Europe a singular equilibrium of contending forces seemed established. Before Ostend, where the chief struggle between imperialism and republicanism had been proceeding for more than a year with equal vigour, there seemed no possibility of a result. The sands drank up the blood of the combatants on both sides, month after month, in summer; the pestilence in town and camp mowed down Catholic and Protestant with perfect impartiality during the winter; while the remorseless ocean swept over all in its wrath, obliterating in an hour the patient toil of months.

In Spain, in England, and Ireland; in Hungary, Germany, Sweden, and Poland, men wrought industriously day by day and year by year, to destroy each other, and to efface the products of human industry, and yet no progress could fairly be registered. The Turk was in Buda, on the right bank of the Danube, and the Christian in Pest, on the left, while the crescent, but lately supplanted by the cross, again waved in triumph over Stuhlweissenberg, capital city of the Magyars. The great Marshal Biron, foiled in his stupendous treachery, 3 had laid down

his head upon the block; the catastrophe following hard upon the madcap riot of Lord Essex in the Strand and his tragic end. The troublesome and restless favourites of Henry and of Elizabeth had closed their stormy career, but the designs of the great king and the great queen were growing wider and wilder, more false and more fantastic than ever,

employed such a servant as Biron to cut his master's throat, and stir up his subjects to mutiny, had more grievously violated the peace than if he had simply seized the best province of his kingdom. Nevertheless, Aerssens felt sure, even as he had done the year before, that the king's rage against Spain and his caresses of the republic were mere grimace. Henry was always horribly anxious lest the States should stop fighting, and at this moment of emotion in France, he was especially suspicious of any appearance of treating between the archduke and the republic.

It was to be seen, at a little later period, how great or how trifling would be the indignation of the British king at a wholesale attempt of murder devised, as it was suspected, in Spain. It may at least be counted among the signs of human progress that assassination is no longer one of the commonplace means employed by anointed sovereigns against each other, and against individuals obnoxious to royal displeasure.

Certainly it may be doubted whether the practice, if now attempted, would be looked upon with such lenity by the civilized world as in the reigns of the Philips, Elizabeth, James, and Henry. Meantime the shallow artifices by which it was attempted at the French court to veil the share of Spain in Biron's plot were pitiable. Excuses for Spain were made by the French Government in order to conceal its own shame, "They don't consider," said Aerssens, "that the Spaniard will never change his designs, but will be ever seeking new opportunities. The sole result of the discovery of this conspiracy is that the king loses a good servant, and is obliged to show too clearly that he fears war, and therefore is seeking for peace. The pope pleads innocence, the king believes him, and Villeroi holds fast to his old maxim that the French crown can only prosper by keeping well with the pope.

"What fruit then shall we gather from the evil of this plot or the good of its discovery? The king says that the King of Spain is too good a brother, too devout, too inexperienced to hatch this perfidy. 'Tis all Fuentes and other ministers in combination with the Duke of Savoy. I have always observed that princes never avow mishaps, but are very forward about successes."—Van Deventer, ii. 294, 295, 324, 325.

1 Van der Kemp, ii. 386.

2 Meteren, Grotius, Bentivoglio, *ubi sup.* Van der Kemp. Wagenaar, ix. 120-122.

3 Henry knew quite as well as did the most Catholic king the share of Spain in this vile intrigue. Villeroi avowed to the States' envoy that the king would be quite justified in resorting to arms to punish the treason of the Spanish governor, who having

is the evening shadows of both were lengthening.

But it was not in Europe nor in Christendom alone during that twilight epoch of declining absolutism, regal and sacerdotal, and the coming glimmer of freedom, religious and commercial, that the contrast between the old and new civilizations was exhibiting itself.

The same fishermen and fighting men, whom we have but lately seen sailing forth from Zeeland and Friesland to confront the dangers of either pole, were now contending in the Indian seas with the Portuguese monopolists of the tropics.

A century long, the generosity of the Roman pontiff in bestowing upon others what was not his property had guaranteed to the nation of Vasco de Gama one half at least of the valuable possessions which maritime genius, unflinching valour, and boundless cruelty had won and kept. But the spirit of change was abroad in the world. Potentates and merchants under the equator had been sedulously taught that there were no other white men on the planet but the Portuguese and their conquerors the Spaniards, and that the Dutch—of whom they had recently heard, and the portrait of whose great military chieftain they had seen after the news of the Nieuport battle had made the circuit of the earth—were a mere mob of pirates and savages inhabiting the ob-

1 Borgia, Pope of Rome, had conscientiously divided something that was supposed to be a new world into two halves, for his two best children, the monarchs of Spain and Portugal; Catholic majesty to take that portion lying west of a line drawn from north to south pole about 1000 miles beyond the Cape Verde Islands; Faithful majesty the other slice. Subsequently, when Catholic majesty, towards the end of the 16th century, swallowed Faithful majesty, with all its kingdoms, he legally absorbed the East Indian possessions, and became proprietor of the whole new world, under the Borgia grant.

This was public law, religion, high politics, and common sense in those days, but the unsophisticated Hollanders could not be made to understand the theory.

scurest of dens. They were soon, however, to be enabled to judge for themselves as to the power and the merits of the various competitors for their trade.

Early in this year Andreas Hurtado de Mendoza with a stately fleet of galleons and smaller vessels, more than five-and-twenty in all, was on his way towards the island of Java to inflict summary vengeance upon those oriental rulers who had dared to trade with men forbidden by his Catholic Majesty and the Pope.

The city of Bantam was the first spot marked out for destruction, and it so happened that a Dutch skipper Wolfert Hermann by name, commanding five trading vessels, in which were three hundred men, had just arrived in those seas to continue the illicit commerce which had aroused the ire of the Portuguese. His whole force both of men and of guns was far inferior to that of the flag-ship alone of Mendoza. But he resolved to make manifest to the Indians that the Batavians were not disposed to relinquish their promising commercial relations with them, nor to turn their backs upon their newly found friends in the hour of danger. To the profound astonishment of the Portuguese admiral the Dutchman with his five little trading ships made an attack on the pompous armada, intending to avert chastisement from the king of Bantam. It was not possible for Wolfert to cope at close quarters with his immensely superior adversary, but his skill and nautical experience enabled him to play at what was then considered long bowls with extraordinary effect. The greater lightness and mobility of his vessels made them more than a match, in this kind of encounter, for the clumsy, topheavy, and sluggish marine castles in which Spain and Portugal then went forth to battle on the ocean. It seems almost like the irony of history, and yet it is the literal fact, that the Dutch galleot

1 Grotius, ix. 688, *seqq.*



of that day—hardly changed in two and a half centuries since—, the bull-browed galleot butting through the stream,"<sup>1</sup>—was then the model clipper, conspicuous among all ships for its rapid sailing qualities and ease of handling. So much has the world moved, on sea and shore, since those simple but heroic days. And thus Wolfert's swift-going galleots circled round and round the awkward, ponderous, and much-puzzled Portuguese fleet, until by well-directed shots and skilful manœuvring they had sunk several ships, taken two, run others into the shallows, and, at last, put the whole to confusion. After several days of such fighting, Admiral Mendoza fairly turned his back upon his insignificant opponent, and abandoned his projects upon Java.<sup>2</sup> Bearing away for the Island of Amboyna, with the remainder of his fleet, he laid waste several of its villages and odoriferous spice-fields, while Wolfert and his companions entered Bantam in triumph, and were hailed as deliverers.<sup>3</sup> And thus on the extreme western verge of this magnificent island was founded the first trading settlement of the Batavian republic in the archipelago of the equator—the foundation-stone of a great commercial empire which was to encircle the earth. Not many years later, at the distance of a dozen leagues from Bantam, a congenial swamp was fortunately discovered in a land whose volcanic peaks rose two miles into the air, and here a town duly laid out with canals and bridges; and trim gardens and stagnant pools, was baptized by the ancient and well-beloved name of Good-Meadow or Batavia, which it bears to this day.

Meantime Wolfert Hermann was not the only Hollander cruising in those seas able to convince the Oriental mind that all Europeans save the Portuguese

were not pirates and savages, and that friendly intercourse with other foreigners might be as profitable as slavery to the Spanish crown.

Captain Nek made treaties of amity and commerce with the potentates of Ternate, Tydor, and other Moluccan islands. The King of Candy on the Island of Ceylon, lord of the odoriferous fields of cassia which perfume those tropical seas, was glad to learn how to exchange the spices of the equator for the thousand fabrics and products of western civilization which found their great emporium in Holland.<sup>1</sup> Jacob Heemskerck, too, who had so lately astonished the world by his exploits and discoveries during his famous winter in Nova Zembla, was now seeking adventures and carrying the flag and fame of the republic along the Indian and Chinese coasts. The King of Johor on the Malayan peninsula entered into friendly relations with him, being well-pleased, like so many of those petty rulers, to obtain protection against the Portuguese whom he had so long hated and feared. He informed Heemskerck of the arrival in the straits of Malacca of an immense Lisbon carrack, laden with pearls and spices, brocades and precious stones, on its way to Europe, and suggested an attack. It is true that the roving Hollander merely commanded a couple of the smallest galleots with about a hundred and thirty men in the two. But when was Jacob Heemskerck ever known to shrink from an encounter—whether from single-handed combat with a polar bear, or from leading a forlorn hope against a Spanish fort, or from assailing a Portuguese armada. The carrack, more than one thousand tons burthen, carried seventeen guns, and at least eight times as many men as he commanded.<sup>2</sup> Nevertheless, after a combat of but brief duration Heemskerck was master of the carrack. He spared the lives of his seven hundred

<sup>1</sup> Oliver Wendell Holmes.

<sup>2</sup> Grotius, xi. 608, 609. Meteren, 463-465. Wagenaar, *ubi sup.*

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>1</sup> Grotius, xi. 608-613.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*

prisoners, and set them on shore before they should have time to discover to what a handful of Dutchmen they had surrendered. Then dividing about a million florins' worth of booty among his men, who doubtless found such cruising among the spice islands more attractive than wintering at the North Pole, he sailed in the carrack for Macao, where he found no difficulty in convincing the authorities of the celestial empire that the friendship of the Dutch republic was worth cultivating. 1 There was soon to be work in other regions for the hardy Hollander—such as was to make the name of Heemskerck a word to conjure with down to the latest posterity. Meantime he returned to his own country to take part in the great industrial movements which were to make this year an epoch in commercial history.

The conquerors of Mendoza and deliverers of Bantam had however not paused in their work. From Java they sailed to Banda, and on those volcanic islands of nutmegs and cloves made, in the name of their commonwealth, a treaty with its republican antipodes. For there was no king to be found in that particular archipelago, and the two republics, the Oriental and the Germanic, dealt with each other with direct and becoming simplicity. 2 Their convention was in accordance with the commercial ideas of the day, which assumed monopoly as the true basis of national prosperity. It was agreed that none but Dutchmen should ever purchase the nutmegs of Banda, and that neither nation should harbour refugees from the other. Other articles, however, showed how much farther the practice of political and religious liberty had advanced than had any theory of commercial freedom. It was settled that each nation should judge its own citizens according to its own laws, that neither

should interfere by force with the other in regard to religious matters, but that God should be judge over them all. 1 Here at least was progress beyond the system according to which the Holy Inquisition furnished the only engine of civilization. The guardianship assumed by Holland over these children of the sun was at least an improvement on the tyranny which roasted them alive if they rejected religious dogmas which they could not comprehend, and which proclaimed with fire, sword, and gibbet that the Omnipotent especially forbade the nutmeg trade to all but the subjects of the most Catholic king.

In Atsgen or Achim, chief city of Sumatra, a treaty was likewise made with the government of the place, and it was arranged that the king of Atsgen should send over an embassy to the distant but friendly republic. Thus he might judge whether the Hollanders were enemies of all the world, as had been represented to him, or only of Spain; whether their knowledge of the arts and sciences, and their position among the western nations entitled them to respect, and made their friendship desirable; or whether they were only worthy of the contempt which their royal and aristocratic enemies delighted to heap upon their heads. 2 The envoys sailed from Sumatra on board the same little fleet which, under the command of Wolfert Hermann, had already done such signal service, and on their way to Europe they had an opportunity of seeing how these republican sailors could deal with their enemies on the ocean.

Off St. Helena an immense Portuguese carrack richly laden and powerfully armed, was met, attacked, and overpowered by the little merchantmen with their usual audacity and skill. A magnificent booty was equitably divided among the captors, the vanquished crew

1 Ibid. „Religiones ob causam molesti aliis non essent sed Deo judici rem permitterent.”

2 Meteren, Grotius, Wagenaar, *ubi sup.*

1 Grotius, Meteren, *ubi sup.*

2 Grotius, xi. 609.

were set safely on shore, and the Hollanders then pursued their home voyage without further adventures. 1

The ambassadors, with an Arab interpreter, were duly presented to Prince Maurice in the lines before the city of Grave. 2 Certainly no more favourable opportunity could have been offered them for contrasting the reality of military power, science, national vigour, and wealth, which made the republic eminent among the nations, with the fiction of a horde of insignificant and bloodthirsty savages which her enemies had made so familiar at the antipodes. Not only were the intrenchments, bastions, galleries, batteries, the discipline and equipment of the troops, a miracle in the eyes of these newly-arrived Oriental ambassadors, but they had awakened the astonishment of Europe, already accustomed to such spectacles. Evidently the amity of the stadholder and his commonwealth was a jewel of price, and the King of Achim would have been far more barbarous than he had ever deemed the Dutchmen to be, had he not well heeded the lesson which he had sent so far to learn.

The chief to the legation, Abdulzamar, died in Zeeland, and was buried with honourable obsequies at Middleburg, a monument being raised to his memory. The other envoys returned to Sumatra, fully determined to maintain close relations with the republic. 3

There had been other visitors in Maurice's lines before Grave at about the same period. Among others, Gaston Spinola, recently created by the archduke Count of Bruay, had obtained permission to make a visit to a wounded relative, then a captive in the republican camp, and was hospitably entertained at the stadholder's table. Maurice, with soldierly bluntness, ridiculed the floating batteries, the castles on wheels, the sausages, and other newly-

invented machines, employed before Ostend, and characterized them as rather fit to catch birds with than to capture a city, defended by mighty armies and fleets.

„If the archduke has set his heart upon it, he had far better try to buy Ostend,” he observed.

„What is your price?” asked the Italian; „will you take 200,000 ducats?”

„Certainly not less than a million and a half,” was the reply; so highly did Maurice rate the position and advantages of the city. He would venture to prophesy, he added, that the siege of Ostend would last as long as the siege of Troy.

„Ostend is no Troy,” said Spinola with a courtly flourish, „although there are certainly not wanting an Austrian Agamemnon, a Dutch Hector, and an Italian Achilles.” 1 The last allusion was to the speaker's namesake and kinsman, the Marquis Ambrose Spinola, of whom much was to be heard in the world from that time forth.

Meantime, although so little progress had been made at Ostend, Maurice had thoroughly done his work before Grave. on the 18th September the place surrendered, after sixty days' siege, upon the terms usually granted by the stadholder. The garrison was to go out with the honours of war. Those of the inhabitants who wished to leave were to leave; those who preferred staying were to stay; rendering due allegiance to the republic, and abstaining in public from the rites of the Roman Church, without being exposed, however, to any inquiries as to their religious opinions, or any interference within their households. 2

The work went slowly on before Ostend. Much effect had been produced, however, by the operations of the archduke's little naval force. The galley of

1 Gallucci, ii. 109.

2 Meteren, 470. Grotius, xi. 604. Vander Kemp, ii. 99 and notes. Wagenaar, ix. 120.

1 Meteren, Grotius, Wagenaar, *ubi sup.*

2 Ibid.

3 Ibid.



that day, although a child's toy as compared with the wonders of naval architecture of our own time, was an effective machine enough to harass fishing and coasting vessels in creeks and estuaries, and along the shores of Holland and Zeeland during tranquil weather.

The locomotive force of these vessels consisted of galley-slaves, in which respect the Spaniards had an advantage over other nations; for they had no scruples in putting prisoners of war into chains and upon the benches of the rowers. Humanity—, the law of Christian piety," in the words of the noble Grotius—forbade the Hollanders from reducing their captives to such horrible slavery,<sup>1</sup> and they were obliged to content themselves with condemned criminals, and with the few other wretches whom abject poverty and the impossibility of earning other wages could induce to accept the service. And as in maritime warfare of our own day, the machinery—engines, wheels, and boilers—is the especial aim of the enemy's artillery, so the chain-gang who rowed in the waist of the galley, the living engine, without which the vessel became a useless tub, was as surely marked out for destruction wherever a sea-fight took place.

The Hollanders did not very much favour this species of war-craft, both by reason of the difficulties of procuring the gang, and because to a true lover of the ocean and of naval warfare the galley was about as clumsy and amphibious a production as could be hoped of human perverseness. High where it should be low—exposed, flat, and fragile, where elevation and strength were indispensable—encumbered and top-heavy where it should be level and compact, weak in the waist, broad at stem and stern, awkward in manœuvre, helpless in rough weather, sluggish under sail, although possessing the single advantage of being able to crawl

over a smooth sea when better and faster ships were made stationary by absolute calm, the galley was no match for the Dutch galleot, either at close quarters or in a breeze.

Nevertheless for a long time there had been a certain awe produced by the possibility of some prodigious but unknown qualities in these outlandish vessels, and already the Hollanders had tried their own hand at constructing them. On a late occasion a galley of considerable size, built at Dort, had rowed past the Spanish forts on the Scheld, gone up to Antwerp, and coolly cut out from the very wharves of the city a Spanish galley of the first class, besides seven war-vessels of lesser dimensions, at first gaining advantage by surprise, and then breaking down all opposition in a brilliant little fight. The noise of the encounter summoned the citizens and garrison to the walls, only to witness the triumph achieved by Dutch audacity, and to see the victors dropping rapidly down the river, laden with booty and followed by their prizes. Nor was the mortification of these unwilling spectators diminished when the clear notes of a bugle on board the Dutch galley brought to their ears the well-known melody of „Wilhelmus of Nassau," once so dear to every patriotic heart in Antwerp, and perhaps causing many a renegade cheek on this occasion to tingle with shame.<sup>1</sup>

Frederic Spinola, a volunteer belonging to the great and wealthy Genoese family of that name, had been performing a good deal of privateer work with a small force of galleys which he kept under his command at Sluys. He had succeeded in inflicting so much damage upon the smaller merchantmen of the republic, and in maintaining so perpetual a panic in calm weather among the seafaring multitudes of those regions, that he was disposed to extend the scale of his operations. On a visit to Spain

<sup>1</sup> Hist. ix. 575.

<sup>1</sup> Hist. 576.

he had obtained permission from Government to employ in this service eight great galleys, recently built on the Guadalquivir for the Royal Navy. He was to man and equip them at his own expense, and was to be allowed the whole of the booty that might result from his enterprise. Early in the autumn he set forth with his eight galleys on the voyage to Flanders, but, off Cezimbra, on the Portuguese coast, unfortunately fell in with Sir Robert Mansell, who, with a compact little squadron of English frigates, was lying in wait for the homeward-bound India fleet on their entrance to Lisbon. An engagement took place, in which Spinola lost two of his galleys. His disaster might have been still greater, had not an immense Indian carrack, laden with richest merchandize, just then hove in sight, to attract his conquerors with a hope of better prize-money than could be expected from the most complete victory over him and his fleet. 1

With the remainder of his vessels Spinola crept out of sight while the English were ransacking the 3 October. carrack. On the 3rd of Octo- 1602. ber he had entered the channel with a force which, according to the ideas of that day, was still formidable. Each of his galleys was of two hundred and fifty slave-power, and carried, besides the chain-gang, four hundred fighting men: His flag-ship was called the *St. Lewis*; the names of the other vessels being the *St. Philip*, the *Morning Star*, the *St. John*, the *Hyacinth*, and the *Padilla*. The *Trinity* and the *Opportunity* had been destroyed off Cezimbra. Now there happened to be cruising just then in the channel, Captain Peter Mol, master of the Dutch warship *Tiger*, and Captain Lubbertson, commanding the *Pelican*. These two espied the Spanish squadron, paddling at about dusk towards the English coast, and quickly gave notice to Vice-Admiral John Kant,

who, in the States' ship *Half-moon*, with three other war-galleots, was keeping watch in that neighbourhood. It was dead calm as the night fell, and the galleys of Spinola, which had crept close up to the Dover cliffs, were endeavouring to row their way across in the darkness towards the Flemish coast in the hope of putting unobserved into the Gut of Sluys. 1 All went well with Spinola till the moon rose; but, with the moon, sprang up a steady breeze, so that the galleys lost all their advantage. Nearly off Gravelines another States' ship, the *Mackerel*, came in sight, which forthwith attacked the *St. Philip*, pouring a broadside into her by which fifty men were killed. Drawing off from this assailant, the galley found herself close to the Dutch admiral in the *Half-moon*, who, with all sail set, bore straight down upon her, struck her amidships with a mighty crash, carrying off her mainmast and her poop, and then, extricating himself with difficulty from the wreck, sent a tremendous volley of cannon-shot and lesser missiles straight into the waist where sat the chain-gang. A howl of pain and terror rang through the air, while oars and benches, arms, legs, and mutilated bodies, chained inexorably together, floated on the moonlit waves. An instant later, and another galleot bore down to complete the work, striking with her iron prow the doomed *St. Philip*, so straightly and surely that she went down like a stone, carrying with her galley-slaves, sailors, and soldiers, besides all the treasure brought by Spinola for the use of his fleet.

The *Morning Star* was the next galley attacked, Captain Sael, in a stout galleot, driving at her under full sail, with the same accuracy and solidity of shock as had been displayed in the encounter with the *St. Philip* and with the same

1 Fleming, 290-294. Bentivoglio, iii. 516. Grotius, *ubi sup.* Haestens, 233, *seqq.* Meteren, 474.

1 Grotius, xi. 607, 608.

result. The miserable, top-heavy monster galley was struck between mainmast and stern, with a blow which carried away the assailant's own bowsprit and fore-bulwarks, but which completely demolished the stern of the galley, and crushed out of existence the greater portion of the live machinery sitting chained and rowing on the benches. And again, as the first enemy hauled off from its victim, Admiral Kant came up once more in the Half-moon, steered straight at the floundering galley, and sent her with one crash to the bottom. It was not very scientific practice perhaps. It was but simple butting, plain sailing, good steering, and the firing of cannon at short pistol-shot. But after all, the work of those unsophisticated Dutch skippers was done very thoroughly, without flinching, and, as usual at great odds of men and guns. Two more of the Spanish galleys were chased into the shallows near Gravelines, where they went to pieces. Another was wrecked near Calais. The galley which bore Frederic Spinola himself and his fortunes succeeded in reaching Dunkirk, whence he made his way discomfited, to tell the tale of his disaster to the archduke at Brussels. During the fight the Dutch admiral's boats had been active in picking up such of the drowning crews, whether galley-slaves or soldiers, as it was possible to save. But not more than two hundred were thus rescued, while by far the greater proportion of those on board, probably three thousand in number, perished, and the whole fleet, by which so much injury was to have been inflicted on Dutch commerce, was, save one damaged galley, destroyed. 1 Yet scarcely any lives were lost by the Hollanders, and it is certain that the whole force in their fleet did not equal the crew of a single one of the enemy's ships. Neither Spinola nor the archduke seemed likely to make much out of the contract. Mean-

time, the Genoese volunteer kept quiet in Sluys, brooding over schemes to repair his losses and to renew his forays on the indomitable Zeelanders.

Another winter had now closed in upon Ostend, while still the siege had scarcely advanced an inch. During the ten months of Governor Dorp's administration, four thousand men had died of wounds or malady within the town, and certainly twice as many in the trenches of the besieging force. Still the patient Bucquoy went on, day after day, night after night, month after month, planting his faggots and fascines, creeping forward almost imperceptibly with his dyke, paying five florins each to the soldiers who volunteered to bring the materials, and a double ducat to each man employed in laying them. So close were they under the fire of the town, that a life was almost laid down for every ducat, but the Gullet, which it was hoped to close, yawned as wide as ever, and the problem how to reduce a city, open by sea to the whole world, remained without solution. On the last day of the year a splendid fleet of transports arrived in the town, 31 Dec. laden with whole droves of 1602.

beeves and flocks of sheep, besides wine and bread and beer enough to supply a considerable city; so that market provisions in the beleaguered town were cheaper than in any part of Europe. 1 Thus skilfully did the States-General and Prince Maurice watch from the outside over Ostend, while the audacious but phlegmatic sea-captains brought their cargoes unscathed through the Gullet, although Bucquoy's batteries had now advanced to within seventy yards of the shore.

On the west side, the besiegers were slowly eating their way through the old harbour towards the heart of the place. Subterranean galleries, patiently drained of their water, were met by counter-galleries leading out from the town,

1 Authorities last cited.

1 Fleming, 321.



and many were the desperate hand-to-hand encounters, by dim lantern, or in total darkness, beneath the ocean and beneath the earth; Hollander, Spaniard, German, Englishman, Walloon, digging and dying in the fatal trenches, as if there had been no graves at home. Those insatiable sand-banks seemed ready to absorb all the gold and all the life of Christendom. But the monotony of that misery it is useless to chronicle. Hardly an event of these dreary days has been left unrecorded by faithful diarists and industrious soldiers, but time has swept us far away from them, and the world has rolled on to fresher fields of carnage and ruin. All winter long those unwearied, intelligent, fierce, and cruel creatures toiled and fought in the stagnant waters, and patiently burrowed in the earth. It seemed that if Ostend were ever lost it would be because at last entirely bitten away and consumed. When there was no Ostend left, it might be that the archduke would triumph.

As there was always danger that the movements on the east side might be at last successful, it was the command of Maurice that the labours to construct still another harbour should go on in case the Gullet should become useless, as the old haven had been since the beginning of the siege. And the working upon that newest harbour was as dangerous to the Hollanders as Bucquoy's dyke-building to the Spaniards, for the pioneers and sappers were perpetually under fire from the batteries which the count had at last successfully established on the extremity of his work. It was a piteous sight to see those patient delvers lay down their spades and die, hour after hour, to be succeeded by their brethren only to share their fate. Yet still the harbour building progressed; for the republic was determined that the city should be open to the sea so long as the States had a stiver, or a ship, or a spade.

While this deadly industry went on,

the more strictly military operations were not pretermitted day nor night. The Catholics were unwearied in watching for a chance of attack, and the Hollanders stood on the ramparts and in the trenches, straining eyes and ears through the perpetual icy mists of that black winter to catch the sight and sound of a coming foe. Especially the by-watches, as they were called, were enough to break down constitutions of iron; for, all day and night, men were stationed in the inundated regions, bound on pain of death to stand in the water and watch for a possible movement of the enemy, until the waves should rise so high as to make it necessary to swim. Then, until the tide fell again, there was brief repose. 1

And so the dreary winter faded away at last into chill and blustering spring. On the 13th of April, 1603, a hurricane, such as had not occurred since the siege began, raged across 18 April, the ocean, deluging and shattering the devoted town. 2 The waters rose over dyke and parapet, and the wind swept from the streets and ramparts every living thing. Not a soldier or sailor could keep his feet, the chief tower of the church was blown into the square, chimneys and windows crashed on all sides, and the elements had their holiday, as if to prove how helpless a thing was man, however fierce and determined, when the powers of Nature arose in their strength. It was as if no siege existed, as if no hostile armies had been lying nearly two years long close to each other, and losing no opportunity to fly at each others' throats. The strife of wind and ocean gave a respite to human rage. It was but a brief respite. At nightfall there was a lull in the tempest, and the garrison crept again to the ramparts. Instantly the departing roar of the winds and waters were succeeded by fainter but still more threatening sounds, and the sentinels on duty

1 Fleming, 350.

2 Ibid. 351.

had scarce time to give the alarm, and the drums and trumpets to rally the garrison, when the attack came. The sleepless Spaniards were already upon them. In the Porcupine fort, a blaze of wickerwork and building materials suddenly illuminated the gathering gloom of night, and the loud cries of the assailants, who had succeeded in kindling this fire by their missiles, proclaimed the fierceness of the attack. Governor Dorp was himself in the fort, straining every nerve to extinguish the flames, and to hold this most important position. He was successful. After a brief but bloody encounter the Spaniards were repulsed with heavy loss. All was quiet again, and the garrison in the Porcupine were congratulating themselves on their victory when suddenly the ubiquitous Philip Fleming plunged, with a face of horror, into the governor's quarters, informing him that the attack on the redoubt had been a feint, and that the Spaniards were at that very moment swarming all over the three external forts, called the South Square, the West Square, and the Polder. 1 These points, which have been already described, were most essential to the protection of the place, as without them the whole counterscarp was in danger. It was to save those exposed but vital positions that Sir Francis Vere had resorted to the slippery device of the last Christmas eve but one.

Dorp refused to believe the intelligence. The squares were well guarded, the garrison ever alert. Spaniards were not birds of prey to fly up those perpendicular heights, and for beings without wings the thing was impossible. He followed Fleming through the darkness, and was soon convinced that the impossible was true. The precious squares were in the hands of the enemy. Nimble as monkeys, those yellow-jerkined Italians, Walloons, and Spaniards—storm-hats on their heads and swords in their

teeth—had planted rope-ladders, swung themselves up the walls by hundreds upon hundreds, while the fight had been going on at the Porcupine, and were now rushing through the forts grinning defiance, yelling and chattering with fierce triumph, and beating down all opposition. It was splendidly done. The discomfited Dorp met small bodies of his men, panic-struck, reeling out from their stronghold, wounded, bleeding, shrieking for help and for orders. It seemed as if the Spaniards had dropped from the clouds. The Dutch commandant did his best to rally the fugitives, and to encourage those who had remained. All night long the furious battle raged; every inch of ground being contested; for both Catholics and Hollanders knew full well that this triumph was worth more than all that had been gained for the archduke in eighteen months of siege. Pike to pike, breast to breast, they fought through the dark April night; the last sobs of the hurricane dying unheard, the red lanterns flitting to and fro, the fireworks hissing in every direction of earth and air, the great wicker piles, heaped up with pitch and rosin, flaming over a scene more like a dance of goblins than a commonplace Christian massacre. At least fifteen hundred were killed—besiegers and besieged—during the storming of the forts and the determined but unsuccessful attempt of the Hollanders to retake them. And when at last the day had dawned, and the Spaniards could see the full extent of their victory, they set themselves with unusual alacrity to killing such of the wounded and prisoners as were in their hands, while, at the same time, they turned the guns of their newly acquired works upon the main counterscarp of the town. 1

Yet the besieged—discomfited but undismayed—lost not a moment in strengthening their inner works, and in doing their best, day after day, by

1 Fleming, 351-354.

1 Ibid.

sortie, cannonade, and every possible device, to prevent the foe from obtaining full advantage of his success. The triumph was merely a local one, and the patient Hollanders soon proved to the enemy that the town was not gained by carrying the three squares, but that every inch of the place was to be contested as hotly as those little redoubts had been. Ostend, after standing nearly two years of siege, was not to be carried by storm. A goodly slice of it had been pared off that April night, and was now in possession of the archduke, but this was all. 1 Meantime the underground work was resumed on both sides.

Frederic Spinola, notwithstanding the stunning defeat sustained by him in the preceding October, had not lost heart while losing all his ships. On 25 May, the contrary, he had been 1603. busy during the winter in building other galleys. Accordingly, one fine morning in May. Counsellor Flooswyk, being on board a war vessel convoying some empty transports from Ostend, observed signs of mischief brewing as he sailed past the Gut of Sluys, and forthwith gave notice of what he had seen to Admiral Joost de Moor, commanding the blockading squadron. The counsellor was right. Frederic Spinola meant mischief. It was just before sunrise of a beautiful summer's day. The waves were smooth—not a breath of wind stirring—and De Moor, who had four little war-ships of Holland, and was supported besides by a famous vessel called the Black Galley of Zeeland, under Captain Jacob Michelzoon, soon observed a movement from Sluys. 2 Over the flat and glassy surface of the sea, eight galleys of the largest size were seen crawling slowly, like vast reptiles towards his position. Four lesser vessels followed in the wake

of the great galleys. The sails of the admiral's little fleet flapped idly against the mast. He could only placidly await the onset. The Black Galley, however, moved forward according to her kind, and was soon vigorously attacked by two galleys of the enemy. With all the force that five hundred rowers could impart, these two huge vessels ran straight into the Zeeland ship, and buried their iron prows in her sides. Yet the Black Galley was made of harder stuff than were those which had gone down in the channel the previous autumn under the blows of John Kant. Those on board her, at least, were made of tougher material than were galley-slaves and land-soldiers. The ramming was certainly not like that of a thousand horsepower of steam, and there was no very great display of science in the encounter; yet Captain Jacob Michelzoon, with two enemy's ships thus stuck to his sides, might well have given himself up for lost. The disproportion of ships and men was monstrous. Beside the chain-gang, each of Spinola's ships was manned by two hundred soldiers, 1 while thirty-six musketeers 2 from the Flushing garrison were the only men-at-arms in De Moor's whole squadron. But those amphibious Zeelanders and Hollanders, perfectly at home in the water, expert in handling vessels, and excellent cannoneers, were more than a match for twenty times their number of landsmen. It was a very simple-minded, unsophisticated contest. The attempt to board the Black Galley was met with determined resistance, but the Zeeland sailors clambered like cats upon the bowsprits of the Spanish galleys, fighting with cutlass and handspike, while a broadside or two was delivered with terrible effect into the benches of the chained and wretched slaves. Captain Michelzoon was killed, 3 but his successor, Lieutenant Hart, although

1 Fleming, 351-354.

2 The best authorities for this encounter are Groen van Prinsterer, Archives, II. 194; Fleming, 382-384; Meteren, 485, 486; Gallucci, xv. 96-98; Grotius, xii. 625, 626; Bentivoglio, iii. 519.

1. Fleming, 383.

2 Grotius, 626.

3 Gallucci, 97. Fleming, 383.



severely wounded, swore that he would blow up his ship with his own hands rather than surrender. The decks of all the vessels ran with blood, but at last the Black Galley succeeded in beating off her assailants; the Zeelanders, by main force, breaking off the enemy's bowsprits, so that the two ships of Spinola were glad to sheer off, leaving their stings buried in the enemy's body.<sup>1</sup>

Next, four galleys attacked the stout little galleot of Captain Logier, and with a very similar result. Their prows stuck fast in the bulwarks of the ship, but the boarders soon found themselves the boarded, and, after a brief contest, again the iron bowsprits snapped like pipe-stems, and again the floundering and inexperienced Spaniards shrank away from the terrible encounter which they had provoked. Soon afterwards, Joost de Moor was assailed by three galleys. He received them, however, with cannonade and musketry so warmly that they willingly obeyed a summons from Spinola, and united with the flagship in one more tremendous onset upon the Black Galley of Zeeland. And it might have gone hard with that devoted ship, already crippled in the previous encounter, had not Captain Logier fortunately drifted with the current near enough to give her assistance, while the other sailing ships lay becalmed and idle spectators. At last Spinola, conspicuous by his armour, and by magnificent recklessness of danger, fell upon the deck of his galley, torn to pieces with twenty-four wounds from a stone gun of the Black Galley, while at nearly the same moment a gentle breeze began in the distance to ruffle the surface of the waters. More than a thousand men had fallen in Spinola's fleet, inclusive of the miserable slaves, who were tossed overboard as often as wounds made them a cumbrous part of the machinery, and the galleys, damaged, discomfited, laden with corpses,

and dripping with blood, rowed off into Sluys as speedily as they could move, without waiting until the coming wind should bring all the sailing ships into the fight, together with such other vessels under Haultain as might be cruising in the distance. They succeeded in getting into the Gut of Sluys, and so up to their harbour of refuge. 1 Meantime, baldheaded, weather-beaten Joost de Moor—farther pursuit being impossible—piped all hands on deck, where officers and men fell on their knees, shouting in pious triumph the 34th Psalm: 2 „I will bless the Lord at all times, His praise shall continually be in my mouth. . . . O magnify the Lord with me, and let us exalt His name together” So rang forth the notes of humble thanksgiving across the placid sea. And assuredly those hardy mariners, having gained a victory with their little vessels over twelve ships and three thousand men—a numerical force of at least ten times their number,—such as few but Dutchmen could have achieved, had a right to give thanks to Him from whom all blessings flow.

Thus ended the career of Frederic Spinola, a wealthy, gallant, high-born, brilliant youth, who might have earned distinction, and rendered infinitely better service to the cause of Spain and the archdukes, had he not persuaded himself that he had a talent for seamanship. Certainly, never was a more misplaced ambition, a more unluckily career. Not even in that age of rash adventure, when grandees became admirals and field-marsals because they were grandees, had such incapacity been shown by any restless patrician. Frederic Spinola, at the age of thirty-two, a landsman and a volunteer, thinking to measure himself on blue water with such veterans as John Kant, Joost de Moor, and the other Dutchmen and Zeelanders whom

1 Fleming, Meteren, Gallucci, Bentivoglio, Grotius, *ubi sup.* 2 Meteren, 486.

1 Authorities cited.

it was his fortune to meet, could hardly escape the doom which so rapidly befel him.

On board the Black Galley Captain Michelzoon, eleven of his officers, and fifteen of his men were killed; Admiral de Moor was slightly wounded, and had five of his men killed and twenty wounded; Captain Logier was wounded in the foot, and lost fifteen killed and twelve wounded. 1

The number of those killed in Spinola's fleet has been placed as high as fourteen hundred, including two hundred officers and gentlemen of quality, besides the crowds of galley-slaves thrown overboard. 2 This was perhaps an exaggeration. The losses were, however, sufficient to put a complete stop to the enterprise out of which the unfortunate Spinola had conceived such extravagant hopes of fame and fortune.

The herring-smacks and other coasters, besides the transports passing to and from Ostend, sailed thenceforth unmolested by any galleys from Sluys. One unfortunate sloop, however, in moving out from the beleaguered city, ran upon some shoals before getting out of the Gullet and thus fell a prize to the besiegers. She was laden with nothing more precious than twelve wounded soldiers on their way to the hospitals at Flushing. These prisoners were immediately hanged, at the express command of the archduke, 3 because they had been taken on the sea where, according to his Highness, there were no laws of war. 4

The stadholder, against his will—for Maurice was never cruel—felt himself obliged to teach the cardinal better jurisprudence and better humanity for

the future. In order to show him that there was but one belligerent law on sea and on land, he ordered two hundred Spanish prisoners within his lines to draw lots from an urn in which twelve of the tickets were inscribed with the fatal word gibbet. Eleven of the twelve thus marked by ill luck were at once executed. The twelfth, a comely youth, was pardoned at the intercession of a young girl. 1 It is not stated whether or not she became his wife. It is also a fact worth mentioning, as illustrating the recklessness engendered by a soldier's life, that the man who drew the first blank sold it to one of his comrades and plunged his hand again into the fatal urn. 2 Whether he succeeded in drawing the gibbet at his second trial has not been recorded. When these executions had taken place in full view of the enemy's camp, Maurice formally announced that for every prisoner thenceforth put to death by the archduke two captives from his own army should be hanged. 3 These stern reprisals, as usual, put an end to the foul system of martial murder.

Throughout the year the war continued to be exclusively the siege of Ostend. Yet the fierce operations, recently recorded, having been succeeded by a period of comparative languor, Governor Dorp at last obtained permission to depart to repair his broken health. He was succeeded in command of the forces within the town by Charles Van der Noot, colonel of the Zeeland regiment which had suffered so much in the first act of the battle of Nieuport. Previously to this exchange, however, a day of solemn thanksgiving and prayer was set apart on the anniversary of the beginning of the siege. 4 Since the 5th of July, 1601, two years had been spent by the whole power of the enemy in

1 Meteren, 486.

2 Letter of Ernest Casimir in Groen van Prinsterer, Arch. II. 194. Grotius says 300 killed and many wounded. Fleming, p. 384, says 1000 killed besides the wounded and slaves uncounted.

3 Grotius, xii. 630.

4 Ibid. „Sed aqua captos ubi nulla forent belli foedera.”

1 Ibid. Meteren, 487. Van der Kemp, 107.

2 Grotius, *ubi sup.*

3 Grotius, Meteren, *ubi sup.*

4 Fleming, 397.

the attempt to reduce this miserable village, and the whole result thus far had been the capture of three little external forts. There seemed cause for thanksgiving.

Philip Fleming, too, obtained a four weeks' holiday—the first in eleven years—and went with his family outside the pestiferous and beleaguered town. He was soon to return to his multifarious duties as auditor, secretary, and chronicle of the city, and unattached aide-de-camp to the commander-in-chief, whoever that might be, and to perform his duty with the same patient courage and sagacity that had marked him from the beginning. „An unlucky cannon-ball of the enemy,” as he observes, did some damage at this period to his diary, but it happened at a moment when comparatively little was doing, so that the chasm was of less consequence. 1

„And so I, Philip Fleming, auditor to the Council of War,” he says with homely pathos, „have been so continually employed as not to have obtained leave in all these years to refresh, for a few days outside this town, my troubled spirit after such perpetual work, intolerable cares, and slavery, having had no other pleasure allotted me than with daily sadness, weeping eyes, and heavy yearnings to tread the ramparts, and, like a poor slave laden with fetters, to look at so many others sailing out of the harbour in order to feast their souls in other provinces with green fields and the goodly works of God. And thus it has been until it has nearly gone out of my memory how the fruits of the earth, growing trees, and dumb beasts appear to mortal eye.”

He then, with whimsical indignation, alludes to a certain author who pleaded in excuse for the shortcomings of the history of the siege the damage done to his manuscripts by a cannon-ball. „Where the liar dreamt of or invented

his cannon-ball,” he says, „I cannot tell, inasmuch as he never saw the city of Ostend in his life; but the said cannon-ball, to my great sorrow, did come one afternoon through my office, shot from the enemy's great battery, which very much damaged not his memoirs but mine; taking off the legs and arms at the same time of three poor invalid soldiers seated in the sun before my door and killing them on the spot, and just missing my wife, then great with child, who stood by me with faithfulness through all the sufferings of the bloody siege and presented me twice during its continuance, by the help of Almighty God, with young Amazons or daughters of war.” 1

And so honest Philip Fleming went out for a little time to look at the green trees and the dumb creatures feeding in the Dutch pastures. Meantime the two armies—outside and within Ostend—went moiling on in their monotonous work; steadily returning at intervals, as if by instinct, to repair the ruin which a superior power would often inflict in a half-hour on the results of laborious weeks.

In the open field the military operations were very trifling, the wager of battle being by common consent fought out on the sands of Ostend, and the necessities for attack and defence absorbing the resources of each combatant. France, England, and Spain were holding a perpetual diplomatic tournament, to which our eyes must presently turn, and the Sublime Realm of the Ottoman and the Holy Roman Empire were in the customary equilibrium of their eternal strife.

The mutiny of the veterans continued; the „Italian republic” giving the arch-duke almost as much trouble, despite his ban and edicts and outlawry, as the Dutch commonwealth itself. For more than a twelvemonth the best troops of the Spanish army had been thus estab-

1 Fleming, 399, *seqq.*

1 Ibid.



lished as a separate empire, levying black-mail on the obedient provinces, hanging such of their old officers as dared to remonstrate, and obeying their elected chief magistrates with exemplary docility.

They had become a force of five thousand strong, cavalry and infantry together, all steady, experienced veterans—the best and bravest soldiers of Europe. The least of them demanded two thousand florins as owed to him by the King of Spain and the archduke. The burghers of Bois-le-Duc and other neighbouring towns in the obedient provinces kept watch and ward, not knowing how soon the Spaniards might be upon them to reward them for their obedience. Not a peasant with provisions was permitted by the mutineers to enter Bois-le-Duc, while the priests were summoned to pay one year's income of all their property on pain of being burned alive. „Very much amazed are the poor priests at these proceedings,” said Ernest Nassau, „and there is a terrible quantity of the vile race within and around the city. I hope one day to have the plucking of some of their feathers myself.” 1

The mutiny governed itself as a strict military democracy, and had caused an official seal to be engraved, representing seven snakes entwined in one, each thrusting forth a dangerous tongue, with the motto—

„tutto in ore  
E sua Eccellenza in nostro favore.” 2

„His Excellency” meant Maurice of Nassau, with whom formal articles of compact had been arranged. It had become necessary for the archduke, notwithstanding the steady drain of the siege of Ostend, to detach a considerable army against this republic and to besiege them in their capital of Hoogstraaten. With seven thousand foot and three thousand cavalry Frederic Van den Berg

took the field against them in the latter part of July. Maurice, with nine thousand five hundred infantry and three thousand horse, lay near Gertruydenberg. When united with the rebel „squadron,” two thousand five hundred strong, he would dispose of a force of fifteen thousand veterans, and he moved at once to relieve the besieged mutineers. 1 His cousin Frederic, however, had no desire to measure himself with the stadholder at such odds, and stole away from him in the dark without beat of drum. 2 Maurice entered Hoogstraaten, was received with rapture by the Spanish and Italian veterans, 3 and excited the astonishment of all by the coolness with which he entered into the cage of these dangerous serpents—as they called themselves—handling them, caressing them, and being fondled by them in return. But the veterans knew a soldier when they saw one, and their hearts warned to the prince—heretic though he were—more than they had ever done to the unfrocked bishop who, after starving them for years, had doomed them to destruction in this world and the next.

The stadholder was feasted and honoured by the mutineers during his brief visit to Hoogstraaten, and concluded with them a convention, according to which that town was to be restored to him, while they were to take temporary possession of the city of Grave. They were likewise to assist, with all their strength, in his military operations until they should make peace on their own terms with the archduke. For two weeks after such treaty they were not to fight against the States, and meantime, though fighting on the republican side, they were to act as an independent corps and in no wise to be merged in the stadholder's forces. 4 So much and no more had resulted

1 Meteren, 486-488.

2 Van der Kemp, ii. 104, and notes.

3 Van der Kemp. Meteren, *ubi sup.*

4 Ibid.

1 Groen van Prinsterer, Archives, II. 203.

2 Meteren, 486.

from the archduke's excommunication of the best part of his army. He had made a present of those troops to the enemy. He had also been employing a considerable portion of his remaining forces in campaigning against their own comrades. While at Grave, the mutineers, or the „squadron” as they were now called, were to be permitted to practise their own religious rites, without offering, however, any interference with the regular Protestant worship of the place. When they should give up Grave, Hoogstraeten was to be restored to them, if still in the possession of the States, and they were to enter into no negotiations with the archduke except with full knowledge of the stadholder.

There were no further military operations of moment during the rest of the year.

Much more important, however, than siege, battle, or mutiny, to human civilization, were the steady movements of the Dutch skippers and merchants at this period. The ears of Europe were stunned with the clatter of destruction going on all over Christendom; and seeming the only reasonable occupation of Christians; but the little republic, while fighting so heroically against the concentrated powers of despotism in the West, was most industriously building up a great empire in the East. In the new era just dawning, production was to become almost as honourable and potent a principle as destruction.

The voyages among the spicy regions of the equator—so recently wrested from their Catholic and Faithful Majesties by Dutch citizens who did not believe in Borgia—and the little treaties made with petty princes and commonwealths, who for the first time were learning that there were other white men in the world beside the Portuguese, had already led to considerable results. Before the close of the previous year that great commercial corporation had been founded—an empire within an empire, a re-

public beneath a republic—a counting-house company which was to organize armies, conquer kingdoms, build forts and cities, make war and peace, disseminate and exchange among the nations of the earth the various products of civilization, more perfectly than any agency hitherto known, and bring the farthest disjoined branches of the human family into closer connection than had ever existed before. That it was a monopoly, offensive to true commercial principles, illiberal, unjust, tyrannical, ignorant of the very rudiments of mercantile philosophy, is plain enough. For the sages of the world were but as clowns, at that period, in economic science.

Was not the great financier of the age, Maximilian de Bethune, at that very moment exhausting his intellect in devices for the prevention of *all* international commerce even in Europe? „The kingdom of France,” he groaned, „is stuffed full of the manufactures of our neighbours, and it is incredible, what a curse to us are these wares. The import of all foreign goods has now been forbidden under very great penalties.” As a necessary corollary to this madhouse legislation an edict was issued, prohibiting the export of gold and silver from France, on pain, not only of confiscation of those precious metals, but of the whole fortune of such as engaged in or winked at the traffic. The king took a public oath never to exempt the culprits from the punishment thus imposed, and, as the thrifty Sully had obtained from the great king a private grant off all those confiscations, and as he judiciously promised twenty-five per cent. thereof to the informer, no doubt he filled his own purse while impoverishing the exchequer. 1

1 Mémoires de Sully, iv. 8-10, ed. Londres, 1748. The great minister adds, with diverting simplicity:—„I found a remedy, shorter and less violent than chastisements and confiscations, to prevent the export of specie that was to raise the value of it.” Accord-

The united States, not enjoying the blessings of a paternal government, against which they had been fighting almost half a century, could not be expected to rival the stupendous folly of such political economy, although certainly not emancipated from all the delusions of the age.

Nor are we to forget how very recently, and even dimly, the idea of freedom in commerce has dawned upon nations, the freest of all in polity and religion. Certainly the vices and shortcomings of the commercial system now inaugurated by the republic may be justly charged in great part to the epoch, while her vast share in the expanding and upward movement which civilization, under the auspices of self-government, self-help, political freedom, free thought, and unshackled science, was then to undertake—never more perhaps to be permanently checked—must be justly ascribed to herself.

It was considered accordingly that the existence of so many private companies and co-partnerships trading to the East was injurious to the interests of commerce. Merchants arriving at the different Indian ports would often find that their own countrymen had been too quick for them, and that other fleets had got the wind out of their sails, that the eastern markets had been stripped, and that prices had gone up to a ruinous height, 1 while on the other hand, in the Dutch cities, nutmegs and cinnamon, brocades and indigo, were as plentiful as red herrings. It was hardly to be expected at that day to find this very triumph of successful

ingly the crown of sixty sous was declared to be worth sixty-five sous, and the crown of gold or pistolet of fifty-eight sous was put at sixty-two sous, and so with other coins in proportion.—*Ibid.* p. 184.

Nothing was wanting but to declare that the three-hooped pot should have ten hoops, that seven halfpenny loaves should be sold for a penny, and to make it felony to drink small beer—according to the system of an earlier financial reformer.

1 Wagenaar, ix. 147-150.

traffic considered otherwise than as a grave misfortune, demanding interference on the part of the only free Government then existing in the world. That already free competition and individual enterprise had made such progress in enriching the Hollanders and the Javanese respectively with a superfluity of useful or agreeable things, brought from the farthest ends of the earth, seemed to the eyes of that day a condition of things likely to end in a general catastrophe. With a simplicity, amazing only to those who are inclined to be vain of a superior wisdom—not their own but that of their wisest contemporaries—one of the chief reasons for establishing the East India Company was stated to be the necessity of providing against low prices of Oriental productions in Europe.

But national instinct is often wiser than what is supposed to be high national statesmanship, and there can be no doubt that the true foundation of the East India Company was the simple recognition of an iron necessity. Every merchant in Holland knew full well that the Portuguese and Spaniards could never be driven out of their commercial strongholds under the equator, except by a concentration of the private strength and wealth of the mercantile community. The Government had enough on its hands in disputing, inch by inch, at so prodigious an expenditure of blood and treasure, the meagre territory with which nature had endowed the little commonwealth. Private organization, self-help, union of individual purses and individual brains, were to conquer an empire at the antipodes if it were to be won at all. By so doing, the wealth of the nation and its power to maintain the great conflict with the spirit of the past might be indefinitely increased, and the resources of Spanish despotism proportionally diminished. It was not to be expected, of Jacob Heemskerk, Wolfert Hermann or Joris van Spilberg, indomitable skip-



pers though they were, that each, acting on his own responsibility or on that of his supercargo, would succeed every day in conquering a whole Spanish fleet and dividing a million or two of prize-money among a few dozen sailors. Better things even than this might be done by wholesome and practical concentration on a more extended scale.

So the States-General granted a patent or charter to one great company with what, for the time, was an enormous paid-up capital, in order that the India trade might be made secure and the Spaniards steadily confronted in what they had considered their most impregnable possessions. All former trading companies were invited to merge themselves in the Universal East India Company, which, for twenty-one years, should alone have the right to trade to the east of the Cape of Good Hope and to sail through the Straits of Magellan. 1

The charter had been signed on 20th March, 1602, and was mainly to the following effect.

The company was to pay twenty-five thousand florins to the States-General for its privilege. The whole March 20 capital was to be six million 1602. six hundred thousand florins. The chamber of Amsterdam was to have one half of the whole interest, the chamber of Zeeland one fourth; the chambers of the Meuse, namely, Delft, Rotterdam, and the north quarter, that is to say, Hoorn and Enkhuizen, each a sixteenth. All the chambers were to be governed by the directors then serving, who however were to be allowed to die out, down to the number of twenty for Amsterdam, twelve for Zeeland, and seven for each of the other chambers. To fill a vacancy occurring among the directors, the remaining members of the board were to nominate three candidates, from

whom the estates of the province should choose one. Each director was obliged to have an interest in the company amounting to at least six thousand florins, except the directors for Hoorn and Enkhuizen, of whom only three thousand should be required. The general assembly of these chambers should consist of seventeen directors, eight for Amsterdam, four for Zeeland, two for the Meuse, and two for the north quarter; the seventeenth being added by turns from the chambers of Zeeland, the Meuse, and the north quarter. This assembly was to be held six years at Amsterdam, and then two years in Zeeland. The ships were always to return to the port from which they had sailed. All the inhabitants of the provinces had the right, within a certain time, to take shares in the company. Any province or city subscribing for forty thousand florins or upwards might appoint an agent to look after its affairs.

The company might make treaties with the Indian powers, in the name of the States-General of the United Netherlands or of the supreme authorities of the same, might build fortresses, appoint generals, and levy troops, provided such troops took oaths of fidelity to the States, or to the supreme authority, and to the Company. No ships, artillery, or other munitions of war belonging to the Company were to be used in service of the country without permission of the Company. The admiralty was to have a certain proportion of the prizes conquered from the enemy.

The directors should not be liable in property or person for the debts of the Company. The generals of fleets returning home were to make reports on the state of India to the States. 1

Notification of the union of all India Companies with this great corporation was duly sent to the fleets cruising in

1 Wagenaar, *ubi sup.* Meteren, 466 and 40 Grotius, xi. 612, 613.

1 Meteren, Grotius, Wagenaar, *ubi sup.*

those regions, where it arrived in the course of the year 1603. 1

Meantime the first fleet of the Company, consisting of fourteen vessels under command of Admiral Wybrand van Warwyck, sailed before the end of

1 Meteren, Grotius, Wagenaar, *ubi sup.*

1602, and was followed towards the close of 1603 by thirteen other ships, under Stephen van der Hagen. 1

The equipment of these two fleets cost two million two hundred thousand florins. 2

1 Ibid.

2 Ibid.

## CHAPTER XLI.

Death of Queen Elizabeth—Condition of Spain—Legations to James I.—Union of England and Scotland—Characteristics of the new monarch—The English Court and Government—Piratical practices of the English—Audience of the States' envoy with King James—Queen Elizabeth's scheme for remodelling Europe—Ambassador extraordinary from Henry IV. to James—De Rosny's strictures on the English people—Private interview of De Rosny with the States' envoy—De Rosny's audience of the king—Objects of his mission—Insinuations of the Duke of Northumberland—Invitation of the embassy to Greenwich—Promise of James to protect the Netherlands against Spain—Misgivings of Barneveld—Conference at Arundel House—Its unsatisfactory termination—Contempt of De Rosny for the English counsellors—Political aspect of Europe—De Rosny's disclosure to the king of the secret object of his mission—Agreement of James to the proposals of De Rosny—Ratification of the treaty of alliance—Return of De Rosny and suite to France—Arrival of the Spanish ambassador.

ON the 24th of March, 1603, Queen Elizabeth died at Richmond, having nearly completed her seventieth year. 1 The two halves of the little island of Britain were at last politically adjoined to each other by the personal union of the two crowns.

A foreigner, son of the woman executed by Elizabeth, succeeded to Elizabeth's throne. It was most natural that the Dutch republic and the French king, the archdukes and his Catholic Majesty, should be filled with anxiety as to the probable effect of this change of individuals upon the fortunes of the war.

For this Dutch war of independence was the one absorbing and controlling interest in Christendom. Upon that vast, central, and, as men thought, baleful

constellation the fates of humanity were dependent. Around it lesser political events were forced to gravitate, and, in accordance to their relation to it, were bright or obscure. It was inevitable that those whose vocation it was to ponder the aspects of the political firmament, the sages and high-priests who assumed to direct human action and to foretell human destiny, should now be more than ever perplexed.

Spain, since the accession of Philip III. to his father's throne, although rapidly declining in vital energy, had not yet disclosed its decrepitude to the world. Its boundless ambition survived as a political tradition rather than a real passion, while contemporaries still trembled at the vision of universal monarchy in which the successor of Charles V. was supposed to indulge.

Meantime, no feebler nor more insignificant mortal existed on earth than this dreared sovereign.

Scarcely a hairdresser or lemonade-dealer in all Spain was less cognizant of the political affairs of the kingdom than was its monarch, for Philip's first care upon assuming the crown was virtually to abdicate in favour of the man soon afterwards known as the Duke of Lerma.

It is therefore only by courtesy and for convenience that history recognizes his existence at all, as surely no human being in the reign of Philip III. requires less mention than Philip III. himself.

1 Meteren, 484. Camden, 661.

I reserve for a subsequent chapter such rapid glances at the interior condition of that kingdom with which it seemed the destiny of the Dutch republic to be perpetually at war, as may be necessary to illustrate the leading characteristics of the third Philip's reign.

Meantime, as the great queen was no more, who was always too sagacious to doubt that the Dutch cause was her own—however disposed she might be to browbeat the Dutchmen—it seemed possible to Spain that the republic might at last be deprived of its only remaining ally. Tassis was despatched as chief of a legation, precursory to a more stately embassy to be confided to the Duke of Frias. The archdukes sent the prince of Arenberg, while from the united States came young Henry of Nassau, associated with John of Olden-Barneveld, Falk, Brederode, and other prominent statesmen of the commonwealth. 1 Ministers from Denmark and Sweden, from the palatinate and from numerous other powers, small and great, were also collected to greet the rising sun in united Britain, while the awkward Scotchman, who was now called upon to play that prominent part in the world's tragedy which had been so long and so majestically sustained by the „Virgin Queen,” already began to tremble at the plaudits and the bustle which announced how much was expected of the new performer.

There was indeed a new sovereign upon the throne. That most regal spirit which had well expressed so many of the highest characteristics of the nation had fled. Mankind has long been familiar with the dark, closing hours of the illustrious reign. The great queen moody, despairing, dying, wrapt in profoundest thought, with eyes fixed upon the ground or already gazing into infinity, was besought by the counsellors around her to name the man to whom she chose that the crown should devolve.

1 Meteren, *ubi sup.*

„Not to a Rough,” said Elizabeth, sententiously and grimly. 1

When the King of France was named, she shook her head. When Philip III. was suggested, she made a still more significant sign of dissent. When the King of Scots was mentioned, she nodded her approval, and again relapsed into silent meditation. 2

She died; and James was King of Great Britain and Ireland. Cecil had become his prime minister long before the queen's eyes were closed. The hard-featured, rickety, fidgetty, shambling, learned, most preposterous Scotchman hastened to take possession of the throne. Never could there have been a more unfit place or unfit hour for such a man.

England, although so small in dimensions, so meagre in population, so deficient compared to the leading nations of Europe, in material and financial strength, had already her great future swelling in her heart. Intellectually and morally she was taking the lead among the nations. Even at that day she had produced much which neither she herself nor any other nation seemed destined to surpass.

Yet this most redoubtable folk only numbered about three millions, one-tenth of them inhabiting London. 3

I „Poichè avvicinatisi all' ultima ora de' suoi giorni e ricercata da quei signori del consiglio che quasi tutti la assistevano quale fosse la volontà sua ed a chi raccomandava il regno disse ella queste sole parole: no ad un *Rough*, che in lingua inglese significa persona bassa e vile, ma ad una, ed accennando con la mano perchè perdè la parola, che portasse corona. Le fu dimandato se al re di Francia ed ella con la testa mostrò che no, fu dimandata se a quel di Spagna e fece il medesimo atto, nominato poi quello di Scozia diede segno questo essere il desiderio suo e poche ore dopo passò da questa vita con universal dispiacere.”

2 Ibid. The particulars of Elizabeth's death are narrated in Despatch 7 April, 1603, of Secretary Scaramelli. Senato iii. Secreta, A. V. G. See N. Barozzi, note, p. 45, of ser. iv. vol. unico.

3 Niccolo Molin, ambassador from Venice to James I., puts the population of London in 1607 at more than 300,000. Relazione in Barozzi and Berchet, ser. iv. vol. unico.



With the Scots and Irish added they amounted to less than five millions of souls, 1 hardly a third as many as the homogeneous and martial people of that dangerous neighbour France.

Ireland was always rebellious; a mere conquered province, hating her tyrant England's laws, religion, and people; loving Spain, and believing herself closely allied by blood as well as sympathy to that most Catholic land.

Scotland, on the accession of James, hastened to take possession of England. Never in history had two races detested each other more fervently. 2 The leeches and locusts of the north, 3 as they were universally designated in England, would soon have been swept forth from the country, or have left it of their own accord, had not the king employed all that he had of royal authority or of eloquent persuasion to retain them on the soil. Of union, save the personal union of the sceptre, there was no thought. As in Ireland there was hatred

1 Antonio Foscarini, Venetian ambassador in England in 1618 (*Relazione in Barozzi and Berchet*, ser. iv. vol. unico), estimates the whole population of the empire at 5,200,000 souls, of which number 3,560,000 are assigned to England, a little more than 1,000,000 to Scotland, and 600,000 to Ireland.

The total revenue he states as three million scudi = 750,000 sterling, almost entirely derived from England:—, *Perchè la Scozia con fatica dà ottanta mila (80,000) scudi l'anno,* and Ireland producing a less sum than that, to which money had to be added from England for current expenses.

2 „*Essendosi il regno della Scozia unito a quello dell' Inghilterra solamente nella persona del presente re, tuttavia per la divisione e contrarietà degli animi che passa fra Scozzesi ed Inglesi non solo viene giudicato che la potenza di quel regno non sia cresciuta ma diminuita piuttosto: poichè l'odio fra di loro è passato tant' oltre che s'insidiano la vita l' un l' altro con maniere molto stravaganti. Onde molti Scozzesi e de' più principali per salvezza delle loro vite pensano di ritirarsi alle proprie case; e se non fosse la violenza per dire così che loro fa il re per fermarli di già tutti ne se sariano andati.*”—N. Molin, *Relazione*.

3 „*Li (gli Scozzesi) chiamano locuste e sanguisughe d'Inghilterra, affermano che hanno trovato in quel regno le minere d'oro che dicono aver altre volte perduto in Scozia.*”—Marcantonio Correr, *Relazione*.

to England and adoration for Spain; so in Scotland, France was beloved quite as much as England was abhorred. Who could have foretold, or even hoped, that atoms so mutually repulsive would ever have coalesced into a sympathetic and indissoluble whole?

Even the virtues of James were his worst enemies. As generous as the day, he gave away with reckless profusion anything and everything that he could lay his hands upon. It was soon to appear that the great queen's most unlamentable characteristic, her avarice, was a more blessed quality to the nation she ruled than the ridiculous prodigality of James.

Two thousand gowns, of the most expensive material, adorned with gold, pearls, and other bravery—for Elizabeth was very generous to herself—were found in the queen's wardrobe, after death. These magnificent and costly robes, not one of which had she vouchsafed to bestow upon or to bequeath to any of her ladies of honour, were now presented by her successor to a needy Scotch lord, who certainly did not intend to adorn his own person therewith. 1 „*The hat was ever held out,*” said a splenetic observer, „and it was filled in overflowing measure by the new monarch.” 2

In a very short period he had given away—mainly to Scotchmen—at least two millions of crowns, in various articles of personal property. 3 Yet England was very poor.

1 „*È per natura per educazione e per abito liberalissimo ed è tale la sua liberalità che quando fu assunto alla corona d'Inghilterra donò ad un Signor Scozzese tutte le vesti della regina Elisabetta ch' erano intorno duemille e d' un valor inestimabile essendone parte di esse fregiate d' oro, di perle e tutto ricchissime.*”—Francesco Contarini, *Relazione*.

2 „*Di una gran parte delle gioie della corona che valevano un tesoro fece mercede a diversi empandosi di esse le mani senza alcun riguardo al valor loro e gettandole nel cappello di questo e di quello,*” &c. &c.—*Ibid*.

3 N. Molin, *Relazione*. „*Essendo comune opinione che fra danari, gioies e beni tabili*

The empire, if so it could be called, hardly boasted a regular revenue of more than two millions of dollars a year; 1 less than that of a fortunate individual or two, in our own epoch, both in Europe and America; and not one-fifth part of the contemporary income of France. The hundred thousand dollars of Scotland's annual budget 2 did not suffice to pay its expenses, and Ireland was a constant charge upon the imperial exchequer. 3

It is astounding, however, to reflect upon the pomp, extravagance, and inordinate pride which characterized the government and the court,

The expenses of James's household were at least five hundred thousand crowns, 4 or about one quarter of the whole revenue of the empire. Henry IV., with all his extravagance, did not spend more than one-tenth of the public income of France upon himself and his court.

abbia donato il re più di due milioni la maggior parte a Scozzesi."

1 N. Molin Relazione. The ambassador puts the income of the crown domains at 125,000*l.* sterling, or about 500,000 dollars (scudi). Taxes and customs he reckons at 700,000 dollars, and income from miscellaneous sources at 100,000. To this total of 1,300,000 dollars he adds an annual parliamentary subsidy of 600,000 dollars (according to the average in Elizabeth's reign, although in 1607 James had not yet had one), and thus makes a general budget of 1,900,000 dols., or somewhat less than 500,000*l.* Mar-antonio Correr, ambassador in 1611, gives nearly the same figures. The envoys of ten years later, Correr and F. Contarini, make the total revenue 3,000,000 dollars.

2 N. Molin.

3 „Il regno poi d'Irlanda non solo non apporta beneficio ma spesa piuttosto."—N. Molin. „Gli altri due regni di Scozia e d'Irlanda apportano seco più spese che rendite."—M. A. Correr, Relazione.

4 N. Molin, Relazione. „E prima nel viver della sua casa si consuma un anno per l'altro 500,000 scudi." „Ha un milione e mezzo d'entrata (ducats, four to the pound, subsidies not counted) . . . la spesa della sua casa arriva a ducati 500,000 l'anno."—Francesco Contarini, amb. app. Giacomo, ser. i. vol. unico. „Nelle spese della casa eccede senz'alcuna comparazione tutti gli altri re cristiani."—Ibid.

Certainly if England were destined to grow great it would be in despite of its new monarch. Hating the People, most intolerant in religion, believing intensely in royal prerogative, thoroughly convinced of his regal as well as his personal infallibility, loathing that inductive method of thought which was already leading the English nation so proudly on the road of intellectual advancement, shrinking from the love of free inquiry, of free action, of daring adventure, which was to be the real informing spirit of the great British nation; abhorring the Puritans—that is to say, one-third of his subjects<sup>1</sup>—in whose harsh but lofty nature he felt instinctively that popular freedom was enfolded—even as the overshadowing tree in the rigid husk—and sending them forth into the far distant wilderness to wrestle with wild beasts and with savages more ferocious than beasts; fearing and hating the Catholics as the sworn enemies of his realm, his race, and himself, trampling on them as much as he dared, forcing them into hypocrisy to save themselves from persecution or at least pecuniary ruin if they would worship God according to their conscience; 2 at deadly feud, therefore,

1 „Tre sono le religioni che universalmente sono abbracciate da quei popoli: la cattolica ed apostolica romana, la protestante e la puritana: questa oltre il danno e la rovina delle anime tende a quella di principati e di monarchie ancora poichè è dirizzata tutta alla libertà ed al governo popolare; e perchè questo nome di libertà è molto dolce e grato ad ognuno è però molto facilmente abbracciata; onde si crede che il terzo di quei popoli sieno puritani ancorchè irò e li suoi usino ogni arte per distruggerla."—M. A. Correr, Relazione.

„Sua Maestà odia questi puritani altre tanto quanto teme de' cattolici."—Ibid

2 „Dirò questo solo che un cattolico ricusante che s' intende quello che ricusa di andare alle loro chiese e prediche se ha il modo è obbligato a pagare 80 scudi al mese; se non ha da pagar tanto perde due terzi delli suoi beni; sicchè uno che averrà 600 ducati d' entrata ne perde 400; se è povero od artifice che non abbia beni stabili ogni mese da' ministri gli viene visitata la casa e levato gli si può dir ogni cosa poichè gli

on religious grounds, with much more than half his subjects—Puritans or Papists—and yet himself a Puritan in dogma and a Papist in Church government, if only the king could be pope; not knowing, indeed, whether a Puritan, or a Jesuit whom he called a Papist-Puritan, I should be deemed the more disgusting or dangerous animal; already preparing for his unfortunate successor a path to the scaffold, by employing all the pedantry, both theological and philosophical, at his command to bring parliaments into contempt, and to place the royal prerogative on a level with Divinity, at the head of a most martial, dauntless, and practical nation, trembling, with unfortunate physical timidity, at the sight of a drawn sword; ever scribbling or haranguing in Latin, French, or broad Scotch, 2 when the world was arming, it must always be a special wonder that one who might have been a respectable, even a useful, pedagogue, should by the caprice of destiny, have been permitted, exactly at that epoch, to be one of the most contemptible and mischievous of kings. 3

portano via sino il letto; se uno sarà convinto di avere udito messe, di avere tenuto un prete o gesuita in casa, anzi di avergli solamente parlato s' intende incorso in delitto di lesa Maestà onde senz' altro perde la roba e la vita. Un cattolico s' intende privo della protezione delle leggi in tanto che se sarà egli creditore di alcuno non potrà esercitar la sua azione contro il debitore perchè dalla giustizia non sarà abbracciata; se il cattolico sarà oltraggiato in parole o in fatti non ha ricorso alla giustizia; intanto che li poveri cattolici sono costituiti in una condizione infelicitissima, pretendendo con questa via il re e quelli che governano di andar a poco a poco costringendo e riducendo per dir così a niente la cattolica religione.”—N. Molin, Relazione.

1 „Aborrisce sopra tutti li padri Gesuiti . . . e compara appunto la loro dottrina di macchinare contro li Stati e vite dei principi con quelle dei puritani perciò li chiama puritani papisti.”—M. A. Correr, Relazione.

2 „È pieno di eloquenza non solo nella propria sua lingua ma anco in diverse altre e nella francese e latina particolarmente.”—Francesco Contarini, Relazione.

3 „Ma molto più dispiace l' aver Sua

But he had a most effective and energetic minister. Even as in Spain and in France at the same period, the administration of government was essentially in one pair of hands.

Robert Cecil, Earl of Salisbury, ever since the termination of the splendid duumvirate of his father and Walsingham, had been in reality supreme. 1 The proud and terrible hunchback, who never forgave, nor forgot to destroy, his enemies, 2 had now triumphed over the last passion of the doting queen. Essex had gone to perdition.

Son of the great minister who had brought the mother of James to the scaffold, Salisbury had already extorted forgiveness for that execution from the feeble king. Before Elizabeth was in her grave, he was already as much the favourite of her successor as of herself, governing Scotland as well as England, and being Prime Minister of Great Britain before Great Britain existed. 3

Lord High Treasurer and First Secre-

Maestà abbandonato in tutto e per tutto il governo dei suoi regni, rimettendo il tutto al suo consiglio, non volendo egli nè trattar nè pensar ad altro che alla caccia . . . . . Così il presente re resta piuttosto spregiato ed odiato che altrimenti; essendo infine la natura di S. M. piuttosto inclinata a vivere ritiratamente con otto o dieci dei suoi che viver alla libera, come è il costume del paese ed il desiderio del popolo.”—Francesco Contarini, Relazione.

1 „L' autorità del quale è così assoluta che con verità si può dire esser egli il re, governatore di quella monarchia.”—N. Molin, Relazione.

2 „È astuto e sagace e persecutore acerrimo dei suoi nemici: il che si vede dall' effetto perchè ne ha avuto molti e tutti li ha fatti precipitare ancorchè che fossero uomini eminentissimi . . . . . è amico de' suoi amici è fa volentieri servizio; ma però è più inclinato alla vendetta che all'amore: è uomo superbo e terribile.”—Ibid. Compare M. A. Correr, Relazione.

3 „Perchè s' insinuò nella grazia del presente re adjutandolo come S. M. medesima mi ha detto e occultamente in vita della regina e scopertamente dopo la morte. Così non solo gli è riuscito di cancellar dalla sua memoria la morte della madre della quale fu principalmente autore il padre di esso conte ma ha condotte la propria fortuna e quella tanta eminenza nella quale si trova al presente.”—M. A. Correr, Relazione.



tary of State, he was now all in all in the council. The other great lords, high-born and highly titled as they were and served at their banquets by hosts of lackeys on their knees—1 Nottinghams, Northampton, Suffolks—2 were, after all, ciphers or at best, mere pensioners of Spain. For all the venality of Europe was not confined to the Continent. 3 Spain spent at least one hundred and fifty thousand crowns 4 annually among the leading courtiers of James, while his wife, Anne of Denmark, a Papist at heart, whose private boudoir was filled with pictures and images of the Madonna and the saints, had already received one hundred thousand dollars in solid cash from the Spanish court, besides much jewelry, and other valuable things. 5 To negotiate with Government

1 N. Molin, Relazione.

2 „Il co: di Northampton custode del privato sigillo . . . . il gran ammiraglio conte di Nottingham ed il conte di Suffolk gran ciambellano . . . . tutti tre sono stati provisionati annualmente da Spagna con qualcheuno altro del consiglio regio.”—M. A. Correr, Relazione.

3 „Nè vi essendo alcuno che o tardi o per tempo non sia necessitato di ricorrer al consiglio di qui è che ognuno procura di acquistarsi la grazia e la protezione di alcuno dei consiglieri il che non si può fare in quel paese con altri mezzi nè con altre vie che con presenti e donativi; li quali sono così ordinarij in quei paesi che chi più riceve è più stimato ed onorato ricevendo non solo da sudditi ma da stranieri e da ministri di principi ancora siccome si è veduto in diverse occasioni.”—N. Molin, Relazione d' Inghilterra.

„Rimettere il tutto ai suoi ministri li quali sono sì fattamente interessati che senza li modi che ordinariamente sogliono usar li Spagnoli non se ne può ricevere quel beneficio che si desidera.”—Ibid. „Avendo molti di essi (ministri) pensioni da Spagna, altri son ben effetti verso la Francia e forse il minor numero e quello che mira al solo ben e servizio del regno e di S. M.”—Francesco Contarini, Relazione. „La Spagna . . . . usando alcuna volta con la Maestà sua l' esca de' matrimonii con li ministri quella delle pensioni e donativi.”—M. A. Correr, Relazione.

4 „All' ambasciatore di Spagna residente alla corte d' Inghilterra sono mandati ogni anno 150,000 scudi, non per sua provizione ma per altri fini, e però impetra gran cose.”—Fran. Contarini, Relazione.

5 N. Molin, Relazione, &c. M. A. Correr,

in England was to bribe, even as at Paris or Madrid. Gold was the only pass-key to justice, to preferment, or to power.

Yet the foreign subsidies to the English court were, after all of but little avail at that epoch. 1 No man had influence but Cecil, and he was too proud, too rich, too powerful to be bribed. 2 Alone with clean fingers among courtiers and ministers, he had, however, accumulated a larger fortune than any. His annual income was estimated at two hundred thousand crowns, and he had a vast floating capital, always well employed. Among other investments, he had placed half a million on interest in Holland, 3 and it was to be expected, therefore, that he should favour the cause of the republic, rebellious and upstart though it were.

The pigmy, as the late queen had been foud of nicknaming him, was the only giant in the Government. Those crooked shoulders held up, without flinching, the whole burden of the State.

Relazione. „Vanno nutrendo le speranze di poter un giorno metter mano in quel regno (d' Inghilterra) e perciò col solito titolo di avvantaggiare la fede cattolica mantengono diversi collegi d' Inglesi per spargere con loro beneficio i soggetti che escono da quelli e dopo la pace hanno dispensate fra quella nazione molti denari fra quali la regina ha avuto in contanti più di cento mille scudi oltre diverse gioie e altre cose di molto valente.”—F. Priuli, Relazione di Spagna, 1604-1608. N. Molin.

1 „Pare che li Spagnuoli si sieno astenuti questi due ultimi anni per il poco frutto che ne cavano.”—M. A. Correr, Relazione.

2 „Nè ha mai voluto accettar pensioni.”—M. A. Correr, Relazione.

3 „Della sua ricchezza non voglio parlare perocchè è cosa che eccede il creder d' ognuno; ma quasi tutto ha in contanti in diverse piazze di Europa, ma sotto diversi nomi; e mi è stato affermato che in Olanda solamente abbia cinque cento mille scudi li quali gli rendono utili tali che se ne può contare.”—Ibid. „Essendo opinione che degli uffici della corona abbi cavato meglio di 200,000 scudi all' anno, onde ha comprato molta quantità di terreni e gira denari in diverse piazze specialmente gran somma in Olanda che profitano più che mediocrementi, cosa che lo tiene affezionato ed obbligato agli interessi di quelle provincie.”—Ibid.

Pale, handsome, anxious, suffering, and intellectual of visage, with his indomitable spirit, ready eloquence, and nervous energy, he easily asserted supremacy over all the intriguers, foreign and domestic, the stipendiaries, the generals, the admirals, the politicians, at court, as well as over the Scotch Solomon who sat on the throne.

But most certainly it was for the public good of Britain that Europe should be pacified. It is very true that the piratical interest would suffer, and this was a very considerable and influential branch of business. So long as war existed anywhere, the corsairs of England sailed with the utmost effrontery from English ports, to prey upon the commerce of friend and foe alike. After a career of successful plunder, it was not difficult for the rovers to return to their native land, and, with the proceeds of their industry, to buy themselves positions of importance, both social and political. It was not the custom to consider too curiously the source of the wealth. If it was sufficient to dazzle the eyes of the vulgar, it was pretty certain to prove the respectability of the owner. 1

1 „Per assicurar questi mari dai bertoni inglesi che hanno apportato e tuttora apportano tanto danno alle navi e sudditi di Vostra Serenità che trafficano in levante: perchè non è dubbio per la informazione che ne ho avuto che molti vascelli partono d' Inghilterra sotto il nome dimercanticon qualche poco di carico per il viaggio di levante ma il loro fine è principalmente di far qualche preda se la occasione si presenta; onde partendo con questo nome di mercanti viene levata l'occasione ai rappresentanti di Vostra Serenità di opporsi alla loro uscita; ma in effetto secondo l'occasione esercitano l'ufficio di corsari e quando loro riesce di far qualche preda si contentano di restare esuli e privi della patria per qualche spazio di tempo e con qualche donativo unico remedio in quel paese per superar tutte le difficoltà di poter ripatriare e godersi la guadagnata preda.”—N. Molin, Relazione.

„Perchè con la pace viene loro levato il modo di andar in corso con che molti si sono arricchiti perchè sotto pretesto di andar contro i nemici depredavano anco le navi degli amici come è pur troppo manifesto a V. S.”—Ibid.

It was in vain that the envoys of the Dutch and Venetian republics sought redress for the enormous damage inflicted on their commerce by English pirates, and invoked the protection of public law. It was always easy for learned juriconsults to prove such depredation to be consistent with international usage and with sound morality. Even at that period, although England was in population and in wealth so insignificant, it possessed a lofty, insular contempt for the opinions and the doctrines of other nations, and expected, with perfect calmness, that her own principles should be not only admitted, but spontaneously adored. 1

Yet the piratical interest was no longer the controlling one. That city on the Thames, which already numbered more than three hundred thousand inhabitants, 2 had discovered that more wealth was to be accumulated by her bustling shopkeepers in the paths of legitimate industry than by a horde of rovers over the seas, however adventurous and however protected by Government.

As for France, she was already defending herself against piracy by what at the period seemed a master-piece of

„Sono gli Inglesi sopra tutti gli uomini dediti al corseggiare, ne facevano particular professione in tempo della regina Elisabetta la quale la permetteva contro gli Spagnuoli ed animava li suoi sudditi ad applicarvisi . . . . di qua sono procedute ricchezze grandi nelli particolari, accrescimenti delli dazzi pubblici e sperienza e gloria nelli cittadini ed augumento di forze considerabilissime a tutto il regno. Ora queste depredazioni che vietate dalla pace contro Spagnuoli si sono indifferentemente voltate sopra tutti vengono più d' ogni tristizia odiata dal re . . . . non di meno come non si trova ufficio di tanta santità e giustizia che l'avarizia degli uomini non la soglia guastare e corromper; così è opinione che quelli medesimi che hanno principal carico di perseguire questi scellerati li abbino spese volte favoriti e protetti.”—Marc Antonio Correr, Ambasc. appresso Giacomo 1. 1611, in Barozzi and Berchet. S. iv. vol. unico.

1 „Essendo l'Inglese per natura superbo crede che ognuno per natura sia obbligato di accarezzarlo non solo ma di adorarlo.”—Ibid. N. Molin, Relazione.

2 Molin.

internal improvement. The Seine, the Loire, and the Rhone were soon to be united in one chain of communication. Thus merchandise might be waterborne from the channel to the Mediterranean, without risking the five or six months' voyage by sea then required from Havre to Marseilles, and exposure along the whole coast to attack from the corsairs of England, Spain, and Barbary. 1

The envoys of the States-General had a brief audience of the new sovereign, in which little more than phrases of compliment were pronounced.

„We are here,” said Barneveld, „between grief and joy. We have lost her whose benefits to us we can never describe in words, but we have found a successor who is heir not only to her kingdom but to all her virtues.” 2 And with this exordium the great Advocate plunged at once into the depths of his subject, so far as was possible in an address of ceremony. He besought the king not to permit Spain, standing on the neck of the provinces, to grasp from that elevation at other empires. He reminded James of his duty to save those of his own religion from the clutch of a sanguinary superstition, to drive away those lurking satellites of the Roman pontiff who considered Britain their lawful prey. He implored him to

1 Angelo Badoer, Ambasc. in Francia, Relazione in Barozzi and Berchet, ser. ii. vol. i. „Ma finito questo taglio che si lavora per far entrare la Loira nella Senna come ho detto s'è risolto di farne un altro per far entrare il Rodano che passa Liona nella Loira essendo già il disegno fatto con che s'andrebbe da un mare all'altro sempre per i fiumi senza aver mai a smontare in terra e quando questo resti effectuat, come pigliandovisi le mani egli resterebbe in non lunghi anni mentre continui la pace nella Francia con più brevità con più sicurezza e con grand'utile a quel regno si manderebbero le merci dal Mediterraneo sempre per acqua sino nell'Oceano senza averle a mandare per tanto mare come si fa ora che le navi hanno a circondare tutta la Spagna per arrivare in quelle parti con tanto rischio di venti e di corsari oltre il tempo di cinque o sei mesi che alle volte consumano nel viaggio.”

2 Grotius, xii. 619. Meteren, ubi sup.

complete the work so worthily begun by Elizabeth. If all those bound by one interest should now, he urged, unite their efforts, the Spaniard, deprived not only of the Netherlands, but, if he were not wise in time, banished from the ocean and stripped of all his transmarine possessions, would be obliged to consent to a peace founded on the only secure basis, equality of strength. The envoy concluded by beseeching the king for assistance to Ostend, now besieged for two years long. 1

But James manifested small disposition to melt in the fervour of the Advocate's eloquence. He answered with a few cold commonplaces. Benignant but extremely cautious, he professed goodwill enough to the States but quite as much for Spain, a power with which, he observed, he had never quarrelled, and from which he had received the most friendly offices. The archdukes, too, he asserted, had never been hostile to the realm, but only to the Queen of England. In brief, he was new to English affairs, required time to look about him, but would not disguise that his genius was literary, studious, and tranquil, and much more inclined to peace than to war. 2

In truth, James had cause to look very sharply about him. It required an acute brain and steady nerves to understand and to control the whirl of parties and the conflict of interests and intrigues, the chameleon shiftings of character and colour, at this memorable epoch of transition in the realm which he had just inherited. There was a Scotch party, favourable on the whole to France; there was a Spanish party, there was an English party, and, more busy than all, there was a party—not Scotch, nor French, nor English, nor Spanish—that undying party in all commonwealths or kingdoms which ever fights for itself and for the spoils.

France and Spain had made peace

1 Ibid.

2 Ibid.



with each other at Vervins five years before, and had been at war ever since.

Nothing could be plainer nor more cynical than the language exchanged between the French monarch and the representative of Spain, That Philip III.—as the Spanish Government by a convenient fiction was always called—was the head and front of the great Savoy-Biron conspiracy to take Henry's life and dismember his kingdom, was hardly a stage secret. Yet diplomatic relations were still preserved between the two countries, and wonderful diplomatic interviews had certainly been taking place in Paris.

Ambassador Tassis had walked with lofty port into Henry's cabinet, disdainingly to salute any of the princes of the blood or high functionaries of state in the apartments through which he passed, and with insolent defiance had called Henry to account for his dealing with the Dutch rebels.

„Sire, the king my master finds it very strange,” he said, „that you still continue to assist his rebels in Holland, and that you shoot at his troops on their way to the Netherlands. If you don't abstain from such infractions of his rights he prefers open war to being cheated by such a pretended peace. Hereupon I demand your reply.”

„Mr. Ambassador,” replied the king, „I find it still more strange that your master is so impudent as to dare to make such complaints—he who is daily making attempts upon my life and upon this State. Even if I do assist the Hollanders, what wrong is that to him? It is an organized commonwealth, powerful, neighbourly, acknowledging no subjection to him. But your master is stirring up rebellion in my own kingdom, addressing himself to the princes of my blood and my most notable officers, so that I have been obliged to cut off the head of one of the most beloved of them all. By these unchristian proceedings he has obliged me to

take sides with the Hollanders, whom I know to be devoted to me; nor have I done anything for them except to pay the debts I owed them. I know perfectly well that the king your master is the head of this conspiracy, and that the troops of Naples were meditating an attack upon my kingdom. I have two letters written by the hand of your master to Marshal Biron, telling him to trust Fuentes as if it were himself and it is notorious that Fuentes has projected and managed all the attempts to assassinate me. Do you think you have a child to deal with? The late King of Spain knew me pretty well. I think this one thinks himself wiser I shall let him see who I am. Do you want peace or war? I am ready for either.”

The ambassador, whose head had thus been so vigorously washed—as Henry expressed it in recounting the interview afterwards to the Dutch envoy, Dr. Aerssens—stammered some unintelligible excuses, and humbly begged his Majesty not to be offended. He then retired quite crest-fallen, and took leave most politely of every-body as he went, down even to the very grooms of the chambers.

„You must show your teeth to the Spaniard,” said Henry to Aerssens, „if you wish for a quiet life.”

Here was unsophisticated diplomacy; for the politic Henry, who could forgive assassins and conspirators, crowned or otherwise, when it suited his purpose to be lenient, knew that it was on this occasion very prudent to use the gift of language, not in order to conceal, but to express his thoughts.

„I left the king as red as a turkey-cock,” said Tassis, as soon as he got home that morning, „and I was another turkey-cock. We have been talking a little bit of truth to each other.”

1 „Ik weet doen Taxis t'huys quam dat hy seyde, ik hebbe den Coninck root als een callichoen gelaeten ende ik ben een ander. Wy hebben malcanderen wat waerheyt ge-

In truth, it was impossible, as the world was then constituted, that France and Spain, in spite of many secret sympathies, should not be enemies; that France, England, and the Dutch commonwealth, although cordially disliking each other, should not be allies.

Even before the death of Elizabeth a very remarkable interview had taken place at Dover, in which the queen had secretly disclosed the great thoughts with which that most imperial brain was filled just before its boundless activity was to cease for ever.

She had wished for a personal interview with the French king, whose wit and valour she had always heartily admired. Henry, on his part, while unmercifully ridiculing that preter-human vanity which he fed with fantastic adulation, never failed to do justice to her genius, and had been for a moment disposed to cross the channel, or even to hold counsel with her on board ship midway between the two countries. 1 But he was however found impracticable to arrange any such meeting, and the gossip of the day hinted that the great Henry, whose delight was in battle, and who had never been known to shrink from danger on dry land, was appalled at the idea of sea-sickness, and even dreaded the chance of being kidnapped by the English pirates. 2

The corsairs who drove so profitable a business at that period by plundering the merchantmen of their enemy, of their Dutch and French allies, and of their own nation, would assuredly have been pleased with such a prize.

The queen had confided to De Bethune

ext." &c.—Aerssens to the States-General, Oct. 1602. Hague Archives MS.

Henry recounted these conversations with his own lips to Dr. Aerssens, who communicated them to the States-General in his secret letters. I have read them in the *France Depêches*, Ao. 1602-1607, Royal Archives at the Hague MS. See especially Aerssens to the States-General, 4 and 18 October, 1602.

1 *Mémoires de Sully*, iv. 34-46, anno 1601.  
2 *Ibid.*

that she had something to say to the king which she could never reveal to other ears than his, but when the proposed visit of Henry was abandoned, it was decided that his confidential minister should slip across the channel before Elizabeth returned to her palace at Greenwich.

De Bethune accordingly came incognito from Calais to Dover, in which port he had a long and most confidential interview with the queen. Then and there the woman, nearly seventy years of age, who governed despotically the half of a small island, while the other half was in the possession of a man whose mother she had slain, and of a people who hated the English more than they hated the Spaniards or the French—a queen with some three millions of loyal but most turbulent subjects in one island, and with about half-a-million ferocious rebels in another requiring usually an army of twenty thousand disciplined soldiers to keep them in a kind of subjugation, with a revenue fluctuating between eight hundred thousand pounds sterling, and the half of that sum, and with a navy of a hundred privateersmen—disclosed to the French envoy a vast plan for regulating the polity and the religion of the civilized world, and for remodeling the map of Europe. 1

There should be three religions, said Elizabeth—not counting the dispensation from Mecca, about which Turk and Hun might be permitted to continue their struggle on the crepuscular limits of civilization. Everywhere else there should be toleration only for the churches of Peter, of Luther, and of Calvin. The house of Austria was to be humbled—the one branch driven back to Spain and kept there, the other branch to be deprived of the imperial crown, which was to be disposed of as in times past by the votes of the princely electors. There should be two

1 *Mémoires de Sully*, iv. 34-36, anno 1601.

republics—the Swiss and the Dutch—each of those commonwealths to be protected by France and England, and each to receive considerable parings out of the possessions of Spain and the empire.

Finally, all Christendom was to be divided off into a certain number of powers, almost exactly equal to each other; the weighing, measuring, and counting, necessary to obtain this international equilibrium, being of course the duty of the king and queen when they should sit some day together at table.

Thus there were five points; sovereigns and politicians having always a fondness for a neat summary in five or six points. Number one, to remodel the electoral system of the holy Roman empire. Number two, to establish the republic of the United Provinces. Number three, to do as much for Switzerland. Number four, to partition Europe. Number five, to reduce all religions to three.<sup>1</sup> Nothing could be more majestic, no plan fuller fraught with tranquillity for the rulers of mankind and their subjects. Thrice happy the people, having thus a couple of heads with crowns upon them and brains within them to prescribe what was to be done in this world and believed as to the next!

The illustrious successor of that great queen now stretches her benignant sceptre over two hundred millions of subjects, and the political revenues of her empire are more than a hundredfold those of Elizabeth; yet it would hardly now be thought great statesmanship or sound imperial policy for a British sovereign even to imagine the possibility of the five points which filled the royal English mind at Dover.

But Henry was as much convinced as Elizabeth of the necessity and the possibility of establishing the five points, and De Bethune had been astonished at

the exact similarity of the conclusion which those two sovereign intellects had reached, even before they had been placed in communion with each other. The death of the queen had not caused any change in the far-reaching design of which the king now remained the sole executor, and his first thought on the accession of James, was accordingly to despatch De Bethune, now created Marquis de Rosny, as ambassador extraordinary to England, in order that the new sovereign might be secretly but thoroughly instructed as to the scheme for remodelling Christendom.<sup>1</sup>

As Rosny was also charged with the duty of formally congratulating King James, he proceeded upon his journey with remarkable pomp. He was accompanied by two hundred gentlemen of quality, specially attached to his embassy—young city fops, as he himself described them, who were out of their element whenever they left the pavements of Paris—and by an equal number of valets, grooms, and cooks.<sup>2</sup> Such retinue was indispensable to enable an ambassador to transact the public business and to maintain the public dignity in those days; unproductive consumption being accounted most sagacious and noble.

Before reaching the English shore the marquis was involved in trouble. Accepting the offer of the English vice-admiral lying off Calais, he embarked with his suite in two English vessels much to the dissatisfaction of De Vic, vice-admiral of France, who was anxious to convey the French-ambassador in the war-ships of his country. There had been suspicion afloat as to the good understanding between England and Spain caused by the great courtesy recently shown to the Count of Arenberg, and there was intense irritation among the seafaring people of France an account

<sup>1</sup> Ibid. 260, *seqq.*

<sup>2</sup> Ibid. 268; v. 21.

<sup>1</sup> Mémoires de Sully, iv. 34-36, anno 1601.



of the exploits of the English corsairs upon their coast. 1 Rosny thought it best to begin his embassy by an act of conciliation, but soon had cause to repent his decision.

In mid-channel they were met by De Vic's vessels with the French banner displayed, at which sight the English commander was so wroth that he forthwith ordered a broadside to be poured into the audacious foreigner; swearing with mighty oaths that none but the English flag should be shown in those waters. And thus, while conveying a French ambassador and three hundred Frenchmen on a sacred mission to the British sovereign, this redoubtable manner of England prepared to do battle with the ships of France. It was with much difficulty and some prevarication that Rosny appeased the strife, representing that the French flag had only been raised in order that it might be dipped, in honour of the French ambassador, as the ships passed each other.

15 June, The full-shotted broadside 1603. was fired from fifty guns, but the English commander consented, at De Rosny's representations, that it should be discharged wide of the mark. 2 A few shots, however, struck the side of one of the French vessels, and at the same time, as Cardinal Richelieu afterwards remarked, pierced the heart of every patriotic Frenchman. 3

The ambassador made a sign, which De Vic understood, to lower his flag and to refrain from answering the fire. 4 Thus a battle between the allies, amid the most amazing circumstances, was avoided, but it may well be imagined how long and how deeply the poison of the insult festered.

Such an incident could hardly predispose the ambassador in favour of the nation he was about to visit, or strengthen his hope of laying, not only

the foundation of a perpetual friendship between the two crowns, but of effecting the palingenesis of Europe. Yet no doubt Sully—as the world has so long learned to call him—was actuated by lofty sentiments in many respects in advance of his age. Although a brilliant and successful campaigner in his youth, he detested war, and looked down with contempt at political systems which had not yet invented anything better than gunpowder for the arbitrament of international disputes. Instead of war being an occasional method of obtaining peace, it pained him to think that peace seemed only a process for arriving at war. Surely it was no epigram in those days, but the simplest statement of commonplace fact, that war was the normal condition of Christians. Alas! will it be maintained that in the two and a half centuries which have since elapsed the world has made much progress in a higher direction? Is there yet any appeal among the most civilized nations except to the logic of the largest battalions and the eloquence of the biggest guns?

De Rosny came to be the harbinger of a political millennium, and he heartily despised war. The schemes nevertheless, which were as much his own as his master's, and which he was instructed to lay before the English monarch as exclusively his own, would have required thirty years of successful and tremendous warfare before they could have a beginning of development.

It is not surprising that so philosophical a mind as his, while still inclining to pacific designs, should have been led by what met his eyes and ears to some rather severe generalizations.

„It is certain that the English hate us,” he said, „and with a hatred so strong and so general that one is tempted to place it among the natural dispositions of this people. Yet it is rather the effect of their pride and their presumption;

1 Mémoires de Sully, iv. 272.

2 Ibid. 273-6. 3 Ibid. 73-6, and notes.

4 Ibid.

since there is no nation in Europe more haughty, more disdainful, more besotted with the idea of its own excellence. If you were to take their word for it, mind and reason are only found with them; they adore all their opinions and despise those of all other nations; and it never occurs to them to listen to others, or to doubt themselves. . . . . Examine what are called with them maxims of state; you will find nothing but the laws of pride itself, adopted through arrogance or through indolence." 1

„Placed by nature amidst the tempestuous and variable ocean," he wrote to his sovereign, „they are as shifting, as impetuous, as changeable as its waves. So selfcontradictory and so inconsistent are their actions almost in the same instant as to make it impossible that they should proceed from the same persons and the same mind. Agitated and urged by their pride and arrogance alone, they take all their imaginations and extravagances for truths and realities; the objects of their desires and affections for inevitable events; not balancing and measuring those desires with the actual condition of things, nor with the character of the people with whom they have to deal." 2

When the ambassador arrived in London he was lodged at Arundel palace. He at once became the cynosure of all indigenous parties and of adventurous politicians from every part of Europe; few knowing how to shape their course since the great familiar lustre had disappeared from the English sky.

Rosny found the Scotch lords sufficiently favourable to France; the English Catholic grandees, with all the Howards and the lord high admiral at their head, excessively inclined to Spain, and a great English party detesting both Spain and France with equal fer-

our and well enough disposed to the United Provinces, not as hating that commonwealth less but the two great powers more.

The ambassador had arrived with the five points, not in his portfolio but in his heart, and they might after all be concentrated in one phrase—Down with Austria, up with the Dutch republic. On his first interview with Ceil, who came to arrange for his audience with the king, he found the secretary much disposed to conciliate both Spain and the empire, and to leave the provinces to shift for themselves. He spoke of Ostend as of a town not worth the pains taken to preserve it, and of the India trade as an advantage of which a true policy required that the United Provinces should be deprived. 1 Already the fine commercial instinct of England had scented a most formidable rival on the ocean.

As for the king, he had as yet declared himself for no party, while all parties were disputing among each other for mastery over him. James found himself, in truth, as much astray in English politics as he was a foreigner upon English earth. Suspecting every one, afraid of every one, he was in mortal awe, most of all, of his wife, who being the daughter of one protestant sovereign and wife of another, and queen of a united realm dependent for its very existence on antagonism to Spain and Rome, was naturally inclined to Spanish politics and the Catholic faith.

The turbulent and intriguing Anne of Denmark was not at the moment in London, but James was daily expecting and De Bethune dreading her arrival.

The ambassador knew very well that, although the king talked big in her absence about the forms which he intended to prescribe for her conduct, he would take orders from her as soon as she arrived, refuse her nothing, conceal

1 *Mémoires*, iv. 291, 292. Compare the ambassador's letters in Vittorio, Siri, vol. i.

2 Rosny to the King, 13 June, 1603, in Vittorio Siri. *Memorie Recondite*, i. 226.

1 Letter last cited, 307.

nothing from her, and tremble before her as usual. 1

The king was not specially prejudiced in favour of the French monarch or his ambassador, for he had been told that Henry had occasionally spoken of him as captain of arts and doctor of arms, and that both the Marquis de Rosny his brother were known to have used highly disrespectful language concerning him.

Before his audience, 'De Rosny received a private visit from Barneveld, and the deputies of the States-General, and was informed that since his arrival they had been treated with more civility by the king. Previously he had refused to see them after the first official reception, had not been willing to grant Count Henry of Nassau a private audience, and had spoken publicly of the States as seditious rebels.

On the 21st June Barneveld had a 21 June, long private interview with 1603. the ambassador at Arundel palace, when he exerted all his eloquence to prove the absolute necessity of an offensive and defensive alliance between France and the United Provinces if the independence of the republic were ever to be achieved. Unless a French army took the field at once, Ostend would certainly fall, he urged, and resistance to the Spaniards would soon afterwards cease. 2

It is not probable that the Advocate felt in his heart so much despair as his words indicated, but he was most anxious that Henry should openly declare himself the protector of the young commonwealth, and not indisposed perhaps to exaggerate the dangers, grave as they were without doubt, by which its existence was menaced.

The ambassador however begged the Hollander to renounce any such hopes,

assuring him that the king had no intention of publicly and singly taking upon his shoulders the whole burden of war with Spain, the fruits of which would not be his to gather. Certainly before there had been time thoroughly to study the character and inclinations of the British monarch it would be impossible for De Rosny to hold out any encouragement in this regard. He then asked Barneveld what he had been able to discover during his residence in London as to the personal sentiments of James.

The Advocate replied that at first the king, yielding to his own natural tendencies and to the advice of his counsellors, had refused the Dutch deputies every hope, but that subsequently reflecting, as it would seem, that peace would cost England very dear if English inaction should cause the Hollanders to fall again under the dominion of the Catholic king, or to find their only deliverance in the protection of France, and beginning to feel more acutely how much England had herself to fear from a power like Spain, he had seemed to awake out of a profound sleep, and promised to take these important affairs into consideration.

Subsequently he had fallen into a dreary abyss of indecision, where he still remained. 1 It was certain however that he would form no resolution without the concurrence of the King of France, whose ambassador he had been so impatiently expecting, and whose proposition to him of a double marriage between their respective children had given him much satisfaction.

De Rosny felt sure that the Dutch statesmen were far too adroit to put entire confidence in anything said by James, whether favourable or detrimental to their cause. He conjured Barneveld therefore, by the welfare of his country, to conceal nothing from him in regard to the most secret resolutions

1 Despatches of Rosny, in Siri, i. 331.

2 Despatches of Rosny, in Siri, 309, 310. Compare Rosny's letter to the King, in Groen v. Prinsterer, Archives, II. 206-210.

1 Letter of Rosny, *ubi sup.*



that might have been taken by the States in the event of their being abandoned by England, or in case of their being embarrassed by a sudden demand on the part of that power for the cautionary towns offered to Elizabeth. 1

Barneveld, thus pressed, and considering the ambassador as the confidential counsellor of a sovereign who was the republic's only friend, no longer hesitated. Making a merit to himself of imparting an important secret, he said that the state-council of the commonwealth had resolved to elude at any cost the restoration of the cautionary towns. 2

The interview was then abruptly terminated by the arrival of the Venetian envoy.

The 22nd of June arrived. The mar-  
22 June, quis had ordered mourning  
1603. suits for his whole embassy  
and retinue, by particular command of his sovereign, who wished to pay this public tribute to the memory of the great queen.

To his surprise and somewhat to his indignation, he was however informed that no one, stranger or native, Scotchman or Englishman, had been permitted to present himself to the king in black, that his appearance there in mourning would be considered almost an affront, and that it was a strictly enforced rule at court to abstain from any mention of Queen Elizabeth, and to affect an entire oblivion of her reign. 3

At the last moment, and only because convinced that he might otherwise cause the impending negotiations utterly to fail, the ambassador consented to attire himself, the hundred and twenty gentlemen selected from his diplomatic family to accompany him on this occasion, and all his servants, in gala costume. The royal guards, with the Earl of Derby at their head, came early in the afternoon to Arundel House to escort him

to the Thames, and were drawn up on the quay as the marquis and his followers embarked in the splendid royal barges provided to convey them to Greenwich. 1

On arriving at their destination they were met at the landing by the Earl of Northumberland, and escorted with great pomp and through an infinite multitude of spectators to the palace. Such was the crowd, without and within, of courtiers and common people, that it was a long time before the marquis, preceded by his hundred and twenty gentlemen, reached the hall of audience.

At last he arrived at the foot of the throne, when James arose and descended eagerly two steps of the dais in order to greet the ambassador. He would have descended them all had not one of the counsellors plucked him by the sleeve, whispering that he had gone quite far enough.

„And if I honour this ambassador,” cried James, in a loud voice, „more than is usual, I don't intend that it shall serve as a precedent for others. I esteem and love him particularly, because of the affection which I know he cherishes for me, of his firmness in our religion, and of his fidelity to his master.” 2

Much more that was personally flattering to the marquis was said thus emphatically by James. To all this the ambassador replied, not by a set discourse, but only by a few words of compliment, expressing his sovereign's regrets at the death of Queen Elizabeth, and his joy at the accession of the new sovereign. He then delivered his letters of credence, and the complimentary conversation continued; the king declaring that he had not left behind him in Scotland his passion for the monarch of France, and that even had he found England at war with that country on his accession he would have instantly

1 Letter of Rosny, 313.

3 Ibid. 320, 321.

2 Ibid.

1 Letter of Rosny, 323, *seqq.*

2 Ibid. *Shi*, vol. i. 324.

concluded a peace with a prince whom he so much venerated.

Thus talking, the king caused his guest to ascend with him to the uppermost steps of the dais, babbling on very rapidly and skipping abruptly from one subject to another. De Rosny took occasion to express his personal esteem and devotion, and was assured by the king in reply that the slanders in regard to him which had reached the royal ears had utterly failed of their effect. It was obvious that they were the invention of Spanish intriguers who wished to help that nation to universal monarchy. Then he launched forth into general and cordial abuse of Spain, much to the satisfaction of Count Henry of Nassau, who stood near enough to hear a good deal of the conversation, and of the other Dutch deputies who were moving about, quite unknown, in the crowd. He denounced very vigorously the magnanimity of the Spaniards in lighting fires everywhere in their neighbours' possessions, protested that he would always oppose their wicked designs, but poke contemptuously of their present being as too feeble of mind and body ever to comprehend or to carry out the projects of his predecessors.

Among other gossip, James asked the envoy if he went to hear the Protestant preaching in London. Being answered in the affirmative, he expressed surprise, having been told, he said, that it was Rosny's intention to repudiate his religion as De Sancy had done, in order to secure his fortunes. The marquis protested that such a thought had never entered his head, but intimated that the reports might come from his familiar intercourse with the papal nuncio, and many French ecclesiastics. The king asked if, when speaking with the nuncio, he called the pope his Holiness, as by so doing he would greatly offend God, in whom alone was holiness. Rosny replied that he commonly used the style prevalent at court, governing himself

according to the rules adopted in regard to pretenders to crowns and kingdoms which they thought belonged to them, but the possession of which was in other hands, conceding to them, in order not to offend them, the titles which they claimed. 1

James shook his head portentously, and changed the subject.

The general tone of the royal conversation was agreeable enough to the ambassador, who eagerly alluded to the perfidious conduct of a Government, which ever since concluding the peace of Vervins with Henry, had been doing its best to promote sedition and territorial dismemberment in his kingdom, and to assist all his open and his secret enemies.

James assented very emphatically, and the marquis felt convinced that a resentment against Spain, expressed so publicly and so violently by James, could hardly fail to be sincere. He began seriously to hope that his negotiations would be successful, and was for soaring at once into the regions of high politics, when the king suddenly began to talk of hunting.

„And so you sent half the stag I sent you to Count Arenberg,” said James; „but he is very angry about it, thinking that you did so to show how much more I make of you than I do of him. And so I do; for I know the difference between your king, my brother, and his masters who have sent me an ambassador who can neither walk nor talk, and who asked me to give him audience in a garden because he cannot go upstairs.” 2

The king then alluded to Tassis, chief courier of his Catholic Majesty and special envoy from Spain, asking whether the marquis had seen him on his passage through France.

„Spain sends me a postillion-ambas-

1 Despatches of Rosny, in Vitt. Siri, i. 231.

2 Sully, Mémoires, iv. 331, *seqq.* Despatches of Rosny, in Vitt. Siri, i.

sador," said he, „that he may travel the faster and attend to business by post." 1

It was obvious that James took a sincere satisfaction in abusing everything relating to that country from its sovereign and the Duke of Lerma downwards; 2 but he knew very well that Velasco, constable of Castile, had been already designated as ambassador, and would soon be on his way to England.

De Rosny on the termination of his audience was escorted in great state by the Earl of Northumberland to the barges.

A few days later, the ambassador had another private audience, in which the

king expressed himself with  
22 June. apparent candour concerning

the balance of power. 3 Christendom, in his opinion, should belong in three equal shares to the families of Stuart, Bourbon, and Habsburg; but personal ambition and the force of events had given to the house of Austria more than its fair third. Sound policy therefore required a combination between France and England, in order to reduce their copartner within proper limits. This was satisfactory as far as it went, and the ambassador complimented the king on his wide views of policy and his lofty sentiments in regard to human rights.

Warning with the subject, James held language very similar to that which De Rosny and his master had used in their secret conferences, and took the ground unequivocally that the secret war levied by Spain against France and England, as exemplified in the Biron conspiracy, the assault on Geneva, the aid of the Duke of Savoy, and in the perpetual fostering of Jesuit intrigues, plots of assassination, and other conspiracies in the British islands, justified a secret war on the part of Henry and himself against Philip.

1 Mémoires, *ubi sup.*

2 See especially the despatches of the ambassador to the king in the month of July, in Vittorio Siri, Mem. Rec. i.

3 Mémoires, 355, *seqq.*

The ambassador would have been more deeply impressed with the royal language had he felt more confidence in the royal character.

Highly applauding the sentiment expressed, and desiring to excite still further the resentment of James against Spain, he painted a vivid picture of the progress of that aggressive power in the past century. She had devoured Flanders, Burgundy, Granada, Navarre, Portugal, the German Empire, Milan, Naples, and all the Indies. If she had not swallowed likewise both France and England those two crowns were indebted for their preservation, after the firmness of Elizabeth and Henry to the *fortunate incident of the revolt of the Netherlands*. 1

De Rosny then proceeded to expound the necessity under which James would soon find himself of carrying on open war with Spain, and of the expediency of making preparations for the great struggle without loss of time.

He therefore begged the king to concert with him some satisfactory measures for the preservation of the United Provinces.

„But," said James, „what better assistance could we give the Netherlands than to divide their territory between the States and Spain; agreeing at the same time to drive the Spaniards out altogether, if he violates the conditions which we should guarantee?"

1 Mémoires, 359. And in thus speaking he expressed the firm conviction of the whole French court. „Provided the States remain at war," said Villeroy, „and the Spaniards have this bone to gnaw, it will always be in the power of the English to change their minds. If Spain could get this thorn out of her foot which God has put there, and the far has kept there so miraculously, what bridle could her insolence be checked? The kingdoms of France and England being filled with discords in regard to religion, they are, how can they resist Spanish power and Spanish corruption? Even now they can hardly do it, occupied, diverted, and wearied as are the Spaniards with their war against the Netherlands." Groen v. Prinser, Archives, II. 281, 282.

2 Mémoires, iv. 404, *seqq.* Siri, *ubi sup.*



This conclusion was not very satisfactory to De Rosny, who saw in the old language of the king—followed us by the indication of a policy that might last to the Greek Kalends, and admit Ostend, Dutch Flanders, and even the republic to fall—nothing but a mixture of timidity, conceit, and procrastination which marked the royal character. He pointed out to him accordingly that Spanish statemanship could not at the world in the art of delay, and in plucking the fruits of delay, and at when the United Provinces had been once subjugated, the turn of England would come. It would be then too late for him to hope to preserve himself by such measures as, taken now, would be most salutary. 1

A few days later the king invited De Rosny and the two hundred members of his embassy to dine at Greenwich, and the excursion down the Thames took place with the usual pomp.

The two hundred dined with the gentlemen of the court, while the king's table, on an

29 June.

elevated platform in the same hall, were no guests but De Rosny, and the special envoy of France, Count Beaumont.

The furniture and decorations of the table were sumptuous, and the attendants, to the surprise of the Frenchmen, went on their knees whenever they offered wine or dishes to the king. The conversation at first was on general

1 *Mémoires, ubi sup.* 363. „In truth,” wrote the ambassador to his sovereign, „Spain owes to honey you both (the kings of France and England) in order to accomplish more easily the complete conquest of the Netherlands. When these are joined to her great and almost infinite power, she hopes to give the law to Christendom, to make herself formidable to all other princes, and to establish a universal monarchy. That is the bottom of their intentions. It is the regular covetousness and ambition of Spain, continued by the successors of Charles V. The two houses of Austria and of Spain being united, she has reached such an increase of power in less than one hundred years that the very imagination of it is terrible.”—Sully to the King, in *Groen v. Prinzerer*, ii. 204, 205.

topics, such as the heat of the weather, which happened to be remarkable, the pleasures of the chase, and the merits of the sermon which, as it was Sunday, De Rosny had been invited to hear before dinner in the royal chapel.

Soon afterwards, however, some allusion being made to the late queen, James spoke of her with contempt. He went so far as to say that, for a long time before her death, he had governed the councils of England; all her ministers obeying and serving him much better than they did herself. 1 He then called for wine, and, stretching out his glass towards his two guests, drank to the health of the king and queen and royal family of France.

De Rosny replied by proposing the health of his august host, not forgetting the queen and their children, upon which the king, putting his lips close to the ambassador's ear, remarked that his next toast should be in honour of the matrimonial union which was proposed between the families of Britain and France. 2

This was the first allusion made by James to the alliance, and the occasion did not strike the marquis as particularly appropriate to such a topic. He however replied in a whisper that he was rejoiced to hear this language from the king, having always believed that there would be no hesitation on his part between King Henry and the monarch of Spain, who as he was aware, had made a similar proposition James, expressing surprise that his guest was so well informed, avowed that he had in fact received the same offer of the Infanta for his son as had been made to his Christian Majesty for the Dauphin. What more convenient counters in the great game of state than an infant prince and princess in each of the three royal families to which Europe belonged! To how many grave political combinations were these unfor-

1 *Mémoires*, iv. 373.

2 *Ibid.*

tunate infants to give rise, and how distant the period when great nations might no longer be tied to the pinafores of children in the nursery!

After this little confidential interlude, James expressed in a loud voice, so that all might hear, his determination never to permit the subjugation of the Netherlands by Spain. Measures should be taken the very next day, he promised, in concert with the ambassador, as to the aid to be given to the States. Upon the faith of this declaration De Rosny took from his pocket the plan of a treaty, and forthwith, in the presence of all the ministers, placed it in the hands of the king, who meantime had risen from table. The ambassador also took this occasion to speak publicly of the English piracies upon French commerce while the two nations were at peace. The king, in reply, expressed his dissatisfaction at these depredations and at the English admiral who attempted to defend what had been done.

He then took leave of his guests, and went off to bed; where it was his custom to pass his afternoons. 1

It was certain that the Constable of Castile was now to arrive very soon, and the marquis had, meantime, obtained information on which he relied, that this ambassador would come charged with very advantageous offers to the English court. Accounts had been got ready in council, of all the moneys due to England by France and by the States, and it was thought that these sums, payment of which was to be at once insisted upon, together with the Spanish dollars set afloat in London, would prove sufficient to buy up all resistance to the Spanish alliance. 2

Such being the nature of the information furnished to De Rosny, he did not look forward with very high hopes to the issue of the conference indicated

by King James at the Greenwich dinner. As, after all, he would have to deal once more with Cecil, the master spirit of the Spanish party, it did not seem very probable that the king's whispered professions of affection for France, his very loud denunciations of Spanish ambition, and his promises of support to the struggling provinces would be brought into any substantial form for human nourishment. Whispers and big words, touching of glasses at splendid banquets, and proposing of royal toasts, would not go far to help those soldiers in Ostend, a few miles away, fighting two years long already for a square half-mile of barren sand in which seemed centred the world's hopes of freedom.

Barneveld was inclined to take an even more gloomy view than that entertained by the French ambassador. He had, in truth, no reason to be sanguine. The honest republican envoys had brought no babies to offer in marriage. Their little commonwealth had only the merit of exchanging buffets forty years long with a power which, after subjugating the Netherlands, would have liked to annihilate France and England too, and which, during that period, had done its best to destroy and dismember both. It had only struggled as no nation in the world's history had ever done, for the great principle upon which the power and happiness of England where ever to depend. It was therefore not to be expected that its representatives should be received with the distinction conferred upon royal envoys. Barneveld and his colleagues accordingly were not invited, with two hundred noble hangers-on, to come down the Thames in gorgeous array and dine at Greenwich palace; but they were permitted to mix in the gaping crowd of spectators, to see the fine folk, and to hear a few words at a distance which fell from august lips.

1 *Mémoires*, iv. 380.

2 *Ibid.* 375, 376. Despatches of Rosny, in *Siri*.

1 *Mémoires*, iv. 327.

this was not very satisfactory, as Barneveld could rarely gain admittance to princes or his ministers, De Rosny, however, was always glad to confer with him, and was certainly capable of rendering justice both to his genius and to the sacredness of his cause. The Advocate, in a long conference with the ambassador, thought it politic to paint the situation of the republic in even more sombre colours than seemed to De Rosny justifiable. He was indeed, the more struck with Barneveld's present despondency, because, at a previous conference, a few days before, he had spoken almost with contempt of the Spaniards, expressing the opinion that the mutinous and disorganised condition of the archduke's army rendered the conquest of Ostend improbable, and hinted at a plan, of which the world as yet knew nothing, which would save that place, or at any rate would secure such an advantage for the States as to more than counterbalance its possible loss.<sup>1</sup> This very sanguine demeanour had rather puzzled those who had conferred with the Advocate, although they were ere long destined to understand his allusions, and it was certainly a contrast to his present gloom. He assured De Rosny that the Hollanders were becoming desperate, and that they were capable of abandoning their country to mass, and seeking an asylum beyond the seas.<sup>2</sup> The menace was borrowed from the famous project conceived by William the Silent in darker days, and seemed to the ambassador a present anachronism. Obviously it was thought desirable to force the French policy to extreme lengths, and Barneveld accordingly proposed that Henry should take the burthen upon his shoulders of an open war with Spain, in the almost certain event that England would make peace with that power. De Rosny calmly estimated to the Advocate that this was asking something entirely beyond his

power to grant, as the special object of his mission was to form a plan of concerted action with England.<sup>1</sup>

The cautionary towns being next mentioned, Barneveld stated that a demand had been made upon Envoy Caron by Cecil for the delivery of those places to the English Government, as England had resolved to make peace with Spain. The Advocate confided, however, to De Rosny that the States would interpose many difficulties, and that it would be long before the towns were delivered. This important information was given under the seal of strictest secrecy, and was coupled with an inference that a war between the republic and Britain would be the probable result, in which case the States relied upon the alliance with France. The ambassador replied that in this untoward event the republic would have the sympathy of his royal master, but that it would be out of the question for him to go to war with Spain and England at the same time.<sup>2</sup>

On the same afternoon there was a conference at Arundel House between the Dutch deputies, the English coun-

<sup>1</sup> The great object of Henry was to prevent a treaty between the kings of Spain and Britain, and above all to exclude the United Provinces from any such arrangement. „You know how much interest I have in this,” he said to his ambassador; „it is the most important affair of my reign. You must never forget what my interest requires, that these two kings shall never come to an agreement. I don't wish the States to enter into the treaty or to lay down their arms on any pretext. Nevertheless, I ought not to appear to have any wish to prevent a peace between the two kingdoms, nor the reconciliation of the provinces, both on account of my reputation and because any demonstration that I might make would rather increase than diminish the desire of the two kings to come to an understanding.” —(Groen v. Prinsterer, Archives, II. 224-226). These being the secret intentions of the monarch, candidly expressed, it was obviously a delicate matter for De Rosny, who knew that his master meant to remain at peace and yet reap the advantage of a successful war at the expense of his friends and enemies alike, to keep on good terms with all parties.

<sup>2</sup> Mémoires, iv. 383.

<sup>1</sup> Mémoires, 344, 345.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid. 381.



sellors, and de Rosny, when Barneveld drew a most dismal picture of the situation; taking the ground that now or never was the time for driving the Spaniards entirely out of the Netherlands. Cecil said in a general way that his Majesty felt a deep interest in the cause of the provinces, and the French ambassador summoned the Advocate, now that he was assured of the sympathy of two great kings, to furnish some plan by which that sympathy might be turned to account. Barneveld, thinking figures more eloquent than rhetoric, replied that the States, besides garrisons, had fifteen thousand infantry and three thousand cavalry in the field, and fifty war ships in commission, with artillery and munitions in proportion, and that it would be advisable for France and England to furnish an equal force, military and naval, to the common cause. 1

De Rosny smiled at the extravagance of the proposition. Cecil, again taking refuge in commonplaces, observed that his master was disposed to keep the peace with all his neighbours, but that, having due regard to the circumstances, he was willing to draw a line between the wishes of the States and his own, and would grant them a certain amount of succour underhand.

Thereupon the Dutch deputies withdrew to confer. De Rosny, who had no faith in Cecil's sincerity—the suggestion being essentially the one which he had himself desired—went meantime a little deeper into the subject, and soon found that England, according to the Secretary of State, had no idea of ruining herself for the sake of the provinces, or of entering into any positive engagements in their behalf. In case Spain should make a direct attack upon the two kings who were to constitute themselves protectors of Dutch liberty, it might be necessary to take up arms. The admission was on the whole superfluous, it

not being probable that Britain, even under a Stuart, would be converted to the doctrine of non-resistance. Yet in this case it was suggested by Cecil that the chief reliance of his Government would be on the debts owed by the Dutch and French respectively, which would then be forthwith collected.

De Rosny was now convinced that Cecil was trifling with him, and evidently intending to break off all practical negotiations. He concealed his annoyance, however, as well as he could, and simply intimated that the first business of importance was to arrange for the relief of Ostend; that eventualities such as the possible attack by Spain upon France and England, might for the moment be deferred, but that England thought it a safe policy to ruin Henry by throwing on his shoulders the whole burthen of a war with the common enemy, she would discover an deeply regret her fatal mistake. The time was a very ill-chosen one to summon France to pay old debts, and his Christian Majesty had given his ambassador no instructions contemplating such liquidation. It was the intention to discharge the sum annually, little by little, but if England desired to exhaust the king by these peremptory demands it was an odious conduct, and very different from any that France had ever pursued.

The English counsellors were not abashed by this rebuke, but became on the contrary, very indignant, avowing that if anything more was demanded of them, England would entirely abandon the United Provinces. „Cecil made himself known to me in this conference,” said De Rosny, „for exactly what I was. He made use only of double meanings and vague propositions, feeling that reason was not on his side. I was forced to blush at his own self-contradictions, when, with a single word, I made him feel the absurdity of his language. Now, endeavouring

1 Mémoires, iv. 383-395.

intimidate me, he exaggerated the strength of England, and again he enlarged upon the pretended offers made by Spain to that nation." 1

The secretary, desirous to saw discord between the Dutch deputies and the ambassador, then observed that France ought to pay to England £ 50,000 upon the nail, which sum would be at once appropriated to the necessities of the States. „But what most enraged me," said De Rosny, „was to see these ministers, who had come to me to state the intentions of their king, thus inopportunely substitute their own; for I knew that he had commanded them to do the very contrary to that which they did." 2

The conference ended with a suggestion by Cecil, that as France would only undertake a war in conjunction with England, and as England would only consent to this if paid by France and the States, the best thing for the two kings to do would be to do nothing, but to continue to live in friendship together, without troubling themselves about foreign complications.

This was the purpose towards which the English counsellors had been steadily tending, and these last words of Cecil seemed to the ambassador the only sincere ones spoken by him in the whole conference.

„If I kept silence," said the ambassador, „it was not because I acquiesced in their reasoning. On the contrary, the manner in which they had just revealed themselves, and avowed themselves in a certain sort liars and impostors, had given me the most profound contempt for them. I thought, however, that by heating myself and contending with them—so far from inducing them to abandon a resolution which they had taken in concert—I might even bring about a total rupture. On the other hand, matters remaining as they were, and a friendship existing

between the two kings, which might perhaps be cemented by a double marriage, a more favourable occasion might present itself for negotiation. I did not yet despair of the success of my mission, because I believed that the king had no part in the designs which his counsellors wished to carry out." 1

That the counsellors, then struggling for dominion over the new king and his kingdom, understood the character of their sovereign better than did the ambassador, future events were likely enough to prove. That they preferred peace to war, and the friendship of Spain to an alliance, offensive and defensive, with France in favour of a republic which they detested, is certain. It is difficult, however, to understand why they were „liars and impostors" because, in a conference with the representative of France, they endeavoured to make their own opinions of public policy valid rather than content themselves simply with being the errand-bearers of the new king, whom they believed incapable of being stirred to an honourable action.

The whole political atmosphere of Europe was mephitic with falsehood, and certainly the gales which blew from the English court at the accession of James were not fragrant, but De Rosny had himself come over from France under false pretences. He had been charged by his master to represent Henry's childish scheme, which he thought so gigantic, for the regeneration of Europe, as a project of his own, which he was determined to bring to execution, even at the risk of infidelity to his sovereign, and the first element in that whole policy was to carry on war underhand against a power with which his master had just sworn to preserve peace. In that age at least it was not safe for politicians to call each other hard names.

The very next day De Rosny had a

1 *Mémoires*, iv. 391.

2 *Ibid.* 392, 393.

1 *Ibid.* 394, 395.

long private interview with James at Greenwich. Being urged to speak without reserve, the ambassador depicted the privy counsellors to the king as false to his instructions, traitors to the best interests of their country, the humble servants of Spain, and most desirous to make their royal master the slave of that power under the name of its ally. He expressed the opinion, accordingly, that James would do better in obeying only the promptings of his own superior wisdom, rather than the suggestions of the intriguers about him. The adroit De Rosny thus softly insinuated to the flattered monarch that the designs of France were the fresh emanations of his own royal intellect. It was the whim of James to imagine himself extremely like Henry of Bourbon in character, and he affected to take the wittiest, bravest, most adventurous, and most adroit knight-errant that ever won and wore a crown as his perpetual model.

It was delightful, therefore, to find himself in company with his royal brother, making and unmaking kings, destroying empires, altering the whole face of Christendom, and, better than all, settling then and for ever the theology of the whole world, without the trouble of moving from his easy chair, or of incurring any personal danger.

He entered at once, with the natural tendency to suspicion of a timid man, into the views presented by De Rosny as to the perfidy of his counsellors. He changed colour, and was visibly moved, as the ambassador gave his version of the recent conference with Cecil and the other ministers, and being thus artfully stimulated, he was prepared to receive with much eagerness the portentous communications now to be made.

The ambassador, however, caused him to season his admiration until he had taken a most solemn oath, by the sacrament of the Eucharist, never to reveal a syllable of what he was about

to hear. This done, and the royal curiosity excited-almost beyond endurance, De Rosny began to unfold the stupendous schemes which had been concerted between Elizabeth and Henry at Dover, and which formed the secret object of his present embassy. Feeling that the king was most malleable in the theological part of his structure, the wily envoy struck his first blows in that direction, telling him that his own interest in the religious condition of Europe, and especially in the firm establishment of the Protestant faith, far surpassed in his mind all considerations of fortune, country, or even of fidelity to his sovereign.<sup>1</sup> Thus far, political considerations had kept Henry from joining in the great Catholic League, but it was possible that a change might occur in his system, and the Protestant form of worship, abandoned by its ancient protector, might disappear entirely from of worship, abandoned by its ancient protector, might disappear entirely from France and from Europe. De Rosny had, therefore, felt the necessity of a new patron for the reformed religion in this great emergency, and had naturally fixed his eyes on the puissant and sagacious prince who now occupied the British throne. Now was the time, he urged, for James to immortalize his name by becoming the arbiter of the destiny of Europe. It would always seem his own design, although Henry was equally interested in it with himself. The plan was vast but simple, and perfectly easy of execution. There would be no difficulty in constructing an all-powerful league of sovereigns for the destruction of the house of Austria, the foundation-stones of which would of course be France, Great Britain, and the United Provinces. The double marriage between the Bourbon and Stuart families would indissolubly unite the two kingdoms, while interest and gratitude, a common

<sup>1</sup> *Mémoires*, iv. 402.



hatred and a common love, would bind the republic as firmly to the union. Denmark and Sweden were certainly to be relied upon, as well as all other Protestant princes. The ambitions and restless Duke of Savoy would be gained by the offer of Lombardy and a kingly crown, notwithstanding his matrimonial connection with Spain. As for the German princes, they would come greedily into the arrangement; as the league, rich in the spoils of the Austrian house, would have Hungary, Bohemia, Silesia, Moravia, the archduchies, and other splendid provinces to divide among them.

The pope would be bought up by a present, in fee-simple, of Naples, and other comfortable bits of property, of which he was now only feudal lord. Sicily would be an excellent sop for the naughty republic of Venice. The Franche Comté, Alsace, Tirol, were naturally to be annexed to Switzerland; Liège and the heritage of the Duke of Clèves and Juliers to the Dutch commonwealth. 1

The King of France, who, according to De Rosny's solemn assertions, was entirely ignorant of the whole scheme, 2 would, however, be sure to embrace it very heartily when James should propose it to him, and would be far too disinterested to wish to keep any of the booty for himself. A similar selfishness was, of course, expected of James, the two great kings satisfying themselves with the proud consciousness of having saved society, rescued the world from the sceptre of an Austrian universal monarchy, and regenerated European civilization for all future time. 3

The monarch listened with ravished ears, interposed here and there a question or a doubt, but devoured every detail of the scheme, as the ambassador slowly placed it before him.

De Rosny showed that the Spanish action was not in reality so powerful

as the league which would be constructed for its overthrow. It was not so much a religious as a political frontier which separated the nations. He undertook to prove this, but, after all, was obliged to demonstrate that the defection of Henry from the Protestant cause had deprived him of his natural allies, and given him no true friends in exchange for the old ones.

Essentially the Catholics were ranged upon one side, and the Protestants on the other, but both religions were necessary to Henry the Huguenot. The bold freethinker adroitly balanced himself upon each creed. In making use of a stern and conscientious Calvinist, like Maximilian de Béthune, in his first assault upon the theological professor who now stood in Elizabeth's place, he showed the exquisite tact which never failed him. Toleration for the two religions which had political power, perfect intolerance for all others; despotic forms of polity, except for two little republics which were to be smothered with protection and never left out of leading strings, a thorough re-casting of governments and races, a palingenesis of Europe, a nominal partition of its hegemony between France and England, which was to be in reality absorbed by France, and the annihilation of Austrian power east and west, these were the vast ideas with which that teeming Bourbon brain was filled. It is the instinct both of poetic and of servile minds to associate a sentiment of grandeur with such fantastic dreams, but usually on condition that the dreamer wears a crown. When the regenerator of society appears with a wisp of straw upon his head, unappreciative society is apt to send him back to his cell. There, at least, his capacity for mischief is limited.

If to do be as grand as to imagine what it were good to do, then the Dutchmen in Hell's Mouth and the Porcupine fighting Universal Monarchy

1 *Mémoires*, iv. 204.2 *Ibid.*3 *Ibid.* 404, *seqq.*

inch by inch and pike to pike, or trying conclusions with the icebears of Nova Zembla, or capturing whole Portuguese fleets in the Moluccas, were effecting as great changes in the world, and doing perhaps as much for the advancement of civilization, as James of the two Britains and Henry of France and Navarre in those his less heroic days, were likely to accomplish. History has long known the results.

The ambassador did his work admirably. The king embraced him in a transport of enthusiasm, vowed by all that was most sacred to accept the project in all its details, and exacted from the ambassador in his turn an oath on the Eucharist never to reveal, except to his master, the mighty secrets of their conference. 1

The interview had lasted four hours. When it was concluded, James summoned Cecil, and in presence of the ambassador and of some of the counsellors, lectured him soundly on his presumption in disobeying the royal commands in his recent negotiations with De Rosny. He then announced his decision to ally himself strictly with France against Spain in consequence of the revelations just made to him, and of course to espouse the cause of the United Provinces. Telling the crest-fallen Secretary of State to make the proper official communications on the subject to the ambassadors of my lords the States-General, 2—thus giving the envoys from the republic for the first time that pompous designation,—the king turned once more to the marquis with the exclamation,—"Well, Mr. Ambassador, this time I hope that you are satisfied with me?" 3

In the few days following De Rosny busied himself in drawing up a plan of a treaty embodying all that had been agreed upon between Henry and himself and which he had just so faithfully

rehearsed to James. He felt now some inconvenience from his own artfulness, and was in a measure caught in his own trap. Had he brought over a treaty in his pocket, James would have signed it on the spot, so eager was he for the regeneration of Europe. It was necessary however, to continue the comedy a little longer, and the ambassador, having thought it necessary to express many doubts whether his master could be induced to join in the plot, and to approve what was really his own most cherished plan, could now do no more than promise to use all his powers of persuasion unto that end.

The project of a convention, which James swore most solemnly to sign, whether it were sent to him in six weeks or six months, was accordingly rapidly reduced to writing, and approved. It embodied, of course, most of the provisions discussed in the last secret interview at Greenwich. The most practical portion of it undoubtedly related to the United Provinces, and to the nature of assistance to be at once afforded to that commonwealth, the only ally of the two kingdoms expressly mentioned in the treaty. England was to furnish troops, the number of which was not specified, and France was to pay for them, partly out of her own funds, partly out of the amount due by her to England. It was, however, understood, that this secret assistance should not be considered to infringe the treaty of peace which already existed between Henry and the Catholic king. Due and detailed arrangements were made as to the manner in which the allies were to assist each other, in case Spain, not relishing this kind of neutrality, should think proper openly to attack either Great Britain or France, or both. 1

Unquestionably the Dutch republic was the only portion of Europe likely to be substantially affected by these secret arrangements; for, after all, it

1 *Mémoires*, iv. 417, *et seqq.* Despatches in Siri, vol. i.      2 *Ibid.* 420.      3 *Ibid.*

1 Sully, *Mémoires*, v. 1-12.

had not been found very easy to embody the splendid visions of Henry, which had so dazzled the imagination of James, in the dry clauses of a protocol.

It was also characteristic enough of the crowned conspirators, that the clause relating to the United Provinces provided that the allies would *either* assist them in the attainment of their independence, *or* 1—if it should be considered expedient to restore them to the domination of Spain or the empire—would take such precautions and lay down such conditions as would procure perfect tranquillity for them, and remove from the two allied kings the fear of a too absolute government by the house of Austria in those provinces.

It would be difficult to imagine a more impotent conclusion. Those Dutch rebels had not been fighting for tranquillity. The tranquillity of the rock amid raging waves—according to the device of the father of the republic—they had indeed maintained; but to exchange their turbulent and tragic existence, ever illumined by the great hope of freedom, for repose under one despot guaranteed to them by two others, was certainly not their aim. They lacked the breadth of vision enjoyed by the regenerators who sat upon mountain-tops.

They were fain to toil on in their own way. Perhaps, however, the future might show as large results from their work as from the schemes of those who were to begin the humiliation of the Austrian house by converting its ancient rebels into tranquil subjects.

The Marquis de Rosny, having distributed 60,000 crowns among the leading politicians and distinguished personages at the English court, with ample promises of future largess if they remained true to his master, 2 took an

affectionate farewell of King James, and returned with his noble two hundred to recount his triumphs to the impatient Henry. The treaty was soon afterwards duly signed and ratified by the high contracting parties. It was, however, for future history to register its results on the fate of pope, emperor, kings, potentates, and commonwealths, and to show the changes it would work in the geography, religions, and polity of the world. 1

The deputies from the States-General, satisfied with the practical assistance promised them, soon afterwards took their departure with comparative cheerfulness, having previously obtained the royal consent to raise recruits in Scotland. Meantime the great Constable of Castile, ambassador from his Catholic Majesty, had arrived in London, and was wroth at all that he saw and all that he suspected. He, too, began to scatter golden arguments with a lavish hand among the great lords and statesmen of Britain, 2 but found that the financier of France had, on the whole, got before him in the business, and was skilfully maintaining his precedence from the other side of the channel.

But the end of these great diplomatic manœuvres had not yet come.

étoit de les retenir et de les attacher de plus en plus à son parti. Je les fis ma propre connaissance et sur les recommandations de Beaumont, et ma principale attention fut de les distribuer de manière qu'ils ne fissent naître aucune jalousie entre ces seigneurs Anglois et que le roy lui même n'en prit aucun soupçon," &c. &c.

1 „Il multiplia le nombre de ses créatures parcequ'il fit des libéralités extraordinaires à tous ceux dont il crut avoir besoin," &c. &c.—Ibid. 35.

2 „Et pour user de toutes sortes de contre-batteries contre les Espagnols qui faisoient des présens à toutes mains, on en fit aussi et même des pensions à tout ce qu'il y avoit d'Anglois distingués à la cour du Roi Jacques . . . . c'est ainsi que l'Espagne se vit frustrée des brillantes espérances qu'elle avoit conçues contre nous de l'avènement du Roy d'Ecosse à la couronne d'Angleterre et qui étoit peut-être le motif des armemens immenses qu'elle fit cette année."—Ibid. 40.

1 Sully, Mémoires, 7, 8.

2 Sully, Mémoires, v. 20, 35, 40. „L'objet du roy en faisant tant de riches présens, dont même une bonne partie fut continuée aux seigneurs Anglois en forme de pension,



## CHAPTER XLII.

Siege of Ostend—The Marquis Spinola made commander-in chief of the besieging army—Discontent of the troops—General aspect of the operations—Gradual encroachment of the enemy.

THE scene again shifts to Ostend. The Spanish cabinet, wearied of the slow progress of the siege, and not entirely satisfied with the generals, now concluded almost without consent of the archdukes, one of the most extraordinary jobs ever made, even in those jobbing days. The Marquis Spinola, elder brother of the ill-fated Frederic, and head of the illustrious Genoese family of that name, undertook to furnish a large sum of money which the wealth of his house and its connection with the great money-lenders of Genoa enabled him to raise, on condition that he should have supreme command of the operations against Ostend and of the foreign armies in the Netherlands. 1 He was not a soldier but he entered into a contract, by his own personal exertions both on the exchange and in the field, to reduce the city which had now resisted all the efforts of the archduke for more than two years. Certainly this was an experiment not often hazarded in warfare. The defence of Ostend was in the hands of the best and most seasoned fighting-men in Europe. The operations were under the constant supervision of the foremost captain of the age; for Maurice, in consultation with the States-General, received almost daily reports from the garrison, and regularly furnished advice and instructions as to their proceedings. He was moreover ever ready to take the field for a relieving campaign. Nothing was known of Spinola save that he was a highborn and very wealthy patrician who had reached his thirty-fourth year without achieving personal distinction of any kind, and who,

during the previous summer, like so many other nobles from all parts of Europe, had thought it worth his while to drawl through a campaign or two in the Low Countries. It was the mode to do this, and it was rather a stigma upon any young man of family not to have been an occasional looker-on at that perpetual military game. His brother Frederic, as already narrated, had tried his chance for fame and fortune in the naval service, and had lost his life in the adventure without achieving the one or the other. This was not a happy augury for the head of the family. Frederic had made an indifferent speculation. What could the brother hope by taking the field against Maurice of Nassau and Lewis William and the Baxes and Meetkerkes? Nevertheless the archduke eagerly accepted his services, while the Infanta, fully confident of his success before he had ordered a gun to be fired, protested that if Spinola did not take Ostend nobody would ever take it. 1. There was also, strangely enough, a general feeling through the republican ranks that the long-expected man had come.

Thus a raw volunteer, a man who had never drilled a hundred men, who had never held an officer's commission in any army in the world, became, as by the waving of a wand, a field-marshal and commander-in-chief at a most critical moment in history, in the most conspicuous position in Christendom, and in a great war, now narrowed down to a single spot of earth, on which the eyes of the world were fixed, and the daily accounts from which were longed for with palpitating anxiety. What but failure and disaster could be expected from such astounding policy? Every soldier in the Catholic forces—from grizzled veterans of half a century who had commanded armies

1 Gallucci, II. lib. xvi. 109-137, 138. Bentivoglio, iii. 519. Grotius, xii. 633, 634. Wagenaar, ix. 162, 163.

1 Gallucci, *ubi sup.*

and achieved victories when this dainty young Italian was in his cradle, down to the simple musketeer or rider who had been campaigning for his daily bread ever since he could carry a piece or mount a horse—was furious with discontent or outraged pride.

Very naturally too, it was said that the position of the archdukes had become preposterous. It was obvious, notwithstanding the pilgrimages of the Infanta to Our Lady of Hall, 1 to implore not only the fall of Ostend, but the birth of a successor to their sovereignty, that her marriage would for ever remain barren. Spain was already acting upon this theory, it was said, for the contract with Spinola was made, not at Brussels, but at Madrid, and a foreign army of Spaniards and Italians, under the supreme command of a Genoese adventurer, was now to occupy indefinitely that Flanders which had been proclaimed an independent nation, and duly bequeathed by its deceased proprietor to his daughter.

Ambrose Spinola, son of Philip, Marquis of Venafri, and his wife, Polyxena Grimaldi, 2 was not appalled by the murmurs of hardly suppressed anger or public criticism. A handsome, aristocratic personage, with an intellectual, sad, but sympathetic face, fair hair and beard, and imposing but attractive presence—the young volunteer, at the beginning of October, made his first visit of inspection in the lines before Ostend. After studying the situation of affairs very thoroughly, he decided that the operations on the Gullet or eastern side, including Bucquoy's dyke, with Pompey Targone's perambulatory castles and floating batteries, were of secondary importance. He doubted the probability of closing up a harbour, now open to the whole world and protected by the fleets of the first naval power of Europe, with wickerwork, sauses, and bridges upon barrels. His attention was at once con-

centrated on the western side, and he was satisfied that only by hard fighting and steady delving could he hope to master the place. To gain Ostend he would be obliged to devour it piecemeal as he went on.

Whatever else might be said of the new commander-in-chief, it was soon apparent that, although a volunteer and a patrician, he was no milksop. If he had been accustomed all his life to beds of down, he was as ready now to lie in the trenches, with a cannon for his pillow, as the most ironclad veteran in the ranks. He seemed to require neither sleep nor food, and his reckless habit of exposing himself to unnecessary danger was the subject of frequent animadversion on the part both of the archdukes and of the Spanish Government. 1

It was however in his case a wise temerity. The veterans whom he commanded needed no encouragement to daring deeds, but they required conviction as to the valour and zeal of their new commander, and this was afforded them in overflowing measure.

It is difficult to decide, after such a lapse of years, as to how much of the long series of daily details out of which this famous siege was compounded deserves to be recorded. It is not probable that for military history many of the incidents have retained vital importance. The world rang, at the beginning of the operations, with the skill and inventive talent of Targone, Giustiniani, and other Italian engineers, artificers, and pyrotechnists, and there were great expectations conceived of the effects to be produced by their audacious and original devices. But time wore on. Pompey's famous floating battery would not float, his moving monster battery would not move. With the one, the subtle Italian had intended to close up the Gullet to the States' fleets. It was to rest on the bottom at low water at the harbour's mouth, to rise majestically

1 Meteren, 49. 70.

2 Galucci, *ubi sup.*

1 Ibid.

with the flood, and to be ever ready with a formidable broadside of fifty pounders against all comers. But the wild waves and tempests of the North Sea soon swept the ponderous toy into space before it had fired a gun. The gigantic chariot, on which a moveable fort was constructed, was still more portentous upon paper than the battery. It was directed against that republican work, defending the Gullet, which was called in derision the Spanish Half-moon. It was to be drawn by forty horses, and armed with no man knew how many great guns, with a mast a hundred and fifty feet high in the centre of the fort, up and down which played pulleys raising and lowering a draw-bridge long enough to span the Gullet.

It was further provided with anchors, which were to be tossed over the parapet of the doomed redoubt, while the assailants, thus grappled to the enemy's work, were to dash over the bridge after having silenced the opposing fire by means of their own peripatetic battery.

Unfortunately for the fame of Pompey, one of his many wheels was crushed on the first attempt to drag the chariot to the scene of anticipated triumph, the whole structure remained embedded in the sand, very much askew; nor did all the mules and horses that could be harnessed to it ever succeed in removing it an inch out of a position, which was anything but triumphant. 1

It seemed probable enough therefore that, so far as depended on the operations from the eastern side, the siege of Ostend, which had now lasted two years and three months, might be protracted for two years and three months longer. Indeed, Spinola at once perceived that if the archduke was ever to be put in possession of the place for which he had professed himself ready to wait eighteen years, it would be

well to leave Bucquoy and Targone to build dykes and chariots and bury them on the east at their leisure, while more energy was brought to bear upon the line of fortifications of the west than had hitherto been employed. There had been shooting enough, bloodshed enough, suffering enough, but it was amazing to see the slight progress made. The occupation of what were called the external Squares has been described. This constituted the whole result of the twenty-seven months' work.

The town itself—the small and very insignificant kernel which lay enclosed in such a complicated series of wrappings and layers of defences—seemed as far off as if it were suspended in the sky. The old haven or canal, no longer navigable for ships, still served as an admirable moat which the assailants had not yet succeeded in laying entirely dry. It protected the counterscarp, and was itself protected by an exterior series of works, while behind the counterscarp was still another ditch, no so broad nor deep as the canal, but a formidable obstacle even after the counterscarp should be gained. There were nearly fifty forts and redoubts in these lines, of sufficient importance to have names which in those days became household words, not only in the Netherlands, but in Europe; the siege of Ostend being the one military event of Christendom so long as it lasted. These names are of course as much forgotten now as those of the bastions before Nineveh. A very few of them will suffice to indicate the general aspect of the operations. On the extreme south-west of Ostend had been in peaceful times a polder—the general term to designate a pasture out of which the sea-water had been pumped—and the forts in that quarter were accordingly called by that name, as Polder Half-moon, Polder Ravelin, or great and little Polder Bulwark, as the case might be. Farther on towards the west, the north-west,

1 Meteren, 496, 497. Gallucci, lib. xvi. xvii. xviii. Bentivoglio, iii. 520-524. Fleming, 432, 433, *et passim*. Grotius, lib. xii. xiii.



and the north, and therefore towards the beach, were the West Ravelin, West Bulwark, Moses's Table, the Porcupine, the Hell's Mouth, the old church, and last and most important of all, the Sand Hill. This lastnamed work was protected by the Porcupine and Hell's Mouth, was the key to the whole series of fortifications, and was connected by a curtain with the old church, which was in the heart of the old town. 1

Spinola had assumed command in October, but the winter was already closing in with its usual tempests and floods before there had been time for him to produce much effect. It seemed plain enough to the besieged that the object of the enemy would be to work his way through the Polder, and so gradually round to the Porcupine and the Sand Hill. Precisely in what direction his subterraneous passages might be tending, in what particular spot of the thin crust upon which they all stood an explosion might at any moment be expected, it was of course impossible to know. They were sure that the process of mining was steadily progressing, and Maurice sent orders to countermine under every bulwark, and to secretly isolate every bastion, so that it would be necessary for Spinola to make his way, fort by fort, and inch by inch. 2

Thus they struggled drearily about under ground, friend and foe, often as much bewildered as wanderers in the catacombs. To a dismal winter succeeded a ferocious spring. Born in February and March were westerly storms, such as had not been recorded even on that tempest-swept coast for twenty years, and so much damage was inflicted on the precious Sand Hill and its curtain that, had the enemy been aware of its plight, it is probable that one determined assault might have put him in possession of the place. But Ostend was in

charge of a most watchful governor, Peter van Gieselles, who had succeeded Charles van der Noot at the close of the year 1603. 1 A plain, lantern-jawed Dutch colonel, with close-cropped hair, a long peaked beard, and an eye that looked as if it had never been shut; always dressed in a shabby old jerkin, with tarnished flowers upon it, he took command with a stout but heavy heart, saying that the place should never be surrendered by him, but that he should never live to see the close of the siege. 2 He lost no time in repairing the damages of the tempest, being ready to fight the west wind, the North Sea, and Spinola at any moment, singly or conjoined. He rebuilt the curtain of the Sand Hill, added fresh batteries to the Porcupine and Hell's Mouth, and amused and distracted the enemy with almost daily sorties and feints. His soldiers passed their days and nights up to the knees in mud and sludge and seawater, but they saw that their commander never spared himself, and having a superfluity of food and drink, owing to the watchful care of the States-General, who sent in fleets laden with provisions faster than they could be consumed, they were cheerful and content.

On the 12th March there was a determined effort to carry the lesser Polder Bulwark. After a fierce and bloody action, the place was taken by storm, and the first success in the game was registered for Spinola. The little fort was crammed full of dead, but such of the defenders as survived were at last driven out of it, and forced to take refuge in the next work. 3 Day after day the same bloody business was renewed, a mere monotony of assaults, repulses, sallies, in which hardly an inch of ground was gained on either side, except at the cost of a great pile of corpses. „Men will never know, nor can mortal pen ever describe,” said one who

1 Fleming, Meteren, Bentivoglio, Grotius, *ubi sup.*

2 Fleming.

1 Fleming, 418.

3 Ibid 470, 471.

2 Ibid.

saw it all, „the ferocity and the pertinacity of both besiegers and <sup>15</sup> March. besieged.” 1 On the 15th of March, Colonel Catrice, an accomplished Walloon officer of engineers, commanding the approaches against the Polder, was killed. 2 On the 21st <sup>21</sup> March. March, as Peter Gieselles was taking his scrambling dinner in company with Philip Fleming, there was a report that the enemy was out again in force. A good deal of progress had been made during the previous weeks on the south-west and west, and more was suspected than was actually known. It was felt that the foe was steadily nibbling his way up to the counterscarp. Moreover, such was the emulation among the Germans, Walloons, Italians, and Spaniards for precedence in working across the canal, 3 that a general assault and universal explosion were considered at any instant possible. The governor sent Fleming to see if all was right in the Porcupine, while he himself went to see if a new battery, which he had just established to check the approaches of the enemy towards the Polder Half-moon and Ravelin in a point very near the counterscarp, was doing its duty. Being, as usual, anxious to reconnoitre with his own eyes, he jumped upon the rampart. But there were sharp-shooters in the enemy's trenches, and they were familiar with the governor's rusty old doublet and haggard old face. 4 Hardly had he climbed upon the breastwork when a ball pierced his heart, and he fell dead without a groan. 5 There was a shout of triumph from the outside, while the tidings soon spread sadness through the garrison, for all loved and venerated the man. 6 Philip Fleming, so soon as he learned the heavy news, lost no time in unavailing regrets, but instantly sent a courier to Prince Maurice; meantime summoning a council of

superior officers, by whom Colonel John van Loon was provisionally appointed commandant. 1

A stately, handsome man, a good officer, but without extensive experience he felt himself hardly equal to the immense responsibility of the post, but yielding to the persuasions of his comrades, proceeded to do his best. His first care was to secure the all-important Porcupine, towards which the enemy had been slowly crawling with his galleries and trenches. Four days after <sup>25</sup> March, had accepted the command. 1604. he was anxiously surveying that fortification, and endeavouring to obtain a view of the enemy's works when a cannon-ball struck him on the right leg, so that he died the next day. 2 Plainly the post of commandant of Ostend was no sinecure. He was temporarily succeeded by Sergeant-Major Jacques de Bievry, but the tumults and confusion incident upon this perpetual change of head were becoming alarming. The enemy gave the garrison no rest night or day, and it had long become evident that the young volunteer, whose name was so potent on the Genoa Exchange, was not a man of straw nor a dawdler, however the super-seded veterans might grumble. At any rate the troops on either side were likely to have their fill of work.

On the 2nd April the Polder Ravelin was carried by storm. It was a most bloody action. Never <sup>2</sup> April. were a few square feet of earth more recklessly assailed, more resolutely maintained. The garrison did not surrender the place, but they all laid down their lives in its defence. Scarcely an individual of them all escaped, and the foe who paid dearly with heaps of dead and wounded for his prize, confessed that such serious work as this had scarce been known before in any part of that great slaughter-house, Flanders. 3

1 Fleming 470, 471. 2 Ibid. 473.

3 Bentivoglio, *ubi sup.*

4 Fleming, 479, 480. 5 Ibid. 6 Ibid.

1 Ibid.

2 Ibid. 487, 492.

3 Fleming, 501, 502.

A few days later, Colonel Bievry, provisional commandant, was desperately wounded in a sortie, and was carried off to Zeeland. 1 The States-General now appointed Jacques van der Meer, Baron of Berendrecht, to the post of honour and of danger. 2 A noble of Flanders, always devoted to the republican cause; an experienced middle-aged officer, vigilant, energetic, nervous; a slight wiry man, with a wizened little face, large bright eyes, a meagre yellow beard, and thin sandy hair flowing down upon his well-starched ruff, the new governor soon showed himself inferior to none of his predecessors in audacity and alertness. It is difficult to imagine a more irritating position in many respects than that of commander in such an extraordinary leaguer. It was not a formal siege. Famine, which ever impends over an invested place, and sickens the soul with its nameless horrors, was not the great enemy to contend against here. Nor was there the hideous alternative between starving through obstinate resistance or massacre on submission, which had been the lot of so many Dutch garrisons in the earlier stages of the war. Retreat by sea was ever open to the Ostend garrison, and there was always an ample supply of the best provisions and of all munitions of war. But they had been unceasingly exposed to two tremendous enemies. During each winter and spring the ocean often smote their bastions and bulwarks in an hour of wrath till they fell together like children's toys, and it was always at work, night and day, steadily lapping at the fragile foundations on which all their structures stood. Nor was it easy to give the requisite attention to the devouring sea, because all the materials that could be accumulated seemed necessary to repair the hourly damages inflicted by their other restless foe.

Thus the day seemed to draw gradually but inexorably nearer when the

place would be, not captured, but consumed. There was nothing for it so long as the States were determined to hold the spot, but to meet the besieger at every point, above or below the earth, and sell every inch of that little morsel of space at the highest price that brave men could impose.

So Berendrecht, as vigilant and devoted as even Peter Gieselles had ever been, now succeeded to the care of the Polders and the Porcupines, and the Hell's Mouths, and all the other forts, whose quaint designations had served, as usually is the case among soldiers, to amuse the honest patriots in the midst of their toils and danger. On the

18 April, 18th April the enemy assailed the great western Ravelin, and after a sanguinary hand-to-hand action, in which great numbers of officers and soldiers were lost on both sides, he carried the fort; the Spaniards, Italians, Germans, and Walloons vieing with each other in deeds of extraordinary daring, and overcoming at last the resistance of the garrison. 1

This was an important success. The foe had now worked his way with galleries and ditches along the whole length of the counterscarp till he was nearly up with the Porcupine, and it was obvious that in a few days he would be master of the counterscarp itself.

A less resolute commander, at the head of less devoted troops, might have felt that when that inevitable event should arrive all that honour demanded would have been done, and that Spinola was entitled to his city. Berendrecht simply decided that if the old counterscarp could no longer be held it was time to build a new counterscarp. This, too, had been for some time the intention of Prince Maurice. A plan for this work had already been sent into the place, and a distinguished English engineer, Ralph Dexter by name, arrived with some able assistants to carry it

1 Fleming, 505.

2 Ibid. 510.

1 Ibid. 515, 516



into execution. 1 It having been estimated that the labour would take three weeks of time, without more ado the inner line was carefully drawn, cutting off with great nicety and precision about one half the whole place. Within this narrowed circle the same obstinate resistance was to be offered as before, and the bastions and redoubts of the new entrenchment were to be baptized with the same uncouth names which two long years of terrible struggle had made so precious. The work was very laborious; for the line was drawn straight through the town, and whole streets had to be demolished and the houses to their very foundations shovelled away. Moreover the men were forced to toil with spade in one hand and matchlock in the other, ever ready to ascend from the ancient dilapidated cellars in order to mount the deadly breach at any point in the whole circumference of the place. 2

It became absolutely necessary therefore to send a sufficient force of common workmen into the town to lighten the labours of the soldiers. Moreover the thought, although whistled to the wind, would repeatedly recur, that, after all, there must be a limit to these operations, and that at last there would remain no longer any earth in which to find a refuge.

The work of the new entrenchment went slowly on, but it was steadily done. Meantime they were comforted by hearing that the stadholder had taken the field in Flanders, at the head of a considerable force, and they lived in daily expectation of relief. It will be necessary, at the proper moment, to indicate the nature of Prince Maurice's operations. For the present, it is better that the reader should confine his attention within the walls of Ostend.

By the 11th May, the enemy had effected a lodgment in a 11 May, corner of the Porcupine, and 1604.

already from that point might threaten the new counterscarp before it should be completed. At the same time he had gnawed through to the West Bulwark, and was busily mining under the Porcupine itself. In this fort friend and foe now lay together, packed like her rings, and profited by their proximity to each other to vary the monotony of pike and snapshance with an occasional encounter of epistolary wit.

Thus Spanish letters, tied to sticks, and tossed over into the next intrenchment, were replied to by others, composed in four languages by the literary man of Ostend, Auditor Fleming, and shot into the enemy's trenches on cross-bow bolts. 1

On the 29th May, a long-prepared mine was sprung beneath the Porcupine.

It did its work effectively. 29 May. and the assailants did their no less admirably, crowding into the breach with headlong ferocity, and after a long and sanguinary struggle with immense loss on both sides, carrying the precious and long-coveted work by storm. 2 Inch by inch the defenders were thus slowly forced back toward their new intrenchment. On the same day, however, they inflicted a most bloody defeat upon the enemy in an attempt to carry the great Polder. He withdrew, leaving heaps of slain, so that the account current for the day would have balanced itself, but that the Porcupine, having changed hands, now bristled most formidably against its ancient masters. 3 The daily slaughter had become sickening to behold. There were three thousand effective men in the garrison. More could have been sent in to supply the steady depletion in the ranks but there was no room for more. There was scarce space enough for the living to stand to their work, or for the dead to lie in their graves. And this was an advantage which could not fail to tell

1 Fleming, 516-522.

2 Ibid.

1 Fleming, 528, *seqq.*

2 Ibid. 538.

3 Ibid.

If necessity the besiegers would always very far outnumber the garrison, so that the final success of their repeated assaults became daily more and more possible.

Yet on the 2nd June the enemy met not only with another signal defeat,

but also with a most bitter surprise. On that day the mine which he had been so long and so laboriously constructing beneath the great Polder Bulwark was sprung with magnificent effect. A breach, forty feet wide, was made in this last stronghold of the old defences, and the soldiers leaped into the crater almost before it had ceased to blaze, expecting by one decisive storm to make themselves masters at last of all the fortifications, and therefore of the town itself. But as, emerging from the mine, they sprang exulting upon the shattered bulwark, a transformation more like a sudden change in some holiday pantomime than a new fact in this three years' most tragic siege presented itself to their astonished eyes. They had carried the last defence of the old counterscarp, and behold—a new one, which they had never dreamed of, bristling before their eyes, with a flanking battery turned directly upon them. 1 The musketeers and pikemen, protected by their new works, now thronged towards the assailants; giving them so hearty a welcome that they reeled back, discomfited, after a brief but severe struggle, from the spot of their anticipated triumph, leaving their dead and dying in the breach. 2

Four days later, Berendrecht, with a picked party of English troops, stole out for a reconnaissance, not wishing to trust other eyes than his own in the imminent peril of the place.

The expedition was successful. A few prisoners were taken, and valuable information was obtained, but these advantages were counterbalanced by a severe

disaster. The vigilant and devoted little governor, before effecting his entrance into the sally port, was picked off by a sharpshooter, and died the next day. 1 This seemed the necessary fate of the commandants of Ostend, where the operations seemed more like a pitched battle lasting three years than an ordinary siege. Gieselles, Van Loon, Bievry, and now Berendrecht, had successively fallen at the post of duty since the beginning of the year. Not one of them was more sincerely deplored than Berendrecht. His place was supplied by Colonel Uytenhoove, a stalwart, hirsute, hard-fighting Dutchman, the descendant of an ancient race, and seasoned in many a hard campaign.

The enemy now being occupied in earping and furnishing with batteries the positions he had gained, with the obvious intention of attacking the new counterscarp, it was resolved to prepare for the possible loss of this line of fortifications by establishing another and still narrower one within it.

Half the little place had been shorn away by the first change. Of the half which was still in possession of the besieged about one-third was now set off, and in this little corner of earth, close against the new harbour, was set up their last refuge. They called the new citadel Little Troy, and announced, with pardonable bombast, that they would hold out there as long as the ancient Trojans had defended Ilium. 2 With perfect serenity the engineers set about their task with line, rule, and level, measuring out the bulwarks and bastions, the miniature salients, half-moons, and ditches, as neatly and methodically as if there were no ceaseless cannonade in their ears, and as if the workmen were not at every moment summoned to repel assaults upon the outward wall. They sent careful drawings of Little Troy to Maurice and the

1 Ibid. 546.

2 Haestens, 272. Grotius, xiii. 645.

1 Fleming, 543.

2 Ibid.

States, and received every encouragement to persevere, together with promises of ultimate relief. 1

But there was one serious impediment to the contemplated construction of the new earth-works. They had no earth. Nearly everything solid had been already scooped away in the perpetual delving. The sea-dykes had been robbed of their material, so that the coming winter might find besiegers and besieged all washed together into the German Ocean, and it was hard digging and grubbing among the scanty cellerages of the dilapidated houses. But there were plenty of graves, filled with the result of three years' hard fighting. And now, not only were all the cemeteries withing the precincts shovelled and carted in mass to the inner fortifications, but rewards being offered of ten stivers for each dead body, great heaps of disinterred soldiers were piled into the new ramparts. 2 Thus these warriors, after laying down their lives for the cause of freedom, were made to do duty after death. Whether it were just or no thus to disturb the repose—if repose it could be called—of the dead that they might once more protect the living, it can scarcely be doubted that they took ample revenge on the already sufficiently polluted atmosphere.

On the 17th June the foe sprang a mine under the western bulwark, close to a countermine exploded by 17 June, the garrison the day before. 1604.

The assailants thronged as merrily as usual to the breach, and were met with customary resolution by the besieged; Governor Uytenhoove, clad in complete armour, leading his troops. The enemy, after an hour's combat, was repulsed with heavy loss, but the governor fell in the midst of the fight. 3 Instantly he was seized by the legs by a party of his own men, some English desperadoes among the number, who, shouting

that the colonel was dead, were about to render him the last offices by plundering his body. The ubiquitous Fleming, observing the scene, flew to the rescue and, with the assistance of a few officers, drove off these energetic friends, and taking off the governor's casque, discovered that he still breathed. 4 That he would soon have ceased to do so, had he been dragged much farther in his harness over that jagged and precipitous pile of rubbish, was certain. 2 He was desperately wounded, and of course incapacitated for his post. Thus, in that year, before the summer solstice, a fifth commandant had fallen.

On the same day, simultaneously with this repulse in the West Bulwark, the enemy made himself at last completely master of the Polder. Here, too, was a savage hand-to-hand combat with broadswords and pikes, and when the pikes were broken, with great clubs and stakes pulled from the fascines; 3 but the besiegers were victorious, and the defenders sullenly withdrew with their wounded to the inner intrenchments.

On the 27th June, Daniel de Hartaing Lord of Marquette, was sent 27 June. by the States-General to take command in Ostend. 4 The colonel of the Walloon regiment which had rendered such good service on the famous field of Nieupoort, the new governor, with his broad, brown, cheerful face, and his Milan armour, was a familiar figure enough to the campaigners on both sides in Flanders or Germany.

The stoutest heart might have sunk at the spectacle which the condition of the town presented at his first inspection. The States General were resolved to hold the place, at all hazards, and Marquette had come to do their bidding, but it was difficult to find anything that could be called a town. The great heaps of rubbish, which had once been the outer walls, were almost entirely in the pos-

1 Fleming, 551, *seqq.*  
3 Fleming, 555.

2 Haestens, 272.

1 Ibid.  
3 Ibid. 556.

2 Ibid.  
4 Ibid. 560.



session of the foe, who had lodged himself in all that remained of the defiant Porcupine, the Hell's Mouth, and other redoubts, and now pointed from them at least fifty great guns against their inner walls. The old town, with its fortifications, was completely honey-combed, riddled, knocked to pieces, and, although the Sand Hill still held out, it was plain enough that its days were numbered unless help should soon arrive. In truth, it required a clear head and a practised eye to discover among those confused masses of prostrate masonry, piles of brick, upturned graves, and mounds of sand and rubbish, anything like order and regularity. Yet amid the chaos there was really form and meaning to those who could read aright, and Marquette saw, as well in the engineers' lines as in the indomitable spirit that looked out of the grim faces of the garrison, that Ostend, so long as anything of it existed in nature, could be held for the republic. Their brethren had not been firmer, when keeping their merry Christmas, seven years before, under the North Pole, upon a pudding made of the gunner's cartridge paste, or the Knights of the Invincible Lion in the horrid solitudes of Tierra del Fuego, than were the defenders of this sandbank.

Whether the place were worth the cost or not, it was for my lords the States-General to decide, not for Governor Marquette. And the decision of those „high and mighty” magistrates, to whom even Maurice of Nassau bowed without a murmur, although often against his judgment, had been plainly enough announced.

And so shiploads of deals and joists, bricks, nails, and fascines, with all other requisite building materials, were sent daily in from Zeeland, <sup>1</sup> in order that little Troy might be completed; and, with God's help, said the garrison, the republic shall hold its own.

And now there were two months more of mining and countermining, of assaults and repulses, of cannonading and hand-to-hand fights with pikes and clubs. Nearer and nearer, day by day, and inch by inch, the foe had crawled up to the verge of their last refuge, and the walls of Little Troy, founded upon fresh earth and dead men's bones, and shifting sands, were beginning to quake under the guns of the inexorable volunteer from Genoa. Yet on the 27th August there <sup>27 August,</sup> was great rejoicing in the <sup>1604.</sup> beleaguered town. Cannon thundered salutes, bonfires blazed, trumpets rang jubilant blasts, and, if the church-bells sounded no merry peals, it was because the only church in the place had been cut off in the last slicing away by the engineers. Hymns of thanksgiving ascended to heaven, and the whole garrison fell on their knees, praying fervently to Almighty God, with devout and grateful hearts. <sup>2</sup> It was not an ignoble spectacle to see those veterans kneeling where there was scarce room to kneel, amid ruin and desolation, to praise the Lord for his mercies. But to explain this general thanksgiving it is now necessary for a moment to go back.

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<sup>1</sup> Fleming.

<sup>1</sup> Ibid. 572.

## CHAPTER LXIII.

Policy of the King of France—Operations of Prince Maurice—Plans for a Flemish Campaign—Passage into Flanders—Fort St. Catharine—Flight of its garrison, and occupation by Maurice—Surrender of Ysendyke and Aardenburg—Skirmish at Stamper's Hook—Siege of Sluys by Prince Maurice—Ineffectual attempt of Spinola to relieve the town—Its capitulation and restoration to the States—Death of Lewis Gunther of Nassau—Operations at Ostend—Surrender of the garrison—Desolation of the scene after its evacuation.

THE States-General had begun to forget the severe lesson taught them in the Nieuport campaign. Being determined to hold Ostend, they became very impatient, in the early part of the present year, that Maurice should once more invade Flanders, at the head of a relieving army, and drive the archdukes from before the town.

They were much influenced in this policy by the persistent advice of the French king. To the importunities of their envoy at Paris, Henry had, during the past eighteen months, replied by urging the States to invade Flanders and seize its ports. When they had thus something to place as pledges in his hands, he might accede to their clamour and declare war against Spain. But he scarcely concealed his intention, in such case, to annex both the obedient and the United Netherlands to his own dominions. Meantime, before getting into the saddle, he chose to be guaranteed against loss. „Assure my lords the States that I love them,” he said, „and shall always do my best for them.”<sup>1</sup> His affection for the territory of my lords was even warmer than the sentiments he entertained for themselves. Moreover, he grudged the preliminary expenses which would be necessary even should he ultimately make himself sovereign of the whole country. Rosny assured the envoy that he was mistaken

in expecting a declaration of war against Spain. „Not that he does not think it useful and necessary,” said the minister, „but he wishes to have war and peace both at once—peace because he wishes to make no retrenchments in his pleasures of women, dogs, and buildings, and so war would be very inopportune. In three months he would be obliged to turn tail for want of means (to use his own words), although I would furnish him funds enough, if he would make the use of them that he ought.”<sup>1</sup>

The Queen of England, who, with all her parsimony and false pretences never doubted in her heart that perpetual hostility to Spain was the chief bulwark of her throne, and that the republic was fighting her battles as well as its own, had been ready to make such a lively war in conjunction with France as would drive the Spaniard out of all the Netherlands. But Henry was not to be moved. „I know that if I should take her at her word,” said he, „she would at once begin to screw me for money. She has one object, I another.” Villeroy had said plainly to Aerssens, in regard to the prevalent system of Englishmen, Spaniards, and Frenchmen being at war with each other while the Governments might be nominally at peace. „Let us take off our masks. If the Spaniard has designs against our State, has he not cause? He knows the aid we are giving you, and resents it. If we should abstain, he would leave us in peace. If the Queen of England expects to draw us into a league, she is mistaken. Look to yourselves and be on your guard. Richardot is intriguing with Cecil. You give the queen securities, fortresses, seats in your council. The king asks nothing but communication of your projects.”<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Aerssens to Olden-Barneveld, in Van Deventer, ii. 333-335.

<sup>1</sup> Ibid.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid.

In short, all the comfort that Aerssens had been able to derive from his experiences at the French court in the autumn of 1602, was that the republic could not be too suspicious both of England and France. Rosny especially he considered the most dangerous of all the politicians in France. His daughter was married to the Prince of Espinoy, whose 50,000 livres a year would be safer the more the archduke was strengthened. „But for this he would be stiffer,” said Aerssens. 1 Nevertheless there were strong motives at work, pressing France towards the support of the States. There were strong political reasons, therefore, why they should carry the war into Flanders, in conformity with the wishes of the king.

The stadholder, after much argument, yielded as usual to the authority of the magistrates, without being convinced as to the sagacity of their plans. It was arranged that an army should make a descent upon the Flemish coast in the early spring, and make a demonstration upon Sluys. The effect of this movement, it was thought, would be to draw the enemy out of his intrenchments, in which case it would be in the power of Maurice to put an end at once to the siege. It is unquestionable that the better alternative, in the judgment of the prince, was to take possession, if possible, of Sluys itself. His preparations were, however, made with a view to either event, and by the middle of April he had collected at Willemstad a force of fifteen thousand foot and three thousand horse. As on the former memorable expedition, he now again insisted that a considerable deputation of the States and of the States' council should accompany the army. 2 His brother Henry, and his cousins Lewis William, Lewis Gunther, and Ernest Casimir, were likewise with him, as well as the

Prince of Anhalt and other distinguished personages.

On the 25th April the army, having crossed the mouth of the West Scheld, from Zeeland, in numberless  
25 April. vessels of all sizes and degrees, effected their debarkation on the island of Cadzand. 1

In the course of two days they had taken possession of the little town, and all the forts of that island, having made their entrance through what was called the Black Channel. Had they steered boldly through the Swint or Sluys channel at once, it is probable that they might have proceeded straight up to Sluys, and taken the place by surprise. Maurice's habitual caution was, perhaps, on this occasion, a disadvantage to him, but he would have violated the rules of war, and what seemed the dictates of common sense, had he not secured a basis of operations, and a possibility of retreat, before plunging with his army into the heart of a hostile country. The republic still shuddered at the possible catastrophe of four years before, when circumstances had forced him to take the heroic but dangerous resolution of sending off his ships from Nieupoort. Before he had completed his arrangements for supplies on the island of Cadzand, he learned from scouts and reconnoitring parties that Spinola had sent a thousand infantry, besides five hundred cavalry, under Trivulzio, to guard the passage across the Swint. Maurice was thus on the wrong side of the great channel by which Sluys communicated with the sea. 2

The town of Sluys and its situation have been described in a former chapter. 3 As a port, it was in those days considered a commodious and important one, capable of holding five hundred ships. As a town, it was not so insignificant as geographical and historical

1 Aerssens to Olden-Barneveld, in Van Deventer, ii. 333-335.

2 V. d. Kemp, ii. 109. *seqq.* and notes.

1 Bentivoglio, iii. 525-529. Meteren, 494, 495. Grotius, xlii. 639-644. Fleming. Haestens.

2 Fleming, 584-587. 3 Vol. II. chap. xvi.



changes have since made it, and was certainly far superior to Ostend, even if Ostend had not been almost battered out of existence. It had spacious streets and squares, and excellent fortifications in perfectly good condition. It was situate in a watery labyrinth, many slender streams from the interior and several saltwater creeks being complicated around it, and then flowing leisurely, in one deep sluggish channel, to the sea. The wrath of Leicester, when all his efforts to relieve the place had been baffled by the superior skill of Alexander Farnese, has been depicted, and during the seventeen years which had elapsed since its capture, the republic had not ceased to deplore that disaster. Obviously if the present expedition could end in the restoration of Sluys to its rightful owners, it would be a remarkable success, even if Ostend should fall. Sluys and its adjacent domains formed a natural portion of the Zeeland archipelago, the geographical counterpart of Flushing. With both branches of the stately Scheld in its control, the republic would command the coast, and might even dispense with Ostend, which, in the judgment of Maurice, was an isolated and therefore not a desirable military possession. The States-General were of a different opinion. They much desired to obtain Sluys, but they would not listen to the abandonment of Ostend. It was expected of the stadholder, therefore, that he should seize the one and protect the other. The task was a difficult one. A less mathematical brain than that of Maurice of Nassau would have reeled at the problem to be solved. To master such a plexus of canals, estuaries, and dykes, of passages through swamps, of fords at low water which were obliterated by flood-tide; to take possession of a series of redoubts built on the only firm points of land, with nothing but quaking morass over which to manœuvre troops or plant batteries against them, would

be a difficult study, even upon paper. To accomplish it the presence of a vigilant and anxious foe seemed bewildering enough.

At first it was the intention of the stadholder, disappointed at learning the occupation of the Swint, to content himself with fortifying Cadzand, in view of future operations at some more favourable moment.<sup>1</sup> So meagre a result would certainly not have given great satisfaction to the States, nor added much to the military reputation of Maurice. While he hesitated between plunging without a clue into the watery maze around him, and returning discomfited from the expedition on which such his hopes had been built, a Flemish boor presented himself. He offered to guide the army around the east and south of Sluys, and to point out passages where it would be possible to cross the waters, which, through the care of Spinola, now seemed to forbid access to the place.<sup>2</sup> Maurice lingered no longer. On the 28th April, led by the friendly boor, he<sup>28 April.</sup> advanced towards Oostburg. Next morning a small force of the enemy's infantry and cavalry was seen, showing that there must be foothold in that direction. He sent out a few companies to skirmish with those troops, who fled after a very brief action, and, in flying, showed their pursuers the road. Maurice marched in force, straight through the waters, on the track of the retreating foe. They endeavoured to rally at the fort of Coxie, which stood upon and commanded a dyke, but the republicans were too quick for them, and<sup>30 April.</sup> drove them out of the place.<sup>3</sup>

The stadholder, thus obtaining an unexpected passage into Flanders, conceived strong hopes of success, despite the broken nature of the ground. Continuing to feel his way cautiously through the wilderness of quagmire, he soon came

<sup>1</sup> Fleming, 585. <sup>2</sup> Ibid. Grotius, *ubi sup*

<sup>3</sup> Grotius, *ubi sup*.

upon a very formidable obstacle. The well-built and well-equipped redoubt of St. Catharine rose frowning before him, overshadowing his path, and completely prohibiting all further progress. Plainly

would be necessary to re-  
 1 May. nce this work at once, unless

he were willing to abandon his enterprise. He sent back to Cadzand for artillery, but it was flood-tide, the waters were out, and it was not till late in the afternoon that nine pieces arrived.

The stadholder ordered a cannonade, less with the hope of producing an impression by such inadequate means on so strong a work, than with the intention of showing the enemy that he had brought field-guns with him, and was not merely on an accidental foray.

At the same time, having learned that the garrison, which was commanded by Trivulzio, was composed of only a few regular troops, and a large force of guerrillas, he gave notice that such combatants were not entitled to quarter, and that if captured they would be all out to the sword. The reply to this great was not evacuation but defiance.

Especially a volunteer ensign mounted upon a rampart, and danced about, waving his flag gaily in the face of the assailants. Maurice bitterly remarked to his staff that such a man alone was rough to hold the fort. 1 As it was obvious that the place would require a siege in form, and that it would be almost impossible to establish batteries upon that quaking soil, where there was no dry land for cavalry or artillery to move, Maurice ordered the nine guns to be carried back to Cadzand that night, betaking himself, much disappointed, in the same direction. 2 Yet so happened that the cannoneers, wading through the bogs, made such an outcry—especially when one of their guns became so bemired that it was difficult for them to escape the disgrace of losing it—that the garrison,

hearing a great tumult, which they could not understand, fell into one of those panics to which raw and irregular troops are liable. 1 Nothing would convince them that fresh artillery had not arrived, that the terrible stadholder with an immense force was not creating invincible batteries, and that they should be all butchered in cold blood, according to proclamation, before the dawn of day. They therefore evacuated the place under cover of the night, so that this absurd accident absolutely placed

Maurice in possession of the  
 3 May. very fort—without striking a blow—which he was about to abandon in despair, and which formed the first great obstacle to his advance. 2

Having occupied St. Catharine's, he moved forward to Ysendyke, a strongly fortified place three leagues to the eastward of Sluys, and invested

6 May. it in form. Meantime in great danger was impending over him. A force of well-disciplined troops, to the number of two thousand, dropped down in boats from Sluys to Cadzand, for the purpose of surprising the force left to guard that important place. The expedition was partially successful. Six hundred landed beating down all opposition. But a few Scotch companies held firm, and by hard fighting were able at last to drive the invaders back to their sloops, many of which were sunk in the affray, with all on board. The rest ignominiously retreated. 3 Had the enterprise been as well executed as it was safely planned, it would have gone hard with the stadholder and his army. It is difficult to see in what way he could have extricated himself from such a dilemma, being thus cut off from his supplies and his fleet, and therefore from all possibility of carrying out his design or effecting his escape to Zeeland. Certainly thus far, fortune had favoured his bold adventure.

1 Ibid.

2 Fleming.

3 Ibid, 588. Grotius, *ubi sup.*

He now sent his own trumpeter, Master Hans, to summon Ysendyke to a surrender. The answer was a bullet which went through the head of unfortunate Master Hans. Maurice, enraged at this barbarous violation of the laws of war, drew his lines

10 May. closer. Next day the garrison, numbering six hundred, mostly Italians, capitulated, and gave up the musketeer who had murdered the trumpeter. 1

Two days later the army appeared before Aardenburg, a well-fortified town four miles south of Sluys. It surren-

dered disgracefully, without 12 May. striking a blow. The place was a most important position for the investment of Sluys, Four or five miles further towards the west, two nearly parallel streams, both navigable, called the Sweet and the Salt, ran from Dam to Sluys. It was a necessary but most delicate operation, to tie up these two important arteries. An expedition despatched in this direction came upon Trivulzio with a strong force of cavalry, posted at a pass called Stamper's Hook, which controlled the first of these streams. The narrowness of the pathway gave the advantage to the Italian commander. A warm action took place, 16 May.

in which the republican cavalry were worsted, and Paul Bax severely wounded. Maurice, coming up with the infantry at a moment when the prospect was very black, turned defeat into victory and completely routed the enemy, who fled from the precious position with a loss of five hundred killed and three hundred prisoners, eleven officers among them. 2 The Sweet was now in the stadholder's possession. Next day he marched against the Salt, at a pass where 17 May. fourteen hundred Spaniards were stationed. Making very ostentatious preparations for an attack upon this posi-

tion, he suddenly fell backwards down the stream to a point which he had discovered to be fordable at low water, and marched his whole army through the stream while the skirmishing was going on a few miles farther up. The Spaniards, discovering their error, and fearing to be cut off, scampered hastily away to Dam. Both streams were now in the control of the republican army, while the single fort of St. Joris was all that was now interposed between Maurice and the much-coveted Swint. This redoubt, armed with 23 May. nine guns, and provided with a competent garrison, was surrendered on the 23rd. May. 1

The Swint, or great sea-channel of Sluys, being now completely in the possession of the stadholder, he deliberately proceeded to lay out his lines, to make his entrenched camp, and to invest his city with the beautiful neatness which ever characterized his sieges. A groan came from the learned Lipsius, as he looked from the orthodox shades of Louvain upon the progress of the heretic prince.

„Would that I were happier,” he cried, „but things are not going on in Flanders as I could wish. How easy it would have been to save Sluys, which we are now trying so hard to do, had we turned our attention thither in time! But now we have permitted the enemy to intrench and fortify himself, and we are the less excusable because we know to our cost how felicitously he fights with the spade, and that he builds works like an ancient Roman. . . . Should we lose Sluys, which God forbid, how much strength and encouragement will be acquired by the foe, and by all who secretly or openly favour him! Our neighbours are all straining their eyes, as from a watch-tower, eager to see the result of all these doings. But what if they too

1 Grotius, *ubi sup.*

2 Grotius, xiii. 591, 572. Bentivoglio, iii. 527, 528. Meteren, 494, 495.

1 Fleming, Bentivo., Met., *ubi sup.* Van der Kemp, ii. 110, 111, and notes.



should begin to move? Where should we be? I pray God to have mercy on the Netherlands, whom He has been so many years chastising with heavy whips." 1

It was very true. The man with the spade had been allowed to work too long at his felicitous vocation. There had been a successful effort made to introduce reinforcements to the garrison. Troops, to the number of fifteen hundred, had been added to those already shut up there, but the attempts to send in supplies were not so fortunate. Maurice had completely invested the town before the end of May, having indisputed possession of the harbour and of all the neighbouring country. He was himself encamped on the west side of the Swint; Charles van der Noot lying on the south. The submerged meadows, stretching all around in the vicinity of the haven, he had planted thickly with gunboats. Scarcely a bird or a fish could go into or out of the place. Thus the stadholder exhibited to the Spaniards who, fifteen miles off towards the west, had been pounding and burrowing three years long before Ostend without success, what he understood by a siege.

On the 22nd of May a day of solemn prayer and fasting was, by 29 May. command of Maurice, celebrated throughout the besieging camp. In order that the day should be strictly kept in penance, mortification, and thanksgiving, it was ordered, on severe penalties, that neither the commissaries or sutlers should dispense any food whatever, throughout the twenty-four hours. 2 Thus the commander-in-chief of the republic prepared his troops for their work before them.

In the very last days of May the experiment was once more vigorously tried to send in supplies. A thousand

galley-slaves, the remnant of Frederic Spinola's unlucky naval 29, 30 May, forces, whose services were 1604.

not likely very soon to be required at sea, were sent out into the drowned land, accompanied by five hundred infantry. Simultaneously Count Berlaymont, at the head of four thousand men, conveying a large supply of provisions and munitions, started from Dam. Maurice, apprised of the adventure, sallied forth with two thousand troops to meet them. Near Stamper's Hook he came upon a detachment of Berlaymont's force, routed them, and took a couple of hundred prisoners. Learning from them that Berlaymont himself, with the principal part of his force, had passed farther on, he started off in pursuit; but, unfortunately taking a different path through the watery wilderness from the one selected by the flying foe, he was not able to prevent his retreat by a circuitous route to Dam. From the prisoners, especially from the galley-slaves, who had no reason for disguising the condition of the place, he now learned that there were plenty of troops in Sluys, but that there was already a great lack of provisions. They had lost rather than gained by their success in introducing reinforcements without supplies. 1 Upon this information Maurice now resolved to sit quietly down and starve out the garrison. If Spinola, in consequence, should raise the siege of Ostend, in order to relieve a better town, he was prepared to give him battle. If the marquis held fast to his special work, Sluys was sure to surrender. This being the position of affairs, the deputies of the States-General took their leave of the stadholder, and returned to the Hague. 2

Two months passed. It was midsummer, and the famine in the beleaguered town had become horrible. The same hideous spectacle was exhibited as on

1 Letter to Heer de Vertering, in Haestens's, and Fleming, 289, 290.

2 Fleming, 593.

1 Fleming, 592. Meteren, Bentivoglio, ubi sup.

2 Fleming, 592.

all occasions where thousands of human beings are penned together without food. They ate dogs, cats, and rats, the weeds from the churchyards, old saddles, and old shoes, and, when all was gone, they began to eat each other. The small children diminished rapidly in numbers, <sup>1</sup> while beacons and signals of distress were fired day and night, that the obdurate Spinola, only a few miles off, might at last move to their relief.

The archdukes too were beginning to doubt whether the bargain were a good one. To give a strong, new, well-fortified city, with the best of harbours, in exchange for a heap of rubbish which had once been Ostend, seemed unthrifty enough. Moreover, they had not got Ostend, while sure to lose Sluys. At least the cardinal could no longer afford to dispense with the service of his best corps of veterans who had demanded their wages so insolently, and who had laughed at his offer of excommunication by way of payment so heartily. Flinging away his pride, he accordingly made a treaty with the mutinous „squadron” at Grave, granting an entire pardon for all their offences, and promising full payment of their arrears. Until funds should be collected sufficient for this purpose, they were to receive twelve stivers a day each foot-soldier, and twenty-four stivers each cavalryman, and were to have the city of Roermond in pledge. The treaty was negotiated by Guerrera, commandant of Ghent citadel, and by the Archbishop of Roermond, while three distinguished hostages were placed in the keeping of the mutineers until the contract should be faithfully executed: Guerrera himself, Count Fontenoy, son of Marquis d’Havr , and Avalos, commander of a Spanish legion. <sup>2</sup> Thus, after making a present of the services of these veterans for a twelve-month to the stadholder,

and after employing a very important portion of his remaining forces in a vain attempt to reduce their revolt, the archduke had now been fain to purchase their submission by conceding all their demands. It would have been better economy perhaps to come to this conclusion at an earlier day.

It would likewise have been more judicious, according to the lamentations of Justus Lipsius, had the necessity of saving Sluys been thought of in time. Now that it was thoroughly enclosed so that a mouse could scarce creep through the lines, the archduke was feverish to send in a thousand wagon loads of provisions. Spinola, although in reality commander-in-chief of the Spanish army, and not strictly subject to the orders of the Flemish sovereigns obeyed the appeal of the archduke but he obeyed most reluctantly. Two thirds of Ostend had been effaced, and it was hard to turn even for a moment from the spot until all should have been destroyed.

Leaving Rivas and Bucquoy to guard the entrenchments, and to keep steadily to the work, Spinola took the field with a large force of all arms, including the late mutineers and the troops of Count Trivulzio. On the 8th August he appeared in the neighbourhood of the Salt and Sweet streams, and exchanged a few cannonshots with the republicans. Next day he made a desperate assault with three thousand men and some companies of cavalry, upon Lewis William’s quarters, where he had reason to believe the lines were weakest. He received from that most vigilant commander a hearty welcome, however, and after a long skirmish was obliged to withdraw carrying off his dead and wounded together with a few cart-horses which had been found grazing outside the trenches. Not satisfied with these trophies or such results, he remained several days inactive, and then suddenly whirled around Aar- 16 Aug.

<sup>1</sup> Gallucci, ii. 176.

<sup>2</sup> Meteren, 495, 496.

lenburg with his whole army, directly southward of Sluys, seized the forts of St. Catharine and St. Philip, which had been left with very small garrisons, and then made a furious attempt to break the lines at Oostburg, hoping to cross the fords at that place, and thus push his way into the isle of Cadzand. The resistance to his progress was obstinate, the result for a time doubtful. After evere fighting, however, he crossed the waters of Oostburg in the face of the enemy. 1 Maurice meantime had collected all his strength at the vital position of Cadzand, hoping to deal, or at least to parry, a mortal blow.

On the 17th, on Cadzand dyke, between two redoubts, Spinola again met Lewis William, who had been transferred to that important position. A severe struggle ensued. The Spaniards were in superior force, and Lewis William, commanding the advance only of the States' troops, was hard pressed. Moving always in the thickest of the fight, he would probably have that day laid down his life, as so many of his race had done before, in the cause of the republic, had not Colonel van Dorp come to his rescue, and so laid about him with a great broad sword, that the dyke was kept until Maurice arrived with Eytzinga's Frisian regiment and other reserves. Van Dorp then fell covered with wounds. Here was the decisive combat. The two commanders-in-chief met face to face for the first time, and could Spinola have gained the position of Cadzand the fate of Maurice must have been sealed. But all his efforts were vain. The stadholder, by coolness and promptness, saved the day, and inflicted a bloody repulse upon the Catholics. Spinola had displayed excellent generalship, but it is not surprising that the young volunteer should have failed upon his first great field day to defeat Maurice

of Nassau and his cousin Lewis William. He withdrew discomfited at last, leaving several hundred dead upon the field, definitely renouncing all hope of relieving Sluys, and retiring by way of Dam to his camp before Ostend. 1 Next day the town capitulated. 2 The

18 Aug. garrison were allowed to depart with the honours of war, and the same terms were accorded to the inhabitants, both in secular and religious matters, as were usual when Maurice re-occupied any portion of the republic. Between three and four thousand creatures, looking rather like ghosts from the churchyards than living soldiers, marched out, with drums beating, colours displayed, matches lighted, and bullet in mouth. Sixty of them fell dead 3 before the dismal procession had passed out of the gates. Besides these troops were nearly fifteen hundred galley-slaves, even more like shadows than the rest, as they had been regularly sent forth during the latter days of the siege to browse upon soudenelle in the submerged meadows, or to drown or starve if unable to find a sufficient supply of that weed. These unfortunate victims of Mahometan and Christian tyranny were nearly all Turks, and by the care of the Dutch Government were sent back by sea to their homes. 4 A few of them entered the service of the States.

The evacuation of Sluys by Governor Serrano and his garrison was upon the 20th August. Next day the stadholder took possession, bestowing the nominal government of the place upon his brother Frederic Henry. The atmosphere, naturally enough, was pestiferous, and young Count Lewis Gunther of Nassau, who had so brilliantly led the cavalry on the famous day of Nieupoort, died of fever soon after entering the town, 5 infinitely regretted by every one who wished well to the republic.

1 Fleming, 594. 595. Bentivoglio, Meteren, Grotius, *ubi sup.* 2 Ibid. 3 Bentivoglio.

4 Metczen, 495.

5 Meteren, 495. Fleming, 597.

1 Fleming, 593, 594. Bentivoglio, *ubi sup.* Meteren, 495. Grotius, xii. 640, 641.



Thus an important portion of Zeeland was restored to its natural owners. A seaport which in those days was an excellent one, and more than a compensation for the isolated fishing village already beleaguered for upwards of three years, had been captured in three months. The States-General congratulated their stadholder on such prompt and efficient work, while the garrison of Ostend, first learning the authentic news seven

27 Aug. days afterwards, although at 1604. a distance of only fourteen miles, had cause to go upon their knees and sing praises to the Most High.

The question now arose as to the relief of Ostend. Maurice was decidedly opposed to any such scheme. 1 He had got a better Ostend in Sluys, and he saw no motive for spending money and blood in any further attempt to gain possession of a ruin which, even if conquered, could only with extreme difficulty be held. The States were of a diametrically opposite opinion. They insisted that the stadholder, so soon as he could complete his preparations, should march straight upon Spinola's works and break up the siege, even at the risk of a general action. 2 They were willing once more to take the terrible chance of a defeat in Flanders. Maurice, with a heavy heart, bowed to their decision, showing by his conduct the very spirit of a republican soldier, obeying the civil magistrate, even when that obedience was like to bring disaster upon the commonwealth. But much was to be done before he could undertake this new adventure.

Meantime the garrison in Ostend were at their last gasp. On being asked by the States-General whether it was possible to hold out for twenty days longer, Marquette called a council of officers, who decided that they would do their best, but that it was impossible to fix a day or hour when resistance must cease. Obviously, however,

the siege was in its extreme old age. The inevitable end was approaching.

Before the middle of September the enemy was thoroughly established in possession of the 13 Sept. new Hell's Mouth, the new Porcupine and all the other bastions of the new intrenchment. On the 13th of that month the last supreme effort was made, and the Sand Hill, that all-important redoubt, which during these three dismal years had triumphantly resisted every assault, was at last carried by storm. 1 The enemy had now gained possession of the whole town except Little Troy. The new harbour would be theirs in a few hours, and as for Troy itself, those hastily and flimsily constructed ramparts were not likely to justify the vaunts uttered when they were thrown up nor to hold out many minutes before the whole artillery of Spinola. Plainly on this last morsel of the fatal sandbank the word surrender must be spoken, unless the advancing trumpets of Maurice should now be heard. But there was no such welcome sound in the air. The weather was so persistently rainy and stormy that the roads became impassable, and Maurice, although ready and intending to march towards Spinola to offer him battle, was unable for some days to move. 2 Meantime a council, summoned by Marquette, of all the officers, decided that Ostend must be abandoned now that Ostend had ceased to exist.

On the 20th September the Accord was signed with Spinola. The garrison were to march out with their arms. They were to carry off four cannon but no powder. All clerical persons were to leave the place, with their goods and chattels. All prisoners taken on both sides during the siege were to be released. 20 Sept. Burghers, sutlers, and others, to go whither they

1 Fleming, 574. Bentivoglio, iii. 530. Meerten, 497<sup>vo</sup>, 498.

2 Van der Kemp, ii. 461, note.

1 Van der Kemp, iii. and notes. 2 Ibid.

ould, undisturbed. 1 And thus the Archdukes, after three years and seventy-seven days of siege, obtained their prize. Three thousand men, in good health, marched out of Little Troy with the honours of war. The officers were entertained by Spinola and his comrades at a magnificent banquet, in recognition of the unexampled heroism with which the town had been defended. 2 Subsequently the whole force marched to the headquarters of the States' army in and about Sluys. They were received by Prince Maurice, who stood bareheaded and surrounded by his most distinguished officers to greet them and to shake them warmly by the hand. 3 Rarely no defeated garrison ever deserved more respect from friend or foe.

The Archduke Albert and the Infanta Isabella entered the place in triumph, if triumph it could be called. It would be difficult to imagine a more desolate scene. The artillery of the first years of the seventeenth century was not the terrible engine of destruction that it has become in the last third of the nineteenth, but a cannonade, continued so steadily and so long, had done its work. There were no churches, no houses, no redoubts, no bastions, no walls, nothing but a vague and confused mass of ruin. Spinola conducted his imperial guests along the edge of extinct volcanoes, amid upturned cemeteries, through quagmires which once were moats, over huge mounds of sand, and vast shapeless masses of bricks and masonry, which had been forts. He endeavoured to point out places where mines had been exploded, where ravens had been stormed, where the assailants had been successful, and where they had been bloodily repulsed. But it was all loathsome, hideous rubbish. There were no human habitations, no

hovels, no casemates. The inhabitants had burrowed at last in the earth, like the dumb creatures of the swamps and forests. In every direction the dykes had burst, and the sullen wash of the liberated waves, bearing hither and thither the floating wreck of fascines and machinery, of planks and building materials, sounded far and wide over what should have been dry land. The great ship channel, with the unconquered Half-moon upon one side and the incomplete batteries and platforms of Bucquoy on the other, still defiantly opened its passage to the sea, and the retiring fleets of the garrison were white in the offing. All around was the grey expanse of stormy ocean, without a cape or a headland to break its monotony, as the surges rolled mournfully in upon a desolation more dreary than their own. The atmosphere was murky and surcharged with rain, for the wild equinoctial storm which had held Maurice spell-bound had been raging over land and sea for many days. At every step the unburied skulls of brave soldiers who had died in the cause of freedom grinned their welcome to the conquerors. Isabella wept at the sight. 1 She had cause to weep. Upon that miserable sandbank more than a hundred thousand men had laid down their lives 2 by her decree, in order

1 Gallucci, ii. 185.

2 The numbers of those who were killed or who died of disease in both armies during this memorable siege, have been placed as high as one hundred and forty thousand. (Gallucci, *ubi sup.*) Meteren, 498, says that on the body of a Spanish officer, who fell in one of the innumerable assaults, was found a list of all the officers and privates killed in the Catholic army up to that date (which he does not give), and the amount was 72,124. Another Spanish authority, Juan Ballono, puts the number of the besiegers who perished in the last year of the siege at sixty thousand—of course a ridiculous exaggeration. Such preposterous statistics show the impossibility of making anything like a correct estimate. Of the besieged the loss is supposed to have been as heavy as that of their antagonists, but no registers have been preserved.

1 Accord, in Fleming, Haestens, Meteren, *entivoglio, ubi sup.*

2 Van der Kemp, ii. 111. Meteren, *ubi sup.*

3 Meteren, *ubi sup.*

that she and her husband might at last take possession of a most barren prize. This insignificant fragment of a sovereignty which her wicked old father had presented to her on his deathbed—a sovereignty which he had no more moral right or actual power to confer than if it had been in the planet Saturn—had at last been appropriated at the cost of all this misery. It was of no great value, although its acquisition had caused the expenditure of at least eight millions of florins, divided in nearly equal proportions

between the two belligerents. It was in vain that great immunities were offered to those who would remain, or who would consent to settle in this foul Golgotha. The original population left the place in mass. No human creatures were left save the wife of freebooter and her paramour, a journeyman blacksmith.<sup>1</sup> This unsavoury couple, to whom entrance into the purer atmosphere of Zeeland was denied, thenceforth shared with the carrion crows the amenities of Ostend.

<sup>1</sup> Fleming, 580.

## CHAPTER XLIV.

Equation between the contending powers—Treaty of peace between King James and the archdukes and the King of Spain—Position of the Provinces—States' envoy in England to be styled ambassador—Protest of the Spanish ambassador—Effect of James's peace-treaty on the people of England—Public rejoicings for the victory of Sluys—Spinola appointed commander-in-chief of the Spanish forces—Preparations for a campaign against the States—Seizure of Dutch cruisers—International discord—Destruction of Sarmiento's fleet by Admiral Haultain—Projected enterprise against Antwerp—Descent of Spinola on the Netherland frontier—Oldenzaal and Lingen taken—Movements of Prince Maurice—Encounter of the two armies—Panic of the Netherlanders—Consequent loss and disgrace—Wachtendonck and Cracow taken by Spinola—Spinola's reception in Spain—Effect of his victories—Results of the struggle between Freedom and Absolution—Affairs in the East—Amboyna taken by Van der Hagen—Contest for possession of the Clove Islands—Commercial treaty between the States and the King of Ternate—Hostilities between the Kings of Ternate and Tydor—Expulsion of the Portuguese from the Moluccas—Du Terrail's attempted assault on Bergen-op-Zoom—Attack on the Dunkirk pirate fleet—Practice of executing prisoners captured at sea.

I HAVE invited the reader's attention to the details of this famous siege because it was not an episode, but almost the sum total, of the great war during the period occupied by its events. The equation between the contending forces indicated the necessity of peace. That equation seemed for the time to have

established itself over all Europe. France had long since withdrawn from this actual strife, and kept its idle thunder in a concealed although ever threatening hand. In the East the Pacha of Bud had become Pacha of Pest.<sup>1</sup> Even Gran was soon to fall before the Turk whose advancing horse-tails might thus almost be descried from the walls of Vienna.<sup>2</sup> Stephen Botschkay meanwhile had made himself master of Transylvania concluded peace with Ahmet, and laughed at the Emperor Rudolph for denouncing him as a rebel.<sup>3</sup>

Between Spain and England a far different result had been reached than the one foreshadowed in the portentous colloquies between King James and Maximilian de Béthune. Those conferences have been purposely described with some minuteness, in order that the difference often existing between vast projects and diametrically opposed and very insignificant conclusions might once more be exhibited.

In the summer of 1603 it had been firmly but mysteriously arranged between the monarchs of France and Great Britain that the House of Austria should be crushed, its territories parcelled out at the discretion of those two potent

<sup>1</sup> Meteren, 502<sup>vo</sup>.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid.



ates, the imperial crown taken from the Habsburgs, the Spaniards driven out of the Netherlands, an alliance offensive and defensive made with the Dutch republic, while the East and West Indies were to be wrested by main force of the allies, from Spain, whose subjects were thenceforth to be for ever excluded from those lucrative regions. As for the Jesuits, who were to James as loathsome as were the Puritans to Elizabeth, the British sovereign had employed the ambassador of his royal brother, almost with tears, never to allow that pestilential brood to regain an entrance into his dominions. 1

In the summer of 1604 King James made a treaty of peace and amity with the archdukes and with the monarch of Spain, thus extending his friendly relations with the doomed house of Austria. The republic of the Netherlands was left to fight her battles alone; her imaginary allies looking down upon her struggle with benevolent indifference. As for the Indies, not a syllable of illusion in the treaty was permitted by pain to that sacred subject; the ambassador informing the British Government that he gave them access to twelve kingdoms and two seas, while Spain acquired by the treaty access only to two kingdoms and one sea. 2 The new world, however, east or west, from the Antilles to the Moluccas, was the private and indefeasible property of his Catholic Majesty. On religious matters, it was agreed that English residents in Spain should not be compelled to go to mass, but that they should kneel in the street to the Host unless they could get out of the way. 3 In regard to the Netherlands, it was agreed by the two contracting powers that one should never assist the rebels or enemies of the other. With regard to the ties and fortresses of Brill, Flushing,

Rammekens, and other cautionary places, where English garrisons were maintained, and which King James was bound according to the contracts of Queen Elizabeth never to restore except to those who had pledged them to the English crown—the king would uphold those contracts. He would, however, endeavour to make an arrangement with the States by which they should agree within a certain period to make their peace with Spain. Should they refuse or fail, he would then consider himself liberated from these previous engagements and free to act concerning those cities in an honourable and reasonable manner, as became a friendly king. 1 Meantime the garrisons should not in any way assist the Hollanders in their hostilities with Spain. 2 English subjects were forbidden to carry into Spain or the obedient Netherlands any property or merchandize belonging to the Hollanders, 3 or to make use of Dutch vessels in their trade with Spain. 4 Both parties agreed to do their best to bring about a pacification in the Netherlands.

No irony certainly could be more exquisite than this last-named article. This was the end of that magnificent conception, the great Anglo-French League against the house of Austria. King James would combine his efforts with King Philip to pacify the Netherlands. The wolf and the watch-dog would unite to bring back the erring flock to the fold. Meantime James would keep the cautionary towns in his clutches, not permitting their garrisons or any of his subjects to assist the rebels on sea or shore. As for the Jesuits, their triumphant re-appearance in France, and the demolition of the pyramid raised to their dishonour on the site of the house where John Castel, who had stabbed Henry IV., had resided, were events about to mark the

1 Sully, v. 18. 2 Meteren, 500.

3 Treaty in Meteren, *ubi sup.* Compare Rotius, xiii. 647, 648.

1 Article vii. of Treaty. 2 Article viii.

3 Article xii.

4 Article xviii.

opening year.<sup>1</sup> Plainly enough Secretary Cecil had out-generalled the French party.

The secret treaty of Hampton Court the result of the efforts of Rosny and Olden-Barneveld in July of the previous year, was not likely to be of much service in protecting the republic. James meant to let the dead treaties bury their dead, to live in peace with all the world, and to marry his sons and daughters to Spanish Infantes and Infantas. Meantime, although he had sheathed the sword which Elizabeth had drawn against the common enemy, and had no idea of fighting or spending money for the States, he was willing that their diplomatic agent should be called ambassador. The faithful and much experienced Noel de Caron coveted that distinction, and moved thereby the spleen of Henry's envoy at the Hague, Buzunval, who probably would not have objected to the title himself. „Twill be a folly," he said, „for him to present himself on the pavement as a prancing steed, and then be treated like a poor hack. He has been too long employed to put himself in such a plight. But there are lunatics everywhere and of all ages." <sup>2</sup>

Never had the Advocate seemed so much discouraged. Ostend had fallen, and the defection of the British sovereign was an off-set for the French Government for assistance than he had ever been before. „A million florins a year from France," he said, „joined to two millions raised in the provinces, would enable them to carry on the war. The ship was in good condition," he added, and fit for a long navigation without danger of shipwreck if there were only biscuit enough on board. <sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Meteren, 502.

<sup>2</sup> Buzunval to Villeroy, in Deventer, iii. 1-9. At the same epoch the French king asked Aerssens if he too was to have the rank of ambassador. That diplomatist replied that he hoped not, unless his salary was to be raised at the same time.—*Ibid.* p. 24.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*

Otherwise she was lost. Before that time came he should quit the helm which he had been holding the more resolutely since the peace of Vervins because the king had told him, when concluding it, that if three years' respite should be given him he would enter into the game afresh, and take again upon his shoulders the burthen which inevitable necessity had made him throw down. But," added Olden-Barneveld, bitterly, „there is little hope of it now, after his neglect of the many admirable occasions during the siege of Ostend. <sup>1</sup>

So soon as the Spanish ambassador learned that Caron was to be accepted into the same diplomatic rank as his own, he made an infinite disturbance, protested most loudly and passionately to the king at the indignity done to his master by this concession to the representative of a crew of traitors and rebels, and demanded in the name of the treaty just concluded that Caron should be excluded in such capacity from all access to court. <sup>2</sup>

As James was nearly forty years of age, as the Hollanders had been rebels ever since he was born, and as the King of Spain had exercised no sovereignty over them within his memory, this was naturally asking too much of him in the name of his new-born alliance with Spain. So he assumed a position of great dignity, notwithstanding the Constable's clamour, and declared his purpose to give audience to the agent of the States by whatever title they presented themselves before him. In so doing he followed the example, he said, of others who (a strange admission of his part) were as wise as himself. It was not for him to censure the crimes and faults of the States, if such they had committed. He had not been the cause of their revolt from Spanish authority, and it was quite sufficient that

<sup>1</sup> Meteren, 502.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.* 501.

he had stipulated to, maintain neutrality between the two belligerents. 1 And with this the ambassador of his Catholic Majesty, having obtained the substance of a very advantageous treaty, was fain to abandon opposition to the shadowy title by which James sought to indemnify the republic for his perfidy. 2

1 Meteren 501.

2 At the same time the republican agent, although recognised as ambassador, received but slender encouragement in his interviews with the British sovereign. „When I tell those on the other side,” said James, „that you are not ready to treat with them, they will say that all wars must sooner or later come to an end. What reply shall I make to that?”

„Say that the king has long ago forfeited all right to these provinces,” answered Caron; „that the sovereignty according to law has fallen into the bosom of my lords the States; that the Spaniard, having usurped so many other countries in the world, might leave us this little bit for the sake of living in peace.”

James replied that kings never willingly gave up their provinces. „And the Netherlands are no longer the king's to give up,” returned the ambassador. His majesty expressed his intention, however, to do nothing more in the matter. He should maintain strict neutrality. At the same time, with amusing inconsistency, he warmly recognised the identity of the Dutch cause with his own. „In your preservation lies my own interest. Your ruin would be my great loss. Rather than it should go so far I will venture my own person and all that God has given me in this world, but I trust that God will never let it come so far as this. As to the assistance you ask of me, God is my witness if it be not my wish that I were able to grant it, but I have told you many times that I was principally moved to make peace by my necessities.”

This statement of the king's financial plight might be true enough. It is certain that in order to obtain the means to make decent provision for the household at his accession it had been necessary to send jewelry and other valuable effects to Amsterdam as a pledge for a secret loan of 25,000*l*. But there were graver and far more dangerous causes at work in the English court to affect a pacification and even an alliance with Spain, than a temporary financial embarrassment.

It could also scarcely console the States' envoy to be told that in case of uttermost need the king meant to lay down his life for the republic. The spectacle of James leading a forlorn hope against Spain was not an inspiring one, especially as the martial sovereign of France had turned his face

The treaty of peace with Spain gave no pleasure to the English public. There was immense enthusiasm in London at the almost simultaneous fall of Sluys, but it was impossible for the court to bring about a popular demonstration of sympathy with the abandonment of the old ally and the new-born affection for the ancient enemy. „I can assure your mightinesses,” wrote Caron, „that no promulgation was ever received in London with more coolness, yes—with more sadness. No mortal has shown the least satisfaction in words or deeds, but, on the contrary, people have cried out openly, „God save our good neighbours the States of Holland and Zeeland, and grant them victory!” On Sunday, almost all the preachers gave thanks from their pulpits for the victory which their good neighbours had gained at Sluys, but would not say a word about the peace. The people were admonished to make bonfires, but you may be very sure not a bonfire was to be seen. But, in honour of the victory, all the vessels in St. Catharine's Docks fired salutes at which the Spaniards were like to burst with spite. The English clap their hands and throw their caps in the air when they hear anything published favourable to us, but, it must be confessed, they are now

away from his old friends. „Had the Spaniard given me as much cause of quarrel as he has to the most Christian king,” said James, „I should certainly have broken with him. Not only I should have done my best to help you, but I should have plunged into the fight at the risk of life and property.”

These were brave words. The very near future was, however, to show whether the British king would feel the outrages of Spain against himself as deeply as he now resented the injuries of the same power to his brother Henry. It was soon obvious enough that the most to be hoped of England was that she would not interfere to prevent such assistance as France might be willing to grant to the republic, James becoming more and more besotted with the idea of an alliance with Spain. A few months later Rosny told Aerssens that the King of Spain found quite as much favour at the English court as he did with the Duke of Savoy. See Deventer, iii. 10-14, 15, 40.



taking very dismal views of affairs. *Vox populi vox Dei.*"<sup>1</sup>

The rejoicing in Paris was scarcely less enthusiastic or apparently less sincere than in London. „The news of the surrender of Sluys," wrote Aerssens, „is received with so much joy by small and great that one would have said it was their own exploit. His Majesty has made such demonstrations in his actions and discourse that he has not only been advised by his council to dissemble in the matter, but has undergone reproaches from the pope's nuncios of having made a league with your Mightinesses to the prejudice of the King of Spain. His Majesty wishes your Mightinesses prosperity with all his heart, yea so that he would rather lose his right arm than see your Mightinesses in danger. Be assured that he means roundly, and we should pray God for his long life; for I don't see that we can expect anything from these regions after his death." 2

It was ere long to be seen, however, roundly as the king meant it, that the republic was to come into grave peril without causing him to lose his right arm, or even to wag his finger, save in reproach of their Mightinesses.

The republic, being thus left to fight its battles alone, girded its loins anew for the conflict. During the remainder of the year 1604, however, there were no military operations of consequence. Both belligerents needed a brief repose. The siege of Ostend had not been a siege. It was a long pitched battle between the new system and the old, between absolutism and the spirit of religious, political, and mercantile freedom. Absolutism had gained the lists on which the long duel had been fought, but the republic had meantime exchanged that war-blasted spot for a valuable and commodious position. It was certainly an advantage, as hostilities were necessarily to have continued somewhere

during all that period, that all the bloodshed and desolation had been concentrated upon one insignificant locality, and one more contiguous to the enemy's possessions than to those of the united States. It was very doubtful, however, whether all that money and blood might not have been expended in some other manner more beneficial to the cause of the archdukes. At least it could hardly be maintained that they took anything by the capitulation of Ostend but the most barren and worthless of trophies. Eleven old guns, partly broken, and a small quantity of ammunition, were all the spoils of war found in the city after its surrender.

The Marquis Spinola went to Spain. On passing through Paris he was received with immense enthusiasm by Henry IV., whose friendship for the States, and whose desperate designs against the house of Austria, did not prevent him from warmly congratulating the great Spanish general on his victory. It was a victory, said Henry, which he could himself have never achieved, and, in recognition of so great a triumph, he presented Spinola with a beautiful Thracian horse, valued at twelve hundred ducats.<sup>1</sup> Arriving in Spain, the conqueror found himself at once the object of the open applause and the scarcely concealed hatred of the courtiers and politicians. He ardently desired to receive as his guerdon the rank of grandee of Spain. He met with a refusal.<sup>2</sup> To keep his hat on his head in presence of the sovereign was the highest possible reward. Should that be bestowed upon him now, urged Lerma, what possible recompense could be imagined for the great services which all felt confident that he was about to render in the future? He must continue to remove his hat in the monarch's company. Meantime, if he wished the title of prince, with considerable revenues attached to his principality, this was at

1 Van der Kemp, ii. 457. 2 Ibid. 435.

1 Gallucci, ii. 194.

2 Ibid. 200.

his disposal. 1 It must be confessed that in a monarchy where the sentiment of honour was supposed to be the foundation of the whole structure, there is something chivalrous and stimulating to the imagination in this preference by the great general of a shadowy but rare distinction to more substantial acquisitions. Nevertheless, as the grandee-ship was refused, it is not recorded that he was displeased with the principality. Meantime there was a very busy intrigue to deprive him of the command-in-chief of the Catholic forces in Flanders, and one so nearly successful that Mexia, governor of Antwerp citadel, was actually appointed in Spinola's stead. It was only after long and anxious conferences at Valladolid with the king and the Duke of Lerma, and after repeated statements in letters from the archdukes that all their hopes of victory depended on retaining the Genoese commander-in-chief, that the matter was finally arranged. Mexia received an annual pension of eight thousand ducats monthly, as commander-in-chief under the archduke, with an equal salary as agent for the king's affairs in Flanders. 2

Early in the spring he returned to Brussels, having made fresh preparations for the new campaign in which he was to measure himself before the world against Maurice of Nassau.

Spinola had removed the thorn from the Belgic lion's foot. „*Ostendæ erasit fatalis Spinola spinam.*” 3 And although it may be doubted whether the relief was as thorough as had been hoped, yet a freedom of movement had unquestionably been gained. There was now at least what for a long time had not existed, a possibility for imagining some new and perhaps more effective course of campaigning. The young Genoese commander-in-chief returned from Spain early in May, with the Golden Fleece around his neck, and with full

powers from the Catholic king to lay out his work, subject only to the approbation of the archduke. It was not probable that Albert, who now thoroughly admired and leaned upon the man of whom he had for a time been disposed to be jealous, would interfere with his liberty of action. There had also been—thanks to Spinola's influence with the cabinet at Madrid and the merchants of Genoa—much more energy in recruiting and in providing the necessary sinews of war. Moreover it had been resolved to make the experiment of sending some of the new levies by sea, instead of subjecting them all to the long and painful overland march through Spain, Italy, and Germany. 1 A *terzo* of infantry was on its way from Naples, and two more were expected from Milan, but it was decided that the Spanish troops should be embarked on board a fleet of transports, mainly German and English, and thus carried to the shores of the obedient Netherlands. 2

The States-General got wind of these intentions, and set Vice-Admiral Haultain upon the watch to defeat the scheme. That well-seasoned mariner accordingly, with a sufficient fleet of war-galleots, cruised thenceforth with great assiduity in the chops of the channel. Already the late treaty between Spain and England had borne fruits of bitterness to the republic. The Spanish policy had for the time completely triumphed in the council of James. It was not surprising therefore that the partisans of that policy should occasionally indulge in manifestations of malevolence towards the upstart little commonwealth which had presumed to enter into commercial rivalry with the British realm, and to assert a place among the nations of the earth. An order had just been issued by the English Government that none of its subjects should engage in the

1 Gallucci, ii. 194-202.

2 Ibid.

3 Ibid. 182.

1 Grotius, xiv. 658, 659. Meteren, 519<sup>vo</sup>.

2 Ibid.

naval service of any foreign power. This decree was a kind of corollary to the Spanish treaty, was levelled directly against the Hollanders, and became the pretext of intolerable arrogance, both towards their merchantmen and their lesser war-vessels. Admiral Monson, an especial partisan of Spain, was indefatigable in exercising the right he claimed of visiting foreign vessels off the English coast, in search of English sailors violating the proclamation of neutrality. On repeated occasions prizes taken by Dutch cruisers from the Spaniards, and making their way with small prize crews to the ports of the republic, were overhauled, visited, and seized by the English admiral, who brought the vessels into the harbours of his own country, liberated the crews, and handed ships and cargoes over to the Spanish ambassador.<sup>1</sup> Thus prizes fairly gained by nautical skill and hard fighting, off Spain, Portugal, Brazil, or even more distant parts of the world, were confiscated almost in sight of port, in utter disregard of public law or international decency. The States-General remonstrated with bitterness. Their remonstrances were answered by copious arguments, proving, of course, to the entire satisfaction of the party who had done the wrong, that no practise could be more completely in harmony with reason and justice. Meantime the Spanish ambassador sold the prizes, and appropriated the proceeds towards carrying on the war against the republic; the Dutch sailors, thus set ashore against their will and against law on the neutral coast of England, being left to get home as they could, or to starve if they could do no better. As for the States, they had the legal arguments of their late ally to console them for the loss of their ships.

Simultaneously with these events considerable levies of troops were made in England by the archduke, in spite of

all the efforts of the Dutch ambassador to prevent this one-sided neutrality, <sup>1</sup> while at the other ends of the world mercantile jealousy in both the Indies was fast combining with other causes already rife to increase the international discord. Out of all this fuel it was fated that a blaze of hatred between the two leading powers of the new era, the United Kingdom and the United Republic, should one day burst forth, which was to be fanned by passion, prejudice, and a mistaken sentiment of patriotism and self-interest on both sides, and which not all the bloodshed of more than one fierce war could quench. The traces of this savage sentiment are burnt deeply into the literature, language, and traditions of both countries, and it is strange enough that the epoch at which chronic wrangling and international coolness changed into furious antipathy between the two great Protestant powers of Europe—for great they already both were, despite the paucity of their population and resources, as compared with nations which were less influenced by the spirit of the age or had less aptness in obeying its impulse—should be dated from the famous year of Guy Fawkes.

Meantime the Spanish troops, embarked in eight merchant ships and a few pinnaces, were slowly approaching their destination. They had been instructed, in case they found it impracticable to enter a Flemish port, to make for the hospitable shores of England, the Spanish ambassador and those whom he had bribed at the court of James having already provided for their protection.<sup>2</sup> Off Dover Admiral Haultain got sight of Sarmiento's little fleet. He made short work with it. Faithfully car-

<sup>1</sup> Meteren, 518.

<sup>2</sup> „Quorum omnium curam Petrus Cubiara acceperat hoc inter cetera mandato ut si Flandria negaretur vitato Gallie Britannie crum adiret tutum ibi hospitium ope legati Hispanici et quos ille Britannorum donis emerat habiturus.”—Grot. xiv. 658.

<sup>1</sup> Grotius, 518vo.



rying out the strenuous orders of the States-General, he captured some of the ships, burned one, and ran others aground after a very brief resistance. Some of the soldiers' and crews were picked up by English vessels cruising in the neighbourhood and narrowly watching the conflict. A few stragglers escaped by swimming, but by far the greater proportion of the newly-arrived troops were taken prisoners, tied together two and two, and then, at a given signal from the admiral's ship, tossed into the sea. 1

Not Peter Titelman, nor Julian Romero, nor the Duke of Alva himself, ever manifested greater alacrity in wholesale murder than was shown by this admiral of the young republic in fulfilling the savage decrees of the States-General. 2

Thus at least one-half of the legion perished. The pursuit of the ships was continued within English waters, when the guns of Dover Castle opened vigorously upon the recent allies of England, in order to protect her newly-found friends in their sore distress. Doubtless in the fervour of the work the Dutch admiral had violated the neutral coast of England, so that the cannonade from the castle was technically justified. It was however a biting satire upon the proposed Protestant league against Spain and universal monarchy in behalf of the Dutch republic, that England was

1 Grotius, xiv. 658. Meteren, *ubi sup.* Wagenaar, ix. 186.

2 Certainly it must be admitted that the world makes some little progress in civilization. To exterminate unorganized and irresponsible bands of brigands disgracing the name of soldiers, may still be inevitable in the interest of humanity, but that regular troops should be destroyed in cold blood, because embarked and captured not in war-vessels but in mercantile and neutral transports, was a barbarity which seems incredible to us, but which, in the beginning of the seventeenth century, was not rebuked by the most gentle and enlightened spirits of the age.

This whole story is minutely related by the illustrious Hugo Grotius, without a syllable of censure. Hist. xiv. 657, 658.

already doing her best to save a Spanish legion and to sink a Dutch fleet. The infraction of English sovereignty was unquestionable if judged by the more scrupulous theory of modern days, but it was well remarked by the States-General, in answer to the remonstrances of James's Government, that the Dutch admiral, knowing that the pirates of Dunkirk roamed at will through English waters in search of their prey, might have hoped for some indulgence of a similar character to the ships of the republic. 1

Thus nearly the whole of the Spanish legion perished. The soldiers who escaped to the English coast passed the winter miserably in huts, which they were allowed to construct on the sands, but nearly all, including the lieutenant-colonel commanding, Pedro Cubiera, died of famine or of wounds. A few small vessels of the expedition succeeded in reaching the Flemish coast, and landing a slight portion of the terzo. 2

The campaign of 1605 opened but languidly. The strain upon the resources of the Netherlands, thus unaided, was becoming severe, although there is no doubt that, as the India traffic slowly developed itself, the productive force of the commonwealth visibly increased, while the thrifty habits of its citizens, and their comparative abstinence from unproductive consumption, still enabled it to bear the tremendous burthen of the war. A new branch of domestic industry had grown out of the India trade, great quantities of raw silk being now annually imported from the East into Holland, to be wrought into brocades, tapestries, damasks, velvets, satins, and other luxurious fabrics for European consumption. 3 It is a curious

1 Grotius, xvi. 659.

2 Grotius, Meteren, *ubi sup.* Wagenaar, ix. 184-187. Winwood, ii. 32; who was informed by Lord Salisbury that more than one hundred men in the Dutch fleet were killed by the Dover cannon.

3 Meteren, 536.

phenomenon in the history of industry that while at this epoch Holland was the chief seat of silk manufactures, the great financier of Henry IV. was congratulating his sovereign and himself that natural causes had for ever prevented the culture or manufacture of silk in France. 1 If such an industry were possible, he was sure that the decline of martial spirit in France and an eternal dearth of good French soldiers would be inevitable, and he even urged that the importation of such luxurious fabrics should be sternly prohibited, in order to preserve the moral health of the people. 2 The practical Hollanders were more inclined to leave silk farthingales and brocaded petticoats to be dealt with by thunderers from the pulpit or indignant fathers of families. Meantime the States-General felt instinctively that the little commonwealth grew richer, the more useful or agreeable things its burghers could call into existence out of nothingness, to be exchanged for the powder and bullets, timber and cordage, requisite for its eternal fight with universal monarchy, and that the richer the burghers grew the more capable they were of paying their taxes. It was not the fault of the States that the insane ambition of Spain and the archdukes compelled them to exhaust themselves annually by the most unproductive consumption that man is ever likely to devise, that of scientifically slaughtering his brethren, because to practise economy in that regard would be to cease to exist, or to accept the most intolerable form of slavery.

The forces put into the field in the spring of 1605 were but meagre. There was also, as usual, much difference of opinion between Maurice and Barneveld as to the most judicious manner of employing them, and as usual the docile stadholder submitted his better judgment to the States. 3 It can hardly be too

much insisted upon that the high-born Maurice always deported himself in fact, and as it were unconsciously, as the citizen soldier of a little republic, even while personally invested with many of the attributes of exalted rank, and even while regarded by many of his leading fellow-citizens as the legitimate and predestined sovereign of the newly-born state.

Early in the spring a great enterprise against Antwerp was projected. It failed utterly. Maurice, at Bergen-op-Zoom, despatched seven thousand troops up the Scheld, under command of Ernest Casimir. The flotilla was a long time getting under weigh, and instead of effecting a surprise, the army, on reaching the walls of Antwerp, found the burghers and garrison not in the least astonished, but on the contrary entirely prepared. Ernest returned after a few insignificant skirmishes having accomplished nothing. 1

Maurice next spent a few days in reducing the castle of Wouda, not far from Bergen, and then, transporting his army once more to the isle of Cadzand, he established his headquarters at Watervliet, near Ysendyke. Spinola followed him, having thrown a bridge across the Scheld. Maurice was disposed to reduce a fort, well called Patience, 2 lying over against the isle of Walcheren. Spinola took up a position by which he defended the place as with an impenetrable buckler. A game of skill now began between these two adepts in the art of war, for already the volunteer had taken rank among the highest professors of the new school. It was the object of Maurice, who knew himself on the whole outnumbered, to divine his adversary's intention. Spinola was supposed to be aiming at Sluys, at Grave, at Bergen-op-Zoom, possibly even at some more remote city, like Rhein-

1 Sully, v. 77-79, *seqq.*

2 Ibid.

3 Van der Kemp, ii. 113.

2 Ibid. 113, 114. Grotius, xiv. 656, 657. Meteren, 518.

1 Grotius, *ubi sup.*

berg, while rumours as to his designs, flying directly from his camp, were as thick as birds in the air. They were let loose on purpose by the artful Genoese, who all the time had a distinct and definite plan which was not suspected. The dilatoriness of the campaign was exasperating. It might be thought that the war was to last another half century, from the excessive inertness of both parties. The armies had all gone into winter quarters in the previous November, Spinola had spent nearly six months in Spain, Midsummer had come and gone, and still Maurice was at Watervliet, guessing at his adversary's first move. On the whole, he had inclined to suspect a design upon Rheinberg, and had accordingly sent his brother Henry with a detachment to strengthen the garrison of that place. On the 1st of August however he learned that Spinola had crossed the Meuse and the Rhine, with ten thousand foot and three thousand horse, and that leaving Count Bucquoy with six thousand foot and one thousand five hundred horse in the neighbourhood of the Rhine, to guard a couple of redoubts which had been constructed for a basis at Kaiserswerth, he was marching with all possible despatch towards Friesland and Groningen. 1

The Catholic general had concealed his design in a masterly manner. He had detained Maurice in the August. Isle of Cadzand, the States still dreaming of a victorious invasion on their part of obedient Flanders, and the stadholder hesitating to quit his position of inactive observation, lest the moment his back was turned the rapid Spinola might whirl down upon sluys, that most precious and skilfully acquired possession of the republic, when lo! his formidable antagonist was marching in force upon what the prince

well knew to be her most important and least guarded frontier.

On the 8th August the Catholic general was before Oldenzaal, which he took in three days, and then 8 August. advanced to Lingën. Should that place fall—and the city was known to be most inadequately garrisoned and supplied—it would be easy for the foe to reduce Coeworden, and so seize the famous pass over the Bourtaanger Morass, march straight to Embden—then in a state of municipal revolution on account of the chronic feuds between its counts and the population, and therefore an easy prey—after which all Friesland and Groningen would be at his mercy, and his road open to Holland and Utrecht; in short, into the very bowels of the republic.

On the 4th August Maurice broke up his camp in Flanders, and leaving five thousand men under Colonel van der Noot, to guard the positions there, advanced rapidly to Deventer, with the intention of saving Lingën. It was too late. That very important place had been culpably neglected. The garrison consisted of but one cannoneer, and he had but one arm. 1 A burgher guard, numbering about three hundred, made such resistance as they could, and the one-armed warrior fired a shot or two from a rusty old demi-cannon. Such opposition to the accomplished Italian was naturally not very effective. On the 18th August the place capitulated. 2 Maurice, arriving at Deventer, and being now strengthened by his cousin

18 Aug. Lewis William with such garrison troops as could be collected, learned the mortifying news with sentiments almost akin to despair. It was now to be a race for Coeworden, and the fleet-footed Spinola was a day's march at least in advance of his competitor. The key to the fatal morass would soon

1 Bentivoglio, iii. 533, 534. Meteren, 521. 522. Grotius, xiv. 660, 661. Van der Kemp, i. 114, 115, and notes.

1 Meteren, *ubi sup.*

2 Bentivoglio, Grotius, Meteren, Van der Kemp, *ubi sup.*



be in his hands. To the inexpressible joy of the stadholder, the Genoese seemed suddenly struck with blindness. The prize was almost in his hands and he threw away all his advantages. Instead of darting at once upon Coeworden he paused for nearly a month, during which period he seemed intoxicated with a success so rapidly achieved, and especially with his adroitness in <sup>14 Sept.</sup>

outwitting the great stadholder. <sup>1</sup> On the 14th September he made a retrograde movement towards the Rhine, leaving two thousand five hundred men in Lingén. Maurice, giving profound thanks to God for his enemy's infatuation, passed by Lingén, and having now, with his cousin's reinforcements, a force of nine thousand foot and three thousand horse, threw himself into Coeworden, strengthened and garrisoned that vital fortress which Spinola would perhaps have taken as easily as he had done Lingén, made all the neighbouring positions secure, <sup>24 Sept.</sup>

and then fell back towards Wesel on the Rhine, in order to watch his antagonist. <sup>2</sup> Spinola had established his headquarters at Ruhrort, a place where the river Ruhr empties into the Rhine. He had yielded to the remonstrances of the Archbishop of Cologne, to whom Kaiserswerth belonged, and had abandoned the forts which Bucquoy, under his directions, had constructed at that place. <sup>3</sup>

The two armies now gazed at each other, at a respectful distance, for a fortnight longer, neither commander apparently having any very definite purpose. At last, Maurice having well reconnoitred his enemy, perceived a weak point in his extended lines. A considerable force of Italian cavalry, with some infantry, was stationed at the village of Mulheim, on the Ruhr, and apparently out of convenient supporting distance

from Spinola's main army. The stadholder determined to deliver a sudden blow upon this tender spot, break through the lines, and bring on a general action by surprise. Assembling his well-seasoned and veteran troopers in force, he divided them into two formidable bands, one under the charge of his young brother Frederic Henry, the other under that most brilliant of cavalry officers, Marcellus Bax, hero of Turnhout and many another well-fought field.

The river Ruhr was a wide but desultory stream, easily fordable in many places. On the opposite bank to Mulheim was the Castle of Broek, and some hills of considerable elevation. Bax was ordered to cross the river and seize the castle and the heights, Count Henry to attack the enemy's camp in front, while Maurice himself, following rapidly with the advance of infantry and wagons, was to sustain the assault.

Marcellus Bax, rapid and dashing as usual, crossed the Ruhr, captured Broek Castle with ease, <sup>8 Oct.</sup>

and stood ready to prevent the retreat of the Spaniards. Taken by surprise in front, they would naturally seek refuge on the other side of the river. That stream was not difficult for infantry, but as the banks were steep, cavalry could not easily extricate themselves from the water, except at certain prepared landings. Bax waited however for some time in vain for the flying Spaniards. It was not destined that the stadholder should effect many surprises that year. The troopers under Frederic Henry had made their approaches through an intricate path, often missing their way, and in far more leisurely fashion than was intended, so that outlying scouts had brought information of the coming attack. As Count Henry approached the village, Trivulzio's cavalry was found drawn up in battle array, formidable in numbers, and most fully prepared for their visitors from Wesel. The party

<sup>1</sup> Meteren. Van der Kemp.

<sup>2</sup> Authorities cited.

<sup>3</sup> Bentivoglio, iii. 536.

most astonished was that which came to surprise. In an instant one of those uncontrollable panics broke out to which even veterans are as subject as to dysentery or scurvy. The best cavalry of Maurice's army turned their backs at the very sight of the foe, and galloped off much faster than they had come.

Meantime, Marcellus Bax was assaulted, not only by his late handful of antagonists, who had now rallied, but by troops from Mulheim, who began to wade across the stream. At that moment he was cheered by the sight of Count Henry coming on with a very few of his troopers who had stood to their colours. A simultaneous charge from both banks at the enemy floundering in the river was attempted. It might have been brilliantly successful, but the panic had crossed the river faster than the Spaniards could do, and that whole splendid picked cavalry force of the republic, commanded by the youngest son of William the Silent, and by the favourite cavalry commander of her armies, was, after a hot but brief action, in disgraceful and unreasonable flight. The stadholder reached the bank of that fatal stream only to witness this maddening spectacle, instead of the swift and brilliant triumph which he was justified in expecting. He did his best to stem the retreating tide. He called upon the veterans, by the memory of Turnhout and Nieuport, and so many other victories, to pause and redeem their name before it was too late. He taunted them with their frequent demands to be led to battle, and their expressed impatience at enforced idleness. He denounced them as valiant only for plundering defenceless peasants, and cowards against armed men; as trusting more to their horses' heels than to their own right hands. He invoked curses upon them for deserting his young brother, who, conspicuous among them in his gilded armour, the orange-plumes upon his casque, and the bright orange-

scarf across his shoulders, was now sorely pressed in the struggling throng. <sup>1</sup>

It was all in vain. Could Maurice have thrown himself into the field, he might, as in the crises of the republic's fate at Nieuport, have once more converted ruin into victory by the magic of his presence. But the river was between him and the battle, and he was an enforced spectator of his country's disgrace.

For a few brief moments his demeanour, his taunts, and his supplications had checked the flight of his troops.

A stand was made by a portion of the cavalry and a few detached but fierce combats took place.

Count Frederic Henry was <sup>8 Oct.</sup> in imminent danger. Leading a mere handful of his immediate retainers, he threw himself into the thickest of the fight, with the characteristic audacity of his house. A Spanish trooper aimed his carbine full at his face. It missed fire, and Henry, having emptied his own pistol, was seized by the floating scarf upon his breast by more than one enemy. There was a brief struggle, and death or capture seemed certain; when an unknown hand laid his nearest antagonist low, and enabled him to escape from overpowering numbers. <sup>2</sup> The soldiers, whose devotion thus saved the career of the youngest Orange-Nassau, destined to be so long and so brilliant, from being cut off so prematurely, was never again heard of, <sup>3</sup> and doubtless perished in the fray.

Meantime the brief sparkle of valour on the part of the States' troops had already vanished. The adroit Spinola, hurrying personally to the front, had caused such a clangor from all the drums and trumpets in Broek and its neighbourhood to be made as to persuade the restive cavalry that the whole force of the enemy was already upon

<sup>1</sup> Grotius, xiv. 671.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.* Meteren, 523vo.

<sup>3</sup> Grotius, *ubi sup.*

them. The day was obviously lost, and Maurice, with a heavy heart, now himself gave the signal to retreat. Drawing up the greater part of his infantry in solid mass upon the banks to protect the passage, he sent a force to the opposite side, Horace Vere being the first to wade the stream. All that was then possible to do was accomplished, and the panic flight converted into orderly retreat, but it was a day of disaster and disgrace for the republic. 1

About five hundred of the best States' cavalry were left dead on the field, but the stain upon his almost unsullied flag was more cutting to the stadholder's heart than the death of his veterans. The material results were in truth almost even. The famous cavalry general, Count Trivulzio, with at least three hundred Spaniards, fell in the combat, 2 but the glory of having defeated the best cavalry of Europe in a stricken field and under the very eyes of the stadholder would have been sufficient compensation to Spinola for much greater losses.

Maurice withdrew towards Wesel, sullen but not desponding. His forces were meagre, and although he had been out-generalled, out-marched, and defeated in the open field, at least the Genoese had not planted the blow which he had mediated in the very heart of the republic.

Autumn was now far advanced, and dripping with rain. The roads and fields were fast becoming impassable sloughs, and no further large operations could be expected in this campaign. Yet the stadholder's cup was not full, and he was destined to witness two more triumphs of his rival, now fast becoming famous, before this year of disasters should close. On the 27th October, Spinola took the 27 Oct. city of Wachtendonk, after 5 Nov.

ten days' siege, and on the 5th of November the strong place of Cracow. 1

Maurice was forced to see these positions captured almost under his eyes being now quite powerless to afford relief. His troops had dwindled by sickness and necessary detachments for garrison-work to a comparatively insignificant force, and very soon afterwards both armies went into winter quarters. 2

The States were excessively disappointed at the results of the year's work and deep if not loud were the reproaches cast upon the stadholder. Certainly his military reputation had not been augmented by this campaign. He had lost many places, and had not gained an inch of ground anywhere. Already the lustre of Sluys, of Nieupoort and Turnhout were growing dim, for Maurice had so accustomed the republic to victories that his own past triumphs seemed now his greatest enemies. Moreover he had founded a school out of which apt pupils had already graduated and it would seem that the Genoese volunteer had rapidly profited by his teachings as only a man endowed with exquisite military genius could have done.

Yet, after all, it seems certain that with the stadholder's limited means and with the awful consequences to the country of a total defeat in the open field, the Fabian tactics, which he had now deliberately adopted, were the most reasonable. The invader of foreign domains, the suppressor of great revolts, can indulge in the expensive luxury of procrastination only at imminent peril. For the defence, it is always possible to conquer by delay, and it was perfectly understood between Spinola and his ablest advisers at the Spanish court that the blows must be struck thick and fast, and at the most vulnerable places, or that the victory would be lost.

1 Grotius. xiv. 669-672. Meteren, 523 and vo. Bentivoglio, iii. 637. Van der Kemp, ii. 116, 510, 511.

2 Ibid.

1 Meteren, 523 vo. Bentivoglio, iii. 530. Grot. xiv. 673. Van der Kemp, ii. 117.

2 Ibid, 3 Grot. xiv. 660.



Time was the ally not of the Spanish invaders, who came from afar, but of the Dutch burghers, who remained at home. „Jam aut Nunquam, I was the motto upon the Italian's banners.

In proportion to the depression in the republic at the results of this year's campaigning was the elation at the Spanish court. Bad news and false news had preceded the authentic intelligence of Spinola's victories. The English envoy had received unquestionable information that the Catholic general had sustained an overwhelming defeat at the close of the campaign, with a loss of three thousand five hundred men.<sup>2</sup> The tale was implicitly believed by king and cabinet, so that when, very soon afterwards, the couriers arrived bringing official accounts of the victory gained over the veteran cavalry of the States in the very presence of the stadholder, followed by the crowning triumph of Wachtenlonk, the demonstrations of joy were all the more vivacious in consequence of the previous gloom.<sup>3</sup> Spinola himself followed hard upon the latest messengers, and was received with ovations.<sup>4</sup> Never, since the days of Alexander Farnese, had a general at the Spanish court been more cordially caressed or hated. Had Philip the Prudent been still upon the throne, he would have felt it his duty to make immediate arrangements for poisoning him. Certainly his plans and his popularity would have been undermined in the most artistic manner.

But Philip III., more dangerous to rabbits than to generals, left the Genoese to settle the plans of his next campaign with Lerma and his parasites.

The subtle Spinola, having, in his despatches, ascribed the chief merit of the victories to Louis Velasco, a Spaniard, while his own original conception of transferring the war to Friesland was

attributed by him with magnificent effrontery to Lerma and to the king I—who were probably quite ignorant of the existence of that remote province—succeeded in maintaining his favourable position at court, and was allowed, by what was called the war-council, to manage matters nearly at his pleasure.

It is difficult however to understand how so much clamour should have been made over such paltry triumphs. All Europe rang with a cavalry fight in which less than a thousand saddles on both sides had been emptied, leading to no result, and with the capture of a couple of insignificant towns, of which not one man in a thousand had ever heard.

Spinola had doubtless shown genius of a subtle and inventive order, and his fortunate audacity in measuring himself, while a mere apprentice, against the first military leader living had been crowned with wonderful success. He had nailed the stadholder fast to the island of Cadzand, while he was perfecting his arrangements and building boats on the Rhine; he had propounded riddles which Maurice had spent three of the best campaigning months in idle efforts to guess, and when he at last moved, he had swept to his mark with the swiftness and precision of a bird of prey. Yet the greatest of all qualities in a military commander, that of deriving substantial fruits from victory instead of barren trophies, he had not manifested. If it had been a great stroke of art to seize Linghen before Maurice could reach Deventer, it was an enormous blunder, worthy of a journeyman soldier, to fail to seize the Bourtange marshes, and drive his sword into the very vitals of the republic, thus placed at his mercy.

Meantime, while there had been all these rejoicings and tribulations at the great doings on the Rhine and the shortcomings in Friesland, the real

1 Grot. xlv. 660.

2 Galiucci, ii. 253, *seqq.*

4 Ibid.

3 Ibid.

1 Ibid.

operations of the war had been at the antipodes.

It is not a very unusual phenomenon in history that the events, upon whose daily development the contemporary world hangs with most palpitating interest, are far inferior in permanent influence upon the general movement of humanity to a series of distant and apparently commonplace transactions.

Empires are built up or undermined by the ceaseless industry of obscure multitudes; often slightly observed, or but dimly comprehended.

Battles and sieges, dreadful marches, eloquent debates, intricate diplomacy—from time to time but only perhaps at rare intervals—have decided or modified the destiny of nations, while very often the clash of arms, the din of rhetoric, the whiz of political spindles, produce nothing valuable for human consumption, and make the world no richer.

If the age of heroic and religious passion was rapidly fading away before the gradual uprising of a politico-mercantile civilization—as it certainly was—the most vital events, those in which the fate of coming generations was most deeply involved, were those inspired by the spirit of commercial enterprise.

Nor can it be denied that there is often a genial and poetic essence even among things practical or of almost vulgar exterior. In those early expeditions of the Hollanders to the flaming lands of the equator there is a rhythm and romance of historical movement not less significant than in their unexampled defence of fatherland and of the world's liberty against the great despotism of the age.

Universal monarchy was baffled by the little republic, not within its own populous cities only, or upon its own barren sands. The long combat between Freedom and Absolutism had now become as wide as the world. The greatest European states had been dragged by the iron chain of necessity into a

conflict from which they often struggled to escape, and on every ocean, and on almost every foot of soil, where the footsteps of mankind had as yet been imprinted, the fierce encounters were every day renewed. In the east and the west, throughout that great vague new world, of which geographers had hardly yet made a sketch, which comprised both the Americas and something called the East Indies, and which Spain claimed as her private property, those humbly born and energetic adventurers were rapidly creating a symmetrical system out of most dismal chaos.

The King of Spain warned all nations from trespassing upon those outlying possessions.

His edicts had not however prevented the English in moderate numbers, and the Hollanders in steadily increasing swarms, from enlarging and making profitable use of these new domains of the world's commerce.

The days were coming when the People was to have more to say than the pope in regard to the disposition and arrangements of certain large districts of this planet. While the world-empire, which still excited so much dismay, was yielding to constant corrosion, another empire was steadily rising out of the depths. It has often been created by well-directed toil and unflinching courage, thought amazing that the little republic should so long and so triumphantly withstand the enormous forces brought forward for her destruction. It was not, however, so very surprising. Foremost among nations, and in advance of the age, the republic had found the strength which comes from the spirit of association. On a wider scale than ever before known, large masses of men, with their pecuniary means, had been intelligently banded together to advance material interests. When it is remembered that, in addition to this force, the whole commonwealth was inspired by the divine influence of liberty,

her power will no longer seem so wonderful.

A sinister event in the Isle of Ceylon had opened the series of transactions in the East, and had cast a gloom over the public sentiment at home. The enterprising voyager, Sebald de Weerdt, one of the famous brotherhood of the Invincible Lion which had wintered in the straits of Magellan.<sup>1</sup> had been murdered through the treachery of the King of Candy. His countrymen had not taken vengeance on his assassins. They were perhaps too fearful of losing their growing trade in those lucrative regions to take a becoming stand in that emergency. They were also not as yet sufficiently powerful there.<sup>2</sup>

The East India Company had sent out in May of this year its third fleet of eleven large ships, besides some smaller vessels, under the general superintendence of Matelieff de Jonghe, one of the directors. The investments for the voyage amounted to more than nineteen hundred thousand florins.<sup>3</sup>

Meantime the preceding adventurers under Stephen van der Hagen, who had sailed at the end of 1603, had been doing much thorough work.<sup>4</sup> A firm league had been made with one of the chief potentates of Malabar, enabling them to build forts and establish colonies in perpetual menace of Goa, the great oriental capital of the Portuguese. The return of the ambassadors sent out from Astgen to Holland had filled not only the island of Sumatra but the Moluccas, and all the adjacent regions, with praises of the power, wealth, and high civilization of that distant republic so long depicted by rivals as a nest of uncouth and sanguinary savages.<sup>5</sup> The fleet now proceeded to Amboyna, a stronghold of the Spanish-Portuguese, and the seat of a most lucrative trade.

On the arrival of those foreign well-armed ships under the guns of the fortress, the governor sent to demand, with Castilian arrogance, who the intruders were, and by whose authority and with what intent they presumed to show themselves in those waters. The reply was that they came in the name and by the authority of their High Mightinesses the States-General, and their stadholder the Prince of Orange: that they were sworn enemies of the King of Spain and all his subjects, and that as to their intent, this would soon be made apparent.<sup>1</sup> Whereupon, without much more ado, they began a bombardment of the fort, which mounted thirty-six guns. The governor, as often happened in those regions, being less valiant against determined European foes than towards the feebler oriental races on which he had been accustomed to trample, succumbed with hardly an effort at resistance.<sup>2</sup> The castle and town and whole island were surrendered to the fleet, and thenceforth became virtually a colony of the republic with which, nominally, treaties of alliance and defence were negotiated. Thence the fleet, after due possession had been taken of these new domains, sailed partly to Banda and partly to two small but most important islands of the Moluccas.<sup>3</sup>

In that multitude of islands which make up the Eastern Archipelago there were but five at that period where grew the clove—Ternate, Tydor, Motiel, Makian, and Bacia.<sup>4</sup>

Pepper and ginger, even nutmegs, cassia, and mace, were but vulgar drugs, precious as they were already to the world's commerce, compared with this most magnificent spice.

It is wonderful to reflect upon the strange composition of man. The world had lived in former ages very comfor-

<sup>1</sup> Vol. iii. page 543 of this History.

<sup>2</sup> Wagenaar, ix. 197. Meteren, books xxvi. xviii.

<sup>3</sup> Wagenaar, Meteren, *loc. cit.*

<sup>4</sup> Wagenaar, ix. 198.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid. Grotius, xv. 700, *seqq.*

<sup>1</sup> Grotius, xv. 702. <sup>2</sup> Ibid. Meteren, 537.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid. Wagenaar, ix. 197, 198.

<sup>4</sup> Grotius, *ubi sup.*



tably without cloves. But by the beginning of the seventeenth century that odoriferous pistil had been the cause of so many pitched battles and obstinate wars, of much vituperations, negotiation, and intriguing, that the world's destiny seemed to have almost become dependent upon the growth of a particular gillyflower. Out of its sweetness had grown such bitterness among great nations as not torrents of blood could wash away. A commonplace condiment enough it seems to us now, easily to be dispensed with and not worth purchasing at a thousand human lives or so the cargo, but it was once the great prize to be struggled for by civilized nations. From that fervid earth, warmed from within by volcanic heat, and basking ever beneath the equatorial sun, arose vapours as deadly to human life as the fruits were exciting and delicious to human senses. Yet the atmosphere of pestiferous fragrance had attracted rather than repelled. The poisonous delights of the climate, added to the perpetual and various warfare for its productions, spread a strange fascination around those fatal isles.

Especially Ternate and Tydor were objects of unending strife. Chinese, Malays, Persians, Arabs, had struggled centuries long for their possession; those races successively or simultaneously ruling these and adjacent portions of the Archipelago. The great geographical discoveries at the close of the fifteenth century had however changed the aspect of India and of the world. The Portuguese adventurers found two rival kings in the two precious islands, and by ingeniously protecting one of these potentates and poisoning the other, soon made themselves masters of the field. The clove trade was now entirely in the hands of the strangers from the antipodes. Goa became the great mart of the lucrative traffic, and thither came Chinese, Arabs, Moors, and other oriental traders, to be supplied from the Portuguese monopoly. Two-thirds of the

spices however found their way directly to Europe.

Naturally enough, the Spaniards soon penetrated into these seas, and claimed their portion of the spice trade. They insisted that the coveted islands were included in their portion of the great Borgian grant. As there had hardly been time to make a trigonometrical survey of an unknown world, so generously divided by the pope, there was no way of settling disputed boundary questions save by apostolic blows. These were exchanged with much earnestness, year after year, between Spaniards, Portuguese, and all who came in their way. Especially the unfortunate natives, and their kings most of all, came in for a full share. At last Charles V. sold out his share of the spice islands to his Portuguese rival and co-proprietor, for three hundred and fifty thousand ducats. 1 The emperor's very active pursuits caused him to require ready money more than cloves. Yet John III. had made an excellent bargain, and the monopoly thenceforth brought him in at least two hundred thousand ducats annually. Goa became more flourishing, the natives more wretched, the Portuguese more detested than ever. Occasionally one of the royal line of victims would consent to put a diadem upon his head, but the coronation was usually the prelude to a dungeon or death. The treaties of alliance, which these unlucky potentates had formed with their powerful invaders, were, as so often is the case, mere deeds to convey themselves and their subjects into slavery.

Spain and Portugal becoming one, the slender weapon of defence which these weak but subtle Orientals sometimes employed with success—the international and commercial jealousy between their two oppressors—was taken away. It was therefore with joy that Zaida, who sat on the throne of Ternate at the end of the sixteenth cen-

1 Grotius, *xv.* 704.

tury, saw the sails of a Dutch fleet arriving in his harbours. 1 Very soon negotiations were opened, and the distant republic undertook to protect the Mahometan king against his Catholic master. The new friendship was founded upon trade monopoly, of course, but at that period at least the islanders were treated with justice and humanity by their republican allies. The Dutch undertook to liberate their friends from bondage, while the King of Ternate, panting under Portuguese oppression, wore to have no traffic, no dealings of any kind, with any other nation than Holland; not even with the English. The Dutch, they declared, were the liberators of themselves, of their friends, and of the seas. 2

The international hatred, already fermenting between England and Holland, shot forth in these flaming regions like a tropical plant. It was carefully nurtured and tended by both peoples. Freedom of commerce, freedom of the seas, meant that none but the Dutch East India Company—so soon as the Portuguese and Spaniards were driven out—should trade in cloves and nutmegs. Decrees to that effect were soon issued, under very heavy penalties, by the States-General to the citizens of the Republic and to the world at large. 3 It was natural therefore that the English islanders should hail the appearance of the Dutch fleets with much less enthusiasm than was shown by the King of Ternate.

On the other hand, the King of Tydor, persisting in his oriental hatred towards the rival potentate in the other island, allowed the Portuguese to build additional citadels, and generally to strengthen their positions within his dominions. Thus when Cornelius Sebastian, with a division of Ver Hagen's fleet, ar-

rived in the Moluccas in the summer of 1605, he found plenty of work prepared for him. The peace recently concluded by James with Philip and the archdukes placed England in a position of neutrality in the war now waging in the clove islands between Spain and the republic's East India Company. The English in those regions were not slow to avail themselves of the advantage. The Portuguese of Tydor received from neutral sympathy a copious supply of powder and of pamphlets. The one explosive material enabled them to make a more effective defence of their citadel against the Dutch fleet; the other revealed to the Portuguese and their Mussulman allies that „the Netherlands could not exist without English protection, that they were the scum of nations, and that if they should get possession of this clove monopoly their insolence would become intolerable.” 1 Samples of polite literature such as these, printed but not published, flew about in volleys. It was an age of pamphleteering, and neither the English nor the Dutch were behind their contemporaries in the science of attack and self-defence. Nevertheless Cornelius Sebastian was not deterred by paper pellets, nor by the guns of the citadel, from carrying out his purpose. It was arranged with King Zaida that the islanders of Ternate should make a demonstration against Tydor, being set across the strait in Dutch vessels. Sebastian, however, having little faith in oriental tenacity, entrusted the real work of storming the fortress to his own soldiers and sailors. On a fine morning in May the assault was delivered in magnificent style. The resistance was obstinate; many of the assailants fell,

1 „Schrijvende seer verachtelijk ende schimpelijk van de Nederlanders als ofte sy sonder haer niet konden bestaen ende diegerlijke meer, die noemende het schuym van Natien die welke soo diesen handel alleen handel hadden haer vermetelheit souden onlydelyk wesen,” &c.—Depositions made by the Netherlands. *Meteren*, 535<sup>vo</sup>.

1 Grotius, xv. 706.

2 „Batavos vere socios ac suos marisque creatores vocans.”—*Ibid*.

3 Grotius, xv. 706.

and Captain Mol, 1 whom we have once before seen as master of the Tiger, sinking the galleys of Frederic Spinola off the Gut of Sluys, found himself at the head of only seven men within the interior defences of the citadel. A Spanish soldier, Torre by name, rushed upon him with a spear. Avoiding the blow, Moll grappled with his antagonist, and both rolled to the ground. A fortunate carbine-shot from one of the Dutch captain's comrades went through the Spaniard's head. 2 Meantime the little band, so insignificant in numbers, was driven out of the citadel. Mol fell to the ground with a shattered leg, and reproached his companions, who sought to remove him, for neglecting their work in order to save his life. Let them take the fort, he implored them, and when that was done they might find leisure to pick him up if they chose. 3 While he was speaking the principal tower of the fortress blew up, and sixty of the garrison were launched into the air. 4 A well directed shot had set fire to the magazine. The assault was renewed with fresh numbers, and the Dutch were soon masters of the place. Never was a stronghold more audaciously or more successfully stormed. The garrison surrendered. The women and children, fearing to be at the mercy of those who had been depicted to them as cannibals, had already made their escape, and were scrambling, like squirrels among the volcanic cliffs. Famine soon compelled them to come down, however, when they experienced sufficiently kind treatment, but were all deported in Dutch vessels to the Philippine islands. 5 The conquerors not only spared the life of the King of Tydor, but permitted him to retain his crown. At his request the citadel was razed to the ground. It would have been better perhaps to

let it stand, and it was possible that in the heart of the vanquished potentate some vengeance was lurking which might bear evil fruit at a later day. Meantime the Portuguese were driven entirely out of the Moluccas, save the island of Times, where the still retained a not very important citadel. 1

The East India Company was now in possession of the whole field. The Moluccas and the clove trade were its own, and the Dutch republic had made manifest to the world that more potent instruments had now been devised for parcelling out the new world than papal decrees, although signed by the immaculate hand of a Borgia.

During the main operations already sketched in the Netherlands, and during those vastly more important oriental movements to which the reader's attention has just been called, a detached event or two deserves notice.

Twice during the summer campaign of this year Du Terrail, an enterprising French refugee in the service of the archdukes, had attempted to surprise the important city <sup>21 Aug.</sup> of Bergen-op-Zoom. On the 21st August the intended assault had been discovered in time to prevent any very serious conflict on either side. On <sup>20 Sept.</sup> the 20th September the experiment was renewed at an hour after midnight. Du Terrail, having arranged the attack at three different points, had succeeded in forcing his way across the moat and through one of the gates. The trumpets of the foremost Spaniards already sounded in the streets. It was pouring with rain; the town was pitch dark. But the energetic Paul Bax was governor of the place, a man who was awake at any hour of the twenty-four, and who could see in the darkest night. He had already informed himself of the

1 I suppose at least this Captain Mol to have been identical with the gallant seaman who command the Tiger in that action.

2 Grotius, xv. 706, 707. 3 Ibid.

4 Ibid. 5 Ibid.

1 Grotius, xv. 700-708. Compare Meteren 535-537. Wagenaar, ix. 196-198. Vander Hagen Reise, 92, 94, 95.



enemy's project, and had strengthened his garrison by a large intermixture of the most trustworthy burgher guards, so that the advance of Du Terrail at the southern gate was already confronted by a determined band. A fierce battle began in the darkness. Meantime Paulus, galloping through the city, had roused the whole population for the defence. At the Steinberg gate, where the chief assault had been prepared, Bax had caused great fires of straw and pitch barrels to be lighted, so that the invaders, instead of finding, as they expected, a profound gloom through the streets, saw themselves approaching a brilliantly illuminated city, fully prepared to give their uninvited guests a warm reception. The garrison, the townspeople, even the women, thronged to the ramparts, sating the Spaniards with a rain of bullets, paving-stones, and pitch hoops, and with a storm of gibes and taunts. They were asked why they allowed their carnal thus to send them to the cattle market, and whether Our Lady of Hall, whom Isabella was so fond of making pilgrimages, did not live rather too far off to be of much use just then to her devotees. Catholics and Protestants stood shoulder to shoulder that night to defend their firesides against the foreign foe, while mothers laid their sleeping children on the ground that they might fill their cradles with powder and shot, which they industriously brought to the soldiers. The less energetic women knelt upon their knees in the street, and prayed aloud through the anxious night, as the attack was splendidly repulsed. As morning dawned the enemy withdrew, leaving one hundred dead outside the walls or in the town, and carrying off thirty-eight wagon loads of wounded. Du Terrail made no further attempts at summer, although the list of his prizes was not yet full. He was a good engineer, and a daring partisan

officer. He was also inspired by an especial animosity to the States-General, who had refused the offer of his services before he made application to the archdukes. 1

At sea there was no very important movement in European waters, save that Lambert Heinrichzoon, commonly called Pretty Lambert, 2 a Rotterdam skipper, whom we have seen doing good service in the sea-fights with Frederic Spinola, captured the admiral of the Dunkirk pirate fleet, Adrian Dirkzoon. It was a desperate fight. Pretty Lambert, sustained at a distance by Rear-Admiral Gerbrantzon, laid himself yard-arm to yard-arm alongside the pirate vessel, boarded her, and after beating down all resistance made prisoners such of the crew as remained alive, and carried them into Rotterdam. Next day they were hanged to the number of sixty. A small number were pardoned on account of their youth, and a few individuals who effected their escape when led to the gallows, were not pursued. 3 The fact that the townspeople almost connived at the escape of these desperadoes showed that there had been a surfeit of hangings in Rotterdam. It is moreover not easy to distinguish with exactness the lines which in those days separated regular sea-belligerents, privateers, and pirates from each other. It had been laid down by the archdukes that there was no military law at sea, and that sick soldiers captured on the water should be hanged. Accordingly they were hanged. 4 Admiral Fazardo, of the Spanish royal navy, not only captured all the enemy's merchant vessels which came in his way, but hanged, drowned, and burned alive every man found on board. 5 Admiral Haultain, of the republican navy, had

1 Grotius, *ubi sup.*

2 „Mooi Lambert.”—Wagenaar, ix. 196.

3 Wagenaar, *ubi sup.* Meteren, 524<sup>vo</sup>.

4 Vide *supra* p. 117.

5 „Quarum naute mersi, suspensie, exusti.”

—Grotius, xv. 685.

1 Grotius, xv. 667, 669. Meteren, 522, 523.  
Wagenaar, ix. 191, 192. 2 Ibid.

just been occupied in drowning a whole regiment of Spanish soldiers, captured in English and German transports. The complaints brought against the English cruisers by the Hollanders for capturing and confiscating their vessels, and hanging, maiming, and torturing their crews—not only when England was neutral, but even when she was the ally of the republic—had been a standing topic for diplomatic discussion, and almost a standing joke. Why, therefore, these Dunkirk sea-rovers should not on the same principle be allowed to rush forth from their very convenient den to plunder friend and foe, burn ships, and butcher the sailors at pleasure, seems difficult

to understand. To expect from the inhabitants of this robbers' cave—this „church on the downs”—a code of maritime law so much purer and sterner than the system adopted by the English, the Spaniards, and the Dutch, was hardly reasonable. Certainly the Dunkirkers, who were mainly Netherlanders—rebels to the republic and partisans of the Spanish crown—did their best to destroy the herring fishery and to cut the throats of the fishermen, but perhaps they received the halter more often than other mariners who had quite as thoroughly deserved it. And this at last appeared the prevailing opinion in Rotterdam.

## CHAPTER XLV.

Preparations for the campaign of 1606—Diminution of Maurice's popularity—Quarrel between the pope and the Venetian republic—Surprise of Sluys by Du Terrail—Dilatoriness of the republic's operations—Movements of Spinola—Influence of the weather on the military transactions of the year—Endeavours of Spinola to obtain possession of the Waal and Yssel—Surrender of Lochem to Spinola—Siege of Groll—Siege and loss of Rheinberg—Munity in the Catholic army—Recovery of Lochem by Maurice—Attempted recovery of Groll—Sudden appearance of the enemy—Withdrawal of the besieging army—Close of the campaign—End of the war of independence—Motives of the Prince in his actions before Groll—Cruise of Admiral Haultain to the coast of Spain and Portugal—His encounter with the war-ships of Fazardo—Courageous conduct of the vice-admiral—Deaths of Justus Lipsius, Hohenlo, and Count John of Nassau.

AFTER the close of the campaign of 1605 Spinola had gone once more to Spain. On his passage through Paris he had again been received with distinguished favour by that warm ally of the Dutch republic, Henry IV., and on being questioned by that monarch as to his plans for the next campaign had replied that he intended once more to cross the Rhine, and invade Friesland. Henry, convinced that the Genoese would of course not tell him the truth

on such an occasion, wrote accordingly to the States-General that they might feel safe as to their eastern frontier. Whatever else might happen. Friesland and the regions adjacent would be safe next year from attack. 1 The immediate future was to show whether the subtle Italian had not compassed as neat a deception by telling the truth as coarser politicians could do by falsehood.

Spinola found the royal finances in most dismal condition. Three hundred thousand dollars a month 2 were the least estimate of the necessary expenses for carrying on the Netherland war, sum which could not possibly be spared by Lerma, Uceda, the Marquis of the Seven Churches, and other financiers then industriously occupied in draining dry the exchequer for their own uses. Once more the general aided his sovereign with purse and credit, as well as with his sword. Once more the exchange at Genoa was glutted with the acceptances of Marquis Spinola. 3 Here

1 Gallucci, 256, 257.

2 Bentivoglio, 538. Grotius, xv. 714.

3 Grot. xv. 680. Compare Gallucci, lib. xviii. xx.

at least was a man of a nature not quite so depraved as that of the parasites bred out of the corruption of a noble but dying commonwealth, and doubtless it was with gentle contempt that the great favourite and his friends looked at the military and financial enthusiasm of the volunteer. It was so much more sagacious to make a princely fortune, than to sacrifice one already inherited, in the service of one's country.

Spinola being thus ready not only to fight but to help to pay for the fighting, found his plans of campaigns received with great benignity by the king and his ministers. Meantime there was much delay. The enormous labours thus devolved upon one pair of shoulders by the do-nothing king and mayor of the palace whose soul was absorbed by his own private robberies, were almost too much for human strength. On his return to the Netherlands Spinola fell dangerously ill in Genoa, 1

Meantime, during his absence and the enforced idleness of the Catholic armies, there was an opportunity for the republicans to act with promptness and vigour. They displayed neither quality. Never had there been so much sluggishness as in the preparations for the campaign of 1606. The State's exchequer was lower than it had been for years. The republic was without friends. Left to fight their battle for national existence alone, the Hollanders found themselves perpetually subjected to hostile censure from their late allies, and to friendly advice still more intolerable. There were many brave Englishmen and Frenchmen sharing in the fatigues of the Dutch war of independence, but the governments of Henry and of James were as protective, as severely virtuous, as offensive, and, in their secret intrigues with the other belligerent, as mischievous as it was possible for the best-intentioned neutrals to be.

The fame and the popularity of the stadholder had been diminished by the results of the past campaign. The States-General were disappointed, dissatisfied, and inclined to censure very unreasonably the public servant who had always obeyed their decrees with docility. While Henry IV, was rapidly transferring his admiration from Maurice to Spinola, the disagreements at home between the Advocate and the Stadholder were becoming portentous.

There was a want of means and of soldiers for the new campaign. Certain causes were operating in Europe to the disadvantage of both belligerents. In the south, Venice had almost drawn her sword against the pope in her settled resolution to put down the Jesuits and to clip the wings of the church party, before, with bequests and donations, votive churches and magnificent monasteries, four-fifths of the domains of the republic should fall into mortmain, as was already the case in Brabant. 1

Naturally there was a contest between the ex-Huguenot; now eldest son of the Church, and the most Catholic king, as to who should soonest defend the pope. Henry offered thorough protection to his Holiness, but only under condition that he should have a monopoly of that protection. 2 He lifted his sword, but meantime it was doubtful whether the blow was to descend upon Venice or upon Spain. The Spanish levies, on their way to the Netherlands, were detained in Italy by this new exigency. The States-General offered the sister republic their maritime assistance, and notwithstanding their own immense

1 Meteren, 536.

2 „Nec dissimulabat Hispanus Pontifici se auxilio futurum, que Gallus comperto significavit Romam, ita meritos majores suos ut ecclesie pericula non alias magis quam Francicas manus respicere deberent; sin Pontifex Hispanum prolatandæ dominationis avidum sibi assumeret haud immerito suspectum id sibi vel coactum contrariis in partibus fore.”—Grotius, xv, 713. Compare Meteren, 546v.



difficulties, stood ready to send a fleet to the Mediterranean. The offer was gratefully declined, and the quarrel with the pope arranged, but the incident laid the foundation of a lasting friendship between the only two important republics then existing. 1 The issue of the Gunpowder Plot, at the close of the preceding year, had confirmed James in his distaste for Jesuits, and had effected that which all the eloquence of the States-General and their ambassador had failed to accomplish, the prohibition of Spanish enlistments in his kingdom. Guido Fawkes had served under the archduke in Flanders.

Here then were delays additional to that caused by Spinola's 2 illness. On the other hand, the levies of the republic were for a season paralysed by the altercation, soon afterwards adjusted, between Henry IV. and the Duke of Bouillon, brother-in-law of the stadholder and of the Palatine, and by the petty war between the Duke and Hanseatic city of Brunswick, in which Ernest of Nassau was for a time employed. 3

During this period of almost suspended animation the war gave no signs of life, except in a few spasmodic efforts on the part of the irrepressible Du Terrail. Early in the spring, not satisfied with his double and disastrous repulse before Bergen-op-Zoom, that partisan now determined to surprise Sluys. That an attack was impending became known to the governor of that city, the experienced Colonel Van der Noot. Not dreaming, however, that any mortal—even the most audacious of Frenchmen and adventurers—would ever think of carrying a city like Sluys by surprise, defended as it was by a splendid citadel and by a whole chain of forts and water-batteries, and capable of withstanding three months long, as it had so recently

done, a siege in form by the acknowledged master of the beleaguering science, the methodical governor went calmly to bed one fine night in June. His slumbers were disturbed before morning by the sound of trumpets sounding Spanish melodies in the streets, and by a great uproar and shouting. Springing out of bed, he rushed half-dressed to the rescue. Less vigilant than Paul Bax had been the year before in Bergen, he found that Du Terrail had really effected a surprise. At the head of twelve hundred Walloons and Irishmen, that enterprising officer had waded through the drowned land of Cadzand, with the promised support of a body of infantry under Frederic Van den Berg, from Damm, had stolen noiselessly by the forts of that island unchallenged and unseen, had effected with petards a small breach through the western gate of the city, and with a large number of his followers, creeping two and two through the gap, had found himself for a time master of Sluys. 1

The profound silence of the place had however somewhat discouraged the intruders. The whole population were as sound asleep as the excellent commandant, but the stillness in the deserted streets suggested an ambush, and they moved stealthily forward, feeling their way with caution towards the centre of the town.

It so happened, moreover, that the sacristan had forgotten to wind up the great town clock. The agreement with the party first entering and making their way to the opposite end of the city, had been that at the striking of a certain hour after midnight they should attack simultaneously and with a great outcry all the guardhouses, so that the garrison might be simultaneously butchered. The clock never struck, the signal was never given, and Du Terrail and his immediate comrades remained

1 Grotius, xv. 684. Wagenaar, ix. 206 Meteren, 536.

2 Meteren, 526.

3 Wagenaar, ix. 199-203.

1 Grotius, xv. 687, *seqq.* Wagenaar, xi. 207, *seqq.*

near the western gate, suspicious and much perplexed. The delay was fatal. The guard, the whole garrison, and the townspeople flew to arms, and halfnaked, but equipped with pike and musket, and led on by Van der Noot in person, fell upon the intruders. A panic took the place of the previous audacity in the breasts of Du Terrail's followers. Thinking only of escape, they found the gap by which they had crept into the town much less convenient as a means of egress in the face of an infuriated multitude. Five hundred of them were put to death in a very few minutes. Almost as many were drowned or suffocated in the marshes, as they attempted to return by the road over which they June, 1606, had come. A few stragglers of the fifteen hundred were all that were left to tell the tale. 1

It would seem scarcely worth while to chronicle such trivial incidents in this great war—the all-absorbing drama of Christendom—were it not that they were for the moment the whole war. It might be thought that hostilities were approaching their natural termination, and that the war was dying of extreme old age, when the Quixotic pranks of a Du Terrail occupied so large a part of European attention. The winter had passed, another spring had come and gone, and Maurice had in vain attempted to obtain sufficient means from the States to take the field in force. Henry, looking on from the outside, was becoming more and more exasperated with the dilatoriness which prevented the republic from profiting by the golden moments of Spinola's enforced absence. 2 Yet the best that could be done seemed to be to take measures for defensive operations.

Spinola never reached Brussels until the beginning of June, yet, during all the good campaigning weather which had been fleeing away, not a blow had

been struck, nor a wholesome counsel taken by the stadholder or the States. It was midsummer before the armies were in the field. The plans of the Catholic general however then rapidly developed themselves. Having assembled as large a force as had ever been under his command, he now divided it into two nearly equal portions. Buequoy, with ten thousand foot, twelve hundred cavalry, and twelve guns, arrived on the 18th July at Mook, on the Meuse. Spinola, with eleven thousand infantry, two thousand horse, and eight guns, crossed the Rhine at the old redoubts of Ruhrort, and on the same 18th July took possession at Goor, in Overijssel. 2 The first plan of the commander-in-chief was to retrace exactly his campaign of the previous year, even as he had with so much frankness stated to Henry. But the republic, although deserted by her former friends, and looked upon askance by the monarch of Britain, and by the most Christian king, had this year a most efficient ally in the weather. Jupiter Pluvius had descended from on high to the rescue of the struggling commonwealth, and his decrees were omnipotent as to the course of the campaign. The seasons that year seemed all fused into one. It was difficult to tell on midsummer day whether it were midwinter, spring, or autumn. 3 The rain came down day after day, week after week, as if the contending armies and the very country which was to be invaded and defended were to be all washed out of existence together. 4 Friesland resolved itself into a vast quagmire; the roads became fluid, the rivers lakes. Spinola turned his face from the east, and proceeded to carry out a second plan which he had long

1 Van der Kemp, ii. 117, 520.

2 For the campaign of 1606 compare Grotius, xv. 689-699. Meteren, 537-543. Bentivoglio, 539-546. Van der Kemp, ii. 117-120, and notes. Wagenaar, ix. 209-220.

3 Bentivoglio, *ubi sup.*

4 Bentivoglio, Grotius, Meteren, *ubi sup.*

1 Wagenaar, ix. 207, *seqq.*

2 Van der Kemp, ii. 117, 520.

meditated, and even a more effective one; in the west.

The Waal and the Yssel formed two sides of a great quadrilateral, and furnished for the natural fortress, thus enclosed, two vast and admirable moats. Within lay Good-meadow and Foul-meadow—Bet-uwe and Vel-uwe—one, the ancient Batavian island which from time immemorial had given its name to the commonwealth, the other, the once dismal swamp which toil and intelligence had in the course of centuries transformed into the wealthy and flowery land of Gueldres.

Beyond, but in immediate proximity, lay the ancient episcopal city and province of Utrecht, over which lay the road to the adjacent Holland and Zeeland. The very heart of the republic would be laid bare to the conqueror's sword if he could once force the passage, and obtain the control of these two protecting streams. With Utrecht as his base, and all Brabant and Flanders—obedient provinces—at his back, Spinola might accomplish more in one season than Alva, Don John, and Alexander Farnese had compassed in forty years, and destroy at a blow what was still called the *Netherland rebellion*. The passage of the rivers once effected, the two enveloping wings would fold themselves together, and the conquest would be made.

Thus reasoned the brilliant young general, and his projects, although far-reaching, did not seem wild. The first steps were, however, the most important as well as the most difficult, and he had to reckon with a wary and experienced antagonist. Maurice had at last collected and reviewed at Arnhem an army of nearly fifteen thousand men, and was now watching closely from Doesburg and Deventer every movement of the foe.

Having been forced to a defensive campaign, in which he was not likely at best to gain many additional laurels,

he was the more determined to lay down his own life, and sacrifice every man he could bring into the field, before Spinola should march into the cherished domains of Utrecht and Holland. Meantime the rain, which had already exerted so much influence on the military movements of the year, still maintained the supremacy over human plans. The Yssel and the Waal, always deep, broad, sluggish, but dangerous rivers—the Rhine in its old age—were swollen into enormous proportions, their currents flowing for the time with the vigour of their far away youth.

Maurice had confided the defence of the Waal to Warner Du Bois, under whose orders he placed a force of about seven thousand men, and whose business it was to prevent Bucquoy's passage. His own task was to baffle Spinola.

Bucquoy's ambition was to cross the Waal at a point as near as possible to the fork of that stream with the true Rhine, seize the important city of Nymegen, and then give the hand to Spinola, so soon as he should be on the other side of the Yssel. At the village of Spardorp or Kekerdom, he employed Pompeo Giustiniani to make a desperate effort, having secured a large number of barges in which he embarked his troops. As the boatmen neared the opposite bank, however, they perceived that Warner Du Bois had made effective preparations for their reception. They lost heart, and on pretence that the current of the river was too rapid to allow them to reach the point proposed for their landing, gradually dropped down the stream, and, in spite of the remonstrances of the commanders, pushed their way back to the shore which they had left. From that time forth, the States' troops, in efficient numbers, fringed the inner side of the Waal, along the whole length of the Batavian island, while armed vessels of the republic

1 Meteren, Bentivoglio, Grotius, Wagenaar, Van der Kemp, *ubi sup.*



lie patrolled the stream itself. In vain Count Bucquoy watched an opportunity, either by surprise or by main strength, to effect a crossing. The Waal remained as impassable as if it were a dividing ocean. 1

On the other side of the quadrilateral, Maurice's dispositions were as effective as those of his lieutenant on the Waal. The left shore of the Yssel, along its whole length, from Arnhem and Doesburg quite up to Zwoll and Campen, where the river empties itself into the Zuyder Zee, was now sprinkled thickly with forts, hastily thrown up, but strong enough to serve the temporary purpose of the stadholder. In vain the fleet-footed and audacious Spinola moved stealthily or fiercely to and fro, from one point to another, seeking an opening through which to creep, or a weak spot where he might dash himself against the chain. The whole line was securely guarded. The swollen river, the redoubts, and the musketeers of Maurice, protected the heart of the republic from the impending danger.

Wearied of this fruitless pacing up and down, Spinola, while apparently intending an assault upon Deventer, and thus attracting his adversary's attention to that important city, suddenly swerved to the right, and came down

upon Lochem. The little town, with its very slender garrison, surrendered at once. It was not a great conquest, but it might possibly be of use in the campaign. It was taken before the stadholder could move a step to its assistance, even had he deemed it prudent to leave Yssel-side for an hour. The summer was passing away, the rain was still descending, and it was the 1st of August before Spinola left Lochem. He then made a rapid movement to the north, between Zwoll and Hasselt, endeavouring to cross the Blackwater, and seize Geelmuyden,

on the Zuyder Zee. Had he succeeded, he might have turned Maurice's position. But the works in that direction had been entrusted to an experienced campaigner, Warmelo, sheriff of Zalant, who received the impetuous Spinola and his lieutenant, Count Solre, so warmly, that they reeled backwards at last, after repeated assaults and great loss of men, and never more attempted to cross the Yssel. 1

Obviously, the campaign had failed. Utrecht and Holland were as far out of the Catholic general's reach as the stars in the sky, but at least, with his large armies, he could earn a few trophies barren or productive, as it might prove, before winter, uniting with the deluge, should drive him from the field.

On the 3rd August, he laid siege to Groll (or Groenlo), a fortified town of secondary importance in the county of Zutphen, and, squandering his men with much recklessness, in his determination not to be baffled, reduced the place in eleven days. Here he paused for a breathing spell, and then, renouncing all his schemes upon the inner defences of the republic, withdrew once more to the Rhine and laid siege to Rheinberg. 2

This frontier place had been tossed to and fro so often between the contending parties in the perpetual warfare that its inhabitants must have learned to consider themselves rather as a convenient circulating medium for military operations than as burghers who had any part in the ordinary business of life. It had old-fashioned defences of stone, which, during the recent occupation by the States, had been much improved, and had been strengthened with earthworks. Before it was besieged, Maurice sent his brother Frederic Henry, with some picked companies into

1 Meteren, Bentivoglio, Grotius, Wagenaar, Van der Kemp, *ubi sup.*

1 Authorities last cited.

2 Ibid.

the place, so that the garrison amounted to three thousand effective men.

The Prince de Soubise, brother of the Duc de Rohan, and other French volunteers of quality, also threw themselves into the place, in order to take lessons in the latest methods of attack and defence. 1 It was now admitted that no more accomplished pupil of the stadholder in the beleaguering art had appeared in Europe than his present formidable adversary. On this occasion, however, there was no great display of science. Maurice obstinately refused to move to the relief of the place, despite all the efforts of a disputation

of the States-General who 26 Sept. visited his camp in September, urging him strenuously to take the chances of a stricken field. 2

Nothing could induce the stadholder, who held an observing position at Wesel, with his back against the precious watery quadrilateral, to risk the defence of those most vital lines of the Yssel and the Waal. While attempting to save Rheinberg, he felt it possible that he might lose Nymegen, or even Utrecht. The swift but wily Genoese was not to be trifled with or lost sight of an instant. The road to Holland might still be opened, and the destiny of the republic might hang on the consequences of a single false move. That destiny, under God, was in his hands alone, and no chance of winning laurels; even from his greatest rival's head, could induce him to shrink from the path of duty, however obscure it might seem. There were a few brilliant assaults and sorties, as in all sieges, the French

volunteers, especially distin- 2 Oct. guishing themselves; but the place fell at the end of forty days. The garrison marched out with the honours of war. In the modern practice, armies were rarely captured in strongholds, nor were

the defenders, together with the population, butchered.

The loss, after a six weeks' siege, of Rheinberg, which six years before, with far inferior fortifications, had held out a much longer time against the States, was felt as a bitter disappointment throughout the republic. Frederic Henry, on leaving the place, made a feeble and unsuccessful demonstration against Venlo, by which the general dissatisfaction was not diminished. Soon afterwards, the war became more languid than ever. News arrived of a great crisis on the Genoa exchange. A multitude of merchants, involved in pecuniary transactions with Spinola, fell with one tremendous crash. The funds of the Catholic commander-in-chief were already exhausted. His acceptances could no longer be negotiated. 1 His credit was becoming almost as bad as the king's own. The inevitable consequence of the want of cash and credit followed. Mutiny, for the first time in Spinola's administration, raised its head once more, and stalked about defiant. Six hundred veterans marched to Breda, and offered their services to Justinus of Nassau. The proposal was accepted. 2 Other bands established their quarters in different places, chose their Elettos and lesser officers, and enacted the scenes which have been so often depicted in these pages. The splendid army of Spinola melted like April snow. By the last week of October there hardly seemed a Catholic army in the field. The commander-in-chief had scattered such companies as could still be relied upon in the villages of the friendly archiepiscopate of Cologne, and had obtained, not by murders and blackmail—according to the recent practice of the Admiral of Arragon, at whose grim name the whole countryside still shuddered—but from the friendship of the leading inhabitants and

1 Wagenaar, ix. 214, 215.

2 Van der Kemp, ii. 120.

1 Grotius, xv. 696, 697.

2 Grotius, Bentivoglio, Meteren, Wagenaar, *ubi sup.*

by honest loans, a sufficient sum to put bread into the mouths of the troops still remaining faithful to him. 1

The opportunity had at last arrived for the stadholder to strike a blow before the season closed. Bankruptcy and mutiny had reduced his enemy

24 Oct. to impotence in the very season of his greatest probable success. On the 24th October Maurice came before Lochem, which he recaptured in five days. Next in the order of Spinola's victories was Groll, which the stadholder at once besieged. He had almost fifteen thousand infantry and three thousand horse. 2 A career of brief triumph before winter should close in upon those dripping fields, seemed now assured. But the rain, which during nearly the whole campaign had been his potent ally, had of late been playing him false. The swollen Yssel, during a brief period of dry weather, had sunk so low in certain shallows as not to be navigable for his transports, 3 and after his trains of artillery and munitions had been dragged wearily overland as far as Groll, the deluge had returned in such force, that physical necessity as well as considerations of humanity compelled him to defer his intrenching operations until the weather should moderate. As there seemed no further danger to be apprehended from the broken mutinous, and dispersed forces of the enemy, the siege operations were conducted in a leisurely manner. What was the astonishment, therefore, among the soldiers, when a rumour flew about the camp in the early days of November, that the indomitable Spinola was again advancing upon them! 4 It was perfectly true. With extraordinary perseverance he had gathered up six or seven thousand infantry and twelve companies of horse—all the remnants of the splendid ar-

mies with which he had taken the field at midsummer—and was now marching to the relief of Groll, besieged as it was by a force at least doubly as numerous as his own. It was represented to the stadholder, however, that an impassable morass lay between him and the enemy, 1 and that there would therefore be time enough to complete his intrenchments before Spinola could put his foolhardy attempt into execution. But the Catholic general, marching faster than rumour itself, had crossed the impracticable swamp almost before a spadeful of earth had been turned in the republican camp. His advance was in sight even while the incredulous were sneering at the absurdity of his supposed project. Informed by scouts of the weakest point in the stadholder's extended lines, Spinola was directing himself thither with beautiful precision. 2 Maurice hastily contracted both his wings, and concentrated himself in the village of Lebel. At last the moment had come for a decisive struggle. There could be little doubt of the result. All the advantage was with the republican army. The Catholics had arrived in front of the enemy fatigued by forced marches through quagmires, in horrible weather, over roads deemed impassable. The States' troops were fresh, posted on ground of their own choosing, and partially intrenched. To the astonishment, even to the horror of the most eager portion of the army, the stadholder deliberately, and despite the groans of his soldiers, refused the combat, and gave immediate orders for raising the siege and abandoning the field. 3

On the 12th of November he broke up his camp and withdrew to a village called Zelem. On the same  
12 Nov. day the marquis, having relieved the city, without paying the expected price, retired in another direction, and established what was left of

1 Grotius, Bentivoglio, Meteren, Wagenaar, *ubi sup.*

2 Grotius, xv. 698.

3 Letter of Prince Maurice, in Van der Kemp, ii. 545.

4 Authorities cited.

1 Van der Kemp, ii. 21.

2 Grotius, xv. 699.

3 Authorities cited.



his army in the province of Munster. The campaign was closed.<sup>1</sup> And thus the great war, which had run its stormy course for nearly forty years, dribbled out of existence, sinking away that rainy November in the dismal fens of Zutphen. The long struggle for independence had come, almost unperceived, to an end.

Peace had not arrived, but the work of the armies was over for many a long year. Freedom and independence were secured. A deed or two, never to be forgotten by Netherland hearts, was yet to be done on the ocean, before the long and intricate negotiations for peace should begin, and the weary people permit themselves to rejoice; but the prize was already won.

Meantime, the conduct of Prince Maurice in these last days of the campaign was the subject of biting censure by friend and foe. The military fame of Spinola throughout Europe grew apace, and the fame of his great rival seemed to shrink in the same proportion.

Henry of France was especially indignant at what he considered the shortcomings of the republic and of its chief. Already, before the close of the summer, the agent Aerssens had written from Paris that his Majesty was very much displeased with Spinola's prosperity, ascribing it to the want of good councils on the part of the States' Government that so fine an army should lie idle so long, without making an attempt to relieve the beleaguered places, so that Spinola felt assured of taking anything as soon as he made his appearance. „Your Mightinesses cannot believe,” continued the agent, „what a trophy is made by the Spanish ministers out of these little exploits, and they have so much address at this court, that if such things continue they may produce still greater results.”<sup>2</sup>

In December he wrote that the king was so malcontent concerning the siege

of Groll as to make it impossible to answer him with arguments, that he openly expressed regret at not having employed the money lent to the States upon strengthening his own frontiers, so distrustful was he of their capacity for managing affairs, and that he mentioned with disgust statements received from his ambassador at Brussels and from the Duc de Rohan, to the effect that Spinola had between five and six thousand men only at the relief of Groll, against twelve thousand in the stadholder's army.<sup>1</sup>

The motives of the deeds and the omissions of the prince at this supreme moment must be pondered with great caution. The States-General had doubtless been inclined for vigorous movements, and Olden-Barneveld, with some of his colleagues, had visited the camp late in September to urge the relief of Rheinberg. Maurice was in daily correspondence with the Government, and regularly demanded their advice, by which, on many former occasions, he had bound himself, even when it was in conflict with his own better judgment.

But throughout this campaign the responsibility was entirely, almost ostentatiously, thrown by the States-General upon their commander-in-chief, and, as already indicated, their preparations in the spring and early summer had been entirely inadequate. Should he lose the army with which he had so quietly but completely checked Spinola in all his really important moves during the summer and autumn, he might despair of putting another very soon into the field. That his force in that November week before Groll was numerically far superior to the enemy is certain, but he had lost confidence in his cavalry since their bad behaviour at Mulheim the previous year, and a very large proportion of his infantry was on the sick-list at the moment of Spinola's approach. „Lest the continual bad weather should

<sup>1</sup> Authorities cited.

<sup>2</sup> Van der Kemp, ii. 549.

<sup>1</sup> Van der Kemp, ii. 550.

entirely consume the army," he said, "we are resolved, within a day or two after we have removed the sick who are here in great numbers, to break up, unless the enemy should give us occasion to make some attempt upon him." 1

Maurice was the servant of a small republic, contending single-handed against an empire still considered the most formidable power in the world. His cue was not necessarily to fight on all occasions; for delay often fights better than an army against a foreign invader. When a battle and a victory were absolutely necessary we have seen the magnificent calmness which at Nieuwport secured triumph under the shadow of death. Had he accepted Spinola's challenge in November, he would probably have defeated him and have taken Groll. He might not, however, have annihilated his adversary, who, even when worsted, would perhaps have effected his escape. The city was of small value to the republic. The principal advantage of a victory would have been increased military renown for himself. Viewed in this light, there is something almost sublime in the phlegmatic and perfectly republican composure with which he disdained laurels, easily enough, as it would seem, to have been acquired, and denied his soldiers the bloodshed and the suffering for which they were clamouring.

And yet, after thoroughly weighing and measuring all these circumstances, it is natural to regret that he did not on that occasion rise upon Spinola and smite him to the earth. The Lord had delivered him into his hands. The chances of his own defeat were small, its probable consequences, should it occur, insignificant. It is hardly conceivable that he could have been so completely overthrown as to allow the Catholic commander to do in November what he had tried all summer in vain to accomplish—cross the Yssel

and the Waal, with the dregs of his army, and invade Holland and Zeeland in midwinter, over the prostrate bodies of Maurice and all his forces. On the other hand, that the stadholder would have sent the enemy reeling back to his bogs, with hardly the semblance of an army at his heels, was almost certain. The effect of such a blow upon impending negotiations, and especially upon the impressive imagination of Henry and the pedantic shrewdness of James, would have been very valuable. It was not surprising that the successful soldier who sat on the French throne, and who had been ever ready to wager life and crown on the results of a stricken field, should be loud in his expressions of disapprobation and disgust. Yet no man knew better than the sagacious Gascon that fighting to win a crown, and to save a republic, were two essentially different things.

In the early summer of this year Admiral Haultain, whom we lately saw occupied with tossing Sarmiento's Spanish legion into the sea off the harbour of Dover, had been despatched to the Spanish coast on a still more important errand. The outward bound Portuguese merchantmen and the home returning fleets from America, which had been absent nearly two years, might be fallen in with at any moment, in the latitude of 36°-38°. The admiral, having received orders, therefore, to cruise carefully in those regions, sailed for the shores of Portugal with a squadron of twenty-four warships. His expedition was not very successful. He picked up a prize or two here and there, and his presence on the coast prevented the merchant-fleet from sailing out of Lisbon for the East Indies, the merchandise already on board being disembarked and the voyage postponed to a more favourable opportunity. He saw nothing, however, of the long-expected ships from the golden West Indies—as Mexico, Peru, and Brazil were then indiscriminately called

1 Letter of 9 November, 1606, in Van der camp, ii. 536.

—and, after parting company with six of his own ships, which were dispersed and damaged in a gale, and himself suffering from a dearth of provisions, he was forced to return without much gain or glory. 1

In the month of September he was once more despatched on the same service. He had nineteen war-galleots of the first class, and two yachts, well equipped and manned. 2 Vice-admiral of the fleet was Regnier Klaaszoon (or Nicholson), of Amsterdam, a name which should always be held fresh in remembrance, not only by mariners and Netherlanders, but by all men whose pulses can beat in sympathy with practical heroism.

The admiral coasted deliberately along the shores of Spain and Portugal. It seemed impossible that the golden fleets, which, as it was ascertained, had not yet arrived, could now escape the vigilance of the Dutch cruisers. An occasional merchant-ship or small war-galley was met from time to time and chased into the harbours. A landing was here and there effected and a few villages burned. But these were not the prizes nor the trophies sought. On the 19th

September a storm off the Portuguese coast scattered the fleet; six of the best and largest ships being permanently lost sight of and separated from the rest. With the other thirteen Haultain now cruised off Cape St. Vincent directly across the ordinary path of the homeward-bound treasure-ships.

On the 6th October many sails were descried in the distance, and the longing eyes of the Hollanders were at last gratified with what was supposed to be the great West India commercial squadrons. The delusion was brief. Instead of innocent and richly-freighted merchantmen, the new comers soon proved to be the war-ships of

Admiral Don Luis de Fazardo, eighteen great galleons and eight galleys strong, besides lesser vessels—the most formidable fleet that for years had floated in those waters. There had been time for Admiral Haultain to hold but a very brief consultation with his chief officers. As it was manifest that the Hollanders were enormously over-matched, it was decided to manœuvre as well as possible for the weather-gage, and then to fight or to effect an escape, as might seem most expedient after fairly testing the strength of the enemy. It was blowing a fresh gale, and the Netherland fleet had as much as they could stagger with under close-reefed topsails. 1 The war-galleys, fit only for fair weather, were soon forced to take refuge under the lee of the land, but the eighteen galleons, the most powerful vessels then known to naval architecture, were bearing directly down, full before the wind, upon the Dutch fleet 2

It must be admitted that Admiral Haultain hardly displayed as much energy now as he had done in the Straits of Dover against the unarmed transports the year before. His ships were soon scattered, right and left, and the manœuvres for the weather-gage resolved themselves into a general scramble for escape. 3 Vice-Admiral Klaaszoon alone held firm, and met the onset of the first comers of the Spanish fleet. A fierce combat, yard-arm to yard-arm, ensued. Klaaszoon's mainmast went by the board, but Haultain, with five ships, all that could be rallied, coming to the rescue, the assailants for a moment withdrew. Five Dutch vessels of moderate strength were now in action against the eighteen great galleons of Fazardo. Certainly it was not an even game, but it might have been played with more heart and better skill. There was but

1 Meteren, *ubi sup.*

2 Meteren, *ubi sup.* It is true that two or three carracks of large size, and mounting twenty-two guns, were scattered among the galleons.

3 Ibid.

1 Grotius, xv. 685. Wagenaar, 221, *segg.*

2 Meteren, 541. Grotius, xv. 699, 700. Wagenaar, ix. 220-224.



a half-hour of daylight left when Klaas-zoon's crippled ship was again attacked. 1 This time there was no attempt to offer him assistance; the rest of the Dutch fleet crowding all the sails their masts would bear, and using all the devices of their superior seamanship, not to harass the enemy, but to steal as swiftly as possible out of his way. Honestly confessing that they dared not come into the fight, they bore away for dear life in every direction. 2 Night came on, and the last that the fugitives knew of the events off Cape St. Vincent was that stout Regnier Klaaszoom had been seen at sunset in the midst of the Spanish fleet; the sound of his broadsides saluting their ears as they escaped.

Left to himself, alone in a dismasted ship, the vice-admiral never thought of yielding to the eighteen Spanish galleons. To the repeated summons of Don Luis Fazardo that he should surrender he remained obstinately deaf. Knowing that it was impossible for him to escape, and fearing that he might blow up his vessel rather than surrender, the enemy made no attempt to board. Spanish chivalry was hardly more conspicuous on this occasion than Dutch valour, as illustrated by Admiral Haultain. Two whole days and nights Klaaszoom drifted about in his crippled ship, exchanging broadsides with his antagonists, and with his colours flying on the stump of his mast. The fact would seem incredible, were it not attested by perfectly trustworthy contemporary accounts. At last his hour seemed to have come. His ship was sinking; a final demand for surrender, 3 with promise of quarter,

was made. Out of his whole crew but sixty remained alive; many of them badly wounded.

He quietly announced to his officers and men his decision never to surrender, in which all concurred. They knelt together upon the deck, and the admiral made a prayer in which all fervently joined. With his own hand Klaaszoom then lighted the powder magazine, and the ship was blown into the air. Two sailors, all that were left alive, were picked out of the sea by the Spaniards and brought on board one of the vessels of the fleet. Desperately mutilated, those grim Dutchmen lived a few minutes to tell the tale, and then died defiant on the enemy's deck. 1

Yet it was thought that a republic, which could produce men like Regnier Klaaszoom and his comrades, could be subjected again to despotism, after a war for independence of forty years, and that such sailors could be forbidden to sail the eastern and western seas. No epigrammatic phrase has been preserved of this simple Regnier, the son of Nicholas. He only did what is sometimes talked about in phraseology more or less melo-dramatic, and did it in a very plain way.

Such extreme deeds may have become so much less necessary in the world, that to threaten them is apt to seem fantastic. Exactly at that crisis of history, however, and especially in view of the Dutch admiral commanding having refused a combat of one to three, the speechless self-devotion of the vice-admiral was better than three years of eloquent arguments and a ship-load of diplomatic correspondence, such as were already impending over the world.

Admiral Haultain returned with all ships uninjured—the six missing vessels having found their way at last safely

1 Meteren, *ubi sup.* It is true that two or three carracks of large size, and mounting twenty-two guns, were scattered among the galleons.

2 „Ende daernade bleef den vice-admirael van d'een ende van d'ander verlaten d'een hem excuseerende of d'ander maer meest datse de Spaensche schepen niet dorsten aendoen.”—Meteren, 541.

3 Meteren, *ubi sup.* Ibid. Grot. xv. 700. Wagenaar, ix. 223.

1 Duo semiusti paulum provixere ab Hispanio excepti cum miraculo spectantibus horridos vultus vocesque in ipsa morte contumaciam.”—Grot. *ubi sup.* Meteren. Wagenaar.

back to the squadron—but with a very great crack to his reputation. It was urged very justly, both by the States-General and the 'public, that if one ship under a determined commander could fight the whole Spanish fleet two days and nights, and sink unconquered at last, ten ships more might have put the enemy to flight, or at least have saved the vice-admiral from destruction. 1

But very few days after the incidents just described, the merchant fleet which, instead of Don Luis Fazardo's war galleons, Admiral Haultain had so longed to encounter, arrived safely at San Lucar. It was the most splendid treasure fleet that had ever entered a Spanish port, and the Dutch admiral's heart might well have danced for joy, had he chanced to come a little later on the track. There were fifty ships, under charge of General Alonzo de Ochores Galindo and General Ganevaye. They had on board, according to the registers, 1,914,176 dollars worth of bullion for the king, and 6,086,617 dollars for merchants, or 8,000,000 dollars in all, besides rich cargoes of silk, cochineal, sarsaparilla, indigo, Brazil-wood, and hides; the result of two years of pressure upon Peruvians, Mexicans, and Brazilians. Never had Spanish finances been at so low an ebb. Never was so splendid an income more desirable. The king's share of the cargo was enough to pay half the arrearages due to his mutinous troops; and for such housekeeping this was to be in funds. 2

There were no further exploits on land or sea that year. There were, however, deaths of three personages

often mentioned in this history. The learned Justus Lipsius died in Louvain, a good editor and scholar, and as sincere a Catholic at last as he had been alternately a bigoted Calvinist and earnest Lutheran. His reputation was thought to have suffered by his late publications, 1 but the world at large was occupied with sterner stuff than those classic productions, and left the final decision to posterity.

A man of a different mould, the turbulent, high-born, hard-fighting, hard-drinking Hohenlo, died also this year, brother-in-law and military guardian, subsequently rival and political and personal antagonist, of Prince Maurice. His daring deeds and his troublesome and mischievous adventures have been recounted in these pages. His name will be always prominent in the history of the republic, to which he often rendered splendid service, but he died, as he had lived, a glutton and a melancholy sot. 2

The third remarkable personage who passed away was one whose name will be remembered as long as the Netherlands have a history, old Count John of Nassau, only surviving brother of William the Silent. 3 He had been ever prominent and deeply interested in the great religious and political movements of upper and lower Germany, and his services in the foundation of the Dutch commonwealth were signal, and ever generously acknowledged. At one period, as will be recollected, he was stadholder of Gelderland, and he was ever ready with sword, purse, and counsel to aid in the great struggle for independence.

1 Meteren, Wagenaar, *ubi sup.*

2 Meteren, 541vo.

1 Grotius, xv. 709.

2 Grotius, xv. 708.

3 *Ibid.*

## CHAPTER XLVI.

*General desire for peace—Political aspect of Europe—Designs of the kings of England, France, and Spain concerning the United Provinces—Matrimonial schemes of Spain—Conference between the French ministers and the Dutch envoy—Confidential revelations—Henry's desire to annex the Netherlands to France—Discussion of the subject—Artifice of Barneveld—Impracticability of a compromise between the Provinces and Spain—Formation of a West India Company—Secret mission from the archdukes to the Hague—Reply of the States-General—Return of the archdukes' envoy—Arrangement of an eight months' armistice.*

THE general tendency towards a pacification in Europe at the close of the year could hardly be mistaken. The languor of fatigue, rather than any sincere desire for peace seemed to make negotiations possible. It was not likely that great truths would yet be admitted, or that ruling individuals or classes would recognize the rise of a new system out of the rapidly dissolving elements of the one which had done its work. War was becoming more and more expensive, while commerce, as the world slowly expanded itself, and manifested its unsuspected resources, was becoming more and more lucrative. It was not, perhaps, that men hated each other less, but that they had for a time exhausted their power and their love for slaughter. Meanwhile new devices for injuring humanity and retarding its civilization were revealing themselves out of that very intellectual progress which ennobled the new era. Although war might still be regarded as the normal condition of the civilized world, it was possible for the chosen ones to whom the earth and its fulness belonged, to inflict general damage otherwise than by perpetual battles.

In the east, west, north, and south of Europe peace was thrusting itself as it were uncalled for and unexpected upon the general attention. Charles and his nephew Sigismund, and the false De-

metrius, and the intrigues of the Jesuits, had provided too much work for Sweden, Poland, and Russia to leave those countries much leisure for mingling in the more important business of Europe at this epoch, nor have their affairs much direct connection with this history. Venice, in its quarrels with the Jesuits, had brought Spain, France, and all Italy into a dead lock, out of which a compromise had been made not more satisfactory to the various parties than compromises are apt to prove. The Dutch republic still maintained the position which it had assumed, a quarter of a century before, of actual and legal independence; while Spain, on the other hand, still striving after universal monarchy, had not, of course, abated one jot of its pretensions to absolute dominion over its rebellious subjects in the Netherlands.

The holy Roman and the sublime Ottoman empires had also drifted into temporary peace; the exploits of the Persians and other Asiatic movements having given Ahmed more work than was convenient on his eastern frontier, while Stephen Botschkay had so completely got the better of Rudolph in Transylvania as to make repose desirable. So there was a treaty between the great Christian on the basis of what each possessed; Stephen Botschkay was recognized as prince of Transylvania with part of Hungary, and, when taken off soon afterwards by family poison, he recommended on his death-bed the closest union between Hungary and Transylvania, as well as peace with the emperor, so long as it might be compatible with the rights of the Magyars. 1

France and England, while suspecting each other, dreading each other, and very sincerely hating each other, were drawn into intimate relations by

1 Grotius, xv. 712, 713. Meteren, 543.



their common detestation of Spain, with which power both had now formal treaties of alliance and friendship. This was the result of their mighty projects for humbling the house of Austria and annihilating its power. England hated the Netherlands because of the injuries she had done them, and more than all on account of the daily increasing commercial rivalry between the two most progressive states in Christendom, the two powers which, comparatively weak as they were in territory, capital, and population; were most in harmony with the spirit of the age.

The Government of England was more hostile than its people to the United Provinces. James never spoke of the Netherlands but as upstarts and rebels, whose success ought to be looked upon with horror by the Lord's anointed everywhere. He could not shut his eyes to the fact that, with the republic destroyed, and a Spanish sacerdotal despotism established in Holland and Zeeland, with Jesuit seminaries in full bloom in Amsterdam and the Hague, his own rebels in Ireland might prove more troublesome than ever, and gunpowder plots in London become common occurrences. The Earl of Tyrone at that very moment was receiving enthusiastic hospitality at the archduke's court, much to the disgust of the Presbyterian sovereign of the United Kingdom, who nevertheless, despite his cherished theology, was possessed with an unconquerable craving for a close family alliance with the most Catholic king. His ministers were inclined to Spain, and the British Government was at heart favourable to some kind of arrangement by which the Netherlands might be reduced to the authority of their former master, in case no scheme could be carried into effect for acquiring a virtual sovereignty over those provinces by the British crown. Moreover, and most of all, the King of France being supposed to contemplate the an-

nexation of the Netherlands to his own dominions, the jealousy excited by such ambition made it even possible for James's Government to tolerate the idea of Dutch independence. Thus the court and cabinet of England were as full of contradictory hopes and projects as a madman's brain.

The rivalry between the courts of England and France for the Spanish marriages, and by means of them to obtain ultimately the sovereignty of all the Netherlands, was the key to most of the diplomacy and interpalatial intrigue of the several first years of the century. The negotiations of Cornwallis at Madrid were almost simultaneous with the schemes of Villeroy and Rosny at Paris.

A portion of the English Government, so soon as its treaty with Spain had been signed, seemed secretly determined to do as much injury to the republic as might lie in its power. While he heart convinced that the preservation of the Netherlands was necessary for England's safety, it was difficult for James and the greater part of his advisers to overcome their repugnance to the republic, and their jealousy of the great commercial successes which the republic had achieved. 1

It was perfectly plain that a continuance of the war by England and the Netherlands united would have very soon ended in the entire humiliation of Spain. 2 Now that peace had been made,

1 „For my own particular,” wrote Cornwallis, „though I hold the preservation of the Low Countries most wholesome and necessary for the kingdom of Great Britain, yet dare I not wish their strength and wealth much increased; it being better to endure an advantage in a monarchy than in a people of their condition.”—*Memorials of affairs of State, from the Papers of Sir Ralph Winwood, London, 1725. Vol. ii. p. 76.*

„Though we must respect the Hollanders,” wrote the Earl of Northampton, „(for such reasons as need no dilatation to a man of your capacity), yet we resolve to mark our favours that they be without exception to Spain.”—*Ibid. pp. 92, 93.*

2 „The King” (of Spain) wrote Cornwallis

however, it was thought possible that England might make a bargain with her late enemy for destroying the existence and dividing the territory of her late ally. Accordingly the Spanish cabinet lost no time in propounding, under seal of secrecy, and with even more mystery than was usually employed by the most Catholic court, a scheme for the marriage of the Prince of Wales with the Infanta; the bridal pair, when arrived at proper age, to be endowed with all the Netherlands, both obedient and republican, in full sovereignty. One thing was necessary to the carrying out of this excellent plot,—the reduction of the republic into her ancient subjection to Spain before her territory could be transferred to the future Princess of Wales.<sup>1</sup>

„being now freed from the distractions he was wont to find by the encounters of the English, proceeds against the Hollanders with more life and hope. If this peace had not been concluded, in mine own understanding I see not how it had been possible for him to have borne out the infinite weight of charges and business laid upon him.” And again, „England never lost such an opportunity of winning honour and wealth as by relinquishing the war with Spain. The king and kingdom were reduced to such estate as they could not in all likelihood have endured the space of two years more; his own treasury was exhausted, his rents and customs assigned for the most part for money borrowed, his nobility poor and much indebted, his merchants wasted, his people of the country in all extremity of necessity, his devices of gaining by the increase of the valuation of money and other such of that nature all played over; his credit in borrowing by means of the uncertainty of his estate during the war with England, much decayed; the subjects of his many distracted dominions held in obedience by force and fear, not by love and duty. Himself very young, and in that regard with this people in no great veneration, and the less for suffering himself to be wholly governed by a man (viz. Duke of Lerma) generally hated of his own country. If this state, standing on such feeble foundations, had made but one such stumble as his father did in the time of the late queen, hardly could he have recovered without a fall; his nearest and last-gained kingdoms more hurting this nation than any other, desiring nothing more than the ruin of it.”—*Ibid* 72, 75, 76.

<sup>1</sup> The important facts connected with this

It was proposed by the Spanish Government that England should undertake this part of the job, and that King James for such service should receive an annual pension of one million ducats a year. It was also stipulated that certain cities in the republican dominions should be pledged to him as security for the regular payment of that stipend. <sup>1</sup> Sir Charles Cornwallis, English ambassador in Spain, lent a most favourable ear to these proposals, and James eagerly sanctioned them so soon as they were secretly imparted to that monarch. „The king here,” said Cornwallis, „hath need of the King of Great Britain’s arm. Our king . . . hath good occasion to use the help of the King of Spain’s purse. The assistance of England to help this nation out of that quicksand of the Low countries, where so long they have struggled to tread themselves out, and by proof find that they sink deeper in, will be a sovereign medicine to the malady of this estate. The addition of a million of ducats to the revenue of our sovereign will be a good help to his estate.”<sup>2</sup>

The Spanish Government had even the effrontery to offer the English envoy a reward of two hundred thousand if the negotiations should prove successful. <sup>3</sup> Care was to be taken however that Great Britain, by this accession of power, both present and in prospect, should not grow too great, Spain reserving to herself certain strongholds and maritime positions in the Netherlands, for the proper security of her European and Indian commerce. <sup>4</sup>

It was thought high time for the intrigue—except such as, being too delicate to be committed to paper, were entrusted to confidential agents—may be found in Winwood’s *Memorials*, vol. ii. pp. 160-177. Compare Van Deventer, iii. 74.

<sup>1</sup> See in particular Winwood, ii. 160, 161.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid*. 177.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid*. 215 Cornwallis repelled with indignation the attempts to bribe him. „Would they give me for every crown a million, I would not think upon so unfaithful a work.” he said.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid*. 160.

bloodshed to cease in the provinces; and as England, by making a treaty of peace with Spain when Spain was at the last gasp, had come to the rescue of that power, it was logical that she should complete the friendly work by compelling the rebellious provinces to awake from their dream of independence. If the statesmen of Holland believed in the possibility of that independence, the statesmen of England knew better. If the turbulent little republic was not at last convinced that it had no right to create so much turmoil and inconvenience for its neighbours and for Christendom in general in order to maintain its existence, it should be taught its duty by the sovereigns of Spain and Britain. 1

It was observed, however, that the more greedily James listened day after day to the marriage propositions, the colder became the Spanish cabinet in regard to that point, the more disposed to postpone those nuptials to „God’s providence and future event.” 2

The high hopes founded on these secret stratagems were suddenly dashed to the earth before the end of the year; the explosion of the Gunpowder Plot blowing the castles in Spain into the air.

Of course the Spanish politicians vied with each other in expressions of horror and indignation at the Plot, and the wicked contrivers thereof, and suggested to Cornwallis that the King of France was probably at the bottom of it, 3

They declined to give up Owen and Baldwin, however, and meantime the

1 „Never can those other people (viz. of the United Provinces) take a better opportunity to compound so great a difference, neither can they require more, with any proportion of reason and justice, than will be yielded unto them. If their purpose be to maintain a popular liberty with the yearly effusion of so much blood, and the infesting of all Christendom so as a few particulars may continue the means of their authority, and enrich themselves, they will by his Majesty be unmasked.”—Sir Charles Cornwallis to Earl of Salisbury. Winwood, ii. 174.

2 Ibid. 166.

3 Ibid. 173.

negotiations for the marriage of the Prince of Wales and the Infanta, the million ducats of yearly pension for the needy James, and the reduction of the Dutch republic to its ancient slavery to Spain „under the eye and arm of Britain,” faded indefinitely away. Salisbury indeed was always too wise to believe in the possibility of the schemes with which James and some of his other counsellors had been so much infatuated.

It was almost dramatic that these plottings between James and the Catholic king against the life of the republic should have been signally and almost simultaneously avenged by the conspiracy of Guido Fawkes.

On the other hand, Rosny had imparted to the Dutch envoy the schemes of Henry and his ministers in regard to the same object, early in 1605. „Spain is more tired of the war,” said he to Aerssens, under seal of absolute secrecy, „than you are yourselves. She is now negotiating for a marriage between the Dauphin and the Infanta, and means to give her the United Provinces, as at present constituted, for a marriage portion. Villeroy and Sillery believe the plan feasible, but demand all the Netherlands together. As for me, I shall have faith in it if they send their Infanta hither at once, or make a regular cession of the territory. Do you believe that my lords the States will agree to the proposition?” 1

It would be certainly difficult to match in history the effrontery of such a question. The republican envoy was asked point blank whether his country would resign her dearly gained liberty and give herself as a dowry for Philip the Second’s three-years-old granddaughter. Aerssens replied cautiously that he had never heard the matter discussed in the provinces. It had always been thought that the French king had no pretensions to their territory, but had ever advocated their independence.

1 Deventer, 41.



He hinted that such a proposition was a mere apple of discord thrown between two good allies by Spain. Rosny admitted the envoy's arguments, and said that his Majesty would do nothing without the consent of the Dutch Government, and that he should probably be himself sent ere long to the Hague to see if he could not obtain some little recognition from the States. 1

Thus it was confidentially revealed to the agent of the republic that her candid adviser and ally was hard at work, in conjunction with her ancient enemy, to destroy her independence, annex her territory, and appropriate to himself all the fruits of her great war, her commercial achievements, and her vast sacrifices; while, as we have just seen, English politicians at the same moment were attempting to accomplish the same feat for England's supposed advantage. All that was wished by Henry to begin with was a little, a very little, recognition of his sovereignty. „You will do well to reflect on this delicate matter in time,” wrote Aerssens to the Advocate; „I know that the King of Spain is inclined to make this offer, and that they are mad enough in this place to believe the thing feasible. For me, I reject all such talk until they have got the Infanta—that is to say, until the Greek Kalends. I am ashamed that they should believe it here, and fearful that there is still more evil concealed than I know of.” 2

Towards the close of the year 1606 the French Government became still more eager to carry out their plans of alliance and absorption. Aerssens, who loved a political intrigue better than became a republican envoy, was perfectly aware of Henry's schemes. He was disposed to humour them, in order to make sure of his military assistance, but with the secret intention of seeing them frustrated by the determined opposition of the States.

The French ministers, by command of their sovereign, were disposed to deal very plainly. They informed the Dutch diplomatist, with very little circumlocution, that if the republic wished assistance from France she was to pay a heavy price for it. Not a pound of flesh only, but the whole body corporate, was to be surrendered if its destruction was to be averted by French arms.

„You know,” said Sillery, „that princes in all their actions consider their interests, and his Majesty has not so much affection for your conservation as to induce him to resign his peaceful position. Tell me, I pray you, what would you do for his Majesty in case anything should be done for you? You were lately in Holland. Do you think that they would give themselves to the king if he assisted them? Do you not believe that Prince Maurice has designs on the sovereignty, and would prevent the fulfilment of the king's hopes? What will you do for us in return for our assistance? 1

Aerssens was somewhat perplexed, but he was cunning at fence. „We will do all we can,” said he, „for any change is more supportable than the yoke of Spain.”

„What can you do then?” persisted Sillery. „Give us your opinion in plain French, I beg of you, and lay aside all passion; for we have both the same object—your preservation. Besides interest, his Majesty has affection for you. Let him only see some advantage for himself to induce him to assist you more powerfully. Suppose you should give us what you have and what you may acquire in Flanders, with the promise to treat secretly with us when the time comes. Could you do that?” 2

The envoy replied that this would be tearing the commonwealth in pieces. If places were given away, the jealousy

1 Deventer. 42.

2 Ibid. 43.

1 Aerssens to Olden-Barneveld, 7 Oct. 1606, in Deventer, iii. 87-93.

2 Aerssens to Olden-Barneveld, *ubi sup.*

of the English would be excited. Certainly it would be no light matter to surrender Sluys, the fruit of Maurice's skill and energy, the splendidly earned equivalent for the loss of Ostend. „As to Sluys and other places in Flanders,” said Aerssens, „I don't know if towns comprised in our Union, could be transferred or pledged without their own consent and that of the States. Should such a thing get wind we might be ruined. Nevertheless I will write to learn what his Majesty may hope.”

„The people,” returned Sillery, „need know nothing of this transfer; for it might be made secretly by Prince Maurice, who could put the French quietly into Sluys and other Flemish places. Meantime you had best make a journey to Holland to arrange matters so that the deputies, coming hither, may be amply instructed in regard to Sluys, and no time be lost. His Majesty is determined to help you if you know how to help yourselves.” 1

The two then separated, Sillery enjoining it upon the envoy to see the king next morning, „in order to explain to his Majesty, as he had just been doing to himself, that this sovereignty could not be transferred, without the consent of the whole people, nor the people be consulted in secret.”

„It is necessary therefore to be armed,” continued Henry's minister very significantly, „before aspiring to the sovereignty.” 2

Thus there was a faint glimmer of appreciation at the French court of the meaning of popular sovereignty. It did not occur to the minister that the right of giving consent was to be respected. The little obstacle was to be overcome by stratagem and by force. Prince Maurice was to put French garrisons stealthily into Sluys and other towns conquered by the republic in Flanders. Then the magnanimous ally was to rise

at the right moment and overcome all resistance by force of arms. The plot was a good one. It is passing strange, however, that the character of the Nassaus and of the Dutch nation should after the last fifty years have been still so misunderstood. It seemed in France possible that Maurice would thus defile his honour and the Netherlanders barter their liberty, by accepting a new tyrant in place of the one so long ago deposed.

„This is the marrow of our conference,” said Aerssens to Barneveld, reporting the interview, „and you may thus perceive whither are tending the designs of his Majesty. It seems that they are aspiring here to the sovereignty, and all my letters have asserted the contrary. If you will examine a little more closely, however, you will find that there is no contradiction. This acquisition would be desirable for France if it could be made peacefully. As it can only be effected by war you may make sure that it will not be attempted; for the great maxim and basis of this kingdom is to preserve repose, and at the same time give such occupation to the King of Spain that his means shall be consumed, and his designs frustrated. All this will cease if we make peace.

„Thus in treating with the king we must observe two rules. The first is that we can maintain ourselves no longer unless powerfully assisted, and that the people inclining to peace, we shall be obliged to obey the people. Secondly, we must let no difficulty appear as to the desire expressed by his Majesty to have the sovereignty of these provinces. We ought to let him hope for it, but to make him understand that by ordinary and legitimate means he cannot aspire to it. We will make him think that we have an equal desire with himself, and we shall thus take from those evil-disposed counsellors the power to injure us who are always persuading him that he is only making us great for ourselves, and thus giving us the

1 Aerssens to Olden-Barneveld, *ubi sup.*  
2 Ibid.

power to injure him. In short, the king can hope nothing from us overtly, and certainly nothing covertly. By explaining to him that we require the authorization of the people, and by showing ourselves prompt to grant his request, he will be the very first to prevent us from taking any steps, in order that his repose may not be disturbed. I know that France does not wish to go to war with Spain. Let us then pretend that we wish to be under the dominion of France, and that we will lead our people to that point if the king desires it, but that it cannot be done secretly. Believe me, he will not wish it on such conditions, while we shall gain much by this course. Would to God that we would engage France in war with Spain. All the utility would be ours, and in the accidents of arms would so press them to Spain, Italy, and other places, that they would have little leisure to think of us. Consider all this and conceal it from Buzanval." 1

Buzanval, it is well known, was the French envoy at the Hague, and it must be confessed that these schemes and paltry falsehoods on the part of the Dutch agent were as contemptible as any of the plots contrived every day in Paris or Madrid. Such *basé coin* as this was still circulating in diplomacy as if fresh from the Machiavellian mint; but the republican agent ought to have known that his Government had long ago refused to pass it current.

So afterwards this grave matter was discussed at the Hague between Henry's envoy and Barneveld. It was a very delicate negotiation. The Advocate wished to secure the assistance of a powerful but most unscrupulous ally, and at the same time to conceal his real intention to frustrate the French design upon the independence of the republic.

Disingenuous and artful as his conduct unquestionably was, it may at least be

questioned whether in that age of deceit any other great statesman would have been more frank. If the comparatively weak commonwealth, by openly and scornfully refusing all the insidious and selfish propositions of the French king, had incurred that monarch's wrath, it would have taken a noble position no doubt, but it would have perhaps been utterly destroyed. The Advocate considered himself justified in using the artifices of war against a subtle and dangerous enemy who wore the mask of a friend. When the price demanded for military protection was the voluntary abandonment of national independence in favour of the protector, the man who guided the affairs of the Netherlands did not hesitate to humour and to outwit the king who strove to subjugate the republic. At the same time—however one may be disposed to censure the dissimulation from the standing-ground of a lofty morality—it should not be forgotten that Barneveld never hinted at any possible connivance on his part with an infraction of the laws. Whatever might be the result of time, of persuasion, of policy, he never led Henry or his ministers to believe that the people of the Netherlands could be deprived of their liberty by force or fraud. He was willing to play a political game, in which he felt himself inferior to no man, trusting to his own skill and coolness for success. If the tyrant were defeated, and at the same time made to serve the cause of the free commonwealth, the Advocate believed this to be fair play.

Knowing himself surrounded by gamblers and tricksters, he probably did not consider himself to be cheating because he did not play his cards upon the table.

So when Buzanval informed him early in October that the possession of Sluys and other Flemish towns would not be sufficient for the king, but that they must offer the sovereignty on even more

1 Aersens to Olden-Barneveld, *ubi sup.*



favourable conditions than had once been proposed to Henry III., the Advocate told him roundly that my lords the States were not likely to give the provinces to any man, but meant to maintain their freedom and their rights. 1 The envoy replied that his Majesty would be able to gain more favour perhaps with the common people of the country.

When it is remembered that the States had offered the sovereignty of the provinces to Henry III., abjectly and as it were without any conditions at all; 2 the effrontery of Henry IV. may be measured, who claimed the same sovereignty, after twenty years of republican independence, upon even more favourable terms than those which his predecessor had rejected.

Barneveld, in order to mitigate the effect of his plump refusal of the royal overtures, explained to Buzanval, what Buzanval very well knew, that the times had now changed; that in those days, immediately after the death of William the Silent, despair and disorder had reigned in the provinces, „while that dainty delicacy—liberty—had not so long been sweetly tickling the appetites of the people; that the English had not then acquired their present footing in the country, nor the house of Nassau the age, the credit, and authority to which it had subsequently attained. 3

He then intimated—and here began the deception, which certainly did not deceive Buzanval—that if things were handled in the right way, there was little doubt as to the king's reaching the end proposed, but that all depended on good management. It was an error, he said, to suppose that in one, two, or three months, eight provinces and their principal members, to wit, forty

good cities all enjoying liberty and equality, could be induced to accept a foreign sovereign.

Such language was very like irony, and probably not too subtle to escape the fine perception of the French envoy.

The first thing to be done, continued the Advocate, is to persuade the provinces to aid the king with all their means to conquer the disunited provinces—to dispose of the archdukes, in short, and to drive the Spaniards from the soil—and then, little by little, to make it clear that there could be no safety for the States except in reducing the whole body of the Netherlands under the authority of the king. Let his Majesty begin by conquering and annexing to his crown the provinces nearest him, and he would then be able to persuade the others to a reasonable arrangement.

Whether the Advocate's general reply was really considered by Buzanval as a grave sarcasm, politely veiled, may be a question. That envoy, however, spoke to his Government of the matter as surrounded with difficulties, but not wholly desperate. Barneveld was, he said, inclined to doubt whether the archdukes would be able, before any negotiations were begun, to comply with the demand which he had made upon them to have a declaration in writing that the United Provinces were to be regarded as a free people over whom they pretended to no authority. If so, the French king would at once be informed of the fact. Meantime the envoy expressed the safe opinion that, if Prince Maurice and the Advocate together should take the matter of Henry's sovereignty in hand with zeal, they might conduct the bark to the desired haven. Surely this was an, 'if' with much virtue in it. And notwithstanding that he chose to represent Barneveld as rich, tired, at the end of his Latin, and willing enough to drop his anchor in a snug harbour, in order to make his fortune secure, it was obvious enough

1 Memorandum of an interview with Buzanval by Olden-Barneveld, October, 1606. Deventer, iii. 94, 95.

2 Vol. i. of this work, chaps. II and iv.

3 Buzanval, in Deventer, iii. 95, 96.

that Buzanval had small hope at heart seeing his master's purpose accomplished. 1

As to Prince Maurice, the envoy did not even affect to believe him capable of being made use of, strenuous as the efforts of the French Government in that direction had been. „He has no private designs that I can find out,” said Buzanval, doing full justice to the straight-forward and sincere character of the prince. „He asks no change for himself or for his country.” The envoy added, as a matter of private opinion however, that if an alteration were to be made in the constitution of the provinces, Maurice would prefer that it should be made in favour of France than of any other Government.

He lost no opportunity; moreover, of impressing it upon his Government that if the sovereignty were to be secured for France at all, it could only be done by observing great caution, and by concealing their desire to swallow the republic of which they were professing themselves the friends. The jealousy of England was sure to be awakened if France appeared too greedy at the beginning. On the other hand, that power „might be the more easily rocked into a profound sleep if France did not show its appetite at the very beginning of the banquet. 2 That the policy of France should be steadily but healthily directed towards getting possession of as many strong places as possible in the Netherlands had long been his opinion. „Since we don't mean to go to war,” said he a year before Villeroi, „let us at least follow the example of the English, who have known

how to draw a profit out of the necessities of this state. Why should we not demand, or help ourselves to, a few good cities? Sluys, for example, would be a security for us, and of great advantage ” 1

Suspicion was rife on this subject at the court of Spain. Certainly it would be less humiliating to the Catholic crown to permit the independence of its rebellious subjects than to see them incorporated into the realms of either France or England. It is not a very striking indication of the capacity of great rulers to look far into the future that both France and England should now be hankering after the sovereignty of those very provinces, the solemn offer of which by the provinces themselves both France and England had peremptorily and almost contemptuously refused.

In Spain itself the war was growing very wearisome. Three hundred thousand dollars a month could no longer be relied upon from the royal exchequer, or from the American voyages, or from the kite-flying operations of the merchant princes on the Genoa exchange.

A great fleet, to be sure, had recently arrived, splendidly laden, from the West Indies, as already stated. Pagan slaves, scourged to their dreadful work, continued to supply to their Christian taskmasters the hidden treasures of the New World in exchange for the blessings of the Evangel as thus revealed; but these treasures could never fill the perpetual sieve of the Netherland war, rapidly and conscientiously as they were poured into it, year after year.

The want of funds in the royal exchequer left the soldiers in Flanders unpaid, and as an inevitable result mutiny admirably organized and calmly defiant was again established throughout the obedient provinces. This happened regularly once a year, so that it seemed

1 Buzanval, in Deventer, *iti.* 95, 96. See also the letter of Aerssens to Olden-Barnevelt, 14 November, 1606, in which he again gets the propriety of pretending to bestow sovereignty on France in the certainty that she will find it impossible to accept. Also the Memoir of Aerssens of 6 January, 1606. *Ibid.* 99-103. Groen v. Prinsterer, *archives*, ii. 370-374.

2 Authorities last cited.

1 Deventer, *III.* xiv.

almost as business-like a proceeding for an Elettore to proclaim mutiny as for a sovereign to declare martial law. Should the whole army mutiny at once what might become of the kingdom of Spain?

Moreover, a very uneasy feeling was prevalent that, as formerly, the Turks had crossed the Hellespont into Europe by means of a Genoese alliance and Genoese galleys, so now the Moors were contemplating the reconquest of Granada, and of their other ancient possessions in Spain, with the aid of the Dutch republic and her powerful fleets. 1

The Dutch cruisers watched so carefully on the track of the homeward-bound argosies, that the traffic was becoming more dangerous than lucrative, particularly since the public law established by Admiral Lazardo, that it was competent for naval commanders to hang, drown, or burn the crews of the enemy's merchantmen.

The Portuguese were still more malcontent than the Spaniards. They had gained little by the absorption of their kingdom by Spain, save participation in the war against the republic, the result of which had been to strip them almost entirely of the conquests of Vasco de Gama and his successors, and to close to them the ports of the Old World and the New.

In the republic there was a party for peace, no doubt, but peace only with independence. As for a return to their original subjection to Spain they were unanimously ready to accept forty years more of warfare rather than to dream of such a proposition. There were many who deliberately preferred war to peace. Bitter experience had impressed very deeply on the Netherlanders the great precept that faith would never be kept with heretics. 2 The present generation

1 Grotius, xv. 715.

2 The Spaniard—who hath been accustomed to serve himself of all the advantages without mercy and sometimes to fail of treaties and contracts, the memory of which

had therefore been taught from the cradles to believe that the word peace in Spanish mouths simply meant the Holy Inquisition. It was not unnatural, too, perhaps, that a people who have never known what it was to be at peace might feel, in regard to that blessing much as the blind or the deaf toward colour or music; as something useful and agreeable, no doubt, but with which they might the more cheerfully dispense as peculiar circumstances had always kept them in positive ignorance of its nature. The instinct of commercial greediness made the merchants of Holland and Zeeland, and especially those of Amsterdam, dread the revival of a war in case of peace, to the imagined detriment of the great trading centres of the republic. It was felt also to be certain that Spain, in case of negotiations, would lay down as an indispensable preliminary the abstinence on the part of the Netherlanders from all intercourse with the Indies, East or West; and although such a prohibition would be received by those republicans with perfect contempt, yet the mere discussion of the subject moved their spleen. They had already driven the Portuguese out of a large portion of the field in the east, and they were now preparing by means of the same machinery to dispute the monopoly of the Spaniards in the west. To talk of excluding such a people as this from intercourse with any portion of the Old World or the New was the mumbling of dotage; yet nothing could be more certain than that such would be the pretensions of Spain.

As for the stadholder, his vocation was war, his greatness had been derived from war, his genius had never turned itself to pacific pursuits. Should a peace be negotiated, not only would his occupation be gone, but he might even find himself hampered for means.

is engraved in the marble hearts of this people to all posterity."—Winwood to Lord Granbourn, 12 Sept. 1604. Memorials, ii. 30.



was probable that his large salaries, as captain and admiral-general of the forces of the republic, would be seriously curtailed, in case his services in the field were no longer demanded, while such secret hopes as he might entertain of acquiring that sovereign power which Barneveld had been inclined to favour, were more likely to be fulfilled if the war should be continued. At the same time, if sovereignty were to be his at all, he was distinctly opposed to such limitations of his authority as were to have been proposed by the States to his father. Rather than reign on those conditions, he avowed that he would throw himself head foremost from the great tower of Hague Castle.

Moreover, the prince was smarting under the consciousness of having lost military reputation, however undeservedly, in the latter campaigns, and might reasonably hope to gain new glory in the immediate future. Thus, while his great rival, Marquis Spinola, whose name had grown to so luxuriant a height in so brief a period, had many reasons to dread the results of future campaigning, Maurice seemed to have personally much to lose and nothing to hope for in peace. Spinola was over head and ears in debt. In the past two years he had spent millions of florins out of his own pocket.<sup>1</sup> His magnificent fortune and boundless credit were seriously compromised. He had found it an easier task to take Ostend and relieve Grol than to bolster up the chances of Spain. His acceptances were becoming as much a drug upon the exchanges of Antwerp, Genoa, or Augsburg, as those of the most Catholic king or their Highnesses the archdukes. Pain stared him in the face, notwithstanding the deeds with which he had startled the world, and he was therefore

sincerely desirous of peace, provided, of course, that all those advantages for which the war had been waged in vain could now be secured by negotiation.

There had been, since the arrival of the Duke of Alva in the Netherlands, just forty years of fighting. Maurice and the war had been born in the same year, and it would be difficult for him to comprehend that his whole life's work had been a superfluous task, to be rubbed away now with a sponge. Yet that Spain, on the entrance to negotiations, would demand of the provinces submission to her authority, re-establishment of the Catholic religion, abstinence from Oriental or American commerce, and the toleration of Spanish soldiers over all the Netherlands, seemed indubitable.

It was equally unquestionable that the seven provinces would demand recognition of their national independence by Spain, would refuse public practice of the Roman religion within their domains, and would laugh to scorn any proposed limitations to their participation in the world's traffic. As to the presence of Spanish troops on their soil, that was, of course, an inconceivable idea.

Where, then, could even a loophole be found through which the possibility of a compromise could be espied? The ideas of the contending parties were as much opposed to each other as fire and snow. Nevertheless, the great forces of the world seemed to have gradually settled into such an equilibrium as to make the continuance of the war for the present impossible.

Accordingly, the peace-party in Brussels had cautiously put forth its tentacles late in 1606, and again in the early days of the new year. Walrave van Wittenhorst and Doctor Gevaerts had been allowed to come to the Hague, ostensibly on private business, but with secret commission from the archdukes to feel and report concerning the po-

<sup>1</sup> Hoofds Brieven, N. 3, bl. 3, cited by *Agendaar*, ix. 234. The preposterous statement is there made that he had spent fourteen millions of his own money.

litical atmosphere. They found that it was a penal offence in the republic to talk of peace or of truce. They nevertheless suspected that there might be a more sympathetic layer beneath the very chill surface which they everywhere encountered. Having intimated in the proper quarters that the archdukes would be ready to receive or to appoint commissioners for peace or armistice, if becoming propositions should be made, they were allowed on the 10th <sup>10 Jan.</sup> of January, 1607, to make a <sup>1607.</sup> communication to the States-General. <sup>1</sup> They indulged in the usual cheap commonplaces on the effusion of blood, the calamities of war, and the blessings of peace; and assured the States of the very benignant disposition of their Highnesses at Brussels.

The States-General, in their reply, seventeen days afterwards, remarking that the archdukes persisted in their unfounded preten- <sup>27 Jan.</sup> sions of authority over them, took occasion to assure their Highnesses that they had no chance to obtain such authority except by the sword. <sup>2</sup> Whether they were like to accomplish much in that way the history of the past might sufficiently indicate, while on the other hand the States would always claim the right, and never renounce the hope, of recovering those provinces which had belonged to their free commonwealth since the union of Utrecht, and which force and fraud had torn away.

During twenty-five years that union had been confirmed as a free state by solemn decrees, and many public acts and dealings with the mightiest potentates of Europe, nor could any other answer now be made to the archdukes than the one always given to his holy, Roman Imperial Majesty, and other princes, to wit, that no negotiations could be had with powers making any

pretensions in conflict with the solemn decrees and well-maintained rights of the United Netherlands. <sup>1</sup>

It was in this year that two words became more frequent in the mouths of men than they had ever been before—two words which as the ages rolled on were destined to exercise a wider influence over the affairs of this planet than was yet dreamed of by any thinker in Christendom. Those words were America and Virginia. Certainly both words were known before, although India was the more general term for these auriferous regions of the west, which, more than a century long, had been open to European adventure, while the land, baptized in honour of the throned Vestal, had been already made familiar to European ears by the exploits of Raleigh. But it was not till 1607 that Jamestown was founded, that Captain John Smith's adventures with Powhatan, „emperor of Virginia,” and his daughter the Princess Pocahontas, became fashionable topics in England, that the English attempts to sail up the Chickahominy to the Pacific Ocean—as abortive as those of the Netherlands to sail across the North Pole to Cathay—were creating scientific discussion in Europe, and that the first cargo of imaginary gold dust was exported from the James River. <sup>2</sup>

With the adventurous minds of England all aflame with enthusiasm for those golden regions, with the thickcoming fancies for digging, washing, refining the precious sands of Virginia rivers, it was certain that a great rent was now to be made in the Borgian grant. It was inevitable that the rivalry of the Netherlands should be excited by the achievements and the marvellous tales of Englishmen beyond the Atlantic, and that they too should claim their share of traffic with that

<sup>1</sup> Gallucci, xx. 313. Meteren, 545, and vo. Grotius, xv. 717.

<sup>2</sup> Meteren, *ubi sup.*

<sup>1</sup> Ibid.

<sup>2</sup> Hildreth's History of the United States i. 105.

golden and magnificent Unknown which was called America. The rivalry between England and Holland, already so conspicuous in the spicy Archipelagos of the east, was now to be extended over the silvery regions of the west. The two leading commercial powers of the Old World were now to begin their great struggle for supremacy in the western hemisphere.

A charter for what was called a West India Company was accordingly granted by the States-General. West India was understood to extend from the French settlements in Newfoundland or Acadia, along the American coast to the Straits of Magellan, and so around to the South Sea, including the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, besides all of Africa lying between the tropic of Cancer and the Cape of Good Hope. At least, within those limits the West India Company was to have monopoly of trade, all other Netherlanders being warned off the precincts. Nothing could be more magnificent, nor more vague. <sup>1</sup>

The charter was for thirty-six years. The company was to maintain armies and fleets, to build forts and cities, to carry on war, to make treaties of peace and of commerce. It was a small peripatetic republic of merchants and mariners, evolved out of the mother republic—which had at last established its position among the powers of Christendom—and it was to begin its career well grown and in full armour.

The States-General were to furnish the company at starting with one million of florins and with twenty ships of war. The company was to add twenty other ships. The Government was to consist of four chambers of directors. One-half the capital was to be contributed by the chamber of Amsterdam, one-quarter by that of Zeeland, one-eighth respectively by the chambers of the Meuse and of North Holland. The

chambers of Amsterdam, of Zeeland, of the Meuse, and of North Holland were to have respectively thirty, eighteen, fifteen, and fifteen directors. Of these seventy-eight, one-third were to be replaced every sixth year by others, while from the whole number seventeen persons were to be elected as a permanent board of managers. Dividends were to be made as soon as the earnings amounted to ten per cent. on the capital. Maritime judges were to decide upon prizes, the proceeds of which were not to be divided for six years, in order that war might be self-sustaining. Afterwards, the treasury of the United Provinces should receive one-tenth, Prince Maurice one-thirtieth, and the merchant stockholders the remainder. Governors and generals were to take the oath of fidelity to the States-General. The merchandize of the company was to be perpetually free of taxation, so far as regarded old duties, and exempt from war-taxes for the first twenty years. <sup>1</sup>

Very violent and conflicting were the opinions expressed throughout the republic in regard to his project. It was urged by those most in favour of it that the chief sources of the greatness of Spain would be thus transferred to the States-General; for there could be no doubt that the Hollanders, unconquerable at sea, familiar with every ocean-path, and whose hardy constitutions defied danger and privation and the extremes of heat and cold, would easily supplant the more delicately organized adventures from Southern Europe, already enervated by the exhausting climate of America. Moreover, it was idle for Spain to attempt the defence of so vast a portion of the world. Every tribe over which she had exercised sway would furnish as many allies for the Dutch company as it numbered men; for to obey and to hate the tyrannical Spaniards were one. The republic would acquire, in reality, the grandeur which

<sup>1</sup> Grotius, xvi. 721-725. Meteren, 545, 546. Hagenaar, ix. 226-230.

<sup>1</sup> Authorities last cited.



with Spain was but an empty boast, would have the glory of transferring the great war beyond the limits of home into those far distant possessions, where the enemy deemed himself most secure, and would teach the true religion to savages sunk in their own superstitions, and still further depraved by the imported idolatries of Rome. Commerce was now world-wide, and the time had come for the Netherlands, to whom the ocean belonged, to tear out from the pompous list of the Catholic king's titles his appellation of Lord of the Seas.

There were others, however, whose language was not so sanguine. They spoke with a shiver of the inhabitants of America, who hated all men, simply because they were men, or who had never manifested any love for their species except as an article of food. To convert such cannibals to Christianity and Calvinism would be a hopeless endeavour, and meanwhile the Spaniards were masters of the country. The attempt to blockade half the globe with forty galleots was insane: for, although the enemy had not occupied the whole territory, he commanded every harbour and position of vantage. Men, scarcely able to defend inch by inch the meagre little sandbanks of their fatherland, who should now go forth in hopes to conquer the world, were but walking in their sleep. They would awake to the consciousness of ruin.

Thus men in the United Provinces spake of America. Especially Barneveld had been supposed to be prominent among the opponents of the new Company, on the ground that the more violently commercial ambition excited itself towards wider and wilder fields of adventure, the fainter grew inclinations for peace. The Advocate, who was all but omnipotent in Holland and Zeeland, subsequently denied the imputation of hostility to the new corporation, but the establishment of the West India

Company, although chartered, was postponed. 1

The archdukes had not been discouraged by the result of their first attempts at negotiation, for Wittenhorst had reported a disposition towards peace as prevalent in the rebellious provinces, so far as he had contrived, during his brief mission, to feel the public pulse.

On the 6th February, 1607, Werner Cruwel, an insolvent tradesman of Brussels, and a relative of Recorder Aerssens, father of the envoy at Paris, made his appearance very unexpectedly at the house of his kinsman at the Hague. Sitting at the dinner-table, but neither eating nor drinking, he was asked by his host what troubled him. He replied that he had a load on his breast. Aerssens begged him, if it was his recent bankruptcy that oppressed him, to use philosophy and patience. The merchant answered that he who confessed well was absolved well. He then took from his pocketbook a letter from President Richardot, and said he would reveal what he had to say after dinner. The cloth being removed, and the wife and children of Aerssens having left the room, Cruwel disclosed that he had been sent by Richardot and Father Neyen on a secret mission. The recorder much amazed and troubled, refused to utter a word, save to ask if Cruwel would object to confer with the Advocate. The merchant expressing himself as ready for such an interview, the recorder, although it was late, immediately sent a message to the great statesman. Barneveld was in bed and asleep but was aroused to receive the communication of Aerssens. „We live in such a calumnious time,” said the recorder „that many people believe that you and I know more of the recent mission of Wittenhorst than we admit. You had best interrogate Cruwel in the presence of witnesses. I know not the man's humour, but it seems to me since his

failure, that, in spite of his shy and lumpish manner, he is false and cunning." 1

The result was a secret interview, on the 8th February, between Prince Maurice, Barneveld, and the recorder, in which Cruwel was permitted to state the object of his mission. He then pronounced a short memorandum, signed by Spinola and by Father Neyen, to the effect that the archdukes were willing to treat for a truce of ten or twelve years, on the sole condition that the States should abstain from the Indian navigation. He exhibited also another paper, signed only by Neyen, in which that friar proposed to come secretly to the Hague, no one in Brussels to know of the visit save the archdukes and Spinola; and all in the United Provinces to be equally ignorant except the prince, the Advocate, and the recorder. Cruwel was then informed that if Neyen expected to discuss such grave matters with the prince, he must first send in a written proposal that could go on all fours and deserve attention. A week afterwards Cruwel came back with a paper in which Neyen declared himself authorized by the archdukes to treat with the States on the basis of their liberty and independence, and to ask that they would give in return for so great a concession as this renunciation of all right to „the so-called United Provinces." 2

This being a step in advance, it was decided to permit the visit of Neyen. It was, however, the recorded opinion of the distinguished personages to whom the proposal was made that it was a trick and a deception. The archdukes could, no doubt, it was said, nominally recognise the provinces as a free State, but without really meaning it. Meanwhile, they would do their best to corrupt the Government and to renew the war after the republic had by this means been separated from its friends. 3

John Neyen, father commissary of the Franciscans, who had thus invited himself to a momentous conference, was a very smooth Flemish friar, who seemed admirably adapted, for various reasons, to glide into the rebel country and into the hearts of the rebels. He was a Netherlander, born at Antwerp, when Antwerp was a portion of the united commonwealth, of a father who had been in the confidential service of William the Silent. He was eloquent in the Dutch language, and knew the character of the Dutch people. He had lived much at court, both in Madrid and Brussels, and was familiar with the ways of kings and courtiers. He was a holy man, incapable of a thought of worldly advancement for himself, but he was a master of the logic often thought most conclusive in those days; no man insinuating golden arguments more adroitly than he into half-reluctant palms. Blessed with a visage of more than Flemish frankness, he had in reality a most wily and unscrupulous disposition. Insensible to contumely, and incapable of accepting a rebuff, he could wind back to his purpose when less supple negotiators would have been crushed. 1

He was described by his admirers as uniting the wisdom of the serpent with the guilelessness of the dove. 2 Who better than he then, in this double capacity, to coil himself around the rebellion, and to carry the olive-branch in his mouth?

On the 25th February the monk, disguised in the dress of a 25 Feb. burgher, arrived at Ryswick, 1607. a village a mile and a half from the Hague. He was accompanied on the journey by Cruwel; and they gave themselves out as travelling tradesmen. 3 After nightfall a carriage having been sent to the hostelry, according to secret

1 Grotius, xvi. 728.

2 Gallucci, xx. 316, 317.

3 Wagenaar, ix. 272.

1 Original documents in Deventer, iii. 14-109.

2 Ibid.

3 Ibid.

agreement, by Recorder Aerssens, John Neyen was brought to the Hague. The friar, as he was driven on through these hostile regions, was somewhat startled, on looking out, to find himself accompanied by two mounted musketeers on each side of the carriage, but they proved to have been intended as a protective escort. He was brought to the recorder's house, whence, after some delay, he was conveyed to the palace. Here he was received by an unknown and silent attendant, who took him by the hand and led him through entirely deserted corridors and halls. Not a human being was seen nor a sound heard until his conductor at last reached the door of an inner apartment through which he ushered him, without speaking a syllable. 1 The monk then found himself in the presence of two personages, seated at a table covered with books and papers. One was in military undress, with an air about him of habitual command, a fair-complexioned man of middle age, inclining to baldness, rather stout, with a large blue eye, regular features, and a mouse-coloured beard. The other was in the velvet cloak and grave habiliments of a civil functionary, apparently sixty years of age, with a massive forehead, heavy features, and a shaggy beard. The soldier was Maurice of Nassau, the statesman was John of Olden-Barneveld.

Both rose as the friar entered, and greeted him with cordiality.

„But,” said the prince, „how did you dare to enter the Hague, relying only on the word of a Beggar?”

„Who would not confide,” replied Neyen, „in the word of so exalted, so respectable a Beggar as you. O most excellent prince?” 2

With these facetious words began the negotiations through which an earnest attempt was at last to be made for terminating a seemingly immortal war.

The conversation, thus begun, rolled amicably and informally along. The monk produced letters from the archdukes, in which, as he stated, the true royal soul of the writers shone conspicuously forth. Without a thought for their own advantage, he observed, moved only by a contemplation of the tears shed by so many thousands of human beings reduced to extreme misery, their Highnesses, although they were such exalted princes, cared nothing for what would be said by the kings of Europe and all the potentates of the universe about their excessive indulgence.

„What indulgence do you speak of?” asked the stadholder.

„Does that seem a trifling indulgence,” replied John Neyen, „that they are willing to abandon the right which they inherited from their ancestors over these provinces, to allow it so easily to slip from their fingers, to declare these people to be free, over whom, as their subjects refusing the yoke, they have carried on war so long?”

„It is our right hands that have gained this liberty,” said Maurice, „not the archdukes that have granted it. Liberty has been acquired by our treasure poured forth how freely! by the price of our blood, by so many thousands of souls sent to their account. Alas, how dear a price have we paid for it! All the potentates of Christendom, save the King of Spain alone, with his relatives the archdukes, have assented to our independence. In treating for peace we ask no gift of freedom from the archdukes. We claim to be regarded by them as what we are—free men. If they are unwilling to consider us as such, let them subject us to their dominion if they can. And as we have hitherto done, we shall contend more fiercely for liberty than for life.” 2

1 *Ibid.*

2 Gallucci, 317, *et seqq.*, who wrote from the original letters and journals of Neyen, Spinola, and many others.

1 Gallucci, *ubi sup.*

2 Gallucci, 317.



With this, the tired monk was dismissed to sleep off the effects of his journey and of the protracted discussion, being warmly recommended to the captain of the citadel, by whom he was treated with every possible consideration.

Several days of private discussion ensued between Neyen and the leading personages of the republic. The emissary was looked upon with great distrust. All schemes of substantial negotiation were regarded by the public as visions, while the monk on his part felt the need of all his tact and temper to wind his way out of the labyrinth into which he felt that he had perhaps too heedlessly entered. A false movement on his part would involve himself and his masters in a hopeless maze of suspicion, and make a pacific result impossible.

At length, it having been agreed to refer the matter to the States-General, Recorder Aerssens waited upon Neyen to demand his credentials for negotiation. He replied that he had been forbidden to deliver his papers, but that he was willing to exhibit them to the States General.

He came accordingly to that assembly, and was respectfully received. All the deputies rose, and he was placed in a seat near the presiding officer. Olden-Barneveld then in a few words told him why he had been summoned. The monk begged that a want of courtesy might not be imputed to him, as he had been sent to negotiate with three individuals, not with a great assembly. Thus already the troublesome effect of publicity upon diplomacy was manifesting itself. The many-headed, many-tongued republic was a difficult creature to manage, adroit as the negotiator had proved himself to be in gliding through the cabinets and council-chambers of princes and dealing with the important personages found there.

The power was, however, produced, and handed around the assembly, the

signature and seals being duly inspected by the members. Neyen was then asked if he had anything to say in public. He replied in the negative, adding only a few vague commonplaces about the effusion of blood and the desire of the archdukes for the good of mankind. He was then dismissed.

A few days afterwards a committee of five from the States-General, of which Barneveld was chairman, conferred with Neyen. He was informed that the paper exhibited by him was in many respects objectionable, and that they had therefore drawn up a form which he was requested to lay before the archdukes for their guidance in making out a new power. He was asked also whether the King of Spain was a party to these proposals for negotiation. The monk answered that he was not informed of the fact, but that he considered it highly probable. 1

John Neyen then departed for Brussels with the form prescribed by the States-General in his pocket. Nothing could exceed the indignation with which the royalists and Catholics at the court of the archdukes were inspired by the extreme arrogance and obstinacy thus manifested by the rebellious heretics. That the offer on the part of their master to negotiate should be received by them with cavils, and almost with contempt, was as great an offence as their original revolt. That the servant should dare to prescribe a form for the sovereign to copy seemed to prove that the world was coming to an end. But it was ever thus with the vulgar, said the courtiers and church dignitaries, debating these matters. The insanity of plebeians was always enormous, and never more so than when fortune for a moment smiled. 2 Full of arrogance and temerity when affairs were

1 Gallucci, *ubi sup.*

2 „Sempre son grandi le insanie del volgo  
ma più allora che gli arride l'aura festigian-  
te della fortuna. Pleno d'arroganza e di  
temerità nelle cose proprie, tutto abjectione

prosperous, plunged in abject cowardice when dangers and reverses came—such was the People—such it must ever be.

Thus blustered the priests and the parasites surrounding the archduke, nor need their sentiments amaze us. Could those honest priests and parasites have ever dreamed, before the birth of this upstart republic, that merchants, manufacturers, and farmers, mechanics and advocates—the People in short—should presume to meddle with affairs of state? Their vocation had been long ago prescribed—to dig and to draw, to brew and to bake, to bear burdens in peace and to fill bloody graves in war—what better lot could they desire? Meantime their superiors, especially endowed with wisdom by the Omnipotent, would direct trade and commerce, conduct war and diplomacy, make treaties, impose taxes, fill their own pockets, and govern the universe. Was not this reasonable and according to the elemental laws? If the beasts of the field had been suddenly gifted with speech, and had constituted themselves into a free commonwealth for the management of public affairs, they would hardly have caused more profound astonishment at Brussels and Madrid than had been excited by the proceedings of the rebellious Dutchmen.

Yet it surely might have been suggested, when the lament of the courtiers over the abjectness of the People in adversity was so emphatic, that Dorp and Van Loon, Berendrecht and Gieselles, with the men under their command, who had disputed every inch of Little Troy for three years and three months, and had covered those fatal sands with a hundred thousand corpses, had not been giving of late such evidence of the People's cowardice in reverses as theory required. The siege of Ostend had been finished only three years before, and it is strange that its lessons should so soon have been forgotten.

It was thought best, however, to dissemble. Diplomacy in those days—certainly the diplomacy of Spain and Rome—meant simply dissimulation. Moreover, that solid apothegm, *heretici non servanda fides*, the most serviceable anchor ever forged for true believers, was always ready to be thrown on shore should storm or quicksand threaten during the intricate voyage to be now undertaken.

John Neyen soon returned to the Hague, having persuaded his masters that it was best to affect compliance with the preliminary demand of the States. During the discussions in regard to peace, it would not be dangerous to treat with the rebel provinces as with free states, over which the archdukes pretended to no authority, because—so it was secretly argued—this was to be understood with a sense of similitude. „We will negotiate with them *as if they were free*,” said the grey-friar to the archduke and his counsellors, „but not with the signification of true and legitimate liberty. They have laid down in their formula that we are to pretend to no authority over them. Very well. For the time being we will pretend that we do not pretend to any such authority. To negotiate with them as if they were free will not make them free. It is no recognition by us that they are free. Their liberty could never be acquired by their rebellion. 1 This is so manifest that neither the king nor the archdukes can lose any of their rights over the United Provinces, even should they make this declaration.” 2

Thus the hair-splitters at Brussels—spinning a web that should be stout enough to entrap the noisy, blundering republicans at the Hague, yet so delicate as to go through the finest dialectic—

1 „Ciò si sarebbe dovuto sempre intendere con senso di similitudine cioè e come se fossero libere e non con significazione di vera e legittimalibertà.”—Bentivoglio, III. 552.

2 Ibid.

e vulta all' incontro poi nelle avverse.”—Bentivoglio, P. iii. 554.

ical needle. Time was to show whether subtilty or bluntness was the best diplomatic material.

The monk brought with him three separate instruments or powers, to be used according to his discretion. Admitted to the assembly of the States-General, he produced number one. It was instantly rejected. He then offered number two, with the same result. He now declared himself offended, not on his own account, but for the sake of his masters, and asked leave to retire from the assembly, leaving with them the papers which had been so benignantly drawn up, and which deserved to be more carefully studied. 1

The States on their parts were sincerely and vehemently indignant. What did all this mean, it was demanded, his producing one set of propositions after another? Why did the archdukes not declare their intentions openly and at once? Let the States depart each to the several provinces, and let John Neyen be instantly sent out of the country. Was it thought to bait a trap for the ingenuous Netherlanders, and catch them little by little, like so many wild animals? This was not the way the States dealt with the archdukes. What they meant they put in front—first, last, and always. Now and in the future they said and they would say exactly what they wished, candidly and seriously. Those who pursued another course would never come into negotiation with them. 2

The monk felt that he had excited wrath which it would be difficult to soothe. He already perceived the difference between a real and an affected indignation, and tried to devise some soothing remedy. Early next morning he sent a petition in writing to the States for leave to make an explanation to the assembly. Barneveld and Reijnders Aerssens, in consequence, came

to him immediately and heaped invectives upon his head for his duplicity. 1

Evidently it was a different matter dealing with this many-headed roaring beast, calling itself a republic, from managing the supple politicians with whom he was more familiar. The noise and publicity of these transactions were already somewhat appalling to the smooth friar who was accustomed to negotiate in comfortable secrecy. He now vehemently protested that never man was more sincere than he, and implored for time to send to Brussels for another power. It is true that number three was still in his portfolio, but he had seen so much indignation on the production of number two as to feel sure that the fury of the States would know no bounds should he now confess that he had come provided with a third.

It was agreed accordingly to wait eight days, in which period he might send for and receive the new power already in his possession. These little tricks were considered masterly diplomacy in those days, and by this kind of negotiators; and such was the way in which it was proposed to terminate a half century of warfare. 2 The friar wrote to his masters, not of course to ask for a new power, but to dilate on the difficulties to be anticipated in procuring that which the losing party is always most bent upon in circumstances like these, and which was most ardently desired by the archdukes—an armistice. He described Prince Maurice as sternly opposed to such a measure, believing that temporary cessation of hostilities was apt to be attended with mischievous familiarity between the opposing camps, with relaxation of discipline, desertion, and various kinds of treachery, and that there was no better path to peace than that which was trampled by contending hosts.

1 Ibid.

2 The narrative is the monk's own, as preserved by his admirer, the Jesuit Gallucci (*ubi sup.*)

1 Gallucci, 318-325, from Neyen's Letters and Journals. 2 Ibid.



Seven days passed, and then Neyen informed the States that he had at last received a power which he hoped would prove satisfactory. Being admitted accordingly to the assembly, he delivered an eloquent eulogy upon the sincerity of the archdukes, who, with perhaps too little regard for their own dignity and authority, had thus, for the sake of the public good, so benignantly conceded what the States had demanded.

Barneveld, on receiving the new power, handed to Neyen a draught of an agreement which he was to study at his leisure, and in which he might suggest alterations. At the same time it was demanded that within three months the written consent of the King of Spain to the proposed negotiations should be produced. The Franciscan objected that it did not comport with the dignity of the archdukes to suppose the consent of any other sovereign needful to confirm their acts. Barneveld insisted with much vehemence on the necessity of this condition. It was perfectly notorious, he said, that the armies commanded by the archdukes were subject to the King of Spain, and were called royal armies. Prince Maurice observed that all prisoners taken by him had uniformly called themselves soldiers of the Crown, not of the archdukes, nor of Marquis Spinola. 1

Barneveld added that the royal power over the armies in the Netherlands and over the obedient provinces was proved by the fact that all commanders of regiments, all governors of fortresses, especially of Antwerp, Ghent, Cambray, and the like, were appointed by the King of Spain. These were royal citadels, with royal garrisons. That without the knowledge and consent of the King of Spain it would be impossible to declare the people of the United Provinces free, was obvious; for in the cession by Philip II. of all the Netherlands it was provided that, without the

consent of the king, no part of the territory could be ceded, and this on pain of forfeiting all the sovereignty. To treat without the king was therefore impossible.

The Franciscan denied that because the sovereigns of Spain sent funds and auxiliary troops to Flanders, and appointed military commanders there, in various degrees, the authority of the archdukes was any the less supreme. Philip II. had sent funds and troops to sustain the League, but he was not King of France.

Barneveld probably thought it not worth his while to reply that Philip, with those funds and those troops, had done his best to becoming King of France, and that his failure proved nothing for the argument either way.

Neyen then returned once more to Brussels, observing as he took leave that the decision of the archdukes as to the king's consent was very doubtful, although he was sure that the best thing for all parties would be to agree to an armistice out of hand.

This, however, was far from being the opinion of the States or the stadholder.

After conferring with his masters the monk came down by agreement from Antwerp to the Dutch ships which lay in the Scheld before Fort Lillo. On board one of these, Dirk van der Does had been stationed with a special commission from the States to compare documents. It was expressly ordered that in these preliminary negotiations neither party was to go on shore. On comparison of the agreement brought by Neyen from Brussels with the draught furnished by Barneveld, of which Van der Does had a copy, so many discrepancies appeared that the document of the archdukes was at once rejected. But of course the monk had a number two, and this, after some trouble, was made to agree with the

1 Gallucci, *ubi sup.*

1 Gallucci, 322.

prescribed form. Brother John then, acting upon what he considered the soundest of principles—that no job was so difficult as not to be accomplished with the help of the precious metals—offered his fellow negotiator a valuable gold chain as a present from the arch-dukes. 1 Dirk van der Does accepted the chain, but gave notice of the fact to his Government.

The monk now became urgent to accompany his friend to the Hague, but this had been expressly forbidden by the States. Neyen felt sure, he said, of being able by arguments, which he could present by word of mouth, to overcome the opposition to the armistice were he once more to be admitted to the assembly. Van der Does had already much overstaid his appointed time bound to the spot, as it were, by the golden chain thrown around him by the excellent friar, 2 and he now, in violation of orders, wrote to the Hague for leave to comply with this request. Pending the answer, the persuasive Neyen convinced him, much against his will, that they might both go together as far as Delft. To Delft they accordingly went; but, within half a league of that place, met a courier with strict orders that the monk was at once to return to Brussels. Brother John was in great agitation. Should he go back, the whole negotiation might come to nought; should he go on, he might be clapped into prison as a spy. Being conscious, however, that his services as a spy were intended to be the most valuable part of his mission, he resolved to proceed in that capacity. 3 So he persuaded his

friend Dirk to hide him in the hold of a canal-boat. Van der Does was in great trepidation himself, but on reaching the Hague and giving up his gold chain to Barneveld, he made his peace, and obtained leave for the trembling but audacious friar to come out of his hiding-place,

Appearing once more before the States-General on the afternoon of 7th May, 1 Neyen urged with much eloquence the propriety of an immediate armistice both by sea and land, insisting that it would be a sanguinary farce to establish a cessation of hostilities upon one element while blood and treasure were profusely flowing on the ocean. 2 There were potent reasons for this earnestness on the part of the monk to procure a truce to maritime operations, as very soon was to be made evident to the world. Meantime, on this renewed visit, the negotiator expressed himself as no longer doubtful in regard to the propriety of requesting the Spanish king's consent to the proposed negotiations. That consent, however, would in his opinion depend upon the earnestness now to be manifested by the States in establishing the armistice by sea and land, and upon their promptness in recalling the fleets now infesting the coast of Spain. No immediate answer was given to these representations, but Neyen was requested to draw up his argument in writing, in order that it might be duly pondered by the States of the separate provinces.

The radical defect of the Dutch constitution—the independent sovereignty claimed by each one of the provinces composing the confederation, each of those provinces on its part being composed of cities, each again claiming something very like sovereignty for itself—could not fail to be manifested whenever great negotiations with foreign

1 „Optime quippe norant negotium nullum esse tam arduum quod auri ope non conficiatur.”—Gallucci, 322. Compare Wagenaar, ix. 249.

2 „Quasi valde tenaciter aurea illa catena Noyo divinctus.”—Gallucci, 323.

3 „Op dat hy den staet der vereinigden landen van naby doorsnuffelen zou en heimelyk arbeiden tot bevordering van den handel.”—Wagenaar, ix. 249. Cf. van der Kemp, iii. 12.

1 Van der Kemp, iii. 119.

2 Gallucci, 321. Van der Kemp, iii. 118. Grotius, xvi. 745.

powers were to be undertaken. To obtain the unanimous consent of seven independent little republics was a work of difficulty, requiring immense expenditure of time in comparatively unimportant contingencies. How intolerable might become the obstructions, the dissensions, and the delays, now that a series of momentous and world-wide transactions was beginning, on the issue of which the admission of a new commonwealth into the family of nations, the international connections of all the great powers of Christendom, the commerce of the world, and the peace of Europe depended.

Yet there was no help for it but to make the best present use of the institutions which time and great events had bestowed upon the young republic, leaving to a more convenient season the task of remodelling the law. Meanwhile, with men who knew their own minds, who meant to speak the truth, and who were resolved to gather in at last the harvest honestly and bravely gained by nearly a half-century of hard fighting, it would be hard for a legion of friars, with their heads full of quirks and their wallets full of bills of exchange, to carry the day for despotism.

Barneveld was sincerely desirous of peace. He was well aware that his province of Holland, where he was an intellectual autocrat, was staggering under the burthen of one half the expenses of the whole republic. He knew that Holland in the course of the last nine years, notwithstanding the constantly heightened rate of impost on all objects of ordinary consumption, was twenty-six millions of florins behindhand, and that she had reason therefore to wish for peace.<sup>1</sup> The great Advocate, than whom no statesman in Europe could more accurately scan the world's horizon, was convinced that the propitious moment

for honourable straightforward negotiations to secure peace, independence, and free commerce, free religion, and free government, had come, and he had succeeded in winning the reluctant Maurice into a partial adoption, at least of his opinions.<sup>1</sup>

The Franciscan remained at Delft waiting, by direction of the States, for an answer to his propositions, and doing his best according to the instructions of his own Government to espay the condition and sentiments of the enemy. Becoming anxious after the lapse of a fortnight, he wrote to Barneveld. In reply the Advocate twice sent a secret messenger, urging him to be patient, assuring him that the affair was working well; that the opposition to peace came chiefly from Zeeland and from certain parties in Amsterdam vehemently opposed to peace or truce; but that the rest of Holland was decidedly in favour of the negotiations.<sup>2</sup>

A few days passed, and Neyen was again summoned before the assembly. Barneveld now informed him that the Dutch fleet would be recalled from the coast of Spain so soon as the consent of his Catholic Majesty to the negotiations arrived, but that it would be necessary to confine the cessation of naval warfare within certain local limits. Both these conditions were strenuously opposed by the Franciscan, who urged that the consent of the Spanish King was certain, but that this new proposition to localize the maritime armistice would prove to be fraught with endless difficulties and dangers. Barneveld and the States remaining firm, however, and giving him a formal communication of their decision in writing, Neyen had nothing for it but to wend his way back rather malcontent to Brussels.

If needed but a brief deliberation at the court of the archdukes to bring about the desired arrangement. The

<sup>1</sup> Remonstr. van Olden-Barneveld in Leven van Olden Barneveld, bl. 157.—Wagenaar, ix. 241.

<sup>1</sup> Wagenaar, ix. 241. Grotius, xviii.

<sup>2</sup> Gallucci, 326, 327.



desire for an armistice, especially for a cessation of hostilities by sea, had been marvellously stimulated by an event to be narrated in the next chapter. Meantime, more than the first three months of the year had been passed in these secret preliminary transactions, and so softly had the stealthy friar crept to and fro between Brussels and the Hague, that when at last the armistice was announced it broke forth like a sudden flash of fine weather in the midst of a raging storm. No one at the archduke's court knew of the mysterious negotiations save the monk himself, Spinola, Richardot, Verreycken, the chief auditor, and one or two others. 1 The great Belgian nobles, from whom everything had been concealed, were very wroth, but the Belgian public was as much delighted as amazed at the prospects of peace. In the United Provinces opinions were conflicting, but doubtless joy and confidence were the prevailing emotions.

Towards the middle of April the armistice was publicly announced. It was to last for eight months from the 4th of May. During this period no citadels were to be besieged, no camps brought near a city, no new fortifications built, and all troops were to be kept carefully within walls. Meantime commissioners were to be appointed by the archdukes to confer with an equal number of deputies of the United Provinces for peace or for a truce of ten, fifteen, or twenty years, on the express ground that the archdukes regarded the United Provinces as free countries, over which their Highness pretended to no authority. 2

The armistice on land was absolute. On sea, hostilities were to cease in the German ocean and in the channel between England and France, while it was also provided that the Netherland

fleet should, within a certain period, be recalled from the Spanish coast.

A day of public fast, humiliation, thanksgiving, and prayer was ordered throughout the republic for the 9th of May, in order to propitiate the favour of Heaven on the great work to be undertaken; and as a further precaution, Prince Maurice ordered all garrisons in the strong places to be doubled, lest the slippery enemy should take advantage of too much confidence reposed in his good faith. The preachers throughout the commonwealth, each according to his individual bias, improved the occasion by denouncing the Spaniard from their pulpits and inflaming the popular hatred against the ancient enemy, or by dilating on the blessings of peace and the horrors of war. 2 The peace party and the war party, the believers in Barneveld and the especial adherents of Prince Maurice, seemed to divide the land in nearly equal portions.

While the Netherlands, both rebellious and obedient, were filled with these various emotions, the other countries of Europe were profoundly amazed at the sudden revelation. It was on the whole regarded as a confession of impotence on the part of Spain that the archdukes should now prepare to send envoys to the revolted provinces as to a free and independent people. Universal monarchy, brought to such a pass as this, was hardly what had been expected after the tremendous designs and the grandiloquent language on which the world had so long been feeding as its daily bread. The spectacle of anointed monarchs thus far humbling themselves to the people—of rebellion dictating terms, instead of writhing in dust at the foot of the throne—was something new in history. The heavens and earth might soon be expected to pass away, now that such a catastrophe was occurring.

1 Meteren, 551<sup>vo</sup>. Gallucci, 325.

2 Meteren, 551. Gallucci, 326. Grotius, xvi. 738. Wagenaar, ix. 250, *et seqq.*

1 Wagenaar, ix. 251.

The King of France had also been kept in ignorance of these events. It was impossible, however, that the negotiations could go forward without his consent and formal participation. Accordingly on receiving the news he

appointed an especial mission to the Hague—President Jeannin and De Russey, besides his regular resident ambassador Buzanval. Meantime, startling news reached the republic in the early days of May.

## CHAPTER XLVII.

A Dutch fleet under Heemskerk sent to the coast of Spain and Portugal—Encounter with the Spanish war-fleet under D'Avila—Death of both commanders-in-chief—Victory of the Netherlands—Massacre of the Spaniards.

THE States-General had not been inclined to be tranquil under the check which Admiral Haultain had received upon the coast of Spain in the autumn of 1606. The deed of terrible self-devotion by which Klaaszoon and his comrades had in that crisis saved the reputation of the republic, had proved that her fleets needed only skilful handling and determined leaders to conquer their enemy in the Western seas as certainly as they had done in the archipelagos of the East. And there was one pre-eminent naval commander, still in the very prime of life, but seasoned by an experience at the poles and in the tropics such as few mariners in that early but expanding maritime epoch could boast. Jacob van Heemskerk, unlike many of the navigators and ocean warriors who had made and were destined to make the Orange flag of the United Provinces illustrious over the world, was not of humble parentage. Sprung of an ancient, knightly race, which had frequently distinguished itself in his native province of Holland, he had followed the seas almost from his cradle. By turns a commercial voyager, an explorer, a privateer's-man, or an admiral of war-fleets, in days when sharp distinctions between the merchant service and the public service, corsairs' work and cruisers' work did not exist, he had ever proved himself

equal to any emergency—a man incapable of fatigue, of perplexity, or of fear. We have followed his career during that awful winter in Nova Zembla, where, with such unflinching cheerful heroism, he sustained the courage of comrades—the first band of scientific martyrs that had ever braved the dangers and demanded the secrets of those arctic regions. His glorious name—as those of so many of his comrades and countrymen—has been rudely torn from cape, promontory, island, and continent, once illustrated by courage and suffering, but the noble record will ever remain.<sup>1</sup>

Subsequently he had much navigated the Indian ocean; his latest achievement having been, with two hundred men, in a couple of yachts, to capture an immense Portuguese carrack, mounting thirty guns, and manned with eight hundred sailors, and to bring back a prodigious booty for the exchequer of the republic. A man with delicate features, large brown eyes, a thin high nose, fair hair and beard, and a soft, gentle expression, he concealed, under a quiet exterior, and on ordinary occasions a very plain and pacific costume, a most daring nature, and an indomitable ambition for military and naval distinction.

He was the man of all others in the commonwealth to lead any new enter-

<sup>1</sup> For a full and learned dissertation on the causes of the oblivion into which the early Dutch voyages have fallen, see in particular Bennet and Van Wyk, III; Hoofdstuk, 156, *et seqq.*

prise that audacity could conceive against the hereditary enemy.

The public and the States-General were anxious to retrace the track of Haultain, and to efface the memory of his inglorious return from the Spanish coast. The sailors of Holland and Zeeland were indignant that the richly freighted fleets of the two Indies had been allowed to slip so easily through their fingers. The great East India Corporation was importunate with Government that such blunders should not be repeated, and that the armaments known to be preparing in the Portuguese ports, the homeward-bound fleets that might be looked for at any moment off the peninsular coast, and the Spanish cruisers which were again preparing to molest the merchant fleets of the Company, should be dealt with effectively and in season.

Twenty-six vessels of small size but of good sailing qualities, according to the idea of the epoch, were provided, together with four tenders. Of this fleet the command was offered to Jacob van Heemskerk. He accepted with alacrity, expressing with his usual quiet self-confidence the hope that, living or dead, his fatherland would have cause to thank him. Inspired only by the love of glory, he asked for no remuneration for his services save thirteen per cent, of the booty, after half a million florins should have been paid into the public treasury. It was hardly probable that this would prove a large share of prize money, while considerable victories alone could entitle him to receive a stiver.

The expedition sailed in the early days of April for the coast of Spain and Portugal, the admiral having full discretion to do anything that might in his judgment redound to the advantage of the republic. Next in command was he vice-admiral of Zeeland, Laurenz Alteras. Another famous seaman in the fleet was Captain Henry Janszoon of Amsterdam, commonly called Long

Harry, while the weather-beaten and well-beloved Admiral Lambert, familiarly styled by his countrymen „Pretty Lambert,” some of whose achievements have already been recorded in these pages, was the comrade of all others upon whom Heemskerk most depended. After the 10th April the admiral, lying off and on near the mouth of the Tagus, sent a lugger in trading disguise to reconnoitre that river. He ascertained by his spies, sent in this and subsequently in other directions, as well as by occasional merchantmen spoken with at sea, that the Portuguese fleet for India would not be ready to sail for many weeks; that no valuable argosies were yet to be looked for from America, but that a great war-fleet, comprising many galleons of the largest size, was at that very moment cruising in the Straits of Gibraltar. Such of the Netherland traders as were returning from the Levant, as well as those designing to enter the Mediterranean, were likely to fall prizes to this formidable enemy. The heart of Joseph Heemskerk danced for joy. He had come forth for glory, not for booty, and here was what he had scarcely dared to hope for—a powerful antagonist instead of peaceful, scarcely resisting, but richly-laden merchantmen. The accounts received were so accurate as to assure him that the Gibraltar fleet was far superior to his own in size of vessels, weight of metal, and number of combatants. The circumstances only increased his eagerness. The more he was overmatched, the greater would be the honour of victory, and he steered for the straits, tacking to and fro in the teeth of a strong head-wind.

On the morning of the 25th of April he was in the narrowest part of the mountain-channel, and learned that the whole Spanish fleet was in the Bay of Gibraltar. The marble pillar of Hercules rose before him. Heemskerk was of a poetic temperament,

<sup>1</sup> Wagenaar, ix. 252.



and his imagination was inflamed by the spectacle which met his eyes. Geographical position, splendour of natural scenery, immortal fable, and romantic history, had combined to throw a spell over that region. It seemed marked out for perpetual illustration by human valour. The deeds by which, many generations later, those localities were to become identified with the fame of a splendid empire—then only the most energetic rival of the young republic, but destined under infinitely better geographical conditions to follow on her track of empire, and with far more prodigious results—were still in the womb of futurity. But St. Vincent, Trafalgar, Gibraltar—words which were one day to stir the English heart, and to conjure heroic English shapes from the depths so long as history endures—were capes and promontories already familiar to legend and romance.

Those Netherlanders had come forth from their slender little fatherland to offer battle at last within his own harbours and under his own fortresses to the despot who aspired to universal monarchy, and who claimed the lordship of the seas. The Hollanders and Zealanders had gained victories on the German Ocean, in the Channel, throughout the Indies, but now they were to measure strength with the ancient enemy in this most conspicuous theatre, and before the eyes of Christendom. It was on this famous spot that the ancient demigod had torn asunder by main strength the continents of Europe and Africa. There stood the opposite fragments of the riven mountain chain, Calpe and Abyla, gazing at each other, in eternal separation, across the gulf, emblems of those two antagonistic races which the terrible hand of Destiny has so ominously disjoined. Nine centuries before, the African king, Moses son of Nuzir, and his lieutenant, Tarik son of Abdallah, had crossed that strait and burned the ships which brought them. Black Africa

had conquered a portion of whiter Europe, and laid the foundation of the deadly mutual repugnance which nine hundred years of bloodshed had heightened into insanity of hatred. Tarik had taken the town and mountain, Carteia and Calpe, and given to both his own name. Gib-al-Tarik, the cliff of Tarik, they are called to this day.

Within the two horns of that beautiful bay, and protected by the fortress on the precipitous rock, lay the Spanish fleet at anchor. There were ten galleons of the largest size, besides lesser war-vessels and carracks, in all twenty-one sail. The admiral commanding was Don Juan Alvarez d'Avila, a veteran who had fought at Lepanto under Don John of Austria. His son was captain of his flag-ship, the St. Augustine. The vice-admiral's galleon was called, *Our Lady of La Vega*,<sup>1</sup> the rear-admiral's was the *Mother of God*,<sup>2</sup> and all the other ships were baptized by the holy names deemed most appropriate, in the Spanish service, to deeds of carnage.

On the other hand, the nomenclature of the Dutch ships suggested a menagerie. There was the *Tiger*, the *Sea Dog*, the *Griffin*, the *Red Lion*, the *Golden Lion*, the *Black Bear*, the *White Bear*. These, with the *Æolus* and the *Morning Star*, were the leading vessels of the little fleet.

On first attaining a distant view of the enemy, Heemskerk summoned all the captains on board his flag-ship, the *Æolus*, and addressed them in a few stirring words.

„It is difficult,” he said, „for Netherlanders not to conquer on salt water. 1 Our fathers have gained many a victory in distant seas, but it is for us to tear from the enemy's list of titles his arrogant appellation of Monarch of the Ocean. Here, on the verge of two con-

<sup>1</sup> Grotius, Meteren, and Wagenaar all give essentially the same report of this speech, and I am inclined to think therefore that something very like it was really spoken.

tients; Europe is watching our deeds, while the Moors of Africa are to learn for the first time in what estimation they are to hold the Batavian republic. Remember that you have no choice between triumph and destruction. I have led you into a position whence escape is impossible—and I ask of none of you more than I am prepared to do myself whither I am sure that you will follow. The enemy's ships are far superior to ours in bulk, but remember that their excessive size makes them difficult to handle and easier to hit, while our own vessels are entirely within control. Their decks are swarming with men, and thus there will be more certainty that our shot will take effect. Remember, too, that we are all sailors, accustomed from our cradles to the ocean; while yonder Spaniards are mainly soldiers and landsmen, qualmish at the smell of bilge-water, and sickening at the roll of the waves. 1 This day begins a long list of naval victories, which will make our fatherland for ever illustrious, or lay the foundation of an honourable peace, by placing, through our triumph, in the hands of the States-General, the power of dictating its terms."

His comrades long remembered the enthusiasm which flashed from the man, usually so gentle and composed in demeanour, so simple in attire. Clad in complete armour, with the orange plumes waving from his casque and the orange scarf across his breast, he stood there in front of the mainmast of the *Eolus*, the very embodiment of an ancient Viking.

He then briefly announced his plan of attack. He would lay his own ship alongside that of the Spanish admiral. Pretty Lambert in the *Tiger* was to grapple with her on the other side.

1, *Illud vero vel præcipuum quod apud nos nautæ pugnant, apud illos milites quos ego mihi videor ut sunt delicati sentinæ odore ac jactatione fluctuum prope exanimis in vertiginem dari.*"—Grotius, 734.

Vice-admiral Alteras and Captain Bras were to attack the enemy's vice-admiral in the same way. Thus two by two, the little Netherland ships were to come into closest quarters with each one of the great galleons. Heemskerck would himself lead the way, and all were to follow, as closely as possible, in his wake. The oath to stand by each other was then solemnly renewed, and a parting health was drunk. The captains then returned to their ships.

As the Lepanto warrior, Don Juan d'Avila, saw the little vessels slowly moving towards him, he summoned a Hollander whom he had on board, one Skipper Gevaerts of a captured Dutch trading bark, and asked him whether those ships in the distance were Netherlanders.

"Not a doubt of it," replied the skipper.

The admiral then asked him what their purpose could possibly be, in venturing so near Gibraltar.

"Either I am entirely mistaken in my countrymen," answered Gevaerts, "or they are coming for the express purpose of offering you battle." 1

The Spaniard laughed loud and long. The idea that those puny vessels could be bent on such a purpose seemed to him irresistibly comic, and he promised his prisoner, with much condescension, that the *St. Augustine* alone should sink the whole fleet.

Gevaerts, having his own ideas on the subject, but not being called upon to express them, thanked the admiral for his urbanity, and respectfully withdrew.

At least four thousand soldiers were in D'Avila's ships, besides seamen. There were seven hundred in the *St. Augustine*, four hundred and fifty in *Our Lady of Vega*, and so on in proportion. There were also one or two hundred noble volunteers who came thronging on board, scenting the battle

1 Meteren, 547.

from afar, and desirous of having a hand in the destruction of the insolent Dutchmen.

It was about one in the afternoon. There was not much wind, but the Hollanders, slowly drifting on the eternal river that pours from the Atlantic into the Mediterranean, were now very near. All hands had been piped on board every one of the ships, all had gone down on their knees in humble prayer, and the loving cup had then been passed around. 1

Heemskerk, leading the way towards the Spanish admiral, ordered the gunners of the *Æolus* not to fire until the vessels struck each other. „Wait till you hear it crack,” 2 he said, adding a promise of a hundred florins to the man who should pull down the admiral’s flag. Avila, notwithstanding his previous merriment, thought it best, for the moment, to avoid the coming collision. Leaving to other galleons, which he interposed between himself and the enemy, the task of summarily sinking the Dutch fleet, he cut the cable of the *St. Augustine*, and drifted farther into the bay. Heemskerk, not allowing himself to be foiled in his purpose, steered past two or three galleons, and came crashing against the admiral. Almost simultaneously, Pretty Lambert laid himself along her quarter on the other side. The *St. Augustine* fired into the *Æolus* as she approached, but without doing much damage. The Dutch admiral, as he was coming in contact, discharged his forward guns, and poured an effective volley of musketry into his antagonist.

The *St. Augustine* fired again, straight across the centre of the *Æolus*, at a few yards’ distance. A cannon ball took off the head of a sailor, standing near Heemskerk, and carried away the admiral’s leg close to the body. He fell on the deck, and, knowing himself to

be mortally wounded, implored the next in command on board, Captain Verhoef, to fight his ship to the last, and to conceal his death from the rest of the fleet. Then prophesying a glorious victory for the republic, and piously commending his soul to his maker, he soon breathed his last. A cloak was thrown over him, and the battle raged. The few who were aware that the noble Heemskerk was gone, burned to avenge his death, and to obey the dying commands of their beloved chief. The rest of the Hollanders believed themselves under his directing influence, and fought as if his eyes were upon them. Thus the spirit of the departed hero still watched over and guided the battle.

The *Æolus* now fired a broadside into her antagonist, making fearful havoc, and killing Admiral d’Avila. The commanders-in-chief of both contending fleets had thus fallen at the very beginning of the battle. While the *St. Augustine* was engaged in deadly encounter, yard-arm and yard-arm, with the *Æolus* and the *Tiger*, Vice-Admiral Alteras had, however, not carried out his part of the plan. Before he could succeed in laying himself alongside of the Spanish vice-admiral, he had been attacked by two galleons. Three other Dutch ships, however, attacked the vice-admiral, and, after an obstinate combat, silenced all her batteries and set her on fire. Her conquerors were then obliged to draw off rather hastily, and to occupy themselves for a time in extinguishing their own burning sails, which had taken fire from the close contact with their enemy. Our Lady of Vega, all ablaze from top-gallant-mast to quarter-deck, floated helplessly about, a spectre of flame, her guns going off wildly, and her crew dashing themselves into the sea, in order to escape by drowning from a fiery death. She was consumed to the water’s edge.

Meantime, Vice-admiral Alteras had successively defeated both his antagonists;

1 Meteren, Wagenaar, Grotius.

2 „En dat sy het hoorden kraaken.”—Meteren, 547vo.



drifting in with them until almost under the guns of the fortress, but never leaving them until, by his superior gunnery and seamanship, he had sunk one of them, and driven the other a helpless wreck on shore.

Long Harry, while *Alteras* had been thus employed, had engaged another great galleon, and set her on fire. She, too, was thoroughly burned to her hulk, but Admiral Harry was killed.

By this time, although it was early of an April afternoon, the heavy clouds of smoke, enveloping the combatants pent together in so small a space, seemed to make an atmosphere of midnight, as the flames of the burning galleons died away. There was a difficulty, too, in bringing all the *Netherland* ships into action—several of the smaller ones having been purposely stationed by *Fleemaskerk* on the edge of the bay to prevent the possible escape of any of the *Spaniards*. While some of these distant ships were crowding sail, in order to come to closer quarters, now that the day seemed going against the *Spaniards*, a tremendous explosion suddenly shook the air. One of the largest galleons, engaged in combat with a couple of Dutch vessels, had received a hot shot full in her powder magazine, and blew up with all on board. The blazing fragments drifted about among the other ships, and two more were soon on fire, their guns going off and their magazines exploding. The rock of *Gibraltar* seemed to reel. To the murky darkness succeeded the intolerable glare of a new and vast conflagration. The scene in that narrow roadstead was now almost internal. It seemed, said an eye-witness, as if heaven and earth were passing away. A hopeless panic seized the *Spaniards*. The battle was over. The *St. Augustine* still lay in the deadly embrace of her antagonists, but all the other galleons were sunk or burned. Several of the lesser war-ships had also been destroyed. It was nearly sunset.

The *St. Augustine* at last ran up a white flag, but it was not observed in the fierceness of the last moments of combat; the men from the *Aolus* and the *Tiger* making a simultaneous rush on board the vanquished foe.

The fight was done, but the massacre was at its beginning. The trumpeter of Captain *Kleinsorg* clambered like a monkey up the mast of the *St. Augustine*, hauled down the admiral's flag, the last which was still waving, and gained the hundred florins. The ship was full of dead and dying; but a brutal, infamous butchery now took place. Some *Netherland* prisoners were found in the hold, who related that two messengers had been successively despatched to take their lives, as they lay there in chains, and that each had been shot, as he made his way towards the execution of the orders. This information did not chill the ardour of their victorious countrymen. No quarter was given. Such of the victims as succeeded in throwing themselves overboard, out of the *St. Augustine*, or any of the burning or sinking ships, were pursued by the *Netherlanders*, who rowed about among them in boats, shooting, stabbing, and drowning their victims by hundreds. It was a sickening spectacle. The bay, said those who were there seemed sown with corpses. Probably two or three thousand were thus put to death, or had met their fate before. Had the chivalrous *Heemskerk* lived, it is possible that he might have stopped the massacre. But the thought of the grief which would fill the commonwealth when the news should arrive of his death—thus turning the joy of the great triumph into lamentations—increased the animosity of his comrades. Moreover, in ransacking the Spanish admiral's ship, all his papers had been found, among them many secret instructions from Government signed „I, the King;” ordering most inhuman persecutions, not only of the *Netherlanders*, but of

all who should in any way assist them, at sea or ashore, Recent examples of the thorough manner in which the royal admirals could carry out these bloody instructions had been furnished by the hangings, burnings, and drownings of Fazardo. But the barbarous ferocity of the Dutch on this occasion might have taught a lesson even to the comrades of Alva.

The fleet of Avila was entirely destroyed. The hulk of the St. Augustine drifted ashore, having been abandoned by the victors, and was set on fire by a few Spaniards who had concealed themselves on board, lest she might fall again into the enemy's hands.

The battle had lasted from half-past three until sunset. The Dutch vessels remained all the next day on the scene of their triumph. The townspeople were discerned, packing up their goods, and speeding panic-struck into the interior. Had Heemskerk survived he would doubtless have taken Gibraltar—fortress

and town—and perhaps Cadiz, such was the consternation along the whole coast.

But his gallant spirit no longer directed the fleet. Bent rather upon plunder than glory, the ships now dispersed in search of prizes towards the Azores, the Canaries, or along the Portuguese coast; having first made a brief visit to Tetuan, where they were rapturously received by the Bey.

The Hollanders lost no ships, and but one hundred seamen were killed. Two vessels were despatched homeward directly, one with sixty wounded sailors, the other with the embalmed body of the fallen Heemskerk. The hero was honoured with a magnificent funeral in Amsterdam at the public expense—the first instance in the history of the republic—and his name was enrolled on the most precious page of her records. <sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The chief-authorities for this remarkable battle are Meteren, 547, 548. Grotius, xv. 731-738. Wagenaar, ix. 251-258.

## CHAPTER XLVIII.

Internal condition of Spain—Character of the people—Influence of the Inquisition—Population and Revenue—Incomes of Church and Government—Degredation of Labour—Expulsion of the Moors and its consequences—Venality the special characteristic of Spanish polity—Maxims of the foreign polity of Spain—The Spanish army and navy—Insolvent state of the Government—The Duke of Lerma—His position in the State—Origin of his power—System of bribery and trafficking—Philip III.—His character—Domestic life of the king and queen.

A GLANCE at the interior condition of Spain, now that there had been more than nine years of a new reign, should no longer be deferred.

Spain was still superstitiously regarded as the leading power of the world, although foiled in all its fantastic and gigantic schemes. It was still supposed, according to current dogma, to share with the Ottoman empire the dominion

of the earth. <sup>1</sup> A series of fortunate marriages having united many of the richest and fairest portions of Europe under a single sceptre, it was popularly believed in a period when men were not much given as yet to examine very deeply the principles of human governments or the causes of national greatness, that an aggregation of powers which had resulted from preposterous laws of succession really constituted a mighty empire, founded by genius and valour.

The Spanish people, endowed with an acute and exuberant genius, which had exhibited itself in many paths of literature, science, and art; with a singular aptitude for military adventure, organization, and achievement; with a great variety, in short, of splendid and

<sup>1</sup> Giro. Soranzo, Relazione.

ennobling qualities; had been, for a long succession of years, accursed with almost the very worst political institutions known to history. The depth of their misery and of their degradation was hardly yet known to themselves, and this was perhaps the most hideous proof of the tyranny of which they had been the victims. To the outward world, the hollow fabric, out of which the whole pith and strength had been slowly gnawed away, was imposing and majestic still. But the priest, the soldier, and the courtier had been busy too long, and had done their work too thoroughly, to leave much hope of arresting the universal decay.

Nor did there seem any probability that the attempt would be made.

It is always difficult to reform widespread abuses, even when they are acknowledged to exist, but when gigantic vices are proudly pointed to as the noblest of institutions and as the very foundations of the state, there seems nothing for the patriot long for but the deluge.

It was acknowledged that the Spanish population—having a very large admixture of those races which, because not Catholic at heart, were stigmatized as miscreants, heretics, pagans, and, generally, as accursed—was by nature singularly prone to religious innovation. Had it not been for the Holy Inquisition, it was the opinion of acute and thoughtful observers in the beginning of the seventeenth century, that the infamous heresies of Luther, Calvin and the rest, would have long before taken possession of the land. 2

1 „Li popeli per la gran mescolanza che fanno avuto coi More e Giudei sono molto acili a divertire dal diretto sentiero della fede.”—Giro. Soranzo, Relazione. „Tremando gli Spagnuoli perchè incominciarono a colpirli l'eresia nei tempi di Filippo II. non solo del volgo ma anche nella nobilita.”—Contarini, Relazione.

2 „È rispettato l'inquisitore maggiore come se fosse un papa, ha il tribunale del suo ufficio per tutte le terre. In somma si può

To that most blessed establishment it was owing that Spain had not polluted itself in the filth and ordure of the Reformation, and had been spared the horrible fate which had befallen large portions of Germany, France, Britain, and other barbarous northern nations. It was conscientiously and thankfully believed in Spain, two centuries ago, that the state had been saved from political and moral ruin by that admirable machine which detected heretics with unerring accuracy, burned them when detected, and consigned their descendants to political incapacity and social infamy to the remotest generation. I

As the awful consequences of religious freedom, men pointed with a shudder to the condition of nations already speeding on the road to ruin, from which the two peninsulas at least have been saved. Yet the British empire, with the American republic still an embryo in its bosom, France, North Germany, and other great powers, had hardly then begun their headlong career. Whether the road of religious liberty was leading exactly to political ruin, the coming centuries were to judge.

Enough has been said in former chapters for the characterization of Philip II. and his polity. But there had now been nearly ten years of another reign. The system inaugurated by Charles and perfected by his son, had reached its last expression under Philip III.

The evil done by father and son lived

dire che il regere di questo officio mantiene il rito della vera religione in Spagna che senza questo si può grandemente temere che per li tanti Moreschi e Marani che sono sparsi per il paese si vederiano per questo rispetto di religione dei movimenti e delle commozioni importanti.”—Soranzo.

1 „Con tanta vergogna ed ignominia che in eterno resta macchiata quella discendenza di infamia nè sono capaci i posteri di dignità nè di onore alcuno onde tutti procurano di vivere in maniera da non imbrattarsi in tanta lordura mantenere la Spagna libera dall' infezione dell' eresia, peste che ha infettato a rovinato gran parte del mondo,” &c., &c.—Giro. Soranzo, Relazione.



and bore plentiful fruit in the epoch of the grandson, And this is inevitable in history. No generation is long-lived enough to reap the harvest, whether of good or evil, which it sows.

Philip II. had been indefatigable in civil, a thorough believer in his supernatural mission as despot, not intirely without capacity for affairs, personally absorbed by the routine of his bureau.

He was a king, as he understood the meaning of the kingly office. His policy was continued after his death; but there was no longer a king. That important regulator to the governmental machinery was wanting. How its place was supplied will soon appear.

Meantime the organic functions were performed very much in the old way. There was at least, no lack of priests or courtiers.

Spain at this epoch had probably less than twelve millions of inhabitants although the statistics of those days cannot be relied upon with accuracy. 1 The whole revenue of the state was nominally sixteen or seventeen millions of dollars, but the greater portion of that income was pledged for many coming years to the merchants of Genoa. 2 All the little royal devices for increasing the budget by debasing the coin of the realm, by issuing millions of copper tokens, by lowering the promised rate of interest on Government loans, by formally repudiating both interest and principal, had been tried, both in this and the preceding reign, with the usual

1 Priuli (1604-1608) puts the population of Spain, inclusive of foreign residents, at thirteen millions (F. Priuli, *Relazione*). But Agostino de Bias, in his work on the population of Spain from official records, cited by N. Barozzi (Notes, s. 1, vol. i. p. 353) allows but 9,680,191 inhabitants for the whole peninsula.

2 „Sono l' entrate di S. M. come dicono da 16 million in circa quasi tutte impegnate e non solo impegnate ma si può dire annullate perchè sono obligate a maggior prezzo che vagliano,” &c. &c.—Otto. Bon. *Relazione*. Compare Ciro. Soranzo, who puts the nominal whole at seventeen millions, but „impegnate ed annihilate affatto.”

success. An inconvertible paper currency stimulating industry and improving morals by converting beneficent commerce into baleful gambling—that fatal invention did not then exist. Meantime the legitimate trader and innocent citizen were harassed, and the general public endangered, as much as the limited machinery of the epoch permitted.

The available, unpledged revenue of the kingdom hardly amounted to five millions of dollars a-year. The regular annual income of the church was at least six millions. 1 The whole personal property of the nation was estimated—in a very clumsy and unsatisfactory way, no doubt—at sixty millions of dollars. 2 Thus the income of the priesthood was ten per cent. of the whole funded estate of the country, and at least a million a-year more than the income of the Government. Could a more biting epigram be made upon the condition to which the nation had been reduced?

Labour was more degraded than ever. The industrious classes, if such could be said to exist, were esteemed every day more and more infamous. Merchants, shopkeepers, mechanics, were reptiles, as vilely esteemed as Jews, Moors, Protestants, or Pagans. Acquiring wealth by any kind of production was dishonourable. A grandee who should permit himself to sell the wool from his boundless sheep-walks disgraced his caste, and was accounted as low as a merchant. 3 To create was the business of slaves and miscreants; to destroy was the distinguishing attribute of Christians and nobles. To cheat, to pick, and to steal, on the most minute and the most gigantic scale—these were also among the dearest privileges of the exalted

1 F. Priuli, *Relazione*.

2 „Eppure la Spagna è povera non trovandosi in essa più di sessanta milioni fra capitali e robe di servizio.”—Fran. Priuli, *Ambas. a Filippo III.* 1604-1608.

3 *Ibid.* Compare notes of Barozzi (s. 1, vol. i. p. 351).

classes. No merchandize was polluting save the produce of honest industry. To sell places in church and state, the army, the navy, and the sacred tribunals of law; to take bribes from rich and poor, high and low, in sums infinitesimal or enormous, to pillage the exchequer in every imaginable form, to dispose of titles of honour, orders of chivalry, posts in municipal council, 1 at auction; to barter influence, audiences, official interviews against money cynically paid down in rascal counters—all this was esteemed consistent with patrician dignity.

The ministers, ecclesiastics, and those about court, obtaining a monopoly of such trade, left the business of production and circulation to their inferiors, while, as has already been sufficiently indicated, religious fanaticism and a pride of race, which nearly amounted to idiocy, had generated a scorn for labour even among the lowest orders. As a natural consequence, commerce and the mechanical arts fell almost exclusively into the hands of foreigners—Italians, English, and French—who resorted in yearly increasing numbers to Spain for the purpose of enriching themselves by the industry which the natives despised.<sup>2</sup>

The capital thus acquired was at regular intervals removed from the country to other lands, where wealth resulting from traffic or manufactures was not accounted infamous.

Moreover, as the soil of the country was held by a few great proprietors—an immense portion in the deadhand of an insatiate and ever-grasping church, and much of the remainder in vast entailed estates—it was nearly impossible

for the masses of the people to become owners of any portion of the land. To be an agricultural day-labourer at less than a beggar's wage could hardly be a tempting pursuit for a proud and indolent race. It was no wonder therefore that the business of the brigand, the smuggler, the professional mendicant became from year to year more attractive and more overdone; while an ever-thickening swarm of priests, friars, and nuns of every order, engendered out of a corrupt and decaying society, increasing the general indolence, immorality, and unproductive consumption, and frightfully diminishing the productive force of the country, fed like locusts upon what was left in the unhappy land. „To shirk labour, infinite numbers become priests and friars,” said a good Catholic, in the year 1608.<sup>1</sup>

Before the end of the reign of Philip III., the peninsula, which might have been the granary of the world, did not produce food enough for its own population. Corn became a regular article of import into Spain, and would have come in larger quantities than it did had the industry of the country furnished sufficient material to exchange for necessary food.

And as if it had been an object of ambition with the priests and courtiers who then ruled a noble country, to make at exactly this epoch the most startling manifestation of human fatuity that the world had ever seen, it was now resolved by government to expel by armed force nearly the whole stock of intelligent and experienced labour, agricultural and mechanical, from the country. It is unnecessary to dwell long upon an event which, if it were not so familiarly known to mankind, would seem almost incredible. But the expulsion of the Moors is, alas! no exaggerated and imaginary satire, but a mon-

<sup>1</sup> „Quelli che governano nelle città sono chiamati Regidores e sono nelle città grandi numero di 40 e forse più e nelle piccole minor numero; questi impieghi il re vende per denari e secondo i luoghi dove vanno vogliono esser venduti per 4 o 6 mille ducati o che porta al popolo gran danno.” &c. c.—S. Contarini. <sup>2</sup> Girò. Soranzo.

<sup>1</sup> „Per schivar il travaglio ed infiniti si fanno preti e frati.”—Gir. Soranzo, *Ambasciatore a Filippo III. 1608-1611.*

ument of wickedness and insanity such as is not often seen in human history. Already, in the very first years of the century, John Ribera, archbishop of Valencia, had recommended and urged the scheme.

It was too gigantic a project to be carried into execution at once, but it was slowly matured by the aid of other ecclesiastics. At last there were indications, both human and divine, that the expulsion of these miscreants could no longer be deferred. It was rumoured and believed that a general conspiracy existed among the Moors to rise upon the Government, to institute a general massacre, and, with the assistance of their allies and relatives on the Barbary coast, to re-establish the empire of the infidels. 1

A convoy of eighty ass-loads of oil on the way to Madrid had halted at a wayside inn. A few flasks were stolen, and those who consumed it were made sick. Some of the thieves even died, or were said to have died, in consequence. 2 Instantly the rumour flew from mouth to mouth, from town to town, that the royal family, the court, the whole capital, all Spain, were to be poisoned with that oil. If such were the scheme it was certainly a less ingenious one than the famous plot by which the Spanish Government was suspected but a few years before to have so nearly succeeded in blowing the king, peers, and commons of England into the air.

The proof of Moorish guilt was deemed all-sufficient, especially as it was supported by supernatural evidence of the most portentous and convincing kind. For several days together a dark cloud, tinged with blood-red, had been seen to hang over Valencia. 3

In the neighbourhood of Daroca, a din of drums and trumpets and the clang of arms had been heard in the

sky, just as a procession went out of a monastery. 1

At Valencia the image of the Virgin had shed tears. In another place her statue had been discovered in a state of profuse perspiration. 2

What more conclusive indication could be required as to the guilt of the Moors? What other means devised for saving crown, church, and kingdom from destruction but to expel the whole mass of unbelievers from the soil which they had too long profaned?

Archbishop Ribera was fully sustained by the Archbishop of Toledo, and the whole ecclesiastical body received energetic support from Government.

Ribera had solemnly announced that the Moors were so greedy of money so determined to keep it, and so occupied with pursuits most apt for acquiring it, that they had come to be the sponge of Spanish wealth. The best proof of this, continued the reverend sage, was that, inhabiting in general poor little villages and sterile tracts of country, paying to the lords of the manor one third of the crops, and being overlaid with special taxes imposed only upon them, they nevertheless became rich while the Christians, cultivating the most fertile land, were in abject poverty.

It seems almost incredible that this should not be satire. Certainly the most delicate irony could not portray the vicious institutions under which the magnificent territory and noble people of Spain were thus doomed to ruin more subtly and forcibly than was done by the honest brutality of this churchman. The careful tillage, the beautiful system of irrigation by aqueduct and canal, the scientific processes by which these „accursed” had caused the wilderness to bloom with cotton, sugar, and every kind of fruit and grain: the

1 Ibid.

2 Ibid.

1 Giro. Soranzo. 2 Ibid.

3 Ibid. and notes of N. Barozzi.

2 Escriba, Vida de Don Juan de Ribera, papel segundo, quoted by Lafuente, vii. 370-390.



untiring industry, exquisite ingenuity, and cultivated taste by which the merchants, manufacturers, and mechanics, guilty of a darker complexion than that of the peninsular Goths, had enriched their native land with splendid fabrics in cloth, paper, leather, silk, tapestry, and by so doing had acquired fortunes for themselves, despite iniquitous taxation, religious persecution, and social contumely—all these were crimes against a race of idlers, steeped to the lips in sloth which imagined itself to be pride.

The industrious, the intelligent, the wealthy, were denounced as criminals, and hunted to death or into exile as vermin, while the Lermas, the Ucedas, and the rest of the brood of cormorants, settled more thickly than ever around their prey.

Meantime, Government declared that the piece of four maravedis should be worth eight maravedis; the piece of two maravedis being fixed at four.<sup>1</sup> Thus the specie of the kingdom was to be doubled, and by means of this enlightened legislation, Spain, after destroying agriculture, commerce, and manufacture, was to maintain great armies and navies, and establish universal monarchy.

This measure, which a wiser churchman than Ribera, Cardinal Richelieu, afterwards declared the most audacious and barbarous ever recorded by history, was carried out with great regularity of organization.<sup>2</sup> It was ordained that the Moors should be collected at three indicated points, whence they were not to move on pain of death, until duly escorted by troops to the ports of embarkation. The children under the age of four years were retained, of course without their parents, from whom they were for ever separated. With admirable forethought, too, the priests took measures, as they supposed, that the arts of refining sugar, irrigating the rice-

fields, constructing canals and aqueducts, besides many other useful branches of agricultural and mechanical business, should not die out with the intellectual, accomplished, and industrious race, alone competent to practise them, which was now sent forth to die. A very small number, not more than six in each hundred, were accordingly reserved to instruct other inhabitants of Spain in those useful arts which they were now more than ever encouraged to despise.

Five hundred thousand full-grown human beings, as energetic, ingenious, accomplished, as any then existing in the world, were thus thrust forth into the deserts beyond sea, as if Spain had been overstocked with skilled labour, and as if its native production had already outgrown the world's power of consumption.

Had an equal number of mendicant monks, with the two archbishops who had contrived this deed at their head, been exported instead of the Moors, the future of Spain might have been a more fortunate one than it was likely to prove. The event was in itself perhaps of temporary advantage to the Dutch republic, as the poverty and general misery, aggravated by this disastrous policy, rendered the acknowledgment of the States' independence by Spain almost a matter of necessity.<sup>1</sup>

It is superfluous to enter into any farther disquisition as to the various branches of the royal revenue. They remained essentially the same as during the preceding reign, and have been elaborately set forth in a previous chapter. The gradual drying up of resources in all the wide-spread heterogeneous territories subject to the Spanish sceptre is the striking phenomenon of the present epoch. The distribution of such wealth as was still created followed

<sup>1</sup> Lafuente, *Hist. Gen. de Espana*, xv. 295.

<sup>2</sup> *Mém. de Richelieu*, t. 231, cited by Lafuente, *ubi sup.*

<sup>1</sup> Giro. Soranzo, *Relazione*. The ambassador expressly states it as a fact. Compare especially Lafuente's admirable history of Spain, vol. xv. 294, 295, *seqq.*, 370-394.

the same laws which had long prevailed, while the decay and national paralysis, of which the prognostics could hardly be mistaken, were a natural result of the system.

The six archbishops had now grown to eleven,<sup>1</sup> and still received gigantic revenues; the income of the archbishop of Toledo, including the fund of one hundred thousand destined for repairing the cathedral, being estimated at three hundred thousand dollars a year, that of the Archbishop of Seville and the others varying from one hundred and fifty thousand dollars to fifty thousand.<sup>2</sup> The sixty-three bishops perhaps averaged fifty thousand a year each,<sup>3</sup> and there were eight more in Italy.<sup>4</sup>

The commanderies of chivalry, two hundred at least in number, were likewise enormously profitable. Some of them were worth thirty thousand a year; the aggregate annual value being from one-and-a-half to two millions, and all in Lerma's gift, upon his own terms.<sup>5</sup>

Chivalry, that noblest of ideals, without which, in some shape or another, the world would be a desert and a sty; which included within itself many of the noblest virtues which can adorn mankind—generosity, self-denial, chastity, frugality, patience, protection to the feeble, the down-trodden, and the oppressed; the love of daring adventure, devotion to a pure religion and a lofty purpose, most admirably pathetic, even when in the eyes of the vulgar most fantastic—had been the proudest and most poetical of Spanish characteristics, never to be entirely uprooted from the national heart.

Alas! what was there in the commanderies of Calatrava, Alcantara, San-

tiago, and all the rest of those knightly orders, as then existing, to respond to the noble sentiments on which all were supposed to be founded? Institutions for making money, for pillaging the poor of their hard-earned pittance trafficked in by greedy ministers and needy courtiers with a shamelessness which had long ceased to blush at vices however gross, at venality however mean.

Venality was in truth the prominent characteristic of the Spanish polity at this epoch. Everything political or ecclesiastical, from highest to lowest, was a matter of merchandize.

It was the autocrat, governing king and kingdom, who disposed of episcopal mitres, cardinals' hats, commanders crosses, the offices of regidores or municipal magistrates in all the cities, farmings of revenues, collectorships of taxes, at prices fixed by himself.

It was never known that the pope refused to confirm the ecclesiastical nominations which were made by the Spanish court.

The nuncius had the privilege of dispensing the small cures from thirty dollars a year downwards,<sup>1</sup> of which the number was enormous. Many of these were capable, in careful hands, of becoming ten times as valuable as their nominal estimate,<sup>2</sup> and the business in them became in consequence very extensive and lucrative. They were often disposed of for the benefit of servants and the hangers-on of noble families, to laymen, to women, children to babes unborn.

When such was the most thriving industry in the land, was it wonderful that the poor of high and low degree were anxious in ever-increasing swarms to effect their entrance into convent, monastery, and church, and that trade agriculture, and manufactures languished?

The foreign polity of the court remained as it had been established by Philip II.

<sup>1</sup> Giro. Soranzo, *Relazione*. The ambassador expressly states it as a fact. Compare especially Lafuente's admirable history of Spain, vol. xv. 294, 295, *seqq.*, 370-394.

<sup>2</sup> S. Contarini, *Relazione*. Fran. Priuli. <sup>3</sup> *Ibid.* <sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.* Giro. Soranzo. „Essendo capaci li maritati e ogni altra condizione di persone non eccezzuate le donne.”

<sup>1</sup> F. Soranzo.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*

Its maxims were very simple. To do unto your neighbour all possible harm, and to foster the greatness of Spain by sowing discord and maintaining civil war in all other nations, was the fundamental precept. To bribe and corrupt the servants of other potentates, to maintain a regular paid body of adherents in foreign lands, ever ready to engage in schemes of assassination, conspiracy, sedition, and rebellion against the legitimate authority, to make mankind miserable, so far as it was in the power of human force or craft to produce wretchedness, were objects still faithfully pursued. 1 They had not yet led to the entire destruction of other realms and their submission to the single sceptre of Spain, nor had they developed the resources, material or moral, of a mighty empire so thoroughly as might have been done perhaps by a less insidious policy, but they had never been abandoned.

It was a steady object of policy to keep such potentates of Italy as were not already under the dominion of the Spanish crown in a state of internecine feud with each other and of virtual dependence on the powerful kingdom. The same policy pursued in France, of fomenting civil war by subsidy, force, and chicane, during a long succession

of years in order to reduce that magnificent realm under the sceptre of Philip, has been described in detail. The chronic rebellion of Ireland against the English crown had been assisted and inflamed in every possible mode, the system being considered as entirely justified by the aid and comfort afforded by the queen to the Dutch rebels.

It was a natural result of the system according to which kingdoms and provinces with the populations dwelling therein were transferred like real estate by means of marriage-settlements, entails, and testaments, that the proprietorship of most of the great realms in Christendom was matter of fierce legal dispute. Lawsuits which in chancery could last for centuries before a settlement of the various claims was made, might have infinitely enriched the gentlemen of the long robe and reduced all the parties to beggary, had there been any tribunal but the battle-field to decide among the august litigants. Thus the King of Great Britain claimed the legal proprietorship and sovereignty of Brittany, Normandy, Anjou, Gascony, Calais, and Boulogne in France, besides the whole kingdom by right of conquest. 1 The French king claimed to be rightful heir of Castile, Biscay, Guipuscoa, Arragon, Navarre, nearly all the Spanish peninsula in short, including the whole of Portugal and the Balearic Islands to boot. 2 The King of Spain claimed, as we have seen often enough, not only Brittany but all France as his lawful inheritance. Such was the virtue of the prevalent doctrine of proprietorship. Every potentate was defrauded of his rights, and every potentate was a criminal usurper. As for the people, it would have excited a smile of superior wisdom on regal, legal, or sacerdotal lips, had it been suggested

1 „In Francia medesimamente procurava col tener le provincie disunite, divise le forze, separati gli animi, diffidenti i pensieri, ribellati i principi, sollevati i popoli e tirando per questa via le cose al lungo di stancare e si fosse potuto di ridurre in niente le forze di quella corona . . . la prima giova alla Spagna per conservarsi, procurando di tener lontane le sedizioni nei propri regni e di nutrire le discordie negli altri potentati . . . e vedendo che questo imperio non è appoggiato alle ricchezze de' grandi chi pochissimi sono che non siano in qualche via consumati, non alle speranze dei popoli perchè questi con le molte grazie sono oppresse, non alle armi poichè propria milizia che sia disciplinata non tiene a Spagna . . . si può affermare che resti il principale fondamento di questo imperio collocato negli travagli nella debolezza e divisione degli altri potentati," &c. &c.—F. Soranzo.

1 Niccolo Molin, Ambasc. appresso Giacomo I. 1607, in Barozzi and Berchet, Ser. IV. vol. i. Pietro Priuli, Ambasc. in Francia, 1608. Ibid. 2 P. Priuli, *ubi sup.*



that by any possibility the governed could have a voice or a thought in regard to the rulers whom God in His grace had raised up to be their proprietors and masters.

The army of Spain was sunk far below the standard at which it had been kept when it seemed fit to conquer and govern the world. Neither by Spain nor Italy could those audacious, disciplined, and obedient legions be furnished, 1 at which the enemies of the mighty despot trembled from one extremity of earth to the other. Peculation, bankruptcy, and mutiny had done their work at last. We have recently had occasion to observe the conduct of the veterans in Flanders at critical epochs. At this moment, seventy thousand soldiers were on the muster and pay roll of the army serving in those provinces, while not thirty thousand men existed in the flesh.

The navy was sunk to fifteen or twenty old galleys, battered, dismantled, unseaworthy, and a few armed ships for convoying the East and West Indiamen to and from their destinations. 2

The general poverty was so great that it was often absolutely impossible to purchase food for the royal household. 3 „If you ask me,” said a cool observer, „how this great show of empire is maintained, when the funds are so small, I answer that it is done by not paying at all.” 4 The Government was shamelessly, hopelessly bankrupt. The noble band of courtiers were growing enormously rich. The State was a carcase which unclean vultures were picking to the bones.

The foremost man in the land—the autocrat, the absolute master in State and Church—was the Duke of Lerma. 5

1 S. Contarini, *Relazione*. „Perchè la Spagna si trova spopolata.” 2 Ibid.

3 Ibid. „Momenti nei quali le mense reali mancavano del necessario onde cibarsi.”

4 Ibid.

5 Francesco Soranzo, *Relazione di Spagna Ambasciatore dall' anno 1597-1602*, in Barozzi

Very rarely in human history has an individual attained to such unlimited power under a monarchy, without actually placing the crown upon his own head. Mayors of the palace, in the days of the do-nothing kings, wielded nothing like the imperial control which was firmly held by this great favourite. Yet he was a man of very moderate capacity and limited acquirements, neither soldier, lawyer, nor priest.

The duke was past sixty years of age, a tall, stately, handsome man, of noble presence and urbane manner. Born of the patrician house of Sandoval, he possessed, on the accession of Philip, an inherited income of ten or twelve thousand dollars. He had now, including what he had bestowed on his son, a funded revenue of seven hundred thousand a year. 1 He had besides, in cash, jewels, and furniture, an estimated capital of six millions. 2 All this he had accumulated in ten years of service, as prime minister, chief equerry, and first valet of the chamber to the king.

The tenure of his authority was the ascendancy of a firm character over a very weak one. At this moment he was doubtless the most absolute ruler in Christendom, and Philip III. the most submissive and uncomplaining of his subjects. 3

and Berchet, *Serie I.* vol. i. pp. 1-214. Otto, Bon, *Ambasciatore strao.* a Filippo III. nel. 1602, *Relazione*. Ibid. Ser. I. vol. i. pp. 215-275. S. Contarini, *Ambasc.* a Filippo III. 1602-1604. Ibid. Ser. I. vol. i. pp. 277-337. F. Priuli, *Ambasc.* a Filippo III. 1604-1608. Ibid. Ser. I. vol. i. pp. 339-402. Giro. Soranzo, *Ambasc.* a Filippo III. 1608-1611. Ibid. Ser. I. vol. i. pp. 431-492.

1 Giro. Soranzo.

2 Ibid.

3 „Ed in questo Duca si può dire che sia ridotta la somma di tutto il governo, la dispensa delle grazie e tutto il bene ed il male di chi pretende alcuna cosa a quelle corte, perchè e veramente senza esempio l' autorità e la grazia che egli possiede appresso il re; anzi che per ottenere quello che si pretende importa più l' aver favorevole il Duca di Lerma che quasi il re medesimo,” &c. &c.—F. Soranzo.

„E che finalmente tutte le cose si riducono alla volontà ed all' autorità del duca e gli altri consiglieri attendono non meno al in-

The origin of his power was well known. During the reign of Philip II., the prince, treated with great severity by his father, was looked upon with contempt by every one about court. He was allowed to take no part in affairs, and, having heard of the awful tragedy of his eldest half-brother, enacted ten years before his own birth, he had no inclination to confront the wrath of that terrible parent and sovereign before whom all Spain trembled. Nothing could have been more humble, more effaced, more obscure, than his existence as prince.<sup>1</sup> The Marquis of Denia, his chamberlain, alone was kind to him, furnished him with small sums of money, and accompanied him on the shooting excursions in which his father occasion-

sinuarsi nelle grazie di S. E. che alli loro proprii interessi in modo che si può dire che questo re sia assolutamente governato e che la maggiore parte dell' ministri più principali, per non dire tutti, attendino fuori dell' ordinario al proprio bene." Otto. Bon, Relazione.

"Dal che nasce il potere che tiene sopra di lui il privato che la governa. Sarà difficile d' ottenere la volontà di questo principe perchè il privato lo tiene in suo potere fino dai primi anni della sua gioventù. Il potere di lui si conserva interamente nella persona del Duca di Lerma."—S. Contarini, Relazione.

"Questo re viene retto da un solo servitore. In questo regno il padrone non ha parte di niente."—F. Priuli.

"Il Duca di Lerma, eminentissimamente assoluto signore di quel governo . . . si ha impossessato della volontà di S. M. che ne è oggidì talmente signore che domina e regge il tutto ai suoi cenni. Assoluto maestro e dispensatore delle grazie regie, egli assegna tutti i vescovati e commende, egli fa i cardinali che sono nominati dal re di Spagna ed è libero signore e padrone di tutta la corona reale."—Gir<sup>o</sup>. Soranzo, Relazione.

"Essendo il Duca così accorto ed avendo così ben disposto a suo gusto il governo del palazzo e circondato il semplice re da suoi dependenti ch' oltre il non esser possibile che alcuno gli parli senza sua saputa quando anco gli fosse pariato da chi s' voglia sa tutto quello che gli viene detto da che segue che non è persona per grande per importante che sia che avesse tant' animo di svegliare il re che non temesse di pagare subito con la sua rovina la pena del suo ardire."—Ott<sup>o</sup>. Bon, Relazione.

<sup>1</sup> F. Soranzo.

ally permitted him to indulge.<sup>1</sup> But even these little attentions were looked upon with jealousy by the king; so that the marquis was sent into honourable exile from court as governor of Valencia.<sup>2</sup> It was hoped that absence would wean the prince of his affection for the kind chamberlain. The calculation was erroneous. No sooner were the eyes of Philip II. closed in death than the new king made haste to send for Denia, who was at once created Duke of Lerma, declared of the privy council, and appointed master of the horse and first gentleman of the bed-chamber. From that moment the favourite became supreme. He was entirely without education, possessed little experience in affairs of state, and had led the life of a commonplace idler and voluptuary until past the age of fifty. Nevertheless he had a shrewd mother-wit, tact in dealing with men, aptitude to take advantage of events. He had directness of purpose, firmness of will, and always knew his own mind. From the beginning of his political career unto its end, he conscientiously and without swerving pursued a single aim. This was to rob the exchequer by every possible mode and at every instant of his life. Never was a more masterly financier in this respect. With a single eye to his own interests, he preserved a magnificent unity in all his actions. The result had been to make him in ten years the richest subject in the world, as well as the most absolute ruler.

He enriched his family, as a matter of course. His son was already made Duke of Uceda, possessed enormous wealth, and was supposed by those who had vision in the affairs of court to be the only individual ever likely to endanger the power of the father. Others thought that the young duke's natural dulness would make it impossible for him to supplant the omnipotent favour-

<sup>1</sup> Ibid.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid.

ite. 1 The end was not yet, and time was to show which class of speculators was in the right. Meantime the whole family was united and happy. The sons and daughters had intermarried with the Infantados, and other most powerful and wealthy families of grandees. 2 The uncle, Sandoval, had been created by Lerma a cardinal and archbishop of Toledo; 3 the king's own schoolmaster being removed from that dignity, and disgraced and banished from court for having spoken disrespectfully of the favourite. 4 The duke had reserved for himself twenty thousand a year from the revenues of the archbishopric, 5 as a moderate price for thus conducting himself as became a dutiful nephew. He had ejected Rodrigo de Vasquez from his post as president of the council. 6 As a more conclusive proof of his unlimited sway than any other of his acts had been, he had actually unseated and banished the inquisitor-general, Don Pietro Porto Carrero, 7 and supplanted him in that dread office, before which even anointed sovereigns trembled, by one of his own creatures.

In the discharge of his various functions, the duke and all his family were domesticated in the royal palace, so that he was at no charges for house-keeping. His apartments there were more sumptuous than those of the king and queen. 8 He had removed from court the Duchess of Candia, 9 sister of the great Constable of Castile, who had been for a time in attendance on the queen, and whose possible influence he chose to destroy in the bud. Her place as mistress of the robes was supplied by his sister, the Countess of Lemos; while his wife, the terrible

Duchess of Lerma, was constantly with the queen, who trembled at her frown. Thus the royal pair were completely beleaguered, surrounded, and isolated from all except the Lermas. 1 When the duke conferred with the king, the doors were always double locked. 2

In his capacity as first valet 3 he was the duke's duty to bring the king's shirt in the morning, to see to his wardrobe and his bed, and to supply him with ideas for the day. The king depended upon him entirely and abjectly, was miserable when separated from him four-and-twenty hours; thought with the duke's thoughts and saw with the duke's eyes. He was permitted to know nothing of state affairs, save such portions as were communicated to him by Lerma. The people thought their monarch bewitched, so much did he tremble before the favourite, and so unscrupulously did the duke appropriate for his own benefit and that of his creatures everything that he could lay his hands upon. It would have needed little to bring about a revolution, such was the universal hatred felt for the minister, and the contempt openly expressed for the king. 4

1 F. Soranzo. „Vi saria anco la regina che potria e sapria svegharlo per la comodità ma è lei ancora *tenuta oppressa* dalla Duchessa e dal medesimo Duca suo marito che non può nè parlare nè respirare e poi conoscendo il re di tanta semplicità come è veramente e vedendolo esser così innamorato del Duca si crede che temi prima di non fare frutto e poi di esser scoperta da S. M. al medesimo Duca da che ne potesse seguire mala disposizione tra loro tanta è in particolare la Duchessa terribile e formidabile il favore del Duca. In tanto che il povero Re per esser di natura poco atto al governare è circondato, sta e starà sempre così dormendo se non è svegliato di qualche gran rovina che straordinariamente lo punge e che insieme necessiti una buona mano de soggetti grandi a sollevarlo ed a liberare tutto il governo da così violenta oppressione.” &c. &c.—Otto. Bon. Relazione. 2 S. Contarini, Relazione.

3 „Somigliar del corpo. L'Ufficio del somigliar del corpo consiste nell'avar cura dei vestiti del re e del suo letto.”—S. Contarini.

4 „Il volgo si esprime dicendo che il re

1 „Ma l'ottusità sua non lo renderà mai atto a un tanto carico.”—F. Priuli.

2 Otto. Bon. 3 F. Soranzo.

4 S. Contarini. F. Soranzo.

5 F. Priuli, Relazione.

6 F. Soranzo. 7 Ibid.

8 Otto. Bon. Relazione. „Tantountuosi da abbagliare quelli del re stesso.”—S. Contarini.

9 F. Soranzo.



The duke never went to the council. All papers and documents relating to business were sent to his apartments. Such matters as he chose to pass upon, such decrees as he thought proper to issue, were then taken by him to the king, who signed them with perfect docility. 1 As time went on, this amount of business grew too onerous for the royal hand, or this amount of participation by the king in affairs of state came to be esteemed superfluous and inconvenient by the duke, and his own signature was accordingly declared to be equivalent to that of the sovereign's sign-manual. It is doubtful whether such a degradation of the royal prerogative had ever been heard of before in a Christian monarchy. 2

It may be imagined that this system of government was not of a nature to expedite business, however swiftly it might fill the duke's coffers. High officers of state, foreign ambassadors, all men in short charged with important affairs, were obliged to dance attendance

fa stregato, altri che trema del su favorito . . . vi vorrebbe poco per far nascere una rivoluzione . . . il duca di Lerma prende per se e per i suoi quello che più gli pare e piace, l'odio del popolo è tanto grande verso il duca per il mal uso del suo potere come verso il re a cagione della sua debolezza."—S. Contarini.

„Hat diese wenige Jahre für ihn und die Seinigen das Gras wol geschnitten und so wil dasz ich mirs nicht trauwe zu schreiben, denn es mehr ein Gedicht als der Wahrheit gleich sieht und doch in *re ipsa* ist."—Khevenhüller' Ann. Ferd. vi. 3041.

„Parlano del re in guisa che non oso riferirlo perche lo tengono in assai poca considerazione e perche fa tutto quello che vuole il duca di Lerma."—Ibid.

1 Ottaviano Bon. Relazione. Ciro. Soranzo. S. Contarini, Relazione. F. Priuli. „Rimettendoli quasi tutti al duca senza vederli."

2 „La segnatura del duca di Lerma fu la re parificata alla propria, esempio unico nella storia delle monarchie," says N. Barozzi, citing Relatione della vita del re Filippo III. e delli suoi favoriti.—MS. della biblioteca reale di Berlino. (Barozzi and Berchet, S. I. vi. p. 288.) See also Lafuente, v. 294, s. 99.

„Dasz er *absolutes Dominus* kan genannt werden."—Khevenhüller, Annal. Ferdin. vi. 3041.

for weeks and months on the one man whose hands grasped all the business of the kingdom, while many departed in despair without being able to secure a single audience. It was entirely a matter of trade. It was necessary to bribe in succession all the creatures of the duke before getting near enough to headquarters to bribe the duke himself. 1 Never were such itching palms. To do business at court required the purse of Fortunatus. There was no deception in the matter. Everything was frank and above board in that age of chivalry. Ambassadors, wrote to their sovereigns that there was no hope of making treaties or of accomplishing any negotiation except by purchasing the favour of the autocrat; 2 and Lerma's price was always high. At one period the republic of Venice wished to put a stop to the depredations by Spanish pirates upon Venetian commerce, but the subject could not even be approached

1 „E che per fargli capitar polizze o d' audienza o di negozio bisogna durar fatica di settimane entiere ed andar a diverse mani con favori straordinarii e per aver la risposta poi bisogna alle volte star a quella discrezione che mai viene," &c. &c.—Ott. Bon. Relazione.

„In modo che per la suprema autorità che lui tiene appresso S. M. (la qual non vede nè ricerca nè fa mai di più di quello che le vien detto e portato da esso duca) in suo potere sta l'espedito quello che comporta il suo interesse."—Ibid.

„Ogni principe o cavaliere avendo qualsivoglia interesse colla corona concorre con richissimi presenti e doni . . . e non vi è ministro o rappresentate regio che non profondi per mantenere lo ben affetto e per goder l'autorità della sua intercessione."—G. Soranzo.

„Ottiene dal re ciò che vuole; he avuto finora beni, commende, entrate donativi per la casa e per la persona sua pel valore di più di due milioni d'oro e ne averà quanti vorrà, e quante ne porterà l'occasione; perciocchè oltre quelle mercedi che le sono fatta dal re che sono grandissime, la libertà ch' ha di accettar presenti lo farà opulentissimo, perchè non è hi pretenda in corte cosa di momento che passando necessariamente per mano del duca non lo presenta largamente, come si fa anco con gran parte di questi ministri novelli, che tutti però si vanno facendo richissimi."—F. Soranzo.

2 F. Soranzo. Ott. Bon. Relazione.

by the envoy until he had expended far more than could be afforded out of his meagre salary in buying an interview. 1

When it is remembered that with this foremost power in the world affairs of greater or less importance were perpetually to be transacted by the representatives of other nations as well as by native subjects of every degree; that all these affairs were to pass through the hands of Lerma, and that those hands had ever to be filled with coin, the stupendous opulence of the one man can be easily understood. Whether the foremost power of the world, thus governed, were likely to continue the foremost power, could hardly seem doubtful to those accustomed to use their reason in judging of the things of this world. 2

1 Otto. Bon. Relazione. The small amount of salary paid by the Venetian republic to its envoys, who had the rank of ambassador at all the principal courts, and were expected to live in as splendid style as did the better paid ministers of other powers, was a perpetual subject of complaint. Some of the royal ambassadors had five hundred dollars a month, a few had a thousand dollars a month, while the diplomatic agent (who was not ambassador) of the Grand Duke of Florence in France had a larger salary than that of the Venetian ambassador at the same court. "We are equal to royal ambassadors in dignity," said Badoer; "we are obliged to approximate to them in expense; one of three things must therefore happen: our salary must be increased over the sum fixed sixty years ago, which averages only one hundred and seventy miserable dollars a month, or the richest citizens of the republic must always be selected to fill all the embassies, or persons must be made use of for the post who will prejudice the esteem and service of this most serene republic. The esteem, because they must suffer the thousand indignities which are caused by contempt; the service, because they will not be able to make their way towards matters of business and information which now-a-days can only be done all over the world with money."—A. Badoer, Relazione di Francia in Barozzi and Berchet, Serie II. vol. i. p. 168.

2 "Questi sono tutti quelli che governano questa gran macchina, la maggiore parte de quali si lascia vincere e dominare dall'avarizia e per ciò sono applicati a ricever volentieri presenti e come presidenti dei consigli liberamente vendono la maggior parte delle vacanze e le volontà loro istesse

Meantime the duke continued to transact business; to sell his interviews and his interest; to traffic in cardinals' hats, bishops' mitres, judges' ermine, civic and magisterial votes in all offices, high or humble, of church, army, or state.

He possessed the art of remembering or appearing to remember, the matters of business which had been communicated to him. When a negotiator, of whatever degree, had the good fortune to reach the presence, he found the duke to all appearance mindful of the particular affair which led to the interview, and fully absorbed by its importance. 1 There were men who, trusting to the affability shown by the great favourite, and to the handsome price paid down in cash for that urbanity, had been known to go away from their interview believing that their business was likely to be accomplished, until the lapse of time revealed to them the wildness of their dream.

The duke perhaps never manifested his omnipotence on a more striking scale than when by his own fiat he removed the court and the seat of government to Valladolid, and kept it there six years long. 2 This was declared

e con l' esempio di questi, gl'inferiori che sono ad essi subordinati s' accomodano all' intesso e in questo tutto sono talmente domesticati ed accordati che sapendolo il rè e non lo proibendo anzi approvandolo con il dare licenza a quello che glielo domandano di poter ricever da qualche soggetto cospicuo gran somma nelli negozi non si cammina d' altra maniera nè per altra via s' ottiene oggidì giustizia e favori a quella corte e non mancano li mezzi a quest' affetto ordinati e conoscinti da tutti."—Otto. Bon. Relazione. Compare S. Contarini, Relazione. "Non è difficile regalare il duca di Lerma. Egl' fa, sciegie ed ordina tutto quello che vuole," &c. "They toss causes from one to another like tennis-balls," wrote Cornwallis from Madrid. "A man may lawfully say here, non est qui facit bonum, non usque ad anum. God Almighty deliver me from amongst them" Winwood. ii. 312.

1 F. Soranzo.

2 Ibid. F. Priuli. "Essendo asceso tanta il credito appresso S. M. che teme di contradirgli e perciò guidato da' suoi interessi si lasciò persuadere a condurre la corte in

by disinterested observers to be not only contrary to common sense, but even beyond the bounds of possibility. 1 At Madrid the king had splendid palaces, and in its neighbourhood beautiful country residences, a pure atmosphere, and the facility of changing the air at will. At Valladolid there were no conveniences of any kind, no sufficient palace, no summer villa, no park, nothing but an unwholesome climate. 2 But most of the duke's estates were in that vicinity, and it was desirable for him to overlook them in person. 3 Moreover, he wished to get rid of the possible influence over the king of the Empress Dowager Maria, widow of Maximilian II. and aunt and grandmother of Philip III. 4 The minister could hardly drive this exalted personage from court, so easily as he had banished the ex-Archbishop of Toledo, the Inquisitor-General, the Duchess of Candia, besides a multitude of lesser note. So he did the next best thing, and banished the court from the empress, who was not likely to put up with the inconveniences of Valladolid for the sake of outrivalling the duke. This Babylonian captivity lasted until Madrid was nearly ruined, until the desolation of the capital, the moans of the tradespeople, the curses of the poor, and the grumblings of the courtiers, finally produced an effect even upon the arbitrary Lerma. 5

Valladolid tenendove la vicino a sei anni contra il senso commune e quasi contro al possibile per l' incapacita del luogo."

1 F. Priuli.

2 F. Soranzo.

3 Ibid. "I fear some evil event to that luke," wrote Cornwallis, "whose immoderate desires of his own particular interest draw him to precipitate himself into the gulf of envy and malediction of the people, by creating a king in such an unfitting sort after him, with manifest neglect of the important affairs of his kingdom, and disregard of what belongs to his kingly office. The wisest say here, according to our English proverb, that hell is broken loose." Winwood, ii. 395.

4 Ibid. She was sister of Philip II. Her daughter Anna was Philip II's fourth wife, and mother of Philip III.

5 Priuli. F. Soranzo.

He then accordingly re-emigrated, with king and Government, to Madrid, and caused it to be published that he had at last overcome the sovereign's repugnance to the old capital, and had persuaded him to abandon Valladolid. 1

There was but one man who might perhaps from his position have competed with the influence of Lerma. This was the king's father-confessor, whom Philip wished—although of course his wish was not gratified—to make a member of the council of state. 2 The monarch, while submitting in everything secular to the duke's decrees, had a feeble determination to consult and to be guided by his confessor in all matters of conscience. As it was easy to suggest that high affairs of state, the duties of government, the interests of a great people, were matters not entirely foreign to the conscience of anointed kings, an opening to power might have seemed easy to an astute and ambitious churchman. But the Dominican who kept Philip's conscience, Gasparo de Cordoba by name, 3 was, fortunately for the favourite, of a very tender paste, easily moulded to the duke's purpose. Dull and ignorant enough, he was not so stupid as to doubt that, should he whisper any suggestions or criticisms in regard to the minister's proceedings, the king would betray him and he would lose his office. 4 The cautious friar accordingly held his peace and his place, and there was none to dispute the sway of the autocrat.

What need to dilate further upon such a minister and upon such a system of government? To bribe and to be

1 Priuli. F. Loranzo.

2 F. Soranzo.

3 Ibid.

4 "Ed il confessore, che è quello che parlando al re di secreto potria avvertirlo, è di pasta così tenera, di così poco intendimento, del tutto ignaro del governo di stato ed incapace di tutte le cose grandi che non sapria farlo e forse per il timore che il re stesso non lo palesasse a S. E. dal che non seguisse la sua total depressione."—Otte. Bon. Relazione.



bribed, to maintain stipendiaries in every foreign Government, to place the greatness of the empire upon the weakness, distraction, and misery of other nations, to stimulate civil war, revolts of nobles and citizens against authority; separation of provinces, religious discontents in every land of Christendom—such were the simple rules ever faithfully enforced.

The other members of what was called the council were insignificant.

Philip III., on arriving at the throne, had been heard to observe that the day of simple esquires and persons of low condition was past, and that the turn of great nobles had come. <sup>1</sup> It had been his father's policy to hold the grandees in subjection, and to govern by means of ministers who were little more than clerks, generally of humble origin; keeping the reins in his own hands. Such great personages as he did employ, like Alva, Don John of Austria, and Farnese, were sure at last to excite his jealousy and to incur his hatred. Forty-three years of this kind of work had brought Spain to the condition in which the third Philip found it. The new king thought to have found a remedy in discarding the clerks, and calling in the aid of dukes. Philip II. was at least a king. The very first act of Philip III. at his father's death was to abdicate.

It was, however, found necessary to retain some members of the former Government. Fuentes, the best soldier and accounted the most dangerous man in the empire, was indeed kept in retirement as governor of Milan, while Cristoval di Mora, who had enjoyed much of the late king's confidence, was removed to Portugal as viceroy. But Don John of Idiaquez, who had really been the most efficient of the old administration, still remained in the council. Without the subordinate aid of his ex-

perience in the routine of business, it would have been difficult for the favourite to manage the great machine with his single hand. But there was no disposition on the part of the ancient minister to oppose the new order of things. A cautious, caustic, dry old functionary, talking more with his shoulders than with his tongue, <sup>1</sup> determined never to commit himself, or to risk shipwreck by venturing again into deeper waters than those of the harbour in which he now hoped for repose. Idiaquez knew that his day of action was past. Content to be confidential clerk to the despot duke, as he had been faithful secretary to the despot king, he was the despair of courtiers and envoys who came to pump, after having endeavoured to fill an inexhaustible cistern. Thus he proved, on the whole, a useful and comfortable man, not to the country, but to its autocrat.

Of the Count of Chinchon, who at one time was supposed to have court influence because a dabbler in architecture, much consulted during the building of the Escorial by Philip II. until the auditing of his accounts brought him into temporary disgrace, <sup>2</sup> and the Marquises of Velada, Villalonga, and other ministers, it is not necessary to speak. There was one man in the council, however, who was of great importance, wielding a mighty authority in subordination to the duke. This was Don Pietro de Franqueza. <sup>3</sup> An emancipated slave, as his name indicated, and subsequently the body-servant of Lerma, he had been created by that minister secretary of the privy council. He possessed some of the virtues of the slave, such as docility and attachment to the

<sup>1</sup> „In modo che è conosciuto da tutti per testa secca e che poco possa ad altri che al rè solo giovare . . . l' ho provato tanto cauta avido e riservato che alle volte più mi rispondeva con le spalle che con la bocca.”—Ott. Bon, Relazione.

<sup>2</sup> F. Soranzo, Relazione.

<sup>3</sup> Ott. Bon, Relazione.

<sup>1</sup> F. Soranzo, Relazione. „Scudieri, certa bassa taglia d' uomini.”

hand that had fed and scourged him, and many vices of both slave and freed-man. He did much of the work which it would have been difficult for the duke to accomplish in person, received his fees, sold and dispensed his interviews, distributed his bribes. In so doing, as might be supposed, he did not neglect his own interest. It was a matter of notoriety, no man knowing it better than the king, that no business, foreign or domestic, could be conducted or even begun at court without large preliminary fees to the secretary of the council, his wife, and his children. He had, in consequence, already accumulated an enormous fortune. His annual income, when it was stated, excited amazement. He was insolent and overbearing to all comers until his dues had been paid, when he became at once obliging, supple, and comparatively efficient. Through him alone lay the path to the duke's sanctuary. 1

The nominal sovereign, Philip III., was thirty years of age. A very little man, with pink cheeks, flaxen hair, and yellow beard, with a melancholy expression of eye, and protruding under lip and jaw, he was now comparatively alert and vigorous in constitution, although for the first seven years of his life it had been doubtful whether he would live from week to week. 2 He had been afflicted during that period with a chronic itch or leprosy, which had undermined his strength, but which had almost entirely disappeared as he advanced in life. 3

He was below mediocrity in mind, 4 and had received scarcely any education.

1 Otto. Bon. Relazione. „Di bassissima condizione, nato d' uno schiavo fatto libero che ha conservato e portato il nome di Franqueza,” &c. &c.

2 „E il re di buona complessione, agile della vita, piccolo della persona ma ben formato, di pelo rosso e biondo, di carnagione bianca e colorita, col labbro del mento sollevato all' Austriaca. Ha la guardatura un poco malinconica, &c. &c. 3 Ibid.

4 S. Contarini. „La sua intelligenza meno che mediocre.”—F. Priuli.

He had been taught to utter a few phrases, more or less intelligible, in French, Italian, and Flemish, but was quite incapable of sustaining a conversation in either of those languages. 1 When a child, he had learned and subsequently forgotten the rudiments of the Latin grammar. 2

These acquirements, together with the catechism and the offices of the Church, made up his whole stock of erudition. That he was devout as a monk of the middle ages, conforming daily and hourly to religious ceremonies, need scarcely be stated. It was not probable that the son of Philip II. would be a delinquent to church observances. He was not deficient in courage, rode well, was fond of hunting, kept close to the staghounds, and confronted, spear in hand, the wild-boar with coolness and success. 3 He was fond of tennis, but his especial passion and chief accomplishment was dancing. He liked to be praised for his proficiency in this art, and was never happier than when gravely leading out the queen or his daughter, then four or five years of age—for he never danced with any one else—to perform a stately bolero. 4

1 S. Contarine. „Parla alcune lingue ma corrottamente solo che basti per farsi intendere . . . ed ha avuto qualche principio di lingua Latina quando era giovanissimo.”

2 Ibid.

3 „Corre dietro ai cani velocissamente, affronta i porchi cinghiali con grande ardore, tira d' archibugio in eccellenza bene,” &c. —F. Soranzo.

4 „Non beve vino e mangia assai, si diletta della caccia e perciò esce spesso in campagna e fa volentieri viaggi impiegando il resto del tempo in giuocare alla pillotta ed in danzare; è soggetto di debole ingegno, nimicissimo del negozio e di governare non pensando nè a guerra nè a pace come se non fosse nè nè avesse stati, non inclinando al governo nè par natura nè per educazione anzi per propria volontà si è allontanato del tutto: è per sua natura liberale sebbene alli negozii di grazia e di giustizia ancora non fa nè più nè meno di quello che vuole il D. di Lerma è in continuo bisogno di denaro, ha qualche notizia degli travagli che gli occorrono di Fiandra, d' Inghilterra e d' altri luoghi ma come quello che non ha gusto nè si può dire parte nel governo . . . ma

He never drank wine, but on the other hand, was an enormous eater; so that, like his father in youth, he was perpetually suffering from stomach-ache as the effect of his gluttony. 1 He was devotedly attached to his queen, and had never known, nor hardly looked at, any other woman. 2 He had no vice but gambling, in which he indulged to a great extent, very often sitting up all night at cards. 3 This passion of the king's was much encouraged by Lerma, for obvious reasons. Philip had been known to lose thirty thousand dollars at a sitting, and always to some one of the family or dependents of the duke, who of course divided with them the spoils. At one time the Count of Pelbes, nephew of Lerma, had won two hundred thousand dollars in a very few nights from his sovereign. 4

For the rest, Philip had few peculiarities or foibles. He was not revengeful, nor arrogant, nor malignant. He was kind and affectionate to his wife and children, and did his best to be obedient to the Duke of Lerma. Occasionally he liked to grant audiences, but there were few to request them. It was ridiculous and pathetic at the same time to see the poor king, as was very frequently the case, standing at a solemn green table till his little legs were

tired, waiting to transact business with applicants who never came; while ushers, chamberlains, and valets were rushing up and down the corridors, bawling for all persons so disposed to come and have an audience of their monarch. Meantime, the doors of the great duke's apartments in the same palace would be belaguered by an army of courtiers, envoys, and contractors, who had paid solid gold for admission, and who were often sent away grumbling and despairing without entering the sacred precincts. 1

As time wore on, the king, too much rebuked for attempting to meddle in state affairs, became solitary and almost morose, moping about in the woods by himself, 2 losing satisfaction in his little dancing and ball-playing diversions, but never forgetting his affection for the queen nor the hours for his daily substantial repasts of meats and pastry. It would be unnecessary and almost cruel to dwell so long upon a picture of what was after all not much better than human imbecility, were it not that humanity is a more sacred thing than royalty. A satire upon such an embodiment of kingship is impossible, the simple and truthful characteristics being more effective than fiction or exaggeration. It would be unjust to exhume a private character after the

non vedendo nè considerando l'espedizione e credo io non essendo capace di cose gradi con il sotto scrivere pare che dalla S. M. esca il tutto ma realmente sebbene vi sono li consigli il Duca fa e risolve tutte le cose a suo beneplacito."—Ottaviano Bon, Relazione.

"Balla molto bene ed è la cosa che gusta di più piacendogli d'esser lodato in queste divertimento . . . quando balla balla sempre con sua figlia o con la regina," &c.—S. Contarini, Relazione.

1 S. Contarini. „Sottoposto al dolor di stomaco per il soverchio mangiare. Nondimeno mangia carne del continuo e con essa si nutrice quattro volte il giorno."—F. Priuli, Relazione.

2 Ottav. Bon. F. Soranzo.

3 S. Contarini. F. Priuli.

4 S. Contarini, Relazione. „Si intratiene la sera dopo la cena nel giuoco con il quale ha arricchito molti cavalieri che lo servono."—Giurolamo Soranzo.

1 „Ed è cosa ridicola il vedere che quando il re vuole dar udienza il che segue più giorni alla settimana non si ritrova alcuno che la voglia e per non lasciarlo con questo indignità, li valletti di camera salgono sinelli corridori del palazzo gridando ed invitando le persone a entrare all'udienza di sua Maestà; neppure poi questo giova in modo che ben spesso le occorre levarsi dalla tavola dove appoggiato suole stare aspettando senza che alcuno o pochi le abbino parlato, ed all'incontro alle stanze del duca di Lerma è tanta frequenza d'ogni sorte di persone che vorrebbero udienza che è cosa non meno di stupore che di compassione il vederlo."—Ottaviano Bon, Relazioni.

2 „E dopo di aversi interamente dato al duca di Lerma il suo carattere è divenuto solitario ed amante di vagar nei boschi tanto che si dice che questi boschi ed il duca di Lerma siano il re."—S. Contarini.



lapse of two centuries merely to excite derision, but if history be not powerless to instruct, it certainly cannot be unprofitable to ponder the merits of a system which, after bestowing upon the world forty-three years of Philip the tyrant, had now followed them up with a decade of Philip the simpleton.

In one respect the reigning sovereign was in advance of his age. In his devotion to the Madonna he claimed the same miraculous origin for her mother as for herself. When the prayer „*O Sancta Maria sine labe originali concepta*” was chanted, he would exclaim with emotion that the words embodied his devotest aspirations. He had frequent interviews with doctors of divinity on the subject, and instructed many bishops to urge upon the pope the necessity of proclaiming the virginity of the Virgin’s mother. Could he secure this darling object of his ambition, he professed himself ready to make a pilgrimage on foot to Rome. 1 The pilgrimage was never made, for it may well be imagined that Lerma would forbid any such adventurous scheme. Meantime, the duke continued to govern the empire and to fill his coffers, and the king to shoot rabbits.

The queen was a few years younger than her husband, and far from beautiful. Indeed, the lower portion of her face was almost deformed. She was graceful, however, in her movements, and pleasing and gentle in manner. 2 She adored the king, looking up to him with reverence as the greatest and wisest of beings. To please him she had upon her marriage given up drinking wine, which, for a German, was considered

a great sacrifice. 1 She recompensed herself, as the king did, by eating to an extent which, according to contemporary accounts, excited amazement. 2 Thus there was perfect sympathy between the two in the important article of diet. She had also learned to play at cards, in order to take a hand with him at any moment, feebly hoping that an occasional game for love might rescue the king from that frantic passion by which his health was shattered and so many courtiers were enriched. 3

Not being deficient in perception, the queen was quite aware of the greediness of all who surrounded the palace. She had spirit enough too to feel the galling tyranny to which the king was subjected. That the people hated the omnipotent favourite, and believed the king to be under the influence of sorcery, she was well aware. She had even a dim notion that the administration of the empire was not the wisest nor the noblest that could be devised for the first power in Christendom. But considerations of high politics scarcely troubled her mind. Of a People she had perhaps never heard, but she felt that the king was oppressed. She knew that he was helpless, and that she was herself his only friend. But of what avail were her timid little flutterings of indignation and resistance? So pure and fragile a creature could accomplish little good for king or people. Perpetually guarded and surrounded by the Countess of Lemos and the Duchess of Lerma, she lived in mortal awe of both. 4 As to the Duke himself, she trembled at his very name. On her first attempts

1 S. Contarini, Relazione. Giro. Soranzo. Norris of N. Barozzi (p. 289 Ser I. vol. i.) Poreno, Dichos y Hechos de Felipe III. ch. xii., cited by Barozzi.

2 „Non si può dire brutta ma non è manco bella per avere la faccia deformata assai dalla bocca a basso, tuttavia la vaghezza del colore e l’agilità del corpo la fa riuscire grata ad ognuno e dal marito è grandemente amata.”—F. Priuli, Relazione.

1 F. Soranzo. Otto. Bon, Relazione.

2 „Le hanno levato il vino per rispetto della conversazione col rè che gli riesce molesto ma si rifa col mangiar tanto che è cosa di maraviglia.”—Otto. Bon, Relazione.

3 „Ne mostra di gustare d’altro trattamento che del giuoco per conformarsi col re pretendendo per tal via di deviarlo dal giuocar con altri che lo fa cadere nelle sopradette perdite.”—F. Priuli.

4 F. Priuli. F. Soranzo.

to speak with Philip on political matters—to hint at the unscrupulous character of his government, to arouse him to the necessity of striking for a little more liberty and for a least a trifling influence in the state—the poor little king instantly betrayed her to the favourite and she was severely punished. The duke took the monarch off at once on a long journey, leaving her alone for weeks long with the terrible duchess and countess. Never before had she been separated for a day from her husband, it having been the king's uniform custom to take her with him in all his expeditions. Her ambition to interfere was thus effectually cured. 1 The duke forbade her thenceforth ever to speak of politics to her husband in public or in private—not even in bed—and the king was closely questioned whether these orders had been obeyed. 2 She submitted without a struggle. She saw how completely her happiness was at Lerma's

1 „Voleva alcuni anni sono estendersi nel maneggio dei negozii ma il duca di Lerma che lo sentiva malissimo per levaria da questi pensieri la mortificò conducendo alcune volte il re in campagna senza di lei e tenendo glielo separato le settimane entiere. Senti tanto la regina quest' assenza regia e conobbe l' origine di questo disgusto che da se si astenne affatto d' ingerirsi più nei negozii ed in questa maniera si pacificò col duca.”—Giro. Soranzo.

2 F. Contarini. „Nemmeno trovandosi a letto.”—N. Barozzi (Ser. I. vol. i. p. 325) citing *Relazione della Vita*, &c. &c. MS. of Berlin.

„Ihr seyen alle Händt gebunden. Wasz man ihr zu wider thun kan, das thue man, wann sie was heimlich redt so hält man sie in Argwohn, es sey wider die Hertzogen Lerma und Uzeda oder die ihrigen augesehen. Ihren Gemahl examinirten sie was sie mit ihm im Bedt redt und haben ihr verboten bey dem König um kein Sachen zu intercediren noch im Bedt oder allein mit ihm Negocio zu tractiren. Was sie nach Deutschland schreibt will man wissen,” etc. etc.—Khevenhüller, *Annales Ferdinandei*, tom. vi. 3038. Surely never was a more dismal picture painted of tyranny exercised by subject over his sovereigns. It was no wonder that the unfortunate queen protested to Count Khevenhüller that she „would rather go into a convent at Gratz than be Queen of Spain.”—Khevenhüller *Annales Ferdinandei*, tom. vi. 3038.

mercy. She had no one to consult with, having none but Spanish people about her, except her German father-confessor, whom, as a great favour, and after a severe struggle, she had been allowed to retain, as otherwise her ignorance of the national language would have made it impossible for her to confess her little sins. 1 Moreover her brothers, the archdukes at Gratz, were in receipt of considerable annual stipends from the Spanish exchequer, and the duke threatened to stop those pensions at once should the queen prove refractory. 2 It is painful to dwell any longer on the abject servitude in which the king and queen were kept. 3 The two were at least happy in each other's society, and were blessed with mutual affection, with pretty and engaging children, and with a similarity of tastes. It is impossible to imagine anything more stately, more devout, more regular, more innocent, more utterly dismal and insipid, than the lives of this wedded pair.

This interior view of the court and council of Spain, will suffice to explain why, despite the languor and hesitations with which the transactions were managed, the inevitable tendency was towards a peace. The inevitable slowness, secrecy, and tergiversations were due to the dignity of the Spanish court,

1 Otto. Bon, *Relazione*. „Confessore della medesima mazione da lei tenuto a viva forza.”

—F. Priuli, *Relazione*.

2 Giro. Soranzo, *Relazione*. Five thousand crowns a month to the Archduke Ferdinand, and much help besides to the others. „L' arciduca Ferdinando al quale ha assegnato 5600 scudi di provizione al mese, e lui ed i fratelli cavano del continuo grossi ajuti di corte, e la regina non cessa mai di procurar loro alcuna cosa; e questa è una delle cause principali che tiene la regina in necessità di stare unita e si può dire dipendente dal duca di Lerma; poichè procurando lei sempre alcun sussidio per i fratelli e convenendo valersi dell' autorità del duca, non può her questo importante rispetto dargli alcun disgusto nè intramettersi in quello che non è di sua soddisfazione.”

3 „Nel resto vive in continua servità e con tanto rispetto che maggiore non si può dire.”—Otto. Bon, *Relazione*.

and in harmony with its most sacred traditions. But what profit could the Duke of Lerma expect by the continu-

ance of the Dutch war, and who in Spain was to be consulted except the Duke of Lerma?

## CHAPTER XLIX.

Peace deliberations in Spain—Unpopularity of the project—Disaffection of the courtiers—Complaints against Spinola—Conference of the Catholic party—Position of Henry IV. towards the republic—State of France—Further peace negotiations—Desire of King James of England for the restoration of the States to Spain—Arrival of the French commissioners—President Jeannin before the States-General—Dangers of a truce with Spain—Dutch legation to England—Arrival of Lewis Verryken at the Hague with Philip's ratification—Rejection of the Spanish treaty—Withdrawal of the Dutch fleet from the Peninsula—The peace project denounced by the party of Prince Maurice—Opposition of Maurice to the plans of Barneveld—Amended ratification presented to the States-General—Discussion of the conditions—Determination to conclude a peace—Indian trade—Exploits of Admiral Matelieff in the Malay peninsula—He lays siege to Malacca—Victory over the Spanish fleet—Endeavour to open a trade with China—Return of Matelieff to Holland.

THE Marquis Spinola had informed the Spanish Government that if 800,000 dollars a month could be furnished, the war might be continued, but that otherwise it would be better to treat upon the basis of *uti possidetis*, and according to the terms proposed by the States-General. He had further intimated his opinion that, instead of waiting for the king's consent, it more comported with the king's dignity for the archdukes to enter into negotiations, to make a preliminary and brief armistice with the enemy, and then to solicit the royal approval of what had been done.

In reply, the king—that is to say he man who thought, wrote, and signed in behalf of the king—had plainly observed that among evils the vulgar rule was to submit to the least. Although, therefore, to grant to the Netherland rebels not only peace and

liberty, but to concede to them whatever they had obtained by violence and the most abominable outrages, was the worst possible example to all princes; yet as the enormous sum necessary for carrying on the war was not to be had, even by attempting to scrape it together from every corner of the earth, he agreed with the opinion of the archdukes that it was better to put an end to this eternal and exhausting war by peace or truce, even under severe conditions. That the business had thus far proceeded without consulting him, was publicly known, and he expressed approval of the present movements towards a peace or a long truce, assuring Spinola that such a result would be as grateful to him as if the war had been brought to a successful issue.

When the Marquis sent formal notice of the armistice to Spain there were many complaints at court. Men said that the measure was beneath the king's dignity, and contrary to his interests. It was a cessation of arms under iniquitous conditions, accorded to a people formerly subject and now rebellious. Such a truce was more fatal than any conflict, than any amount of slaughter. During this long and dreadful war, the king had suffered no disaster so terrible as this, and the courtiers now declared openly that the archduke was the cause of the royal and national humiliation. Having no children, nor hope of any, he desired only to live in tranquillity and selfish indulgence, like the indolent priest that he was, not caring what detriment or dishonour might accrue to the crown after his life was over.

Thus murmured the parasites and the plunderers within the dominions of the

1 The King to Spinola, 28 February, 1607, Gallucci, 328.



do-nothing Philip, denouncing the first serious effort to put an end to a war which the laws of nature had proved to be hopeless on the part of Spain.

Spinola too, who had spent millions of his own money, who had plunged himself into debt and discredit, while attempting to sustain the financial reputation of the king, who had by his brilliant services in the field revived the ancient glory of the Spanish arms, and who now saw himself exposed with empty coffers to a vast mutiny, which was likely to make his future movements as paralytic as those of his immediate predecessors—Spinola, already hated because he was an Italian, because he was of a mercantile family, and because he had been successful, was now as much the object of contumely with the courtiers as was the archduke himself.

The splendid victory of Heemskerk had struck the government with dismay and diffused a panic along the coast. The mercantile fleets, destined for either India, dared not venture forth so long as the terrible Dutch cruisers, which had just annihilated a splendid Spanish fleet, commanded by a veteran of Lepanto; and under the very guns of Gibraltar, were supposed to be hovering off the Peninsula. <sup>1</sup> Very naturally, therefore, there was discontent in Spain that the cessation of hostilities had not originally been arranged for sea as well as land, and men said openly at court that Spinola ought to have his head cut off for agreeing to such an armistice. <sup>2</sup> Quite as reasonably, however, it was now felt to be necessary to effect as soon as possible the recal of this very inconvenient Dutch fleet from the coast of Spain.

The complaints were so incessant against Spinola that it was determined to send Don Diego d'Yharra to Brus-

sels, charged with a general superintendence of the royal interests in the present confused condition of affairs. He was especially instructed to convey to Spinola the most vehement reproaches in regard to the terms of the armistice, and to insist upon the cessation of naval hostilities, and the withdrawal of the cruisers.

Spinola, on his part, was exceedingly irritated that the arrangements which he had so carefully made with the archduke at Brussels should be so contumaciously assailed, and even disavowed at Madrid. He was especially irritated that Ybarra should now be sent as his censor and overseer, and that Fuentes should have received orders to levy seven thousand troops in the Milanese for Flanders, the arrival of which reinforcement would excite suspicion, and probably break off negotiations. <sup>1</sup>

He accordingly sent his private secretary Biraga, post-haste to Spain with two letters. In number one he implored his Majesty that Ybarra might not be sent to Brussels. If this request were granted, number two was to be burned. Otherwise, number two was to be delivered, and it contained a request to be relieved from all further employment in the king's service. The marquis was already feeling the same effects of success as had been experienced by Alexander Farnese, Don John of Austria and other strenuous maintainers of the royal authority in Flanders. He was railed against, suspected, spied upon, put under guardianship, according to the good old traditions of the Spanish court. Public disgrace or secret poison might well be expected by him, as the natural guerdons of his eminent deeds.

Biraga also took with him the draught of the form in which the king's consent to the armistice and pending negotiations was desired, and he was particularly directed to urge that not one letter or comma should be altered, in

<sup>1</sup> Letter of Henry IV., 13 June, 1607. in Jeannin, f. 146.

<sup>2</sup> Letters of F. Aerssens, in Van der Kemp, iii. 123.

<sup>1</sup> Gallucci, 329.

order that no pretext might afforded to the suspicious Netherlanders for a rupture.

In private letters to his own superintendent Strata, to Don John of Idiaguez, to] the Duke of Lerma, and to Stephen Ybarra, Spinola enlarged upon the indignity about to be offered him, remonstrated vehemently against the wrong and stupidity of the proposed policy, and expressed his reliance upon the efforts of these friends of his to prevent its consummation. He intimated to Idiaguez that a new deliberation would be necessary to effect the withdrawal of the Dutch fleet—a condition not inserted in the original armistice—but that within the three months allowed for the royal ratification there would be time enough to procure the consent of the States to that measure. 1 If the king really desired to continue the war he had but to alter a single comma in the draught, and, out of that comma, the stadholder's party would be certain to manufacture for him as long a war as he could possibly wish. 2

In a subsequent letter to the king, Spinola observed that he was well aware of the indignation created in Spain by the cessation of land hostilities without the recall of the fleet, but that nevertheless John Neyen had confidentially represented to the archdukes the royal assent as almost certain. As to the mission of Ybarra, the marquis reminded his master that the responsibility and general superintendence of the negotiations had been almost forced upon him. Certainly he had not solicited them. If another agent were now interposed, it was an advertisement to the world that the business had been badly managed. If the king wished a rupture, he had but to lift his finger or his pen; but to appoint another commissioner was an unfit reward for his faithful service. He was in the king's hands.

1 Gallucci, 329, 331.

2 Ibid.

If his reputation were now to be destroyed, it was all over with him and his affairs. The man, whom mortals had once believed incapable, would be esteemed incapable until the end of his days,

It was too late to prevent the mission of Ybarra, who, immediately after his arrival in Brussels, began to urge in the king's name that the words in which the provinces had been declared free by the archdukes might be expunged. What could be more childish than such diplomacy? What greater proof could be given of the incapacity of the Spanish court to learn the lesson which forty years had been teaching? Spinola again wrote a most earnest remonstrance to the king, assuring him that this was simply to break off the negotiation. It was ridiculous to suppose, he said, that concessions already made by the archdukes, ratification of which on the part of the king had been guaranteed, could now be annulled. Those acquainted with Netherland obstinacy knew better. The very possibility of the king's refusal excited the scorn of the States-General. 1

Ybarra went about, too, prating to the archdukes and to others of supplies to be sent from Spain sufficient to carry on the war for many years, and of fresh troops to be forwarded immediately by Fuentes. As four millions of crowns a-year were known to be required for any tolerable campaigning, such empty vaunts as these were preposterous. The king knew full well, said Spinola, and had admitted the fact in his letters, that this enormous sum could not be furnished. 2 Moreover, the war cost the Netherlanders far less in proportion. They had river transportation, by which they effected as much in two days as the Catholic army could do in a fortnight, so that every siege was managed with far greater rapidity and less cost by the rebels than by their opponents.

1 Letter to the king, 25 June, 1607, in Gallucci, 337.

2 Ibid.

As to sending troops from Milan, he had already stated that their arrival would have a fatal effect. The minds of the people were full of suspicion. Every passing rumour excited a prodigious sensation, and the war party was already gaining the upper hand. Spinola warned the king, in the most solemn manner, that if the golden opportunity were now neglected, the war would be eternal. This, he said, was more certain than certain. For himself, he had strained every nerve, and would continue to do his best in the interest of peace. If calamity must come, he at least would be held blameless. <sup>1</sup>

Such vehement remonstrances from so eminent a source produced the needful effect. Royal letters were immediately sent, placing full powers of treating in the hands of the marquis, and sending him a ratification of the archduke's agreement. Government moreover expressed boundless confidence in Spinola, and deprecated the idea that Ybarra's mission was in derogation of his authority. He had been sent, it was stated, only to procure that indispensable preliminary to negotiations, the withdrawal of the Dutch fleet, but as this had now been granted Ybarra was already recalled.

Spinola now determined to send the swift and sure-footed friar, who had made himself so useful in opening the path so discussion, on a secret mission to Spain. Ybarra objected; especially because it would be necessary for him to go through France, where he would be closely questioned by the king. It would be equally dangerous, he said, for the Franciscan in that case to tell the truth or to conceal it. But Spinola replied that a poor monk like him could steal through France undiscovered. Moreover, he should be disguised as a footman, travelling in the service of Aurelio Spinola, a relative of the marquis, then proceeding to Madrid. Even

should Henry hear of his presence and send for him, was it to be supposed that so practised a hand would not easily parry the strokes of the French king—accomplished fencer as he undoubtedly was? After stealing into and out of Holland as he had so recently done, there was nothing that might not be expected of him. So the wily friar put on the Spinola livery, and, without impediment, accompanied Don Aurelio to Madrid. <sup>1</sup>

Meantime, the French commissioners—Pierre Jeannin, Buzanval, regular resident at the Hague, and De Russy, who was destined to succeed that diplomatist—had arrived in Holland.

The great drama of negotiation, which was now to follow the forty years' tragedy involved the interests and absorbed the attention of the great Christian powers. Although serious enough in its substance and its probable consequences, its aspect was that of solemn comedy. There was a secret disposition on the part of each leading personage—with a few exceptions—to make dupes of all the rest. Perhaps this was a necessary result of statesmanship, as it had usually been taught at that epoch.

Paul V., who had succeeded Clement VIII. in 1605, with the brief interlude of the twenty-six days of Leo XI.'s pontificate, was zealous, as might be supposed, to check the dangerous growth of the pestilential little republic of the north. His diplomatic agents, Millino at Madrid, Barberini at Paris, and the accomplished Bentivoglio, who had just been appointed to the nunciatura at Brussels, were indefatigable in their efforts to suppress the heresy and the insolent liberty of which the upstart commonwealth was the embodiment. <sup>2</sup>

Especially Barberini exerted all the powers at his command to bring about a good understanding between the kings

<sup>1</sup> Gallucci, 335.

<sup>2</sup> Bentivoglio, 543, 549.

<sup>1</sup> Letter last cited.



of France and Spain. He pictured to Henry, in darkest colours, the blight that would come over religion and civilization if the progress of the rebellious Netherlands could not be arrested. The United Provinces were becoming dangerous, if they remained free, not only to the French kingdom, but to the very existence of monarchy throughout the world. 1

No potentate was ever more interested, so it was urged, than Henry IV. to bring down the pride of the Dutch rebels. There was always sympathy of thought and action between the Huguenots of France and their co-religionists in Holland. They were all believers alike in Calvinism—a sect inimical not less to temporal monarchies than to the sovereign primacy of the Church 2—and the tendency and purposes of the French rebels were already sufficiently manifest in their efforts, by means of the so-called cities of security, to erect a state within a state; to introduce, in short, a Dutch republic into France. 3

A sovereign remedy for the disease of liberty, now threatening to become epidemic in Europe, would be found in a marriage between the second son of the King of Spain and a daughter of France. As the archdukes were childless, it might be easily arranged that this youthful couple should succeed them—the result of which would of course be the reduction of all the Netherlands to their ancient obedience.

It has already been seen, and will become still farther apparent, that nostrums like this were to be recommended in other directions. Meantime, Jeannin and his colleagues made their appearance at the Hague.

If there were a living politician in Europe capable of dealing with Barne-

veld on even terms, it was no doubt President Jeannin. An ancient Leaguer, an especial adherent of the Duke of Mayenne, he had been deep in all the various plots and counter-plots of the Guises, and often employed by the extinct confederacy in various important intrigues. Being secretly sent to Spain to solicit help for the League after the disasters of Ivry and Arques, he found Philip II. so sincerely imbued with the notion that France was a mere province of Spain, and so entirely bent upon securing the heritage of the Infanta to that large property, as to convince him that the maintenance of the Roman religion was with that monarch only a secondary condition. Aid and assistance for the confederacy were difficult of attainment, unless coupled with the guarantee of the Infanta's rights to reign in France.

The Guise faction being inspired solely by religious motives of the loftiest kind, were naturally dissatisfied with the lukewarmness of his most Catholic Majesty. When therefore the discomfited Mayenne subsequently concluded his bargain with the conqueror of Ivry, it was a matter of course that Jeannin should also make his peace with the successful Huguenot, now become eldest son of the Church. He was very soon taken into especial favour by Henry, who recognised his sagacity, and who knew his hands to be far cleaner than those of the more exalted Leaguers with whom he had dealt. The „good old fellow,” as Henry familiarly called him, had not filled his pockets either in serving or when deserting the League. Placed in control of the exchequer at a later period, he was never accused of robbery of peculation. He was a hard-working, not overpaid, very intelligent public functionary. He was made president of the parliament, or supreme tribunal of Burgundy, and minister of state, and was recognised as one of the ablest jurists and most

1 Bentivoglio, 542, 549.

2 Sette inimica non meno alle monarchie temporali che al sovrano primato ecclesiastico.”—*Ibid.*

3 „E di voler introdurre un governo di Olanda in Francia.”—*Ibid.*

skilful politicians in the kingdom. An elderly man, with a tall, serene forehead, a large dark eye and a long grey beard, he presented an image of vast wisdom and reverend probity. He possessed—an especial treasure for a statesman in that plotting age—a singularly honest visage. Never was that face more guileless, never was his heart more completely worn upon his sleeve, than when he was harbouring the deepest or most dangerous designs. 1 Such was the „good fellow,” whom that skilful reader of men, Henry of France, had sent to represent his interests and his opinions at the approaching conferences.

What were those opinions? Paul V. and his legates Barberini, Millino, and the rest, were well enough aware of the secret strings of the king's policy, and knew how to touch them with skill. Of all things past, Henry perhaps most regretted that not he, but the last and most wretched of the Valois line, was sovereign of France when the States-General came to Paris with that offer of sovereignty which had been so con- tumaciously refused.

In the object were attainable, the ex-chief of the Huguenots still meant to be king of the Netherlands as sincerely as Philip II. had ever intended to be monarch of France. 2 But Henry was too accurate a calculator of chances, and had hustled too much in the world of realities, to exhaust his strength in striving, year after year, for a manifest impossibility. The enthusiast, who had passed away at last from the dreams of the Escorial into the land of shadows, had spent a lifetime, and melted the wealth of an empire; but universal monarchy had never come forth from his crucible. The French king, although

possessed likewise of an almost boundless faculty for ambitious visions, was capable of distinguishing cloudland from substantial empire. Jeannin, as his envoy would at any rate not reveal his master's secret aspirations to those with whom he came to deal, as openly as Philip had once unveiled himself to Jeannin.

There could be no doubt that peace at this epoch was the real interest of France. That kingdom was beginning to flourish again, owing to the very considerable administrative genius of Bethune, an accomplished financier according to the lights of the age, and still more by reason of the general impoverishment of the great feudal houses and of the clergy. The result of the almost interminable series of civil and religious wars had been to cause a general redistribution of property. Capital was mainly in the hands of the middle and lower classes, and the consequence of this general circulation of wealth through all the channels of society was precisely what might have been expected, an increase of enterprise and of productive industry in various branches. 1 Although the financial wisdom of the age was doing its best to impede commerce, to prevent the influx of foreign wares, to prohibit the outflow of specie—in obedience to the universal superstition, which was destined to survive so many centuries, that gold and silver alone constituted wealth—while at the same time, in deference to the idiotic principle of sumptuary legisla-

1 Grotius, xvi. 740. „Vultus autem sermonisque adeo potens ut cum maxime abderet sensus apertissimus videretur.”

2 See especially *Seconde Instruction pour le Sr Jeannin. Negotiations de M. le President Jeannin*, ed. Petitot, 1659, i. 40-43, and 62, 63.

1 Anche per ricchezza avanza la città di Parigi tu altre perchè essendo la nobiltà rovinata per le guerre passate ed il clero medesimamente per l'istessa causa, cominciando questo da poco in qua a ristorarsi resta il solo popolo con denari nel qual numero sono quelli li quali fanno la facoltà con le liti, con li giudizi e con l'amministrazione della entrate pubbliche perchè vendono tutte queste cariche a denari contante però al può immaginare ognuno quante se le facciano fruttare per farsi padroni di centinaia di migliaia di scudi e vi sono molti di questi tali in Francia ma nella città di Parigi più che in ogul ultra.”—A. Badoer, *Relazione*.

tion, it was vigorously opposing mulberry culture, silk manufactures, and other creations of luxury, which, in spite of the hostility of governmental sages, were destined from that time forward to become better mines of wealth for the kingdom than the Indies had been for Spain, yet on the whole the arts of peace were in the ascendant in France.

The king, although an unscrupulous, self-seeking despot and the coarsest of voluptuaries, was at least a man of genius. He had also too much shrewd mother-wit to pursue such schemes as experience had shown to possess no reality. The talisman „Espoir,” emblazoned on his shield, had led him to so much that it was natural for him at times to think all things possible.

But he knew how to renounce as well as how to dare. He had abandoned his hope to be declared Prince of Wales and successor to the English crown, which he had cherished for a brief period, at the epoch of the Essex conspiracy; <sup>1</sup> he had forgotten his magnificent dream of placing the crown of the holy German empire upon his head, <sup>2</sup> and if he still secretly resolved to annex the Netherlands to his realms, and to destroy his excellent ally, the usurping, rebellious, and heretic Dutch republic, he had craft enough to work towards his aim in the dark, and the common

1 „I quali sono che egli pretendi di essere dichiarato principe di Galles e successore del regno e spera in questa congiuntura di poter ottenere quello che per il passato non gli è riuscito.”—Despatch of Cavalli, Venetian ambassador in England, 16 April, 1601. Barozzi, Ser. II. vol. i. p. 38.

2 „Era stata sua Maestà già tempo desiderosa di farsi elegger ere de' Romani ed allora si tratteneva più amorevolmente con quei principi ma scuoprendo poi d'aver debole fondamento per tale pretensione se a è levata del tutti dall' animo.”—A. Badoer, Relazione. Ibid.

„Ebbe anco opinione di procurarsi la elezione a re dei Romani dubitando che il re di Spagna avesse questo medesimo pensiero ma avendo scoperto d' altra inclinazione non se n' è molto occupato.”—P. Priuli, Relazione.

sense to know that by now throwing down the mask he would be for ever baffled of his purpose.

The history of France, during the last three-quarters of a century, had made almost every Frenchman, old enough to bear arms, an accomplished soldier. Henry boasted that the kingdom could put three hundred thousand veterans into the field—a high figure, when it is recollected that its population certainly did not exceed fifteen millions. <sup>1</sup> No man however was better aware than he, that in spite of the apparent pacification of parties, the three hundred thousand would not be all on one side, even in case of a foreign war. There were at least four thousand great feudal lords, <sup>2</sup> faithful to the Huguenot faith and cause as he had been false to both; many of them still wealthy, notwithstanding the general ruin which had swept over the high nobility, and all of them with vast influence and a splendid following, both the lesser gentry and the men of lower rank.

Although he kept a Jesuit priest ever at his elbow, <sup>3</sup> and did his best to persuade the world and perhaps himself that he had become a devout Catholic, in consequence of those memorable five hours instruction from the Bishop of Bourges, and that there was no hope for France save in its return to the bosom of the Church, he was yet too politic and too farseeing to doubt that for him to oppress the Protestants would be not only suicidal, but, what was worse in his eyes, ridiculous.

1 „Computandosi che in tutto il regno vi passano essere quindici milioni d'anime.”—Angelo Badoer, Relazione, 1603, Barozzi and Berchet, Ser. II. vol. i.

The population of Paris was estimated by the same ambassador at 400,000. Pietro Priuli (Relazione Francia, 1608) was often told by the king that he had 300,000 veterans in France.

2 A. Badoer, Relazione. P. Priuli.

3 „Non avendo li religiosi in Francia maggior protettore di lui tenendo sempre a canto a sì un gesuita suo favoritissimo che mai lo abbandona.”—Ibid.



He knew, too, that with thirty or forty thousand fighting-men <sup>1</sup> in the field, with seven hundred and forty churches in the various provinces <sup>2</sup> for their places of worship, with all the best fortresses in France in their possession, with leaders like Rohan, Lesdiguières, Bouillon, and many others, and with the most virtuous, self-denying, Christian government, <sup>3</sup> established and maintained by themselves, it would be madness for him and his dynasty to deny the Protestants their political and religious liberty, or to attempt a crusade against their brethren in the Netherlands.

France was far more powerful than Spain, although the world had not yet recognised the fact. Yet it would have been difficult for both united to crush the new commonwealth, however paradoxical such a proposition seemed to contemporaries.

Sully was conscientiously in favour of peace, and Sully was the one great minister of France. Not a Lerma, certainly; for France was not Spain, nor was Henry IV. a Philip III. The Huguenot duke was an inferior financier to his Spanish contemporary, if it were the height of financial skill for a minister to exhaust the resources of a great kingdom in order to fill his own pocket. Sully certainly did not neglect his own interests, for he had accumulated a fortune of at least seventy thousand dollars a year, besides a cash capital estimated at a million and a half. <sup>4</sup> But while enriching himself, he had won-

<sup>1</sup> Badoer estimates the force at only 25,000.

<sup>2</sup> P. Priuli, Relazione.

<sup>3</sup> „Il governo politico degli eretici,” said one who cordially hated heretics, „è così diligente ed accurato quanto ogni altro che sia al mondo ed in questo avanzano veramente loro medesimi perchè trascurano affatto l'interesse particolare per attender al solo pubblico, proprietà contraria alla natura Francese se non vogliono dire che l'interesse pubblico serva per conservazione del particolare.”—A. Badoer.

„Le più importanti fortezze del regno sono da essi tenute,” &c.—P. Priuli.

<sup>4</sup> P. Priuli, Relazione.

derfully improved the condition of the royal treasury. He had reformed many abuses and opened many new sources of income. He had, of course, not accomplished the whole Augean task of purification. He was a vigorous Huguenot, but no Hercules, and demigods might have shrunk appalled at the filthy mass of corruption which great European kingdoms every-where presented to the reformer's eye. Compared to the Spanish Government, that of France might almost have been considered virtuous, yet even there everything was venal.

To negotiate was to bribe, right and left, and at every step. All the ministers and great functionaries received presents, as a matter of course, and it was necessary to pave the pathway even to their ante-chambers with gold.

The king was fully aware of the practice, but winked at it, because his servants, thus paid enormous sums by the public and by foreign Governments, were less importunate for rewards and salaries from himself <sup>1</sup>

One man in the kingdom was said to have clean hands, the venerable and sagacious chancellor Pomponne de Bellièvre. His wife, however, was less scrupulous, and readily disposed of influence and court-favour for a price, without the knowledge, so it was thought, of the great judge. <sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> „Con tutti li ministri indifferentemente l' uomo si fa strada in Francia con quei mezzi che ormai mi pare che usino per tutto il mondo . . . il re medesimo lo sa e lo permette forse perchè profitando li ministri lascino di molestara la S. M. per altre ricompense del servizio che prestano ed essi per questa via pretendono riportare le giuste mercedi dello loro fatiche mentre veggono poter difficilmente sperarne altre dal re.”—P. Priuli, Relazione.

<sup>2</sup> „Il signore cancelliere solo si mantiene in concetto di molto ingegno ma ha una moglie che supplisce al suo mancamento, ben si crede senza sua saputa, poichè nè anco la moglie basta a fargli fare quello che non conviene.”—Ibid. The ambassador adds, on the general subject of corruption and bribery at the French court, „Queste cose sono tanto pubbliche nella corte che non pretando far torto ad alcuno a riferirle

Jeannin, too, was esteemed a man of personal integrity, ancient Leaguer and tricky politician though he were.

Highest offices of magistracy and judicature, Church and State, were objects of a traffic almost as shameless as in Spain. 1 The ermine was sold at auction, mitres were objects of public barter, Church preferments were bestowed upon female children in their cradles. Yet there was hope in France, notwithstanding that the Pragmatic Sanction of St. Louis, the foundation of the liberties of the Gallican Church, had been annulled by Francis, who had divided the seamless garment of Church patronage with Leo.

Those four thousand great Huguenot lords, those thirty thousand hard-fighting weavers, and blacksmiths, and other plebeians, those seven hundred and forty churches, those very substantial fortresses in every province of the kingdom, were better facts than the Holy Inquisition to preserve a great nation from sinking into the slough of political extinction.

Henry was most anxious that Sully should convert himself to the ancient Church, and the gossips of the day told each other that the duke had named his price for his conversion. To be made

high constable of France, it was said would melt the resolve of the stiff Huguenot. 1 To any other inducement or blandishment he was adamant. Whatever truth may have been in such chatter, it is certain that the duke never gratified his master's darling desire.

Yet it was for no lack of attempts and intrigues on the part of the king, although it is not probable that he would have ever consented to bestow that august and coveted dignity upon a Bethune.

The king did his best by intrigue, by calumny, by tale-bearing, by inventions, to set the Huguenots against each other, and to excite the mutual jealousy of all his most trusted adherents, whether Protestant or Catholic. The most good-humoured, the least vindictive, the most ungrateful, the falsest of mankind, he made it his policy, as well as his pastime, to repeat, with any amount of embroidery that his most florid fancy could devise, every idle story or calumny that could possibly create bitter feeling and make mischief among those who surrounded him. Being aware that this propensity was thoroughly understood, he only multiplied fictions, so cunningly mingled with truths, as to leave his hearers quite unable to know what to believe and what to doubt. By such arts, force being impossible, he hoped one day to sever the band which held the conventicles together, and to reduce Protestantism to insignificance. He would have cut off the head of D'Aubigné or Duplessis Mornay to gain an object, and have not only pardoned but caressed and rewarded Biron when reeking from the conspiracy against his own life and crown, had he been willing to confess and ask pardon

1 P. Priuli, Relazione. „Procura (il re) che egli (Sully) si faccia cattolico . . . . seppure avesse a venire a tal risoluzione si è lasciato intendere con i suoi confidenti che non lo farebbe per altro che con essere dichiarato Contestabile di Francia, dignità sì sublime che tiensi fermo che il re non gliela conferirebbe.”

in questo sacrario dove sono nondimeno sicuro che saranno custodite con le altre cose dette e da darsi sotto quel sigillo di segretezza che conviene al servizio ed alla riputazione di questo stimatissimo consiglio.”

1 „Di qua nasce che oltre alle altre invenzioni s'è introdotto vendere non solo tutti li ufficii e le cariche anco di giustizia ma di più gli stessi servizi della casa del re di maestri di casa dei gentiluomini della camera, dei valetti, ed in sino li capitani delle guardie della propria persona del re che non si può dire più; il che rende molto mal sodisfatto la nobiltà alla quale erano in altri tempi riservati per premii de' loro servizi questi luoghi che ora vendendosi convengono cadere in mano a chi ha più denari senza alcuna distinzione de' meriti. E siccome il re non è sotto posto all' odio manco è soggetto all' affezione verso le persone che per esso patiscino nell' interesse come faceva il re passato che per troppa amorevolezza donava più che non avera.”—A Badoer, Relazione.

for his stupendous crime. He hated vindictive men almost as much as he despised those who were grateful. 1

He was therefore far from preferring Sully to Villeroy or Jeannin, but he was perfectly aware that, in financial matters at least, the duke was his best friend and an important pillar of the state.

The minister had succeeded in raising the annual revenue of France to nearly eleven millions of dollars, and in reducing the annual expenditures to a

1 „Non vi è delitto per grande che pensassero commettere del quale non sieno sicuri d'ottenere il perdono dalla Maestà sua e di siffatta maniera che da quell'ora in poi userà il re con essi gli stessi termini di confidenza che usa con i più antichi e fedeli servitori che abbia, il che non si scuopre solo nel trattare apparente, accarezzando tutti ad uno modo ma nell'esistente ancora perchè quando il re ha bisogno dell'opera di qualcheduno conosciuto che possa valere in quel servizio non distingue antica da nuova, sincera da interessato servitù nè in somma fedeltà ma chiama S. M. quel tale gli comunica il tutto e l'incarica di negoziare come ad un più vecchio più sincero e più fedele servitore suo. In fine è proprio del re non solo perdonare indifferentemente ad ognuno qual si voglia colpa mentre la confessi e gli dimandi il perdono ma quando conosce un uomo che sia di nature vendicativa l'odia più che per qualsivoglia altro vizio. Usa S. M. un altro termine con li suoi servitori credendo convenirgli viver geloso dell'azione di ciascheduno che quando stima che qualche unione di particolari persone possa apportare pregiudizio al servizio suo procura disunirli con porle al punto l'uno contra l'altra non lasciando di ridire tutto quello che gli fosse stato riferito anco con obbligo di segretezza mentre ciò possa giovare al suo disegno ed orna la relazione con quei fregi d'invenzione che vengono felicemente composti dal suo florido ingegno, quando conosca potere con essi generare e nutrire gelosia fra quelli amici, per disunirli e farli anco venire alle mani come molte volte accade. Con questo arriva S. M. al fine che desidera, di dissolvere le convenicole delle quali vive gelosissimo ma ne conviene provare anco danno notabile, perchè conosciuto ormai la sua natura non vi è chi si fidi di dirgli molte cose che saria suo servizio il saperle. Conosce il re medesimo questa sua facilità di ridire ma essendogli impossibile il mutare natura per rimediarsi in quanto può fra le cose vere mischia con arte dell'invenzione per ridurre l'uomo a non saper che si credere.”—A. Badoer, Relazione.

little more than ten millions. 1 To have a balance on the right side of the public ledger was a feat less easily accomplished in those days even than in our own. Could the duke have restrained his sovereign's reckless extravagance in buildings, parks, hunting establishments and harems, he might have accomplished even greater miracles. He lectured the king roundly, as a parent might remonstrate with a prodigal son, but it was impossible even for a Sully to rescue that hoary-headed and most indomitable youth from wantonness and riotous living. The civil-list of the king amounted to more than one-tenth of the whole revenue. 2

On the whole, however, it was clear, as France was then constituted and administered, that a general peace would be, for the time at least, most conductive to its interests, and Henry and his great minister were sincerely desirous of bringing about that result.

Preliminaries for a negotiation which should terminate this mighty war were now accordingly to be laid down at the Hague. Yet it would seem rather difficult to effect a compromise. Besides the powers less interested, but which nevertheless sent representatives to watch the proceedings—such as Sweden, Denmark, Brandenburg, the Elector Palatine—there were Spain, France, England, the republic, and the archdukes.

Spain knew very well that she could not continue the war; but she hoped by some quibbling recognition of an impossible independence to recover that authority over her ancient vassals which the sword had for a time struck down. Distraction in councils, personal rivalries, the well-known incapacity of a people to govern itself, commercial

1 Badoer says 12,000,000 of scudi (four to the pound sterling), of which however 6,000,000 were pledged. P. Priuli puts the whole receipts of the exchequer at 10,727,907 dollars, and the expenses at 10,333,114.

2 To 1,238,632 dollars, according to P. Priuli.



greediness, provincial hatreds, envies, and jealousies, would soon reduce that jumble of cities and villages, which aped the airs of sovereignty, into insignificance and confusion. Adroit management would easily re-assert afterwards the sovereignty of the Lord's anointed. That a republic of freemen, a federation of independent states, could take its place among the nations did not deserve a serious thought.

Spain in heart preferred therefore to treat. It was however indispensable that the Netherlands should re-establish the Catholic religion throughout the land, should abstain then and for ever from all insolent pretences to trade with India or America, and should punish such of their citizens as attempted to make voyages to the one or the other. With these trifling exceptions, the court of Madrid would look with favour on propositions made in behalf of the rebels.

France, as we have seen, secretly aspired to the sovereignty of all the Netherlands, if it could be had. She was also extremely in favour of excluding the Hollanders from the Indies, East and West. The king, fired with the achievements of the republic at sea, and admiring their great schemes for founding empires at the antipodes by means of commercial corporations, was very desirous of appropriating to his own benefit the experience, the audacity, the perseverance, the skill and the capital of their merchants and mariners. He secretly instructed his commissioners, therefore, and repeatedly urged it upon them, to do their best to procure the renunciation, on the part of the republic, of the Indian trade, and to contrive the transplantation into France of the mighty trading companies, so successfully established in Holland and Zeeland. 1

1 *Negotiations de Jeannin*, i. 71, 153, 183, (especially 196, 219). Compare Gallucci, 345, 346, and see especially the memoir of F. Aerssens, in *Deventer*, iii. 26-31. Correspondence between Henry IV. and Olden-Barneveld, pp. 46-50. *Ibid.*

The plot thus to deprive the provinces of their India trade was supposed by the Statesmen of the republic to have been formed in connivance with Spain. That power, finding itself half pushed from its seat of power in the East by the „grand and infallible society created by the United Provinces,” 1 would be but too happy to make use of this French intrigue in order to force the intruding Dutch navy from its conquests.

Olden-Barneveld, too politic to offend the powerful and treacherous ally by a flat refusal, said that the king's friendship was more precious than the India trade. At the same time he warned the French Government that, if they ruined the Dutch East India Company, „neither France nor any other nation would ever put its nose into India again.” 2

James of England, too, flattered himself that he could win for England that sovereignty of the Netherlands which England as well as France had so decidedly refused. The marriage of Prince Henry with the Spanish Infanta was the bait, steadily dangled before him by the politicians of the Spanish court, and he deluded himself with the thought that the Catholic king, on the death of the childless archdukes, would make his son and daughter-in-law a present of the obedient Netherlands. He already had some of the most important places in the United Netherlands—the famous cautionary towns—in his grasp, and it should go hard but he would twist that possession into a sovereignty over the whole land. As for recognising the rebel provinces as an independent sovereignty, that was most abhorrent to him. Such a tampering with the great principles of Government was an offence against all crowned heads, a crime in which he was unwilling to participate.

His instinct against rebellion seemed like second sight. The king might almost

1 *Memoir of Aerssens*, *ubi sup.*

2 *Deventer*, iii. 50.

be imagined to have foreseen in the dim future those memorable months in which the proudest triumph of the Dutch commonwealth was to be registered before the forum of Christendom at the congress of Westphalia, and in which the solemn trial and execution of his own son and successor, with the transformation of the monarchy of the Tudors and Stuarts into a British republic, were simultaneously to startle the world. But it hardly needed the gift of prophecy to inspire James with a fear of revolutions.

He was secretly desirous therefore, sustained by Salisbury and his other advisers, of effecting the restoration of the provinces to the dominion of his most Catholic Majesty. 1 It was of course the interest of England that the Netherlands rebels should renounce the India trade. So would James be spared the expense and trouble of war; so would the great doctrines of divine right be upheld; so would the way be paved towards the ultimate absorption of the Netherlands by England. Whether his theological expositions would find as attentive pupils when the pope's authority had been re-established over all his neighbours; whether the Catholic rebels in Ireland would become more tranquil by the subjugation of the Protestant rebels in Holland; whether the principles of Guy Fawkes might not find more effective application, with no bulwark beyond the seas against the incursion of such practitioners—all this he did not perhaps sufficiently ponder.

Thus far had the discursive mind of James wandered from the position which it occupied at the epoch of Maximilian de Bethune's memorable embassy to England.

The archdukes were disposed to quiet. On them fell the burthen of the war. Their little sovereignty, where—if they could only be allowed to expend

the money squeezed from the obedient provinces in court diversions, stately architecture, splendid encouragement of the fine arts, and luxurious living, surrounded by a train of great nobles, fit to command regiment in the field or assist in the counsels of state, but chiefly occupied in putting dishes on the court table, handing ewers and napkins to their Highnesses, or in still more menial offices—so much enjoyment might be had, was reduced to a mere parade ground for Spanish soldiery. 1 It was ridiculous, said the politicians of Madrid, to suppose that a great empire like Spain would not be continually at war in one direction or another, and would not perpetually require the use of large armies. Where then could there be a better mustering place for their forces than those very provinces, so easy of access, so opulent, so conveniently situate in the neighbourhood of Spain's most insolent enemies? 2 It was all very fine for the archduke, who knew nothing of war, they declared, who had no hope of children, who longed only for a life of inglorious *esse*, such as he could have had as archbishop, to prate of peace and thus to compromise the dignity of the realm. On the contrary, by making proper use of the Netherlands, the repose and grandeur of the monarchy would be secured, even should the war become eternal. 3

This prospect, not agreeable certainly for the archdukes or their subjects, was but little admired outside the Spanish court.

1 „Il se fait servir par les plus grands et même par ses confrères et compagnons d'ordre jusques aux choses indignes d'être nommées . . .

„L'on voit chacun jour grand nombre de noblesse, qui pourroit bien s'employer à la tête d'une compagnie de cavalerie ou d'un regiment, ne s'exercer qu'à porter des plats sur une table, et d'autres encore à d'autres choses moins nécessaires.”—Letter from Brussels in P. de l'Etoile. Supplement au Journal du Règne de Henri IV., 1599-1606, tom. iii. pp. 460, 461. In Petitot, vol. xivii.

2 Bentivoglio, 564.

3 Idem.

1 Negotiations de Jeannin, i. 128, 129, 152, 134, 199, 217, 240, 524, et *passim*.

Such then were the sentiments of the archdukes, and such the schemes and visions of Spain, France, and England. On two or three points, those great powers were mainly, if unconsciously, agreed. The Netherlands should not be sovereign; they should renounce the India navigation; they should consent to the re-establishment of the Catholic religion.

On the other hand, the States-General knew their own minds, and made not the slightest secret of their intentions. They would be sovereign, they would not renounce the India trade, they would not agree to the re-establishment of the Catholic religion.

Could the issue of the proposed negotiations be thought hopeful, or was another half century of warfare impending?

On the 28th May the French commissioners came before the States-General. 1

There had been many wild rumours flying through the provinces in regard to the king's secret designs upon the republic, especially since the visit made to the Hague a twelvemonth before by Francis Aerssens, States' resident at the French court. 2 That diplomatist, as we know, had been secretly commissioned by Henry to feel the public pulse in regard to the sovereignty, so far as what could be done by very private and delicate fingering. Although only two or three personages had been dealt with—the suggestions being made as the private views of the ambassadors only—there had been much gossip on the subject, not only in the Netherlands, but at the English and Spanish courts. Throughout the commonwealth there was a belief that Henry wished to make himself king of the country.

As this happened to be the fact, it was natural that the President, according to the statecraft of his school, should deny it at once, and with an air of gentle melancholy.

Wearing therefore his most ingenuous expression, Jeannin addressed the assembly.

He assured the States that the king had never forgotten how much assistance he had received from them when he was struggling to conquer the kingdom legally belonging to him, and at a time when they too were fighting in their own country for their very existence. 1

The king thought that he had given so many proofs of his sincere friendship as to make doubt impossible; but he had found the contrary, for the States had accorded an armistice, and listened to overtures of peace, without deigning to consult him on the subject. They had proved, by beginning and concluding so important a transaction without his knowledge, that they regarded him with suspicion, and had no respect for his name. Whence came the causes of that suspicion it was difficult to imagine, unless from certain false rumours of propositions said to have been put forward in his behalf, although he had never authorised any one to make them, by which men had been induced to believe that he aspired to the sovereignty of the provinces.

„This falsehood,” continued the candid President, „has cut our king to the heart, wounding him more deeply than anything else could have done. To make the armistice without his knowledge showed merely your contempt for him, and your want of faith in him. But he blamed not the action in itself, since you deemed it for your good, and God grant that you may not have been deceived. But to pretend that his Majesty wished to grow great at your expense, this was to do a wrong to his reputation, to his good faith, and to the desire which he has always shown to secure the prosperity of your state.” 2

Much more spoke Jeannin in this vein, assuring the assembly that those abomin-

1 Meteren, 551. Jeannin, i. 109.

2 Wagenaar, ix. 261, *seqq.*

1 Jeannin, i. 109.

2 Ibid. 110.



able falsehoods proceeded from the enemies of the king, and were designed expressly to sow discord and suspicion in the provinces. The reader, already aware of the minute and detailed arrangements made by Henry and his ministers for obtaining the sovereignty of the United Provinces and destroying their liberties, will know how to appreciate the eloquence of the ingenuous President.

After the usual commonplaces concerning the royal desire to protect his allies against wrong and oppression, and to advance their interests, the President suggested that the States should forthwith communicate the pending deliberations to all the kings and princes who had favoured their cause, and especially to the King of England, who had so thoroughly proved his desire to promote their welfare. 1

As Jeannin had been secretly directed to pave the way by all possible means for the king's sovereignty over the provinces: as he was not long afterwards to receive explicit instructions to expend as much money as might be necessary in bribing Prince Maurice, Count Lewis William, Barneveld and his son, together with such others as might seem worth purchasing, in order to assist Henry in becoming monarch of their country; 2 and as the English king was at that moment represented in Henry's private letters to the commissioners as actually loathing the liberty, power, and prosperity of the provinces, 3 it must be conceded that the President had acquitted himself very handsomely in his first oration.

Such was the virtue of his honest face.

Barneveld answered with generalities and commonplaces. No man knew better than the Advocate the exact position of affairs; no man had more profoundly fathomed the present purpose of the French king; no man had more acutely

scanned his character. But he knew the critical position of the commonwealth. He knew that, although the public revenue might be raised by extraordinary and spasmodic exertion to nearly 1 a million sterling, a larger income than had ever been at the disposition of the great Queen of England, the annual deficit might be six millions of florins—more than half the revenue—if the war continued, 2 and that there was necessity of peace, could the substantial objects of the war be now obtained. He was well aware too of the subtle and scheming brain which lay hid beneath that reverend brow of the President, although he felt capable of coping with him in debate or intrigue. Doubtless he was inspired with as much ardour for the intellectual conflict as Henry might have experienced on some great field-day with Alexander Farnese.

On this occasion, however, Barneveld preferred to glide gently over the rumours concerning Henry's schemes. Those reports had doubtless emanated, he said, from the enemies of Netherland prosperity. The private conclusion of the armistice he defended on the ground of necessity, and of temporary financial embarrassment, and he promised that deputies should at once be appointed to confer with the royal commissioners in regard to the whole subject.

In private, he assured Jeannin that the communications of Aerssens had only been discussed in secret, and had not been confided to more than three or four persons. 3

The Advocate, although the leader of the peace party, was by no means over anxious for peace.

The object of much insane obloquy because disposed to secure that blessing for his country on the basis of freedom and independence, he was not disposed to trust in the sincerity of the arch-dukes, or the Spanish court, or the

1 Jeannin, i. 113.

2 Ibid. 43, 62, 63, 69, 70, 71.

3 Ibid. 157.

1 Wagenaar, ix. 274, 275.

2 Ibid. 277.

3 Resol. Holl. 146, 147. Wagenaar, ix. 270.

French king. „*Timeo Danaos etiam dona ferentes*,” he had lately said to Aerssens. 1 Knowing that the resistance of the Netherlands had been forty years long the bulwark of Europe against the designs of the Spaniard for universal empire, he believed the republic justified in expecting the support of the leading powers in the negotiations now proposed. „Had it not been for the opposition of these provinces,” he said, „he might, in the opinion of the wisest, have long ago been monarch of all Europe, with small expense of men, money, or credit.” 2 He was far from believing therefore that Spain, which had sacrificed, according to his estimate, three hundred thousand soldiers and two hundred million ducats in vain endeavours to destroy the resistance of the United Provinces, was now ready to lay aside her vengeance and submit to a sincere peace. {Rather he thought to see „the lambskins, now frisking so innocently about the commonwealth, suddenly transform themselves into lions and wolves.” 3 It would be a fatal error, he said, to precipitate the dear fatherland into the net of a simulated negotiation, from unwise impatience for peace. The Netherlanders were a simple, truthful people and could hope for no advantage in dealing with Spanish friars, nor discover all the danger and deceit lurking beneath their fair words. Thus the man, whom his enemies perpetually accused of being bought by the enemy, of wishing peace at any price, of wishing to bring back the Catholic party and ecclesiastical influence to the Netherlands, was vigorously denouncing a precipitate peace, and warning his countrymen of the danger of premature negotiations.

„As one can hardly know the purity and value of gold,” he said, „without testing it, so it is much more difficult

to distinguish a false peace from a genuine one; for one can never touch it nor taste it, and one learns the difference when one is cheated and lost. Ignorant people think peace negotiations as simple as a private lawsuit. Many sensible persons even think that, the enemy once recognizing us for a free sovereign state, we shall be in the same position as England and France, which powers have lately made peace with the archdukes and with Spain. But we shall find a mighty difference. Moreover, in those kingdoms the Spanish king has since the peace been ever busy corrupting their officers of state and their subjects, and exciting rebellion and murder within their realms, as all the world must confess. And the English merchants complain that they have suffered more injustice, violence, and wrong from the Spaniards since the peace than they did during the war.” 1

The Advocate also reminded his countrymen that the archduke, being a vassal of Spain, could not bind that power, by his own signature, and that there was no proof that the king would renounce his pretended rights to the provinces. If he affected to do so, it would only be to put the republic to sleep. He referred, with much significance, to the late proceedings of the Admiral of Arragon at Emmerich, who refused to release that city according to his plighted word, saying roundly that whatever he might sign and seal one day he would not hesitate absolutely to violate on the next if the king's service was thereby to be benefited. 2 With such people, who had always learned law-doctors and ghostly confessors to strengthen and to absolve them, they could never expect anything but broken faith and contempt for treaties however solemnly ratified.

Should an armistice be agreed upon and negotiations begun, the Advocate urged that the work of corruption and

1 Olden-Barneveld to Aerssens, 2 June, 1607, in Deventer, iii. 135.

2 Memoire van Olden-Barneveld, in Deventer, iii. excix. 137-147.

3 Ibid.

1 Ibid.

2 Ibid.

bribery would not be a moment delayed, and although the Netherlanders were above all nations a true and faithful race, it could hardly be hoped that no individuals would be gained over by the enemy. 1

„For the whole country,” said Barneveld, „would swarm with Jesuits, priests, and monks, with calumnies and corruptions—the machinery by which the enemy is wont to produce discord, relying for success upon the well-known maxim of Philip of Macedon, who considered no city impregnable into which he could send an ass laden with gold.” 2

The Advocate was charged too with being unfriendly to the India trade, especially to the West India Company.

He took the opportunity, however, to enlarge with emphasis and eloquence upon that traffic as constituting the very life-blood of the country.

„The commerce with the East Indies is going on so prosperously,” he said, „that not only our own inhabitants but all strangers are amazed. The West India Company is sufficiently prepared, and will cost the commonwealth so little, that the investment will be inconsiderable in comparison with the profits. And all our dangers and difficulties have nearly vanished since the magnificent victory of Gibraltar, by which the enemy’s ships, artillery, and sailors have been annihilated, and proof afforded that the Spanish galleys are not so terrible as they pretend to be. By means of this trade to both the Indies, matters will soon be brought into such condition that the Spaniards will be driven out of all those regions and deprived of their traffic. Thus will the great wolf’s teeth be pulled out, and we need have no farther fear of his biting again. Then we may hope for a firm and assured peace, and may keep the Indies, with the whole navigation thereon depending, for our-

selves, sharing it freely and in common with our allies.” 1

Certainly no statesman could more strongly depict the dangers of a pusillanimous treaty, and the splendid future of the republic, if she held fast to her resolve for political independence, free religion, and free trade, than did the great Advocate at this momentous epoch of European history.

Had he really dreamed of surrendering the republic to Spain, that republic whose resistance ever since the middle of the previous century had been all that had saved Europe, in the opinion of learned and experienced thinkers, from the universal empire of Spain—had the calumnies, or even a thousandth part of the calumnies, against him been true—how different might have been the history of human liberty!

Soon afterwards, in accordance with the suggestions of the French king and with their own previous intentions, a special legation was despatched by the States to England, in order to notify the approaching conferences to the sovereign of that country, and to invite his participation in the proceedings.

The States’ envoys were graciously received by James, who soon appointed Richard Spencer and Ralph Winwood as commissioners to the Hague, duly instructed to assist at the deliberations, and especially to keep a sharp watch upon French intrigues. There were also missions and invitations to Denmark and to the Electors Palatine and of Brandenburg, the two latter potentates having, during the past three years, assisted the States with a hundred thousand florins annually. 2

The news of the great victory at Gibraltar had reached the Netherlands almost simultaneously with the arrival of the French commissioners. It was thought probable that John Neyer had received the weighty intelligence some days earlier, and the intense

1 Memoire van Olden-Barneveldt, in Deventer, iil. cxcix. 137-147.

2 Ibid.

1 Ibid.

2 Wagenaar, ix. 274.



eagerness of the archdukes and of the Spanish Government to procure the recall of the Dutch fleet was thus satisfactorily explained. Very naturally this magnificent success, clouded though it was by the death of the hero to whom it was due, increased the confidence of the States in the justice of their cause and the strength of their position.

Once more, it is not entirely idle to consider the effect of scientific progress on the march of human affairs, as so often exemplified in history. Whether that half-century of continuous war would have been possible with the artillery, means of locomotion, and other machinery of destruction and communication now so terribly familiar to the world, can hardly be a question. The preterhuman prolixity of negotiation which appals us in the days when steam and electricity had not yet annihilated time and space, ought also to be obsolete. At a period when the news of a great victory was thirty days on its travels from Gibraltar to Flushing, aged counsellors justified themselves in a solemn consumption of time such as might have exasperated Jared or Methuselah in his boyhood. Men fought as if war was the normal condition of humanity, and negotiated as if they were all immortal. But has the art political kept pace with the advancement of physical science? If history be valuable for the examples it furnishes both for imitation and avoidance, then the process by which these peace conferences were initiated and conducted may be wholesome food for reflection.

John Neyen, who, since his secret transactions already described at the Hague and Fort Lillo, had been speeding back and forth between Brussels, London, and Madrid, had once more returned to the Netherlands, and had been permitted to reside privately at Delft until the king's ratification should arrive from Spain. <sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Meteren, 558.

While thus established, the industrious friar had occupied his leisure in studying the situation of affairs. Especially he had felt inclined to renew some of those little commercial speculations which had recently proved so comfortable in the case of Dirk van der Does. Recorder Cornelius Aerssens came frequently to visit him, with the private consent of the Government, and it at once struck the friar that Cornelius would be a judicious investment. So he informed the recorder that the archdukes had been much touched with his adroitness and zeal in facilitating the entrance of their secret agent into the presence of the Prince and the Advocate. Cruwel, in whose company the disguised Neyen had made his first journey to the Hague, was a near relative of Aerssens. The honest monk accordingly, in recognition of past and expected services, begged one day the recorder's acceptance of a bill, drawn by Marquis Spinola on Henry Beckman, merchant of Amsterdam, for eighty thousand ducats. He also produced a diamond ring, valued at then thousand florins, which he ventured to think worthy the acceptance of Madame Aerssens. Furthermore, he declared himself ready to pay fifteen thousand crowns in cash, on account of the bill, whenever it might be desired, and observed that the archdukes had ordered the house which the recorder had formerly occupied in Brussels to be reconveyed to him. <sup>1</sup> Other good things were in store, it was delicately hinted, as soon as they had been earned.

Aerssens expressed his thanks for the house, which, he said, legally belonged to him according to the terms of the surrender of Brussels. He hesitated in regard to the rest, but decided finally to accept the bill of exchange and the diamond, apprising Prince Maurice and Olden-Barneveld of the fact, however,

<sup>1</sup> Wagenaar, ix. 271, *et seqq.* Grotius, xvi. 741, 742.

on his return to the Hague. 1 Being subsequently summoned by Neyen to accept the fifteen thousand crowns, he felt embarrassed at the compromising position in which he had placed himself. He decided accordingly to make a public statement of the affair to the States-General. This was done, and the States placed the ring and the bill in the hands of their treasurer, Joris de Bie.

The recorder never got the eighty thousand ducats, nor his wife the diamond; but although there had been no duplicity on his part, he got plenty of slander. His evil genius had prompted him, not to listen seriously to the temptings of the monk; but to deal with him on his own terms. He was obliged to justify himself against public suspicion with explanations and pamphlets, but some taint of the calumny stuck by him to the last.

Meantime, the three months allotted for the reception of Philip's ratification had nearly expired. In March, the royal Government had expressly consented that the archdukes should treat with the rebels on the ground of their independence. In June that royal permission had been withdrawn, exactly because the independence could never be acknowledged. Albert, naturally enough indignant at such double dealing, wrote to the king that his disapprobation was incomprehensible, as the concession of independence had been made by direct command of Philip. „I am much amazed,” he said, „that, having treated with the islanders on condition of leaving them free, by express order of your Majesty (which you must doubtless very well remember), your Majesty now reproves my conduct, and declares your dissatisfaction.” 2 At last, on the 23rd July, Spinola requested a safe conduct

for Louis Verreyken, auditor of the council at Brussels, to come to the Hague. 1

On the 23rd of July that functionary accordingly arrived. He came before Prince Maurice and fifty deputies of the States-General and exhibited the document. At the same time he urged them, now that the long-desired ratification had been produced, to fulfil at once their promise, and to recall their fleet from the coast of Spain. 2

Verreyken was requested to withdraw while the instrument was examined. When recalled, he was informed that the States had the most straightforward intention to negotiate, but that the royal document did not at all answer their expectation. As few of the delegates could read Spanish, it would first of all be necessary to cause it to be translated. When that was done they would be able to express their opinion concerning it and come to a decision in regard to the recall of the fleet. This ended the proceedings on that occasion.

Next day Prince Maurice invited Verreyken and others to dine. After dinner the stadholder informed him that the answer of the States might soon be expected; at the same time expressing his regret that the king should have sent such an instrument. It was very necessary, said the prince; to have plain speaking, and he, for one, had never believed that the king would send a proper ratification. The one exhibited was not at all to the purpose. The king was expected to express himself as clearly as the archdukes had done in their instrument. He must agree to treat with the States General as with people entirely free, over whom he claimed no authority. If the king should refuse to make this public declaration, the States would at once break off all negotiation. 3

1 Wagenaar, ix. 271, *et seqq.* Grotius, xvi. 741, 742.

2 Extract from MS. Letter cited by Deventer, iii. xvi.

1 Wagenaar, ix. 278.

2 Meteren, 552, 553. Gallucci, 336. Wagenaar, 278, *seqq.*

3 Galucci, *ubi sup.*

Three days afterwards, seven deputies conferred with Verreyken. Barneveld, as spokesman, declared that, so far as the provinces were concerned, the path was plain and open to an honest, ingenuous, lasting peace, but that the manner of dealing on the other side was artificial and provocative of suspicion.<sup>1</sup> A most important line, which had been placed by the States at the very beginning of the form suggested by them, was wanting in the ratification now received. This hardly seemed an accidental omission. The whole document was constrained and defective. It was necessary to deal with Netherlanders in clear and simple language. The basis of any possible negotiation was that the provinces were to be treated with as and called entirely free. Unless this was done negotiations were impossible. The States-General were not so unskilled in affairs as to be ignorant that the king and the archdukes were quite capable, at a future day, of declaring themselves untrammelled by any conditions. They would boast that conventions with rebels and pledges to heretics were alike invalid. If Verreyken had brought no better document than the one presented, he had better go at once. His stay in the provinces was superfluous.<sup>2</sup>

At a subsequent interview Barneveld informed Verreyken that the king's confirmation had been unanimously rejected by the States-General as deficient both in form and substance. He added that the people of the provinces were growing very lukewarm in regard to peace, that Prince Maurice opposed it, that many persons regretted the length to which the negotiations had already gone. Difficult as it seemed to be to succeed, the archdukes might be certain that a complete rupture was imminent.

All these private conversations of Barneveld, who was known to be the

chief of the peace party, were duly reported by Verreyken in secret notes to the archduke and to Spinola. Of course they produced their effect. It surely might have been seen that the tricks and shifts of an antiquated diplomacy were entirely out of place if any wholesome result were desired. But the habit of dissimulation was inveterate. That the man who cannot dissemble is unfit to reign, was perhaps the only one of his father's golden rules which Philip III. could thoroughly comprehend, even if it be assumed that the monarch was at all consulted in regard to this most important transaction of his life. Verreyken and the friar knew very well when they brought the document that it would be spurned by the States, and yet they were also thoroughly aware that it was the king's interest to begin the negotiations as soon as possible. When thus privately and solemnly assured by the Advocate that they were really wasting their time by being the bearers of these royal evasions, they learned therefore nothing positively new, but were able to assure their employers that to thoroughly disgust the peace party was not precisely the mode of terminating the war.

Verreyken now received public and formal notification that a new instrument must be procured from the king. In the ratification which had been sent, that monarch spoke of the archdukes as princes and sovereign proprietors of all the Netherlands. The clause by which, according to the form prescribed by the States, and already adopted by the archdukes, the United Provinces were described as free countries over which no authority was claimed had been calmly omitted, as if, by such a subterfuge, the independence of the republic could be winked out of existence. Furthermore, it was objected that the document was in Spanish, that it was upon paper instead of parchment, that it was not sealed with the great,

<sup>1</sup> Gallucci, *ubi sup.*

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, 337, 338.



but with the little seal, and that it was subscribed „I the King.” This signature might be very appropriate for decrees issued by a monarch to his vassals, but could not be rightly appended, it was urged, to an instrument addressed to a foreign power. Potentates, treating with the States-General of the United Provinces, were expected to sign their names.

Whatever may be thought of the technical requirements in regard to the parchment, the signature, and the seal, it would be difficult to characterize too strongly the polity of the Spanish Government in the most essential point. To seek relief from the necessity of recognising—at least in the sense of similitude, according to the subtlety of Bentivoglio—the freedom of the provinces, simply by running the pen through the most important line of a most important document, was diplomacy in its dotage. Had not Marquis Spinola, a man who could use his brains and his pen as well as his sword, expressly implored the politicians of Madrid not to change even a comma in the form of ratification which he sent to Spain?

Verreyken, placed face to face with plain-spoken, straightforward, strong-minded men, felt the dreary absurdity of the position. He could only stammer a ridiculous excuse about the clause, having been accidentally left out by a copying secretary.<sup>1</sup> To represent so important an omission as a clerical error was almost as great an absurdity as the original device; but it was necessary for Verreyken to say something. He promised, however, that the form prescribed by the States should be again transmitted to Madrid, and expressed confidence that the ratification would now be sent as desired. Meantime he trusted that the fleet would be at once recalled.

This at once created a stormy debate which lasted many days, both within the walls of the House of Assembly and out of doors. Prince Maurice bitterly denounced the proposition, and asserted the necessity rather of sending out more ships than of permitting their cruisers to return. It was well known that the Spanish Government, since the destruction of Avila's fleet, had been straining every nerve to procure and equip other war-vessels, and that even the Duke of Lerma had offered a small portion of his immense plunderings to the crown in aid of naval armaments.<sup>1</sup>

On the other hand, Barneveld urged that the States, in the preliminary armistice, had already agreed to send no munitions nor reinforcements to the fleet already cruising on the coasts of the peninsula. It would be better, therefore, to recall those ships than to leave them where they could not be victualled nor strengthened without a violation of good faith.

These opinions prevailed, and on the 9th August, Verreyken was summoned before the Assem-<sup>9 Aug</sup>bly, and informed by Barneveld that the States had decided to withdraw the fleet, and to declare invalid all prizes made six weeks after that date. This was done, it was said, out of respect to the archdukes, to whom no blame was imputed for the negligence displayed in regard to the ratification. Furthermore, the auditor was requested to inform his masters that the documents brought from Spain were not satisfactory, and he was furnished with a draught, made both in Latin and French. With this form, it was added, the king was to comply within six weeks, if he desired to proceed further in negotiations with the States.<sup>2</sup>

Verreyken thanked the States-General made the best of promises, and courteously withdrew.

<sup>1</sup> Grotius, xvi. 744, 745. Meteren, 352. Wagenaar, ix. 279.

<sup>1</sup> Wagenaar, iv. 280, 281.

<sup>2</sup> Meteren, 352. Wagenaar, ix. 281

Next day, however, just as his preparations for departure had been made, he was once more summoned before the Assembly to meet with a somewhat disagreeable surprise. Barneveld, speaking as usual in behalf of the States-General, publicly produced "Spinola's bill of exchange for eighty-thousand ducats, the diamond ring intended for Madame Aerssens, and the gold chain given to Dirk van der Does, and expressed the feelings of the republican Government in regard to those barefaced attempts of Friar John at bribery and corruption, in very scornful language. 1 The Netherlands were not to be bought—so the agent of Spain and of the archdukes was informed—and, even if the citizens were venal, it would be necessary in a popular Government to buy up the whole nation. „It is not in our commonwealth as in despotisms,” said the Advocate, „where affairs of state are directed by the nod of two or three individuals, while the rest of the inhabitants are a mob of slaves. By turns, we all govern and are governed. This great council, this senate—should it seem not sufficiently fortified against your presents—could easily be enlarged. Here is your chain, your ring, your banker's draught. Take them all back to your masters. Such gifts are not necessary to ensure a just peace, while to accept them would be a crime against liberty, which we are incapable of committing.” 2

Verreyken, astonished and abashed, could answer little save to mutter a few words about the greediness of monks, who, judging every one else by themselves, thought no one inaccessible to a bribe. 3 He protested the innocence of the archdukes in the matter, who had given no directions to bribe, and

who were quite ignorant that the attempt had been made.

He did not explain by whose authority the chain, the ring, and the draught upon Beckman had been furnished to the friar.

Meantime that ecclesiastic was cheerfully wending his way to Spain in search of the new ratification, leaving his colleague vicariously to bide the pelting of the republican storm, and to return somewhat weather-beaten to Brussels.

During the suspension, thus ridiculously and gratuitously caused, of preliminaries which had already lasted the better portion of a year, party-spirit was rising day by day higher, and spreading more widely throughout the provinces. Opinions and sentiments were now sharply defined and loudly announced. The clergy, from a thousand pulpits, thundered against the peace, exposing the insidious practices, the faithless promises, the monkish corruptions, by which the attempt was making to reduce the free republic once more into vassalage to Spain. The people everywhere listened eagerly and applauded. Especially the mariners, cordwainers, smiths, ship-chandlers, boatmen, the tapestry weavers, lace manufacturers, shopkeepers, and above all, the India merchants and stockholders in the great commercial companies for the East and West, lifted up their voices for war. This was the party of Prince Maurice, who made no secret of his sentiments, and opposed, publicly and privately, the resumption of negotiations. Doubtless his adherents were the most numerous portion of the population.

Barneveld, nowever, was omnipotent with the municipal governments, and although many individuals in those bodies were deeply interested in the India navigation and the great corporations, the Advocate turned them as usual around his finger.

Ever since the memorable day of Nieuport there had been no love lost

1 Meteren. 553<sup>vo</sup>. Grotius, xvi 745. Wa-genaar, ix. 283. 2 Ibid.

3 „Nec mirum si monachi avarum imprumus hominum genus alios ex se aestimarent.”—Grotius, *ubi sup.*

between the stadholder and the Advocate. They had been nominally reconciled to each other, and had, until lately, acted with tolerable harmony, but each was thoroughly conscious of the divergence of their respective aims.

Exactly at this period the long-smothered resentment of Maurice against his old preceptor, counsellor, and, as he believed, betrayer, flamed forth anew. He was indignant that a man, so infinitely beneath him in degree, should thus dare to cross his plans, to hazard, as he believed, the best interests of the state, and to interfere with the course of his legitimate ambition. 1 There was more glory for a great soldier to earn in future battle-fields, a higher position before the world to be won. He had a right by birth, by personal and family service, to claim admittance among the monarchs of Europe. The pistol of Balthasar Gerard had alone prevented the elevation of his father to the sovereignty of the provinces. The patents, wanting only a few formalities, were still in possession of the son. As the war went on—and nothing but blind belief in Spanish treachery could cause the acceptance of a peace which would be found to mean slavery—there was no height to which he might not climb. With the return of peace and submission, his occupation would be gone, obscurity and poverty the sole recompense for his life-long services and the sacrifices of his family. The memory of the secret movements twice made but a few years before to elevate him to the sovereignty, and which he In 1602 believed to have been baffled and 1603. by the Advocate, doubtless rankled in his breast. He did not forget that when the subject had been discussed by the favourers of the scheme in Barneveld's own house, Barneveld himself had prophesied that one day or another, the rights would burst out which his Excellency had to become prince of the

provinces, on strength of the signed and sealed documents addressed to the late Prince of Orange; that he had further alluded to the efforts then on foot to make him Duke of Gelderland; adding with a sneer, that Zeeland was all agog on the subject, while in that province there were individuals very desirous of becoming children of Zeb-dee." 1

Barneveld, on his part, although accustomed to speak in public of his Excellency Prince Maurice in terms of profoundest respect, did not fail to communicate in influential quarters his fears that the prince was inspired by excessive ambition, and that he desired to protract the war, not for the good of the commonwealth, but for the attainment of greater power in the state. The envoys of France, expressly instructed on that subject by the king, whose purposes would be frustrated if the ill-blood between these eminent personages could not be healed, did their best to bring about a better understanding, but with hardly more than an apparent success.

Once more there were stories flying about that the stadholder had called the Advocate liar, and that he had struck him or offered to strike him 2—tales as void of truth, doubtless, as those so rife after the battle of Nieuwport, but which indicated the exasperation which existed.

When the news of the rejection of the king's ratification reached Madrid, the indignation of the royal conscience-keepers was vehement. 3

That the potentate of so large a portion of the universe should be treated by those lately his subjects with less respect than that due from equals to equals, seemed intolerable. So thoroughly inspired, however, was the king

1 Van der Kemp, iii. 100-103, 396-400. i. e. zealous disciples of their master, as Van der Kemp explains.

2 Wagenaar, ix. 285.

3 Gallucci, 333.

1 Wagenaar, ix. 283-285.



by the love of religion and the public good—as he informed Marquis Spinola by letter—and so intense was his desire for the termination of that disastrous war, that he did not hesitate indulgently to grant what had been so obstinately demanded. Little was to be expected; he said, from the stubbornness of the provinces, and from their extraordinary manner of transacting business, but looking, nevertheless, only to divine duty, and preferring its dictates to a selfish regard for his own interests, he had resolved to concede that liberty to the provinces which had been so importunately claimed. He however imposed the condition that the States should permit free and public exercise of the Catholic religion throughout their territories, and that so long as such worship was unobstructed, so long and no longer should the liberty now conceded to the provinces endure. 1

„Thus did this excellent prince,” says an eloquent Jesuit, „prefer obedience to the Church before subjection to himself, and insist that those, whom he emancipated from his own dominions, should still be loyal to the sovereignty of the Pope.” 2

Friar John, who had brought the last intelligence from the Netherlands, might have found it difficult, if consulted, to inform the king how many bills of exchange would be necessary to force this wonderful condition on the Government of the provinces. That the republic should accept that liberty as a boon which she had won with the red right hand, and should establish within her domains as many agents for Spanish reaction as there were Roman priests; monks, and Jesuits to be found, was not very probable. It was not thus nor then that the great lesson of religious equality and liberty for all men—the inevitable result of the Dutch revolt—was to be expounded. The inser-

tion of such a condition in the preamble to a treaty with a foreign power would have been a desertion on the part of the very principle of religious or civil freedom.

The monk, however, had convinced the Spanish Government that in six months after peace had been made the States would gladly accept the dominion of Spain once more, or, at the very least, would annex themselves to the obedient Netherlands under the sceptre of the archdukes.

Secondly, he assured the duke that they would publicly and totally renounce all connection with France.

Thirdly, he pledged himself that the exercise of the Catholic religion would be as free as that of any other creed. 1

And the duke of Lerma believed it all: such and no greater was his capacity for understanding the course of events which he imagined himself to be directing. Certainly Friar John did not believe what he said.

„Master Monk is not quite so sure of his stick as he pretends to be,” said Secretary-of-State Villeroy. 2 Of course, no one knew better the absurdity of those assurances than Master Monk himself.

„It may be that he has held such language,” said Jeannin, in order to accomplish his object in Spain. But 'tis all dreaming and moonshine, which one should laugh at rather than treat seriously. These people here mean to be sovereign for ever and will make no peace except on that condition. This grandeur and vanity have entered so deeply into their brains that they will be torn into little pieces rather than give it up.” 3

Spinola, as acute a politician as he was a brilliant commander, at once demonstrated to his Government the impotence of such senile attempts. No

1 Negotiations de Jeannin, i. 360.

2 Ibid. Letter of 19th Sept. 1607.

3 Ibid. i. 394. Letter of 6th Oct. 1607.

1 The King to Spinola, *apud* Gallucci, *ubi sup.*

2 Gallucci, *ubi sup.*

definite agreements could be made, he wrote, except by a general convention. Before a treaty of peace, no permission would be given by the States to the public exercise of the Catholic religion, for fear of giving offence to what were called the Protestant powers. Unless they saw the proper ratification they would enter into no negotiations at all. When the negotiations had produced a treaty, the Catholic worship might be demanded. Thus peace might be made, and the desired conditions secured, or all parties would remain as they had been. 1

The Spanish Government replied by sending a double form of ratification. 2 It would not have been the Spanish Government, had one simple, straightforward document been sent. Plenty of letters came at the same time, triumphantly refuting the objections and arguments of the States-General. To sign „*Yo el Rey*” had been the custom of the king’s ancestors in dealing with foreign powers. Thus had Philip II. signed the treaty of Vervins. Thus had he signed the recent treaty with England as well as other conventions with other potentates. If the French envoys at the Hague said the contrary they erred from ignorance or from baser reasons. The provinces could not be declared free until Catholic worship was conceded. The donations must be mutual and simultaneous and the States would gain a much more stable and diuturnal liberty, founded not upon a simple declaration, but lawfully granted them as a compensation for a just and pious work performed. To this end the king sent ratification number one in which his sentiments were fully expressed. If, however, the provinces were resolved not to defer the declaration so ardently desired and to refuse all negotiation until they had received it, then ratification number two, therewith sent

and drawn up in the required form, might be used. It was, however, to be exhibited but not delivered. The provinces would then see the clemency with which they were treated by the king, and all the world might know that it was not his fault if peace were not made. 1

Thus the politicians of Madrid; speaking in the name of their august sovereign and signing „*Yo el Rey*” for him without troubling him even to look at the documents.

When these letters arrived, the time fixed by the States for accepting the ratification had run out, and their patience was well-nigh exhausted. The archduke held council with Spinola, Verreyken, Richardot, and others, and it was agreed that ratification number two, in which the Catholic worship was not mentioned, should be forthwith sent to the States. Certainly no other conclusion could have been reached, and it was fortunate that a lucid interval in the deliberations of the lunatics at Madrid had furnished the archduke with an alternative. Had it been otherwise and had number one been presented, with all the accompanying illustrations, the same dismal comedy might have gone on indefinitely until the Dutchmen hissed it away and returned to their tragic business once more.

On the 25th October, Friar John and Verreyken came before 25 Oct. the States-General, more than 1607. a hundred members being present, besides Prince Maurice and Count Lewis William. 2

The monk stated that he had faithfully represented to his Majesty as Madrid the sincere, straightforward, and undissembling proceedings of their lordships in these negotiations. 3 He had also explained the constitution of their Government and had succeeded in ob-

1 Gallucci, 338.

2 Ibid. 340.

1 Ibid.

2 Wagenaar, ix. 285.

3 Jeannin, i. 423.

aining from his royal Majesty the desired ratification, after due deliberation with the council. This would now give the assurance of a firm and durable peace, continued Neyen, even if his Majesty should come one day to die—being mortal. Otherwise, there might be inconveniences to fear. Now, however, the document was complete in all its parts, so far as regarded what was principal and essential, and in conformity which the form transmitted by the States-General. „God the Omnipotent knows,” proceeded the friar, „how sincere is my intention in this treaty of peace as a means of delivering the Netherlands from the miseries of war, as your lordships will perceive by the form of the agreement, explaining itself and making manifest its pure and undissembling intentions, promising nothing and engaging to nothing which will not be effectually performed. This would not be the case if his Majesty were proceeding by finesse or deception. The ratification might be nakedly produced as demanded, without any other explanation. But his Majesty, acting in good faith, has now declared his last determination in order to avoid anything that might be disputed at some future day, as your lordships will see more amply when the auditor has exhibited the document.”<sup>1</sup>

When the friar had finished Verreyken spoke.

He reminded them of the proofs already given by the archdukes of their sincere desire to change the long and sanguinary war into a good and assured peace. Their lordships the States had seen how liberally, sincerely, and roundly their Highnesses had agreed to all demands and had procured the ratification of his Majesty, even although nothing had been proposed in that regard at the beginning of the negotiations.

He then produced the original document, together with two copies, one

in French the other in Flemish, to be carefully collated by the States.<sup>1</sup>

„It is true,” said the auditor, „that the original is not made out in Latin nor in French as your lordships demanded, but in Spanish, and in the same form and style as used by his Majesty in treating with all the kings, potentates, and republics of Christendom. To tell you the truth, it has seemed strange that there should be a wish to make so great and puissant a king change his style, such demand being contrary to all reason and equity, the more so as his Majesty is content with the style which your lordships have been pleased to adopt.”

The ratification was then exhibited.

It set forth that Don Philip, by grace of God King of Castile, Leon, Arragon, the Two Sicilies, Portugal, Navarre, and of fourteen or fifteen other European realms duly enumerated; King of the Eastern and Western Indies and of the continent on terra firma adjacent, King of Jerusalem, Archduke of Antioch, Duke of Burgundy, and King of the Ocean, having seen that the archdukes were content to treat with the States-General of the United Provinces in quality of, and as holding them for, countries, provinces, and free states over which they pretended to no authority; either by way of a perpetual peace or for a truce or suspension of arms for twelve, fifteen or twenty years, at the choice of the said States, and knowing that the said most serene archdukes had promised to deliver the king's ratification; had, after ripe deliberation with his council, and out of his certain wisdom and absolute royal power, made the present declarations, similar to the one made by the archdukes, for the accomplishment of the said promise so far as it concerned him:

„And we principally declare,” continued the King of Spain, Jerusalem, America, India, and the Ocean, „that

<sup>1</sup> Jeannin. 422, 423.

<sup>1</sup> Ibid. 423, 424.



we are content that in our name, and on our part, shall be treated with the said States in the quality of, and as held by us for, free countries, provinces, and states, over which we make no pretensions. Thus we approve and ratify every point of the said agreement, promising on faith and word of a king to guard and accomplish it as entirely as if we had consented to it from the beginning."

"But we declare," said the king, in conclusion, "that if the treaty for a peace or a truce of many years, by which the pretensions of both parties are to be arranged—as well in the matter of religion as all the surplus—shall not be concluded, then this ratification shall be of no effect and as if it never had been made and, in virtue of it, we are not to lose a single point of our right, nor the United Provinces to acquire one, but things are to remain, so far as regards the rights of the two parties, exactly as they are at present; each to do what to each shall seem best." <sup>1</sup>

Such were the substantial parts of the document—with much superfluous verbiage lopped away—which had been signed "I the King" at Madrid on the 18th September, and the two copies which were presented to the States-General on the 25th October, the commissioners retaining the original.

The papers were accepted, with a few general commonplaces by Barneveld meaning nothing, and an answer was promised after a brief delay. <sup>2</sup>

A committee of seven, headed by the Advocate as chairman and spokesman, held a conference with the ambassadors of France and England, at four o'clock in the afternoon of the same day and another at ten o'clock next morning. <sup>3</sup>

The States were not very well pleased with the ratification. What especially

moved their discontent was the concluding clause, according to which it was intimated that if the pretensions of Spain in regard to religion were not fulfilled in the final treaty, the ratification was waste-paper and the king would continue to claim all his rights.

How much more loudly would they have vociferated, could they have looked into Friar John's wallet and have seen ratification number one! Then they would have learned that, after nearly a year of what was called negotiation, the king had still meant to demand the restoration of the Catholic worship before he would even begin to entertain the little fiction that the provinces were free.

As to the signature, the paper, and the Spanish language, those were minor matters. Indeed, it is difficult to say why the King of Spain should not issue a formal document in Spanish. It is doubtful whether, had he taken a fancy to read it, he could have understood it in any other tongue. Moreover, Spanish would seem the natural language for Spanish state-papers. Had he, a King of Jerusalem, America, or India chosen the Hebrew, Aztec, or Sanscrit in his negotiations with the United Provinces, there might have been more cause for dissatisfaction.

Jeannin, who was of course the leading spirit among the foreign members of the conference, advised the acceptance of the ratification. Notwithstanding the technical objections to its form, he urged that in substance it was in sufficient conformity to the draught furnished by the States. Nothing could be worse in his opinion, for the provinces than to remain any longer suspended between peace and war. They would do well therefore, to enter upon negotiations as soon as they had agreed among themselves upon three points.

They must fix the great indispensable terms which they meant to hold, and from which no arguments would ever induce them to recede. Thus they would

<sup>1</sup> Jeannin, 425-429.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid. 433.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid. 432-433.

ave valuable time and be spared much frivolous discourse.

Next, they ought to establish a good anterior government.

Thirdly, they should at once arrange their alliances and treaties with foreign powers, in order to render the peace to be negotiated a durable one. 1

As to the first and second of these points, the Netherlanders needed no prompter. They had long ago settled the conditions without which they would make no treaty at all, and certainly it was not the States-General that had thus far been frivolously consuming time.

As to the form of government, defective though it was, the leaders of the republic knew very well in whose interests such sly allusions to their domestic affairs were repeatedly ventured by the French envoys. In regard to treaties with foreign powers it was, of course, most desirable for the republic to obtain the formal alliance of France and England. Jeannin and his colleagues were ready to sign such a treaty, offensive and defensive, at once, but they found it impossible to induce the English ambassadors, with whom there was

a conference on the 26th October, to come into any written engagement on the subject. They expressed approbation of the plan individually and in words, but deemed it best to avoid any protocol, by which their sovereign could be implicated in a promise. Should the negotiations for peace be broken off, it would be time enough to make a treaty to protect the provinces. Meantime, they ought to content themselves with the general assurance, already given them, that in case of war the monarchs of France and England would not abandon them, but would provide for their safety, either by succour or in some other way, so that they would be placed out of danger. 2

Such promises were vague without being magnificent, and, as James had

never yet lifted his finger to assist the provinces, while indulging them frequently with oracular advice, it could hardly be expected that either the French envoys or the States-General would reckon very confidently on assistance from Great Britain, should war be renewed with Spain.

On the whole, it was agreed to draw up a paper briefly stating the opinion of the French and English plenipotentiaries that the provinces would do well to accept the ratification. 1

The committee of the States, with Barneveld as chairman, expressed acquiescence, but urged that they could not approve the clause in that document concerning religion. It looked as if the King of Spain wished to force them to consent by treaty that the Catholic religion should be re-established in their country. As they were free and sovereign, however, and so recognized by himself, it was not for him to meddle with such matters. They foresaw that this clause would create difficulties when the whole matter should be referred to the separate provinces, and that it would, perhaps, cause the entire rejection of the ratification.

The envoys, through the voice of Jeannin, remonstrated against such a course. After all, the objectionable clause, it was urged, should be considered only as a demand, which the king was competent to make and it was not reasonable, they said, for the States to shut his mouth and prevent him from proposing what he thought good to propose.

On the other hand, they were not obliged to acquiesce in the proposition. In truth, it would be more expedient that the States themselves should grant this grace to the Catholics, thus earning their gratitude, rather than that it should be inserted in the treaty. 2

A day or two later there was an interview between the French envoys and

1 Jeannin, 432-437.

2 Ibid. 434.

1 Ibid. 429.

2 Ibid. 435.

Count Lewis William, for whose sage, dispassionate, and upright character they had all a great respect. <sup>1</sup> It was their object—in obedience to the repeated instructions of the French king—to make use of his great influence over Prince Maurice in favour of peace. It would be better, they urged, that the stadholder should act more in harmony with the States than he had done of late, and should reflect that, the ratification being good, there was really no means of preventing a peace, except in case the King of Spain should refuse the conditions necessary for securing it. The prince would have more power by joining with the States than in opposing them. Count Lewis expressed sympathy with these views, but feared that Maurice would prefer that the ratification should not be accepted until the states of the separate provinces had been heard; feeling convinced that several of those bodies would reject that instrument on account of the clause relating to religion.

Jeannin replied that such a course would introduce great discord into the provinces, to the profit of the enemy, and that the King of France himself—so far from being likely to wish the ratification rejected because of the clause—would never favour the rupture of negotiations if it came on account of religion. He had always instructed them to use their efforts to prevent any division among the States, as sure to lead to their ruin. He would certainly desire the same stipulation as the one made by the King of Spain, and would support rather than oppose the demand thus made, in order to content the Catholics. To be sure, he would prefer that the States should wisely make this provision of their own accord rather than on the requisition of Spain, but a rupture of the pending negotiations from the cause suggested would be painful

to him and very damaging to his character at Rome. <sup>1</sup>

On the 2nd November the States-General gave their formal answer to the commissioners, <sup>2</sup> Nov. in regard to the ratification.

That instrument, they observed, not only did not agree with the form as promised by the archdukes in language and style, but also in regard to the seal, and to the insertion and omission of several words. On this account, and especially by reason of the concluding clause, there might be inferred the annulment of the solemn promise made in the body of the instrument. The said king and archdukes knew very well that these States-General of free countries and provinces, over which the king and archdukes pretended to no authority, were competent to maintain order in all things regarding the good constitution and government of their land and its inhabitants. On this subject, nothing could be pretended or proposed on the part of the king and archdukes without violation of formal and solemn promises. <sup>2</sup>

„Nevertheless,” continued the States-General, „in order not to retard a good work, already begun, for the purpose of bringing the United Provinces out of a long and bloody war into a Christian and assured peace, the letters of ratification will be received in respect that they contain the declaration, on the part of both the king and the archdukes, that they will treat for a peace or a truce of many years with the States-General of the United Provinces, in quality of, and as holding them to be free countries, provinces, and states over which they make no pretensions.” <sup>3</sup>

It was further intimated, however, that the ratification was only received for reference to the estates of each of the provinces, and it was promised that

<sup>1</sup> Ibid. 482-487.

<sup>2</sup> Jeannin, i. 432-437. V. d. Kemp, iii. 30  
Wagenaar, ix. 287, 288. <sup>3</sup> Jeannin, i. 430

<sup>1</sup> Jeannin, i. 437.



Within six weeks the commissioners should be informed whether the provinces would consent or refuse to treat. It was moreover declared that, neither at that moment nor at any future time, could any point in the letters of ratification be accepted which, directly or indirectly, might be interpreted as against that essential declaration and promise in regard to the freedom of the provinces. In case the decision should be taken to enter into negotiation upon the basis of that ratification, or any other that might meantime arrive from Spain, then firm confidence was expressed by the States that, neither on the part of the king nor that of the archdukes could there be proposed or pretended, in contravention of that promise, any point touching the good constitution, welfare, state, or government of the United Provinces, and of the inhabitants. The hope was furthermore expressed that, within ten days after the reception of the consent of the States to treat, commissioners would be sent by the archdukes to the Hague, fully authorised and instructed to declare roundly their intentions, in order to make short work of the whole business. In that case, the States would duly authorize and instruct commissioners to act in their behalf.

Thus in the answer especial warning was given against any possible attempt to interfere with the religious question. The phraseology could not be mistaken.

At this stage of the proceedings, the States demanded that the original instrument of ratification should be deposited with them. The two commissioners declared that they were without power to consent to this. Hereupon the Assembly became violent, and many members denounced the refusal as equivalent to breaking off the negotiations. Everything indicated, so it was urged, a desire on the Spanish side to spin delays out of delays, and, meantime, to invent daily some new trap for deception. Such was the vehemence upon

this point that the industrious Franciscan posted back to Brussels, and returned with the archduke's permission to deliver the document. 1 Three conditions, however, were laid down. The States must give a receipt that the archdukes, in obtaining the paper from Spain, had fulfilled their original promise. If peace should not be made, they were to return the document.

When these conditions were announced, the indignation of the republican Government at the trifling of their opponents was fiercer than ever. The discrepancies between the form prescribed and the ratification obtained had always been very difficult of digestion, but, although willing to pass them by, the States stoutly refused to accept the document on these conditions.

Tooth and nail 2 Verreyken and Neyen fought out the contest and were worsted. Once more the nimble friar sped back and forth between the Hague and his employer's palace, and at last, after tremendous discussions in cabinet council, the conditions were abandoned.

„Nobody can decide," says the Jesuit historian, which was greater—the obstinacy of the federal Government in screwing out of the opposite party everything it deemed necessary, or the indulgence of the archdukes in making every possible concession. 3

Had these solemn tricksters of an antiquated school perceived that, in dealing with men who meant, all these little dilatory devices were superfluous, perhaps the wholesome result might have sooner been reached. In a contest of diplomacy against time it generally happens that time is the winner, and on this occasion, time and the republic were fighting on the same side.

On the 13th December the States-General re-assembled at the Hague, the separate provinces having in the inter-

1 Gallucci, 342.

2 „Mordicius." Ibid.

3 Gallucci, 342.

val given fresh instructions to their representatives. It was now decided that no treaty should be made, unless the freedom of the commonwealth was recognized in phraseology which, after consultation with the foreign ambassadors, should be deemed satisfactory. Farther it was agreed that, neither in ecclesiastical nor secular matters, should any conditions be accepted which could be detrimental to freedom. In case the enemy should strive for the contrary, the world would be convinced that he alone was responsible for the failure of the peace negotiations. Then, with the support of other powers friendly to the republic, hostilities could be resumed in such a manner as to ensure a favourable issue for an upright cause.

The armistice, begun on the 24th of May, was running to an end, and it was now renewed at the instance of the States. That Government, moreover, on the 23rd December formally notified to the archdukes that, trusting to their declarations, and to the statements of Neyen and Verreyken, it was willing to hold conferences for peace.<sup>1</sup> Their Highnesses were accordingly invited to appoint seven or eight commissioners at once, on the same terms as formally indicated.

The original understanding had been that no envoys but Netherlanders should come from Brussels for these negotiations.<sup>2</sup>

Barneveld and the peace party, however, were desirous that Spinola, who was known to be friendly to a pacific result, should be permitted to form part of the mission. Accordingly the letters, publicly drawn up in the Assembly, adhered to the original arrangement, but Barneveld, with the privacy of other leading personages, although without the knowledge of Maurice, Lewis William, and the State-Council, secretly enclosed a little note

in the principal despatch to Neyen and Verreyken. In this billet it was intimated that, notwithstanding the prohibition in regard to foreigners, the States were willing—it having been proposed that one or two who were not Netherlanders should be sent—that a single Spaniard, provided he were not one of the principal military commanders, should make part of the embassy.<sup>2</sup>

The phraseology had a double meaning. Spinola was certainly the chief military commander, but he was not a Spaniard. This eminent personage might be supposed to have thus received permission to come to the Netherlands, despite all that had been urged by the war-party against the danger incurred, in case of a renewal of hostilities, by admitting so clear-sighted an enemy into the heart of the republic. Moreover, the terms of the secret note would authorize the appointment of another foreigner—even a Spaniard—while the crafty president Richardot might creep into the commission, on the ground that, being a Burgundian, he might fairly call himself a Netherlander.

And all this happened.

Thus, after a whole year of parley, in which the States-General had held firmly to their original position, while the Spanish Government had crept up inch by inch, and through countless windings and subterfuges, to the point on which they might have all stood together at first, and thus have saved a twelvemonth, it was finally settled that peace conferences should begin.

Barneveld had carried the day. Maurice and his cousin Lewis William had uniformly, deliberately, but not factiously, used all their influence against any negotiations. The prince had all along loudly expressed his conviction

<sup>1</sup> 1 Resol. Holl. 4 Dec. 1607. Wagenaar, ix. 290, 291.

<sup>2</sup> 2 Wagenaar, ix. 247, 293.

1 Resol. Holl. 4 Dec. Wagenaar, ix. 290, 295. Van der Kemp, iii. 31, 134, 135.

2 Authorities last cited.

that neither the archdukes nor Spain would ever be brought to an honourable peace. The most to be expected of them was a truce of twelve or fifteen years, to which his consent at least should never be given, and during which cessation of hostilities, should it be accorded, every imaginable effort would be made to regain by intrigue what the king had lost by the sword. 1 As for the King of England and his counsellors, Maurice always denounced them as more Spanish than Spaniards, as doing their best to put themselves on the most intimate terms with his Catholic Majesty, and as secretly desirous—insane policy as it seemed—of forcing the Netherlanders back again under the sceptre of that monarch.

He had at first been supported in his position by the French ambassadors, who had felt or affected disinclination for peace, but who had subsequently thrown the whole of their own and their master's influence on the side of Barneveld. They had done their best—and from time to time they had been successful—to effect at least a superficial reconciliation between those two influential personages. They had employed all the arguments at their disposal to bring the prince over to the peace party. Especially they had made use of the *argumentum ad crumenam*, which that veteran broker in politics, Hannin, had found so effective in times past with the great lords of the League. But Maurice showed himself so proof against the golden inducements suggested by the President that he and his king both arrived at the conclusion that there were secret motives at work, and that Maurice was not dazzled by the brilliant prospects held out to him by Henry, only because his eyes were steadfastly fixed upon some unknown but splendid advantage, to be gained through other combinations. It was naturally difficult for Henry to imagine

the possibility of a man, playing a first part in the world's theatre, being influenced by so weak a motive as conviction.

Lewis William too—that „grave and wise young men,” as Lord Leicester used to call him twenty years before—remained steadily on the side of the prince. Both in private conversation and in long speeches to the States-General, he maintained that the Spanish court was incapable of sincere negotiations with the commonwealth, that to break faith with heretics and rebels would always prove the foundation of its whole policy, and that to deceive them by pretences of a truce or a treaty, and to triumph afterwards over the results of its fraud, was to be expected as a matter of course. Sooner would the face of nature be changed than the cardinal maxim of Catholic statesmanship be abandoned. 1

But the influence of the Nassaus, of the province of Zeeland, of the clergy, and of the war-party in general, had been overbalanced by Barneveld and the city corporations, aided by the strenuous exertions of the French ambassadors.

The decision of the States-General was received with sincere joy at Brussels. The archdukes had something to hope from peace, and little but disaster and ruin to themselves from a continuance of the war. Spinola too was unaffectedly in favour of negotiations. He took the ground that the foreign enemies of Spain, as well as her pretended friends, agreed in wishing her to go on with the war, and that this ought to open her eyes as to the expediency of peace. While there was a general satisfaction in Europe that the steady exhaustion of her strength in this eternal contest made her daily less and less formidable to other nations, there were on the other hand puerile complaints at court that the conditions pre-

1 See especially Resol. Stat.-Gen. 30 Oct. 1607, in Van der Kemp, iii. 126-130.

1 Van der Kemp, iii. 16.



scribed by impious and insolent rebels to their sovereign were derogatory to the dignity of monarchy. <sup>1</sup> The spectacle of Spain sending ambassadors to the Hague to treat for peace, on the basis of Netherland independence, would be a humiliation such as had never been exhibited before. That the haughty confederation should be allowed thus to accomplish its ends, to trample down all resistance to its dictation, and to defy the whole world by its insults to the Church and to the sacred principle of monarchy, was most galling to Spanish pride. Spinola, as a son of Italy, and not inspired by the fervent hatred to Protestantism which was indigenous to the other peninsula, steadily resisted these arguments. None knew better than he the sternness of the stuff out of which that republic was made, and he felt that now or never was the time to treat, even as, five years before, *jam aut nunquam* had been inscribed on his banner outside Ostend. But he protested that his friends gave him even harder work than his enemies had ever done, and he stoutly maintained that a peace against which all the rivals of Spain seemed to have conspired from fear of seeing her tranquil and disembarrassed, must be advantageous to Spain. The genial and quickwitted Genoese could not see and hear all the secret letters and private conversations of Henry and James and their ambassadors, and he may be pardoned for supposing that, notwithstanding all the crooked and incomprehensible politics of Greenwich and Paris, the serious object of both France and England was to prolong the war. In his most private correspondence he expressed great doubts as to a favourable issue to the pending conferences, but avowed his determination that if they should fail it would be from no want of earnest effort on his part to make them succeed. It should never be

said that he preferred his own private advantage to the duty of serving the best interests of the crown. <sup>1</sup>

Meantime the India trade, which was to form the great bone of contention in the impending conferences, had not been practically neglected of late by the enterprising Hollanders. Peter Verhooft, fresh from the victory of Gibraltar, towards which he had personally so much contributed by the splendid manner in which he had handled the *Æolus* after the death of Admiral Heemskerk, was placed in command of a fleet to the East Indies, which was to sail early in the spring. <sup>2</sup>

Admiral Matelieff, who had been cruising in those seas during the three years past, was now 1806 on his way home. His exploits had been worthy the growing fame of the republican navy. In the summer of 1606 he had laid siege to the town and fortress of Malacca, constructed by the Portuguese at the southmost extremity of the Malay peninsula. Andreas Hurtaut de Mendoza commanded the position with a force of three thousand men, among whom were many Indians. The King or Sultan of Johore, at the southern extremity of the peninsula, remained faithful to his Dutch allies, and accepted the proposition of Matelieff to take part in the hostilities now begun. The admiral's fleet consisted of eleven ships, with fourteen hundred men. It was not exactly a military expedition. To the sailors of each ship were assigned certain shares of the general profit, and as it was obvious that more money was likely to be gained by trade with the natives, or by the capture of stray carracks and other merchantmen of the enemy as were frequently to be met in these regions, the men were particularly eager to take part in sieges of towns or battles with cruisers. Matelieff, however, had sufficient influen-

<sup>1</sup> Spinola's letters, *apud* Gallucci 347, *seqq.* Bentivoglio.

<sup>1</sup> Gallucci, 349, 350.

<sup>2</sup> Wagenaar, ix. 301.

ver his comrades to inflame their zeal on this occasion for the fame of the republic, and to induce them to give the Indian princes and the native soldiery a lesson in Batavian warfare.

A landing was effected on the peninsula, the sailors and guns were disembarked, and an imposing auxiliary force, sent, according to promise, after much delay, by the Sultan of Johore, proceeded to invest Malacca. The ground proved wet, swampy, and impracticable for trenches, galleries, covered ways, and all the other machinery of a regular siege. Matelieff was not a soldier nor a naval commander by profession, but a merchant-skipper, like so many other heroes whose achievements were to be the permanent glory of their fatherland. He would not, however, have been a Netherlander had he not learned something of the science which Prince Maurice had so long been teaching, not only to his own countrymen, but to the whole world. So moveable turrets, constructed of the spice-trees which grew in rank luxuriance all around, were filled with earth and stones, and advanced towards the fort. Had the natives been as docile to learn as the Hollanders were eager to teach a few easy lessons in the military art, the doom of Andreas Hurtado de Mendoza would have been sealed. But the great truths which those youthful pedants, Maurice and Lewis William, had extracted twenty years before from the works of the Emperor Leo and earlier pagans, amid the jeers of veterans, were not easy to transplant to the Malayan peninsula.

It soon proved that those white-turbaned, loose garmented, supple-jointed, highly picturesque troops of the sultan were not likely to distinguish themselves for anything but wonderful rapidity in retreat. Not only did they shrink from any advance towards the distant forts, but they were incapable of abiding an attack within or behind their towers, and, at every random shot from the

enemy's works, they threw down their arms and fled from their stations in dismay. It was obvious enough that the conquest and subjugation of such feeble warriors by the Portuguese and Spaniards were hardly to be considered brilliant national trophies. They had fallen an easy prey to the first European invader. They had no discipline, no obedience, no courage; and Matelieff soon found that to attempt a scientific siege with such auxiliaries against a well-constructed stone fortress, garrisoned with three thousand troops, under an experienced Spanish soldier, was but midsummer madness.

Fevers and horrible malaria, bred by the blazing sun of the equator out of those pestilential jungles, poisoned the atmosphere. His handful of troops, amounting to not much more than a hundred men to each of his ships, might melt away before his eyes. Nevertheless, although it was impossible for him to carry the place by regular approach, he would not abandon the hope of reducing it by famine. During four months long, accordingly, he kept every avenue by land or sea securely invested. In August, however, the Spanish viceroy of India, Don Alphonso de Castro, made his appearance on the scene. Coming from Goa with a splendid fleet, numbering fourteen great galleons, four galleys, and sixteen smaller vessels, manned by three thousand seven hundred Portuguese and other Europeans, and an equal number of native troops, he had at first directed his course towards Achen, on the north-west point of Sumatra. Here, with the magnificent arrogance which Spanish and Portuguese viceroys were accustomed to manifest towards the natives of either India, he summoned the king to surrender his strongholds, to assist in constructing a fortress for the use of his conquerors, to deliver up all the Netherlanders within his domains, and to pay the expenses of the expedition which had thus been sent

to chastise him. But the King of Achen had not sent ambassadors into the camp of Prince Maurice before the city of Grave in vain. He had learned that there were other white skins besides the Spaniards at the antipodes, and that the republic whose achievements in arts and arms were conspicuous trophies of Western civilization, was not, as it had been represented to him, a mere nest of pirates. He had learned to prefer an alliance with Holland to slavery under Spain. Moreover, he had Dutch engineers and architects in his service, and a well-constructed system of Dutch fortifications around his capital. To the summons to surrender himself and his allies he returned a defiant answer. The viceroy ordered an attack upon the city. One fort was taken. From before the next he was repulsed with great loss. The Sumatrans had derived more profit from intercourse with Europeans than the inhabitants of Johore or the Moluccas had done. De Castro abandoned the siege. He had received intelligence of the dangerous situation of Malacca, and moved down upon the place with his whole fleet. Admiral Matelieff, apprised by scouts of his approach behaved with the readiness and coolness of a veteran campaigner. Before De Castro could arrive in the roadstead of Malacca, he had withdrawn all his troops from their positions, got all his artillery reshipped, and was standing out in the straits, awaiting the enemy.

On the 17th August, the two fleets, so vastly disproportionate in number, size, equipment, and military force—eighteen galleons and 17 Aug. 1686. galleys, with four or five thousand fighting men, against eleven small vessels and twelve or fourteen hundred sailors—met in that narrow sea. The action lasted all day. It was neither spirited nor sanguinary. It ought to have been within the power of the Spaniard to crush his diminutive adversary.

It might have seemed a sufficient triumph for Matelieff to manœuvre himself out of harm's way. No vessel on either side was boarded, not one surrendered, but two on each side were set on fire and destroyed. Eight of the Dutchmen were killed—not a very sanguinary result after a day's encounter with so imposing an armada. De Castro's losses were much greater, but still the battle was an insignificant one, and neither fleet gained a victory. Night put an end to the cannonading, and the Spaniards withdrew to Malacca, while Matelieff bore away to Johore. The siege of Malacca was relieved, and the Netherlands now, occupied themselves with the defence of the feeble sovereign at the other point of the peninsula.

Matelieff lay at Johore a month, repairing damages and laying in supplies. While still at the place, received information that a large part of the Spanish armada had sailed from Malacca. Several of his own crew, who had lost their shares in the adventure by the burning of the ships to which they belonged in the action of 17th August were reluctant and almost mutinous when their their admiral now proposed to them a sudden assault on the portion of the Spanish fleet still remaining within reach. They had not come forth for barren glory, many protested, but in search of fortune; they were not elated by the meagre result of the expedition. Matelieff succeeded, however, at last in inspiring all the men of his command with enthusiasm superior to sordid appeals, and made a few malcontents. On the 21st September, he sailed to Malacca, and late in the afternoon again attacked the Spaniards. Their fleet consisted of seven great galleons and three galleys lying in a circle before the town. The outermost ship, called the St. Nicholas, was boarded by men from three of the Dutch galleons with sudden and irresistible fury. There was a brief but most terrible action,



the Netherlanders seeming endowed with superhuman vigour. So great was the panic that there was hardly an effort at defence, and within less than an hour nearly every Spaniard on board the *St. Nicholas* had been put to the sword. The rest of the great galleons was soon set on fire and burned to the water's edge. Another, dismasted and crippled, struck her flag, and all that remained would probably have been surrendered or destroyed had not the sudden darkness of a tropical nightfall put an end to the combat at set of sun. Next morning another galleon, in a shattered and sinking condition, was taken possession of and found filled with dead and dying. The rest of the Spanish ships made their escape into the harbour of Malacca. Matelieff stood off and on in the straits for a day or two, hesitating for fear of shallows to follow into the roadstead. Before he could take a decision, he had the satisfaction of seeing the enemy, panic-struck, save him any further trouble. Not waiting for another attack, the Spaniards set fire to every one of their ships and retired into their fortress, while Matelieff and his men enjoyed the great conflagration as idle spectators. Thus the enterprising Dutch admiral had destroyed ten great war-ships of the enemy, and, strange to relate, had scarcely lost one man of his whole squadron. Rarely had a more complete triumph been achieved on the water than in this battle in the straits of Malacca. Matelieff had gained much glory but very little booty. He was also encumbered with a great number of prisoners. These he sent to Don Alfonso, exchanging them for a very few Netherlanders then in Spanish hands, at the rate of two hundred Spaniards for ten Dutchmen—thus showing that he held either the enemy very cheap, or his own countrymen very dear. The captured ships he burned as useless to him, but retained twenty-four pieces of artillery.

It was known to Matelieff that the Spanish viceroy had received instructions to inflict chastisement on all the oriental potentates and their subjects who had presumed of late to trade and to form alliances with the Netherlanders. Johore, Achem, Paham, Patane, Amboyna, and Bantam, were the most probable points of attack. Johore had now been effectually defended, Achem had protected itself. The Dutch fleet proceeded at first to Bantam for refreshment, and from this point Matelieff sent three of his ships back to Holland. With the six remaining to him, he sailed for the Moluccas, having heard of various changes which had taken place in that important archipelago. Pausing at the great emporium of nutmegs and all-spice, Amboyna, he took measures for strengthening the fortifications of the place, which was well governed by Frederick Houtman, and then proceeded to Ternate and Tidore.

During the absence of the Netherlanders, after the events on those islands recorded in a previous chapter, the Spaniards had swept down upon them from the Philippines with a fleet of thirty-seven ships, and had taken captive the Sultan of Ternate: while the potentate of Tidore, who had been left by Stephen van der Hagen in possession of his territories on condition of fidelity to the Dutch, was easily induced to throw aside the mask, and to renew his servitude to Spain. Thus both the coveted clove-islands had relapsed into the control of the enemy. Matelieff found it dangerous, on account of quik sands and shallow, to land on Tydore, but he took very energetic measures to recover possession of Ternate. On the southern side of the island, the Spaniards had built a fort and a town. The Dutch admiral disembarked upon the northern side, and, with assistance of the natives, succeeded in throwing up substantial fortifications at a village called Malaya.

The son of the former sultan, who was a Spanish prisoner at the Philippines, was now formally inducted into his father's sovereignty, and Matelieff established at Malaya for his protection a garrison of forty-five Hollanders and a navy of four small yachts. Such were Hollanders and a navy of four small yachts. Such were the slender means with which Orientalempires were founded in those days by the stout-hearted adventurers of the little Batavian republic.

With this miniature army and navy, and by means of his alliance with the distant commonwealth, of whose power this handful of men was a symbol, the King of Ternate was thenceforth to hold his own against the rival potentate on the other island, supported by the Spanish King. The same convention of commerce and amity was made with the Ternatians as the one which Stephen van der Hagen had formerly concluded with the Bandians, and it was agreed that the potentate should be included in any treaty of peace that might be made between the republic and Spain.

Matelieff, with three ships and a cutter, now sailed for China, but lost his time in endeavouring to open trade with the Celestial empire. The dilatory mandarins drove him at last out of all patience, and, on turning his prow once more southward, he had nearly brought his long expedition to a disastrous termination. Six well-armed, well-equipped Portuguese galleons sailed out of Macoa to assail him. It was not Matelieff's instinct to turn his back on a foe, however formidable, but on this occasion discretion conquered instinct. His three ships were out of repair; he had a deficiency of powder; he was in every respect unprepared for a combat; and he reflected upon the unfavourable impression which would be made on the Chinese mind should the Hollanders,

upon their first appearance in the flowery regions, be vanquished by the Portuguese. He avoided an encounter, therefore, and, by skilful seamanship, eluded all attempts of the foe at pursuit. Returning to Ternate, he had the satisfaction to find that during his absence the doughty little garrison of Malaya had triumphantly defeated the Spaniards in an assault on the fortifications of the little town. On the other hand, the King of Johore, panic-struck on the departure of his Dutch protectors, had burned his own capital, and had betaken himself with all his court into the jungle.

Commending the one and rebuking the other potentate, the admiral provided assistance for both, some Dutch trading-vessels having meantime arrived in the archipelago. Matelieff now set sail for Holland, taking with him some ambassadors from the King of Siam and five ships well laden with spice. On his return he read a report of his adventures to the States-General, and received the warm commendations of their High Mightinesses.<sup>1</sup> Before his departure from the tropics, Paul van Kaarden, with eight war-ships, had reached Bantam. On his arrival in Holland the fleet of Peter Verhoef was busily fitting out for another great expedition to the East.<sup>2</sup> This was the nation which Spanish courtiers thought to exclude for ever from commerce with India and America, because the Pope a century before had divided half the globe between Ferdinand the Catholic and Emmanuel the Fortunate.

It may be supposed that the results of Matelieff's voyage were likely to influence the pending negotiations for peace.

<sup>1</sup> The authorities for Matelieff's voyages are Grotius, xvii. 792-800; Meteren, 562, 563, and especially the original journals and records in „Begin und Vortgang“

<sup>2</sup> Authorities last cited.

## CHAPTER I.

Movements of the Emperor Rudolph—Marquis Spinola's reception at the Hague—Meeting of Spinola and Prince Maurice—Treaty of the Republic with the French Government—The Spanish commissioners before the States-General—Beginning of negotiations—Stormy discussions—Real object of Spain in the negotiations—Question of the India trade—Abandonment of the peace project—Negotiations for a truce—Prolongation of the armistice—Further delays—Treaty of the States with England—Proposals of the Spanish ambassadors to Henry of France and to James of England—Friar Neyen at the court of Spain—Spanish procrastination—Decision of Philip on the conditions of peace—Further conference at the Hague—Answer of the States-General to the proposals of the Spanish Government—General rupture.

TOWARDS the close of the year 1607 a very feeble demonstration was made in the direction of the Dutch republic by the very feeble Emperor of Germany. Rudolph, awaking as it might be from a trance, or descending for a moment from his star-gazing tower and his astrological pursuits to observe the movements of political spheres, suddenly discovered that the Netherlands were no longer revolving in their pre-ordained orbit. Those provinces had been supposed to form part of one great system, deriving light and heat from the central imperial sun. It was time therefore to put an end to these perturbations. The emperor accordingly, as if he had not enough on his hands at that precise moment with the Hungarians, Transylvanians, Bohemian protestants, his brother Matthias and the Grand Turk, addressed a letter to the States of Holland, Zeeland, and the provinces confederated with them.<sup>1</sup>

Reminding them of the care ever taken by himself and his father to hear all their petitions, and to obtain for them a good peace, he observed that he had just heard of their contemplated negotiations with King Philip and Arch-

duke Albert, and of their desire to be declared free states and peoples. He was amazed, he said, that they should not have given him notice of so important an affair, inasmuch as all the United Provinces belonged to and were fiefs of the holy Roman Empire. They were warned, therefore, to undertake nothing that might be opposed to the 9 Oct. feudal law except with his full 1607. knowledge. This letter was dated the 9th of October. The States took time to deliberate, and returned no answer until after the new year. 1

On the 2nd of January, 1608, they informed the emperor that they could never have guessed of his requiring notification as to the 1608. approaching conferences. They had not imagined that the archduke would keep them a secret from his brother, or the king from his uncle-consin. Otherwise, the States would have sent due notice to his Majesty. They well remembered, they said, the appeals made by the provinces to the emperor from time to time, at the imperial diets, for help against the tyranny of the Spaniards. They well remembered, too, that no help was ever given them in response to those appeals. They had not forgotten either the famous Cologne negotiations for peace in presence of the imperial envoys, in consequence of which the enemy had carried on war against them with greater ferocity than before. At that epoch they had made use of an extreme remedy for an intolerable evil, and had solemnly renounced allegiance to the king. Since that epoch a whole generation of mankind had passed away, and many kings and potentates had recognised their freedom, obtained for just cause and maintained by the armed hand. After a long and bloody war, Albert and Philip had at last been

<sup>1</sup> Meteren, 553, *et seqq.* Wagenaar, ix. 295-299. Grotius, xvi. 751, 752.

<sup>1</sup> Authorities last cited.



brought to acknowledge the provinces as free countries over which they pretended to no right, as might be seen by the letters of both, copies of which were forwarded to the emperor. Full confidence was now expressed, therefore, that the emperor and all Germany would look with favour on such a God-fearing transaction, by which an end would be put to so terrible a war.<sup>1</sup> Thus the States-General; replying with gentle scorn to the antiquated claim of sovereignty on the part of imperial majesty. Duly authenticated by citations of investitures, indulgences, and concordates, engrossed on yellowest parchment, sealed with reddest sealing-wax, and reposing in a thousand pigeon-holes in mustiest archives, no claim could be more solemn or stately. Unfortunately, however, rebel pikes and matchlocks, during the past forty years, had made too many rents in those sacred parchments to leave much hope of their ever being pieced handsomely together again. As to the historical theory of imperial enfeoffment, the States thought it more delicate to glide smoothly and silently over the whole matter. It would have been base to acknowledge and impolite to refute the claim.<sup>2</sup>

It is as well to imitate this reserve. It is enough simply to remind the reader that although so late as the time of Charles V., the provinces had been declared constituent parts of the empire, liable to its burthens, and entitled to its protection; the Netherlands being practical people, and deeming burthens and protection correlative, had declined the burthen because always deprived of the protection.

And now, after a year spent in clearing away the mountains of dust which impeded the pathway to peace, and which one honest vigorous human

breath might at once have blown into space, the envoys of the archduke set forth towards the Hague.

Marquis Spinola, Don Juan de Man-  
cidor, private secretary to the King  
of Spain, President Richardot, Auditor  
Verreyken, and Brother John Neyer,  
—a Genoese, a Spaniard, a Burgun-  
dian, a Fleming, and a Franciscan friar  
—travelling in great state, with a long  
train of carriages, horses, lackeys, cooks,  
and secretaries, by way of Breda,  
Bergen-op-Zoom, Dort, Rot- 31 Jan.  
terdam, and Delft, and being 1608.  
received in each town and village through-  
out which they passed with great demonstra-  
tions of respect and cordial welcome,  
arrived at last within a mile of the  
Hague. 1

It was the dead of winter, and of  
the severest winter that had occurred  
for many years. Every river, estuary,  
canal was frozen hard. All Holland was  
one broad level sheet of ice, over which  
the journey had been made in sledges.  
On the last day of January Prince Mau-  
rice, accompanied by Lewis William, and  
by eight state coaches filled with distin-  
guished personages, left the Hague and  
halted at the Hoorn bridge, about midway  
between Ryswyk and the capital. The  
Prince had replied to the first request  
of the States that he should go forward  
to meet Spinola, by saying that he would  
do so willingly if it were to give him  
battle; otherwise not. Olden-Barneveld  
urged upon him however that, as ser-  
vant of the republic, he was bound to  
do what the States commanded, as a  
matter involving the dignity of the  
nation. In consequence of this remon-  
strance Maurice consented to go, but  
he went unwillingly.<sup>2</sup> The advancing  
procession of the Spanish ambassadors  
was already in sight. Far and wide in  
whatever direction the eye could sweep,  
the white surface of the landscape was  
blackened with human beings. It seemed

1 Meteren, Wagenaar, *ubi sup.*

2 „De fendo silebatur quia et refellere  
odiosum et fateri inglorium.”—Grotius, xvi.  
752.

1 Meteren, 563.

2 Letter of Aerssens, in Deventer, iii. 168.

as if the whole population of the Netherlands had assembled, in mass meeting, to witness the pacific interview between those two great chieftains who had never before stood face to face, except upon the battle-field.

In carriages, in donkey carts, upon horseback, in sledges, on skates, upon foot—men, women, and children, gentle and simple, Protestants, Catholics, Gomarites, Arminians, Anabaptists, country squires in buff and bandaleer, city magistrates and merchants in furs and velvet, artisans, boatmen, and peasants, with their wives and daughters in well-starched ruff and tremendous head-gear—they came thronging in countless multitudes, those honest Hollanders; cheering and throwing up their caps in honour of the chieftain whose military genius had caused so much disaster to their country. This uproarious demonstration of welcome on the part of the multitude moved the spleen of many who were old enough to remember the horrors of Spanish warfare within their borders. „Thus unreflecting, gaping, boorish, are nearly all the common people of these provinces,”<sup>1</sup> said a contemporary, describing the scene, and forgetting that both high and low, according to his own account, made up the mass of spectators on that winter's day. Moreover, it seems difficult to understand why the Hollanders should not have indulged a legitimate curiosity, and made a holiday on this memorable occasion. Spinola was not entering their capital in triumph, a Spanish army was not marching—as it might have done had the course of events been different—over the protective rivers and marshes of the fatherland, now changed by the exceptional cold into solid highways for invasion. On the contrary, the arrival of the great enemy within their gates, with the olive-branch instead of the sword in his hand, was a victory not for Spain but

for the republic. It was known throughout the land that he was commissioned by the king and the archdukes to treat for peace with the States-General of the United Provinces as with the representatives of a free and independent nation, utterly beyond any foreign control.

Was not this opening of a cheerful and pacific prospect, after a half century's fight for liberty, a fair cause for rejoicing?

The Spanish commissioners arrived at the Hoorn bridge, Spinola alighted from his coach, Prince Maurice stepped forward into the road to greet him. Then the two eminent soldiers, whose names had of late been so familiar in the mouths of men, shook hands and embraced with heroic cordiality, while a mighty shout went up from the multitude around. It was a stately and dramatic spectacle, that peaceful meeting of the rival leaders in war which had begun before either of them was born. The bystanders observed, or thought that they observed, signs of great emotion on the faces of both. It has also been recorded that each addressed the other in epigrammatic sentences of compliment. „God is my witness,” Maurice was supposed to have said, „that the arrival of these honourable negotiators is most grateful to me. Time, whose daughter is truth, will show the faith to be given to my words.”<sup>1</sup>

„This fortunate day,” replied Spinola, „has filled full the measure of my hopes and wishes, and taken from me the faculty of ever wishing for anything again. I trust in divine clemency that an opportunity may be given to show my gratitude, and to make a fit return for the humanity thus shown me by the most excellent prince that the sun shines upon.”<sup>2</sup>

Wit this both got into the stadholder's carriage, Spinola being placed on Maurice's right hand. Their conversation, during their brief drive to the

<sup>1</sup> Meteren, 563.

<sup>1</sup> Gallucci, 352.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*

capital, followed by their long retinue, and by the enthusiastic and vociferating crowd, has not been chronicled. It is also highly probable that the second-rate theatrical dialogue which the Jesuit historian, writing from Spinola's private papers, has preserved for posterity, was rather what seemed to his imagination appropriate for the occasion than a faithful shorthand report of anything really uttered. A few commonplace phrases of welcome, with a remark or two perhaps on the unexampled severity of the frost, seem more likely to have formed the substance of that brief conversation.

A couple of trumpeters of Spinola went braying through the streets of the village capital, heralding their master's approach with superfluous noise, and exciting the disgust of the quieter portion of the burghers. <sup>1</sup> At last however the envoys and their train were all comfortably housed. The Marquis, President Richardot, and Secretary Mancidor, were established at a new mansion on the Vyverberg, belonging to Goswyn Menskens. The rest of the legation were lodged at the house of Wassenæer. <sup>2</sup>

It soon became plain that the ways of life and the style of housekeeping habitual to great officers of the Spanish crown were very different from the thrifty manners and customs of Dutch republicans. It was so long since anything like royal pomp and circumstance had been seen in their borders that the exhibiton, now made, excited astonishment. It was a land where every child went to school, where almost every individual inhabitant could read and write, where even the middle classes were proficient in mathematics and the classics, and could speak two or more modern languages; where the whole nation, with but few exceptions, were producers of material or intellectual wealth, and where comparatively little of unproductive consumption prevailed. Those self-governing and

self-sustaining municipalities had almost forgotten the existence of the magnificent nothings so dear to the hearts of kings.

Spinola's house was open day and night. The gorgeous plate, gigantic candelabra, mighty ewers, shields and layers of silver and gold, which decorated his tables and sideboards, amazed the graping crowd. He dined and supped in state every day, and the public were admitted to gaze upon his banquets, as if he had been a monarch. It seemed, said those homely republicans, as if „a silver christening were going on every day in his house.” <sup>1</sup>

There were even grave remonstrances made to the magistracy and to the States-General against the effect of such ostentations and immoral proceedings upon the popular mind, and suggestions that at least the doors should be shut, so that the scandal might be confined to Spinola's own household. But the republican authorities deciding, not without wisdom, that the spectacle ought to serve rather as a wholesome warning than as a contaminating example, declined any inquisitorial interference with the housekeeping of the Spanish ambassadors. <sup>2</sup>

Before the negotiations began, a treaty had been made between the republic and the French Government, by which it was stipulated that every effort should be made by both contracting parties to bring about an honourable and assured peace between the United Provinces, Spain, and the archdukes. In case of the continuance of the war, however, it was agreed that France should assist the States with ten thousand men, while in case at any time, during the continuance of the league, France should be attacked by a foreign enemy, she should receive from her ally five thousand auxiliary troops, or their equivalent in maritime assistance. This convention was thought by other powers to be so pro-

<sup>1</sup> Meteren, *ubi sup.*

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>1</sup> Meteren, 565.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*



stable to the Netherlands as to excite general uneasiness and suspicion.

The States would have gladly signed a similar agreement with England, but nothing was to be done with that Government until an old-standing dispute in regard to the cloth trade had been arranged. Middelburg had the exclusive right of deposit for the cloths imported from England. This monopoly for Zeeland being naturally not very palatable to Amsterdam and other cities of Holland, the States-General had at last authorized the merchant-adventurers engaged in this traffic to deposit their goods in any city of the United Provinces.<sup>1</sup> The course of trade had been to import the raw cloth from England, to dress and dye it in the Netherlands, and then to re-export it to England. Latterly, however, some dyers and clothiers emigrating from the provinces to that country, had obtained a monopoly from James for practising their art in his dominions. In consequence of this arrangement the exportation of undyed cloths had been forbidden. This prohibition had caused irritation both in the kingdom and the republic, had necessarily deranged the natural course of trade and manufacture, and had now prevented for the time any conclusion of an alliance offensive and defensive between the countries, even if political sentiment had made such a league possible. The States-General had recourse to the usual expedient by which bad legislation on one side was countervailed by equally bad legislation on the other. The exportation of undyed English cloths being forbidden by England, the importation of dyed English cloths was now prohibited by the Netherlands. The international cloth trade stopped. This embargo became at last so detestable to all parties that concession was made by the crown for a limited export of raw cloths. The concession was soon widened by custom into a general exportation,

the royal government looking through its fingers at the open infraction of its own laws, while the natural laws of trade before long re-established the old equilibrium. Meantime the ill-feeling produced by this dissension delayed any cordial political arrangement between the countries.

On the 5th of February the Spanish commissioners came for the first time before the States-General, assembled to the number of a hundred and thirty, in their palace at the Hague.<sup>1</sup>

The first meeting was merely one of mutual compliment, President Richardot, on behalf of his colleagues, expressing gratitude for the cordial welcome which had been manifested to the envoys on their journey through so many towns of the United Provinces. They had been received, he said, not as enemies with whom an almost perpetual war had been waged, but as friends, confederates, and allies. A warmer reception they could never have hoped for nor desired.

Two special commissioners were now appointed by the States-General to negotiate with the envoys. These were Count Lewis William and Brederode, With these delegates at large were associated seven others, one from each province. Barneveld of course represented Holland; Maldere, Zeeland; Berk, Utrecht; Hillama, Friesland; Sloat, Overijssel; Koender van Helpen, Groningen; Cornelius van Gend, Gelderland.<sup>1</sup>

The negotiations began at once. The archdukes had empowered the five envoys to deal in their name and in that of the King of Spain. Philip had authorized the archdukes to take this course by an instrument dated 10th January, In this paper he called the archdukes hereditary sovereigns of the Netherlands.

It was agreed that the various points of negotiation should be taken up in regular order; but the first question of

<sup>1</sup> Wagenaar, ix. 317, 318.

<sup>1</sup> Wagenaar, ix. 322, 323. Gallucci, 352-355.

all that presented itself was whether the conferences should be for a truce or a peace. 1

The secret object of Spain was for a truce of years. Thus she thought to save her dignity, to reserve her rights of re-conquest, to replenish her treasury, and to repair her military strength. Barneveld and his party, comprising a large majority of the States-General, were for peace. Prince Maurice, having done his utmost to oppose negotiations for peace, was, for still stronger reasons, determined to avoid falling into what he considered the ambush of a truce. The French ambassadors were also for peace. The Spanish envoys accordingly concealed their real designs, and all parties began discussions for the purpose of establishing a permanent peace.

This preliminary being settled, Barneveld asked the Spaniards if they had full powers to treat with the States as with a free nation, and if they recognised them as such.

„The most ample power,” was the reply; „and we are content so treat with you even if you should choose to call yourself a kingdom.”

„By what right then are the archdukes called by the king hereditary sovereigns of the Netherlands, and why do they append the seals of the seven United Provinces to this document?” asked the Advocate, taking up from the table the full power of Albert and Isabella and putting his finger on the seals. 2

„By the same right,” replied President Richardot, „that the King of France calls himself King of Navarre, that the

King of Great Britain calls himself King of France, that the King of Spain calls himself King of Jerusalem.”

Nothing could be more logical, nothing more historically accurate. But those plain-spoken republicans saw no advantage in beginning a negotiation for peace on the basis of their independence by permitting the archduke to call himself their sovereign, and to seal solemn state papers with their signet. It might seem picturesque to genealogical minds, it might be soothing to royal vanity, that paste counterfeits should be substituted for vanished jewels. It would be cruelty to destroy the mock glitter without cause. But there was cause. On this occasion the sham was dangerous. James Stuart might call himself King of France. He was not more likely to take practical possession of that kingdom than of the mountains in the moon. Henry of Bourbon was not at present contemplating an invasion of the hereditary possessions of the house of Albret. It was a matter of indifference to the Netherlands whether Philip III. were crowned in Jerusalem that very day, or the week afterwards, or never. It was very important, however, that the United Provinces should have it thoroughly recognised that they were a free and independent republic, nor could that recognition be complete so long as any human being in the whole world called himself their master, and signed with their seals of state. „’Tis absurd,” said the Hollanders, „to use the names and arms of our provinces. We have as yet no precedent to prove that you consider the United Provinces as lost, and name and arms to be but wind.” Barneveld reminded them that they had all expressed the most straightforward intentions, and that the father commissary especially had pledged his very soul for the sincerity of the king and the archdukes. „We ourselves never wished and never could deceive any one,” continued the Advocate, „and it

1 Wagenaar, ix. 322, 323. Meteren, 564, 565.

2 Negotiations de Jeannin, i. 538, 539. Gallucci, Meteren, Wagenaar, *ubi sup.* Compare also, for the whole course of these negotiations the Minutes of Olden-Barneveld during the conferences, now first published in the invaluable and admirably-edited collection of Van Deventer. „Verhaal der Onderhandelungen te ’s Hage tusschen de Nederlandsche en Spaansche gevolmagtigden,” &c., 1 Februarij, 1608-4 Maart, 1609.—Deventer, iii. No. civili. pp. 169-239, *passim*.

is also very difficult for others to deceive us." 1

This being the universal sentiment of the Netherlanders, it was thought proper to express it in respectful but vigorous language. This was done and the session was terminated. The Spanish envoys, knowing very well that neither the king nor the archduke regarded the retention of the titles and seals of all the seventeen Netherlands as an empty show, but that a secret and solid claim lurked beneath that usurpation, were very indignant. They however dissembled their wrath from the States commissioners. They were unwilling that the negotiations should be broken up at the very first session, and they felt that neither Prince Maurice nor Barneveld was to be trifled with upon this point. 2 But they were loud and magnificent in their demonstrations when they came to talk the matter over with the ambassadors of France and England. 3 It was most portentous, they thought, to the cause of monarchy and good government all over the world, that these republicans, not content to deal with kings and princes on a footing of equality, should presume to dictate to them as to inferiors. Having passed through rebellion to liberty, they were now proceeding to trample upon the most hallowed customs and rites. What would become of royalty, if in the same breath it should not only renounce the substance, but even put away the symbols of authority. This insolence of the people was not more dangerous to the king and the archdukes than it was to every potentate in the universe. It was a sacred duty to resist such insults. 4 Sage Jeannin did his best to pacify the vehemence of the commissioners. He represented to them that foreign titles borne by anointed kings were only

ensigns of historical possessions which they had for ever renounced; but that it might become one day the pleasure of Spain, or lie in the power of Spain, to vindicate her ancient rights to the provinces.

Hence the anxiety of the States was but natural. The old Leaguer and political campaigner knew very well, moreover, that at least one half of Richardot's noble wrath was feigned. 1 The commissioners would probably renounce the title and the seven seals, but in so doing would drive a hard bargain. For an empty phrase and a pennyworth of wax they would extort a heavy price. And this was what occurred. The commissioners agreed to write for fresh instructions to Brussels. A reply came in due time from the Archdukes, in which they signified their willingness to abandon the title of sovereigns over all the Netherlands, and to abstain from using their signet. In exchange for this concession they merely demanded from the States-General a formal abandonment of the navigation to both the Indies. This was all. The archdukes granted liberty to the republic. The republic would renounce its commerce with more than half the world.

The scorn of the States' commissioners at this proposition can be imagined, and it became difficult indeed for them to speak on the subject in decorous language. Because the archdukes were willing to give up something which was not their property, the republic was voluntarily to open its veins and drain its very lifeblood at the bidding of a foreign potentate. She was to fling away all the trophies of Heemskerk and Sebalt de Weerd, of Balthasar de Cordes, Van der Haren, Matelieff, and Verhoeff; she was to abdicate the position which she had already acquired of mistress of the seas, and she was to deprive herself for ever of that daily increasing ocean commerce which was rapidly converting

1 Minutes of Olden-Barneveld.

2 Gallucci, 355, 356. Grotius. xvii. 764, 765. Wagenaar, ix. 324-326. Meteren, 564<sup>vo</sup>. Bentivoglio, 564.

3 Ibid.

4 Gallucci, Bentivoglio, *ubi sup.*

1 Gal lucci, 358.



a cluster of puny, half-submerged provinces into a mighty empire. Of a certainty the Spanish court at this new epoch was an astounding anachronism. In its view Pope Alexander VI. still lived and reigned.

Liberty was not a boon conferred upon the Netherlands by their defeated enemy. It had been gained by their own right hands; by the blood, and the gold, and the sweat of two generations. If it were the king's to give, let him try once more if he could take it away. Such were the opinions and emotions of the Dutchmen, expressed in as courteous language as they could find.

„It would be a political heresy,” said Barneveld to the Spanish commissioners at this session, „if my lords the States should by contract banish their citizens out of two-thirds of the world, both land and sea.”

„Tis strange,” replied the Spaniards, „that you wish to have more than other powers—kings or republics—who never make any such pretensions. The Indies, East and West, are our house, privately possessed by us for more than a hundred years, and no one has a right to come into it without our permission. This is not banishment, but a custom to which all other nations submit. We give you your sovereignty before all the world, quitting all claims upon it. We know very well that you deny receiving it from us; but to give you a quit claim, and to permit free trade besides, would be a little more than you have a right to expect.” 1

Was it not well for the cause of liberty, commercial intercourse, and advancement of the human intellect, that there was this obstinate little republic in the world, refusing to tolerate that

to which all other great powers of the earth submitted; that there was one nation determined not to acknowledge three-quarters of the world; including America and India, as the private mansion of the King of Spain, to be locked against the rest of the human race?

The next session of the negotiators after the arrival of this communication from the archdukes was a stormy one. The India trade was the sole subject of discussion. As the States were firmly resolved never to relinquish that navigation which in truth was one of their most practical and valuable possessions, and as the royal commissioners were as solemnly determined that it should never be conceded, it may be imagined how much breath, how much foolscap paper, was wasted.

In truth, the negotiation for peace had been a vile mockery from the beginning. Spain had no real intention of abdicating her claim to the United Provinces.

At the very moment when the commissioners were categorically making that concession in Brussels, and claiming such a price for it, Hoboken, the archduke's diplomatic representative in London, was earnestly assuring King James that neither his master nor Philip had the remotest notion of renouncing their sovereignty over all the Netherlands. What had been said and written to that effect was merely a device, he asserted, to bring about a temporary truce. During the interval of imaginary freedom it was certain that the provinces would fall into such dire confusion that it would be easier for Spain to effect their re-conquest, after a brief delay for repairing her own strength, than it would be by continuing the present war without any cessation. 1

The Spanish ambassador at Vienna too on his part assured the Emperor Rudolph that his master was resolved

1 Minutes of Olden-Barneveld, *ubi sup.* „Dattet hant. Huys was over hundert jaren privatim beseten en dat men daer jegens hun danek niet behoorde te komen. Datter geen bannissement was maer een gebruyck als de andere Coningen en Republiken deden,” &c.

never to abdicate the sovereignty of the provinces. The negotiations then going on, he said, were simply intended to extort from the States a renunciation of the India trade and their consent to the re-introduction of the Catholic religion throughout their territories.

Something of all this was known and much more suspected at the Hague; the conviction therefore that no faith could be kept with rebels and heretics, whatever might be said or written, gained strength every day. That these delusive negotiations with the Hollanders were not likely to be so successful as the comedy enacted twenty years before at Bourbourg, for the amusement of Queen Elizabeth and her diplomatists while the tragedy of the Armada was preparing might be safely prophesied. Richardot was as effective as ever in the part which he had so often played, but Spinola laboured under the disadvantage of being a far honest man than Alexander Farnese. Far from equal to that famous chieftain in the management of great military campaign, it is certain that he was infinitely inferior to him in genteel comedy. Whether Maurice and Lewis William, Barneveld and Brederode, were to do better in the parts formerly assigned to John Rogers Valentine Dale, Comptroller Croft, and their colleagues, remained to be seen.

On the 15th of February, at the fifth conference of the commissioners, the first pitched battle on the India trade was fought. Thereafter the combat was almost every day renewed. Exactly, as a year before, the news of Heemskerk's victory at Gibraltar had made the king and the archdukes eager to obtain an armistice with the rebels both by land and sea, so now the report of Matelieff's recent achievements in the Indian Ocean was increasing their anxiety to exclude the Netherlands from the regions which they were rapidly making their own.

As we look back upon the negotiations, after the lapse of two centuries and a half, it becomes difficult to suppress our amazement at those scenes of solemn trickery and superhuman pride. It is not necessary to follow, step by step, the proceedings at each daily conference, but it is impossible for me not to detain the reader for yet a season longer with those transactions, and especially to invite him to ponder the valuable lesson which in their entirety they convey.

No higher themes could possibly be laid before statesmen to discuss. Questions of political self-government, religious liberty, national independence, divine Right, rebellious Power, freedom of commerce, supremacy of the seas, omnipotence claimed by the old world over the destiny of what was called the new, were importunately demanding solution. All that most influenced human passion, or stirred human reason to its depths—at that memorable point of time when two great epochs seemed to be sweeping against each other in elemental conflict—was to be dealt with. The emancipated currents of human thought, the steady tide of ancient dogma, were mingling in wrath. There are times of paroxysm in which Nature seems to effect more in a moment, whether intellectually or materially, than at other periods during a lapse of years. The shock of forces, long preparing and long delayed, is apt at last to make itself sensible to those neglectful of gradual but vital changes. Yet there are always ears that remain deaf to the most portentous din.

Thus, after that half century of war, the policy of Spain was still serenely planting itself on the position occupied before the outbreak of the revolt. The commonwealth, solidly established by a free people, already one of the most energetic and thriving among governments, a recognised member of the great international family, was now

gravely expected to purchase from its ancient tyrant the independence which it had long possessed, while the price demanded for the free papers was not only extravagant, but would be disgraceful to an emancipated slave. Holland was not likely at that turning point in her history, and in the world's history, to be false to herself and to the great principles of public law. It was good for the cause of humanity that the republic should reappear at that epoch. It was wholesome for Europe that there should be just then a plain self-governing people, able to speak homely and important truths. It was healthy for the moral and political atmosphere—in those days and in the time to come—that a fresh breeze from that little sea-born common-wealth should sweep away some of the ancient fog through which a few very feeble and very crooked mortals had so long loomed forth like giants and gods.

To vindicate the laws of nations and of nature; to make a noble effort for reducing to a system—conforming, at least approximately, to divine reason—the chaotic elements of war and peace; to recall the great facts that earth, sea, and sky ought to belong to mankind, and not to an accidental and very limited selection of the species, was not an unworthy task for a people which had made such unexampled sacrifices for liberty and right.

Accordingly, at the conference on the 15th February, the Spanish commissioners categorically summoned the States to desist entirely from the trade to either India, exactly as before the war. To enforce this prohibition, they said, was the principal reason why Philip desired peace. To obtain their freedom was surely well worth renunciation of this traffic; the more so, because their trade with Spain, which was so much shorter and safer, was now to be re-opened. If they had been able to keep that commerce, it was

suggested, they would have never talked about the Indies. The commissioners added, that this boon had not been conceded to France nor England, by the treaties of Vervins and London, and that the States therefore could not find it strange that it should be refused to them.<sup>1</sup>

The States' commissioners stoutly replied that commerce was open to all the world, that trade was free by the great law of nature, and that neither France, England, nor the United Provinces, were to receive edicts on this great subject from Spain and Portugal. It was absurd to circumscribe commercial intercourse at the very moment of exchanging war for peace. To recognise the liberty of the States upon paper, and to attempt the imposition of servitude in reality, was a manifest contradiction. The ocean was free to all nations. It had not been enclosed by Spain with a rail-fence.<sup>2</sup>

The debate grew more stormy every hour. Spinola expressed great indignation that the Netherlands should be so obstinate upon this point. The tall, spare President arose in wrath from his seat at the council-board, loudly protesting that the king of Spain would never renounce his sovereignty over the provinces until they had foresworn the

<sup>1</sup> Wagenaar, ix. 327, *seqq.* Meteren, 565-567-593. Grotius, xvii. 763-781. Gallucci, 356-358.

<sup>2</sup> „Oceanum quippe nullis clausum cancellis cunctis nationibus patere.”—Gallucci, 357. It is impossible in this connection not to recall the quaint words of a great poet of our own country in a famous idyl written two-and-a-half centuries later than these transactions:—

„We own the ocean, too, John,  
You must n't think it hard  
If we can't think with you John,  
It's just your own back-yard.

Old uncle S., says he, I guess  
If that's his game, says he,  
*The fencing stuff* will cost enough  
To bust up friend J. B.  
As well as you and me.”

J. R. Lowell.



India trade; and with this menace talked out of the room. 1

The States' commissioners were not frightened. Barneveld was at least a match for Richardot, and it was better, after all, that the cards should be played upon the table. Subsequent meetings were quite as violent as the first, the country was agitated far and wide, the prospects of pacification dwindled to a speck in the remote horizon. Arguments at the Board of Conference, debates at the States-General, pamphlets by merchants and advocates—especially several emanating from the East India Company—handled the great topic from every point of view, and it became more and more evident that Spain could not be more resolute to prohibit than the republic to claim the trade. 2

It was an absolute necessity, so it was urged, for the Hollanders to resist the tyrannical dominion of the Spaniards. But this would be impossible for them, should they rely on the slender natural resources of their own land. Not a sixth part of the population could be nourished from the soil. The ocean was their inheritance, their birthright, their empire. It was necessary that Spain should understand this first, at last, and always. She ought to comprehend, too, that her recognition of Dutch independence was not a gift, but the acknowledgment peace was impossible. If peace were to be established, it was not to be bought by either party. Each gave and each received, and certainly Spain was in no condition to dictate the terms of a sale. Peace, without freedom of commerce, would be merely war without killing, and therefore without result. The Netherlands, who in the middle of the previous century had risen against unjust taxation and arbitrary laws, had not grown so vile as to accept from a vanished foe what they had spurned from

their prince. To be exiled from the ocean was an unimaginable position for the republic. Moreover, to retire from the Indies would be to abandon her Oriental allies, and would be a dishonour as well as a disaster. Her good faith, never yet contaminated, would be stained, were she now to desert the distant peoples and potentates with whom she had formed treaties of friendship and commerce, and hand them over to the vengeance of the Spaniards and Portuguese. 1

And what a trade it was which the United Provinces were thus called upon to renounce! The foreign commerce of no other nation could be compared in magnitude to that of their commonwealth. Twenty ships traded regularly to Guinea, eighty to the Cape de Verd Islands, twenty to America, and forty to the East Indies. Ten thousand sailors, who gained their living in this traffic, would be thrown out of employment, if the States should now listen to the Spanish propositions. 2

It was well known too that the profits of the East India Company had vastly increased of late; and were augmenting with every year. The trade with Cambay, Malabar, Ceylon, Koromandel, and Queda, had scarcely begun, yet was already most promising. Should the Hollanders only obtain a footing in China, they felt confident of making their way through the South Seas and across the pole to India. Thus the search for a great commercial highway between Cathay, Europe, and the New World, which had been baffled in the arctic regions, should be crowned with success at the antarctic, while it was deemed certain that there were many lands, lighted by the Southern Cross, awaiting the footsteps of the fortunate European discoverer. What was a coasting trade with Spain compared with this boundless career of ad-

1 Meteren, Grotius, Gallucci. Wagenaar, *sup.* 2 Ibid.

1 Authorities last cited.

2 Ibid.

venture? Now that the world's commerce, since the discovery of America and the passage around the Cape of Good Hope, had become oceanic and universal, was the nation which took the lead on blue water to go back to the creeping land-locked navigation of the ancient Greeks and Phœnicians? If the East India Company, in whose womb was empire, were now destroyed, it would perish with its offspring for ever. There would be no regeneration at a future day. The Company's ships too were a navy in themselves, as apt for war as for trade. This the Spaniards and Portuguese had already learned to their cost. The merchant traders to Spain would be always in the power of Spain, and at any favourable moment might be seized by Spain. The Spanish monopoly in the East and West was the great source of Spanish power, the chief cause of the contempt with which the Spanish monarchy looked down upon other nations. Let those widely expanded wings be clipped, and Spain would fall from her dizzy height. To know what the States ought to refuse the enemy, it was only necessary to observe what he strenuously demanded, to ponder the avowed reason why he desired peace. The enemy was doing his best to damage the commonwealth; the States were merely anxious to prevent injury to themselves and to all the world; to vindicate for themselves, and for all men, the common use of ocean, land, and sky.

A nation which strove to shut up the seas, and to acquire a monopoly of the world's trade, was a pirate, an enemy of mankind. She was as deserving of censure as those who created universal misery in time of famine, by buying up all the corn in order to enrich themselves. According to the principles of the ancients, it was legitimate to make war upon such States as closed their own ports to foreign intercourse. Still more just was it, therefore, to carry arms against a

nation which closed the ports of other people. 1

The dispute about the India navigation could be settled in a moment, if Spain would but keep her word. She had acknowledged the great fact of independence, which could not be gained said. Let each party to the negotiation therefore, keep that which it already possessed. Let neither attempt to prescribe to the other—both being free and independent States—any regulations about interior or foreign trade. 2

Thus reasoned the States-General, the East India directors, the great majority of the population of the provinces, upon one great topic of discussion. A small minority only attempted to defend the policy of renouncing the India trade as a branch of industry, in which a certain class, and that only in the maritime provinces, was interested. It is certainly no slight indication of the liberty of thought, of speech, and of the press, enjoyed at that epoch in the Netherlands—and nowhere else to anything like the same extent—that such opinions, on a subject deemed vital to the very existence of the republic, were freely published and listened to with toleration, if not with respect. Even the enlightened mind of Grotius was troubled with terrors as to the effect on the public mind at this crisis of anonymous pamphlets concerning political affairs. 3 But in this regard it must be admitted that Grotius was not in advance of his age, although fully conceding that press-laws were inconsistent with human liberty.

Maurice and Barneveld were equally strenuous in maintaining the India trade the prince, because he hoped that resistance to Spain upon this point would

1 Authorities last cited.

2 Ibid

3, "Non minimum ego istius republice malum arbitror tantam in plebe libellis concitanda proterviam vetitam sæpe et tunc novæ edicto nec repressam tamen, dum acris indago et graves pœne repudiatur ut libertati contraria."—Grotius, xvii. 776.

cause the negotiations to be broken off, the Advocate in the belief that firmness on the part of the States would induce the royal commissioners to yield.

The States-General were not likely to be deficient in firmness. They felt that the republic was exactly on the point of wresting the control of the East from the hands of the Portuguese, and they were not inclined to throw away the harvest of their previous labours just as it was ripening. Ten thousand persons at least, besides the sailors employed, were directly interested in the traffic, most of whom possessed great influence in the commonwealth, and would cause great domestic dissension should they be now sacrificed to Spain. To keep the India trade was the best guarantee for the future possession of the traffic to Spain; for the Spanish Government would never venture an embargo upon the direct intercourse between the provinces and its own dominions, for fear of vengeance in the East. On the other hand, by denouncing oceanic commerce, they would soon find themselves without a navy at all, and their peaceful coasting-ships would be at the mercy of Spain or of any power possessing that maritime energy which would have been killed in the republic. By abandoning the ocean, the young commonwealth would sink into sloth, and become the just object of contempt to the world. It would cease to be an independent power, and deserve to fall a prey to any enterprising neighbour.<sup>1</sup>

Even Villeroy admitted the common belief to be, that if the India trade were abandoned „the States would melt away like snow in the sun.”<sup>2</sup> He would not, on that account, however, counsel the States obstinacy upon the subject, if Spain refused peace or truce except on condition of their exclusion from the traffic.<sup>3</sup> Jeannin, Villeroy,

and their master; Isaac le Maire and Peter Plancius, could have told the reason why if they had chosen.

Early in March a triple proposition was made by the States' commissioners. Spain might take her choice to make peace on the basis of free trade; to make peace, leaving everything beyond the Tropic of Cancer to the chance of war; or to make peace in regard to all other than the tropical regions, concluding for those only a truce during a definite number of years.<sup>1</sup>

The Spaniards rejected decidedly two of these suggestions. Of course they would not concede freedom of the sea. They considered the mixture of peace and war a monstrous conception. They were, however, willing to favour peace for Europe and truce in the tropics, provided the States bound themselves, on the expiration of the limited period, to abandon the Indian and American trade for ever. And to this proposition the States of course were deaf. And thus they went on spinning around, day after day, in the same vicious circle, without more hope of progress than squirrels in a cage.

Barneveld, always overbearing with friend or foe, and often violent, was not disposed to make preposterous concessions, notwithstanding his eager desire for peace. „The might of the States-General,” said he, „is so great, thank God, that they need not yield so much to the King of Spain as seems to be expected, nor cover themselves with dishonour.”

„And do you think yourselves more mighty than the Kings of England and France?” cried Richardot in a great rage, „for they never dared to make any attempt upon the Indies, East or West.”<sup>2</sup>

„We are willing to leave the king

<sup>1</sup> Wagenaar, ix. 334. Gallucci, 358, 359. Bentivoglio, 565.

<sup>2</sup> Minutes of Olden-Barneveld, 291, and note from Memoire van Staet.

<sup>1</sup> Wagenaar, ix. 332, 334.

<sup>2</sup> Jeannin, i. 625.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid.



in his own quarters," was the reply, „and we expect him to leave us in ours."

„You had better take a sheet of paper at once," said Richardot, „write down exactly what you wish, and order us to agree to it all without discussion."

„We demand nothing that is unreasonable in these negotiations," was the firm rejoinder, „and expect that nothing unjust will be required of us." 1

It was now suggested by the States' commissioners that a peace, with free navigation, might be concluded for Europe, and a truce for other parts of the world, without any stipulations as to what should take place on its termination.

This was hardly anything new, but it served as a theme for more intellectual buffeting. Hard words were freely exchanged during several hours, and all parties lost their temper. At last the Spaniards left the conference-chamber in a rage. Just as they were going, Barneveld asked them whether he should make a protocol of the session for the States-General, and whether it was desirable in future to resume the discussion.

„Let every one do exactly as he likes," replied Spinola, wrathfully, as he moved to the door.

Friar John always plausible, whispered a few soothing words in the ear of the marquis; adding aloud, so that the commissioners might hear, „Night brings counsel." These words he spoke in Latin.

„He who wishes to get everything is apt to lose everything," cried out Maldere, the Zeeland deputy, in Spanish, to the departing commissioners.

„Take that to yourselves," rejoined Richardot, very fiercely; „you may be sure that it will be your case." 2

So ended that interview.

Directly afterwards there was a con-

ference between the States' commissioners and the French envoys.

Jeannin employed all his powers of argument and persuasion to influence the Netherlands against a rupture of the negotiations because of the India trade. It would be better to abandon that commerce, so he urged, than to give up the hope of peace. The commissioners failed to see the logic or to melt at the eloquence of his discourse. They would have been still less inclined if that were possible, to move from their position, had they known of the secret conferences which Jeannin had just been holding with Isaac le Maire of Amsterdam, and other merchants practically familiar with the India trade. Carrying out the French king's plan to rob the republic of that lucrative traffic, and to transplant it, by means of experienced Hollanders, into France, the president, while openly siding with the States, as their most disinterested friend, was secretly doing all in his power to destroy the very foundation of their commonwealth. 1

Isaac le Maire came over from Amsterdam in a mysterious manner, almost in disguise. Had his nocturnal dealings with the French minister been known, he would have been rudely dealt with by the East India Company. He was a native of Tournay, not a sincere republican therefore, was very strongly affected to France, and declared that all his former fellow-townsmen, and many more, had the *fleur-de-lys* stamped on their hearts. If peace should be made without stipulation in favour of the East India Company, he, with his three brothers, would do what they could to transfer that corporation to France. All the details of such a prospective arrangement were thoroughly discussed, and it was intimated that the king would be expected to take shares in the enterprise. Jeannin had also repeated conferences on the same

1 Minutes of Olden-Barneveld, 191, and note from Memoire van Staet.

2 Jeannin, i. 595.

1 Jeannin, i. 603-606.

subject with the great cosmographer Plancius. It may be well understood, therefore, that the minister of Henry IV. was not very ardent to encourage the States in their resolve to oppose peace or truce, except with concession of the India trade. <sup>1</sup>

The States preferred that the negotiations should come to nought on the religious ground rather than on account of the India trade. The provinces were nearly unanimous as to the prohibition of the Catholic worship, not from bigotry for their own or hatred of other creeds, but from larger views of what was then called tolerance, and from practical regard for the necessities of the State. To permit the old worship, not from a sense of justice but as an article of bargain with a foreign power, was not only to abase the government of the States but to convert every sincere Catholic throughout the republic into a grateful adherent of Philip and the archdukes. It was deliberately to place a lever, to be used in all future time, for the overthrow of their political structure.

In this the whole population was interested, while the India navigation, although vital to the well-being of the nation, was not yet universally recognised as so supremely important, and was declared by a narrow minded minority to concern the provinces of Holland and Zeeland alone.

All were silently agreed, therefore, to defer the religious question to the last.

Especially, commercial greed induced the States to keep a firm clutch on the great river on which the once splendid city of Antwerp stood. Ever since that commercial metropolis had succumbed to Farnese, the republic had maintained the lower forts, by means of which and of Flushing at the river's mouth, Antwerp was kept in a state of suspended animation. To open the navi-

gation of the Scheld. to permit free approach to Antwerp, would, according to the narrow notions of the Amsterdam merchants, be destructive to their own flourishing trade.

In vain did Richardot, in one well-fought conference, do his best to obtain concessions on this important point. The States' commissioners were as deaf as the Spaniards had been on the India question. Richardot, no longer loud and furious, began to cry. With tears running down his cheeks <sup>1</sup> he besought the Netherlands not to insist so strenuously upon all their points, and to remember that concessions were mutually necessary, if an amicable arrangement were to be framed. The chances for peace were promising. „Let not a blight be thrown over all our hopes,” he exclaimed, by too great pertinacity on either side. Above all, let not the States dictate terms as to a captive or conquered king, but propose such conditions as a benevolent but powerful sovereign could accept.

These adjurations might be considered admirable, if it had been possible for the royal commissioners to point to a single mustard-seed of concession ever vouchsafed by them to the republic.

Meantime the month of March had passed. Nothing had been accomplished, but it was agreed to prolong the armistice through April and May.

The negotiations having feebly dribbled off into almost absolute extinction, Friar John was once more set in motion, and despatched to Madrid. He was sent to get fresh instructions from Philip, and he promised, on departing, to return in forty days. He hoped as his reward, he said, to be made bishop of Utrecht. „That will be a little above your calibre,” replied Barneveld. <sup>2</sup> Forty days was easily said, and the States consented to the additional delay.

During his absence there was much

<sup>1</sup> Grotius, xvii. 769.

<sup>2</sup> Minutes of Olden-Barneveld, 205.

<sup>1</sup> Jeannin, i. 603-606.

tedious discussion of minor matters, such as staple rights of wine and cloths, regulations of boundaries, removal of restrictions on trade and navigation, passports, sequestered estates, and the like; all of which were subordinate to the all-important subjects of India and Religion, those two most tender topics growing so much more tender the more they were handled as to cause at last a shiver whenever they were approached. Nevertheless both were to be dealt with, or the negotiations would fall to the ground. 1

The States felt convinced that they would fall to the ground, that they had fallen to the ground, and they at least would not stoop to pick them up again.

The forty days passed away, but the friar never returned. April and May came and went, and again the armistice expired by its own limitation. The war party was disgusted with the solemn trifling, Maurice was exasperated beyond endurance, Barneveld at the peace men began to find immense difficulty in confronting the gathering storm.

The prince, with difficulty, consented to a prolongation of the armistice for two months longer; resolute to resume hostilities should no accord be made before the end of July. The Advocate, with much earnestness, and with more violence than was habitual with him, insisted on protracting the temporary truce until the end of the year. The debates in the States-General and the state-council were vehement; passion rose to fever-heat, but the stadholder, although often half beside himself with rage, ended by submitting once more to the will of Barneveld.

This was the easier, as the Advocate at last proposed an agreement which seemed to Maurice and Lewis William even better than their own original suggestion. It was arranged that the

armistice should be prolonged until the end of the year, but it was at the same time stipulated that unless the negotiations had reached a definite result before the 1st of August, they should be forthwith broken off.

Thus a period of enforced calm—a kind of vacation, as if these great soldiers and grey-beards had been a troop of idle school-boys—was now established, without the slightest reason.

President Jeannin took occasion to make a journey to Paris, leaving the Hague on the 20th June.

During his absence a treaty of the States with England, similar in its terms to the one recently concluded between the republic and France, but only providing for half the number of auxiliary troops arranged for in the French convention, was signed at the Hague. The English plenipotentiaries, Winwood and Spencer, wished to delay 26 June, the exchange of signatures 1608. until the pending negotiations with Spain and the archdukes were brought to a close, as King James was most desirous at that epoch to keep on good terms with his Catholic Majesty. The States were so urgent, however, to bring at least this matter to a termination, and the English so anxious lest France should gain still greater influence than she now enjoyed in the provinces, that they at last gave way. It was further stipulated in the convention that the debt of the States to England, then amounting to 818,408*l.* sterling, should be settled by annual payments of 60,000*l.*; to begin with the expected peace. 1

Besides this debt to the English Government, the States-General owed nine millions of florins (900,000*l.*), and the separate provinces altogether eighteen millions (1,800,000*l.*) In short, there would be a deficiency of at least three hundred thousand florins 2 a

1 Grotius, xvii. Wagenaar, ix. 343, *seqq.* Meteren, A. xxix. Van der Kemp, 31, 37, 154-157.

1 Wagenaar, ix 344.

2 Ibid. 377. Compare Grotius, xvii. 777.



month if the war went on, although every imaginable device had already been employed for increasing the revenue from taxation. It must be admitted, therefore, that the Barneveld party were not to be severely censured for their desire to bring about an honourable peace.

That Jeannin was well aware of the disposition prevailing throughout a great part of the commonwealth is certain. It is equally certain that he represented to his sovereign, while at Paris, that the demand upon his exchequer by the States, in case of the resumption of hostilities, would be more considerable than ever. Immense was the pressure put upon Henry by the Spanish court, during the summer, to induce him to abandon his allies. Very complicated were the nets thrown out to entangle the wary old politician in „the grey jacket and with the heart of gold,” as he was fond of designating himself, into an alliance with Philip and the archdukes.

Don Pedro de Toledo, at the head of a magnificent embassy, arrived in Paris with projects of arranging single, double, or triple marriages between the respective nurseries of France and Spain. The Infanta might marry with a French prince, and have all the Netherlands for her dower, so soon as the childless archdukes should have departed this life. Or an Infanta might espouse a daughter of France with the same heritage assigned to the young couple.

Such proposals, duly set forth in sonorous Spanish by the Constable of Castile, failed to produce a very soothing effect on Henry's delicate ear. He had seen and heard enough of gaining thrones by Spanish marriages. Had not the very crown on his own head, which he had won with foot in stirrup and lance in rest, been hawked about for years, appended to the wedding ring of the Spanish Infanta? It might become convenient to him, at some later day, to form a family alliance with the house

of Austria, although he would not excite suspicion in the United Provinces by openly accepting it then. But to wait for the shoes of Albert and Isabella and until the Dutch republic had been absorbed into the obedient Netherlands by his assistance, was not a very flattering<sup>o</sup> prospect for a son or daughter of France. The ex-Huguenot and indomitable campaigner in the field or in politics, was for more drastic measures. Should the right moment come, he knew well enough how to strike, and could appropriate the provinces, obedient or disobedient, without assistance from the Spanish babies. 1

Don Pedro took little by his propositions. The king stoutly declared that the Netherlands were very near to his heart, and that he would never abandon them on any consideration. So near, indeed, that he meant to bring them still nearer, but this was not then suspected by the Spanish court; Henry, the while, repelling as a personal insult to himself the request that he should secretly labour to reduce the United Provinces under subjection to the archdukes. It had even been proposed that he should sign a secret convention to that effect, and there were those about the court who were not ill-disposed for such a combination. The king was, however, far too adroit to be caught in any such trap. The marriage proposals in themselves he did not dislike, but Jeannin and he were both of a mind that they should be kept entirely secret.

Don Pedro, on the contrary, for obvious reasons, was for making the transactions ostentatiously public, and, as a guarantee of his master's good faith in regard to the heritage of the Netherlands, he proposed that every portion of the republic, thenceforth to be conquered by the allies, should be confided to hands in which Henry and

1 Wagenaar, ix. 350-357. Grotius, xvii. 774. Jeannin.

the archdukes would have equal confidence.

But these artifices were too trivial to produce much effect. Henry remained true, in his way, to the States-General, and Don Pedro was much laughed at in Paris, although the public scarcely knew wherefore.

These intrigues had not been conducted so mysteriously but that Barneveld was aware of what was going on. Both before Jeannin's departure from the Hague in June, and on his return in the middle of August, he catechised him very closely on the subject. The old Leaguer was too deep, however, to be thoroughly pumped, even by so practised a hand as the Advocate's so that more was suspected than at the time was accurately known.

As, at the memorable epoch of the accession of the King of Scots to the throne of Elizabeth, Maximilian de Bethune had flattered the new monarch with the prospect of a double marriage, so now Don Fernando Girono had been sent on solemn mission to England; in order to offer the same infants to James which Don Pedro was placing at the disposition of Henry.

The British sovereign, as secretly fascinated by the idea of a Spanish family alliance as he had ever been by the proposals of the Marquis de Rosny for the French marriages, listened with eagerness. Money was scattered as profusely among the English courtiers by Don Fernando as had been done by De Bethune four years before. <sup>1</sup> The bribes were accepted, and often by the very personages who knew the colour of Bourbon money, but the ducats were scarcely earned. Girono, thus urging on the English Government the necessity of deserting the republic and cementing a cordial, personal and political understanding between James and Philip, effected but little. It soon became thoroughly understood in England that the

same bargaining was going on simultaneously in France. As it was evident that the Spanish children could not be disposed of in both markets at the same time, it was plain to the dullest comprehension that either the brokerage of Toledo or of Girono was a sham, and that a policy erected upon such flimsy foundations would soon be washed away.

It is certain, however, that James, while affecting friendship for the States, and signing with them the league of mutual assistance, was secretly longing to nibble the bait dangled before him by Girono, and was especially determined to prevent, if possible, the plans of Toledo.

Meantime, brother John Neyen was dealing with Philip and the Duke of Lerma in Spain.

The friar strenuously urged upon the favourite and the rest of the royal advisers the necessity of prompt action with the States. This needed not interfere with an unlimited amount of deception. It was necessary to bring the negotiations to a definite agreement. It would be by no means requisite, however, to hold to that agreement whenever a convenient opportunity for breaking it should present itself. The first object of Spanish policy, argued honest John, should be to get the weapons out of the rebels' hands. The Netherlands ought to be encouraged to return to their usual pursuits of commerce and manufactures, whence they derived their support, and to disband their military and naval forces. Their sailors and traders should be treated kindly in Spain, instead of being indulged as heretofore with no hospitality save that of the Holy Inquisition and its dungeons. Let their minds be disarmed of all suspicion. Now the whole population of the provinces had been convinced that Spain, in affecting to treat, was secretly devising means to re-impose her ancient yoke upon their necks. <sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Wagenaar, ix. 355, 356. Jeannin.

<sup>1</sup> Gallucci, 361, 363.

Time went by in Aranjuez and Madrid. The forty days, promised as the period of Neyen's absence, were soon gone; but what were forty days, or forty times forty, at the Spanish court? The friar, who, whatever his faults, was anything but an idler, chafed at a procrastination which seemed the more stupendous to him, coming fresh as he did from a busy people who knew the value of time. In the anguish of his soul he went to Rodrigo Calderon, of the privy council, and implored his influence with Government to procure for him to depart. Calderon, in urbane but decisive terms, assured him that this would be impossible before the king should return to Madrid. The monk then went to Idiaquez, who was in favour of his proceeding at once to the Netherlands, but who on being informed that Calderon was of a different opinion, gave up the point. More distressed than ever, Neyen implored Prada's assistance, but Prada plunged him into still deeper despair. His Majesty, said that counsellor, with matchless effrontery, was studying the propositions of the States-General, and all the papers in the negotiation, line by line, comma by comma. There were many animadversions to make, many counter suggestions to offer. The king was pondering the whole subject most diligently. When those lucubrations were finished, the royal decision, aided by the wisdom of the privy council, would be duly communicated to the archdukes. 1

To wait for an answer to the propositions of the suspicious States-General until Philip III. had mastered the subject in detail, was a prospect too dreary even for the equable soul of Brother John. Dismayed at the position in which he found himself, he did his best to ferret out the reasons for the preposterous delay; not being willing to be paid off in allusions to the royal investigations. He was still further appalled

at last by discovering that the delay was absolutely for the delay's sake. It was considered inconsistent with the dignity of the Government not to delay. The court and cabinet had quite made up their minds as to the answer to be made to the last propositions of the rebels, but to make it known at once was entirely out of the question. In the previous year His Majesty's administration, so it was now confessed with shame, had acted with almost indecent haste. That everything had been conceded to the confederated provinces was the common talk of Europe. Let the time-honoured, inveterate custom of Spain in grave affairs to proceed slowly, and therefore surely, be in future observed. A proper self-respect required the king to keep the universe in suspense for a still longer period upon the royal will and the decision of the royal council. 1

Were the affairs of the mighty Spanish empire so subordinate to the convenience of that portion of it called the Netherlands that no time was to be lost before settling their affairs? 2

Such dismal frivolity, such palsied pride, seems scarcely credible; but more than all this has been carefully recorded in the letters of the friar.

If it were precipitation to spend the whole year 1607 in forming a single phrase; to wit, that the archdukes and the king would treat with the United Provinces as with countries to which they made no pretensions; and to spend the best part of another year in futile efforts to recall that phrase; if all this had been recklessness and haste, then, surely, the most sluggish canal in Holland was a raging cataract, and the march of a glacier electric speed.

Midsummer had arrived. The period

1 „Ad existimationem quoque rei facere ut diutius in expectatione regie voluntatis regique senatus-consulti suspensus esset orbis terrarum.”—Gallucci, *ubi sup.*

2 Neyen's letters to Spinola, 28 May, 1608, in Gallucci, 362, 363.

1 Gallucci, 361, 363.



in which peace was to be made or abandoned altogether had past. Jeannin had returned from his visit to Paris; the Danish envoys, sent to watch the negotiations, had left the Hague, utterly disgusted with a puppet-show, all the strings of which, they protested, were pulled from the Louvre. Brother John, exasperated by the superhuman delays, fell sick of a fever at Burgos, and was sent, on his recovery, to the court at Valladolid to be made ill again by the same cause, and still there came no sound from the Government of Spain. 1

At last the silence was broken. Something that was called the voice of the king reached the ears of the archduke. Long had he wrestled in prayer on this great subject, said Philip III., fervently had he besought the Omnipotent for light. He had now persuaded himself that he should not fulfil his duty to God, nor satisfy his own strong desire for maintaining the Catholic faith, nor preserve his self-respect, if he now conceded his supreme right to the Confederated Provinces at any other price than the uncontrolled exercise, within their borders, of the Catholic religion. He wished, therefore, as obedient son of the Church and Defender of the Faith, to fulfil this primary duty, untrammelled by any human consideration, by any profit that might induce him towards a contrary course. That which he had on other occasions more than once signified he now confirmed. His mind was fixed; this was his last and immutable determination, that if the confederates should permit the free and public exercise of the Catholic, Roman, Apostolic religion to all such as wished to live and die in it, for this cause so grateful to God, and for no other reason, he also would permit to them that supreme right over the provinces, and that authority which

now belonged to himself. Natives and residents of those countries should enjoy liberty, just so long as the exercise of the Catholic religion flourished there, and not one day nor hour longer.

Philip then proceeded flatly to refuse the India navigation, giving reasons very satisfactory to himself why the provinces ought cheerfully to abstain from that traffic. If the confederates, in consequence of the conditions thus definitely announced, moved by their innate pride and obstinacy, and relying on the assistance of their allies, should break of the negotiations, then it would be desirable to adopt the plan proposed by Jeannin to Richardot, and conclude a truce for five or six years. The king expressed his own decided preference for a truce rather than a peace, and his conviction that Jeannin had made the suggestion by command of his sovereign. 1

The negotiators stood exactly where they did when Friar John, disguised as a merchant, first made his bow to the Prince and Barneveld in the palace at the Hague,

The archduke, on receiving at last this peremptory letter from the king, had nothing for it but to issue instructions accordingly to the plenipotentiaries at the Hague.

A decisive conference between those diplomatists and the States' commissioners took place immediately afterwards.

It was on the 20th August

Although it had been agreed on the 1st May to break off negotiations on the ensuing 1st of August, should no result be reached, yet three weeks beyond that period had been suffered to elapse, under a tacit agreement to wait a little longer for the return of the friar. President Jeannin, too, had gone to Paris on the 20th June, to receive new and important instructions, verbal and written, from his sovereign,

1 Neyen to Spinola, 20 Aug. 1659, in Gallucci, 369.

1 King to the Archdukes, in Gallucci, 365, 367.

and during his absence it had not been thought expedient to transact much business. Jeannin returned to the Hague on the 14th of August, and, as definite instructions from king and archduke had now arrived, there seemed no possibility of avoiding an explanation.

The Spanish envoys accordingly, with much gravity, and as if they had been propounding some cheerful novelty, announced to the assembled commissioners that all reports hitherto flying about as to the Spanish king's intentions were false.

His Majesty had no intention of refusing to give up the sovereignty of the provinces. On the contrary, they were instructed to concede that sovereignty freely and frankly to my lords the States-General—a pearl and a precious jewel, the like of which no prince had ever given away before. Yet the king desired neither gold nor silver, neither cities nor anything else of value in exchange. He asked only for that which was indispensable to the tranquillity of his conscience before God, to wit, the re-establishment in those countries of the Catholic Apostolic Roman religion. 1 This there could surely be no reasons for refusing. They owed it as a return for the generosity of the king, they owed it to their own relatives, they owed it to the memory of their ancestors, not to show greater animosity to the ancient religion than to the new and pernicious sect of Anabaptists, born into the world for the express purpose of destroying empires; they owed it to their many fellow-citizens, who would otherwise be driven into exile, because deprived of that which is dearest to humanity. 2

In regard to the East India navigation, inasmuch as the provinces had no right whatever to it, and as no other prince but the sovereign of Spain had

any pretensions to it, his Majesty expected that the States would at once desist from it. 1

This was the magnificent result of twenty months of diplomacy. As the king's father had long ago flung away the pearl and precious jewel which the son now made a merit of selling to its proprietors at the price of their life's blood—the world's commerce—it is difficult to imagine that Richardot, while communicating this preposterous ultimatum, could have kept his countenance. But there were case-hardened politicians on both sides. The proposition was made and received with becoming seriousness, and it was decided by the States' commissioners to make no answer at all on that occasion. They simply promised to render their report to the States-General, who doubtless would make short work with the matter.

They made their report and it occasioned a tumult. Every member present joined in a general chorus of wrathful denunciation. The Spanish commissioners were infamous, it was loudly asserted. There should be no more dealings with them at all. Spain was a power only to be treated with on the battle-field. In the tempest of general rage no one would listen to argument, no one asked which would be the weaker, which the stronger party, what resourced for the renewed warfare could be found, or who would be the allies of the republic. Hatred, warlike fury and scorn at the duplicity with which they had been treated, washed every more politic sentiment away, and metamorphosed that body of burghers as in an instant. The negotiations should be broken off, not on one point, but on all points, and nothing was left but to prepare instantly for war. 2

Three days later, after the French 23 Aug. and English ambassadors, as 1608. Prince Maurice and Count

1 Van der Kemp, iii. 156-160, from Sec. Res. Stat.-Gen. Grotius, xvii. 755. Wagenaar.

2 Grotius, *ubi sup.*

1 Van der Kemp, *ubi sup.*

2 Jeannin, i. 819.

Lewis William, had been duly consulted, comparative calm was restored and a decisive answer was unanimously voted by the States-General. The proposition of the commissioners was simply declared to be in direct violation of the sovereignty and freedom of the country, and it was announced that, if it should be persisted in, the whole negotiation might be considered as broken off. A formal answer to the royal propositions would be communicated likewise to the envoys of foreign powers, in order that the royal commissioners might be placed completely in the wrong, 1

On the 25th August an elaborate response was accordingly delivered in

1 Van der Kemp, *ubi sup.* Wagenaar, ix. 357, 358.

25 Aug. writing by the States' commissioner 1603. to those of the archdukes and king, it being at the same time declared by Barneveld and his colleagues that their functions were ended, and that this document, emanating from the States-General, was a sovereign resolution, not a diplomatic note. 1

The contents of this paper may be inferred from all that has been previously narrated. The republic knew its own mind, and had always expressed itself with distinctness. The Spanish Government having at last been brought to disclose its intentions, there was an end to the negotiations for peace. The rupture was formally announced.

1 See the paper in *Meteren*, 605, 606.

## CHAPTER LI.

Designs of Henry IV.—New marriage project between France and Spain—Formal proposition of negotiating for a truce between the States and Spain—Exertions of Prince Maurice to counteract the designs of Barneveld—Strife between the two parties in the republic—Animosity of the people against Barneveld—Return of the Spanish commissioners—Further trifling—Dismissal of the commissioners—Close of the negotiations—Accidental discovery of the secret instructions of the archdukes to the commissioners—Opposing factions in the republic—Oration of President Jeannin before the States-General—Comparison between the Dutch and Swiss republics—Calumnies against the Advocate—Ambassador Lambert in France—Henry's letter to Prince Maurice—Reconciliation of Maurice and Barneveld—Agreement of the States to accept a truce.

PRESIDENT JEANNIN had long been prepared for this result. It was also by no means distasteful to him. A peace would not have accorded with the ulterior and secretly cherished schemes of his sovereign, and during his visit to Paris, he had succeeded in persuading Henry that a truce would be far the most advantageous solution of the question, so far as his interests were concerned.

For it had been precisely during that midsummer vacation of the President at Paris that Henry had completed his plot against the liberty of the republic, of which he professed himself the only friend. Another phase of Spanish marriage-making had excited his ever-scheming and insidious brain. It had been proposed that the second son of the Spanish king should espouse one of Henry's daughters.

The papal Nuncio asked what benefit the King of Spain would receive for his share, in case of the marriage. The French king replied by plainly declaring to the Nuncio that the united States should abstain from and renounce all navigation to and commerce with the Indies, and should permit public exercise of the Catholic religion. If they refused, he would incontinently abandon them to their fate. More than this, he said, could not honestly be expected of him. 1

1 „Le nonce avait demandé au roy quel bénéfice recevrait de sa part le Roy d'Espagne en respect des mariages. Et pour parler plus



Surely this was enough. Honestly, or dishonestly, what more could Spain expect of the republic's best ally, than that he should use all his efforts to bring her back into Spanish subjection, should deprive her of commerce with three-quarters of the world, and compel her to re-establish the religion which she believed, at that period, to be incompatible with her constitutional liberties? It is difficult to imagine a more profligate or heartless course than the one pursued at this juncture by Henry. Secretly, he was intriguing, upon the very soil of the Netherlands, to filch from them that splendid commerce which was the wonder of the age, which had been invented and created by Dutch navigators and men of science, which was the very foundation of their State, and without which they could not exist, in order that he might appropriate it to himself, and transfer the East India Company to France; while at Paris he was solemnly engaging himself in a partnership with their ancient and deadly enemy to rob them of their precious and nobly gained liberty. Was better proof ever afforded that God alone can protect us against those whom we trust? Who was most dangerous to the United Provinces during those memorable peace negotiations, Spain the avowed enemy, or France the friend?

The little republic had but her own sword, her own brain, and her own purse to rely upon. Elizabeth was dead, and James loved Spain better than he did the Netherlands, and quiet better than Spain. „I have told you often,” said Caron, „and I say it once more, the Spaniard is lucky that he has such

a peaceable king as this to deal with in England.”<sup>1</sup>

The details of the new marriage project were arranged at Paris between the Nuncius, the Spanish ambassador, Don Pedro de Toledo, the diplomatic agent of the archdukes, and Henry's ministers, precisely as if there had been no negotiations going on between the States and Spain. Yet the French king was supposed to be the nearest friend of the States, and was consulted by them on every occasion, while his most intimate and trusted counsellor, the ingenuous Jeannin, whose open brow was stamped with sincerity, was privy to all their most secret deliberations.

But the statesman thus dealing with the Hollanders under such a mask of friendly candour, knew perfectly well the reason why his Government preferred a truce to a peace. During a prolonged truce, the two royal children would grow old enough for the consummation of marriage, and the States—so it was hoped—would be corrupted and cajoled into renouncing their liberty. All the Netherlands would be then formed into a secundogeniture for Spain, and the first sovereign would be the husband of a French princess.<sup>2</sup> Even as an

<sup>1</sup> Deventer, iii. 253.

<sup>2</sup> „Et le point auquel nous travaillons maintenant est de pénétrer à quoy le Roy de France se résouldra advenant faulte de paix; et tachons de faire trouver bon à ses dits ministres qu'en ce cas il abandonne les dits Etats et empoigne le party du mariage du second fils d'Espagne avecq l'une de ses filles aux conditions ja proposées; pour à quoy les induire sert de beaucoup de les avoir mené jusques là qu'ils confessent y avoir de la raison, equité et justice es conditions concernans la religion et la navigation aux Indes, sous lesquelles l'on est content de quitter la souveraineté des dites provinces; ce qu'aussi le roy mesme advoue assez clèrement en ma dernière audience. Et sur ce a resparti qu'estans les dites conditions telles, il auroit juste occasion de s'offenser et retirer des dits Etats s'ils ne s'y accommodaient, il me dit qu'il s'entendoit comme cela . . . Et se resolvant le roy à cest abandon et délaissement des dits Etats, le dit Don Pedro m'a dit qu'il a pouvoir d'accorder en tel cas le dit mariage avecq

clair le roy déclara au nonce que les Etats se deporteront de toute navigation et commerce aux Indes, et permettront quelque exercice public de la foy Catholique es Provinces Unies, ou à faulte de ce il les délaissera et abandonnera incontinent, en quoy il dit estre compris tout ce que l'on peut honnêtement prétendre de luy pour le présent.”  
—Extract of Letter of Peckins, cited in Deventer, iii. 250.

object of ambition, the prize to be secured by so much procrastination and so much treachery was paltry.

When the Spanish commissioners came to the French and English ambassadors accordingly, complaining of the abrupt and peremptory tone of the States' reply, the suggestion of conferences for truce, in place of fruitless peace negotiations, was made at once, and of course favourably received. It was soon afterwards laid before the States-General. To this end, in truth, Richardot and his colleagues had long been secretly tending. Moreover, the subject had been thoroughly but secretly discussed long before between Jeannin and Barneveld.

The French and English ambassadors, accordingly, on the 27th August, came before the States-General, and made a formal proposition for the opening of negotiations for a truce. They advised the adoption of this course in the strongest manner. „Let the truce be made with you,” they said, „as with free States, over which the king and the archdukes have no pretensions, with the understanding that *during the time of the truce* you are to have free commerce as well to the Indies as to Spain and the obedient Netherlands, and to every part of the Spanish dominions; that you are to retain all that you possess at present, and that such other

*l'investiture des Pais-Bas et aultres conditions plus fortes pour asseurer le roy qu'iceux pays demeurent séparés de la couronne d'Espagne. Mais il semble à aucuns des ministres qu'à faulte de paix le plus expédient sera de faire une longue trêve avecq les dits Estats et cependant arrester le dit mariage et attendre le temps de consommation d'iceluy et de la lignée qui en pourra procéder. Auquel cas le roy tres Chretien ne seroit seulement content d'abandonner les dits Estats, mais encore de tenir la main à les faire rejoindre aux aultres provinces de l'obeyssance de votre altesse.*”—Peckius to the Archduke, 18 Aug. 1608, in Deventer, iii. 250-252.

Two months before Peckius had written that the Duc de Sully had been feeling his pulse in regard to a truce in the Netherlands with reference to these marriage projects.—1bid.

conditions are to be added as you may find it reasonable to impose. During this period of leisure you will have time to put your affairs in order, to pay your debts, and to reform your Government, and if you remain united, the truce will change into an absolute peace.” 1

Maurice was more indignant when the new scheme was brought to his notice than he had ever been before, and used more violent language in opposing a truce than he had been used to employ when striving against a peace. To be treated with, *as* with a free State, and to receive permission to trade with the outside world until the truce should expire, seemed to him a sorry result for the republic to accept.

The state-council declared, by way of answer to the foreign ambassadors, that the principal points and conditions which had been <sup>28 August,</sup> solemnly fixed, before the States had consented to begin the negotiations, had been disputed with infinite effrontery and shamelessness by the enemy. 2 The pure and perfect sovereignty notoriously included religion and navigation to any part of the world; and the republic would never consent to any discussion of truce unless these points were confirmed beforehand with the Spanish king's signature and seal.

This resolution of the council—body which stood much under the influence of the Nassaus—was adopted next day by the States-General, and communicated to the friendly ambassadors. 3

The foreign commissioners, when apprised of this decision, begged for six week's time, in order to be able to hear from Madrid.

Even the peace party was disgusted with this impertinence. Maurice boiled over with wrath, The ambassadors recommended compliance with the pro-

1 Jeannin, i. 827.

2 „Vermeetelyck en onbeschaemd.”

3 Van der Kemp, iii. 160, 162.

posal. Their advice was discussed in the States-General, eighty members being present, besides Maurice and Lewis William. The stadholder made a violent and indignant speech. 1

He was justified in his vehemence. Nothing could exceed the perfidy of their great ally.

„I know that the king of France calculates thus”—wrote Aerssens at that moment from Paris—„If the truce lasts seven years, my son will be old enough to accomplish the proposed marriage, and they will be obliged to fulfil their present offers. Otherwise, I would break the truce in the Netherlands, and my own peace with them, in order to take from the Spaniard by force what he led me to hope from alliance.” Thus it is,” continued the States’ envoy, „that his Majesty condescends to propose to us a truce, which may have a double interpretation, according to the disposition of the strongest, and thus our commonwealth will be kept in perpetual disquiet, without knowing whether it is sovereign or not. Nor will it be sovereign unless it shall please our neighbour, who by this means will always keep his foot upon our throat.” 2

„To treat with the States as if they were free,” said Henry to the Nuncius soon afterwards, „is not to make them free. This clause does no prejudice to the rights of the King of Spain, except for the time of the truce.” Aerssens taxed the king with having said this. His Majesty flatly denied it. The republican envoy bluntly adduced the testimony of the ambassadors of Venice and of Wirtemberg. The king flew into a rage seeing that his secrets had been divulged, and burst out with these words:—„What you demand is not reasonable. You wish the King of Spain to renounce his rights in order to arrive at a truce. You wish to dictate the law to

him. If you had just gained four battles over him, you could not demand more. I have always held you for sovereigns, because I am your friend, but if you would judge by equity and justice, you are not sovereigns. It is not reasonable that the King of Spain should quit the sovereignty *for always*, and you ought to be satisfied with having it so long as the treaty shall last.” 1

Here was playing at sovereignty with a vengeance. Sovereignty was a rattle for the States to amuse themselves with, until the royal infants, French and Spanish, should be grown old enough to take the sovereignty for good. Truly this was indeed keeping the republic under the king’s heel to be crushed at his pleasure, as Aerssens, with just bitterness, exclaimed.

Two days were passed at the Hague in vehement debate. The deputies of Zeeland withdrew. The deputies from Holland were divided, but, on the whole, it was agreed to listen to propositions of truce, provided the freedom of the United Provinces—not under conditions nor during a certain period, but simply and for all time—should be recognised beforehand. 2

It was further decided on the 14th September to wait until the end of the month for the answer from Spain. 14 Sept.

After the 1st of October it was distinctly intimated to the Spanish commissioners that they must at once leave the country unless the king had then acknowledged the absolute independence of the provinces. 3

A suggestion which had been made by these diplomatists to prolong the actually existing armistice into a truce of seven years, a step which they professed themselves willing to take upon their own responsibility, had been scornfully rejected by the States. It was already carrying them far enough away,

1 Van der Kemp, iii. 40.

2 Correspondence in Deventer, iii. 262-267.

1 Ibid. 2 Wagenaar, ix. 378-380.

3 Van der Kemp, iii. 41.



they said, to take them from a peace to a truce, which was something far less secure than a peace, but the continuance of this floating, uncertain armistice would be the most dangerous insecurity of all. This would be going from firm land to slippery ice, and from slippery ice into the water. By such a process, they would have neither war nor peace—neither liberty of government nor freedom of commerce—and they unanimously refused to listen to any such schemes. <sup>1</sup>

During the fortnight which followed this provisional consent of the States, the prince redoubled his efforts to counteract the Barneveld party.

He was determined, so far as in him lay, that the United Netherlands should never fall back under the dominion of Spain. He had long maintained the impossibility of effecting their thorough independence except by continuing the war, and had only with reluctance acquiesced in the arguments of the French ambassadors in favour of peace negotiations. As to the truce, he vehemently assured those envoys that it was but a trap. How could the Netherlands know who their friends might be when the truce should have expired, and under what unfavourable auspices they might not be compelled to resume hostilities? <sup>2</sup>

As if he had been actually present at the council boards in Madrid and Valladolid, or had been reading the secret letters of Friar John to Spinola, he affirmed that the only object of Spain was to recruit her strength and improve her finances, now entirely exhausted. He believed, on the other hand, that the people of the provinces, after they should have once become accustomed to repose, would shrink from exchanging their lucrative pursuits for war, and would prefer to fall back under thy yoke of Spain. During the truce they would object to the furnishing

of necessary contributions for garrison expenses, and the result would be that the most important cities and strongholds, especially those on the frontier, which were mainly inhabited by Catholics, would become insecure. Being hostile to a Government which only controlled them by force, they would with difficulty be kept in check by diminished garrisons, unless they should obtain liberty of Catholic worship. <sup>1</sup>

It is a dismal proof of the inability of a leading mind, after half a century's war, to comprehend the true lesson of the war—that toleration of the Roman religion seemed to Maurice an entirely inadmissible idea. The prince could not rise to the height on which his illustrious father had stood; and those about him, who encouraged him in his hostility to Catholicism, denounced Barneveld and Arminius as no better than traitors and atheists. In the eyes of the extreme party, the mighty war had been waged, not to liberate humanity, but to enforce predestination: and heretics to Calvinism were as offensive in their eyes as Jews and Saracens had ever been to Torquemada.

The reasons were unanswerable for the refusal of the States to bind themselves to a foreign sovereign in regard to the interior administration of their commonwealth; but that diversity of religious worship should be considered incompatible with the health of the young republic—that the men who had so bravely fought the Spanish inquisition should now claim their own right of inquisition into the human conscience—this was almost enough to create despair as to the possibility of the world's progress. The seed of intellectual advancement is slow in ripening, and it is almost invariably the case that the generation which plants—often but half-conscious of the mightiness of its work—is not the generation which reaps the harvest. But all mankind at last

<sup>1</sup> Meteren, 606, 607.

<sup>2</sup> Jeannin, i. 889, *seqq.*

<sup>1</sup> *Ibid.*

inherits what is sown in the blood and tears of a few. That Government, whether regal or democratic, should dare to thrust itself between man and his Maker—that the State, not satisfied with interfering in a thousand superfluous ways with the freedom of individual human action in the business of life, should combine with the Church to reduce human thought to slavery in regard to the sacred interests of eternity, was one day to be esteemed a blasphemous presumption in lands which deserved to call themselves free. But that hour had not yet come.

„If the garrisons should be weakened,” said the prince, „nothing could be expected from the political fidelity of the town populations in question, unless they should be allowed the exercise of their own religion. But the States could hardly be disposed to grant this voluntarily, for fear of injuring the general security and violating the laws of the commonwealth, built as it is upon a foundation which cannot suffer this diversity in the public exercise of religion. Already,” continued Maurice, „there are the seeds of dissension in the provinces and in the cities, sure to ripen in the idleness and repose of peace to an open division. This would give the enemy a means of intriguing with and corrupting those who are already wickedly inclined.”<sup>1</sup>

Thus, in the year 1608, the head of the Dutch republic, the son of William the Silent, seemed to express himself in favour of continuing a horrible war, not to maintain the political independence of his country, but to prevent Catholics from acquiring the right of publicly worshipping God according to the dictates of their conscience.

Yet it would be unjust to the prince, whose patriotism was as pure and unsullied as his sword, to confound his motives with his end. He was firmly convinced that liberty of religious

worship, to be acquired during the truce, would inevitably cause the United Provinces to fall once more under the Spanish yoke. The French ambassador, with whom he conferred every day, never doubted his sincerity. Gelderland, Friesland, Overijssel, Groningen, and Utrecht, five provinces out of the united seven, the prince declared to be chiefly inhabited by Catholics. They had only entered the union, he said, because compelled by force. They could only be kept in the union by force, unless allowed freedom of religion. His inference was, not that the experiment of religious worship should be tried, but that the garrisons throughout the five provinces ought to be redoubled, and the war with Spain indefinitely waged. The President was likewise of opinion that „a revolt of these five provinces against the union might be at any moment expected, ill disposed as they were to recognise a sovereignty which abolished their religion.” Being himself a Catholic, however, it was not unnatural that he should make a different deduction from that of the prince, and warmly recommend, not more garrisons, but more liberty of worship.<sup>1</sup>

Thus the very men who were ready to dare all and to sacrifice all in behalf of their country really believed themselves providing for the imperishable security of the commonwealth by placing it on the narrow basis of religious intolerance.

Maurice, not satisfied with making these vehement arguments against the truce in his conferences with the envoys of the French and British sovereigns, employed the brief interval yet to elapse before definitely breaking off or resuming the conferences with the

<sup>1</sup> Thus Jeannin (i. 891, 892) reported in his letters to Villeroy the prince's conversation, yet certainly the prince was erroneously or falsely quoted.—Compare Van der Kemp, iii. 43.

<sup>1</sup> Jeannin, i. 889, *seqq.*

Spanish commissioners in making vigorous appeals to the country.

„The weal or woe of the United Provinces for all time,” he said, „is depending on the present transactions. I Weigh well the reasons we urge, and make use of those which seem to you convincing. You know that the foe, according to his old deceitful manner, laid down very specious conditions at the beginning, in order to induce my lords the States-General to treat.

„If the king and the archdukes sincerely mean to relinquish absolutely their pretensions to these provinces, they can certainly have no difficulty in finding honest and convenient words to express their intention. As they are seeking other phrases than the usual and straightforward ones, they give certain proof that they mean to keep back from us the substance. They are trying to cheat us with dark, dubious, loosely-screwed terms, 2 which secure nothing and bind to nothing. If it be wise to trust the welfare of our State to ambiguous words, you can judge according to your own discretion.

Recognition of our sovereignty is the foundation-stone of these negotiations.

„Let every man be assured that, with such mighty enemies, we can do nothing by halves. We cannot afford to retract, mutilate, or moderate our original determination. He who swerves from the straight road at the beginning is lost; he who stumbles at the first step is apt to fall down the whole staircase. If, on account of imaginary necessity, we postpone that most vital point, the assurance of our freedom, we shall very easily allow less important points to pass muster, 3 and at last come tamely into the path of reconciliation. That was

1 The letter, dated 21 Sept 1608, is published in full by Van der Kemp, iii. 166-174. It is less accurately given by Meteren, 606-608.

2 „Op schroeven gestelde woorden en termen.”

3 „Geringere punten ook wel door de monsterringen passeren.”

exactly the danger which our ancestors in similar negotiations always feared, and against which we too have always done our best to guard ourselves.

„Wherefore, if the preservation of our beloved fatherland is dear to you, I exhort you to maintain that great fundamental resolution, at all times and against all men, even if this should cause the departure of the enemy's commissioners. What can you expect from them but evil fruit?”

He then advised all the estates and magistracies which he was addressing to instruct their deputies, at the approaching session of the States-General, to hold on to the first article, of the often-cited preliminary resolution without allowing one syllable to be altered. Otherwise nothing could save the commonwealth from dire and notorious confusion. Above all, he entreated them to act in entire harmony and confidence with himself and his cousin, even as they had ever done with his illustrious father.

Certainly the prince fully deserved the confidence of the States, as well for his own signal services and chivalrous self-devotion, as for the unexampled sacrifices and achievements of William the Silent. His words had the true patriotic ring of his father's frequent and eloquent appeals; and I have not hesitated to give these extracts from his discourse, because comparatively few of such utterances of Maurice have been preserved, and because it gives a vivid impression of the condition of the republic and the state of parties at that momentous epoch. It was not merely the fate of the United Netherlands and the question of peace or war between the little republic and its hereditary enemy that were upon the issue. The peace of all Christendom, the most considerable material interests of civilization, and the highest political and moral principles that can influence human action, were involved in those negotiations.



There were not wanting many to impeach the purity of the stadholder's motives. As admiral or captain-general, he received high salaries, besides a tenth part of all prize-money gained at sea by the fleets, or of ransom and blackmail on land by the armies of the republic. His profession, his ambition, his delights, were those of a soldier. As a soldier in a great war, he was more necessary to his countrymen than he could expect to be as a statesman in time of peace. But nothing ever appeared, in public or in private, which threw a reasonable suspicion upon his lofty patriotism. Peace he had always believed to be difficult of attainment. It had now been proved impossible. A truce he honestly considered a pitfall of destruction, and he denounced it, as we have seen, in the language of energetic conviction. He never alluded to his pecuniary losses in case peace should be made. His disinterested patriotism was the frequent subject of comment in the most secret letters of the French ambassadors to the king. He had repeatedly refused enormous offers if he would forsake the cause of the republic. The King of France was ever ready to tempt him with bribes, such as had proved most efficacious with men as highly born and as highly placed as a cadet of the house of Orange-Nassau. But there is no record that Jeannin assailed him at this crisis with such temptations, although it has not been pretended that the prince was obdurate to the influence of Mammon when that deity could be openly approached.

That Maurice loved power, pelf, and war, can hardly be denied. That he had mounting ambition; that he thought monarchy founded upon the historical institutions and charters of the provinces might be better than the burgher-rustocracy which, under the lead of Barneveld, was establishing itself in the country; that he knew no candidate so

eligible for such a throne as his father's son; all this is highly probable and scarcely surprising. But that such sentiments or aspirations caused him to swerve the ninth part of a hair from what he considered the direct path of duty; that he determined to fight out the great fight with Spain and Rome until the States were free in form, in name, and in fact, only that he might then usurp a sovereignty which would otherwise revert to Philip of Spain or be snatched by Henry of Navarre—of all this there is no proof whatever.

The language of Lewis William to the provinces under his government was quite as vigorous as the appeals of Maurice. <sup>1</sup>

During the brief interval remaining before the commissioners should comply with the demands of the States or take their departure, the press throughout the Netherlands was most active. Pamphlets fell thick as hail. The peace party and the war party contended with each other, over all the territory of the provinces, as vigorously as the troops of Fuentes or Bucquoy had ever battled with the columns of Bax and Meeterkerke. The types of Blaauw and Plantin were as effective during the brief armistice, as pike and arquebus in the field, but unfortunately they were used by Netherlanders against each other. As a matter of course, each party impeached the motives as well as the actions of its antagonist. The adherents of the Advocate accused the stadholder of desiring the continuance of the war for personal aims. They averred that six thousand men for guarding the rivers would be necessary, in addition to the forty-five thousand men, now kept constantly on foot. They placed the requisite monthly expenses, if hostilities were resumed, at 800,000 florins, while they pointed to the 27,000,000 of debt over and above the 8,000,000 due to the British

<sup>1</sup> His letter is published by Van der Kemp, iii. 174-176.

crown, as a burthen under which the republic could scarcely stagger much longer.<sup>1</sup> Such figures seem modest enough, as the price of a war of independence.

Familiar with the gigantic budgets of our own day, we listen with something like wonder, now that two centuries and a half have passed, to the fierce denuntiations by the war party of these figures as wilful fictions. Science has made in that interval such gigantic strides. The awful intellect of man may at last make war impossible for his physical strength. He can forge but cannot wield the hammer of Thor; nor has Science yet discovered the philosopher's stone. Without it, what exchequer can accept chronic warfare and escape bankruptcy? After what has been witnessed in these latest days, the sieges and battles of that distant epoch seem like the fights of pigmies and cranes. Already an eighty years' war, such as once was waged, has become inconceivable. Let two more centuries pass away, and perhaps a three weeks' campaign may exhaust an empire.<sup>2</sup>

Meantime the war of words continued. A proclamation with penalties was issued by the States against the epidemic plague of pamphlets or „blue-books,” as those publications were called in Holland<sup>3</sup> but with little result.<sup>4</sup> It was not deemed consistent with liberty by those republicans to put chains on the press because its utterances might occasionally be distasteful to magistrates.<sup>5</sup> The writers, printers, and sellers of the „bluebooks” remained unpunished and snapped their fingers at the placard.

We have seen the strenuous exertions

<sup>1</sup> Wagenaar, ix. 377.

<sup>2</sup> This was written in March, 1866.

<sup>3</sup> „Blaauw boekje.” Was the phrase derived from the name of the great printer Blaauw?

<sup>4</sup> Groot Plakaat Boek, i. D. kol. 437. Wagenaar, ix. 373.

<sup>5</sup> „Alzo het streng onderzoeken naar schryvers en verspreiden voor strydig met de vryheid aangezien en daarom gemyd werd.”—Wagenaar, ix. 373.

of the Nassaus and their adherents by public appeals and private conversation to defeat all schemes of truce. The people were stirred by the eloquence of the two stadholders. They were stung to fury against Spain and against Barneveld by the waspish effusions of the daily press. The magistrates remained calm, and took part by considerable majorities with Barneveld. That statesman, while exercising almost autocratic influence in the estates, became more and more odious to the humbler classes to the Nassaus, and especially to the Calvinist clergy. He was denounced as a papist, an atheist, a traitor, because striving for an honourable peace with the foe, and because admitting the possibility of more than one road to the kingdom of Heaven. To doubt the infallibility of Calvin was as heinous a crime, in the eyes of his accusers, as to kneel to the host. Peter Titelman half a century earlier, dripping with the blood of a thousand martyrs, seemed hardly a more loathsome object to the Netherlands than the Advocate now appeared to his political enemies, thus daring to preach religious toleration and boasting of humble ignorance as the safest creed.<sup>1</sup> Alas! we must always have something to persecute, and individual man is never so convinced of his own wisdom as when dealing with subjects beyond human comprehension.

Unfortunately, however, while the great Advocate was clear in his conscience he had scarcely clean hands. He had very recently accepted a present of twenty thousand florins from the King of France. That this was a bribe by which his services were to be purchased for a cause not in harmony with his own convictions it would be unjust to say. We of a later generation, who have had the advantage of looking through the portfolio of President Jeannin, and

<sup>1</sup> „Nil scire tutissima fides.”—Device of the Olden-Barneveld family, *vide* vol. i. of this work, page 299.

of learning the secret intentions of that diplomatist and of his master, can fully understand however that there was more than sufficient cause at the time for suspecting the purity of the great Advocate's conduct. We are perfectly aware that the secret instructions of Henry gave his plenipotentiaries almost unlimited power to buy up as many influential personages in the Netherlands as could be purchased. So they would assist in making the king master of the United Provinces at the proper moment there was scarcely any price that he was not willing to pay.

Especially Prince Maurice, his cousin, and the Advocate of Holland, were to be secured by life pensions, property, offices, and dignities, all which Jeannin might offer to an almost unlimited amount, if by such means those great personages could possibly be induced to perform the king's work.

There is no record that the president ever held out such baits at this epoch to the prince. There could never be a doubt however in any one's mind that if the political chief of the Orange-Nassau house ever wished to make himself the instrument by which France should supplant Spain in the tyranny of the Netherlands, he might always name his own price. Jeannin never insulted him with any such trading propositions. As for Barneveld, he avowed long years afterwards that he had accepted the twenty thousand florins, and that the king had expressly exacted secrecy in regard to the transaction. He declared however that the money was a reward for public services rendered by him to the French Government ten years before, in the course of his mission to Vervins. The reward had been promised in 1598, and the pledge was fulfilled in 1608. In accepting wages fairly earned, however, he protested that he had bound himself to no dishonourable service, and that he had never ex-

changed a word with Jeannin or with any man in regard to securing for Henry the sovereignty of the Netherlands. <sup>1</sup>

His friends moreover maintained in his defence that there were no laws in the Netherlands forbidding citizens to accept presents or pensions from foreign powers. Such an excuse was as bad as the accusation. Woe to the republic whose citizens require laws to prevent them from becoming stipendiaries of foreign potentates! If public virtue, the only foundation of republican institutions, be so far washed away that laws in this regard are necessary to save it from complete destruction, then already the republic is impossible. Many who bore illustrious names, and occupied the highest social positions at that day in France, England, and the obedient provinces, were as venal as cattle at a fair. Philip and Henry had bought them over and over again, whenever either was rich enough to purchase and strong enough to enforce the terms of sale. Bribes were taken with both hands in overflowing measure; the difficulty was only in obtaining the work for the wage.

But it would have been humiliating beyond expression had the new commonwealth, after passing through the fiery furnace of its great war, proved no purer than leading monarchies at a most corrupt epoch. It was no wonder therefore that men sought to wipe off the stain from the reputation of Barneveld, and it is at least a solace that there was no proof of his ever rendering, or ever having agreed to render, services inconsistent with his convictions as to the best interests of the commonwealth. It is sufficiently grave that he knew the colour of the king's money, and that in a momentous crisis of history he accepted a reward for former professional services, and that

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<sup>1</sup> See for this whole story of the twenty thousand florins paid to the Advocate, Van der Kemp, iii. 43, 165, 166. Brandt Regtspleging, 87, 88. Wagenaar, ix. 367-370.



the broker in the transaction, President Jeannin, seriously charged him by Henry's orders to keep the matter secret. It would be still more dismal if Jeannin, in his private letters, had ever intimated to Villeroy or his master that he considered it a mercantile transaction, or if any effort had ever been made by the Advocate to help Henry to the Batavian throne. This however is not the case.

In truth, neither Maurice nor Barneveld was likely to assist the French king in his intrigues against the independence of their fatherland. Both had higher objects of ambition than to become the humble and well-paid servants of a foreign potentate. The stadholder doubtless dreamed of a crown which might have been his father's, and which his own illustrious services might be supposed to have earned for himself. If that tempting prize were more likely to be gained by a continuance of the war, it is none the less certain that he considered peace, and still more truce, as fatal to the independence of the provinces.

The Advocate, on the other hand, loved his country well. Perhaps he loved power even better. To govern the city magistracies of Holland, through them the provincial estates, and through them again the States-General of the whole commonwealth; as first citizen of a republic to wield the powers of a king; as statesman, diplomatist, and financier, to create a mighty empire out of those slender and but recently emancipated provinces of Spain, was a more flattering prospect for a man of large intellect, iron will, and infinite resources, than to sink into the contemptible position of stipendiary to a foreign master. He foresaw change, growth, transformation in the existing condition of things. Those great corporations the East and West India Companies were already producing a new organism out of the political and commercial chaos which had been so long brooding over civili-

zation. Visions of an imperial zone extending from the little Batavian island around the earth, a chain of forts and factories dotting the newly-discovered and yet undiscovered points of vantage on island or promontory, in every sea a watery nebulous, yet most substantial empire—not fantastic, but practical—not picturesque and mediæval, but modern and lucrative—a world-wide commonwealth with a half-submerged metropolis, which should rule the ocean with its own fleets and, like Venice and Florence, job its land wars with mercenary armies—all these dreams were not the cloudy pageant of a poet but the practical schemes of a great creative mind. They were destined to become reality. Had the geographical conditions been originally more favourable than they were, had Nature been less a stepmother to the metropolis of the rising Batavian realm, the creation might have been more durable. Barneveld, and the men who acted with him, comprehended their age, and with slender materials were prepared to do great things. They did not look very far perhaps into futurity, but they saw the vast changes already taking place, and felt the throb of forces actually at work.

The days were gone when the iron-clad man on horseback conquered a kingdom with his single hand. Doubtless there is more of poetry and romance in his deeds than in the achievements of the counting-house aristocracy, the hierarchy of joint-stock corporations that was raking the lead in the world's affairs. Enlarged views of the social compact and of human liberty, as compared with those which later generations ought to take, standing upon the graves heaped up mountains high, of their predecessors, could hardly be expected of them. But they knew how to do the work before them. They had been able to smite a foreign and sacerdotal tyranny into the dust at the expense of more blood and more treasure, and

with sacrifices continued through a longer cycle of years, than had ever been recorded by history.

Thus the Advocate believed that the chief fruits of the war—political independence, religious liberty, commercial expansion—could be now secured by diplomacy, and that a truce could be so handled as to become equivalent to a peace. He required no bribes therefore to labour for that which he believed to be for his own interests and for those of the country.

First citizen of Holland, perpetual chairman of a board of ambitious shopkeepers who purposed to dictate laws to the world from their counting-house table, with an unerring eye for the interests of the commonwealth and his own, with much vision, extraordinary eloquence, and a magnificent will, he is as good a sample of a great burgher—an imposing not a heroic figure—as the times had seen.

A vast stride had been taken in the world's progress. Even monopoly was freedom compared to the sloth and ignorance of an earlier epoch and of other lands, and although the days were still far distant when the earth was to belong to mankind, yet the modern republic was leading, half unconsciously, to a period of wider liberty of government, commerce, and above all of thought.

Meantime, the period assigned for the departure of the Spanish commissioners, unless they brought a satisfactory communication from the king, was rapidly approaching.

On the 24th September Verreyken returned from Brussels, but it was soon known that he came empty handed. He informed the French and English ambassadors that the archdukes,

24 Sept. on their own responsibility, now suggested the conclusion of a truce of seven years for Europe only. This was to be negotiated with the States-General as with free people, over whom no pretensions of authority were made,

and the hope was expressed that the king would give his consent to this arrangement.

The ambassadors naturally refused to carry the message to the States. To make themselves the mouthpieces of such childish suggestions was to bring themselves and their masters into contempt. There had been trifling enough, and even Jeannin saw that the storm of indignation about to burst forth would be irresistible. There was no need of any attempt on the part of the commissioners to prolong their stay if this was the result of the fifteen days' grace which had so reluctantly been conceded to them. To express a hope that the king might perhaps give his future approval to a proceeding for which his signed and sealed consent had been exacted as an indispensable preliminary, was carrying effrontery further than had yet been attempted in these amazing negotiations.

Prince Maurice once more addressed the cities of Holland, giving

26 Sept. vent to his wrath in language with which there was now more sympathy than there had been before. „Verreyken has come back,” he said, „not with a signature, but with a hope. The longer the enemy remains in the country the more he goes back from what he had originally promised. He is seeking for nothing more than, in this cheating way and in this pretence of waiting for the king's consent—which we have been expecting now for more than eighteen months—to continue the ruinous armistice. Thus he keeps the country in a perpetual uncertainty, the only possible consequence of which is her complete destruction. We adjure you therefore to send a resolution in conformity with our late address, in order that through these tricks and snares the fatherland may not fall into the clutch of the enemy, and thus into eternal and intolerable slavery. God save us all from such a fate!” 1

1 Document given in Van der Kemp, iii. 177, 178.

Neither Barneveld nor Jeannin attempted to struggle against the almost general indignation. The deputies of Zeeland withdrew from the assembly of the States-General, protesting that they would never appear there again so long as the Spanish commissioners remained in the country. The door was opened wide, and it was plain that those functionaries must take their departure. Pride would not allow them to ask permission of the States to remain, although they intimated to the ambassadors their intense desire to linger for ten or twelve days longer. This was obviously inadmissible, and on the 30th September they appeared before the Assembly to take leave. <sup>1</sup>

There were but three of them, the Genoese, the Spaniard, and the Burgundian—Spinola, Mancidior, and Richardot. Of the two Nederlanders, Brother John was still in Spain, and Verreyken found it convenient that day to have a lame leg.

President Richardot, standing majestically before the States-General, with his robes wrapped around his tall, spare form, made a solemn farewell speech of mingled sorrow, pity, and the resentment of injured innocence. They had come to the Hague, he said, sent by the King of Spain and the archdukes, to treat for a good and substantial peace, according to the honest intention of his Majesty and their Highnesses. To this end they had sincerely and faithfully dealt with the gentlemen deputed for that purpose by their High Mightinesses the States, doing everything they could think of to further the cause of peace. They lamented that the issue had not been such as they had hoped, notwithstanding that the king and archdukes had so far derogated from their reputation as to send their commissioners into the United

Netherlands, it having been easy enough to arrange for negotiations on other soil. It had been their wish thus to prove to the world how straight-forward were their intentions by not requiring the States to send deputies to them. They had accorded the first point in the negotiations, touching the free state of the country. Their High Mightinesses had taken offence upon the second, regarding the restoration of religion in the United Provinces. Thereupon the father commissary had gone to Spain, and had remained longer than was agreeable. Nevertheless, they had meantime treated to other points. Coming back at last to the point of religion, the States-General had taken a resolution, and had given them their dismissal, without being willing to hear a word more, or to make a single proposition of moderation or accommodation.

He could not refrain from saying that the commissioners had been treated roughly. Their High Mightinesses had fixed the time for their dismissal more precisely than one would do with a servant who was discharged for misconduct; for the lackey, if he asked for it, would be allowed at least a day longer to pack his trunk for the journey. They protested before God and the assembly of the States that the king and princes had meant most sincerely, and had dealt with all roundness and sincerity. They at least remained innocent of all the disasters and calamities to come from the war.

„As for myself,” said Richardot, „I am no prophet, nor the son of a prophet; yet I will venture the prediction to you, my lords the States-General, that you will bitterly rue it that you did not embrace the peace thus presented, and which you might have had. The blood which is destined to flow, now that you have scorned our plan of reconciliation, will be not on our heads but your own.” <sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Meteren, 608. Grotius, xvii. 780, 781. Wegenaar, ix. 385-388. Van der Kemp, iii. 178-183.

<sup>1</sup> Authorities, last cited.



Barneveld replied by temperately but firmly repelling the charges brought against the States in this artful oration of the president. They had proceeded in the most straightforward manner, never permitting themselves to enter into negotiations except on the preliminary condition that their freedom should be once for all conceded and recognized. "You and you only," he continued, "are to bear the blame that peace has not been concluded; you who have not been willing or not been able to keep your promises. One might, with better reason, hold you guilty of all the bloodshed; you whose edicts, bloodier and more savage than war itself, long ago forced these provinces into the inevitable necessity of waging war; you whose cruelty, but yesterday exercised on the crews of defenceless and innocent merchantmen and fishing-vessels, has been fully exhibited to the world."

Spinola's countenance betrayed much emotion as he listened to the exchange of bitter recriminations which took place on this farewell colloquy. It was obvious that the brave and accomplished soldier honestly lamented the failure of the attempt to end the war.

But the rupture was absolute. The marquis and the president dined that day with Prince Maurice, by whom they were afterwards courteously accompanied a part of the way on their journey to Brussels. 1

Thus ended the comedy which had lasted nearly two years. The dismal leave-taking, as the curtain fell, was not as entertaining to the public outside as the dramatic meeting between Maurice and Spinola had been at the opening scene near Ryswyk. There was no populace to throw up their hats for the departing guests. From the winter's night in which the subtle Franciscan had first stolen into the prince's cabinet down to this autumn evening, not a step of real progress could be recorded

as the result of the intolerable quantity of speech-making and quill driving. There were boat-loads of documents, protocols, and notes, drowsy and stagnant as the canals on which they were floated off towards their tombs in the various archives. Peace to the dust which we have not wantonly disturbed, believing it to be wholesome for the cause of human progress that the art of ruling the world by doing nothing, as practised some centuries since, should once and again be exhibited.

Not in vain do we listen to those long-bearded, venerable, very tedious old presidents, advocates, and friars of orders gray, in their high ruffs, taffety robes or gowns of frieze, as they squeak and gibber, for a fleeting moment, to a world which knew them not. It is something to learn that grave statesmen, kings, generals, and presidents, could negotiate for two years long, and that the only result should be the distinction between a conjunction, a preposition, and an adverb. That the provinces should be held *as* free States, not *for* free States—that they should be free in similitude, not in substance—thus much and no more had been accomplished.

And now to all appearance every chance of negotiation was gone. The half-century war, after this brief breathing space, was to be renewed for another century or so, and more furiously than ever. So thought the public. So meant Prince Maurice. Richardot and Jeannin knew better.

The departure of the commissioners was recorded upon the register of the resolutions of Holland, with the ominous note: „God grant that they may not have sown evil seed here; the effects of which will one day be visible in the ruin of this commonwealth.” 1

Hardly were the backs of the commissioners turned before the indefatigable

1 Authorities, last cited.

1 Resol. Holl. 30 Sept. 1608, bl. 228. Wagenaar, ix. 388.

Jeannin was ready with his scheme for repatching the rupture. He was at first anxious that the deputies of Zeeland should be summoned again, now that the country was rid of the Spaniards. Prince Maurice, however, was wrathful when the president began to talk once more of truce. The proposition, he said, was simply the expression of a wish to destroy the State. Holland and Zeeland would never agree to any such measure, and they would find means to compel the other provinces to follow their example. If there were but three or four cities in the whole country to reject the truce, he would, with their assistance alone, defend the freedom of the republic, or at least die an honourable death in its defence. This at least would be better than after a few months to become slaves of Spain. Such a result was the object of those who began this work, but he would resist it at the peril of his life. 1.

A singular incident now seemed to justify the wrath of the stadholder, and to be likely to strengthen his party.

Young Count John of Nassau happened to take possession of the apartments in Goswyn Meursken's hostelry at the Hague, just vacated by Richardot. In the drawer of a writing-table was found a document, evidently left there by the president. This paper was handed by Count John to his cousin, Frederic Henry, who at once delivered it to his brother Maurice. The prince produced it in the assembly of the States-General, members from each province were furnished with a copy of it within two or three hours, and it was soon afterwards printed and published. The document, being nothing less than the original secret instructions of the archdukes to their commissioners, was naturally read with intense interest by the States-General, by the foreign envoys, and by the general public. 2

It appeared, from an inspection of the paper, 1 that the commissioners had been told that, if they should find the French, English, and Danish ambassadors desirous of being present at the negotiations for the treaty, they were to exclude them from all direct participation in the proceedings. They were to do this, however, so sweetly and courteously that it would be impossible for those diplomatists to take offence, or to imagine themselves distrusted. On the contrary, the States-General were to be informed that their communication in private on the general subject with the ambassadors was approved by the archdukes, because they believed the sovereigns of France, England, and Denmark, their sincere and affectionate friends. The commissioners were instructed to domesticate themselves as much as possible with President Jeannin and to manifest the utmost confidence in his good intentions. They were to take the same course with the English envoys, but in more general terms, and were very discreetly to communicate to them whatever they already knew, and, on the other hand, carefully to conceal from them all that was still a secret.

They were distinctly told to make the point of the Catholic religion first and foremost in the negotiations; the arguments showing the indispensable necessity of securing its public exercise in the United Provinces being drawn up with considerable detail. They were to insist that the republic should absolutely renounce the trade with the East and West Indies, and should pledge itself to chastise such of its citizens as might dare to undertake those voyages, as disturbers of the peace and enemies of the public repose, whether they went to the Indies in person or associated themselves with men of other nations for that purpose, under any pretext

1 Wagenaar, ix. 389-390. Jeannin.

2 Jeannin, i. 925, *et seq.*

1 See the document itself in Jeannin, i. 52-58.

whatever. When these points, together with many matters of detail less difficult of adjustment, had been satisfactorily settled, the commissioners were to suggest measures of union for the common defence between the united and the obedient provinces. This matter was to be broached very gently. „In the sweetest terms possible,” it was to be hinted that the whole body of the Netherlands could protect itself against every enemy, but if dismembered, as it was about to be, neither the one portion nor the other would be safe. The commissioners were therefore to request the offer of some proposition from the States-General for the common defence. In case they remained silent, however, then the commissioners were to declare that the archdukes had no wish to speak of sovereignty over the United Provinces, however limited. „Having once given them that morsel to swallow,” said their Highnesses, „we have nothing of the kind in our thoughts. But if they reflect, it is possible that they may see fit to take us for protectors.”

This scheme was to be managed with great discreetness and delicacy, and accomplished by hook or by crook, if the means could be found. „You need not be scrupulous as to the form or law of protection, provided the name of protector can be obtained,” continued the archdukes.

At least the greatest pains were to be taken that the two sections of the Netherlands might remain friends. „We are in great danger unless we rely upon each other,” it was urged. „But touch this chord very gently, lest the French and English hearing of it suspect some design to injure them. At least we may each mutually agree to chastise such of our respective subjects as may venture to make any alliance with the enemies of the other.”

It was much disputed whether these instructions had been left purposely or by accident in the table-drawer. Jean-

nin could not make up his mind whether it was a trick or not, and the vociferous lamentations of Richardot upon his misfortunes made little impression upon his mind. He had small confidence in any austerity of principle on the part of his former fellow-leaguer that would prevent him from leaving the document by stealth, and then protesting that he had been foully wronged by its coming to light. On the whole, he was inclined to think however, that the paper had been stolen from him. 1

Barneveld, after much inquiry, was convinced that it had been left in the drawer by accident. 2

Richardot himself manifested rage and dismay when he found that a paper, left by chance in his lodgings, had been published by the States. Such a proceeding was a violation, he exclaimed, of the laws of hospitality. With equal justice, he declared it to be an offence against the religious respect due to ambassadors, whose persons and property were sacred in foreign countries. „Decency required the States,” he said, „to send the document back to him, instead of showing it as a trophy, and he was ready to die of shame and vexation at the unlucky incident.” 3

Few honourable men will disagree with him in these complaints, although many contemporaries obstinately refused to believe that the crafty and experienced diplomatist could have so carelessly left about his most important archives. He was generally thought by those who had most dealt with him, to prefer, on principle, a crooked path to a straight one. „’Tis a mischievous old monkey,” said Villeroy, on another occasion, „that likes always to turn its tail instead of going directly to the purpose.” 4 The archduke, however, was very indulgent to his plenipotentiary. „My good master,” said the president, „so soon as he learned the loss of that accursed paper,

1 Jeannin, i. 914, 919, 925. 2 Ibid. 919.

3 Ibid. 924.

4 Ibid. ii. 129.



benignantly consoled, instead of chastising me; and, after having looked over the draught, was glad that the accident had happened; for thus his sincerity had been proved, and those who sought profit by the trick had been confounded." <sup>1</sup> On the other hand, what good could it do to the cause of peace, that these wonderful instructions should be published throughout the republic. They might almost seem a fiction, invented by the war party to inspire a general disgust for any further negotiation. Every loyal Netherlander would necessarily be qualmish at the word peace, now that the whole design of the Spanish party was disclosed.

The public exercise of the Roman religion was now known to be the indispensable condition—first, last, and always—to any possible peace. Every citizen of the republic was to be whipped out of the East and West Indies, should he dare to show his face in those regions. The States-General, while swallowing the crumb of sovereignty vouchsafed by the archdukes, were to accept them as protectors, in order not to fall a prey to the enemies whom they imagined to be their friends.

What could be more hopeless than such negotiations? What more dreary than the perpetual efforts of two lines to approach each other which were mathematically incapable of meeting? That the young republic, conscious of her daily growing strength, should now seek refuge from her nobly won independence in the protectorate of Albert, who was himself the vassal of Philip, was an idea almost inconceivable to the Dutch mind. Yet so impossible was it for the archdukes to put themselves into human relations with this new and popular Government, that in the inmost recesses of their breasts they actually believed themselves, when making the offer, to be performing a noble act of Christian charity.

The efforts of Jeannin and of the English ambassador were now unremitting and thoroughly seconded by Barneveld. Maurice was almost at daggers drawn, not only with the Advocate, but with the foreign envoys. Sir Ralph Winwood, who had, in virtue of the old treaty arrangements with England, a seat in the state-council at the Hague, and who was a man of a somewhat rough and insolent deportment, took occasion at a session of that body, when the prince was present, to urge the necessity of at once resuming the ruptured negotiations. The King of Great Britain, he said, only recommended a course which he was himself always ready to pursue. Hostilities which were necessary, and no others, were just. Such, and such only, could be favoured by God or by pious kings. But wars were not necessary which could be honourably avoided. A truce was not to be despised, by which religious liberty and commerce were secured, and it was not the part of wisdom to plunge into all the horrors of immediate war in order to escape distant and problematical dangers, that might arise when the truce should come to an end. If a truce were now made, the kings of both France and England would be guarantees for its faithful observance. They would take care that no wrong or affront was offered to the States-General. <sup>1</sup>

Maurice replied, with a sneer, to these sententious commonplaces derived at second-hand from King James that great kings were often very indifferent to injuries sustained by their friends. Moreover, there was an eminent sovereign, he continued, who was even very patient under affronts directly offered to himself. It was not very long since a horrible plot had been discovered to murder the King of England, with his wife, his children, and all the great

<sup>1</sup> Jeannin, ii. 21.

<sup>1</sup> Wagenaar, ix. 408, 409. Grotius, xvii. 785. Van der Kemp, iii. 48. Jeannin.

personages of the realm. That this great crime had been attempted under the immediate instigation of the King of Spain was notorious to the whole world, and certainly no secret to King James. Yet his Britannic Majesty had made haste to exonerate the great criminal from all complicity in the crime; and had ever since been fawning upon the Catholic king, and hankering for a family alliance with him. Conduct like this the prince denounced in plain terms as cringing and cowardly, and expressed the opinion that guarantees of Dutch independence from such a monarch could hardly be thought very valuable.

These were terrible words for the representative of James to have hurled in his face in full council by the foremost personage of the republic. Winwood fell into a furious passion, and of course there was a violent scene, with much subsequent protesting and protocolling.

The British king insisted that the prince should make public amends for the insult, and Maurice firmly refused to do anything of the kind. The matter was subsequently arranged by some amicable concessions made by the prince in a private letter to James, but there remained for the time a state of alienation between England and the republic, at which the French sincerely rejoiced. The incident, however, sufficiently shows the point of exasperation which the prince had reached, for, although choleric, he was a reasonable man, and it was only because the whole course of the negotiations had offended his sense of honour and of right that he had at last been driven quite beyond the bounds of self-control. <sup>1</sup>

On the 13th of October, the envoys of France, England, Denmark, and of  
 13 Oct. Elector Palatine, the Elector of Brandenburg, and other German princes, came before the States-General.

<sup>1</sup> Jeannin, ii. 303, 304, and authorities last cited. Winwood, ii. 353, 354.

Jeannin in the name of all these foreign ministers, made a speech warmly recommending the truce. <sup>1</sup>

He repelled the insinuation that the measure proposed had been brought about by the artifices of the enemy, and was therefore odious. On the contrary, it was originated by himself and the other good friends of the republic.

In his opinion, the terms of the suggested truce contained sufficient guarantees for the liberty of the provinces, not only during the truce, but for ever.

No stronger recognition of their independence could be expected than the one given. It was entirely without example, argued the president, that in similar changes brought about by force of arms, sovereigns after having been despoiled of their states have been compelled to abandon their rights shamefully by a public confession, unless they had absolutely fallen into the hands of their enemies and were completely at their mercy. „Yet the princes who make this great concession,” continued Jeannin, „are not lying vanquished at your feet, nor reduced by dire necessity to yield what they have yielded.”

He reminded the assembly that the Swiss enjoyed at that moment their liberty in virtue of a simple truce, without ever having obtained from their former sovereign a declaration such as was now offered to the United Provinces.

The president argued, moreover, with much force and acuteness, that it was beneath the dignity of the States, and inconsistent with their consciousness of strength, to lay so much stress on the phraseology by which their liberty was recognised. That freedom had been won by the sword, and would be maintained against all the world by the sword.

„In truth,” said the orator, „you do wrong to your liberty by calling it so often in doubt, and in claiming with so much contentious anxiety from

<sup>1</sup> See the text in Jeannin, ii. 3-8.

your enemies a title-deed for your independence. You hold it by your own public decree. In virtue of that decree, confirmed by the success of your arms, you have enjoyed it long. Nor would anything obtained from your enemies be of use to you if those same arms with which you gained your liberty could not still preserve it for you."

Therefore, in the opinion of the president, this persistence in demanding a more explicit and unlimited recognition of independence was only a pretext for continuing the war, ingeniously used by those who hated peace.

Addressing himself more particularly to the celebrated circular letter of Prince Maurice against the truce, the president maintained that the liberty of the republic was as much acknowledged in the proposed articles as if the words „for ever" had been added. „To acknowledge liberty is an act which, by its very nature, admits of no conditions," he observed with considerable force.<sup>1</sup>

The president proceeded to say that in the original negotiations the qualifications obtained had seemed to him enough. As there was an ardent desire, however, on the part of many for a more explicit phraseology, as something necessary to the public safety, he had thought it worth attempting.

„We all rejoiced when you obtained it," continued Jeannin, „but not when they agreed to renounce the names, titles, and arms of the United Provinces; for that seemed to us shameful for them beyond all example. That princes should make concessions so entirely unworthy of their grandeur, excited at once our suspicion, for we could not imagine the cause of an offer so specious. We have since found out the reason." <sup>2</sup>

The archdukes being unable, accordingly, to obtain for the truce those specious conditions which Spain had

originally pretended to yield, it was the opinion of the old diplomatist that the king should be permitted to wear the paste substitutes about which so many idle words had been wasted.

It would be better, he thought, for the States to be contented with what was precious and substantial, and not to lose the occasion of making a good treaty of truce, which was sure to be converted with time into an absolute peace.

„It is certain," he said, „that the princes with whom you are treating will never go to law with you to get an exposition of the article in question. After the truce has expired, they will go to war with you if you like, but they will not trouble themselves to declare whether they are fighting you as rebels or as enemies, nor will it very much signify. If their arms are successful, they will give you no explanations. If you are the conquerors, they will receive none. The fortune of war will be the supreme judge to decide the dispute, not the words of a treaty. Those words are always interpreted to the disadvantage of the weak and the vanquished, although they may be so perfectly clear that no man could doubt them; never to the prejudice of those who have proved the validity of their rights by the strength of their arms." <sup>1</sup>

This honest, straightforward cynicism, coming from the lips of one of the most experienced diplomatists of Europe, was difficult to gainsay. Speaking as one having authority, the president told the States-General in full assembly, that there was no law in Christendom, as between nations, but the good old fist-law, the code of brute force.

Two centuries and a half have rolled by since that oration was pronounced, and the world has made immense progress in science during that period. But there is still room for improvement in this regard in the law of nations.

<sup>1</sup> Ibid.

<sup>1</sup> Ecrit fait par Monsieur Jeannin, 13 Oct. 1608. Text in Jeannin, ii. 8-19.

<sup>2</sup> Jeannin, ii. 8-19.



Certainly there is now a little more reluctance to come so nakedly before the world. But has the cause of modesty or humanity gained very much by the decorous fig-leaves of modern diplomacy?

The president alluded also to the ungrounded fears that bribery and corruption would be able to effect much, during the truce, towards the reduction of the provinces under their repudiated sovereign. After all, it was difficult to buy up a whole people. In a commonwealth, where the People was sovereign, and the persons of the magistrates ever changing, those little comfortable commercial operations, could not be managed so easily as in civilized realms like France and England. The old Leaguer thought with pensive regret, no doubt, of the hard but still profitable bargains by which the Guises and Mayennes and Mercœurs, and a few hundred of their noble adherents, had been brought over to the cause of the king. He sighed at the more recent memories of the Marquis de Rosny's embassy in England, and his largess scattered broadcast among the great English lords. It would be of little use, he foresaw—although the instructions of Henry were in his portfolio, giving him almost unlimited powers to buy up everybody in the Netherlands that could be bought—to attempt that kind of traffic on a large scale in the Netherlands.

Those republicans were greedy enough about the navigation to the East and West Indies, and were very litigious about the claim of Spain to put up railings around the ocean as her private lake, but they were less keen than were their more polished contemporaries for the trade in human souls.

„When we consider,” said Jeannin, „the constitution of your State, and that to corrupt a few people among you does no good at all, because the frequent change of magistracies takes away the means of gaining over many of them at the same time, capable by

a long duration of their power to conduct an intrigue against the commonwealth, this fear must appear wholly vain.”<sup>1</sup>

And then the old Leaguer, who had always refused bribes himself, although he had negotiated much bribery of others, warmed into sincere eloquence as he spoke of the simple virtues on which the little republic, as should be the case with all republics, was founded. He did homage to the Dutch love of liberty.

„Remember,” he said, „the love of liberty which is engraved in the hearts of all your inhabitants, and that there are few persons now living who were born in the days of the ancient subjection, or who have not been nourished and brought up for so long a time in liberty that they have a horror for the very name of servitude. You will then feel that there is not one man in your commonwealth who would wish or dare to open his mouth to bring you back to subjection, without being in danger of instant punishment as a traitor to his country.”<sup>2</sup>

He again reminded his hearers that the Swiss had concluded a long and perilous war with their ancient masters by a simple truce, during which they had established so good a government that they were never more attacked. Honest republican principles, and readiness at any moment to defend dearly won liberties, had combined with geographical advantages to secure the national independence of Switzerland.<sup>3</sup>

Jeannin paid full tribute to the maritime supremacy of the republic.

„You may have as much good fortune,” he said, „as the Swiss, if you are wise. You have the ocean at your side, great navigable rivers enclosing you in every direction, a multitude of ships, with sailors, pilots, and seafaring men of every description, who are the very best soldiers in battles at sea to

be found in Christendom. With these you will preserve your military vigour and your habits of navigation, the long voyages to which you are accustomed continuing as usual. And such is the kind of soldiers you require. As for auxiliaries, should you need them you know where to find them." 1

The president implored the States-General accordingly to pay no attention to the writings which were circulated among the people to prejudice them against the truce.

This was aimed directly at the stadholder, who had been making so many direct personal appeals to the people, and who was now the more incensed, recognising the taunt of the president as an arrow taken from Barneveld's quiver. There had long ceased to be any communication between the Prince and the Advocate, and Maurice made no secret of his bitter animosity both to Barneveld and to Jeannin.

He hesitated on no occasion to denounce the Advocate as travelling straight on the road to Spain, and although he was not aware of the twenty thousand florins recently presented by the French king, he had accustomed himself, with the enormous exaggeration of party spirit, to look upon the first statesman of his country and of Europe as a traitor to the republic and a tool of the archdukes. As we look back upon those passionate days, we cannot but be appalled at the depths to which theological hatred could descend.

On the very morning after the session of the assembly in which Jeannin had been making his 14 Oct. great speech, and denouncing the practice of secret and incendiary publication, three remarkable letters were found on the doorstep of a house in the Hague. One was addressed to the States-General, another to the States of Holland, and a third to the burgomaster of Amsterdam. In all these documents, the Ad-

vocate was denounced as an infamous traitor, who was secretly intriguing to bring about a truce for the purpose of handing over the commonwealth to the enemy. A shameful death, it was added, would be his fitting reward, 1

These letters were read in the Assembly of the States-General, and created great wrath among the friends of Barneveld. Even Maurice expressed indignation, and favoured a search for the anonymous author, in order that he might be severely punished.

It seems strange enough that anonymous letters picked up in the street should have been deemed a worthy theme of discussion before their High Mightinesses the States-General. Moreover, it was raining pamphlets and libels against Barneveld and his supporters every day, and the stories which grave burghers and pious elders went about telling to each other, and the everybody who would listen to them, about the Advocate's depravity, were wonderful to hear.

At the end of September, just before the Spanish commissioners left the Hague, a sledge of the kind used in the Dutch cities as drays stopped before Barneveld's front-door one fine morning, and deposited several large baskets filled with money, sent by the envoys for defraying certain expenses of forage, hire of servants, and the like, incurred by them during their sojourn at the Hague, and disbursed by the States. The sledge, with its contents, was at once sent by order of the Advocate under guidance of Commissary John Spronsen, to the Receiver-General of the republic. 2

Yet men wagged their beard dismally as they whispered this fresh proof of Barneveld's venality. As if Spinola and his colleagues were such blunderers in bribing as to send bushel baskets full

1 Wagenaar, ix. 411, 412. Van der Kemp iii. 51, 52.

2 Van der Kemp, iii. 54, 229, 230.

1 Jeannin, ii. 8-19.

of Spanish dollars on a sledge, in broad daylight, to the house of a great statesman whom they meant to purchase, expecting doubtless a receipt in full to be brought back by the drayman! Well might the Advocate say at a later moment, in the bitterness of his spirit, that his enemies, not satisfied with piercing his heart with their false, injurious, and honour-filching libels and stories, were determined to break it. „He begged God Almighty,” he said, „to be merciful to him, and to judge righteously between him and them.”<sup>1</sup>

Party spirit has rarely run higher in any commonwealth than in Holland during these memorable debates concerning a truce. Yet the leaders both of the war party and the truce party were doubtless pure, determined patriots, seeking their country's good with all their souls and strength.

Maurice answered the discourse of Jeannin by a second and very elaborate letter. In this circular, addressed to the magistracies of Holland, he urged his countrymen once more with arguments already employed by him, and in more strenuous language than ever, to beware of a truce even more than of a peace, and warned them not to swerve by a hair's breadth from the formula in regard to the sovereignty agreed upon at the very beginning of the negotiations.<sup>2</sup> To this document was appended a paper of considerations, drawn up by Maurice and Lewis William, in refutation, point by point, of all the arguments of President Jeannin in his late discourse.

It is not necessary to do more than allude to these documents, which were marked by the close reasoning and fiery spirit which characterized all the appeals of the prince and his cousin at this period, because the time had now come which comes to all controversies when

argument is exhausted and either action or compromise begins.

Meantime Barneveld, stung almost to madness by the poisonous though ephemeral libels which buzzed so perpetually about him, had at last resolved to retire from the public service. He had been so steadily denounced as being burthensome to his superiors in birth by the power which he had acquired, and to have shot up so far above the heads of his equals, that he felt disposed to withdraw from a field where his presence was becoming odious.

His enemies, of course, considered this determination a trick by which he merely wished to prove to the country how indispensable he was, and to gain a fresh lease of his almost unlimited power by the alarm which his proposed abdication would produce. Certainly, however, if it were a trick, and he were not indispensable, it was easy enough to prove it and to punish him by taking him at his word.

On the morning after the anonymous letters had been found in the street he came into the House of Assembly and made a short speech. He spoke simply of his thirty-one years of service, during which he believed himself to have done his best for the good of the fatherland and for the welfare of the house of Nassau. He had been ready thus to go on to the end, but he saw himself environed by enemies, and felt that his usefulness had been destroyed. He wished, therefore, in the interest of the country, not from any fear for himself, to withdraw from the storm, and for a time at least, to remain in retirement. The displeasure and hatred of the great were nothing new to him, he said. He had never shrunk from peril when he could serve his fatherland; for against all calumnies and all accidents he had worn the armour of a quiet conscience. But he now saw that the truce, in itself an unpleasant affair, was made still more odious by the hatred felt towards

<sup>1</sup> Van der Kemp, iii. 229.

<sup>2</sup> Jeannin, ii. 25-35, gives the text.



him. He begged the provinces, therefore, to select another servant less hated than himself to provide for the public welfare. 1

Having said these few words with the dignity which was natural to him, he calmly walked out of the Assembly House. 2

The personal friends of Barneveld and the whole truce party were in consternation. Even the enemies of the Advocate shrank appalled at the prospect of losing the services of the foremost statesman of the commonwealth at this critical juncture. There was a brief and animated discussion as soon as his back was turned. Its result was the appointment of a committee of five to wait upon Barneveld and solemnly to request him to reconsider his decision. Their efforts were successful. After a satisfactory interview with the committee he resumed his functions with greater authority than ever. 3 Of course there were not wanting many to whisper that the whole proceeding had been a comedy, and that Barneveld would have been more embarrassed than he had ever been in his life had his resignation been seriously accepted. But this is easy to say, and is always said, whenever a statesman who feels himself aggrieved, yet knows himself useful, lays down his office. The Advocate had been the mark of unceasing and infamous calumnies. He had incurred the deadly hatred of the highest placed, the most powerful, and the most popular man in the commonwealth. He had more than once been obliged to listen to opprobrious language from the prince, and it was even whispered that he had been threatened with personal violence. That Maurice was perpetually denouncing him in public and private, as a traitor, a papist, a Spanish partisan, was notorious. He had just been held up to the States of the union and of

his own province by unknown voices as a criminal worthy of death. Was it to be wondered at that a man of sixty, who had passed his youth, manhood, and old age in the service of the republic, and was recognised by all as the ablest, the most experienced, the most indefatigable of her statesmen, should be seriously desirous of abandoning an office which might well seem to him rather a pillory than a post of honour?

„As for neighbour Barneveld,” said recorder Aerssens, I little dreaming of the foul witness he was to bear against that neighbour at a terrible moment to come, „I do what I can and wish to help him with my blood. He is more courageous than I. I should have sunk long ago, had I been obliged to stand against such tempests. The Lord God will, I hope, help him and direct his understanding for the good of all Christendom, and for his own honour. If he can steer this ship into a safe harbour we ought to raise a golden statue of him. I should like to contribute my mite to it. He deserves twice as much honour, despite all his enemies, of whom he has many rather from envy than from reason. May the Lord keep him in health, or it will go hardly with us all. 2

Thus spoke some of his grateful countrymen when the Advocate was contending at a momentous crisis with storms threatening to overwhelm the republic. Alas! where is the golden statue?

He believed that the truce was the most advantageous measure that the country could adopt. He believed this with quite as much sincerity as Maurice held to his conviction that war was the only policy. In the secret letter of the French ambassador there is not a trace of suspicion as to his fidelity.

1 Aerssens and the Advocate were next door neighbours in the Spuistraat at the Hague. Deventer, iii. 271.

2 Aerssens to Van der Veecken, 7 Nov. 1608. In Deventer, iii. 272.

1 Wagenaar, ix. 411, 412. Van der Kemp, iii. 51, 52. 2 Ibid 3 Ib id.

to the commonwealth, not the shadow of proof of the ridiculous accusation that he wished to reduce the provinces to the dominion of Spain. Jeannin, who had no motive for concealment in his confidential correspondence with his sovereign, always rendered unequivocal homage to the purity and patriotism of the Advocate and the Prince.

He returned to the States-General and to the discharge of his functions as Advocate-General of Holland. His policy for the time was destined to be triumphant, his influence more extensive than ever. But the end of these calumnies and anonymous charges was not yet.

Meantime the opposition to the truce was confined to the States of Zeeland and two cities of Holland. 1 Those cities were very important ones, Amsterdam and Delft, but they were already wavering in their opposition. Zeeland stoutly maintained that the treaty of Utrecht forbade a decision of the question of peace and war except by a unanimous vote of the whole confederacy. The other five provinces and the friends of the truce began with great vehemence to declare that the question at issue was now changed. It was no longer to be decided whether there should be truce or war with Spain, but whether a single member of the confederacy could dictate its law to the other six States. Zeeland, on her part, talked loudly of seceding from the union, and setting up for an independent, sovereign, commonwealth. 2 She would hardly have been a very powerful one, with her half-dozen cities, one prelate, one nobleman, her hundred thousand burghers at most, bustling and warlike as they were, and her few thousand mariners, although the most terrible fighting men that had ever sailed on blue water.

She was destined ere long to abandon her doughty resolution of leaving her sister provinces to their fate.

Maurice had not slackened in his opposition to the truce, despite the renewed vigour with which Barneveld pressed the measure since his return to the public councils. The prince was firmly convinced that the kings of France and England would assist the republic in the war with Spain so soon as it should be renewed. His policy had been therefore to force the hand of those sovereigns, especially that of Henry, and to induce him to send more stringent instructions to Jeannin than those with which he believed him to be furnished. He had accordingly despatched a secret emissary to the French king, supplied with confidential and explicit instructions. This agent was a Captain Lambert. Whether it was „Pretty Lambert,” „Dandy Lambert”—the vice-admiral who had so much distinguished himself at the great victory of Gibraltar—does not distinctly appear. If it were so, that hard-hitting mariner would seem to have gone into action with the French Government as energetically as he had done eighteen months before, when, as master of the *Tiger*, he laid himself aboard the Spanish admiral and helped send the *St. Augustine* to the bottom. He seemed indisposed to mince matters in diplomacy. He intimated to the king and his ministers that Jeannin and his colleagues were pushing the truce at the Hague much further and faster than his Majesty could possibly approve, and that they were obviously exceeding their instructions. Jeannin, who was formerly so much honoured and cherished throughout the republic, was now looked upon askance because of his intimacy with Barneveld and his partisans. 1 He assured the king that nearly all the cities of Holland, and the whole of Zeeland, were entirely agreed with Maurice, who would

1 Wagenaar, ix. 414.

2 Wagenaar, ix. 416. „Zo ver liep de twist dat de Zeeuwen spraaken van zich te willen afzonderen van de overigen.”

1 Jeannin, i. 932

rather die than consent to the proposed truce. 1 The other provinces, added Lambert, would be obliged, will ye nill ye, to receive the law from Holland and Zeeland. Maurice, without assistance from France or any other power, would give Spain and the archdukes as much exercise as they could take for the next fifty years before he would give up, and had declared that he would rather die sword in hand than basely betray his country by consenting to such a truce. 2 As for Barneveld, he was already discovering the blunders which he had made, and was trying to curry favour with Maurice. 3 Barneveld and both the Aerssens were traitors to the State, had become the objects of general hatred and contempt, and were in great danger of losing their lives, or at least of being expelled from office. 4

Here was altogether too much zeal on the part of Pretty Lambert; a quality which, not for the first time, was thus proved to be less useful in diplomatic conferences than in a sea-fight. Maurice was obliged to disavow his envoy, and to declare that his secret instructions had never authorized him to hold such language. But the mischief was done. The combustion in the French cabinet was terrible. The Dutch admiral had thrown hot shot into the powder-magazine of his friends, and had done no more good by such tactics than might be supposed. Such diplomacy was denounced as a mere mixture of „in-discretion and impudence.” 5 Henry was

very wroth, and forthwith indited an imperious letter to his cousin Maurice. 1

„Lambert’s talk to me by your orders,” said the king, „has not less astonished than scandalized me I now learn the new <sup>23 Oct.</sup> resolution which you have taken, and I observe that you have begun to entertain suspicions as to my will and my counsels on account of the proposition of truce.”

Henry’s standing orders to Jeannin, as we know, were to offer Maurice a pension of almost unlimited amount, together with ample rewards to all such of his adherents as could be purchased, provided they would bring about the incorporation of the United Provinces into France. 2 He was therefore full of indignation that the purity of his intentions and the sincerity of his wish for the independence of the republic could be called in question.

„People have dared to maliciously invent,” he continued, „that I am the enemy of the repose and the liberty of the United Provinces, and that I was afraid lest they should acquire the freedom which had been offered them by their enemies, because I derived a profit from their war, and intended in time to deprive them of their liberty. Yet these falsehoods and jealousies have not been contradicted by you nor by anyone else although you know that the proof of my sincerity and good faith have been entirely without reproach or example. You knew what was said, written, and published everywhere, and I confess that when I knew this malice, and that you had not taken offence at it, I was much amazed and very mal-content.”

Queen Elizabeth, in her most waspish moods, had not often lectured the States-General more roundly than Henry now lectured his cousin Maurice.

The king once more alluded to the

1 Jeannin, i. 932, 933. and ii. 49.

2 Ibid.

3 Ibid.

4 Ibid Compare for this mission of Lambert, Wagenaar, ix. 384, 385; Van der Kemp, iii. 57, 232.

5 Jeannin, i. 932. Every one of these amazing assertion of „the gentle ambassador Lambert” were denounced by Jeannin in his letters to Villeroy as impudent falsehoods. Especially in regard to the pretended vaunt of Maurice, that he could carry on the war fifty years if France would only remain neutral, the president said that he had been expressly informed by the prince that without the assistance of France the republic was lost for ever.—Jeannin’ ii, 45-51.

1 The letter is given in Jeannin, ii. 58-64.

2 Jeannin, i. 43, 62, 63, 69, 70, 71.



secret emissary's violent talk, which had so much excited his indignation.

„If by weakness and want of means,” he said, „you are forced to abandon to your enemies one portion of your country in order to defend the other—as Lambert tells me you are resolved to do, rather than agree to the truce without recognition of your sovereignty for ever—I pray you to consider how many accidents and reproaches may befall you. Do you suppose that any ally of the States, or of your family, would risk his reputation and his realms in such a game, which would seem to be rather begun in passion and despair than required by reason or necessity?”

Here certainly was plain speaking enough, and Maurice could no longer expect the king for his partner, should he decide to risk once more the bloody hazard of the die.

But Henry was determined to leave no shade of doubt on the subject.

„Lambert tells me,” he said, „that you would rather perish with arms in your hands than fall shamefully into inevitable ruin by accepting truce. I have been and am of a contrary opinion. Perhaps I am mistaken, not knowing as well as you do the constitution of your country and the wishes of your people. But I know the general affairs of Christendom better than you do, and I can therefore judge more soundly on the whole matter than you can, and I know that the truce, established and guaranteed as proposed, will bring you more happiness than you can derive from war.”

Thus the king, in the sweeping slashing way with which he could handle an argument as well as a sword, strode forward in conscious strength, cutting down right and left all opposition to his will. He was determined, once for all, to show the stadholder and his adherents that the friendship of a great king was not to be had by a little republic on easy terms, nor every day.

Above all, the Prince of Nassau was not to send a loud-talking, free and easy Dutch sea-captain to dictate terms to the King of France and Navarre. „Lambert tells me”—and Maurice might well wish that Pretty Lambert had been sunk in the bay of Gibraltar, Tiger and all, before he had been sent on this diplomatic errand—„Lambert tells me,” continued his Majesty, „that you and the States-General would rather that I should remain neutral, and let you make war in your own fashion, than that I should do anything more to push on this truce. My cousin, it would be very easy for me, and perhaps more advantageous for me and my kingdom than you think, if I could give you this satisfaction, whatever might be the result. If I chose to follow this counsel, I am, thanks be to God, in such condition, that I have no neighbour who is not as much in need of me as I can be of him, and who is not glad to seek for and to preserve my friendship. If they should all conspire against me, moreover, I can by myself, and with no assistance but heaven's, which never failed me yet, wrestle with them altogether, and fling them all, as some of my royal predecessors have done. Know then, that I do not favour war nor truce for the United Provinces because of any need I may have of one or the other for the defence of my own sceptre. The counsels and the succours, which you have so largely received from me, were given because of my consideration for the good of the States, and of yourself in particular, whom I have always favoured and cherished, as I have done others of your house on many occasions.”

The king concluded his lecture by saying, that after his ambassadors had fulfilled their promise, and had spoken the last word of their master at the Hague, he should leave Maurice and the States to do as they liked.

„But I desire,” he said, „that you and the States should not do that

wrong to yourselves or to me as to doubt the integrity of my counsels nor the actions of my ambassadors. I am an honest man and a prince of my word, and not ignorant of the things of this world. Neither the States nor you, with your adherents, can permit my honour to be compromised without tarnishing your own, and without being branded for ingratitude. I say not this in order to reproach you for the past nor to make you despair of the future, but to defend the truth. I expect, therefore, that you will not fall into this fault, knowing you as I do. I pay more heed to what you said in your letter than in all Lambert's fine talk, and you will find out that nobody wishes your prosperity and that of the States more sincerely than I do, or can be more useful to you than I can." 1

There could be but little doubt in the mind of Prince Maurice, after this letter had been well pondered, that Barneveld had won the game, and that the peace party had triumphed.

To resume the war, with the French king not merely neutral but angry and covertly hostile, and with the sovereign of Great Britain an almost open enemy in the garb of an ally, might well seem a desperate course.

And Maurice, although strongly opposed to the truce, and confident in his opinions at this crisis, was not a desperado.

He saw at once the necessity of dismounting from the high horse upon which, it must be confessed, he had been inclined for more rough-riding of late than the situation warranted. Peace was unattainable, war was impossible, truce was inevitable; Barneveld was master of the field.

The prince acquiesced in the result which the letter from the French king so plainly indicated. He was, however,

more incensed than ever against Barneveld; for he felt himself not only checkmated but humiliated by the Advocate, and believed him a traitor, who was selling the republic to Spain. It was long since the two had exchanged a word.

Maurice now declared, on more than one occasion, that it was useless for him any longer to attempt opposition to the policy of truce. The States must travel on the road which they had chosen, but it should not be under his guidance, and he renounced all responsibility for the issue.

Dreading disunion, however, more than aught else that could befall the republic, he now did his best to bring about the return of Zeeland to the federal councils. He was successful. 1 The deputies from that province reappeared in the States-General on the 11th November. They were still earnest, however, in their opposition to the truce, and warmly maintained, in obedience to instructions, that the Union of Utrecht forbade the conclusion of a treaty except by unanimous consent of the Seven Provinces. They were very fierce in their remonstrances, and again talked loudly of secession. After consultation with Barneveld, the French envoys now thought it their duty to take the recalcitrant Zeelanders in hand; Maurice having, as it were, withdrawn from the contest.

On the 18th November, accordingly, Jeannin once more came very solemnly before the States-General, 18 Nov. accompanied by his diplomatic colleagues. 2

He showed the impossibility of any arrangement, except by the submission of Zeeland to a vote of the majority. „It is certain,” he said, „that six provinces will never be willing to be conquered by a single one, nor permit

1 I have abbreviated this remarkable letter, but of course the next of the passages cited is literally given.

1 Van der Kemp, iii. 58. Jeannin.

2 The speech of the president is given in full in his „Negotiations.”—Jeannin, ii. 106-112.

her to assert that, according to a fundamental law of the commonwealth, her dissent can prevent the others from forming a definite conclusion."

"It is not for us," continued the president, "who are strangers in your republic, to interpret your laws, but common sense teaches us that, if such a law exist, it could only have been made in order to forbid a surrender.

"If any one wishes to expound it otherwise, to him we would reply, in the words of an ancient Roman, who said of a law which seemed to him pernicious, that at least the tablet upon which it was inscribed, if it could not be destroyed, should be hidden out of sight. Thus at least the citizens might escape observing it, when it was plain that it would cause detriment to the republic, and they might then put in its place the most ancient of all laws, *salus populi suprema lex*."

The president, having suggested this ingenious expedient of the antique Roman for getting rid of a constitutional provision by hiding the statute-book, proceeded to give very practical reasons for setting up the supreme law of the people's safety on this occasion. And, certainly, that magnificent commonplace, which has saved and ruined so many States, the most effective weapon in the political arsenal, whether wielded by tyrants or champions of freedom, was not unreasonably recommended at this crisis to the States in their contest with the refractory Zeelanders. It was easy to talk big, but after all it would be difficult for that doughty little sand-bank, not withstanding the indomitable energy which it had so often shown by land and sea, to do battle by itself with the whole Spanish empire. Nor was it quite consistent with republican principles that the other six provinces should be plunged once more into war, when they had agreed to accept peace and independence instead, only that Zeeland should have its way.

The orator went on to show the absurdity in his opinion, of permitting one province to continue the war, when all seven united had not the means to do it without the assistance of their allies. He pointed out, too, the immense blunders that would be made, should it be thought that the Kings of France and England were so much interested in saving the provinces from perdition as to feel obliged in any event to render them assistance.

"Beware of committing an irreparable fault," he said, "on so insecure a foundation. You are deceiving yourselves. And, in order that there may be no doubt on the subject, we declare to you by express command that if your adversaries refuse the truce, according to the articles presented to you by us, it is the intention of our kings to assist you with armies and subsidies, not only as during the past, but more powerfully than before. If, on the contrary, the rupture comes from your side, and you despise the advice they are giving you, you have no succour to expect from them. The refusal of conditions so honourable and advantageous to your commonwealth will render the war a useless one, and they are determined to do nothing to bring the reproach upon themselves."

The president then intimated, not without adroitness, that the republic was placing herself in a proud position by accepting the truce, and that Spain was abasing herself by giving her consent to it. The world was surprised that the States should hesitate at all. <sup>1</sup>

There was much more of scholastic dissertation in the president's address, but enough has been given to show its very peremptory character.

If the war was to go on it was to be waged mainly by Zeeland alone. This was now plain beyond all peradventure. The other provinces had resolved to accept the proposed treaty. The cities

<sup>1</sup> Jeannin, *ubi sup*.



of Delft and Amsterdam, which had stood out so long among the estates of Holland, soon renounced their opposition. Prince Maurice, with praiseworthy patriotism, reconciled himself with the inevitable, and now that the great majority had spoken, began to use his influence with the factious minority.

On the day after Jeannin's speech he made a visit to the French ambassadors. After there had been some little discussion among them, Barneveld made his appearance. His visit seemed an accidental one, but it had been previously arranged with the envoys. 1

The general conversation went on a little longer, when the Advocate, frankly turning to the Prince, spoke of the pain which he felt at the schism between them. He defended himself with honest warmth against the rumours circulated, in which he was accused of being a Spanish partisan. His whole life had been spent in fighting Spain, and he was now more determined than ever in his hostility to that monarchy. He sincerely believed that by the truce now proposed all the solid advantages of the war would be secured, and that such a result was a triumphant one for the republic. He was also most desirous of being restored to the friendship and good opinion of the house of Nassau; having proved during his whole life his sincere attachment to their interests—a sentiment never more lively in his breast than at that moment. 2

This advance was graciously met by the stadholder, and the two distinguished personages were, for the time at least, reconciled. 3

It was further debated as to the number of troops that it would be advisable for the States to maintain during the truce, and Barneveld expressed his decided opinion that thirty thousand

men, at least, would be required. This opinion gave the prince at least as much pleasure as did the personal devotion expressed by the Advocate, and he now stated his intention of working with the peace party.

The great result was now certain. Delft and Amsterdam withdrew from their opposition to the treaty, so that Holland was unanimous before the year closed; Zeeland, yielding to the influence of Maurice, likewise gave in her adhesion to the truce.

The details of the mode in which the final arrangement was made are not especially interesting. The discussion was fairly at an end. The subject had been picked to the bones. It was agreed that the French ambassadors should go over the frontier, and hold a preliminary interview with the Spanish commissioners at Antwerp.

The armistice was to be continued by brief and repeated renewals, until it should be superseded by the truce of years.

Meantime, Archduke Albert sent his father confessor, Inigo Brizuela, to Spain in order to make the treaty proposed by Jeannin palatable to the king. 1

The priest was to set forth to Philip, as only a ghostly confessor could do with full effect, that he need not trouble himself about the recognition by the proposed treaty of the independence of the United Provinces. Ambiguous words had been purposely made use of in this regard, he was to explain, so that not only the foreign ambassadors were of opinion that the rights of Spain were not curtailed, but the emptiness of the imaginary recognition of Dutch freedom had been proved by the sharp criticism of the States.

It is true that Richardot, in the name of the archduke, had three months before promised the consent of the king, as having already been obtained. But

1 Van der Kemp, iii. 59, 60. Compare Wagenaar, ix. 422, 423.

2 Van der Kemp. Wagenaar, *ubi sup.*

3 Ibid.

1 Wagenaar, ix. 425, 426. Jeannin.

Richardot knew very well when he made the statement that it was false. The archduke, in subsequent correspondence with the ambassadors in December, repeated the pledge. Yet, not only had the king not given that consent, but he had expressly refused it by a courier sent in November. 1

Philip, now convinced by Brother Inigo that while agreeing to treat with the States-General as with a free commonwealth, over which he pretended to no authority, he really meant that he was dealing with vassals over whom his authority was to be resumed when

it suited his convenience, at last gave his consent to the proposed treaty. The royal decision was, however, kept for a time concealed, in order that the States might become more maleable. 1

1 Wagenaar, ix. 425, 426. Jeannin. The reasoning was quite in accordance with the views of the French court. „Maintenant la caption est tout claire,” wrote Aerssens, „en ce qu'ils refusent d'ôter le mot comme. Et ajoutent nos amis, que cette clause a esté conçue ainsi douteusement par M. Janin, pour au bout des dix ans réserver au roy de nous déclarer libres ou non selon que le Roy d'Espagne luy tiendra parole sur les mariages.”—Deventer, iii. 175. „If a peace it prove, wrote Cornwallis from Madrid, „such are the difficulties as for mine own part I should think it like the peace of God which passeth all understanding.”—Winwood, ii. 387.

1 Documents in Deventer, iii. 273.

## CHAPTER LII.

Vote of the States-General on the groundwork of the treaty—Meeting of the plenipotentiaries for arrangement of the truce—Signing of the twelve year's truce—Its purport—The negotiations concluded—Ratification by the States-General, the Archdukes, and the King of Spain—Question of toleration—Appeal of President Jeannin on behalf of the Catholics—Religious liberty the fruit of the war—Internal arrangements of the States under the rule of peace—Deaths of John Duke of Cleves and Jacob Arminius—Doctrines of Arminius and Gomarus—Theological warfare—Twenty years' truce between the Turkish and Roman empires—Ferdinand of Styria—Religious peace—Prospects of the future.

ON the 11th January, 1609, the States-General decided by unanimous vote that the first point in the treaty should be not otherwise fixed than thus:—

„That the archdukes—to superfluity—declare, as well in their own name as in that of the King of Spain, their willingness to treat with the lords States of the United Provinces in the capacity of, and as holding them for, free countries, provinces, and states, over which they have no claim, and that they are making a treaty with them in those said names and qualities.” 1

It was also resolved not to permit that any ecclesiastical or secular matters, conflicting with the above-mentioned freedom, should be proposed; nor that any delay should be sought for, by reason of the India navigation or any other point.

In case anything to the contrary should be attempted by the king or the archdukes, and the deliberations protracted in consequence more than eight days, it was further decided by unanimous vote that the negotiations should at once be broken off, and the war forthwith renewed, with the help, if possible, of the kings, princes, and states, friends of the good cause. 1

This vigorous vote was entirely the work of Barneveld, the man whom his enemies dared to denounce as the partisan of Spain, and to hold up as traitor or deserving of death. It was entirely within his knowledge that a considerable party in the provinces had grown so weary of the war, and so much alarmed at the prospect of the negotiations for truce coming to nought, as to be ready to go into a treaty with

1 Wagenaar, ix. 429, 430.

1 Ibid.

out a recognition of the independence of the States. This base faction was thought to be instigated by the English Government, intriguing secretly with President Richardot. The Advocate, acting in full sympathy with Jeannin, frustrated the effects of the manœuvre by obtaining all the votes of Holland and Zeeland for this supreme resolution. The other five provinces dared to make no further effort in that direction against the two controlling states of the republic.

It was now agreed that the French and English ambassadors should delay going to Antwerp until informed of the arrival in that city of Spinola and his colleagues; and that they should then proceed thither, taking with them the main points of the treaty, as laid down by themselves, and accepted with slight alterations by the States. 1

When the Spanish commissioners had signed these points the plenipotentiaries were to come to Antwerp in order to settle other matters of less vital import. Meantime, the States-General were to be summoned to assemble in Bergen-op-Zoom, that they might be ready to deal with difficulties, should any arise. 2

The first meeting took place on the 10th February, 1609. The first objection to the draught 10 Feb. was made by the Spaniards. It was about words and wind. They liked not the title of high and puissant lords 3 which was given to the States-General, and they proposed to turn the difficulty by abstaining from giving any qualifications whatever, either to the arch-dukes or the republican authorities. The States refused to lower these ensigns of their new-born power. It was, however, at last agreed that, instead of high and mighty, they should be called illustrious and serene. 4

This point being comfortably adjusted,

1 Wagenaar, ix. 431. Jeannin.

2 Ibid. Jeannin. Grotius, xviii.

3 Wagenaar, ix. 432 „Hoogmogende heeren,” „Hauts et puissants seigneurs.”

4 Wagenaar, ix. 432.

the next and most important one was accepted by the Spaniards. The independence of the States was recognised according to the prescribed form. Then came the great bone of contention, over which there had been such persistent wrangling the India trade.

The Spanish Government had almost registered a vow in heaven that the word India should not be mentioned in the treaty. It was no less certain that India was stamped upon the very heart of the republic, and could not be torn from it while life remained. The subtle diplomatists now invented a phrase in which the word should not appear, while the thing itself should be granted. The Spaniards, after much altercation, at last consented. 1

By the end of February, most of the plenipotentiaries thought it safe to request the appearance of the States-General at Bergen-op-Zoom. 2

Jeannin, not altogether satisfied, however, with the language of the Spaniards in regard to India, raised doubts as to the propriety of issuing the summons. Putting on his most reverend, and artless expression of countenance, he assured Richardot that he had just received despatch from the Hague, to the effect that the India point would, in all probability, cause the States at that very moment to break off the negotiations. 3 It was surely premature therefore, to invite them to Bergen. The despatch from the Hague was a neat fiction on the part of the president, but it worked admirably. The other president, himself quite as ready at inventions as Jeannin could possibly be, was nevertheless taken in; the two ex-leaguers being, on the whole, fully a match for each other in the art of

1 „Huic additamento Hispanici valde reluctabantur tum quod Indiam non minus quam si nominaretur claris indicibus exprimeret.” &c.—Grotius, xviii. 808, 809.

2 Wagenaar, ix. 432, 433, 434. Jeannin, vol. ii. Resol. Holl. 4 March, 1609.

3 Jeannin, ii. 383.



intrigue Richardot, somewhat alarmed, insisted that the States should send their plenipotentiaries to Antwerp as soon as possible. He would answer for it that they would not go away again without settling upon the treaty. 1 The commissioners were forbidden, by express order from Spain, to name the Indies in writing, but they would solemnly declare, by word of mouth, that the States should have fully liberty to trade to those countries; the King of Spain having no intention of interfering with such traffic during the period of the truce 2

The commissioners came to Antwerp. The States-General assembled at Bergen. On the 9th April, 1609, the truce for twelve years was signed. This was its purport:—

The preamble recited that the most serene princes and archdukes, Albert and Isabella Clara Eugenia, had made, on the 24th April, 1607, a truce and cessation of arms for eight months with the illustrious lords the States-General of the United Provinces of the Netherlands, in quality of, and as holding them for, states, provinces, and free countries, over which they pretended to nothing; which truce was ratified by his Catholic Majesty, as to that which concerned him, by letters patent of 18th September, 1607; and that, moreover, a special power had been given to the archdukes on the 10th January, 1608, to enable them in the king's name as well as their own to do everything that they might think proper to bring about a peace or a truce of many years.

It then briefly recited the rupture of the negotiations for peace, and the subsequent proposition, originated by the foreign ambassadors, to renew the conference for the purpose of concluding a truce. The articles of the treaty thus agreed upon were:—

That the archdukes declared, as well in their own name as that of the king, that they were content to treat with the lords the States-General of the United Provinces in quality of, and as holding them for, countries, provinces, and free states, over which they pretended to nothing, and to make with them a truce on certain following conditions—to wit:—

That the truce should be good, firm, loyal, inviolable, and for the term of twelve years, during which time there was to be cessation of all acts of hostility between the king, archdukes, and States-General, as well by sea and other waters as by land, in all their kingdoms, countries, lands, and lordships, and for all their subjects and inhabitants of whatever quality and condition, without exception of places or of persons;

That each party should remain seized of their respective possessions, and be not troubled therein by the other party during the truce;

That the subjects and inhabitants of the respective countries should preserve amity and good correspondence during the truce, without referring to past offences, and should freely and securely entertain communication and traffic with each other by land and sea. This provision, however, was to be expressly understood as limited by the king to the kingdoms and countries possessed by him in Europe, and in other places and seas where the subjects of other kings and princes, his friends and allies, have amicable traffic. In regard, however to places, cities, ports, and harbours which he possessed outside of those limits, the States and their subjects were to exercise no traffic, without express permission of the king. They could, however, if they chose, trade with the countries of all other princes, potentates, and peoples who were willing to permit it, even outside those limits, without any hindrance by the king;

That the truce should begin in regard

1 Jeannin, ii. 383.

2 Winwood, ii. 489.

to those distant countries after a year from date, unless actual notification could be sooner served there on those concerned;

That the subjects of the United Provinces should have the same liberty and privilege within the States of the king and archdukes as had been accorded to the subjects of the King of Great Britain, according to the last treaty made with that sovereign;

That letters of marque and reprisal should not be granted during the truce, except for special cause, and in cases permitted by the laws and imperial constitutions, and according to the rules therein prescribed;

That those who had retired into neutral territory during the war were also to enjoy the benefit of the truce, and could reside wherever they liked without being deprived of their property;

That the treaty should be ratified by the archdukes and the States-General within four days. As to the ratification of the king, the archdukes were bound to deliver it in good and due form within three months, in order that the lords the States-General, their subjects and inhabitants, might enjoy effectively the fruits of the treaty;

That the treaty should be published everywhere immediately after the ratification of the archdukes and States-General

This document was signed by the ambassadors of the Kings of France and Great Britain, as mediators, and then by the deputies of the archdukes, and afterwards by those of the lords the States-General.<sup>1</sup>

There were thirty-eight articles in all, but the chief provisions have been indicated. The other clauses, relating to boundaries, confiscations, regulations of duties, frontier fortifications, the estates of the Nassau family, and other

sequestered property, have no abiding interest.

There was also a secret and special treaty which was demanded of the King of Spain by the States-General, and by him accorded.

This secret treaty consisted of a single clause. That clause was made up of a brief preamble and of a promise. The preamble recited textually article fourth of the public treaty relative to the India trade. The promise was to this effect. 1 For the period of the truce the Spanish commissioners pledged the faith of the king and of his successors that his Majesty would cause no impediment, whether by sea or land, to the States nor their subjects, in the traffic that hereafter might be made in the countries of all princes, potentates, and peoples who might permit the same, in whatever place it might be, even without the limits designated, and everywhere else, nor similarly to those carrying on such traffic with them, and that the king and his successors would faithfully carry into effect everything thus laid down, so that the said traffic should be free and secure, consenting even, in order that the clause might be the more authentic, that it should be considered as inserted in the principal treaty, and as making part thereof. 2

It will be perceived that the first article of all, and the last or secret article, contained the whole marrow of the treaty. It may be well understood, therefore, with what wry faces the Spanish plenipotentiaries ultimately signed the document.

After two years and a quarter of dreary negotiation, the republic had carried all its points, without swerving a hair's breadth from the principles laid down in the beginning. The only concession made was that the treaty was for a truce of twelve years, and not for peace. But as after all, in those

<sup>1</sup> See the treaty in full in Jeannin, ii. 446-457. Compare Meteren, 613

<sup>1</sup> The text of the secret treaty is given in Jeannin, ii. 457, 458. <sup>2</sup> Ibid.

days, an interval of twelve years might be almost considered an eternity of peace, and as calling a peace perpetual can never make it so, the difference was rather one of phraseology than of fact.

On the other hand the States had extorted from their former sovereign a recognition of their independence.

They had secured the India trade.

They had not conceded Catholic worship.

Mankind were amazed at this result—an event hitherto unknown in history. When before had a sovereign acknowledged the independence of his rebellious subjects, and signed a treaty with them as with equals? When before had Spain, expressly or by implication, admitted that the East and West Indies were not her private property, and that navigators to those regions from other countries than her own, were not to be chastised as trespassers and freebooters?

Yet the liberty of the Netherlands was acknowledged in terms which convinced the world that it was thenceforth an established fact. And India was as plainly expressed by the omission of the word, as if it had been engrossed in large capitals in Article IV. 1

The King's Government might seek solace in syntax. They might triumph in Cardinal Bentivoglio's subtleties, and persuade themselves that to treat with the republic *as* a free nation was not to hold it *for* a free nation then and

for ever. But the whole world knew that the republic really was free, and that it had treated, face to face with its former sovereign, exactly as the Kings of France or Great Britain, or the Grand Turk, might treat with him. The new commonwealth had taken its place among the nations of the earth. Other princes and potentates made not the slightest difficulty in recognising it for an independent power, and entering into treaties and alliances with it as with any other realm.

To the republic the substantial blessing of liberty: to his Catholic Majesty the grammatical quirk. When the twelve years should expire, Spain might reconquer the United Provinces if she could; relying upon the great truth that an adverb was not a preposition. And France or Great Britain might attempt the same thing if either felt strong enough for the purpose. Did as plausible a pretext as that ever fail to a state ambitious of absorbing its neighbours?

Jeannin was right enough in urging that this famous clause of recognition ought to satisfy both parties. If the United Provinces, he said, happened not to have the best muskets and cannons on their side, when it should once more come to blows, small help would they derive from verbal bulwarks and advantages in the text of treaties. 1

Richardot consoled himself with his quibbles; for quibbles were his daily bread. „Thank God our truce is made,” said he, „and we have only lost the sovereignty for twelve years, if after that we have the means or the will to resume the war—whatever Don Pedro de Toledo may say.” 2.

Barneveld, on his part, was devoutly and soberly pleased with the result. „To-day we have concluded our negotiations for the truce,” he wrote to Aerssens. „We must pray to the Lord God, and we must do our highest duty

1 Bentivoglio, 576.

2 Deventer, iii 308.

1 The words too of the certificate signed by the ambassadors of France and England were very explicit:—Certifions aussi les députés des archiducs avoir consenty et accordé tout, ainsi que les sieurs estats et leurs sujets ne pourront trafiquer aux ports, lieux et places que tiennent les dits sieurs estats des dites Indes si ce n'est avec leur permission. Et outre ce que les députés des dits sieurs ont déclaré plusieurs fois en notre présence et des députés des archiducs, si on entreprend sur leurs amis et allies es dits pays qu'ils entendent les secourir et assister sans qu'on puisse prétendre la trefve estre enfreinte et violée à cette occasion.”—*Annvers*, 9 Avril, 1609. *Négotiations de Jeannin*, ii. 458, 459.



that our work may redound to His honour and glory, and to the nation's welfare. It is certain that men will make their criticisms upon it according to their humours. But those who love their country, and all honest people who know the condition of the land, will say that it is well done." 1

Thus modestly, religiously, and sincerely spoke a statesman, who felt that he had accomplished a great work, and that he had indeed brought the commonwealth through the tempest at last.

The republic had secured the India trade. On this point the negotiators had taken refuge in that most useful figure of speech for hard-pressed diplomats and law-makers — the ellipsis. They had left out the word *India*, and his Catholic Majesty might persuade himself that by such omission a hemisphere had actually been taken away from the Dutch merchants and navigators. But the whole world saw that Article IV. really contained both the East and West Indies. It hardly needed the secret clause to make assurance doubly sure.

President Richardot was facetiously wont to observe that this point in the treaty was so obscure that he did not understand it himself. 2 But he knew better. He understood it very well. The world understood it very well. The United Provinces had throughout the negotiations ridiculed the idea of being excluded from any part of the old world or the new by reason of the Borgian grant. All the commissioners knew that the war would be renewed if any attempt were to be seriously made to put up those famous railings around the ocean, of which the Dutch diplomatists spoke in such bitter scorn. The Spanish plenipotentiaries, therefore, had insisted that the word itself should be left out, and that the republic should be forbidden access to territories subject to the crown of Spain.

So the Hollanders were thenceforth to

deal directly with the kings of Sumatra and the Moluccas, and the republics of Banda, and all the rich commonwealths and principalities of nutmegs, cloves, and indigo, unless, as grew every day more improbable, the Spaniards and Portuguese could exclude them from that traffic by main force. And the Orange flag of the republic was to float wit equal facility over all America, from the Isle of Manhattan to the shores of Brazil and the Straits of Magellan, provided Philip had not ships and soldiers to vindicate with the sword that sovereignty which Spanish swords and Spanish genius had once acquired.

As for the Catholic worship, the future was to prove that liberty for the old religion and for all forms of religion was a blessing more surely to flow from the enlightened public sentiment of a free people emerging out of the most tremendous war for liberty ever waged, than from the stipulations of a treaty with a foreign power.

It was characteristic enough of the parties engaged in the great political drama that the republic now requested from France and Great Britain a written recognition of its independence, and that both France and England refused. 1

It was strange that the new commonwealth, in the very moment of extorting her freedom from the ancient tyranny, should be so unconscious of her strength as to think free papers from neutral powers a boon. As if the sign-manual of James and Henry were a better guarantee than the trophies of the Nassaus, of Heemskerk, of Matelieff, and of Olden-Barneveld!

It was not strange that the two sovereigns should decline the proposition; for we well know the secret aspirations of each, and it was natural that they should be unwilling to sign a formal quit-claim, however improbable it might be that those dreams should ever become a reality.

1 Deventer, iii. 309. 2 Bentivoglio, 576.

1 Wagenaar, ix. 445. Jeannin, vol. ii.

Both powers, however, united in a guarantee of the truce. This was signed on the 17th June, and stipulated that, without their knowledge and consent, the States should make no treaty during the period of truce with the King of Spain or the archdukes. On the other hand, in case of an infraction of the truce by the enemy, the two kings agreed to lend assistance to the States in the manner provided by the treaties concluded with the republic previously to the negotiation of the truce. 1

The treaty had been at once ratified by the States-General, assembled for the purpose with an extraordinary number of deputies at Bergen-op-Zoom. It was also ratified without delay by the archdukes. The delivery of the confirmation by his Catholic Majesty had been promised within three months after the signatures of the plenipotentiaries.

It would however have been altogether inconsistent with the dignity and the traditions of the Spanish court to fulfil this stipulation. It was not to be expected that „I the King” could be written either by the monarch himself, or by his *alter ego* the Duke of Lerma, in so short a time as a quarter of a year.

Several weeks accordingly went by after the expiration of the stated period. The ratification did not come, and the Netherlanders began to be once more indignant. Before the storm had risen very high, however, the despatches arrived. The king's signature was antedated 7th April, being thus brought within the term of three months, and was a thorough confirmation of what had been done by his plenipotentiaries. His Majesty, however, expressed a hope that during the truce the States would treat their Catholic subjects with kindness. 2

Certainly no exception could be taken to so reasonable an intimation as this.

President Jeannin too, just before his departure, handed in to the States-General an eloquent appeal on behalf of the Catholics of the Netherlands; a paper which was not immediately made public. 1

„Consider the great number of Catholics,” he said, „in your territory, both in the cities and the country. Remember that they have worked with you, spent their property, have been exposed to the same dangers, and have always kept their fidelity to the commonwealth inviolate as long as the war endured, never complaining that they did not enjoy liberty of religious worship, believing that you had thus ordained because the public safety required such guaranty. But they always promised themselves, should the end of the war be happy, and should you be placed in the enjoyment of entire freedom, that they too would have some part in this good fortune, even as they had been sharers in the inconveniences, the expenses, and the perils of the war

„But those cannot be said to share in any enjoyment from whom has been taken the power of serving God according to the religion in which they were brought up. On the contrary, no slavery is more intolerable nor more exasperates the mind than such restraint. You know this well, my lords States; you know too that it was the principal, the most puissant cause that made you fly to arms and scorn all dangers, in order to effect your deliverance from this servitude. You know that it has excited similar movements in various parts of Christendom, and even in the kingdom of France, with such fortunate success everywhere as to make it appear that God so willed it, in order to prove that religion ought to be taught and inspired by the movements which come from the Holy Ghost, and not by the force of man. Thus kings and princes

1 Jeannin, ii. 536, 538. Wagenaar, ix. 446.

2 Meteren, xxx. 679<sup>vo</sup>. Wagenaar, ix. 467.

1 Jeannin, ii. 539-597. gives the whole text of his address on this occasion.

should be induced by the evils and ruin which they and their subjects have suffered from this cause, as by a sentiment of their own interest, to take more care than has hitherto been taken to practise in good earnest those remedies which were wont to be used at a time when the church was in its greatest piety, in order to correct the abuses and errors which the corruption of mankind had tried to introduce as being the true and sole means of uniting all Christians in one and the same creed."

Surely the world had made progress in these forty years of war. Was it not something gained for humanity, for intellectual advancement, for liberty of thought, for the true interests of religion, that a Roman Catholic, an ex-leaguer, a trusted representative of the immediate successor of Charles IX. and Henry III., could stand up on the blood-stained soil of the Netherlands and plead for liberty of conscience for all mankind?

"Those cannot be said to share in any enjoyment from whom has been taken the power of serving God according to the religion in which they have been brought up. No slavery is more intolerable nor more exasperating to the mind than such restraint."

Most true, O excellent president! No axiom in mathematics is more certain than this simple statement. To prove its truth William the Silent had lived and died. To prove it a falsehood, emperors, and kings, and priests, had issued bans, and curses, and damnable decrees. To root it out they had butchered, drowned, shot, strangled, poisoned, tortured, roasted alive, buried alive, starved, and driven mad, thousand and tens of thousands of their fellow creatures. And behold there had been almost a century of this work, and yet the great truth was not rooted out after all; and the devil-worshippers, who had sought at the outset of the

great war to establish the Holy Inquisition in the Netherlands upon the ruins of religious and political liberty, were overthrown at last and driven back into the pit. It was progress; it was worth all the blood and treasure which had been spilled, that instead of the Holy Inquisition, there was now holy liberty of thought.

That there should have been a party, that there should have been an individual here and there, after the great victory was won, to oppose the doctrine which the Catholic president now so nobly advocated, would be enough to cause every believer in progress to hide his face in the dust, did we not know that the march of events was destined to trample such opposition out of existence, and had not history proved to us that the great lesson of the war was not to be rendered nought by the efforts of a few fanatics. Religious liberty was the ripened and consummate fruit, and it could not but be gathered.

Consider too," continued the president, how much injury your refusal, if you give it, will cause to those of your religion in the places where they are the weakest, and were they are every day imploring with tears and lamentations the grace of those Catholic sovereigns to whom they are subject, to enable them to enjoy the same religious liberty which our king is now demanding in favour of the Catholics among you. Do not cause it to come again into the minds of those sovereigns and their peoples, whom an inconsiderate zeal has often driven into violence and ferocity against protestant, that a war to compel the weakest to follow the religion of the strongest is just and lawful."

Had not something been gained for the world when this language was held by a Catholic on the very spot where less than a half century before the whole population of the Netherlands, men, women, and children, had been



condemned to death by a foreign tyrant, for the simple reason that it was just legal, and a Christian duty to punish the weak for refusing to follow the religion of the strong?

„As for the perils which some affect to fear,” said Jeannin, further, „if this liberty of worship is accorded, experience teaches us every day that diversity of religion is not the cause of the ruin of states, and that a government does not cease to be good, nor its subjects to live in peace and friendship with one another, rendering due obedience to the laws and to their rulers as well as if they had all been of the same religion, without having another thought, save for the preservation of the dignity and grandeur of the state in which God had caused them to be born. The danger is not in the permission, but in the prohibition of religious liberty.”

All this seems commonplace enough to us on the western side of the Atlantic, in the middle of the nineteenth century, but it would have been rank blasphemy in New England in the middle of the seventeenth, many years after Jeannin spoke. It was a horrible sound, too, in the ears of some of his audience.

To the pretence so often urged by the Catholic persecutors, and now set up by their Calvinistic imitators, that those who still clung to the old religion were at liberty to depart from the land, the president replied with dignified scorn.

„With what justice,” he asked, „can you drive into exile people who have committed no offence, and who have helped to conquer the very country from which you would now banish them? If you do drive them away, you will make solitudes in your commonwealth, which will be the cause of evils such as I prefer that you should reflect upon without my declaring them now. Although these reasons,” he continued, „would seem sufficient to induce you to accord the free and public exercise

of the Catholic religion, the king, not hoping as much as that, because aware that you are not disposed to go so far, is content to request only this grace in behalf of the Catholic, that you will tolerate them, and suffer them to have some exercise of their religion within their own households, without interference or inquiry on that account, and without execution of the rigorous decrees heretofore enforced against them.”

Certainly if such wholesome, moderate, and modest counsels as these had been rejected, it would have been sound doctrine to proclaim that the world did not move. And there were individuals enough, even an influential party, prepared to oppose them for both technical and practical reasons. And the cause of intolerance derived much warmth and comfort at this juncture from that great luminary of theology and political philosophy, the King of Great Britain. Direful and solemn were the warnings uttered by James to the republic against permitting the old religion, or any religion save his own religion, to obtain the slightest foothold within her borders.

„Let the religion be taught and preached in its purity throughout your provinces without the least mixture,” said Sir Ralph Winwood, in the name of his sovereign.

„On this foundation the justice of your cause is built. There is but one verity. Those who are willing to tolerate any religion, whatever it may be, and try to make you believe that liberty for both is necessary in your commonwealth, are paving the way towards atheism.”<sup>1</sup>

Such were the counsels of King James to the united States of the Netherlands against harbouring Catholics. A few years later he was casting forth Calvinists from his own dominions as if they had been lepers; and they went forth on their weary pilgrimage to the howling wilderness of North America, those exiled

<sup>1</sup> Cited in Van der Kemp, iii. 264.

Calvinists, to build a greater republic than had ever been dreamed of before on this planet; and they went forth, not to preach, but in their turn to denounce toleration and to hang heretics. „He who would tolerate another religion that his own may be tolerated, would if need be, hang God's bible at the devil's girdle." So spoke an early Massachusetts pilgrim, in the very spirit, almost the very words of the royal persecutor, who had driven him into outer darkness beyond the seas. He had not learned the lesson of the mighty movement in which he was a pioneer, any more than Gomarus or Uytenbogaart had comprehended why the Dutch republic had risen.

Yet the founders of the two commonwealths, the United States of the seventeenth and of the nineteenth centuries, although many of them fiercely intolerant, through a natural instinct of resistance, not only to the oppressor but to the creed of the oppressor, had been breaking out the way, not to atheism, as King James believed, but to the only garden in which Christianity can perennially flourish—religious liberty.

Those most ardent and zealous pathfinders may be forgiven, in view of the inestimable benefits conferred by them upon humanity, that they did not travel on their own road. It should be sufficient for us, if we make due use of their great imperishable work ourselves; and if we never cease rendering thanks to the Omnipotent, that there is at least one great nation on the globe where the words toleration and dissenter have no meaning whatever.

For the Dutch fanatics of the reformed church, at the moment of the truce, to attempt to reverse the course of events, and to shut off the mighty movement of the great revolt from its destined expanse, was as hopeless a dream as to drive back the Rhine, as it reached the ocean, into the narrow channel of the Rheinwald glacier whence it sprang.

The republic became the refuge for the oppressed of all nations, where Jews and Gentiles, Catholics, Calvinists, and Anabaptists prayed after their own manner to the same God and Father. It was too much, however, to hope that passions which had been so fiercely bubbling during fifty years would subside at once, and that the most intense religious hatreds that ever existed would exhale with the proclamation of truce. The march of humanity is rarely rapid enough to keep pace with the leaders in its most sublime movements, and it often happens that its chieftains are dwarfed in the estimation of the contemporaneous vulgar by the very distance at which they precede their unconscious followers. But even if the progress of the human mind towards the truth is fated to be a spiral one, as if to remind us that mankind is of the earth, earthy—a worm in the dust while inhabiting this lower sphere—it is at least a consolation to reflect upon the gradual advancement of the intellect from age to age.

The spirit of Torquemada, of Charles, of Philip, of Titelmann, is even now not extinct on this globe, but there are counter forces at work, which must ultimately blast it into insignificance. At the moment of the great truce, that evil spirit was not exorcised from the human breast, but the number of its victims and the intensity of its influence had already miraculously diminished.

The truce was made and announced all over the Netherlands by the ringing of bells, the happy discharge of innocent artillery, by illuminations, by *Te Deums* in all the churches. Papist and Presbyterian fell on their knees in every grand cathedral or humblest village church to thank God that what had seemed the eternal butchery was over. The inhabitants of the united and of the obedient Netherlands rushed across the frontiers into a fraternal embrace, like the meeting of many waters when the

flood-gates are lifted. It was pity that the foreign sovereignty, established at Brussels, could not then and there have been for ever swept away, and self-government and beneficent union extended over all the seventeen Netherlands, Walloon and Flemish, Catholic and reformed. But it hardly needs a word to show that the course of events had created a deeper chasm between the two sections than the gravest physical catastrophe could have produced. The opposing cliffs which religious hatred had rent asunder, and between which it seemed destined to flow for ever, seemed very close, and yet eternally separated.

The great war had established the republic, and apparently doomed the obedient Netherlands to perpetual servitude.

There were many details of minor importance to be settled between the various governments involved in these great transactions; but this history draws to its predestined close, and it is necessary to glide rapidly over matters which rather belong to a later epoch than the one now under consideration.

The treaty between the republic and the government of Great Britain, according to which each was to assist the other in case of war with four thousand troops and twenty ships of war, was confirmed in the treaty of truce. The debt of the United Provinces to the Crown of England was definitely reckoned at 8,184,080 florins, and it was settled by the truce that 200,000 florins should be paid semi-annually, to begin with the year 1611, until the whole debt should be discharged. 1

The army establishment of the republic was fixed during the truce at thirty thousand infantry and three thousand horse. This was a reduction from the war footing of fifteen thousand men. Of the force retained, four thousand were a French legion maintained by the

king, two thousand other French at the expense of the States, and distributed among other troops, two thousand Scotch, three thousand English, three thousand Germans. The rest were native Netherlanders, among whom, however, were very few Hollanders and Zeelanders, from which races the navy, both public and mercantile, was almost wholly supplied.

The revenue of the United Provinces was estimated at between seven and eight millions of florins.

It is superfluous to call attention again to the wonderful smallness of the means, the minuteness of the physical enginry, as compared with more modern manifestations, especially in our own land and epoch, by which so stupendous a result had been reached. In the midst of an age in which regal and sacerdotal despotism had seemed as omnipotent and irreversible as the elemental laws of the universe, the republic had been reproduced. A commonwealth of sand-banks, lagoons, and meadows, less than fourteen thousand square miles in extent, had done battle, for nearly half a century, with the greatest of existing powers, a realm whose territory was nearly a third of the globe, and which claimed universal monarchy. And this had been done with an army averaging forty-six thousand men, half of them foreigners hired by the job, and by a sea-faring population, volunteering into ships of every class and denomination, from a fly-boat to a galleot of war.

And when the republic had won its independence, after this almost eternal warfare, it owed four or five millions of dollars; and had sometimes an annual revenue of nearly that amount.

It was estimated by Barneveld, at the conclusion of the truce, that the interest on the public debt of Spain was about thrice the amount of the yearly income of the republic, and it was characteristic of the financial ideas of the period, that fears were enter-

1 Meteren, 614vo.



tained lest a total repudiation of that burthen by the Spanish Government would enable it to resume the war against the provinces with redoubled energy. 1

The annual salary of Prince Maurice, who was to see his chief occupation gone by the cessation of the war, was fixed by the States at 120,000 florins. 2 It was agreed, that in case of his marriage he should receive a further yearly sum of 25,000 florins, and this addition was soon afterwards voted to him outright, 3 it being obvious that the prince would remain all his days a bachelor.

Count Frederic Henry likewise received a military salary of 25,000 florins, 4 while the emoluments of Lewis William were placed at 36,000 florins, a year. 5

It must be admitted that the republic was grateful. 70,000 dollars a year, in the seventeenth century, not only for life, but to be inherited afterwards by his younger brother, Frederic Henry, was surely a munificent sum to be accorded from the puny exchequer of the States-General to the chief magistrate of the nation.

The mighty transatlantic republic, with its population of thirty or forty millions, and its revenue of five hundred millions of dollars, pays 25,000 dollars annually to its president during his four years of office, and this in the second half of the nineteenth century, when a dollar is worth scarcely one-fifth of its value two hundred and fifty years ago.

Surely here is improvement, both in the capacity to produce and in the power to save.

1 Van der Kemp, iii. 223.

2 Van der Kemp (from the Sec. Res. Stat.-Gen.), iii. 250, 251.

3 Van der Kemp (from the Sec. Res. Stat.-Gen.), iii. 251, 252. „No one thing hath been of greater trouble to us,” wrote Spencer and Winwood, „than the craving humour of Count Maurice.”—Winwood's Memorials, iii. 1, 2. 4 Ibid. 255. 5 Ibid.

In the year 1609, died John, the last sovereign of Cleves and Juliers, and Jacob Arminius, Doctor of Divinity at Leyden. Is would be difficult to imagine two more entirely dissimilar individuals of the human family than this lunatic duke and that theological professor. And yet perhaps, the two names, more concisely than those of any other mortals, might serve as an index to the ghastly chronicle over which a coming generation was to shudder. The death of the duke was at first thought likely to break off the negotiations for truce. The States-General at once declared that they would permit no movements on the part of the Spanish party to seize the inheritance in behalf of the Catholic claimants. Prince Maurice, nothing loth to make use of so well-timed an event in order to cut for ever the tangled skein at the Hague, was for marching forthwith into the duchies.

But the archdukes gave such unequal vocal assurances of abstaining from interference, and the desire of peace was so strong both in the obedient and in the United Provinces, that the question of the duchies was postponed. It was to serve as both torch and fuel for one of the longest and most hideous tragedies that had ever disgraced humanity. A thirty years' war of demons was, after a brief interval, to succeed the forty years' struggle between slaves and masters, which had just ended in the recognition of Dutch independence.

The gentle Arminius was in his grave, but a bloody harvest was fast ripening from the seeds which he had sown. That evil story must find its place in the melancholy chapter where the fortunes of the Dutch republic are blended with the grim chronicle of the thirty years' war. Until the time arrives for retracing the course of those united transactions to their final termination in the peace of Westphalia, it is premature to characterize an epoch which

at the moment with which we are now occupied, had not fairly begun

The Gomarites accused the Arminians of being more lax than Papists, and of filling the soul of man with vilest arrogance and confidence in good works; while the Arminians complained that the God of the Gomarites was an unjust God, himself the origin of sin. 1

The disputes on these themes had been perpetual in the provinces ever since the early days of the Reformation. Of late, however, the acrimony of theological conflict had been growing day by day more intense. It was the eternal struggle of religious dogma to get possession of the State, and to make use of political forces in order to put fetters on the human soul; to condemn it to slavery where most it requires freedom. The conflict between Gomarus and Arminius proceeded with such ferocity in Leyden, that since the days of the memorable siege, to which the university owed its origin, men's minds had never been roused to such feverish anxiety. The theological cannonades, which thundered daily from the college buildings and caused all Holland to quake, seemed more appalling to the burghers than the enginry of Valdez and Boisot had ever seemed to their fathers.

The Gomarite doctrine gained most favour with the clergy, the Arminian creed with the municipal magistracies. The magistrates claimed that decisions concerning religious matters belonged to the supreme authority. The Gomarites contended that sacred matters should be referred to synods of the clergy. 2 Here was the germ of a conflict which might one day shake the republic to its foundations.

Barneveld, the great leader of the municipal party, who loved political power quite as well as he loved his country, was naturally a chieftain of

the Arminians; for church matters were no more separated from political matters in the commonwealth at that moment than they were in the cabinets of Henry, James, or Philip.

It was inevitable therefore that the war party should pour upon his head more than seven vials of theological wrath. The religious doctrines which he espoused were odious not only because they were deemed vile in themselves, but because he believed in them.

Arminianism was regarded as a new and terrible epidemic, daily gaining ground, and threatening to destroy the whole population. Men deliberated concerning the best means to cut off communication with the infected regions, and to extirpate the plague even by desperate and heroic remedies, as men in later days take measures against the cholera or the rinderpest.

Theological hatred was surely not extinct in the Netherlands. It was a consolation, however, that its influence was rendered less noxious by the vastly increased strength of principles long dormant in the atmosphere. Anna van der Hoven, buried alive in Brussels, simply because her Calvinistic creed was a crime in the eyes of the monks who murdered her, was the last victim to purely religious persecution. If there were one day to be still a tragedy or two in the Netherlands it was inevitable that theological hatred would be obliged to combine with political party spirit in its most condensed form before any deadly effect could be produced.

Thus the year 1609 is a memorable one in the world's history. It forms a great landmark in human progress. It witnessed the recognition of a republic, powerful in itself, and whose example was destined to be most influential upon the career of two mighty commonwealths of the future. The British empire, just expanding for wider flight than it had hitherto essayed, and about to pass through a series of vast revolutions,

1 Grotius, xvii. 790-792.

2 Grotius, xvii. 791.

gathering strength of wing as it emerged from cloud after cloud; and the American republic, whose frail and obscure beginnings at that very instant of time scarcely attracted a passing attention from the contemporaneous world—both these political organisms, to which so much of mankind's future liberties had been entrusted, were deeply indebted to the earlier self-governing commonwealth.

The Dutch republic was the first free nation to put a girdle of empire around the earth. It had courage, enterprise, intelligence, perseverance, faith in itself, the instinct of self-government and self-help, hatred of tyranny, the disposition to domineer, aggressiveness, greediness, inquisitiveness, insolence, the love of science, of liberty, and of money—all this in unlimited extent. It had one great defect,—it had no country. Upon that meagre standing ground its hand had moved the world with an impulse to be felt through all the ages, but there was not soil enough in those fourteen thousand square miles to form the metropolis of the magnificent empire which the genius of liberty had created beyond the seas.

That the political institutions bequeathed by the United States of the seventeenth century have been vastly improved, both in theory and practice, by the United States of the nineteenth, no American is likely to gainsay. That the elder Republic showed us also what to avoid, and was a living example of the perils besetting a Confederacy which dared not become a Union, is a lesson which we might take closely to heart. But the year 1609 was not only memorable as marking an epoch in Dutch history. It was the beginning of a great and universal pause. The world had need of rest. Disintegration had been going on too rapidly, and it was absolutely necessary that there should be a new birth, if civilization were not to vanish.

A twenty years truce between the Turkish and Holy Roman empires was nearly simultaneous with the twelve years' truce between Spain and the United Provinces. The Emperor Rudolph having refused to ratify the treaty which his brother Matthias had made, was in consequence partially discrowned. The same archduke who, thirty years before, had slipped away from Vienna in his nightgown, with his face blackened, to outwit and outgeneral William the Silent at Brussels, was now more successful in his manœuvres against his imperial brother. Standing at the head of his army in battle array, in the open fields before the walls of Prague, he received from the unfortunate Rudolph the crown and regalia of Hungary, and was by solemn treaty declared sovereign of that ancient and chivalrous kingdom.

His triumphal entrance into Vienna 14 July, succeeded, where, surrounded 1608. by great nobles and burghers, with his brother Maximilian at his side, with immense pomp and with flowers strewn before his feet, he ratified that truce with Ahmed which Rudolph had 19 Oct. rejected. Three months later 1608. he was crowned at Pressburg, having first accepted the conditions proposed by the estates of Hungary. Foremost among these was the provision that the exercise of the reformed religion should be free in all the cities and villages beneath his sceptre, and that every man in the kingdom was to worship God according to his conscience.

In the following March, at the very 12 March, moment accordingly when the 1609. conclusive negotiations were fast ripening at Antwerp, Matthias granted religious peace for Austria likewise. Great was the indignation of his nephew Leopold, the nuncius, and the Spanish ambassador in consequence, by each and all of whom the revolutionary mischief-maker, with his brother's crown



on his head, was threatened with excommunication. 1

As for Ferdinand of Styria, his wrath may well be imagined. He refused religious peace in his dominions with scorn ineffable. Not Gomarus in Leyden could have shrunk from Arminianism with more intense horror than that with which the archduke at Gratz recoiled from any form of Protestantism. He wrote to his brother-in-law the King of Spain and to other potentates—as if the very soul of Philip II. were alive within him—that he would rather have a country without inhabitants than with a single protestant on its soil. 2 He strongly urged upon his Catholic Majesty—as if such urging were necessary at the Spanish court—the necessity of extirpating heresy, root and branch.

Here was one man at least who knew what he meant, and on whom the dread lessons of fifty years of bloodshed had been lost. Magnificent was the contempt which this pupil of the Jesuits felt for

any little progress made by the world since the days of Torquemada. In Ferdinand's view Alva was a Christian hero, scarcely second to Godfrey of Bouillon, Philip II. a sainted martyr, while the Dutch republic had never been born.

And Ferdinand was one day to sit on the throne of the holy Roman Empire. Might not a shudder come over the souls of men as coming events vaguely shaped themselves to prophetic eyes?

Meantime there was religious peace in Hungary, in Austria, in Bohemia, in France, in Great Britain, 5 July, in the Netherlands. The hang- 1609. man's hands were for a period at rest, so far as theology had need of them. Butchery in the name of Christ was suspended throughout Christendom. The Cross and the Crescent, Santiago and the Orange banner, were for a season in repose.

There was a vast lull between two mighty storms. The forty years' war was in the past, the thirty years' war in the not far distant future.

1 Meteren, 600, 601.

2 Ibid.

## CHAPTER LIII.

### CONCLUSION.

FORTY-THREE years had passed since the memorable April morning in which the great nobles of the Netherlands presented their „Request” to the Regent Margaret at Brussels.

They had requested that the holy Spanish Inquisition might not be established on their soil to the suppression of all their political and religious institutions.

The war which those high-born „beggars” had then kindled, little knowing what they were doing, had now come to a close, and the successor of Philip II., instead of planting the Inquisition in the provinces, had recog-

nised them as an independent, sovereign, protestant republic.

In the ratification which he had just signed of the treaty of truce the most Catholic king had in his turn made a Request. He had asked the States-General to deal kindly with their Catholic subjects.

That request was not answered with the axe and faggot; with the avenging sword of mercenary legions. On the contrary, it was destined to be granted. The world had gained something in forty-three years. It had at least begun to learn that the hangman is not the most appropriate teacher of religion.

During the period of apparent chaos with which this history of the great revolt has been occupied, there had in truth been a great re-organization, a perfected new birth. The republic had once more appeared in the world.

Its main characteristics have been indicated in the course of the narrative, for it was a polity which gradually unfolded itself out of the decay and change of previous organisms.

It was, as it were, in their own despite and unwittingly that the United Provinces became a republic at all.

In vain, after originally declaring their independence of the ancient tyrant, had they attempted to annex themselves to France and to England. The sovereignty had been spurned. The magnificent prize which France for centuries since has so persistently coveted, and the attainment of which has been a cardinal point of her perpetual policy—the Low Countries and the banks of the Rhine—was deliberately laid at her feet, and as deliberately refused.

It was the secret hope of the present monarch to repair the loss which the kingdom had suffered through the imbecility of his two immediate predecessors. But a great nation cannot with impunity permit itself to be despotically governed for thirty years by lunatics. It was not for the Béarnese, with all his valour, his wit, and his duplicity, to obtain the prize which Charles IX. and Henry III. had thrown away. Yet to make himself sovereign of the Netherlands was his guiding but most secret thought during all the wearisome and tortuous negotiations which preceded the truce; nor did he abandon the great hope with the signature of the treaty of 1609.

Maurice of Nassau too was a formidable rival to Henry. The stadholder prince was no republican. He was a good patriot, a noble soldier, an honest man. But his father had been offered the sovereignty of Holland and Zeeland,

and the pistol of Balthasar Gerard had alone, in all human probability, prevented the great prince from becoming constitutional monarch of all the Netherlands, Batavian and Belgic.

Maurice himself asserted that not only had he been offered a million of dollars, and large estates besides in Germany, if he would leave the provinces to their fate, but that the archdukes had offered, would he join his fortunes with theirs, to place him in a higher position over all the Netherlands than he had ever enjoyed in the United Provinces, and that they had even unequivocally offered him the sovereignty over the whole land. 1

Maurice was a man of truth, and we have no right to dispute the accuracy of the extraordinary statement. He must however have reflected upon the offer once made by the Prince of Darkness from the mountain top, and have asked himself by what machinery the archdukes proposed to place him in possession of such a kingdom.

There had, however, been serious question among leading Dutch statesmen of making him constitutional, hereditary monarch of the United Netherlands. As late as 1602 a secret conference was held at the house of Olden-Barneveld, in which the Advocate had himself urged the claims of the prince to the sovereignty, and reminded his guests that the signed and sealed documents—with the concurrence of the Amsterdam municipality alone lacking—by which William the Silent had been invited to assume the crown were still in the possession of his son. 2

Nothing came of these deliberations. It was agreed that to stir in the matter at that moment would not only overburthen him with expense, but make him a more conspicuous mark than ever for the assassin. It is certain that

1 Jeannin, i. 174, 175.

2 Van der Kemp, ii. 100-102. Leven van Olden-Barneveld, 156. Wugenaaar, ix. 454.

the prince manifested no undue anxiety at any period in regard to those transactions.

Subsequently, as Olden-Barneveld's personal power increased, and as the negotiations for peace became more and more likely to prove successful, the Advocate lost all relish for placing his great rival on a throne. The whole project, with the documents and secret schemes therewith connected, became mere alms for oblivion. Barneveld himself, although of comparatively humble birth and station, was likely with time to exercise more real power in the State than either Henry or Maurice; and thus while there were three individuals who in different ways aspired to supreme power, the republic, notwithstanding, asserted and established itself.

Freedom of government and freedom of religion were, on the whole, assisted by this triple antagonism. The prince, so soon as war was over, hated the Advocate and his daily increasing power more and more. He allied himself more closely than ever with the Gomarites and the clerical party in general, and did his best to inflame the persecuting spirit, already existing in the provinces, against the Catholics and the later sects of Protestants.

Jeannin warned him that „by thus howling with the priests” he would be suspected of more desperately ambitious designs than he perhaps really cherished. 1

On the other hand, Barneveld was accused of a willingness to wink at the introduction, privately and quietly, of the Roman Catholic worship. That this was the deadliest of sins, there was no doubt whatever in the minds of his revilers. When it was added that he was suspected of the Arminian leprosy, and that he could tolerate the thought that a virtuous man or woman, not predestined from all time for salvation, could possibly find the way to heaven, language becomes powerless to stigmatize

his depravity. Whatever the punishment impending over his head in this world or the next, it is certain that the cause of human freedom was not destined on the whole to lose ground through the life-work of Barneveld.

A champion of liberties rather than of liberty, he defended his fatherland with heart and soul against the stranger; yet the government of that fatherland was, in his judgment, to be transferred from the hand of the foreigner, not to the self-governing people, but to the provincial corporations. For the People he had no respect, and perhaps little affection. He often spoke of popular rights with contempt. Of popular sovereignty he had no conception. His patriotism, like his ambition, was provincial. Yet his perceptions as to eternal necessity in all healthy governments taught him that comprehensible relations between the state and the population were needful to the very existence of a free commonwealth. The United Provinces, he maintained, were not a republic, but a league of seven provinces very loosely hung together, a mere provisional organization for which it was not then possible to substitute anything better. He expressed this opinion with deep regret, just as the war of independence was closing, and added his conviction that, without some well-ordered government, no republic could stand.

Yet, as time wore on, the Advocate was destined to acquiesce more and more in this defective constitution. A settled theory there was none, and it would have been difficult legally and historically to establish the central sovereignty of the States-General as matter of right.

Thus Barneveld, who was anything but a democrat, became, almost unwittingly, the champion of the least venerable or imposing of all forms of aristocracy—an oligarchy of traders who imagined themselves patricians. Cor-

1 Van der Kemp, iii. 72. Jeannin.



porate rights, not popular liberty, seemed, in his view, the precious gains made by such a prodigious expenditure of time, money, and blood. Although such acquisitions were practically a vast addition to the stock of human freedom then existing in the world, yet torrents of blood and millions of treasure were to be wasted in the coming centuries before mankind was to convince itself that a republic is only to be made powerful and perpetual by placing itself upon the basis of popular right rather than on that of municipal privilege.

The singular docility of the Dutch people, combined with the simplicity, honesty, and practical sagacity of the earlier burgher patricians, made the defects of the system tolerable for a longer period than might have been expected; nor was it until theological dissensions had gathered to such intensity as to set the whole commonwealth aflame that the grave defects in the political structure could be fairly estimated.

It would be anticipating a dark chapter in the history of the United Provinces were the reader's attention now to be called to those fearful convulsions. The greatest reserve is therefore necessary at present in alluding to the subject.

It was not to be expected that an imperious, energetic but somewhat limited nature like that of Barneveld should at that epoch thoroughly comprehend the meaning of religious freedom. William the Silent alone seems to have risen to that height. A conscientious Calvinist himself, the father of his country would have been glad to see Protestant and Papist, Lutheran, Presbyterian, and Anabaptist living together in harmony and political equality. This was not to be. The soul of the immortal prince could not inspire the hearts of his contemporaries. That Barneveld was disposed to a breadth of religious sympathy unusual in those days, seems

certain. It was inevitable, too, that the mild doctrines of Arminius should be more in harmony with such a character than were the fierce dogmas of Calvin. But the struggle, either to force Arminianism upon the Church which considered itself the established one in the Netherlands, or to expel the Calvinists from it, had not yet begun; although the seeds of religious persecution of Protestants by Protestants had already been sown broadcast.

The day was not far distant when the very Calvinists, to whom, more than to any other class of men, the political liberties of Holland, England, and America are due, were to be hunted out of churches into farmhouses, suburban hovels, and canal-boats, by the arm of provincial sovereignty and in the name of state-rights, as pitilessly as the early reformers had been driven out of cathedrals in the name of emperor and pope; and when even those refuges for conscientious worship were to be denied by the dominant sect. And the day was to come, too, when the Calvinists, regaining ascendancy in their turn, were to hunt the heterodox as they had themselves been hunted; and this, at the very moment when their fellow Calvinists of England were driven by the Church of that kingdom into the American wilderness.

Toleration—that intolerable term of insult to all who love liberty—had not yet been discovered. It had scarcely occurred to Arminian or Presbyterian that civil authority and ecclesiastical doctrine could be divorced from each other. As the individual sovereignty of the seven states established itself more and more securely, the right of provincial power to dictate religious dogmas, and to superintend the popular conscience, was exercised with a placid arrogance which papal infallibility could scarcely exceed. The alternation was only between the sects, each in its turn becoming orthodox, and therefore

persecuting. The lessened intensity of persecution however, which priesthood and authority were now allowed to exercise, marked the gains secured.

Yet while we censure—as we have a right to do from the point of view which we have gained after centuries—the crimes committed by bigotry against liberty, we should be false to our faith in human progress did we not acknowledge our debt of gratitude to the hot gospellers of Holland and England.

The doctrine of predestination, the consciousness of being chosen soldiers of Christ, inspired those puritans, who founded the commonwealths of England, of Holland, and of America, with a contempt of toil, danger, and death which enabled them to accomplish things almost supernatural.

No uncouthness of phraseology, no unlovely austerity of deportment, could, except to vulgar minds, make that sublime enthusiasm ridiculous, which on either side the ocean ever confronted tyranny with dauntless front, and welcomed death on battle-field, scaffold, or rack with perfect composure.

The early puritan at least believed. The very intensity of his belief made him—all unconsciously to himself, and narrowed as was his view of his position—the great instrument by which the widest human liberty was to be gained for all mankind.

The elected favourite of the King of kings feared the power of no earthly king. Accepting in rapture the decrees of a supernatural tyranny, he rose on mighty wings above the reach of human wrath. Prostrating himself before a God of vengeance, of jealousy, and of injustice, he naturally imitated the attributes which he believed to be divine. It was inevitable, therefore, that Barneveld, and those who thought with him, when they should attempt to force the children of Belial into the company of the elect and to drive the faithful out of their own churches, should be

detested as bitterly as papists had ever been.

Had Barneveld's intellect been broad enough to imagine in a great republic the separation of Church and State, he would deserve a tenderer sympathy, but he would have been far in advance of his age. It is not cheerful to see so powerful an intellect and so patriotic a character daring to entrust the relations between man and his Maker to the decree of a trading corporation. But alas! the world was to wait for centuries until it should learn that the State can best defend religion by letting it alone, and that the political arm is apt to wither with palsy when it attempts to control the human conscience.

It is not entirely the commonwealth of the United Netherlands that is of importance in the epoch which I have endeavoured to illustrate. History can have neither value nor charm for those who are not impressed with a conviction of its continuity.

More than ever during the period which we call modern history has this idea of the continuousness of our race, and especially of the inhabitants of Europe and America, become almost oppressive to the imagination. There is a sense of immortality even upon earth when we see the succession of heritages in the domains of science, of intellectual and material wealth by which mankind, generation after generation, is enriching itself.

If this progress be a dream, if mankind be describing a limited circle instead of advancing towards the infinite, then no study can be more contemptible than the study of history.

Few strides more gigantic have been taken in the march of humanity than those by which a parcel of outlying provinces in the north of Europe exchanged slavery to a foreign despotism and to the Holy Inquisition for the position of a self-governing commonwealth, in the front rank of contem-

porary powers, and in many respects the foremost of the world. It is impossible to calculate the amount of benefit rendered to civilization by the example of the Dutch republic. It has been a model which has been imitated, in many respects, by great nations. It has even been valuable in its very defects; indicating to the patient observer many errors most important to avoid.

Therefore, had the little republic sunk for ever in the sea so soon as the treaty of peace had been signed at Antwerp, its career would have been prolific of good for all succeeding time.

Exactly at the moment when a splendid but decaying despotism, founded upon wrong—upon oppression of the human body and the immortal soul, upon slavery, in short, of the worst kind—was awaking from its insane dream of universal empire to a consciousness of its own decay, the new republic was recognised among the nations.

It would hardly be incorrect to describe the Holland of the beginning of the seventeenth century as the exact reverse of Spain. In the commonwealth labour was most honourable; in the kingdom it was vile. In the north to be idle was accounted and punished as a crime. In the southern peninsula, to be contaminated with mechanical, mercantile, commercial, manufacturing pursuits, was to be accursed. Labour was for slaves, and at last the mere spectacle of labour became so offensive that even the slaves were expelled from the land. To work was as degrading in the south as to beg or to steal was esteemed unworthy of humanity in the north. To think a man's thought upon high matters of religion and government, and through a thousand errors to pursue the truth, with the aid of the Most High and with the best use of human reason, was a privilege secured by the commonwealth at the expense of two generations of continuous bloodshed. To lie

fettered, soul and body, at the feet of authority wielded by a priesthood in its last stage of corruption, and monarchy almost reduced to imbecility, was the lot of the chivalrous, genial, but much oppressed Spaniard.

The pictures painted of the republic by shrewd and caustic observers, not inclined by nature or craft to portray freedom in too engaging colours, seem, when contrasted with those revealed of Spain, almost like enthusiastic fantasies of an ideal commonwealth.

During the last twenty years of the great war the material prosperity of the Netherlands had wonderfully increased. They had become the first commercial nation in the world. They had acquired the supremacy of the seas. The population of Amsterdam had in twenty years increased from seventy thousand to a hundred and thirty thousand, and was destined to be again more than doubled in the coming decade. 1 The population of Antwerp had sunk almost as rapidly as that of its rival had increased; having lessened by fifty thousand during the same period. 2 The commercial capital of the obedient provinces, having already lost much of its famous traffic by the great changes in the commercial current of the world, was unable to compete with the cities of the United Provinces in the vast trade which the geographical discoveries of the preceding century had opened to civilization. Freedom of thought and action were denied, and without such liberty it was impossible for oceanic commerce to thrive. Moreover, the possession by the Hollanders of the Scheld

1 Tomaso Contarini ritornato Ambre dalli Signori Stati di Fiandra (anno 1610).—(MS. Archives of Venice.) Antonio Donato in 1618 puts the number of inhabitants at 300,004, and describes the city as „the very image of Venice in its prime.” The streets and public places were so thronged and bustling that „the scene looked to him like a fair to end in one day.”—Relazione, MS.

2 Ibid. Antwerp had sunk from 150,000 to 80,000.



forts below Antwerp, and of Flushing at the river's mouth, suffocated the ancient city, and would of itself have been sufficient to paralyze all its efforts.

In Antwerp the exchange, where once thousands of the great merchants of the earth held their daily financial parliament, now echoed to the solitary footfall of the passing stranger. Ships lay rotting at the quays; brambles grew in the commercial streets. In Amsterdam the city had been enlarged by two-thirds, and those who swarmed thither to seek their fortunes could not wait for the streets to be laid out and houses to be built, but established themselves hovels and temporary residences, although certain to find their encampments swept away with the steady expanse of the city.<sup>1</sup> As much land as could be covered by a man's foot was worth a ducat in gold.<sup>2</sup>

In every branch of human industry these republicans took the lead. On that scrap of solid ground, rescued by human energy from the ocean, were the most fertile pastures in the world. On those pastures grazed the most famous cattle in the world. An ox often weighed more than two thousand pounds.<sup>3</sup> The cows produced two and three calves at a time, the sheep four and five lambs.<sup>4</sup> In a single village four thousand kine were counted.<sup>5</sup> Butter and cheese were exported to the annual value of a million, salted provisions to an incredible extent. The farmers were industrious, thriving and

independent. It is an amusing illustration of the agricultural thrift and republican simplicity of this people that on one occasion a farmer proposed to Prince Maurice that he should marry his daughter, promising wit her a dowry of a hundred thousand florins.<sup>1</sup>

The mechanical ingenuity of the Netherlands, already celebrated by Julius Cæsar and by Tacitus, had lost nothing of its ancient fame. The contemporary world confessed that in many fabrics the Hollanders were at the head of mankind. Dutch linen, manufactured of the flax grown on their own fields or imported from the obedient provinces, was esteemed a fitting present for kings to make and to receive. The name of the country had passed into the literature of England as synonymous with the delicate fabric itself. The Venetians confessed themselves equalled, if not outdone, by the crystal workers and sugar refiners of the northern republic.<sup>2</sup> The tapestries of Arras—the name of which Walloon city had become a household word of luxury in all modern languages—were now transplanted to the soil of freedom, more congenial to the advancement of art. Brocades of the precious metals; splendid satins and velvets, serges and homely fustians; laces of thread and silk; the finer and coarser manufactures of clay and porcelain; iron, steel, and all useful fabrics for the building and outfitting of ships; substantial broadcloths manufactured of wool imported from Scotland—all this was but a portion of the industrial production of the provinces.

They supplied the deficiency of coal, not then an article readily obtained by commerce, with other remains of antediluvian forests long since buried in the sea, and now recovered from its depths and made useful and portable by untiring industry. Peat was not only the fuel for the fireside, but for the

<sup>1</sup> Contarini, *Relazione*, MS.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid. „All' habitationi di questa città concorrono i popoli con tanto ardore che non ostante la proibitione di alloggiarsi per certo spatio all' incontro si fabbrice non di meno ogni anno con allegro animo ogni giorno case di legni ben che sia certo di vederse le distruggere in breve tanto stimano il poter cominciare a metter il loro nido almeno vicino se non dentro a quella città nelle quale per il semplice fondo si paga un ducato d' oro tanto terreno quanto può coprire nn huomo con la pianta del piede,”

<sup>3</sup> Contarini, *Relazione*, MS.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid.

<sup>1</sup> Ibid.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid.

extensive fabrics of the country, and its advantages so much excited the admiration of the Venetian envoys that they sent home samples of it, in the hope that the lagunes of Venice might prove as prolific of this indispensable article as the polders of Holland. 1

But the foundation of the national wealth, the source of the apparently fabulous power by which the republic had at last overthrown her gigantic antagonist, was the ocean. The republic was seaborne and sea-sustained.

She had nearly one hundred thousand sailors, and three thousand ships. 2 The sailors were the boldest, the best disciplined, and the most experienced in the world, whether for peaceable seafaring or ocean warfare. The ships were capable of furnishing from out of their number in time of need the most numerous and the best appointed navy then known to mankind.

The republic had the carrying trade for all nations. Feeling its very existence dependent upon commerce, it had strode centuries in advance of the contemporary world in the liberation of trade. But two or three per cent. *ad valorem* was levied upon imports; foreign goods however, being subject, as well as internal products, to heavy imposts in the way of both direct and indirect taxation.

Every article of necessity or luxury known was to be purchased in profusion and at reasonable prices in the warehouses of Holland.

A swarm of river vessels and fly-boats were coming daily through the rivers of Germany, France, and the Netherlands, laden with the agricultural pro-

ducts and the choice manufactures of central and western Europe. Wine and oil, and delicate fabrics in thread and wool, came from France, but no silks, velvets, nor satins; for the great Sully had succeeded in persuading his master that the white mulberry would not grow in his kingdom, and that silk manufactures were an impossible dream for France. Nearly a thousand ships were constantly employed in the Baltic trade. 1 The forests of Holland were almost as extensive as those which grew on Norwegian hills, but they were submerged. The foundation of a single mansion required a grove, and wood was extensively used in the superstructure. The houses, built of a framework of substantial timber, and filled in with brick or rubble, were raised almost as rapidly as tents, during the prodigious expansions of industry towards the end of the war. 2 From the realms of the Osterlings, or shores of the Baltic, came daily fleets laden with wheat and other grains, so that even in time of famine the granaries of the republic were overflowing, and ready to dispense the material of life to the outer world.

Eight hundred vessels of lesser size but compact build were perpetually fishing for herrings on the northern coasts. These hardy mariners, the militia of the sea, who had learned in their life of hardship and daring the art of destroying Spanish and Portuguese armadas, and confronting the dangers of either pole, passed a long season on the deep. Commercial voyagers as well as fishermen, they salted their fish as soon as taken from the sea, and transported them to the various ports of Europe, thus reducing their herrings into specie before their return, and proving that a fishery in such hands was worth more than the mines of Mexico and Peru.

It is customary to speak of the natural

1 Ibid. „Eperche pare quasi questa cosa incredibile ho fatto mettere qualche pezzi di queste turbe con le mie robbe che vengono per mare acciò si piacesse al Signore Dio che in questi coatorni si trovasse terreno simile potesse il pubblico ricevere due gran benefitti; uno di cavare il terreno che riempie le lagune; l'altro di abondar la città di materia per abbrucciare.”

2 Contarini, Relazione, MS.

1 Ibid.

2 Ibid.

resources of a country as furnishing a guarantee of material prosperity. But here was a republic almost without natural resources, which had yet supplied by human intelligence and thrift what a niggard nature had denied. Spain was overflowing with unlimited treasure, and had possessed half the world in fee; and Spain was bankrupt, decaying, sinking into universal pauperism. Holland, with freedom of thought, of commerce, of speech, of action, placed itself, by intellectual power alone, in the front rank of civilization.

From Cathay, from the tropical coasts of Africa, and from farthest Ind, came every drug, spice, or plant, every valuable jewel, every costly fabric, that human ingenuity had discovered or created. The Spaniards, maintaining a frail tenure upon a portion of those prolific regions, gathered their spice harvests at the point of the sword, and were frequently unable to prevent their northern rivals from ravaging such fields as they had not yet been able to appropriate. 2

Certainly this conduct of the Hollanders was barbarism and supreme selfishness, if judged by the sounder political economy of our time. Yet it should never be forgotten that the contest between Spain and Holland in those distant regions, as everywhere else, was war to the knife between superstition and freedom, between the spirits of progress and of dogma. Hard blows and foul blows were struck in such a fight, and humanity, although gaining at last immense results, had much to suffer and much to learn ere the day was won.

But Spain was nearly beaten out of those eastern regions, and the very fact that the naval supremacy of the republic placed her ancient tyrant at her mercy

was the main reason for Spain to conclude the treaty of truce. Lest she should lose the India trade entirely, Spain consented to the treaty article by which, without mentioning the word, she conceded the thing. It was almost pathetic to witness, as we have witnessed, this despotism in its dotage, mumbling so long over the formal concession to her conqueror of a portion of that India trade which would have been entirely wrested from herself had the war continued. And of this Spain was at heart entirely convinced. Thus the Portuguese, once the lords and masters, as they had been the European discoverers, of those prolific regions and of the ocean highways which led to them, now came with docility to the republic which they had once affected to despise, and purchased the cloves and the allspice, the nutmegs and the cinnamon, of which they had held the monopoly; or waited with patience until the untiring Hollanders should bring the precious wares to the peninsula ports. 1

A Dutch Indiaman would make her voyage to the antipodes and her return in less time than was spent by a Portuguese or a Spaniard in the outward voyage. 2- To accomplish such an enterprise in two years was accounted a wonder of rapidity, and when it is remembered that inland navigation through France by canal and river from the North Sea to the Mediterranean was considered both speedier and safer, because the sea voyage between the same points might last four or five months, it must be admitted that two years occupied in passing from one end of the earth to the other and back again might well seem a miracle.

The republic was among the wealthiest and the most powerful of organized States. Her population might be estimated at three millions and a half, about equal to that of England at the same period. But she was richer than Eng-

1 „Tengono quà Hollandesi la maggior parte di detta Isola (Ternat) rimanendo la minore a Spagnuoli che raccolgono i loro pochi garofani: con la punta della spada,” &c. &c. &c.—Contarini, MS. 2 Ibid.

1 Contarini, Relazione, MS.

2 Ibid.



land. Nowhere in the world was so large a production in proportion to the numbers of a people. Nowhere were so few unproductive consumers. Every one was at work. Vagabonds, idlers, and do-nothings, such as must be in every community, were caught up by the authorities, and made to earn their bread.<sup>1</sup> The devil's pillow, idleness, was smoothed for no portion of the population.

There were no beggars, few paupers, no insolently luxurious and ostentatiously idle class. The modesty, thrift, and simple elegance of the housekeeping, even among the wealthy, was noted by travellers with surprise.<sup>2</sup> It will be remembered with how much amused wonder, followed by something like contempt, the magnificent household of

<sup>1</sup> Contarini.

<sup>2</sup> „In somma sono quei popoli così inchinati all' industria et al negotio che niuna cosa è tanto difficile che non ardiscono di superarla . . . . Sopra tutte le cose invigilano a questo di mantenere il negotio et et favorirlo in modo libero da soverchie gravetze che cessi ogni occasione di divertirlo e secarlo. Abbondano di ricchezze e di commodi con tal misura che non si vede nei più ricchi lusso o pompe straordinarie servando tutti et in casa et fuorai nell' habito e nel rimanente la vera mediocrità di una modesta fortuna senza che si vedano nè additamenti ne argenterie ne fornimenti ne cadreghe de sete come apunto non si vedevano ne anco in questa città (Venezia) nei tempi de Vostri Antecessori. Nei poveri non si conosce mancamento di alcuna delle cose necessarie anzi nelle loro piccioli ed humili abitazioni non men che nelle case de' grandi risplende una politia singolare onde aiducono da tutte le parti et sono tutti così inimici del mal governo et dell' odio che si sono luoghi particolari nelle città fabbricata di ordine pubblico ove quei del governo fanno serrar le genti vagabonde et otiosi o che non governano bene le cose loro bastando che o le moglie o altre dei lor congiunti se ne querelino al magistrato et in quei luoghi sono costretti di lavorare et guadagnarsi le spese ancorchè non vogliano.”—Contarini, Relazione, MS.

„Li popoli di questo paese sono nati al travaglio ed al stentare e tutti travagliano, chi per una via, chi per l' altra. . . . Non s' usa servitori, non si veste di seta, non si tapezza le case, tutto è menaggio molto sottile e limitato.”—Anto. Donat., Relazione, MS.

Spinola, during his embassy at the honest burghers of Holland. The authorities showed their wisdom in permitting the absurd exhibition, as an example of what should be shunned, in spite of grave remonstrances from many of the citizens. Drunken Helotism is not the only form of erring humanity capable of reading lessons to a republic.

There had been monasteries, convents, ecclesiastical establishments of all kinds in the country, before the great war between Holland and the Inquisition. These had, as a matter of course, been confiscated as the strife went on. The buildings, farms, and funds, once the property of the Church, had not, however, been seized upon, as in other Protestant lands, by rapacious monarchs and distributed among great nobles according to royal caprice. Monarchs might give the revenue of a suppressed convent to a cook, as reward for a successful pudding; the surface of Britain and the continent might be covered with abbeys and monasteries now converted into lordly palaces—passing thus from the dead hand of the Church into the idle and unproductive palm of the noble; but the ancient ecclesiastical establishments of the free Netherlands were changed into eleemosynary institutions, admirably organized and administered with wisdom and economy, where orphans of the poor, widows of those slain in the battles for freedom by land and sea, and the aged and the infirm, who had deserved well of the republic in the days of their strength, were educated or cherished at the expense of the public, thus endowed from the spoils of the Church. <sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> „Si vedono in quelle città chiese antiche bellissime parte distrutte et parte senza imagini ridotti per i loro esercitii che non consistono in altro che all' ascoltar le domeniche e pochi altri giorni le prediche de' loro predicatori. Dell' entrate di queste chiese ch' erano già dei prelati, dei monasterie, e dei sacerdoti manteugono un buon numero de' hospitali nelle principale città del paese fabbricati con molte spese, goveri

In Spain, monasteries upon monasteries were rising day by day, as if there were not yet receptacles enough for monks and priests, while thousands upon thousands of Spaniards were pressing into the ranks of the priesthood, and almost forcing themselves into monasteries, that they might be privileged to beg, because ashamed to work. In the United Netherlands the confiscated convents, with their revenues, were appropriated for the good of those who were too young or too old to labour, and too poor to maintain themselves without work. Need men look further than to this simple fact to learn why Spain was decaying while the republic was rising?

The ordinary budget of the United Provinces was about equal to that of England, varying not much from four millions of florins, or four hundred thousand pounds. But the extraordinary revenue was comparatively without limits, and there had been years, during the war, when the citizens had taxed themselves as highly as fifty per cent. on each individual income, and doubled the receipts of the exchequer.<sup>1</sup> The budget was proposed once a year, by the council of state, and voted by the States-General, who assigned the quota of each province; that of Holland being always one-half of the whole, that of Seeland sixteen per cent., and that of the other five of course in lesser proportions. The revenue was collected in the separate provinces, one-third of the whole being retained for provincial expenses, and the balance paid into the

general treasury.<sup>1</sup> There was a public debt, the annual interest of which amounted to 200,000 florins. During the war, money had been borrowed at six per cent., and the whole debt was funded on that basis. Taxation was enormously heavy, but patriotism caused it to be borne with cheerfulness, and productive industry made it comparatively light. Rents were charged twenty-five per cent. A hundred per cent. was levied upon beer, wine, meat, salt, spirits. Other articles of necessity and luxury were almost as severely taxed.<sup>2</sup> It is not easy to enumerate the tax-list, scarcely anything foreign or domestic being exempted, while the grave error was often committed of taxing the same article, in different forms, four, five, and six times.

The people virtually taxed themselves, although the superstition concerning the State, as something distinct from and superior to the people, was to linger long and work infinite mischief among those seven republics which were never destined to be welded theoretically and legally into a union. The sacredness of corporations had succeeded, in a measure, to the divinity which hedges kings. Nevertheless, those corporations were so numerous as to be effectively open to a far larger proportion of the population than, in those days, had ever dreamed before of participating in the Government. The magistracies were in general unpaid and little coveted, being regarded as a burthen and a responsibility rather than an object of ambition. The juriconsults, called pensionaries, who assisted the municipal authorities, received, however, a modest salary, never exceeding 1500 florins a year.

These numerous bodies, provincial and municipal, elected themselves by supplying their own vacancies. The magistrates were appointed by the stadholder, on a double or triple nomina-

nati con bellissimi ordini et custoditi con gran politia ne quali nutriscono allevano et mantengono i veccegii impotenti, i figli orfani ed altsi de' benemeriti dello Stato che hanno spesi i migliori anni o perso le vite nei loro servitii. Et a questi hospitali si applicheranno ancora l' entrate di quei pochi monasterii et collegi Teutonici che si rimangono, morti che siano quelli che le godono al presente."—Contarini, MS. Antonio Donato, too, speaks of these hospitals as model institutions.—Relazione, MS.

<sup>1</sup> Contarini, MS.

<sup>1</sup> Ibid.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid.

tion from the municipal board. This was not impartial suffrage nor manhood suffrage. The germ of a hateful burgher-oligarchy was in the system, but, as compared with Spain, where municipal magistracies were sold by the crown at public auction; or with France, where every office in church, law, magistrature, or court was an object of merchandise disposed of in open market, the system was purity itself, and marked a great advance in the science of government.

It should never be forgotten, moreover, that while the presidents and judges of the highest courts of judicature in other civilized lands were at the mercy of an irresponsible sovereign, and held office—even although it had been paid for in solid specie—at his pleasure, the supreme justices of the high courts of appeal at the Hague were nominated by a senate, and confirmed by a stadholder, and that they exercised their functions for life, 1 or so long as they conducted themselves virtuously in their high office—*quamdiu se bene gesserint*.

If one of the great objects of a civilized community is to secure to all men their own—*ut sua tenerent*—surely it must be admitted that the republic was in advance of all contemporary States in the laying down of this vital principle, the independence of judges.

As to the army and navy of the United Provinces, enough has been said, in earlier chapters of these volumes, to indicate the improvements introduced by Prince Maurice, and now carried to the highest point of perfection ever attained in that period. There is no doubt whatever, that for discipline, experience, equipment, effectiveness of movement, and general organization, the army of the republic was the model army of Europe. 2 It amounted to but

thirty thousand infantry and two thousand five hundred cavalry, but this number was a large one for a standing army at the beginning of the seventeenth century. It was composed of a variety of materials, Hollanders, Walloons, Flemings, Scotch, English, Irish, Germans, but all welded together into a machine of perfect regularity. The private foot-soldier received twelve florins for a so-called month of forty-two days, the drummer and corporal eighteen, the lieutenant fifty-two, and the captain one hundred and fifty florins. 1 Prompt payment was made every week. 2 Obedience was implicit; mutiny, such as was of periodical recurrence in the archduke's army, entirely unknown. The slightest theft was punished with the gallows, 3 and there was therefore no thieving.

The most accurate and critical observers confessed, almost against their will, that no army in Europe could compare with the troops of the States. As to the famous regiments of Sicily, and the ancient legions of Naples and Milan, a distinguished Venetian envoy, who had seen all the camps and courts of Christendom, and was certainly not disposed to overrate the Hollanders at the expense of the Italians, if any rivalry between them had been possible, declared that every private soldier in the republic was fit to be a captain in any Italian army; while, on the other hand, there was scarcely an Italian captain who would be accepted as a private in any company of the States. 4 So low had the once-famous

et al combattere per tanti anni di guerra et per la singolare obbedienza accompagnata da tutti gli ordini della vera militare disciplina essendo tenuti in continuo esercitazione de' capitani e soggetti di gran qualità."—Contarini, MS.

1 Ibid.

2 Ibid.

3 Ibid., "Ogni minimo furto si castiga con la forza."

4 „Posso afirmar a Vostra Serenità che qual si voglia fantà privato fra quelle milizie si stimerebbe qui buono per comandare una compagnia tanto è declinato in Italia e l'

1 Contarini, MS.

2 „Ma tutta gente esquisita per la propria conditione per l' habito già fermo al patire



soldiery of Alva, Don John, and Alexander Farnese descended.

The cavalry of the republic was even more perfectly organized than was the infantry. „I want words to describe its perfection,” said Contarini. 1 The pay was very high, and very prompt. A captain received four hundred florins a month (of forty-two days), a lieutenant one hundred and eighty florins, and other officers and privates in proportion. 2 These rates would be very high in our own day. When allowance is made for the difference in the value of money at the respective epochs, the salaries are prodigious; but the thrifty republic found its account in paying well and paying regularly the champions on whom so much depended, and by whom such splendid services had been rendered. 3

While the soldiers in the pay of Queen Elizabeth were crawling to her palace gates to die of starvation before her eyes; while the veterans of Spain and of Italy had organized themselves into a permanent military, mutinous republic, on the soil of the so-called obedient Netherland, because they were left by their masters without clothing or food; the cavalry and infantry of the Dutch commonwealth, thanks to the organizing spirit, and the wholesome thrift of the burgher authorities, were

„...et l'antico splendore della militar disciplina che ci bisogna impararla dalle nationi straniere che pur l'appriessero da quelle di questa provincia. Et a tale sono arrivati i gradi della militia che molti presso di noi capitani difficilmente presso di loro sarebbero ammessi per buoni soldati.”—Contarini, MS.

„Le qualità delle militia terrestri che servono in questi Stati sono senza dubbio le migliori di Europa e del Mondo,” says Antonio Donato, adding that among them „the first place is held by the English infantry, best beloved by the natives, brave, patient veterans, whose habits and character are in conformity with the country.”—Relazione, MS.

1 Contarini, MS. „Della Cavalleria debbono dire poco poiche poco si può dire che arrivi ad esprimere la sua perfezione.”

2 Ibid.

3 Ibid.

contented, obedient, well fed, well clothed, and well paid; devoted to their Government, and ever ready to die in its defence.

Nor was it only on the regular army that reliance was placed. On the contrary, every able-bodied man in the country was liable to be called upon to serve, at any moment, in the militia. All were trained to arms, and provided with arms, and there had been years during this perpetual war in which one man out of three of the whole male population was ready to be mustered at any moment into the field, 1

Even more could be said in praise of the navy than has been stated of the armies of the republic; for the contemporary accounts of foreigners, and of foreigners who were apt to be satirical, rather than enthusiastic, when describing the institutions, leading personages, and customs of other countries, seemed ever to speak of the United Provinces in terms of eulogy. In commerce, as in war, the naval supremacy of the republic was indisputable. It was easy for the States to place two thousand vessels of war in commission, if necessary, of tonnage varying from four hundred to twelve hundred tons, to man them with the hardiest and boldest sailors in the world, and to despatch them with promptness to any quarter of the globe. 2

1 „Si dimostrano tutti quei popoli così inchinati alla militia per la difesa comune che si piacesse a' Serenissimi Stati di ricercare il terzo uomo da tutto il paese offerirano essi che pochi si sarebbero i quali non desiderassero che a loro ne toccasse la sorte tanto si rende piacevole all' orecchie di quelle genti il nome della guerra.”—Ibid.

2 Contarini, MS. „Le forze del mare dei Serenissimi Stati sono veramente stimate le maggiori che posse havere altro Principe per la copia dei vascelli et per il numero di marinari et per la qualità degli uomini di comando. Tenendosi per cosa certa che possan essere in quelle Provincie settanta mille marinari buoni et intelligenti non solo per l' uso delle navigationi ma insieme ancora per le battaglie navali nelle quali si adoperano per soldati et ognuno di essi per la singolare attitudine et ordinaria assue-

It was recognised as nearly impossible to compel a war-vessel of the republic to surrender. 1 Hardly an instance was on her naval record of submission, even to far superior force, while it was filled with the tragic but heroic histories of commanders who had blown their ships, with every man on board, into the air, rather than strike their flag. Such was the character, and such the capacity of the sea-born republic.

That republic had serious and radical defects, but the design remained to be imitated and improved upon, centuries afterwards. The history of the rise and progress of the Dutch republic is a leading chapter in the history of human liberty.

The great misfortune of the commonwealth of the United Provinces, next to the slenderness of its geographical proportions, was the fact that it was without a centre and without a head, and therefore not a nation capable of unlimited vitality. There were seven states. Each claimed to be sovereign. The pretension on the part of several of them was ridiculous. Overijssel, for example, contributed two and three-quarters per cent. of the general budget. It was a swamp of twelve hundred square miles in extent, with some heath-

*fazione è solito di far più che molti soldati insieme. Et ogni volta che volessero fare un sforzo per qualunque occasione potrebbero metter insieme il numero di due mille vascelli sufficienti per ogni fattione senza far in essi spese di momento per la prontezza et delle genti e dei vascelli medesimi sempre apparenchiate in mano de particolari."* Antonio Donato puts the number of Dutch vessels of all classes at nearly 6000. *Relazione, MS.* "This fury for dominion upon the sea," he says, "increases every day, and is sustained by such assiduity, intelligence, and interest as to show that it is the business of all, and the whole business, strength, and security of the States."

2 *Mentre sono certi che gli Hollandesi più tosto che lasciarsi vincere darebbero fuoco al proprio vascello per abbruciare con se medesimi l' inimico insieme. Onde con questi due termini della clemenza (agli inimici) e del sommo rigore sono fatti padroni del mar."*—Contarini, MS.

spots interspersed, and it numbered perhaps a hundred thousand inhabitants. The doughty Count of Embden alone could have swallowed up such sovereignty. He have annexed all the buckwheat patches and cranberry marshes of Overijssel to his own meagre territories, and nobody the wiser.

Zeeland, as we have seen, was disposed at a critical moment to set up its independent sovereignty. Zeeland far more important than Overijssel, had a revenue of perhaps five hundred thousand dollars,—rather a slender budget for an independent republic, wedged in as it was by the most powerful empires of the earth, and half drowned by the ocean, from which it had scarcely emerged.

There was therefore no popular representation, and on the other hand no executive head. As sovereignty must be exercised in some way, however, in all living commonwealths, and as a low degree of vitality was certainly not the defect of those bustling provinces, the supreme functions had now fallen into the hands of Holland.

While William the Silent lived, the management of war, foreign affairs and finance, for the revolted provinces was in his control. He was aided by two council boards, but the circumstances of history and the character of the man had invested him with an inevitable dictatorship.

After his death, at least after Leicester's time, the powers of the state council, the head of which, Prince Maurice, was almost always absent from the wars, fell into comparative disuse. The great functions of the confederation passed into the possession of the State General. That body now came to settle permanently at the Hague. The number of its members, deputies from the seven provinces—envoys from those seven immortal and soulless sovereigns—was not large. The extraordinary assembly held at Bergen-op-Zoom for confirmation

the truce was estimated by Bentivoglio at eight hundred. Bentivoglio, who was on the spot, being then nuncius at Brussels, ought to have been able to count then, yet it is very certain that the number was grossly exaggerated.

At any rate the usual assembly at the Hague rarely amounted to one hundred members. The presidency was changed once a week, the envoy of each province taking his turn as chairman.

Olden-Barneveld, as member for Holland, was always present in the diet. As Advocate-General of the leading province, and keeper of its great seal, more especially as possessor of the governing intellect of the whole commonwealth, he led the administration of Holland, and as the estates of Holland contributed more than half of the whole budget of the confederacy, it was a natural consequence of the actual supremacy of that province, and of the vast legal and political experience of the Advocate, that Holland should govern the confederacy, and that Barneveld should govern Holland.

The States-General remained virtually supreme, receiving envoys from all the great powers, sending abroad their diplomatic representatives, to whom the title and rank of ambassador was freely accorded, and dealing in a decorous and dignified way with all European affairs. The ability of the republican statesmen was as fully recognised all over the earth, as was the genius of their generals and great naval commanders.

The People did not exist; but this was merely because, in theory, the People had not been invented. It was exactly because there was a People—an

energetic and intelligent People—that the republic was possible.

No scheme had yet been devised for laying down in primary assemblies a fundamental national law, for distributing the various functions of governmental power among selected servants, for appointing representatives according to population or property, and for holding all trustees responsible at reasonable intervals to the nation itself.

Thus government was involved, fold within fold, in successive and concentric municipal layers. The States-General were the outer husk, of which the separate town-council was the kernel or bulb. Yet the number of these executive and legislative boards was so large, and the whole population comparatively so slender, as to cause the original inconveniences from so incomplete a system to be rather theoretic than practical. In point of fact, almost as large a variety of individuals served the State as would perhaps have been the case under a more philosophically arranged democracy. The difficulty was rather in obtaining a candidate for the post than in distributing the posts among candidates.

Men were occupied with their own affairs. In proportion to their numbers they were more productive of wealth than any other nation then existing. An excellent reason why the people were so well governed, so productive, and so enterprising, was the simple fact that they were an educated people. There was hardly a Netherlander—man, woman, and child—that could not read and write. The school was the common property of the people, paid for among the municipal expenses. In the cities, as well as in the rural districts, there were not only common schools but classical schools. In the burgher families it was rare to find boys who had not been taught Latin, or girls unacquainted with French. Capacity to write and speak several modern languages was very common, and there were

1 Gelderland contributed	4½	per cent.
Utrecht	5¾	"
Friesland	11½	"
Overijssel	2¾	"
Groningen	6¾	"
Zeeland	13½	"
Holland	55½	"
	100	



many individuals in every city, neither professors nor pedants, who had made remarkable progress in science and classical literature. 1 The position, too, of women in the commonwealth proved a high degree of civilization. They are described as virtuous, well-educated, sovereigns in their households, and accustomed to direct all the business of home. „It would be ridiculous,” said Donato, „to see a man occupying himself with domestic house-keeping. The women do it all, and command absolutely.” The Hollanders, so rebellious against Church and King, accepted with meekness the despotism of woman.

The great movement of emancipation from political and ecclesiastical tyranny had brought with it a general advancement of the human intellect. The foundation of the Leyden university in memory of the heroism displayed by burghers during the siege was as noble a monument as had ever been raised by a free people jealous of its fame. And the scientific lustre of the university well sustained the nobility of its origin. The proudest nation on earth might be more proud of a seat of learning, founded thus amidst carnage and tears, whence so much of profound learning and brilliant literature had already been diffused. The classical labours of Joseph Scaliger, Heinsius—father and son—the elder Dousa, almost as famous with his pen Latin poetry as his sword had made him in the vernacular chronicle; of Dousa the son, whom Grotius called „the crown and flower of all good learning, too soon snatched away by envious death, than whom no man more skilled in poetry, more consummate in acquaintance with ancient science and literature, had ever lived;” 2 of Hugo Grotius

himself, who at the age of fifteen had taken his doctor's degree at Leyden, who as a member of Olden-Barneveld's important legation to France and England very soon afterwards had excited the astonishment of Henry IV. and Elizabeth, who had already distinguished himself by editions of classic poets, and by original poems and dramas in Latin, and was already, although but twenty-six years of age, laying the foundation of that magnificent reputation as a jurist, a philosopher, a historian, and a statesman, which was to be one of the enduring glories of humanity,—all these were the precious possessions of the high school of Leyden.

The still more modern university of Franeker, founded amid the din of perpetual warfare in Friesland, could at least boast the name of Arminius, whose expansive views were destined to exert such influence over his contemporaries and posterity.

The great history of Hoofd, in which the splendid pictures and the impassioned drama of the great war of independence were to be preserved for his countrymen through all time; was not yet written. It was soon afterwards, however, to form not only a chief source of accurate information as to the great events themselves, but a model of style never since surpassed by any prose writer in either branch of the German tongue.

Had Hoofd written for a wider audience, it would be difficult to name a contemporary author of any nation whose work would have been more profoundly studied or more generally admired.

But the great war had not waited to be chronicled by the classic and impassioned Hoofd. Already there were thorough and exhaustive narrators of what was instinctively felt to be one of the most pregnant episodes of human history. Bor of Utrecht, a miracle of industry, of learning, of unwearied perseverance, was already engaged in the

1 Antonio Donato, *Relazione*, MS. Grot. *Paralell. Rer. publ.* ed. Meerman, iii. 51. Van Kampen, i. 608, 609.

2 Van Kampen, i. 608. Grot. *Paralell. Rer. publ.* iii. 49.

production of those vast folios in which nearly all the great transactions of the forty years' war were conscientiously portrayed, with a comprehensiveness of material and an impartiality of statement, such as might seem almost impossible for a contemporary writer. Immersed in attentive study and profound contemplation, he seemed to lift his tranquil head from time to time over the wild ocean of those troublous times, and to survey with accuracy without being swayed or appalled by the tempest. There was something almost sublime in his steady, unimpassioned gaze.

Emanuel van Meteren, too, a plain Protestant merchant of Antwerp and Amsterdam, wrote an admirable history of the war and of his own times, full of precious details, especially rich in statistics—a branch of science which he almost invented—which still remains as one of the leading authorities, not only for scholars, but for the general reader.

Reyd and Burgundius, the one the Calvinist private secretary of Lewis William, the other a warm Catholic partisan, both made invaluable contemporaneous contributions to the history of the war.

The trophies already secured by the Netherlanders in every department of the fine arts, as well as the splendour which was to enrich the coming epoch, are too familiar to the world to need more than a passing allusion.

But it was especially in physical science that the republic was taking a leading part in the great intellectual march of the nations.

The very necessities of its geographical position had forced it to pre-eminence in hydraulics and hydrostatics. It had learned to transform water into dry land with a perfection attained by no nation before or since. The wonders of its submarine horticulture were the despair of all gardeners in the world.

And as in this gentlest of arts, so

also in the dread science of war, the republic had been the instructor of mankind. The youthful Maurice and his cousin Lewis William had so restored and improved the decayed intelligence of antique strategy, that the greybeards of Europe became docile pupils in their school. The mathematical teacher of Prince Maurice amazed the contemporary world with his combinations and mechanical inventions; the flying chariots of Simon Stevinus seeming products of magical art.

Yet the character of the Dutch intellect was averse to sorcery. The small but mighty nation which had emancipated itself from the tyranny of Philip and of the Holy Inquisition, was foremost to shake off the fetters of superstition. Out of Holland came the first voice to rebuke one of the hideous delusions of the age. While grave magistrates and sages of other lands were exorcising the devil by murdering his supposed victims, John Wier, a physician of Grave, boldly denounced the demon which had taken possession, not of the wizards, but of the judges.

The age was lunatic and sick; and it was fitting that the race which had done so much for the physical and intellectual emancipation of the world, should have been the first to apply a remedy for this monstrous madness. Englishmen and their descendants were drowning and hanging witches in New England, long after John Wier had rebuked and denounced the belief in witchcraft.

It was a Zelander, too, who placed the instrument in the hand of Galileo by which that daring genius traced the movements of the universe, and who, by another wondrous invention, enabled future discoverers to study the infinite life which lies all around us, hidden not by its remoteness but its minuteness. Zacharias Jansens of Middelburg, in 1590, invented both the telescope and the microscope.

The wonder-man of Alkmaar, Cornelius Drebbel, who performed such astounding feats for the amusement of Rudolph of Germany and James of Britain, is also supposed to have invented the thermometer and the barometer. But this claim has been disputed. The inventions of Jansens are proved.

Willebrod Snellius, mathematical professor of Leyden, introduced the true method of measuring the degrees of longitude and latitude, and Huygens, who had seen his manuscripts, asserted that Snellius had invented, before Descartes, the doctrine of refraction.

But it was especially to that noble band of heroes and martyrs, the great navigators and geographical discoverers of the republic, that science is above all indebted.

Nothing is more sublime in human story than the endurance and audacity with which those pioneers of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries confronted the nameless horrors of either pole, in the interests of commerce, and for the direct purpose of enlarging the bounds of the human intellect.

The achievements, the sufferings, and the triumphs of Barendz and Cordes, Heemskerk, Van der Hagen, and many others, have been slightly indicated in these pages. The contributions to botany, mineralogy, geometry, geography, and zoology, of Linschoten, Plancius,

Wagenaar, and Houtmann, and so many other explorers of pole and tropic, can hardly be overrated.

The Netherlands had wrung their original fatherland out of the grasp of the ocean. They had confronted for centuries the wrath of that ancient tyrant ever ready to seize the prey of which he had been defrauded.

They had waged fiercer and more perpetual battle with a tyranny more cruel than the tempest, with an ancient superstition more hungry than the sea. It was inevitable that a race, thus invigorated by the ocean, cradled to freedom by their conflicts with its power, and hardened almost to invincibility by their struggle against human despotism, should be foremost among the nations in the development of political, religious, and commercial freedom.

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The writer now takes an affectionate farewell of those who have followed him with an indulgent sympathy as he has attempted to trace the origin and the eventful course of the Dutch commonwealth. If by his labours a generous love has been fostered for that blessing, without which everything that this earth can offer is worthless—freedom of thought, of speech, and of life—his highest wish has been fulfilled.



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